FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOURTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Friday, 1 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. NOCEK (Czechoslovakia)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

**Bulgaria:**
- Mr. M. Tarabanov
- Col. K. Savov
- Mr. K. Christov

**Canada:**
- Mr. E.L.M. Burns
- Mr. A.G. Campbell
- W/Cdr. R.J. Mitchell

**Czechoslovakia:**
- Mr. J. Nosek
- Lieut.-Gen. J. Hecko
- Mr. Z. Trhlík

**France:**
- Mr. J. Moch
- Mr. M. Legrandre
- Gen. P. Genevey

**Italy:**
- Mr. F. Cavalletti
- Mr. L. Dainelli
- Mr. D. Philipson

**Poland:**
- Mr. M. Naszkowski
- Mr. M. Lohs
- Brig.-Gen. J. Sliwinski

**Romania:**
- Mr. E. Mezincescu
- Mr. C. Bogdan
- Col. C. Popa

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:**
- Mr. V.A. Zorin
- Col.-Gen. A.A. Gryzlov
- Mr. A.A. Roshchin
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDLE

United States of America:

Mr. F.M. HATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:

Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): I declare open the fourteenth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): This time last week I talked about a specific disarmament proposal, which was the establishment of force-level ceilings and the reduction of armed forces to lower levels tied in each case with armament reductions, and I suggested that we move on during the week that has just passed to the discussion of specific means of controlling these measures and of the type of international disarmament or control organization that would be necessary to give us all the security we need. I indicated that this was just one of several measures in the first stage of our plan.

I thought that today I would take up another measure we have talked about, which is the question of seeing if we cannot do something now about preventing weapons of mass destruction from being launched into outer space -- the greatest of all of the areas that man has begun to conquer. To this end I should like to make a statement to indicate what our position is, to indicate the importance which we attach to this problem and the importance of verification that would satisfy each of us that we are not moving into this frightful new area with massive weapons, and to make the point that the verification of this measure at this stage does not require a great many men. It would be comparatively easy and it could be accomplished with comparatively few individuals scattered around the world -- at the moment probably just on the territory of the USSR and upon our own territory.

Our plan includes a proposal for a prohibition of placing into orbit or stationing in outer space vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction, to become effective immediately after the installation and effective operation of an agreed control system to verify the measure. Like the force levels and conventional armaments proposals in the early stages of the Western plan on which I commented last week, this is another concrete and specific proposal upon which we are prepared to seek the earliest agreement. It is therefore a proposal around which we can profitably endeavour to clarify the ideas of both sides with respect to adequate means for the control of specific disarmament measures.

I would like to emphasize that we do not regard this simply as an isolated proposal but as one of the many measures which are included in the first stage of the Western plan. This proposal has quite naturally aroused very keen interest.
throughout the world and this is not surprising because there is an increasing awareness on the part of peoples everywhere that unless steps are taken fairly early to forbid the entry into outer space of these weapons of mass destruction the world that we know today may become quite a different place. This is not a remote or a hypothetical danger but one which science will bring closer every day as a by-product of man's conquest of space unless measures are taken promptly to ensure against placing weapons of mass destruction into orbit above the earth. The prospect that this danger can be averted before we have reached the point of no return is therefore of very great and compelling interest to all the peoples of the world. As Mr. Ormsby-Gore pointed out during the opening days of this Conference, one such point of no return was passed in 1947 when the world, in his words, "missed the golden opportunity to ensure that nuclear energy was not used for any but peaceful purposes". (TNCD/FV.2, page 12) Let it not be said that we here fail likewise to find a basis of agreement that would spare the world from the consequences of another revolutionary development in the realm of science and military technology.

There are other reasons why the proposal to prohibit the placing in orbit of vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction is an important and mutually advantageous feature of the Western plan. It is a tangible and concrete step which can be taken promptly in the early stages of any programme leading toward the goal of general disarmament in a free and peaceful world without losing or involving the loss of the present security of any nation. In fact, the very virtue of this proposal is that it may be taken before and not after the question of military advantage to any part has arisen. Because no sacrifice of present security advantage is involved for anyone, the proposal offers an ideal opportunity for demonstrating a serious desire to get on with the business of curbing armament competition among the nations. If we are seriously engaged here -- and there can be no doubt of that -- this is a measure which could be adopted with comparatively little study beforehand, and on which agreement could be promptly reached. It would not go on into the years ahead but would be a current and present measure. It cannot be said that this is a meaningless proposal or that it deals with a minor matter. It is pregnant with dangers for the people of this world in the very near future, if science is correct. It has the additional merit that experience gained in working out this measure will prove valuable in seeking eventual solutions to our separate but related proposals of controlling missiles.
While we believe the problem of keeping mass destruction weapons out of orbit can most successfully be dealt with apart from the more difficult and complicated problem of controlling missiles, we have not lost sight of the importance to the world of this latter problem. Hence whatever progress we can make in working out measures in a less difficult and less controversial area of disarmament will help us at the same time as we try to work out agreement on missiles. This is a principle which we feel can be usefully applied to mutual advantage in the entire field of disarmament.

Finally, there is another important aspect to the measures we have proposed for ensuring that no nation shall place vehicles for carrying weapons of mass destruction in outer space. It is the fact that inspection and verification satisfactory to all parties concerned would be attainable, as I indicated earlier, under existing conditions by a relatively modest inspection effort on the territories of the States concerned.

Orbital satellites and deep-space probes are today launched from a relatively small number of research testing stations and installations. They are expensive, complex and highly instrumented. In my country there are only two such installations. These are well-known to the world. They are those at Cape Canaveral in Florida and at the Vandenberg Air Base in California. Perhaps also in the Soviet Union -- the only other country at present engaged in the actual launching of orbital vehicles and deep-space probes -- the number of installations is small, although the Soviet Government has not made this known. In any event, it should be possible for States to agree that such launchings would be made from only a few -- adequate but few -- designated installations. The important point is that as long as the installations are few in number the total number of inspectors required for on-site inspection by the International Disarmament Organization will be relatively modest. As we envisage it, it will call for a team of perhaps not more than thirty international inspectors on each site, and most of these need not actually be there except at the time when a launching has been announced. They would then inspect to ensure that the space vehicles which were launched were not carrying weapons of mass destruction. The inspectors would probably need to be admitted only to that portion of the installation where the actual launching preparations were taking place.
Thus, access by inspectors to the territories of the States engaged in the launching of satellites and space probes, for the purpose of launching-site inspections, would be of a limited nature confined to actual launching-sites and commensurate with the particular measure to be inspected: namely, to verify that a space vehicle was not carrying a weapon of mass destruction.

The technical details would have to be worked out as a result of common discussion, but its general scope would certainly be sufficiently modest, as I have indicated, for any country which is genuinely interested in reaching agreement in this vital area to have no fears that their security was imperilled but rather enhanced.

In addition to on-site inspection -- kept to a minimum, as I have described -- the Western proposal also envisages that there will be an agreed co-operative international effort under the International Disarmament Organization to utilize available tracking facilities to detect unreported and uninspected launchings of orbital vehicles, and to keep track of those vehicles which are launched.

This book-keeping arrangement would involve prior notification to the International Disarmament Organization of proposed space-vehicle launchings as well as provisions for communicating to that Organization the data obtained from the available tracking facilities. This particular provision is included in one of the early paragraphs of the Western plan.

We believe that these two types of inspection -- namely, modest on-site inspection and tracking with available facilities -- would suffice to furnish the initial basis for developing a verification system, but only if these steps are taken promptly. The matter can get out of hand in a relatively few years in the same way that the nuclear problem has got out of hand. This is a matter which should receive our very earliest attention as it is one which is essential for carrying out the mandate which we have, which is that of working towards the development of measures for a disarmament plan.

As the number of potential space launching-sites increases, the requirements for on-site inspection will correspondingly increase. This means, in effect, that a proposal made under today's conditions could well be overtaken by events unless we act, and act promptly. This does not in any way mean that we should slight, disregard or place in any secondary position in order of priority, the other disarmament measures which this Conference must consider. In fact, speedy progress toward agreement on this measure, and its means of verification, would give a very healthy impetus on these other, more controversial problems.
I believe that at the moment this problem is peculiar to the Soviet Union and to my Government. I cannot but believe that every other delegation at this table would welcome an arrangement which could be reached in this area, and on behalf of my own Government I should like to say that we are prepared to have any such agreement included in any arrangements which we are able to agree to at this table.

The verification system which I have indicated would consist in general of two parts: on-site inspection and the use of the available tracking facilities. These latter facilities could account for the appearance in outer space of any vehicle with respect to which prior notification had not been given. This is why this measure is relatively simple to verify. There are few sites, only a limited number of people are involved — far fewer than in any other of these measures we are discussing. Some increase in the number of stations now in the world would make a very good auditing system, but a very good system exists already to determine whether countries are living up to their commitments.

I hope again today, on this Friday, as I did last week, that this concrete proposal will have the most earnest consideration of all delegations here as being one which we could work out quite promptly. Our experience in working on it, experience that we would develop in working out the necessary international disarmament organization with a few inspectors, the manner of their mobility, would be of the greatest assistance to us. It could be in effect the pilot plan for moving on into the more complicated concrete measures of disarmament which are included in the first stage of the Western proposal.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): Does any other representative wish to speak? If there is no other speaker I would like now to read to the Committee the draft communique.

Mr. EATON (United States of America): I have a brief statement that I would like to make. At this the end of the third week there seems to be some doubt in the minds of the representatives of the Soviet bloc as to the intentions of the Western delegations at this Conference, and some indication has been given that it would help if we could clarify these doubts, if answers could be given to certain of the questions, some of a general and some of a specific nature, which have been raised here.
On behalf of my own delegation let me again repeat and try to answer these questions.

What is the intention of my delegation?

1. We intend to sit here patiently and work out measures leading toward the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We came with this intention and we remain with this intention.

2. The Soviet proposal, in our view, will not meet this objective.

3. The proposal made by the Western Governments will meet this objective.

4. My delegation is not prepared to accept any sweeping, meaningless, age-worn slogans as a guide for our work in Geneva in the days to come.

5. We are prepared, as a start, to discuss and negotiate in detail and in specific terms reasonable, balanced and safeguarded measures of disarmament of the scope contained in parts I and II of the Western plan; and, as we have indicated, we are prepared to be flexible in this area.

6. When those first measures have been agreed we are prepared to negotiate those further measures necessary to achieve the goal which has been set for us by the resolution of the United Nations and the agreement of the four Foreign Ministers which gave birth to this Conference.

The foregoing answers will, I hope, clarify to the delegations how we construe our mandate, and help us to move on with the urgent task which confronts us. We give ground to no man here, no delegation here, no peoples in the world in our true desire to find an answer to this problem which haunts all the world today.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have just heard a fairly detailed statement by the United States representative which related to one question, namely the establishment of control over the launching into outer space of vehicles which carry or may carry nuclear warheads. The question stated this morning by Mr. Eaton could be so understood. At the end of his statement Mr. Eaton shortly described the intentions of the United States delegation in our Committee.

The formulae proposed today by Mr. Eaton require of course the careful examination of all the six points he mentioned. It is also necessary, apparently, to compare those formulae with the explanatory remarks made upon specific questions
by the United States delegation itself and the other Western delegations in our Committee. This will obviously have to be done at a later stage.

I must say that the exposition of the general direction of the intentions expressed by the United States representative clearly disappointed the Soviet delegation, because it seems obvious that the United States does not intend to work on the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; it does not wish to define the main provisions of the future treaty. It is against formulating the main principles which might be embodied in the treaty on general and complete disarmament; it wishes instead to deal with certain measures contained in its plan, in the first and second parts of the Western Powers' plan, and only after this to discuss further measures, as it says, towards the goal. This means that, instead of a direct endeavour to fulfil the task set by the United Nations General Assembly resolution, which speaks of a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, attempts are made to deal with separate measures relating to the first and second parts of the Western plan which, as has been demonstrated by the statements made by a number of delegations, are not actually disarmament measures but are in the main measures of control without disarmament.

The basis of the United States Government's views on questions relative to outer space, as set forth in the statement made this morning by Mr. Eaton, is in fact again purely a control measure, and in substance no disarmament even in that field is suggested.

This is why our first impression of this answer to our repeated questions is discouraging.

We shall, of course, carefully study the verbatim record of Mr. Eaton's intervention, and later on we shall revert to these questions, both to their substance as it was stated today, and to the intentions of which the United States representative spoke.

This is all I have to say for the time being concerning the statements made by the United States representative.
Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): At a later meeting I shall revert to Mr. Eaton's second statement of this morning, and give our position in exact detail. I shall not do so today even though I could — because I believe I have a more urgent task to perform, that of replying to Mr. Zorin, who in his own reply to Mr. Eaton again argued that the Western plan did not contain measures of disarmament, but only of control without disarmament.

I had already heard those criticisms from most of the Eastern representatives, and I must confess that, although they may have surprised me to start with, their repetition and homogeneity have surprised me less. But there are false interpretations which must not be allowed to develop; and that is why I should like, on behalf of the Western delegations, to show once again that the Western plan represents an earnest and sincere effort at disarmament. To that end I shall take the liberty of considering here with you what the position in the world would be once the first two stages of the Western plan were completed. I am entitled to take them together, because we have shown in our statements that any operation planned for the second stage, but studied in the course of the first, could at once be undertaken at the end of the corresponding study — that is to say, in certain cases, before all the operations of the first stage were completed, provided they were making reasonable progress. Our two phases thus constitute, as Mr. Eaton put it, two scenes of the same act, with no interval between them.

May we now take a look together at each measure of disarmament at the end of the second stage, beginning with those which are most important, namely those relating to the nuclear weapon? I shall divide my analysis into two parts: vehicles capable of delivering weapons on the one hand, and materials and weapons on the other.

Vehicles include satellites, rockets, and what I shall call mixed-purpose weapons, which may be simultaneously conventional and nuclear, or either at choice. As Mr. Eaton has just shown in his first statement, the satellites problem is entirely settled before the end of the second stage: it will be forbidden to put any into orbit unless they are strictly peaceful, and a system of control will have been set up by which the exclusively scientific use of satellites put into orbit can be verified. Thus the first indisputable point established is that outer space will be kept out of the arms race. No twentieth-century sword of Damocles will be hanging over our heads. A disarmament measure will in this case, for the first time, have been taken before passing the point of no return, as it was called successively
by Mr. Ormsby-Gore and Mr. Eaton, and the existence of which I myself have been indicating ever since our discussions in 1952 on the nuclear weapon in general.

As regards launchings of missiles according to agreed criteria — for example their diameter or range — drawn up in such a way as to include all missiles of intercontinental or intermediate range, it will only be possible to test those intended for peaceful uses, and those of characteristics below the permitted limits. Furthermore, even such launchings will be subject to prior notification and on-site inspection. Moreover, in general, all launching-sites will be progressively reported and controlled, and the factories producing missiles indicated with a view to subsequent inspection.

The other means of launching nuclear weapons — cannon, aircraft, submarines and ships of agreed characteristics — will also be eliminated in the first and second stages, to the extent to which they are in excess of a mutually agreed relation to the force levels provisionally tolerated at the end of the second stage.

Storage of such materials under international control has appeared to cause some anxiety to our Eastern colleagues. It is in our view a measure preliminary to the destruction of those materials, and its essential purpose is to assemble them for inventory purposes. But any other means proposed by the Eastern delegations for eliminating these surplus materials would be seriously studied by us. The only thing that matters to us is the goal: storage is one of the means, but others may be envisaged.

Thus at the end of the second stage the most formidable vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons, the satellites, would be totally eliminated from national arsenals. Experimental launchings of missiles and all launching-sites would be controlled; other weapons would be limited in proportion to the remaining forces. The control progressively established over the vehicles, which would themselves be gradually eliminated, combined with the controlled conversion of stocks of fissile materials, of which I shall say a word later, is the necessary condition for prohibiting the use and possession of nuclear weapons. Such moral prohibitions are thus envisaged only at the end of the disarmament process when a new world takes the place of this one.
I now come to nuclear material itself.

At the end of the second stage the production of fissionable material for military purposes will have been totally stopped, and control will have been instituted in all factories for separating isotopes or extracting plutonium, and over all power reactors.

At the same time, the stocks of fissionable material already constituted will be effectively and not merely symbolically converted and immediately used for peaceful purposes, or stock-piled under international control for future industrial uses. What will be the amounts converted each year? It is for us to fix their proportions, taking into account the stocks probably existing in each of our countries, so that reduction is massive during this period.

At the end of the second stage, of course, some stocks as well as some armies will remain. Here again, however, an advance will have been made towards complete disarmament — an advance enabling international relations to be eased, outstanding disputes to be settled, and thus further progress to be made towards our common goal.

The world will breathe more freely when, at the end of the second stage, it realizes that no satellite can threaten it; that no long-range missile will be tested without prior notification and control; that launching sites will be known and inspected; that other vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons will largely be placed under international control or destroyed; that the stocks of fissionable materials, far from increasing or even remaining constant, will diminish year by year at a substantial rate — in short, that the terrible threat of today will have receded and be tending to disappear.

I now come to measures of disarmament in the conventional field. At the end of the second stage, forces are reduced to 2,100,000 men for the United States and for the Soviet Union, to levels to be agreed for certain other Powers, and to other levels — which in the meantime will have been fixed by an international conference — for all countries with substantial forces.

That reduction, which will be controlled, appears slight to the Eastern delegations. I could, of course say that the difference between 2,100,000 and 1,700,000 is not considerable and does not warrant certain protests we have heard; but to our way of thinking the main purpose of that reduction is to measure the reduction of conventional armaments, which we regard as much more important than the reductions of force levels. It is obvious, as we have repeatedly pointed out, that, in all countries with compulsory military service, forces which have been disbanded, even unilaterally, can be speedily recalled to the colours. It is only a matter of days.
At the end of the second period, States will only retain major armaments --
that is to say guns over a certain calibre, armoured vehicles over a certain
tonnage, and surface vessels, submarines and aircraft conforming to certain
specifications -- in quantities proportionate -- according to formulae to be
decided by us -- to the forces allowed to each, and strictly controlled. That is
tantamount to saying that at the end of the second stage a general mobilization will
no longer be of any use, because it would not allow equipment of troops in excess of the
agreed force levels. The abolition of mobilization will be one of the victories of
peace.

At the same time, the measures necessary to give States greater protection
against surprise attack would have been brought into effect by means, for example,
of aerial inspection, ground observation at agreed points, mobile teams, overlapping
radar, installation of the necessary transmission facilities, and all the other
operations which our respective experts might suggest.

The world disarmament conference, bringing together all Powers with significant
military capability, would have been convened for the end of that second period. I
note here one difference, which favours our plan. This world conference, when it
meets, will not have prevented certain measures from having already been taken or
being under study, because there are certain measures which we agree to adopt among
ourselves even before we have the agreement of the other nations; whereas in the
Soviet plan all measures are subordinated to the holding of the world conference and
the course of its debates. By then, force level and armament ceilings will have
been fixed for all the Powers. The world will thus be moving towards a state of
equilibrium at a very much lower level than at present; and that is the necessary
condition for future advances towards a state of complete disarmament.

Budgetary information verified in the accounts will make it possible to obtain
a financial picture of preceding reductions of forces and armaments.

The international disarmament organization, which to start with will have
confined itself to collecting declared information, will begin to inspect operational
sites, before extending its action, though not till later, to the places of
manufacture. Lastly, the initial steps will have been taken to establish an
international body responsible for maintaining world peace and operating within
the framework of the United Nations.
In giving this outline of the results of the first two stages of the Western plan, I have endeavoured to show how their implementation would enable the world to breathe more freely. Mr. Zorin or another of our Eastern colleagues will tell me that that is not complete disarmament. I readily agree. But we have sufficiently emphasized, and I am prepared to do so again next week if necessary, that to pass brusquely, without intermediate consolidation stages, from the over-armed and disturbed world of today to the disarmed and peaceful world of tomorrow appears to us impracticable and Utopian. What is essential is to progress towards that goal and to pave the way for those better relations between peoples -- which in their turn will allow further disarmament measures.

What will those measures be? It is difficult to foresee them today in detail, and their immediate discussion would dangerously delay the entry into force of their precursors. I believe that it is wiser for us to agree on relatively modest initial measures and to begin to put them into effect forthwith in order to reverse the trend, rather than go on for months or years discussing full-scale measures and waiting for a general agreement before beginning to take even the most modest steps.

The very most we can say today is that the third stage will comprise, besides the final measures for the reduction of conventional armaments and of force-levels, further reduction of existing stocks of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons until their final abolition; elimination of the last vehicles for delivering such devices; and prohibition of the production and possession of weapons of mass destruction of all sorts, accompanied by extension of control to the places of manufacture and strengthening of the organization for the maintenance of peace.

Such are the main features of the task in which we hope our colleagues from the East will agree to co-operate. Standing firmly on the principle of this wise and prudent progression, we are ready to study with them all the ways in which it may be applied. For thus and only thus shall we advance towards our common ideal by realistic and practical steps.

Mr. MEZINESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I listened very carefully to the statement made by the French representative just now. Naturally I intend to read the verbatim record more carefully still, but I think I must make a few remarks at this point in our discussion.
Mr. Moch, with his usual eloquence, tried to show us the idyllic picture the world will present if the Western plan is adopted and its first two stages are carried through.

A closer examination of the picture the French representative has just painted will, of course, enable us to add a few touches to it and to highlight its true — its real features. But I wish to emphasize now that execution of the measures provided for in the first two stages of the Western plan would leave intact the military nuclear striking power of the nuclear Powers — what is known, I believe, as the "nuclear strike power". Thus, if the first two stages of the Western plan were carried through, nuclear striking power — and consequently the threat of nuclear aggression and of unleashing a nuclear war, with all its foreseeable consequences — would not be reduced in the slightest. The execution of these measures would have no influence — no result — as regards reducing the risk of nuclear war, the risk of nuclear aggression with all the devastation and misery that must accompany it, because the military nuclear striking power of the nuclear Powers would be left completely intact and undergo no reduction. So while implementation of these two stages of the plan might perhaps deceive and mislead some naive sectors of public opinion, it would only give a sense of false security far more dangerous in its consequences than people are inclined to believe and to point out.

There is another aspect of the matter I wish to stress — and this, I think, answers a question raised by the French representative — namely, the statement that the sword of Damocles would no longer be hanging over our heads. It is very nice of you to say so. But with military bases equipped with missiles situated as they are — not intercontinental missiles, for you know quite well where these bases are and that, at the distance they are from our countries, intercontinental missiles are not needed in order to strike — no threat would be removed from the peoples of the socialist countries. After the first two stages of the Western plan are carried out, the military bases distributed and organized all round the socialist countries — not at the range of intercontinental missiles or of medium or even short-range missiles, but within the range of artillery and of the shortest range aircraft — these military bases will remain in being with their destructive nuclear equipment, missiles, aircraft and so on.

I do not know what kind of security is sought in proposals of this nature. We understand very well what they mean, but we think it is going rather far to present us with this picture of the world, in which the nuclear Powers will
retain their military nuclear power intact, the risks and dangers of a nuclear war will remain unchanged, and the military, air and naval bases distributed all round the socialist countries will remain in being, as a world in which the threat of war will have been reduced or eliminated.

I shall say no more at the moment. I shall, of course, comment more fully at some time I think appropriate next week, after I have studied the verbatim record.

Mr. MOGH (France) (translation from French): In the division of labour which seems to be adopted in the Eastern camp, it appears that the Romanian representative has been appointed to reply to me, while Mr. Zorin confines himself to retorting to the United States and the three other representatives share their opposite numbers. I am perfectly willing to be exposed to arrows of remote yet romance origin, but I would inform the Romanian representative that I can be a pretty tough opponent and that the arrows may well be blunted on reaching the mark.

He intends, he tells us, to highlight the true features of the Western plan when he has read my statement; that implies, albeit most politely, that I presented the plan under false colours — in plain language, that I have been lying.

I hope that his study will show him that the plan's real features are indeed those I outlined, for I took them all from the document you all have before you.

He added, in an extemporary statement, that striking power — I am using his own words — would remain intact at the end of the second stage, and that the threat of nuclear aggression would remain undiminished. That is not the case. I explained all the reductions which would take place; to this he will reply, or would reply no doubt, that so long as nuclear bombs still exist, they are dangerous. There I agree with him.

But what I particularly wish to tell him today is that he is addressing his criticisms to the wrong quarter. It is to his neighbour opposite, Mr. Zorin, that he ought to speak, because everything he said about our plan is much more applicable to the Soviet plan. It is the Soviet plan which lies open to the charge that — I quote — "the military nuclear striking power of the nuclear Powers would be left completely intact" until the third stage, for in its original form there is no measure of nuclear disarmament in the first two stages of the Soviet plan.
I am extremely sorry to have produced such evident dissension in the Eastern camp. But it is not my fault. It is not I who ventured onto this dangerous ground.

I may add, moreover, that the prohibition of use desired by Mr. Zorin — I know the Romanian representative did not mention it — would also leave the nuclear threat undiminished because, alas, history teaches us that all countries do not always scrupulously fulfil their undertakings; besides, if they did so our work would be unnecessary, because peace treaties have been signed between all the Powers represented here, and if these treaties had always been respected and always would be, war would be inconceivable.

When the Romanian representative said that our plan is calculated to mislead naive sectors of public opinion, I assume he was speaking of public opinion in his own country, because I can assure him that our own public, the Western public in general, is very well aware not only of the danger, but also of the serious, realistic measures required to put an end to it.

I shall therefore conclude simply by asking the Romanian representative kindly to read carefully, not only the Western plan, but also my statement this morning, which corresponds to it exactly. Since I am sure he is acting in good faith, he will find a detailed reply to his questions and note, as I have just done, that his criticisms apply to the Soviet plan, not the Western plan.

Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I should like, in a few words, to reassure the Committee about the prospects of dissension between the country I represent and that represented by Mr. Zorin, and also to clarify the position.

I am on the whole a modest man and would not go so far as to ask certain representatives here to read one of my statements again. But since I have been asked to re-read a statement myself — after publicly declaring my intention of reading Mr. Moch's statement most carefully — I shall venture to recommend a re-reading of my statement of 22 March (TNCD/FV.6), in which I raised certain of the questions to which the French representative considers he has replied.
Moreover, I pointed out, in my remarks on 22 March, that the place at present occupied by nuclear disarmament in the plan presented by the Soviet delegation, and supported by all the socialist countries, met the wishes expressed on various occasions in the history of the disarmament discussions by the Western powers, and that it was they who had been unwilling to begin disarmament with measures of nuclear disarmament. At the time, I ventured to quote the statement made a day or two earlier by Mr. Zorin, showing that the Soviet Union was perfectly prepared to bring the nuclear disarmament measures forward to an earlier stage of the disarmament programme submitted to our Committee for discussion. Thus there is no mistake as to where the criticisms belong.

I must, much to my regret, repeat that the paragraphs referring to problems having some connexion with fissionable materials, nuclear materials etc., in the first two stages of the Western plan, are not measures of nuclear disarmament; they cannot be regarded as such, because the only measure which can be regarded as a measure of nuclear disarmament is one which can affect the military nuclear power of a State, which can affect -- reduce or eliminate -- a State's nuclear striking power, the danger of aggression and the risk of a nuclear war.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I do not propose to comment now on the statements made this morning, for it is essential to study them and reflect on them before replying. Neither do I propose to dwell on what was said -- with great skill, I admit -- by Mr. Moch, the representative of France. It is rather the procedure which seems to have been established in our Committee that I wish to discuss. I refer to the fact that each weekend we are asked to consider a measure in the Western plan, as though we were concerned with one measure only. Our task, however, even if certain delegations do not like it, is to study the question of general and complete disarmament.

Instead of serious work on the whole of the problems before us, it is sought, by means of minor measures relating solely or principally to control -- I stress this -- to give public opinion the impression that progress is being made towards disarmament or that concessions are being made.

I had not intended to speak this morning, but I think other delegations have also pointed out that an attempt is being made to submit certain proposals
(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

bit by bit, solely in order to hold the Committee's attention instead of tackling the problem as a whole.

I recognize that, in his statement to us, the United States representative said at the outset that his country accepted the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly and the instructions given last year by the four Foreign Ministers to guide the Committee in its work. But the representative of the United States immediately added that it was absolutely necessary to agree on certain measures, since we could not begin by discussing the question of general and complete disarmament.

Nevertheless this is the question before the Committee. All the measures to be examined by the Committee must fall within the framework of general and complete disarmament — must be calculated to secure general and complete disarmament. Are we on the road leading to that goal? I do not think we shall reach it by studying control measures.

The CHAIRMAN (Czechoslovakia): If no other representative wishes to speak I will read the draft communique to the Committee:

"The fourteenth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 1 April 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of Czechoslovakia.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 4 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

If there is no objection to this communique, I take it as approved by the Committee.

The meeting rose at 12.5 p.m.