FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 31 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. E.L.M. BURNS (Canada)
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<td><strong>Bulgaria:</strong></td>
<td>Mr. M. TARABANOV</td>
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<td>Mr. K. CHRISTOV</td>
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<td>Col. K. SAVOV</td>
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<td><strong>Canada:</strong></td>
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<td>Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL</td>
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<td>W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL</td>
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<td><strong>Czechoslovakia:</strong></td>
<td>Mr. J. NCSEK</td>
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<td>Lieut.-Gen. J. HEČKO</td>
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<td>Mr. Z. TRHLIK</td>
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<td><strong>France:</strong></td>
<td>Mr. J. MOCH</td>
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<td>Mr. M. LEGENDRE</td>
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<td><strong>Italy:</strong></td>
<td>Mr. F. CAVALLETTI</td>
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<td>Maj.-Gen. D. PANALI</td>
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<td><strong>Poland:</strong></td>
<td>Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI</td>
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<td>Mr. M. LACHS</td>
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<td>Mr. C. BOGDAN</td>
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<td>Col. C. POPA</td>
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<td><strong>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</strong></td>
<td>Mr. V.A. ZORIN</td>
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<td>Col.-Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV</td>
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<td>Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN</td>
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PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDLE

United States of America:

Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.J. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Personal Representative of
the Secretary General:

Dr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare the thirteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament open. I recognize the representative of Poland as the first speaker.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): In my remarks today, I should like to deal with two problems. The first can be summed up in the question: What should be done next? The second is one of the essential problems of the programme of general and complete disarmament; that of the relations which will be maintained in the world after disarmament has taken place.

The first problem arose towards the end of last week and it is still coming up in our discussions. It is the problem of what direction the work of our Committee is to take in future. That is undoubtedly a very important matter. After the preliminary discussion, which has helped to clarify the positions of the countries represented on this Committee, it is now certainly time to pass on to the formulation of concrete measures — in other words, to the task assigned to the Ten Nation Committee.

To the Polish delegation, as to the delegations of the other socialist countries, it is clear that this task consists in the preparation of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. With that end in view, we could begin by settling the fundamental principles on which the treaty should be based.

As our discussion has shown, the delegations of the Western States understand the future task of our Committee differently. They have described it in various ways, but the expressions used have a common denominator.

The United States delegation proposes that we should work out a system of control for an isolated fragment of the process of disarmament, namely, a reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. That reduction, moreover, is to be taken solely as an example, before its amount is settled and even without deciding whether it is to be carried out or not.

The question therefore arises what purpose would be served by this control system, and what the inspectors would have to work on.

In reply to the criticism made by the socialist States, Mr. Eaton, the representative of the United States, attempted, at the meeting on 29 March, to show that his country's delegation was not putting the problem in an abstract manner. In order to do so, he asserted that the reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and of the United States of America to a level of 2,500,000 men, and then to a level of 2,100,000 men, was a concrete measure. The reduction
of armed forces is undoubtedly a concrete measure; but, in the first place, as other delegations have pointed out, the establishment of a ceiling of 2,500,000 does not represent a reduction when applied to the present strength of the United States forces, if we are to believe that country's official figures, or when applied to the figure which will soon be reached by the Soviet Union as a result of unilateral reduction of its forces. As to the lowering of the ceiling to 2,100,000 men, that would be a reduction but, it must be observed, an insignificant reduction without any great importance. Further, the United States representative does not even propose that we should agree on these limited measures; he merely takes them as a hypothesis, in order to propose a concrete and detailed formulation of the control system. I must say that it is difficult to reconcile such a presentation of the problem with Mr. Eaton's statement that the United States Government shares the view that there can be no disarmament without control and no control without disarmament.

Finally, even if it were admitted that the United States delegation favours agreement on a reduction of forces down to given ceilings, that would still not mean that it agrees on the attainment of the goal set for us, which is general and complete disarmament.

I do not wish it to be understood from this that the Polish delegation underestimates the importance of control of disarmament. That is by no means the case. We have often stated, and we emphasize once again, that we are in favour of effective control accompanying disarmament.

Seeing that control is only a means to an end and not the end itself, as indeed, Mr. Ormsby-Gore observed at our second meeting, what would be the point of embarking on a detailed discussion of means before we had agreed on the end to be served by those means? Would that not, as the proverb says, be putting the cart before the horse?

Disputing the assertion that the United States delegation was presenting the problem of control in an abstract manner, the representative of Italy described in detail, in his statement on Monday, completed by that of yesterday, a whole series of functions of the international disarmament organization provided for in the Western plan. Those particulars do not, however, in any way alter the substance of the problem, which is whether there is to be control before disarmament or control in step with disarmament. It must be noted that the Western proposals concerning the future work of our Committee set out from the standpoint of control before disarmament.
Finally, the French delegation's proposal is similarly characterized by its abstract method of approach. They suggest that we should examine measures to be taken in a first stage, without, however, specifying whether it is to be a stage of general and complete disarmament, or a stage of something which has not been defined, or, rather, the first stage of general control without general disarmament.

The realistic nature of the task I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks is borne out by the fact that, in spite of our differences, points on which our views coincide have emerged in the discussions. I may mention, as an example, the principle that disarmament should proceed by stages, and that it should begin with a reduction of armed forces, appropriate ceilings being fixed for the various stages. Another example is the principle that disarmament should be supervised from beginning to end by a system of international control, and that this control should also be maintained after disarmament. Mr. Moch himself, who seems to be the greatest pessimist among us, enumerated a certain number of points relating to control on which the positions of the Western States and the socialist countries coincide.

Further concrete discussion might reveal more points on which our views converge. For that, however, we must proceed to discuss the contents of the programme, the order of the disarmament measures and the time-limits for carrying them out, together with the scope and nature of the control measures. That can be done provided that we adopt, and not only in words, a constructive approach to the tasks assigned to us by the United Nations General Assembly in the resolution for which we all voted.

It is true that there are politicians who have a different conception of disarmament. For instance, in his recent speech in Tokyo, Mr. Adenauer advised the Western Powers to negotiate from the famous "position of strength", and to go all out with the arms race if the Soviet Union rejects the methods of a Diktat. Such an attitude on the part of the head of a government which is pressing on with armaments in its own country, relying on the forces of revenge and militarism and seeking bases for them in other countries, including Franco's Spain, is not surprising to anyone. I do not think, however, that the delegations of the Western States sitting at this table need the "good advice" of Mr. Adenauer, or wish to act on it. World opinion, including that of my country -- a country which had to suffer so much from the results of the arms race that preceded the last
world war — cannot resign itself to the squandering of this great opportunity presented to the nations in the form of general and complete disarmament, which would deliver mankind for ever from the nightmare of war.

I should now like to go on to a second problem which calls for clarification. As I said at the beginning, this is the problem of what we imagine the state and development of international relations will be after the achievement of general and complete disarmament. In various speeches made here last week, the opinion was expressed that a disarmed world might be threatened with anarchy. That statement was intended to show the need to set up a special body to safeguard the security of States, particularly the smaller States, and to see that it was respected.

Those ideas are, moreover, reflected in the five-Power plan. Besides the international disarmament organization, the Western plan provides for the establishment of another organization — an organization for preserving world peace. It remains to be seen what reasons justify the setting up of a new organization of that kind, when the United Nations is already in existence. In the Soviet Union's plan, the need to ensure peace after disarmament has taken place is based entirely on international law in its present form, but taking its development and progress into consideration. We rely first and foremost on the United Nations Charter. Those who criticize our plan consider this insufficient. Let us, then, examine the whole problem more closely.

Is it correct to say that the United Nations would not be able to discharge in a disarmed world the duties for which it was created? Was it designed for a world of armaments and the "cold war"?

If we take as our premise the fact that the United Nations was founded when smoke was still rising from the ruins caused by the ravages of the Second World War, and that the dominant idea in the Charter is the desire to save the peoples from a tragic new war, we shall have little difficulty in realizing that a state of general and complete disarmament would be much closer to the ideal of the Charter and its authors than the present hotly contested arms race.
The United Nations was to establish a world-wide system of collective security. It laid the legal foundations for action to defend the peace and the safety of the world. The organs of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council as the body having primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, were endowed with various means of action -- from discussion and recommendations regarding the means of settling disputes peacefully, to a wide range of sanctions and coercive measures.

What exactly is the United Nations Charter?

It is, by its very nature, a code of fundamental principles of contemporary international law. It is the expression of the historic need for peaceful cooperation between States with different political and social systems; it gave birth to the bodies which ought to bring about such cooperation. The Charter finally rejects the right to wage war, and sanctions the right of all States to enjoy peace. That right is formulated not in abstract but in concrete terms. The Charter is the law for us all.

It is not the fault of the system created by the United Nations Charter if the Organization has not actually been able to solve several problems with which it was confronted. The cold war and the arms race which have burdened the world have become the main source of the weakness of the United Nations. It is the atmosphere of cooperation which has been lacking. Yet negotiations are the basic prerequisite of United Nations activity. In view of the conditions existing at present, the main problem lies in the fact that there is no other reasonable course to follow in international affairs than that of solving international problems by means of negotiations and understanding. It is only by following that course, and not by setting up new bodies by means of which, as the representative of Canada maintained, the defects of the United Nations would be "remedied", that it will be possible to arrive at a radical restoration -- in the conditions of a completely disarmed world -- of the efficient operation of the system of collective security created by the United Nations Charter.

It is quite understandable that certain functions of the United Nations, which were devised in an armed world, will have to be adapted to the conditions of a completely disarmed world. That is the answer to the question of the French representative, who anxiously asked what would become of certain United Nations functions but at the same time was not worried by the problem of reconciling the establishment of a new world organization for the maintenance of peace with the
existence of the United Nations. We hold that the explanations given by the Canadian delegation, according to which that organization would be included within the framework of the United Nations, in no way alter the position. For even if it were included within the framework of the United Nations, an answer would still have to be found to the question of what that new organization would be. Would it be a new Security Council? We would then have two security councils. But is that, perhaps, what is sought?

We also think that the doubts concerning the means of maintaining international loyalty in a disarmed world are without foundation. We must remember that general and complete disarmament will help to change the international atmosphere radically, that it will tend to develop mutual confidence and strengthen a sense of security among nations. This sense of security will result from disappearance of the fear of a threat of aggression.

We must also remember that the Soviet plan of general and complete disarmament would leave at the disposal of States only police or militia forces, strictly limited and fixed for each country and intended solely for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of the personal security of citizens. The plan precludes the maintenance of extra police forces which might be employed in any activity abroad.

The plan of the socialist countries provides first of all for the maintenance in a disarmed world of freedom of access for an international control organ to anything subject to control. This extremely wide system of control, which would cover the territories of all States, would make control an efficient and effective instrument of prevention. In those circumstances an invasion by police forces armed solely with small arms — which is what some of the Western delegates seem to fear — would be impossible. A surprise attack with the small arms which would be all that those forces would have would be out of the question, and a preliminary concentration of such forces at the frontiers of any State could not remain undetected by the control organs.

What, then, would be the object of having "international police forces?"

First of all, either these international forces would be few and weakly armed, in which case even from the point of view of the supporters of this conception they would be useless because they would not be able to act effectively as custodian, guarantor and defender. Or else they would be numerous and strong, and then they
might easily become a source of armed threat to disarmed States, particularly
the smaller ones — in fact the only source of threat in a disarmed world.

Secondly, and I now come to the main question: of what positive value could
international armed forces be in a disarmed world?

We are in perfect accord with all the delegations which stress the necessity
of establishing in the world conditions that would ensure respect for law in
international relations. What is more, this premise is written into the
United Nations Charter. We entirely agree that, to be effective, law must be
backed by measures of coercion. In an armed world the notion of coercion calls to
mind first of all armed forces. In a disarmed world, however, many notions, and
that of coercion among them, will have to be rethought. In a disarmed world it will
be impossible to violate international order by using armed force. There will
therefore be neither reason nor need to use armed force in order to re-establish
that order.

The United Nations Charter contains a wide range of non-military measures of
correction. These are enumerated in Article 41. In a disarmed world the provisions
of Article 41 must and will come into prominence if ever the need arises to restore
respect for international law and order by coercive measures.

In a disarmed world, collective measures such as interruption of communications,
economic sanctions and severance of diplomatic relations will be powerful means of
maintaining respect for international law. Economic sanctions will prove a
particularly effective instrument.

Numerous States oppose the establishment of international armed forces. I
might refer specifically to opinions expressed by the representatives of India and
Ceylon at the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which
provide an example of categorical opposition to the setting up of international
armed forces.

Finally, the retention of armed forces of any kind, even if they are called
international forces, becomes an anachronism in the setting of a fully-executed
process of general and complete disarmament. In the absence of armaments,
in international relations will assume a different quality and will leave no room
for military sanctions.
Those are the fundamental principles upon which international relations will be based once the disarmament process has been carried out. Mr. Moch said it was necessary to codify international law. But does not codification go on all the time? International law is in fact a continuously evolving institution. Merely by bringing about general and complete disarmament we shall contribute to its further codification. Mr. Moch has also said that it was important to see that decisions were carried out. But this is provided for by the United Nations Charter and other international treaties. The disarmament treaty will deal with it too.

International law has enough sanctions in its arsenal to command respect in a disarmed world.

That, broadly speaking, is how we conceive that the security of States and respect for law can be maintained by the United Nations Charter and the generally-recognized principles of international law when general and complete disarmament is a reality.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): We have heard an interesting speech from the representative of Poland, and I shall wish to study carefully what he has said.

However, he started by pouring scorn once again on the idea of reductions in the level of forces to 2.5 millions as a first step. He again, like many of his colleagues, seemed to imply that this would not entail any reduction in forces, and yet everyone round this table knows very well -- because Mr. Khrushchev has said so -- that the present armed forces of the Soviet Union are 3.6 million men, and therefore a reduction to 2.5 million men is quite considerable.

The representative of Poland also seemed to ignore the fact that this is the figure which was recommended by the Soviet Union both in its 1956 plan and in its 1957 plan as the first step in reducing levels of armed forces.

Thirdly, of course, he ignored the statement of Mr. Moch -- I think it was the day before yesterday -- when the latter pointed out that the levels of armed forces are linked to the levels of armaments. This is extremely important because, as Mr. Moch informed the Committee, it would be quite possible for a country to reduce its armed forces -- that is the actual men -- to 2.5 millions but have in reserve armaments for 5 million men -- and we all know that in certain countries it is quite possible to recall to the colours by decree at a moment's notice very large
numbers of trained reserves. Therefore this measure of putting a ceiling of 2.5
millions on the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union is a
contribution to disarmament. This is especially the case when it is borne in
mind that the levels of armaments would also be involved.

Finally on that particular point I would like to point out to the
representative of Poland that this is a measure which can be put into effect in
the immediate future. This is not a measure which requires us to await the
calling of a world conference and then to await the successful conclusion of that
conference.

Later in his speech the representative of Poland made some reference to the
peace-keeping machinery which would be required at a later stage in disarmament,
and I shall have something to say about that in the course of my remarks. But he
made a very detailed and interesting statement on this particular topic and I
would not propose to do more today than touch on some of the points he made.

A little over a week ago, at the fifth meeting, I asked a series of questions
designed to clarify for the benefit of the Western delegations various aspects of
the disarmament plan supported by the Soviet and Eastern European delegations.
Many of these questions have since been answered and for this I wish to thank
Mr. Zorin and his colleagues. As a result it is becoming easier to understand
what is the scope and what are the limitations of Mr. Khrushchev's disarmament
plan.

In the first place let me deal with the clarifications which seem to me to
be useful and satisfactory. Mr. Zorin has made it clear on a number of occasions
that, although the Soviet delegation is of course anxious to ensure the adoption
of Mr. Khrushchev's plan as it stands, yet he is prepared to examine any other
proposals. He has further, in response to the proposal for examination of
specific measures made by Mr. Eaton at the ninth meeting, agreed that it is
possible to discuss details of the various phases of the plan more thoroughly to
the extent that they raise problems admitting concrete solutions susceptible of
proper and effective control. He said last Friday -- and I quote:

"Nor do we exclude the possibility of discussing particular stages in
greater detail at this moment since, if we proceed by stages we shall
have a better chance now of finding a concrete solution of the problem".

(TNCD/FV, page 37)

On the same day Mr. Zorin said:
"We are prepared to make a careful study in order to find out what part of the content of these concrete stages can be considered from the standpoint of possibly combining them in a single programme of general and complete disarmament." (ibid., page 38)

On the subject of peace preservation machinery, a proposal to which the Soviet delegation has in the past taken some exception, Mr. Zorin expressed a readiness to examine the Western proposals in an effort — and I quote again — to

"... try to reach mutual agreement on such a question as how to ensure peaceful relations between States after general and complete disarmament has been brought about." (ibid., page 38)

Then there has been a useful discussion on the question of a time-table for a disarmament programme, as a result of which I think there is a better understanding of our respective points of view. Perhaps the most interesting developments during the past week in this respect, however, have been the clarifications given about the preparatory negotiations which would have to take place before the signature of a disarmament treaty and the coming into effect of the time-table which, in the original plan of Mr. Khrushchev, was so rigidly fixed at four years. We have now been told specifically that the world conference, or the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, proposed in the first stage of the Soviet plan would have taken place before the proposed Soviet four-year time-table for disarmament could even begin. In other words, the Soviet time-table for general and complete disarmament is not four years. It is $x$ plus 4 years, with $x$ the unknown quantity representing the length of time it will take to make all the preparations for a conference at which perhaps 90 nations are to be represented and, once they are gathered together, to obtain their unanimous agreement to arrangements intimately affecting the security of each and every one of them.

This $x$, this unspecified and unpredictable lapse of time — because no member of an Eastern delegation has attempted to say how long this period might be — also represents the delay which must elapse before a beginning is made with the process of disarmament under the Soviet plan. It is true that the Western plan also provides, in its second stage, for the calling of a world conference, but the Western delegations are convinced that the first steps along the road to real disarmament can be taken from the outset. As I suggested in my speech at the fifth meeting, in some respects the first stage of the Soviet plan corresponds not to the first stage but to the second stage of the Western plan. I think it
is most useful and important that we should have been able to clarify this point, since it would be unfortunate if public opinion did not understand that some at least of the differences between the two plans arise from the fact that the Western plan sets out specifically in its first stage much of the detailed preparation for disarmament which is apparently ignored in the Soviet plan -- although I am glad now to understand that the need for such preparation is indeed recognized and acknowledged by its authors.

Before attempting to examine how agreement should be reached between our ten delegations on the concrete measures which would go to make up a comprehensive disarmament plan satisfying the broad directive laid down by the four Foreign Ministers in September 1959 and the intentions of the General Assembly resolution of November 1959, I feel I must first draw attention to various aspects of the Soviet plan which still appear to the Western delegations to be unsatisfactory and unrealistic.

In general we still feel that the Soviet plan lacks precision and necessary detail. I have referred to one aspect of this already, namely the lack of precision in the references to a world conference at which force reductions would be agreed. But one of the most striking examples of this imprecision is the provision made in the Soviet plan for destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and missiles. At our fifth and sixth meetings Mr. Zorin expressed willingness to advance this general ban to any stage which would suit the Western delegations adding a general formula about the establishment of an "appropriate control". (TNC/PV.5, page 30) This clarification is, of course, welcome, but without preparatory study and a series of carefully graded measures, such as those included in the first and second stages of the Western plan, it does not constitute a particularly useful guide to our negotiations. There is, for instance, no provision in the Soviet plan for the study of the problems of the cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes or of the important problem of re-converting such materials for peaceful uses. These problems are complex in the extreme. Their solution demands careful and detailed consideration. And that is why their examination forms an essential part of the first stage of the Western plan. Then again, the so-called cut-off and the re-conversion of fissionable material are in our view essential prerequisites to any realistic programme of disarmament in the nuclear field. They find their place in the second stage of our plan but seem, as I have said, to have been totally overlooked in Mr. Khrushchev's proposals.
Similar lack of detail and of clarity appears in the references to missiles in the third stage of the Soviet plan. Simply to talk of destruction of missiles is almost meaningless unless controls have been established at an earlier stage over the launching and production of all kinds of missiles which would be used to deliver these weapons of mass destruction. These problems have been carefully examined by the Western delegations and the necessary preliminary arrangements for control have been included in the first and second stages of the Western plan. We hope it will be possible to reach a general agreement on the importance of these preparatory measures.

A puzzling inconsistency in the Soviet plan is moreover indicated by the proposal for the destruction of nuclear weapons and missiles in the third stage, that is to say, at a time when under the Soviet plan the military manpower to handle them will no longer exist. The same inconsistency appears in the relegation to the third stage of the destruction of air force equipment. Presumably if all armed forces had been disbanded in the second stage there would, under the Soviet plan, be large numbers of combat aircraft lying unattended in various parts of the world. And I cannot understand who will be manning the nuclear weapons that remain in the third stage; if they are not military personnel, then we have a very odd definition of civilians. More specifically, the Soviet plan does not appear to have examined the problem of reducing or eliminating categories of military aircraft in the earlier stages. I asked at the fifth meeting for clarification on those points, but have so far not received it.

The Soviet plan does provide for some aircraft to remain in the service of what they call the International Control Organization. I am sorry, however, to find that Mr. Zorin would impose the most stringent restrictions on the use of such aircraft as an aid to control by means of aerial photography until the third stage. I cannot myself see any reason why the use of this speedy and effective method of control should not be made available at an earlier stage. It is true that Mr. Zorin at our eighth meeting admitted that limited forms of aerial surveillance might be acceptable, for example, in relation to the control over the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. He also referred on that occasion to the use of aerial photography in connexion with the prevention of surprise attack, and he seemed to imply on that occasion that it was the Western Powers who were unready to discuss the matter. I would remind Mr. Zorin, however, of the provision in Stage II, paragraph E of the Western plan which provides for:

"Establishment of appropriate measures to give participating States greater protection against surprise attack, including aerial inspection, ..."

(TNOD/3, page 4)
It would, therefore, be quite wrong to infer that the Western Powers are unwilling to make use of aerial photography at an earlier stage. Quite the contrary is the case. As I have already said, the second stage of the Western plan corresponds in some respects to the first stage of the Soviet plan, although it goes far beyond it in general scope. Mr. Moch and other Western speakers have already made it clear that we cannot follow the Soviet and Eastern European delegations in their tendency to equate inspection with espionage. Measures for inspection, including aerial photography, could of course only be agreed on a reciprocal basis; it is difficult to see how in these circumstances a complaint of espionage could hold water. I therefore want to make it very, very clear that the Western Powers do not seek to impose any control or verification measures on other countries which they are not fully prepared to accept for themselves.

A considerable gap in the Soviet plan is its lack of clarity on the subject of peace preservation and the maintenance of international law and order. Various references have been made by the Soviet and Eastern European delegations -- including the representative from Poland -- in our discussions to their belief that the Western plan in this respect would deprive the United Nations of much of its raison d'être. This imputation has been rebutted by several Western delegations already and I do not propose to cover the same ground. However, before I leave the subject I must once again emphasize that this very curious conception of a harmoniously ordered international anarchy -- which seems to me a fitting description of the third stage of the Soviet plan -- remains for us an utterly unrealistic conception and a blueprint for an unrealizable Utopia.

Mr. Burns has already illustrated from his own experience how easy it is for forces ostensibly designed for the preservation of internal security in one country to be used to the detriment of the internal security of another. How then is the integrity of a small country to be safeguarded against a populous neighbour, disposing of vastly greater security forces, in the absence of some world-wide agency for keeping the peace? According to the representative of Czechoslovakia, the small country would have nothing to fear since the Soviet plan provides that the size of these forces shall "be agreed upon." I am bound to say that I do not quite see the relevance of this remark, and I would be very interested to hear Mr. Nossek elaborate on this point. Has he, perhaps, some illustrative figures in mind in comparing one State with another? For my part,
I find it impossible to envisage a level for the internal security forces of a large country that would at once satisfy a small neighbour, in the absence of a peace-keeping authority, that its integrity was not at risk, and satisfy the large country that it had adequate means to deal with any internal disturbances that might arise.

We heard some further comments on this problem from the representative of Poland this morning and, as I said earlier, I would like to study these remarks in rather greater detail. However, he did seem at least to envisage the possibility that this internal security force would be a threat to another country when he talked about the possibility of some international force, and he said that it would either be so weak that it could not, in fact, give any security to a smaller country, or it would have to be so numerous and so strong as to constitute a danger in itself. I do not think that this is a very cogent argument. I would have thought that it would be possible to arrive at the correct size of international force which would be sufficient to deter a country from committing aggression with its large internal security forces and yet, knowing the size of these internal security forces, it would not have to be so very numerous or so very powerful. This is a matter which would have to be discussed, but I do not think it is to be excluded that a reasonable basis could be reached.

Our Polish colleague also touched on the question of peace-keeping machinery and seemed to suggest that all that was required was the United Nations Charter. He seemed to be suggesting that the Charter as it now stands should be the basis for our consideration. He did not, however, indicate what was his own country's attitude to, for instance, Article 43 or Article 47 of the Charter. I would like to remind my colleagues of some paragraphs in these articles. Article 43 of the Charter says:

"All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security."

I would repeat, "make available ... armed forces".
Then in Article 47 we read:

"There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament."

These are provisions in the Charter which we have always thought important. It was my understanding that the Polish representative would wish to base the peace-keeping machinery on the Charter as a whole, presumably including the measures referred to in these articles. However, in other parts of his remarks, quite frankly, he seemed to deny this possibility and to be suggesting that what would be needed would be a considerable review of the Charter and a change in the Charter. It is very important for us to know whether the Soviet Union and its colleagues are now in favour of a review of the Charter and changes in the provisions of the Charter, or whether they are in favour of carrying out all the articles and all the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

It is true that various organs of the United Nations are already grappling with problems closely linked with the preservation of peace and the maintenance of international law and order. We would wish to profit from the experience they have gained and to avail ourselves of the machinery already set up to examine these problems further. The International Law Commission is already concerned with the codification of existing law and might well be called upon to examine the assumption by international organs of powers of jurisdiction over problems at present regarded as being within the sphere of municipal law. In the Western view the extension of the powers of the International Court of Justice to deal with the development of international jurisdiction requires detailed and careful consideration. For instance, the attitude of the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union to the jurisdiction of the Court is very relevant in this respect.

Another important gap in the Soviet plan is the absence of any reference to the problem of preventing weapons of mass destruction being introduced into outer space, apart from a cursory reference to cessation of manufacture in the third stage of the Soviet plan. In my speech at the second meeting, when I introduced
the Western plan, I pointed out the danger of reaching "a point of no return" in the field of control of space vehicles, just as in 1947 we missed a golden opportunity to ensure that nuclear energy was not used for any but peaceful purposes. I said then:

"We must ensure that nuclear weapons are never put into orbit round the world by anyone. Then, even when the scientists devise the means of bringing orbiting bodies back to a predetermined point on the earth, the fact need cause us no alarm." (TNCD/PV.2, page 12)

Although I have heard little comment on this proposal in the meetings of the Conference, I had hoped that this was due to the fact that our proposal was being carefully examined. I was therefore surprised to see reports of a Press conference given by the Soviet delegation which appeared to criticize and reject out of hand this fundamental Western proposal. I should like to point out that, as in the case of the other far-reaching proposals contained in the Western plan, this proposal for the control of vehicles capable of orbiting in space has been carefully geared to a progressive programme of development through the three stages of the Western plan.

In conclusion, and having again studied the Soviet proposal in the light of the explanations we have been given, I would like to suggest to the Committee that as a basis for discussion the Western plan is not only more realistic but is more comprehensive in scope. It enables us to start on disarmament measures right away without having to await the conclusions of a world disarmament conference the date of which no one can foretell. It enables essential work to be done immediately, work which is the inevitable preliminary to progress in the disarmament field. It is more comprehensive in scope than the Soviet plan because it looks to the solution of those problems which will face the nations of the world as purely national armaments diminish. The goal it sets is an ambitious one and in my view it accords fully with both the spirit and the letter of the United Nations resolution which we all supported last autumn. If we can achieve the goal set forth in the Western plan I sincerely believe that we shall have far exceeded the most optimistic hopes of all who so anxiously await the successful conclusion of our negotiations here in Geneva.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):
I should like, first of all, to make a few remarks on the speech we have just heard from Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the representative of the United Kingdom, and then to deal with a few questions of substance relating to our work in this Committee. We cannot, of course, immediately after the rather lengthy speech made by the United Kingdom representative, give any kind of detailed analysis of the points he made on a number of matters.

It seems to us, however, that some of the United Kingdom representative's assertions can be evaluated forthwith and on those I should like to say a few words. First, at the outset and again at the end of his speech, the United Kingdom representative laid a special stress on the fact that the Western plan contains some proposals that can be put into effect at once, whereas the Soviet plan involves lengthy work and preparation. He referred, first of all, to the proposition in the first part of the Western plan and, in particular, to the proposal to fix the force-level ceilings for the United States and the Soviet Union at 2.5 million. He claimed that this proposal is a real contribution to disarmament.

The representative of Poland, Mr. Naszkowski, who spoke today, has already shown that this proposal is meaningless from the point of view of real disarmament. I entirely agree, and should like to inform the United Kingdom representative, in reply to his speech, that he does not handle figures quite correctly; I would even go further and say he misinterprets them. He has just asserted that there are at the present time in the Soviet Union armed forces 3.6 million men, so that adoption of the Western Powers' plan with its force level of 2.5 million will make a great contribution to disarmament.

I should, however, like to point out at once that this is a contribution made, not by the Western Powers, but primarily by the Soviet Union, which, without waiting for an agreement, has already decided to reduce its armed forces, and is even now putting that reduction into effect. What, therefore, would adoption of this proposal by the Committee mean from the standpoint of the figures relating to the Soviet Union? Absolutely nothing. Whether this proposal were accepted or not would make no difference; the Soviet Union will anyhow reduce its armed forces in the very near future, and reduce them to a lower level than you propose.

What kind of contribution is this that the Western Powers are making, and what contribution is this that the Committee is making, towards disarmament?
The French representative, when he spoke a few days ago, also touched on this question, and said that, in his view, a unilateral decision to reduce armed forces has no significance. Perhaps he is saying that because, so far, not a single Western Power, France included, has yet declared a unilateral reduction of armed forces, and so to him anything that has to do with the Soviet Union is of no significance. This approach seems to me glaringly unilateral and unobjective for, all over the world, this step by the Soviet Union has been hailed as an immense pacific step of enormous significance, particularly for the work of this Conference. After all, if a great Power reduces its armed forces unilaterally in a year and a half by 1,200,000 men without lengthy negotiations, or any prolonged discussions, has that really no significance for the cause of disarmament? I think it is hardly worth while enlarging on this point in too great detail. Any impartial person, I think, will agree that this is a real step forward in disarmament. It is indeed a substantial contribution to disarmament; only it is not a contribution made by the Western Powers nor, unfortunately, by our Committee, but one made by the Soviet Union alone.

So when the United Kingdom representative says that acceptance of the figure of 2.5 million proposed in the Western plan would be a real step forward and a real contribution to the disarmament cause, that is, of course, not really so. It does not represent a contribution at all; because, I repeat, whether this decision is taken or not, the Soviet Union's armed forces will be reduced, and reduced to a lower figure than you propose.

The Soviet Union is thus really making a contribution; but what contribution are the representatives of the Western Powers making? You are proposing 2.5 million men for the United States; but what does that mean for the United States? It is no reduction at all of armed forces; on the contrary, a little may even have to be added on because, as far as we know from the official statistics, the United States armed forces are slightly less than 2.5 million. What sort of a contribution, then, is this to disarmament? In other words, you regard something done outside this plan as a contribution to the plan. It is nothing of the kind. But what would really need to be done in the case of a Power which already has armed forces of this level i.e. reduce them, that you are not proposing to do at this moment. Moreover, the Western Powers' plan says later on:
"Initial force level ceilings to be
2.5 million for the Soviet Union
2.5 million for the United States;"
and -- I draw the delegates' attention to the following words -- "and agreed
appropriate force levels for certain other States." (TNCD/3, page 2)

What are the United Kingdom and its representative contributing to disarmament
at the first stage; what figure does he propose for the reduction of his country's
armed forces? What figure does the representative of France suggest for the
reduction of its armed forces at the first stage? The plan does not mention this;
their contributions are not indicated in it. And when the representative of the
United Kingdom says, in effect, "in our plan we propose realistic measures of
disarmament at the first stage without any conferences, whereas according to your
plan an international conference is necessary," in which words he draws a comparison
between the plans favourable to the Western plan, I say that any thinking person will
realize that that proposal at present has no real significance whatever, because, in
order to bring about a real reduction of the armed forces of the United States and
then of France and the United Kingdom and all other countries it will still be
necessary to have "agreed appropriate force levels for certain other States". You
are trying to make out that, if this plan were adopted, you would have a concrete
disarmament measure, so to speak, in your pocket tomorrow; but would you? Nothing
of the kind. You would still have to agree the force levels of other States, even
of States which are members of our Committee and which have already given figures of
reduction for their armed forces. It will therefore be necessary to agree those
figures, either in our Committee or at the international conference of which you have
spoken. This means that your plan is not a plan on the basis of which some measures
can be introduced starting tomorrow. Nothing of the kind. No concrete measures can
be taken on the basis of your plan, taking your first stage, because in that stage
what concerns the Soviet Union is already being done even without the plan; and what
concerns the United States does not signify any reduction of armed forces; and what
concerns France, the United Kingdom and certain other countries has not yet been
agreed and is still to be agreed. According to the Press this has not yet been
agreed among the Western Powers. I do not know, and I had better not say. Anyhow,
there are no figures in the plan, so agreement has not yet been reached. It must
therefore be reached either here or at some international conference. In other
words, your plan does not really amount to anything from the point of view of solving
this simple problem of reducing the armed forces, even of the great Powers alone.
So, if we examine carefully the question raised today by the United Kingdom representative -- and I must say that he spoke in the same sense at earlier meetings -- then it seems to me that a simple analysis of the considerations put forward by Mr. Ormsby-Gore shows that the Western Plan does not offer in the first stage anything from the standpoint of real disarmament measures. I might put it like this: you already have in your pocket the reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union to a level below that proposed by you, namely 2,423,000, and that without any negotiations or agreements. But so far we find nothing said even in your plan about a reduction of the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

Thus the contribution made by the Soviet Union is perfectly obvious, whereas the contribution of the Western Powers is so far missing. We hope that during our negotiations we shall come to some agreement for a real reduction of armed forces. We propose, in the first stage of our plan, a reduction down to 1.7 million for the Soviet Union and the United States, and down to 650,000 for the United Kingdom and France.

We hope that the representatives of the Western Powers will support this proposal as a genuine and concrete contribution, not only from the Soviet Union but also from the Western Powers, to the cause of disarmament.

That is one observation which I wanted to make in connexion with Mr. Ormsby-Gore's statement.

The second small point I should like to make concerns inspection, about which the representative of the United Kingdom also spoke when he reminded us again that control and inspection should not be equated with espionage.

I have already had occasion to speak on this matter, and have explained that we do not in the least intend to regard all control as espionage. Certainly not. I said that we were agreeable to effective control over concrete disarmament measures. We shall not regard this as spying. But I am sorry to have to say that that is not how it is understood by everyone, even among the members of our own Committee. Please excuse me; possibly what I am going to say will somehow be cleared up, and what has been written about some members of our Committee will be shown to be not what was intended. At the moment I am using material that is available to all newspaper readers.
The Süddeutsche Zeitung in its issue of 26 - 27 March 1950, that is only a few days ago, contained a communication which I shall quote.

"Mr. Martino, the Italian delegato, in an article which appeared in the Roman paper Giornale d'Italia" — this is an important newspaper, — "said that the Soviet Union was ready to accept control only if it would in actual fact be ineffective".

And further:

"The demand that control should be limited so that it could not be used for espionage purposes means in practice that it would be ineffective."

This is what, according to the report in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, was written by Mr. Martino. I am very sorry that he is absent. I wish he were here. I hope, however, that the Italian delegates, who possibly know about this article, will give us an explanation.

As you can see from the communication I have quoted, Mr. Martino thinks, and says publicly, that the demand to have control limited so that it cannot be used for espionage purposes would in practice mean that it will be inoperative.

I find it difficult to understand that point of view. In any case it cannot, as we see it, be acceptable to us. I wish to apologize in advance if I am mistaken. I should like to ask the representative of Italy, Mr. Martino himself, what is actually his point of view on this question.

I can only say that there seems to be people who would like to use control and inspection for purposes of spying. We must it seems, do all that is necessary to preclude such a possibility and to work out a system of control which would have the single objective of verifying on an agreed basis, the execution by States of disarmament measures. That should be the only purpose of control. All other purposes should, in our view, be rejected, and above all the purpose of espionage.

Another brief remark.

The United Kingdom representative spoke this morning of "anarchy" in the third stage of the plan of general disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union. He mentioned the danger to small neighbouring countries constituted by the existence of security forces of larger States, and so forth.
He referred in detail to Articles 43 and 47 of the United Nations Charter, but I would say that he has so far ignored the important observations and considerations advanced on this subject this morning by the representative of Poland.

I presume that the United Kingdom representative, and also our other Western colleagues, will study carefully the important considerations put forward today by Mr. Naszkowski on this question. I should not wish to anticipate an exchange of views on the subject, but I should like to make only one remark. We of the Soviet delegation wonder, when we are discussing the period when general and complete disarmament will be carried out, the period which we now call rather picturesquely a "disarmed world" — why some Western representatives turn to articles of the Charter which refer to the intervention and utilization of armed forces.

Why is this? Why does the United Kingdom representative not think of the articles of the Charter which refer to non-military measures and the use of means for the peaceful settlement of problems? Why does he place this compulsive emphasis on armed forces? The long-established habit, so to say, of using armed forces seems to be making itself felt. It is going to be difficult to get rid of this habit for a long time to come. But it seems to me that, if we are talking about general and complete disarmament, we ought to think together about measures for maintaining international order which would exclude the use of armed forces, since we are talking about a disarmed world.

That the Western Powers are turning their attention to that aspect naturally causes us to reflect that they themselves do not, apparently, believe in this disarmed world and therefore instinctively reach for arms again whenever any relations have to be adjusted, even after general disarmament is achieved.

In this connexion, of course, the Western plan too must again be considered as a whole, for it contains no provision that armed forces and armaments will be completely abolished. And this is apparently no accident, because all the time there is talk of armed forces and of armaments.

As we see it, this is why the Western plan cannot of course, serve as a basis for drafting a treaty about general and complete disarmament, because there is nothing in it about complete disarmament. Perhaps that is why the representatives of the Western Powers have not, so far, clearly stated their attitude to the proposals which were put forward by the Soviet delegation and later repeated and developed yesterday by the representative of Czechoslovakia and by certain other
delegations who spoke about the scope of the measures necessarily implied in the concept of general and complete disarmament and which in our view would have to be included in a treaty or even in the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

In my private capacity I have asked many of the Western delegates what they find unacceptable in the list of fundamental disarmament measures which we have put forward and proposed as a basis for discussion. What do you not agree with in this list? Tell us. Or perhaps you want to introduce some more precise wording or add something to the list? We shall be glad to listen to all this. But the Western representatives are still shying away from discussing this question.

In view of the statement made today by the United Kingdom representative, the question that occurs to our minds is whether this is not due to the fact that the Western Powers are simply reluctant at the moment to get down to the task of formulating the basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Perhaps I am mistaken, but I should like to hear a fuller explanation of this matter.

Another question touched on this morning by the United Kingdom representative was that of nuclear disarmament.

Since the problem of nuclear disarmament is an integral part of our overall plan for general and complete disarmament and since total nuclear disarmament must in our view form an integral part of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, I should like to express some further views on this question.

We assume that there can be no two opinions about the importance of complete nuclear disarmament. Never before has the arms race, particularly in the sphere of atomic and hydrogen weapons, been so fraught with danger as it is today. The introduction of atomic weapons into the equipment of armies, the training of military personnel in the use of these weapons, the elaboration of the new tactics and strategy entailed in fighting with these weapons have taken on such forms that any armed conflict between States threatens to turn into a devastating nuclear war. All this makes it urgently necessary to adopt radical measures for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.
The Soviet Government, attaching exceptional importance to the solution of this problem, suggests in its plan that atomic weapons be banned, that all the atomic and hydrogen bombs now held by States be destroyed and that the further production of such weapons be discontinued. The energy of fissionable materials must be used only for peaceful economic and scientific purposes.

Only such an approach to the solution of the nuclear disarmament problem can really ensure the complete deliverance of mankind from the threat of nuclear war. The implementation of these measures must be an inalienable and major part of the treaty on general and complete disarmament, because anyone can see that without a total ban on atomic and hydrogen weapons, general and complete disarmament is inconceivable.

In our disarmament programme it is proposed to implement these measures at the third stage. At one of the meetings of this Committee, we explained why we were introducing these measures at the third stage. The Soviet delegation also declared that if the Western Powers expressed readiness to accept a complete ban on nuclear weapons at an earlier stage in the disarmament programme, this would meet with no objections from our side, since the Soviet Union is ready to proceed to implement these measures at any stage of the disarmament programme.

It is self-evident that the measures proposed by the Soviet Union for a complete ban on nuclear weapons would have to be put into effect under international control, so as to ensure that a check could be maintained on the compliance of States with the obligations assumed by them in connexion with the prohibition of these weapons. The Soviet Government considers that effective control over the discontinuance of nuclear weapon production must be established. The representatives of the control authorities must have the right of inspecting the destruction of all existing stocks of these weapons.

In proposing to include measures for a complete ban on nuclear weapons as one of the major clauses in the treaty on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union at the same time considers that, even before the conclusion of such a treaty, it would be most important to implement certain preliminary measures which would form a first substantial contribution to the solution of the nuclear disarmament problem.

In this connexion we think it necessary to point out that it would not be correct to picture the matter in the way it has been represented by certain Western representatives, as though the Soviet Union were not proposing that any
measures at all should be taken in the sphere of nuclear disarmament until after measures for reducing the armed forces and armaments of States had been put into effect. But surely the Soviet Government's proposal for the prompt discontinuance of tests of all types of nuclear weapons, under international control, is a measure which would put obstacles in the way of a further nuclear arms race.

The communique issued on the conversations between the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, with regard to the Soviet Union's proposals on this count shows clearly that the Governments of these two great Powers attach great importance to the latest proposals of the Soviet Government on this matter, and consider that, in making this proposal, the Soviet Union is demonstrating its desire for a real discontinuance of the tests and is taking a definite step towards stopping the nuclear weapons race.

The discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests would have substantial significance for stopping the nuclear weapons race and in our view would be a first step on the road to banning nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government is ready to include the question of stopping nuclear weapon tests in its plan for general and complete disarmament, even at the first stage of the plan, but it assumes that the treaty on discontinuance of nuclear tests could be drafted and enter into force even before the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. This in any case is what the Soviet Union is striving for.

In this connexion, a circumstance that attracts attention is that, in the British disarmament plan as expounded by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, on 17 September 1959, at the United Nations, the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests was envisaged as one of the measures in the first stage of disarmament. Yet, in the joint plan put forward by the Western Powers for consideration by our Committee, this reference to discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is completely absent. Should we not interpret this as meaning that the provision concerning discontinuance of nuclear tests was not included in the new Western plan on the insistence of those who are not interested in banning nuclear weapon tests?

The Soviet Government in any case continues to hold strongly to this point of view, that the question of the discontinuance of nuclear tests is an urgent one which cannot be shelved and that its solution must not be conditional on agreement on other disarmament questions.
Another important step in the direction of solving the problem of a total ban on nuclear weapons would be for States to assume the obligation not to be the first to use these weapons. This measure too could be put into effect before a treaty on general and complete disarmament were signed.

We know the attitude of some Western Powers towards this proposal of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we think that it would be very useful if we agreed to put this important measure into effect, since it could be an indication that States seriously intended to take the path of freeing the nations from the threat of nuclear war. The peoples of the world want to know the intentions of the Powers with regard to nuclear weapons and their use. There can be no doubt that for States to assume such an obligation would be a major act of confidence and would make the solution of the disarmament problem as a whole a great deal easier.

In statements they have made in this Committee, some representatives of Western Powers -- Mr. Ormsby-Gore, for example, this morning -- allege that the Western disarmament plan goes further than the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament as regards nuclear disarmament.

Let us look at the measures for nuclear disarmament which are proposed in the Western plan. The plan mentions three measures: that the production of fissionable materials for military purposes should cease; that some quantity of fissionable materials should be transferred from stockpiles that have been accumulated in the past and converted to peaceful ends; and, finally, that "further steps" -- it is not quite clear what they are -- should be taken, "in the light of the latest scientific knowledge, to achieve the final elimination of these weapons".

(TNCD/3, page 5)

Let us leave aside for the moment the question of this last measure and look at the real meaning of the proposal to discontinue the production of fissile materials for military purposes and the proposal to transfer some quantity of nuclear stockpiles to peaceful ends.

Could this procedure conduce to removing the danger of a nuclear war? Of course not, because, even after it had been put into effect, nuclear weapons would as before remain in the armaments of States. Indeed, as the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, stated at his last press conference, these stocks are already so large that there is no need to increase them further. Moreover, the mere discontinuance of the production of fissile materials for military
purposes can contribute nothing at all even from the standpoint of stopping the atomic armaments race. For States will be able to produce atomic and hydrogen bombs by using the huge reserves of fissionable materials that have already been built up and stockpiled by certain States.

As to the clauses in the Western plan which provide that States shall start gradually transferring part of their fissionable materials to peaceful uses, that proposal too is without any real significance from the point of view of reducing the danger of a nuclear war, because this measure cannot prevent States from continuing to manufacture nuclear weapons from already existing stockpiles of fissionable materials.

Implementation of these two measures in isolation from a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and the elimination of stockpiles of such weapons will, therefore, not help to reduce the threat of a nuclear war.

So long as there is no trust between States, so long as bases on foreign territory from which a nuclear attack can be launched at any moment have not been eliminated, so long as nuclear weapons have not been banned and it is open to States to use them, and some States do not want even to declare that they will not be the first to use them, to establish control only over the cessation of manufacture of nuclear materials would merely create a sense of false security, whereas in reality the threat of unleashing a nuclear war with all its dire consequences for the nations would remain.

In their plan the Western Powers declare their desire to advance towards the goal of the final destruction of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. However, as may be seen from the text of the Western proposals, attainment of this goal is highly problematical because it is bound up with the fulfilment of a whole series of conditions.

Moreover, the Western Powers, so we understand, are not even proposing that concrete agreement on this question should be reached within the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It appears from the Western plan that this is to remain a subject for further talks in the far distant future.

Consequently the nuclear disarmament measures which the Western Powers are proposing should be carried out do not solve the problem of the nuclear weapon ban and therefore cannot provide a basis for drafting the relevant nuclear disarmament provisions in a treaty on general and complete disarmament.
In our view, a treaty on general and complete disarmament should include nuclear disarmament provisions that are genuinely equal to the task of eliminating completely the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet proposals on the subject fully meet this requirement. Their implementation would lead to the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, the discontinuance of their manufacture, their elimination from the armaments of States and the destruction of existing nuclear weapon stockpiles.

We should be glad to know the Western delegations' views on the proposals we have made. We are prepared to listen carefully to any comments on, additions or amendments to our proposals, because a concrete discussion of this kind would enable us to get ahead with deciding the main provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, the preparation of which should, we suggest, be tackled without undue delay.

Mr. ORMSEY-GORE (United Kingdom): We shall of course need to study the interesting statement which Mr. Zorin has made this morning.

In the latter part of his remarks he was apparently trying to argue that if the production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes was stopped and the conversion of existing stockpiles of fissile material to peaceful uses was begun, this would make no contribution towards ending the nuclear arms race. I am bound to say that I found this part of his remarks totally unconvincing.

Just previously Mr. Zorin mentioned the attitude of the Soviet Government towards the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. I do not think it would be wise to become involved in a protracted argument about a subject which is being discussed in great detail in another conference but I must correct the impression which Mr. Zorin apparently tried to give, that it is only the Soviet Union that is interested in the success of this particular conference.

I would like to remind the Committee seated here of the history of that particular conference. The first technical meetings were held here in Geneva at the invitation of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments; the calling of the political conference in October 1958 was at the instigation of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments; and I would have thought that it was quite clear to everyone seated round this table that all the three Governments concerned had it as their objective to reach agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests under effective control. It would therefore be wrong to suggest that the Soviet Union was more interested in attaining that objective than we were.
Mr. Zorin then made again a reference to the fact that although Mr. Selwyn Lloyd mentioned in his speech at the United Nations the question of nuclear weapon tests in connexion with a comprehensive disarmament plan, it does not now appear in the Western plan. I thought I had made this position quite clear, but if Mr. Zorin did not hear me on the previous occasion I would like to read out again what Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said at the United Nations. He said:

"If, as we very much hope, agreement is reached at the present conference between the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, that agreement should be endorsed by other nations."

(A/194, paragraph 49)

As Mr. Zorin very well knows, agreement has not yet been reached. It would not therefore be possible to have in a Western plan put forward today the endorsement of a treaty which does not exist. I thought I had made that clear previously, but perhaps it is clear now.

Earlier in his remarks, Mr. Zorin reverted once again to this question of force levels. I do not mean to take up very much time this morning on it but, of course, it is a necessary fact of life that if one country has piled up arms, armaments and armed forces well above the level of any other country, it is likely that that country should be the first to reduce those arms, armaments and armed forces. Mr. Zorin who, I imagine, believes in the philosophy which has equality as its principle, must realize that if a nation is very rich in arms and armed forces, it is not altogether unreasonable that it should be the first to reduce them to a lower level. If at the present time the Soviet Union has 3.6 million men under arms, this is a very considerable figure, and it is not surprising that other Governments would wish to see it reduced.

Now, the question arises of how soon. As I understand it, Mr. Khrushchov's proposals were that this reduction should take place over a period of one and a half to two years. I do not know whether the Soviet could agree, but we might wish to see that reduction take place rather more quickly; and, therefore, this would constitute a reduction in the armed forces in the first stage of our plan.

Nor do I understand why he finds so abhorrent now the idea of a level of 2.5 million men both for the Soviet Union and for the United States, when this was the precise level which the Soviet Union itself included for the first stage of both their 1956 and their 1957 plans. He and the Soviet Government evidently accepted then that the first thing to do was to bring about some kind of equality
between the level of armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. This was included in the Soviet plan. Therefore, I do not quite understand why the Eastern delegations should now decide that this would be an unfair measure to suggest in the first stage of our plan. He did not, of course, deal in any way with the question of armaments which was developed several times by Mr. Moch, and is very relevant to this particular measure.

Finally, I should like to speak about this example which the Soviet Union is supposed to have given to the world by a reduction of 1.2 million men unilaterally over a period of eighteen months or two years. I think that on this occasion Mr. Zorin was obviously speaking with his tongue in his cheek, because he suggested that the whole world had welcomed this as a clear sign of a desire for disarmament, as an example of the wishes of the Soviet Union to reduce their armed forces. But he did not go on to say that in other parts of Mr. Khrushchev's speech which we all round this table have read, Mr. Khrushchev went on to explain how the armed forces of the Soviet Union would be more powerful at the end of the reduction than they are today — more powerful. How it can be said that an example of a re-organization of their armed forces, which at the end of the day makes them more powerful than they are today, is a real contribution to balanced, safeguarded, controlled disarmament, I fail to see.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should just like to reply to one criticism Mr. Zorin made of the Italian delegation. He quoted an article in the Süddeutsche Zeitung which, if I understood rightly, in its turn quoted an Italian paper, the Giornale d'Italia. I have not, I admit, read the Süddeutsche Zeitung, or the Giornale d'Italia either but, if we want our discussions to be constructive, I think we must not base our remarks on quotations from the Press, but use the official documents of the Conference.

Regarding the problem of control, I believe that the Italian position has been defined very effectively and very clearly at previous meetings, as may be seen from the records.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (transl. from Russian): I only want to reply to the question Mr. Ormsby-Gore has just asked me. He asked: Why does the Soviet Union not like the level of 2.5 million men? Why does that figure seem unfair? That seems to me an odd way of putting the question. We are not talking about that, but are saying that the inclusion of this figure in the plan is of no importance for a real solution of the problem of reducing armed forces because, even without its inclusion, the armed forces of the Soviet Union will be reduced to 2,423,000 men. So it is not a question of whether we like this figure or not. We say that the figure does nothing to secure a real reduction of armed forces under the Western plan. That is what we are talking about.

I just wanted to explain that. Without the Western plan, without lengthy talks, we shall all the same carry out a reduction of armed forces. Why, then, put this in the plan and pretend it is a contribution by the whole of our Committee, the Western Powers included, to solving the disarmament problem? It surprises us why that should be necessary. The point is that the Western plan says nothing about an effective reduction of the armed forces of the Powers which are not making such reductions. The plan does not even mention a reduction of the armed forces of the United Kingdom and France, although earlier on those two Powers named a figure for such reductions. We find that surprising.

Mr. EATON (United States of America): I think Mr. Zorin must not have understood what Mr. Ormsby-Gore said. I understood Mr. Ormsby-Gore to say -- what I have tried to say on a number of occasions -- that we are tying force levels to armaments. We are suggesting in the first phase of our plan that we establish force levels, which we on our side will agree not to exceed, tied to a reduction in armaments.

There is nothing in Mr. Khrushchev's speech of 14 January, as Mr. Ormsby-Gore indicated, that talks about reduction of armaments. If you recall, he says that "we are working on a new fantastic weapon." I think I quote him correctly. He says, "Let us be clear that we are not" -- and I think I again quote him correctly -- "in any way weakening our fire-power." Perhaps this is disarmament as Mr. Zorin conceives it, but this does not strike us as a disarmament measure.
What we are suggesting, and what I suggested on 25 March, was that we should address ourselves to a true disarmament measure, that is the establishment of force-levels agreed between us which neither we nor the Soviet Union would exceed. We are not requiring any other country to agree with this commitment, but we are prepared for other countries to accept it if they see fit. We are prepared to make this agreement with the Soviet Union alone. All we want is to have an agreement on the force-levels and an agreement on armament reduction and the amounts which will go into international depots. At the same time, we want to have an agreement on the procedures which will be established subsequently to check levels of forces as they go down to 2.1 million men, and we also want to include other nations in these reduced levels, again with armaments. We feel that these are disarmament measures. We do not feel that the unilateral reduction of men with no consequent reduction of arms -- in fact, with a statement that arms are to be increased -- is a disarmament measure. There are parts of Mr. Khrushchev's speech which would indicate that it was an economic measure, not a disarmament measure.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I only want to reply to Mr. Eaton's last remark. Mr. Eaton spoke about the Western Powers tying force-levels to armaments. I am sorry, but I would like to draw the Western delegation's attention to the fact that in the Declaration of the Soviet Government on general and complete disarmament, which is under consideration by our Committee, it is quite clearly stated that we too propose to cut down armaments. The following measures are proposed to be put into effect in the first stage:

"The reduction, under appropriate control, of the strength of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the People's Republic of China to the level of 1.7 million men, and of those of the United Kingdom and France to the level of 650,000 men." (A/4219, page 14).

Further on it says:

"The reduction of the armaments and military equipment at the disposal of the armed forces of States to the extent ..." (ibid.).

I cannot, therefore, quite understand the question: have we set ourselves the
task of reducing armaments? We are setting ourselves this aim— and on a much larger scale than the Western Powers propose. We propose a reduction to 1.7 million men. This is really a serious reduction, which leads up to and prepares for general and complete disarmament. And, on the other hand, there is a corresponding reduction in armaments. The Western Powers, however, propose a level of 2.5 million men, in other words, virtually no reduction of the armed forces of the United States, no reduction of the armed forces of the United Kingdom and France and, as regards armaments, they propose to place some quantity of weapons or other in storage depots. This is rather different from a genuine reduction of armaments. It is merely placing armaments in reserve on their own territory, albeit under international control.

Thus, the essential point is that the Soviet Union is proposing really more radical steps for solving the problem of reducing armed forces and armaments. The Western plan, on the other hand, does not propose any radical measures. It proposes to maintain in substance the levels at present existing. There is the difference. I believe it is clear to everyone.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): I would like to thank Mr. Zorin. I agree that the provisions in the proposals which we are discussing here in the first stage of the Soviet plan are proposals for real disarmament measures. I tried last Friday to grab hold of those and to get on with the discussion of them. My comments this morning were directed to the constant reiteration that forces have already been reduced by 1.2 million, and that the unilateral declaration made by Mr. Khrushchev on 14 January constituted disarmament measures in any true sense. Those were not disarmament measures; we all know they were not disarmament measures.

However, I am quite glad that Mr. Zorin has pointed out and reiterated that the Soviet proposal to which we are addressing ourselves here does include a very real disarmament measure in its first stage. Our plan includes, in the first stage, an immediate ceiling of 2.5 million to which we are prepared to go—and I shall not reiterate that—followed by a reduction to 2.1 million under the conditions indicated just as quickly as we can achieve it. These are real measures. I do not want to be haunted any more by this statement that the
reduction by 1.2 million men is a unilateral disarmament measure when there was no reference to armaments being reduced but rather to the fact that they were being increased. That is the only point I wanted to make.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): If no other delegations wish to speak this morning I will proceed to the reading of the proposed communique:

"The thirteenth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 31 March 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 1 April 1960, at 10.30 a.m."
As I hear no dissenting voice I take it that the draft has been accepted.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.