FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ELEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Tuesday, 29 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Eaton (United States of America)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Col. K. SAVOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Canada:
Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.C. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R.J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. J. NOSEK
Gen. J. HRÔKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:
Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Gen. P. GENEVEY

Italy:
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DAINELLI
Cdr. A. SENZI

Poland:
Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LECHS
Brig.-Gen. J. SLIMINSKI

Romania:
Mr. E. MEZINCESCU
Mr. C. BOGDEN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Gen. A.A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:
Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
Miss B. SALT
Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

United States of America:
Mr. F.M. EATON
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

Secretariat:
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General
Dr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Personal Representative of the Secretary-General
Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare the eleventh meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament called to order, and I recognize the representative of Bulgaria as the first speaker.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): One cannot fail to note, on reading the record of the last meeting, that new light has been thrown on our discussions. All the Western delegations, even the most reticent, have had to admit that the goal of our Conference is, as already stressed in General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), general and complete disarmament. Thus our purpose in meeting here is to arrive at the preparation of an agreement which will lead us to the attainment of that goal — general and complete disarmament.

Since that is the goal set for our Conference, one is bound to be surprised that certain Western delegations, in particular the United States delegation, should have come and submitted to our meeting on 25 March proposals, not that we should begin work which could lead us to the study of the measures necessary to reach that goal, but that we should concentrate on one particular matter — control.

We must now ask ourselves whether there is really any point in beginning discussion of a single question — one moreover which, although linked with disarmament by its very nature, is subordinate to disarmament and is not itself disarmament or a part of disarmament. Certainly not, since we would not be tackling measures of actual disarmament, but only the problem of control, which should only come with disarmament, if any. It is easy to foresee that, if we start discussing control in a hypothetical case — where neither the main aspects, nor the scope, nor certain details of disarmament are known — so many questions can be raised about control that it will not be possible to get to the end of them. The United States representative has already raised fifteen.

Instead of putting the matter that way, which would result in our working without any prospect of success, would it not be more sensible to begin by defining the framework of our task, allowing ourselves to be guided by the United Nations resolution for which we all voted, and taking into account the identity or similarity of points of view noted during the discussion which has taken place here?

It must not be forgotten that in the past, whenever some progress has begun to be made on the subject of disarmament, it has always been with discussions about control that specialists have managed to block all further progress. Past
failures to achieve concrete measures of disarmament should induce us not to put things the wrong way round once again.

If we wish to achieve real progress on concrete measures of disarmament, it is naturally necessary to avoid repeating past errors and allowing ourselves to get involved in interminable discussions of hypothetical questions; we must, on the contrary, set ourselves to discuss concrete measures which, taken together, will constitute real disarmament — general and complete disarmament. Would it not be more practical, instead of beginning with discussion of the problem of control over some given disarmament measure by way of example, to attempt to define all the disarmament questions which we are going to discuss, to define their various stages, and then to tackle the individual problems, separately or in groups, while also providing appropriate measures of control in respect of each disarmament measure or group of measures already agreed on?

From the discussions which have taken place so far in our Committee, it appears that there are a number of points on which the views of both parties have come closer.

Would it not be more useful if we attempted to define those points more exactly, and to compare the plans proposed for the various stages of disarmament, starting, of course, with the fundamental principles which are to guide us in the accomplishment of our task: preparation of the measures necessary for general and complete disarmament?

The first point on which there appears to be similarity of view is that disarmament should be general and complete; that is also in conformity with the United Nations resolution. It is true that certain delegations think that the text adopted by the General Assembly is sufficiently vague for them to support, and that consequently, while saying everything, it nevertheless says nothing. But we have also noted that the reason why certain other Western delegations have adhered to that text is not that they find it vague. According to the statements of the United Kingdom representative, the United Nations resolution reflects his Government's policy in the sphere of disarmament. Seeing that at the meeting of 28 March other Western delegations expressed their agreement with the resolution and the goals it defines for our Conference, we shall certainly be able to agree on the principles which are to guide us in the accomplishment of our task.
There are also other disarmament measures about which points of view are fairly close. The principle of fixing limits for conventional forces and weapons has been recognized.

We consider that, if we really want to do useful work, we should start by defining the principles by which we shall be guided, and defining the various measures of disarmament in order to achieve general and complete disarmament, while at the same time working out all the measures of control corresponding to the measures of disarmament.

In response to the desire expressed by certain delegations to know what could be done in a first stage towards achieving that objective -- general and complete disarmament -- and then in a second stage, and so on, all the time linking the disarmament measures and the corresponding control measures together, the Bulgarian delegation would like to examine briefly some of the measures envisaged in the first and second stages of the Soviet plan and the Western plan.

In the first place, both plans provide for a reduction of force levels.

The plan proposed by the Soviet Union (A/4219) envisages, during the first stage, the reduction, under appropriate control, of the strength of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the People's Republic of China to the level of 1.7 million men, and of those of the United Kingdom and France to the level of 650,000 men. It also provides for the reduction of armaments and military equipment to the extent necessary to ensure that the remaining quantity of armaments corresponds to the level fixed for the armed forces. In the second stage, it is proposed to complete the disbandment of the armed forces retained by States.

These are absolutely concrete genuine measures expressed in figures for the numbers and the time needed for implementation. Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, set a time-limit of from twelve to eighteen months for the first stage, and twelve months for the second.

What is the situation in the Western plan with regard to this same problem -- the disbandment of armed forces and the factors which will ensure its accomplishment -- that is to say, the reduction by stages of force levels within a specific time?

There are differences on this point important enough to merit emphasis:
(1) The question of a reduction of force levels is given fourth place in the first stage of the Western plan. Thus it is not regarded as an immediate measure. Rather, it is a measure which depends on three other preliminary measures, namely:

A. The establishment of an International Disarmament Organization by progressive steps ...

B. Prior notification to the International Disarmament Organization of proposed launchings of space vehicles ...

C. Collection of information on present force-levels ...

(2) There is another important difference. When the Western plan finally does mention the reduction of armed forces, it refers to

D. The co-ordinated reduction or limitation of force-levels and conventional armaments upon the establishment of agreed arrangements and procedures for initial and continuing verification by the International Disarmament Organization as follows:

1. Initial force-level ceilings: 2,500,000 men for the Soviet Union ... and the United States; and agreed appropriate force-levels for certain other States;

2. The placing in storage depots, within national territory and under the supervision of the International Disarmament Organization -- that is to say the control organization -- of agreed types and quantities of conventional armaments ...

The difference from what is proposed in the Soviet plan is clearly enormous, and bears on three essential points:

(a) It cannot be really called a reduction of armed forces; the Western text comes closer to the truth when it uses the words "co-ordinated limitation". We would thus be completely justified in asking when and how conventional disarmament will be achieved.

(b) The ceiling is fixed at 2.5 million men for the Soviet Union and the United States. It will be seen -- the point has already been made -- that these figures, quite apart from the fact that they do not represent any decrease in force-levels, go well beyond the figures proposed by the Western Powers in 1952 and in 1955, when they were between 1 million and \( \frac{1}{2} \) million respectively. This enormous discrepancy between the levels proposed some years ago and those proposed
now has naturally caused an unpleasant surprise, and has raised a large number
of questions which have so far remained unanswered. Do the authors of the
Western plan consider that the international situation is more strained today
than in 1952 or 1955? What is the point of this attachment to conventional armed
forces at a time when the Soviet Union is taking unilateral steps to disband
on masse some 1.2 million men, and is thus reducing its forces to below the
ceiling fixed by the Western countries?

What is the meaning of this proposal, which actually represents a trend
towards increasing conventional forces, at a time when the Khrushchev plan,
proposing to disband all armed forces in four years, has been known for months
past?

Finally, what does this proposal mean now that the representative of
France declares that conventional armed forces are of no great importance from
the point of view of disarmament?

We may be told that one of the advantages of the Western plan lies in the
measures leading to cessation of the production of fissionable materials and
the preference given to nuclear disarmament. As regards the value of this
argument, we shall come back to the point in a moment.

We should like now to ask a further question: what does paragraph C, in
the second stage of the Western plan, mean when it says

"The cessation of production of fissionable materials ... conditional
upon satisfactory progress in the field of conventional disarmament"?

(TNCD/3, page 3)

As we see it, that means that the production of fissionable materials
is linked, in the Western plan, with measures of conventional disarmament in such
a way as to be dependent on them.

We feel bound to dwell at this point on a question which has already been asked,
namely: Why have ceilings not been fixed for France and the United Kingdom? Nor
can we abstain from pursuing our analysis as far as paragraph C of the second stage
of the Western plan, where it is said that another ceiling will be fixed later for
the force-levels of the Soviet Union and the United States, which are to be reduced
to 2.1 million men. That seems to us to be a matter of purely theoretical
importance. Nobody can give us a more or less approximate date for achieving such
a reduction -- insignificant though it is and far removed from the general and
comprehensive disarmament mentioned in the title of the Western plan.
Attempts have also been made to depict the Western plan as specially superior to the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament because from the very outset it eliminates, so they say, the nuclear threat. How? It is apparently thought to contain proposals for stopping the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and beginning their reconversion for peaceful purposes. But even when the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes has been stopped, and the reconversion for peaceful purposes of fissionable materials originally intended for weapons purposes has begun, there will still be sufficient quantities left to undertake and wage a destructive war with what remains in the warheads of the missiles or in existing atomic and hydrogen bombs.

At the same time, Western speakers criticize the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament because it did not, as they alleged, provide for nuclear disarmament from the very beginning of disarmament. It is common knowledge that the Soviet plan, in the light of earlier objections raised by the Western countries insisting that nuclear disarmament should come last, provides for the destruction of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of their use in the third stage.

The Soviet Union, however, in response to certain statements by the Western representatives, has agreed that nuclear disarmament may be carried out in any one of the earlier stages. Its representative in our Committee stated, on 21 March 1960, the following:

"If, however, the Western Powers express their readiness to accept a complete ban on atomic and hydrogen weapons -- to eliminate these from national armaments and destroy the stocks of such weapons -- right at the beginning of the disarmament programme, there will be no obstacle on our part to an agreement on this question; for the Soviet government has always been, and will continue to be, a determined advocate of the total prohibition of nuclear weapons at any stage of the disarmament programme". (TNCD/FV.5, page 43)

It appears that this proposal, too, is not to the liking of the representatives of the Western countries -- even though at the opening meeting Mr. Moch said: "... such is the destructive power of the new nuclear weapons that no one would dare to use them deliberately. No human stake can justify blasting humanity". (TNCD/FV.1, page 16)
Further, to ward off the danger of nuclear war, Mr. Moch proposed to abolish vehicles for nuclear devices: satellites, missiles, aircraft, aircraft carriers, submarines, launching-ramps, etc. And Mr. Moch concluded with these words:

"Once the vehicles have been banned and destroyed, the military stocks will appear worthless". (Ibid, page 16)

What is the value, it may be asked, of such a statement, seeing that the Western countries have not yet replied to the Soviet Union proposal which met the wishes expressed for a start to be made with nuclear disarmament. Are we to conclude that the Western countries do not want nuclear disarmament, and that the only reason for their including such a measure in their plan was to impress public opinion and create the impression that they wanted nuclear disarmament, but that in reality they are being very careful to avoid even mentioning it when there is a serious proposal for nuclear disarmament?

It has often been repeated that the Soviet plan is not realistic and that it cannot be carried out within the four-year period proposed.

It is time this question was answered: why can it not be achieved and in what sense is it unachievable? Is it materially impossible to reduce armed forces, to disband armies, to stop production of armaments, etc.?

Is it this material implementation people have in mind when they say that the four-year period is not long enough for implementing, in the practical and technical sense of the term, the Soviet plan? But, in that case, let us get this point clear. What is there that is unrealistic in the plan submitted by the socialist countries? To say that the Soviet plan is not realistic -- is that an argument?

In the light of the considerations we have put forward, we feel we may venture a comment: If anyone talks of lack of realism, the remark should apply rather to the Western plan -- that is, of course, if by realism we mean our attitude to disarmament problems, namely to try to make real progress in achieving general and complete disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I must say that the Canadian delegation was disappointed by the response at last Friday's meeting of the representative of the Soviet Union to the suggestion put forward by the representative of the United States regarding the course of our work this week. In our view that suggestion
was altogether a suitable one on which progress could be made in discussing a concrete measure of disarmament.

I believe that our general discussion during the first two weeks of the Conference has been useful. It has also been encouraging in certain respects. It is true that the Soviet representative indicated at our meeting on 25 March that the Western plan lacked certain provisions which the Socialist countries represented here regarded as essential to a disarmament plan. He seemed to express the view that it would be necessary to reach agreement on all measures to be included in a joint disarmament programme and decide upon the stage at which they would be implemented prior to discussing any of these measures in detail. In the same passage, however, Mr. Zorin drew attention to a number of points common to the two positions. I thought that he might have been conveying a desire to develop these common points and to add to them. Because of that impression I found it particularly difficult to understand his reluctance to accept the practical suggestion put forward by the representative of the United States.

The members of the Committee will recall that the representative of the United States also emphasized the areas of agreement when he introduced his suggestion. It appears to me that his suggestion accords with the general desire to turn to specific problems -- a desire which has been voiced by the Soviet representative as well as by others. And he cited a concrete disarmament measure in the context of which controls would have been discussed, which should have met the Soviet conditions in this respect.

After reading various declarations on the subject, it does not seem to me that the views of the Canadian delegation as to how controls can usefully be discussed differ essentially from those of the Soviet Union. Clearly we cannot go much beyond generalities and principles with respect to the processes of verification until we know approximately what the measures to be verified are. It is not clear to me that the Soviet representative is prepared to accept the connected proposition which seems to my delegation to have no less force: that is, that we cannot profitably discuss measures of disarmament without discussing also the processes of verification which would accompany them. In other words, to discuss "disarmament" alone, or "control" alone, is not an appropriate mode of reaching agreement on any item of a general disarmament programme. Each measure and its control have to be discussed in parallel. I had something to say along these lines at our sixth meeting.
Having in mind the explanations given by the chief Soviet representative, it seems that our Committee agrees that there must be adequate verification of all disarmament measures. It also appears that there is agreement on the need for an international control organ which will be in a position to verify the execution of each measure from its inception. It further appears that in both plans the first step would be the submission of statements or declarations regarding the levels of forces and armaments existing at the time the treaty comes into force.

Under the Soviet plan, so far as we have been able to establish its interpretation, there would be no reductions, either to 1.7 million or to any other level, until after the world conference had taken place. There does not seem to be any material difference between the timing of such reductions and the Western plan's timing of the reductions of United States and Soviet Union forces to 2.1 million, which would also take place after a world conference.

I should point out in passing that there are measures under our plan, the Western plan, which would be put into effect before the world conference. However, for the present it is not my purpose to discuss this difference between the two plans. I desire rather to emphasize the common elements: one concerns the timing and the other concerns the substantial nature of the reductions in the two cases. Whether the level is 2.1 million or 1.7 million the procedures for verification will be very much the same. It therefore appears to my delegation that it is possible and useful to consider in a concrete manner what these procedures might be. Among other things, such a discussion would assist us in reaching conclusions as to some of the attributes of the control organ and the practical problems with which it would be confronted.

It may be useful to reiterate here, although I should have thought it had already been made abundantly clear, that the five-Power plan does not propose that verification should begin before the measures of disarmament have been agreed or before these measures have begun to be put into effect. It is also our position, and this is what I should like to emphasize, that we cannot agree to any specific measure of disarmament unless there is also agreement on the accompanying measures of verification.

At present it must be admitted that there is a considerable difference between the levels to which the forces of the two largest powers are to be reduced after the world conference — 2.1 million and 1.7 million represents quite a difference, and it is unlikely that agreement can be reached on one figure without long
negotiations. It would certainly advance matters if we were to set aside for
the moment all controversy over the precise figure of the reduction and, as the
representative of the United States has suggested, examine the requirements for
adequate verification on the basis of a reduction to 2.1 million. This surely is
a sound way of getting down to particulars and advancing the work of our Committee.
So far we have been given no sufficiently detailed and adequate information about
the forms of verification which the Soviet Union envisages as appropriate in
relation to the processes of reduction. I trust that this method, or something
very like it, will be acceptable to the Soviet representative. We shall find
grave difficulty in proceeding very far if members of the Committee decline to
participate in the examination of the verification processes as each measure of
disarmament comes up for discussion.

In closing, I feel I must refer to suggestions made in this Committee to the
effect that a number of governments represented here, including the Canadian
Government, had in some fashion withdrawn in whole or in part their endorsement
of the General Assembly resolution. Our position with respect to the resolution
is like that of the United Kingdom: we accepted the resolution as a whole and
that is our continuing position. We find no difficulty in reaffirming that our
objectives are those laid down in the resolution -- all of them -- and in the
precise terms of the resolution. This does not mean, of course, that we accept
the interpretation which some speakers in the Committee have tried to give the
resolution, i.e., that it calls on this Ten Nation Committee to approach the
problem of achieving disarmament in accordance with the methods sketched out in
one particular programme, nor can I see that the resolution lays a mandate on this
Ten Nation Committee to draft a disarmament treaty on the lines of that programme
or any other programme. No, the resolution expresses the General Assembly's hope
that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under
effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in
the shortest possible time.

Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom): I think that some of the points
General Burns has just made were extremely relevant to the remarks we heard
earlier from the representative of Bulgaria. I would just like to make a few
comments on that earlier speech and take up again some of the points that have
already been made by General Burns.
First of all, the representative of Bulgaria said once again, as some of his colleagues have said previously, that last week the United States representative in his intervention of Friday talked about control in a hypothetical way and had not addressed his remarks to any particular measures of control. All I can say is that I think that we have been listening to different speeches because I heard very definitely from the United States representative the precise measures of disarmament he was suggesting should be discussed, in particular with regard to the control and verification that would need to be applied to them.

The representative of Bulgaria then went on to discuss where there appeared to be some agreement between us, that is to say, a comparison of the Western plan and the Soviet plan. He pointed out that in the first two stages the Western plan suggested a reduction in the number of armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States to 2.1 million whereas in the Soviet plan there was a suggested reduction in the first stage to 1.7 million. But he pointed out that in the Soviet plan this 1.7 million was to be achieved with a definite time-limit of one year or one year and a half, but he omitted to add that this one year or year and a half would only begin after the conclusion of a world conference on disarmament. This may be a very long time off and it would be quite unrealistic to imagine that this reduction would be brought about in a year or a year and a half from now—this is looking well into the future—whereas the figures in the Western plan for the initial reductions to 2.5 million could be carried out in the comparatively near future and before any world conference on disarmament had taken place. This is an important difference between the two plans and indicates that certain measures of disarmament would, in fact, occur earlier under the Western plan than they would under the Soviet plan.

He then went on to say that when we looked at the first stage of the Western plan the force-level ceilings appeared only as the fourth item, in fourth position, and that they were dependent on three prior measures. I do not think it would be true to say that they were dependent on all the three prior measures, certainly if he looks at the first measure to which he referred—the establishment of an international disarmament organization. I understood we were all agreed that this was one of the first things that would have to be done before any disarmament took place. We shall have to establish the organization which is going to verify the measures. We have heard from the Soviet representative that he agrees to this organization—the means of carrying out the verification—coming into existence
in time to apply itself to any measures of disarmament which were agreed to. Therefore, I do not think there can be any objection whatever to the establishment of the international disarmament organization, or as the Soviet plan calls it, the international control organization. That is agreed between all of us.

The second measure is the prior notification to this organization of proposed launchings of space vehicles. I agree that this measure is not necessarily to be placed before the carrying out of the force-level ceilings -- not necessarily -- but I would have thought that this was a measure upon which we could all agree. I have heard no objection to this measure from any representative of the Eastern countries, and if there are objections to this measure perhaps we should be told what they are and why they are put forward.

The third prior measure, as the Bulgarian representative called it, is the collection of information on present force-levels. But is that objected to? As I pointed out in a previous intervention, it appears as one of the first measures in the Soviet Union's 1955 plan. Under the first stage we read:

"The United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France shall furnish the Disarmament Commission, within one month after the entry into force of the convention (treaty), with complete official figures of their armed forces, conventional armaments and expenditure for military requirements." (DC/71, annex 15, page 21)

We think that is a very good provision. We have put it in our plan. Are there objections to it? Before we start on the process of disarmament, is it not as well for us all to know what the present levels of armed forces are?

Previously we heard, I think from the Polish representative, that he was surprised at this measure. Now we hear it from the Bulgarian representative. We should like to know what their objections to this are. The Polish representative said, I believe, that he knew what the figures for the Soviet armed forces are. We have been told them, I think, for the first time this year. Incidentally, I should remind the representatives around the table that the figures for the Soviet armed forces at the present time, according to Mr. Khrushchev, are 3.6 million and not 2.5 million as the Bulgarian representative was trying to suggest. If I remember rightly, he said that the provision for force-ceilings in the first stage required no reductions in armed forces. However, if the Soviet Union's armed forces today are 3.6 million, a reduction to 2.5 million is very considerable; a reduction to 2.1 million is even more considerable.
The Bulgarian representative then went on to suggest that this was not a measure of any considerable disarmament. I have tried to show that, in fact, it does require — certainly from the Soviet Union — a much more rapid run-down of their forces than they at present contemplate. In addition, I would like to remind Mr. Tarabanov of the provisions in the 1957 Soviet plan. These were put forward in March 1957, and what do they say about a first-stage reduction? They say: "The said five Powers shall, by the end of 1958, reduce their armed forces to the following levels: United States, the Soviet Union and China to 2.5 million men." (Disarmament Commission Official Records, Supplement for Jan.-Dec. 1957, page 6). That was to take place two and a half years after this plan was introduced, which was in March 1956; namely, by the end of 1958 the force levels were to be 2.5 million for the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

Therefore, I think it would be wrong to suggest that fixing your force-level ceilings at 2.5 million constitutes no progress in disarmament. This is particularly true when we bear in mind — as General Burns pointed out — that this level of armaments could be achieved in the comparatively near future with little verification and before a world conference on disarmament had taken place.

The representative of Bulgaria then went on to discuss the question of nuclear disarmament. He said that although originally there had been provision for nuclear disarmament only in the third stage of the Soviet plan, the representative of the Soviet Union more recently had said that they were quite prepared to have nuclear disarmament in the first stage. In this he was in flat contradiction with what the Czechoslovak representative had just told me, because he had said that nuclear disarmament should take place only in the third stage.

However, if we take the Soviet representative's suggestion, what was it? It was not that we should start with some measure of nuclear disarmament in the first stage, but that we should start by prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in the first stage. But this is a measure which is uncontrollable at the present time, unless the representative of Bulgaria is prepared to intervene and tell us how he would control a ban on the use of nuclear weapons with our present scientific knowledge. Surely if we are to arrive at a measure of nuclear disarmament we must start by stopping the further production of fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes. We must start by transferring from existing stockpiles of nuclear
weapons and fissile materials quantities of this material to peaceful uses. Surely this is the method to bring about nuclear disarmament, and that is why we put it in our first two stages. We think that this is something which is probably controllable. We should have a study made of it by all of us and should decide on which control measures should be introduced to stop the production of fissile material for weapon purposes, and also to arrange for the reconversion of that material to peaceful uses.

That seems to us to be a measure which has to be taken at some time. The Soviet plan talks about ending the production of nuclear weapons. What are their details? What are the details of their plan for ending the production of nuclear weapons? Do they not intend to cut off the production of fissile material? Is it not one of the first elements of any nuclear disarmament? Therefore, we suggest that this should be studied in the first stage and, if we have success in those studies, we should then implement the measures of control over the cut-off of nuclear material for weapon purposes. We should also implement the measure for reconverting existing fissile material to a form in which it can be used for peaceful purposes. That seems to us to be a sensible way of proceeding.

The representative of Bulgaria finally suggested that the Soviet plan was more realistic compared with the Western plan since it contained time-limits, but I think many of us have already pointed out how difficult it is to set time-limits at this stage. We have referred to the difficulty of ensuring that ninety nations will come to an agreement on disarmament within one year from the calling of the disarmament conference.

Although we have had this reiteration of the realism of placing time-limits on disarmament stages we have had no arguments to indicate how that is regarded as being realistic. I would again like to make the point, which General Burns has already made, that this so-called four-year time-limit is entirely dependent on the successful conclusion of this world conference. I remain extremely sceptical of the possibility of carrying through a plan of this kind in four years or any other period of time laid down beforehand.

I am bound to say that the more the Bulgarian representative talked about the Soviet plan the more imprecise it seemed to me to become and the more unrealistic many of its aspects appeared to me to be; and I am also bound to say that the more I hear from the representatives of the communist countries round this table about the Soviet plan, the more convinced I become of the overwhelming advantages of the Western plan.
Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I should like to thank the United Kingdom representative for referring to certain matters which I myself raised in my statement at the opening of the meeting.

He said, first, that in the Western plan the reduction of the armed forces of the Great Powers, and in particular those of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, was not conditional on any of the points mentioned in the Western plan. He himself, however, stated that a control organization or, as the Western plan has it, an International Disarmament Organization, would have to be established before this "reduction", as he calls it, could take place. But let us be clear on this point. This is not a reduction, but simply a fixation of the armed force levels of the two Great Powers at 2,500,000 men, which means a level higher than that which the Soviet Union itself fixed when it decided upon the latest reduction of its armed force level; it also means that the United States would, according to its latest statements, actually have to raise its level of armed forces. Thus there is no question of a reduction of forces; what the Soviet Union has itself decided to do is not for us to decide. It has taken the decision itself.

Furthermore, the Western plan contains a number of points which are placed before the reduction of armed force levels. I read in particular: "The establishment of an international disarmament organization by progressive steps ...." -- that is to say that a certain time would be needed to make this organization work -- not to reach agreement at an international conference or in some other way -- but merely to make it work in one way or another.

That is the first point.

We have not reached agreement. As for the launching of space vehicles and other measures provided for here, which are not linked to any other condition, is it possible to think of limiting these activities and hedging them in with conditions while the military bases which certain countries have on foreign territories are left where they are?

That is a second point.

I should like to point out that this depends also on the collection of information which would have to be carried out and which would certainly entail a certain amount of work, whereas the United States, according to what it says, has at present an armed force level below 2,500,000 men, and we are also informed of a decision by the Soviet Union that its forces are going to be reduced by 1,200,000 men within a specified period.
I repeat once again that what we have here is not a disarmament measure but simply a measure of fixation at the present levels.

Mr. Armstige-Gore then raised the question of nuclear disarmament. He recalled that the representative of the Soviet Union had stated at the meeting on 25 March that the Soviet Union was prepared to try and meet certain wishes expressed by the Western Powers; and he agreed to put nuclear disarmament in one of the stages preceding the third stage of disarmament.

The United Kingdom representative now tells us that it is impossible to control and carry out such disarmament. I have before me the verbatim record of our first meeting on 15 March and, in particular, the statement made by the representative of France.

Here is exactly what he says: "Once the vehicles have been banned and destroyed, the military stocks" — let me make it clear: the military stocks of fissionable materials — "will appear worthless." (TNOD/PV.1, page 12). If these military stocks are worthless, why not transform and convert them immediately? Why not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, if they are entirely worthless and if we have a system of control that will certainly be adequate? We agree. I do not think, therefore, in view of statements made here by the representatives of the Western Powers from which suitable conclusions may be drawn, that it is absolutely necessary to have all these measures for finding stocks which may have been hidden away.

We have now been told once again that the time-limits laid down in the plan upheld by the socialist countries cannot be observed and that the plan is unrealistic precisely because it includes time-limits. But we were not told the reasons why these time-limits cannot be observed. We were merely given an example, that of the Conference on the Law of the Sea; but I do not think this example counts for anything. The Soviet Union has stated here that, according to available data, it is technically possible to lower force levels as well as take certain measures of reduction. Why could the Western Powers not proceed in the same way as they have done previously, and as the Soviet Union is doing, in the reduction of force levels? And if this reduction cannot be fully achieved within the proposed time-limits, why do they not say within what time-limits this could be done? Instead, all they do is to say that we cannot lay down or even estimate any time-limits. I reserve the right, of course, to speak again when I have studied the other remarks made by the United Kingdom representative.
Mr. ORMOND-GORE (United Kingdom): As I wish to reply to one or two of the comments made by the representative of Bulgaria, if Mr. Moch does not mind, perhaps I could have the floor first because the representative from Bulgaria began by saying that I had made it clear that the limitation of force-levels was not conditional on other measures of the Western plan. There may have been some difficulty about the interpretation, but that is not what I said. I said that the order of priority was not necessarily relevant to this particular measure, that the question of the prior notification of proposed launchings of space-vehicles need not necessarily come into effect previous to the establishment of the force-levels.

He then repeated the remark he had made previously that the force-levels mentioned did not constitute a reduction. But, as he did not deny that the Soviet Union's present armed forces are 3.6 million men, I think he must agree that if this measure was introduced, say this year, this would require a very considerable reduction in the Soviet armed forces. I think we may be working on different figures because I understood that Mr. Khrushchev has said that the forces would be reduced from 3.6 million men to 2.4 million men over a period of one and a half to two years, whereas the representative of Bulgaria said that they were to be reduced to 2.2 million men. This is the first time that I have heard that figure.

He then went on to talk about this measure with regard to the prior notification of the launchings of space-vehicles and seemed to think that it had some connexion with military missiles and air bases. But I think if he reads the Western plan carefully he will see that this is just the first measure to ensure that no vehicle is put into space equipped with a weapon of mass destruction. Now, that is a measure on which I imagine we are all agreed around this table, that it would be wise to see that vehicles entering outer space were not turned into military weapons; and this is the first measure to bring that state of affairs about. It is not connected with military affairs. Indeed, I was rather disturbed to hear the representative of Bulgaria introduce the question of military bases with regard to this measure. I hope he was not inferring that these space vehicles were already being used for military purposes by the Soviet Union or that they had some possibility of using them for military purposes. We regard this measure as quite unconnected with military bases. This is a measure to ensure that we do not have further difficulties thrust upon us in disarmament negotiations. This is a measure to ensure that never does anybody put into space a vehicle equipped with weapons of mass destruction.
He finished by saying that, although I had said that the laying down of time-limits for disarmament measures was unrealistic, nevertheless we had not advanced any good arguments for this. He went on to say that the Soviet Union had stated it was technically possible to do it. It may be all right for the Bulgarian representative to accept blindly that what the Soviet Union says is technically possible, but we, using our own minds, do not believe that it is technically possible to lay down in advance the precise period during which a measure of disarmament can be carried out before there is even agreement on the carrying out of such measures. Therefore, the reason why we do not mention a time-limit, the reason why we do not think it is realistic to lay down time-limits, is simply and solely that we do not believe it is possible. In the general nature of things it is not possible to say now precisely how long it is going to take to carry out these very far-reaching measures which are contained in both our plans.

**Mr. MOGH (France) (translation from French):** Mr. Ormsby-Gore has just made a remarkably clear extemporaneous speech on the qualities of our plan, so that I shall have no need at all to revert to it. He has just replied to Mr. Tarabanov, the representative of Bulgaria; and I myself should like to make five comments on Mr. Tarabanov's statement. Because I still hope that the constructive part of these negotiations will in the end be reached, I regard these points as important.

My first comment is this. We have discussed -- or rather, Mr. Ormsby-Gore and Mr. Tarabanov have discussed -- the present force levels. This leads me to make two different observations as part of my first comment. The first is that unilateral decisions never have very much international effect, because one never knows when or to what extent they are implemented; whereas the same measure carried out under international control would have important consequences.

The discussion which has just taken place is evidence that unsupervised gestures lack psychological effect.

The second point I want to make in my first comment is that, even if the force levels of 2.5 million men proposed for the first stage corresponded to the present strength of the Soviet and United States forces -- again, we do not know that they do -- it would still be true that our plan also deals with armaments, which in my view are vastly more important than manpower. The first part of the
plan states that armaments must bear a relationship to the agreed force levels, the second part states, in still greater detail, that armaments must be abolished "in agreed relation to the force level ceilings". I therefore ask you to ponder for a moment the fundamental difference between the two following situations:

In the first there are 2.5 million men with the colours, but five million additional reservists can immediately be re-equipped and the strength of the armed forces raised from 2.5 million to 7.5 million men within a few days.

In the second, where armaments are kept in relation to the authorized force levels, if five million reservists were called up they could not be given heavy equipment, but only rifles, sub-machine guns or grenades.

The difference seems to me fundamental, and there is rather too great a tendency to lose sight of it by talking solely about force levels just because these can be expressed in figures, whereas we are only mentioning force levels in order to arrive at limitation of armaments.

A job we could usefully do at once, without even reaching agreement on any plan or any levels, would be to set up a small group of experts to work out the quantity and types of arms — I mean the major armament — required for one million men; this would be multiplied by 2.5 and by 2.1 if our figures are adopted. That is my first comment.

My second comment concerns what the representative of Bulgaria said about the international organization. If I understood him aright, he said that to set it up at the beginning would be a waste of time. May I refer him to documents which he certainly respects? It is all in the old Soviet proposals; and in the last but one, dated 27 March 1956 -- I do not know why much less is said about this than about the one dated 10 May 1955 -- I find the following sentences:

"With a view to the establishment of effective international control over the fulfilment of States of the above-mentioned obligations with respect to the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, an international control organ shall be established having the following rights and powers." (DO/50.1/41, page 3)

I will refrain from reading the rights and powers of this organization, and will merely quote from paragraph 6:

"The control organ shall establish in the capitals of States parties to the agreement branches whose functions shall include maintaining liaison with the governmental organizations of States..." (ibid., page 5).
In paragraph 7 I find:

"The international control organ shall be established within the two months following the entry into force of the agreement. It shall establish its local branches, set up the control posts ..." (ibid., page 5)

In paragraph 9 we have:

"The States parties to the agreement shall submit to the international control organ within one month after its establishment complete official figures of their armed forces, conventional armaments and expenditures for military requirements." (ibid., page 5)

These are texts which we are ready to discuss seriously and can accept without many amendments. I therefore ask the representative of Bulgaria not to forget all that the Soviet delegation wrote on the subject before we had the pleasure of seeing Bulgaria at this table.

My third comment concerns space vehicles. Do not protest against the duty of prior notification. The Soviet Government has already accepted that. It accepted it in connexion with the International Geophysical Year. I have not the text here, but it is in my office and I shall be able to show you that very little would have to be amended in what has already been accepted for a scientific purpose in order to arrive at statements which would give complete security in terms of peace.

My fourth comment refers to nuclear disarmament. The representative of Bulgaria referred to certain expressions of mine; for example:

"Once the vehicles have been banned and destroyed, the military stocks will appear worthless." (TNCD/PV.1, page 16)

He immediately added, with apparently impeccable logic: if they are worthless, why not prohibit them?

This seems very simple, and I should be ready to ban them if I could control the ban. Any representative at this table who could show us how to control a prohibition of stockpiling would do all his colleagues an outstanding service. We should breathe more freely because our work would advance more quickly.

In reality the controlled discontinuance of production is a first check. But for the ban on use, which is so close to the heart of the Soviet representative, we have not yet found a method of control. A control which consists in saying that the weapons have not been used today is worthless, because it will not tell us beforehand that they will not be used a week hence.
To be precise, the only method of laying the foundations for a guarantee is to prohibit the vehicles, for when they are prohibited — I am keeping to my formula — the accumulated stocks will lose their value, until the States themselves have no interest in keeping them and convert them to peaceful ends.

I am well aware that this is an indirect method of control; but, I repeat, offer us a more direct one, for we have learnt our lesson from the failure of the past outlawing war and shall not be satisfied with a moral prohibition.

My fifth and last observation concerns time-limits. Mr. Ormsby-Gore has already replied on this matter, but I should like to make it quite clear at this point that those of us who regard ourselves as men capable of reasoning for themselves, that is to say as distant disciples of Descartes, will not agree to bow down in any way before dogma or the criterion of authority.

Mr. Zorin will forgive me if I answer Mr. Tarabanov by saying that his statement that a thing is possible in four years is not sufficient to make me accept it. I require evidence, and the little evidence I have indicates the contrary. These negotiations have been going on for nine years with a two-year interruption. When we started them — Mr. Vyshinsky, Mr. Jessup, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and I — none of us thought that nine years later we should not have solved anything at all.

The negotiations on this very small matter of stopping test explosions — which is not disarmament and is one of the simplest of all matters — have been going on for eighteen months, and to this day only partial agreement has been reached. So when we hear talk of a conference of eighty-two States — even more than eighty-two, for there are States not Members of the United Nations which ought to participate — with all their accumulated rivalries, jealousies and local distrust, I cannot possibly say how long it would last, but I do know from past experience that the whole range of measures we have to deal with and the whole range of difficulties which we have to overcome in a general disarmament plan are so great that no one of good faith can seriously propose a time-limit. One can express the wish to move as quickly as possible, to overcome the difficulties in four, six or eight years; but these are only wishes. We have
no certainty whatsoever that, even if all the participants had the best will in
the world, we should succeed in overcoming these difficulties within a pre-arranged
time-limit. That is why we do not accept a time-limit.

Those are the five comments I have thought it necessary, as part of what I
believe to be a consistently realistic approach, to set against the statements
made by the representative of Bulgaria.

Mr. MEZINCESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I should first
like to comment on a statement just made by the United Kingdom representative and
repeated by the representative of France. We shall, of course, carefully study
in the verbatim report the speeches made by the representatives of the
United Kingdom and France. But I should like to make one point straight away.
Perhaps the United Kingdom representative will be so good as to give us
explanations which will help us to a better understanding of the Western Powers'
position on this very controversial question of time-limits and of whether a
term can or cannot be set for the implementation of a disarmament programme.

In his statement made on 16 March 1960 the United Kingdom representative
said -- I quote:

(continues in English)

"Without in any way limiting ourselves or tying ourselves down
we think it might be reasonable to try and complete the measures in
Stage I in say one year." (TNOD/PV.2, page 9)

(translation from French)

That sentence shows true British caution. It contains at least two or
three reservations -- I may perhaps have miscounted. But in presenting the
measures included in the first stage of the Western plan Mr. Ormsby-Gore was
holding out the prospect that the measures envisaged in the first stage of the
British plan could be put into effect "in say one year". In the circumstances
I wonder if, "without tying or limiting ourselves", we could lay down time-limits,
let us say for the second stage, or let us say for the third stage, of a
dismament plan, and, by making the algebraic sum of the time-limits fixed for
the first, second and third stages, get an idea of how long it could take to
implement a complete programme, an overall plan for general and complete
dismament.
I can assure the representative of France that I am just as capable of thinking for myself as any other delegate here present. But let us now compare what Mr. Ormsby-Gore said with what Mr. Zorin said when in the first few days of our Conference he presented the Soviet plan in greater detail and indicated precisely the time-limits envisaged for each stage, that is to say the estimated time-limits required for the implementation of the measures set out for each stage. He then indicated how this time-limit of four years for the implementation of an overall plan for general and complete disarmament had been reached.

I do not think we ought to adopt a "don't know" position towards the time-limits for an overall programme of general and complete disarmament. Nor ought we to refuse to explore this question in order to try to reach agreement on time-limits. It is not possible to make constructive criticisms of the plan advocated by the socialist countries by taking this example of time-limits and not putting forward alternative time-limits. The representatives of the Western countries think that the four-year limit laid down in the Soviet proposal is too short for the implementation of that plan; but they do not tell us their own views on this question of the time-limit.

They tell us that it is impossible to establish a time-limit for putting a general and complete disarmament plan into effect. But in that case there are two irreconcilable positions. If we want to make progress in our work, what we must do is to look for common ground and for a way to reconcile our views on the establishment of the time-limit within which an overall plan for general and complete disarmament could be put into operation.

I should now like to make a second observation. This refers to the question of prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.

A few days ago the representative of France made a statement on the possibilities of controlling various aspects of the nuclear capacity of a country. He enumerated four controllable and two uncontrollable operations. I have not the document with me at the moment, but I do not think the representative of France will want me to quote it, because I believe we all remember it. In any case because, of the six operations which he enumerated in connexion with the nuclear capacity of a country, he thought four were controllable and two were not, he concluded that we shall never manage to abolish nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States and put the prohibition of nuclear weapons into practice.
I cannot tell whether his statement is correct, for I am no expert in this matter; but it does not seem to me justifiable to infer from it that the prohibition of nuclear weapons is impossible. I should like to explain why this inference raises certain doubts in my mind.

Let us base our examination on the plan put forward by the Soviet Union and supported by all the socialist countries. It contains the following provision:

"The complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the cessation of the manufacture of all types of these weapons, their elimination from the armaments of States and the destruction of stockpiles." (A/4219, page 13).

At what moment, then, does the Soviet plan propose that there shall be a total ban on atomic and hydrogen weapons and that they shall be eliminated from the armaments of States? At the third stage; that is to say at the moment when, if the measures provided for in the second stage have been implemented, the armed forces and armaments of States have all ceased to exist, along with all military, air and naval bases on foreign territory, means of delivery of nuclear weapons, including rockets and aircraft irrespective of their range, and so forth. That means the moment when, according to the Soviet plan, we should have every guarantee, at the third stage, that nuclear weapons could never be brought back into the arsenals of States and used in case of war, since all stocks of nuclear weapons would have been destroyed. This is a particularly important point, for the Western plan nowhere speaks of the destruction of nuclear weapon stocks, unless at the third stage, and indeed makes no reference to their final destruction.

We would thus have: destruction of nuclear weapon stocks, that is to say fissionable material contained in nuclear warheads; discontinuance of production of fissionable material for military purposes; and the conversion of stocks of existing fissionable material to peaceful uses. We shall also have the destruction of all vehicles capable of carrying nuclear weapons and of guns capable of firing nuclear shells, at least at their present stage of development and up to intercontinental rockets, satellites, and so forth; that is to say, we shall have accomplished all the operations which have been discussed here.

The Soviet plan further states:

"Scientific research for military purposes and the development of weapons and military equipment shall be prohibited." (A/4219, page 15).
All these measures must be accompanied by the widest and most effective possible international control.

I therefore wonder why we cannot admit the possibility of effectively prohibiting nuclear weapons if we tackle the whole problem radically and adopt measures which can really solve it.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): First of all I should like to comment briefly on the French representative's statement, and in particular his last remark. I wish to emphasize that in our opinion the misinterpretation of clear explanations given in the course of our work is not calculated to help it forward. I should like to remind you of the explanation I gave at the eighth meeting of our Committee regarding the negotiations which must precede the execution of the programme of general and complete disarmament. I said then explicitly, on behalf of all the delegations of the socialist countries on the Committee, that there would be a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or a disarmament conference "before" — I repeat "before" — "the signature of the treaty on general and complete disarmament" (TNOD/FV.8, page 7). So I fail to see what grounds certain representatives have — in particular Mr. Moch, who has done this for the second time today — for continuing to maintain that we require the four-year period to include not only execution of the plan, but also the preliminary discussions and the special session of the United Nations General Assembly or the disarmament conference.

My second comment concerns the United Kingdom representative's remarks about the possibility of laying down time-limits for specific measures, in particular the reduction of conventional armed forces. I must say that if it is not considered possible to lay down in advance time-limits for a reduction of armed forces, which is a relatively easy measure, no agreement will be possible on any measure at all, and it seems to me that the United Kingdom representative was not justified in criticizing Mr. Tarabanov, the Bulgarian representative, for referring only to the Soviet Union's experience of the reduction of armed forces and the time required for that reduction. The reason why we refer to this experience of the Soviet Union is very simple: it is that, unfortunately, there are as yet no other examples of unilateral reduction of armed forces by Great Powers. Furthermore, I should like to remind the United Kingdom representative that at the ninth meeting of our Committee he admitted that specific dates for the completion of the various measures of disarmament should be laid down.
Mr. ORMESBY-GORE (United Kingdom): I should like to try once more to clarify the position about time-limits, forecasts and dates. As I understand the representative of Romania, he was trying to suggest that the forecast that I had made as regards the possible carrying out of the first stage of our plan in one year was something very similar to a time-limit. He was good enough to say that, of course, I had made all the usual reservations, which I think in cases of this kind are very important. I wished to indicate that the measures set out in the first stage of the Western plan, although they might look rather formidable on paper, consisted of a number of comparatively minor measures and a number of important studies — and I said that I thought it might be possible to complete this work in one year. This is a forecast, it is not a condition of the plan; we do not write into the plan that this should be carried out in one year. We indicate that this is the possible period in which this work might be completed, but if it was not completed in one year it could carry on into the next year; no obligations would have been broken by anybody.

If the representative of Romania now says that that is exactly the same as what he means by a time-limit, this of course puts a very different interpretation on the whole of the Soviet plan. If he is now suggesting that when they talk about a four-year plan all they mean is that they are making a forecast such as I have made, this, of course, completely changes the basis of their proposal. I would be very interested to hear from him whether that is now his impression of the question of time-limits as regards the Soviet plan. If not, his intervention was not particularly relevant. If he sees that there is a clear distinction between a forecast of a possible time period and time-limits, then I would be very happy because that is a position I have tried to explain in this Conference on previous occasions.

The representative of Poland said that I had mentioned actual dates and that it would be impossible to arrive at fixed force levels unless you had specific dates. This is perfectly true of course: if you had an agreement on a specific measure of disarmament, you would have to set out in the agreement when the level of armaments should be reached; this is quite understandable. It is different from a forecast, it is quite different from a time-limit for an entire disarmament plan which, incidentally, includes total disarmament by all the Powers in the world.
(Mr. Ormsby-Gore, United Kingdom)

I would remind the Polish representative of what is actually written in the Soviet plan. We read the heading — and I am quoting from the United Nations document: "The following measures are proposed for the first stage", and as a measure in the first stage we have:

"The reduction of the strength of the armed forces of other States to levels to be agreed upon at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or at a world conference on general and complete disarmament". (A/4219, page 14)

That is regarded as a measure in the first stage and we have been told that this stage would take one year to one and a half years. We say that we believe this is unrealistic. We do not mind the Soviet Union and the other communist countries making a forecast of what might happen, and if that is what we are now to understand by time-limits, as I say, it puts a different complexion on the Soviet plan — if it is merely a forecast. All I would say is that forecasts are not rigid things, they do not bind countries. Indeed, in trying to make forecasts, I am bound to tell the representative of Romania that I am not a particularly good forecaster. Mr. Moch referred to the negotiations of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests and I am bound to tell my colleagues that on arriving at that Conference I made the forecast that the maximum time it would take was six months and it has now taken sixteen months. But none of us has broken any obligations and we are still working patiently to arrive at a treaty. Therefore, there is this very firm distinction between the making of a forecast — what you hope may happen — and the writing into a treaty of specific time periods, the non-fulfilment of which would be a breach of the treaty.

Mr. MOGH (France) (translation from French): I am glad that this meeting, which seemed likely to come to an end after we had heard the first speaker on the list, has taken the turn it has and is producing a number of important clarifications.

I wish to go back for a moment to this question of time-limits. I should like to inform those of our colleagues who are taking part in this discussion for the first time, that the position of the Western Powers, though it has varied in the course of time, has always retained one constant feature — this distrust of time-limits. In a plan now far behind us, which is contained in the latest dated of the Franco-British working papers, the plan of 19 March 1956, three stages were envisaged; but an annex to the plan showed how the first stage would lead into the second and the second into the third.
The procedure we devised was cumbersome, but it was consistent with this aim of not committing ourselves rashly, in view of the difficulties we suspected and the political state of the world. We proposed that, at the end of the first stage, the control organ should report to its executive committee informing it whether the measures had been properly carried out and whether it considered itself to be in a position to supervise the new measures of the second stage.

On the basis of this report the executive committee of the international disarmament organization was required to decide, unanimously, that the measures had been properly carried out, and that the control organ was in a position to supervise the new measures. If it so decided, unanimously, the second stage was to begin at once. If the voting was divided, if the decision was not unanimous, a period of six months would be allowed for completion of the overdue operations. At the end of this six months period another vote would be taken, which again had to be unanimous; if it were not, the laggards were to be allowed a further period of three months. On the expiry of these three months, if unanimity was not achieved, the matter was to be brought before the Security Council. A similar procedure applied to the transition from the second stage to the third. Here you see this feeling we have always had about the difficulty of specifying exact stages and the need to restore confidence.

In a document issued a year and some months later, this time a four-Power document, presented by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, a first stage of one year was provided for: "... Within one year from the entry into force of the Convention, the following States will restrict ...". (DC/113, Annex 5). But the second stage was not to be negotiated until the end of the first, i.e. the first stage was to be completed and then the content and duration of the second stage were to be further discussed. That is more or less the idea to which Mr. Crasby-Gore was reverting just now when he mentioned his forecast of one year. If the first stage includes only simple operations, it is certainly possible to make a forecast with a fair degree of mathematical certainty, though that does not mean that a firm date can be specified in the treaty. That is a matter for discussion. But the operations are never simple; in particular, I do not know whether you all realize just what the obligation to eliminate a certain number of weapons means — first an agreement on the weapons to be eliminated — such and such a piece of artillery, as distinct from some other piece — and then a relationship between the force-levels and each of these weapons. How can one forecast the time needed for such negotiations.
Again, the Polish representative told us just now — or rather repeated, for he said it a few days ago — that the international disarmament conference should be held before the four-year period begins — which does not seem to be quite the idea put forward in the Soviet plan: that is a point we shall have to clear up.

In any event — my apologies to the Romanian representative — we shall not let ourselves be led into making an algebraical sum -- which incidentally would be only an arithmetical sum -- consisting of: so long for the first stage; so long for the second; so long for the third; total, the sum of those periods. For, although we can make a reasonable and sound forecast for the first stage of our plan, it is much more difficult to do so for the second and, in the present state of world affairs, it is impossible for the third; so that our sum would really become an algebraical one, consisting of so many months for the first stage and so many months for the second, plus X for the third -- X being entirely unknown.

I should also like to say a word about controllable operations relating to nuclear weapons.

The Romanian representative summarized from memory, and very accurately, what I said on 22 March. I showed that four of the six operations are in fact controllable, but two are not. I concluded with this sentence, which I wish to repeat, because I think it is important:

"We must begin with the four other operations" — i.e. the ones which are controllable — "and it is when their execution has reduced the danger potential and, what is still more important, has re-established some confidence in the world, that we shall be able to decide bans on the use or possession or — which comes to the same thing — the total destruction of weapons, all of which are things that can only be discussed at the end, because at the beginning we should have no certainty that they were being carried out by both sides". (TNCD/PV.6, page 36)

I wanted to read this sentence to you again because it sums up what I believe to be a fundamental Western position, namely, that we are prepared for important disarmament measures wherever these measures can be, and will be, effectively controlled, but that we are not prepared to run a disproportionate risk by committing ourselves to operations that cannot be controlled.

I have one more comment to make, which may be premature, but I believe that in conferences like this one must sometimes run on a bit ahead, and then come back to the same idea a little later.
I proposed in the United Nations General Assembly, on 20 October 1958, the appointment of a certain number of committees of experts to study in detail the technique of measures -- which did not mean the ceilings for those measures -- in order to clear the ground for us. I mentioned as examples the following subjects for committees of experts, which I wished to have placed under the authority either of the Disarmament Commission, if it were still working, or of our own Ten Nation Committee:

"(1) composition of the military budgets of the chief Powers" -- at the time I called for reductions -- "and the means of controlling reductions in these budgets"; (2) reduction and control of specified armed forces and armaments" -- in accordance with principles to be laid down by us; (3) controlled discontinuance of the production of fissionable materials for military use and ... converting stockpiles to peaceful uses ... ; (4) prevention of surprise attacks and demarcation of inspection zones; (5) and (6) control of outer space and international law respecting outer space, subjects for which two distinct groups of experts would be required. (A/C.1/3955, paragraph 18).

I am not suggesting that we should agree now to set up these committees of experts, but I think the need will shortly make itself felt and in my opinion the sooner we do so the better.

That is why I wished, in concluding this further intervention, to remind you of what has been the French delegation's constant position. We are here to lay down general principles and to assign work to committees of experts instructed to report to us within a short time; that is the only way we can make quick progress.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I should like first of all to thank the United Kingdom representative for explaining to us that he does not, as I understand, insist on the order in which their proposals are to be carried out.

There may well have been some misunderstanding between us, and I accept his statement as he has just made it. I certainly do not propose to reply now to all the questions raised during this discussion, because there were many; but I reserve the right to answer them after studying the record.
I should, however, like to make a few remarks which may be useful at this point.

It may also have been a misunderstanding when the United Kingdom representative understood me to say that the level of the Soviet Union's forces was to be fixed at 1,200,000 men. I did not say that. I only said that the Soviet Union was unilaterally reducing its armed forces by 1,200,000 men. That is quite different.

Moreover, both the United Kingdom representative and the French representative said that the Soviet plan was unrealistic as regards the time-limits, because they themselves do not believe in them, having had experience of other conferences at which time-limits that should have been observed for international matters were not complied with. Mr. Ormsby-Gore added that he had made a forecast in connexion with the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests and that he is a bad forecaster. We might agree on that. But because Mr. Ormsby-Gore may have been a bad forecaster for the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, we should not conclude that there should be no time-limits. Time-limits are absolutely necessary when we come to discuss very important matters, and when public opinion and the whole world are interested.

I should also like to observe that Mr. Moch, if I understood him rightly, said that the Western representatives have always been somewhat wary of fixing time-limits, and of time-limits generally. Perhaps they have, but if they are wary of time-limits we may never succeed in fixing any, or, consequently, in achieving disarmament as the world expects us to do, for without time-limits we cannot make any progress.

The United Kingdom representative said in this connexion that we accept blindly whatever the representative of the Soviet Union says about time-limits. The fact that we took the time-limits proposed and the arguments advanced here by the Soviet delegation as our starting point does not mean that we are absolutely determined to work to those time-limits. We adopted these arguments because no other delegation had put forward any statements or arguments to the same effect. If you remember, when the Soviet Union representative was explaining the realistic time-limits proposed in the Soviet plan, he referred not only to the experience of the Soviet Union, but also to that of other States which had succeeded in demobilizing within a certain time. Thus it was these
statements and arguments that recently came to our notice, and that is why we used them. I am sorry, but the reason why we are using these arguments is that we have not found any others.

As I said before, I certainly do not intend to answer all the questions raised, but I should nevertheless like to say that I do not remember having expressed the view — I am referring now to the remarks made by Mr. Moch — that the setting up of a control organ or of an international disarmament organization was a waste of time.

I have no recollection of this, and I do not know how I could have been misunderstood or misinterpreted.

Lastly, I should like to make one further comment regarding unilateral military reductions. We have been told that unilateral reductions and unilateral decisions lack psychological effect, and that consequently they are not desirable — that the need is for reductions agreed between the Powers, which have a psychological effect. We certainly hope — as I believe the whole world hopes — that there will be reductions of armed forces and force levels by the Western Powers too, even if they have no psychological effect. I think the world would feel better than if there were no reduction.

Mr. MEZINOESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I should like to make only a few very brief remarks in connexion with the last comments made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and France. With regard to our idea of time-limits, as we have already had occasion to point out, we feel that the time-limits given in the plan submitted by the socialist countries are realistic time-limits; they are time-limits that are feasible for implementing the measures provided for each stage.

In saying this I, of course, do not exclude the possibility — and even if I tried to do so, I would have no success — that other delegations hold different views on this matter; and I must repeat that I think it would be very useful if the Western delegations would tell us what their views are on the time-limits we propose — tell us: This time-limit is too short; the other is too long. Proposals for concrete measures fixing the time-limit which we deem necessary for their implementation, cannot be countered by simply refusing to accept the actual idea of a time-limit or some date for enforcing the measures we propose to adopt.
Besides, what would happen I wonder, to the concrete plan presented by the Western Powers — if this plan is adopted — if we did not at some point in our discussion manage to fix the time-limit for its enforcement. Let me, for example — I quote quite at random — take paragraph C of the second stage of the Western plan. It is proposed:

(continued in English)

"The cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes immediately after the installation and effective operation ..."

etc. (TNCD/3, page 3)

(continued in French)

But how could control be exercised, for instance, over such a measure? How would the international control organization find out when it should send its inspectors, its international team of inspectors, to verify whether, for instance, France had stopped producing fissionable material, if no time-limit had been laid down for this operation?

Do you want another example? The Western plan provides for a reduction of the armed forces of the two Great Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, to 2,100,000 men. But naturally we would want to send out inspectors to see whether this measure had been put into effect.

But then, if no date is fixed, no time-limit set for implementing this measure — and I might quote further examples — then it would be practically impossible to exercise wide, effective international control — and I have added the word "wide" to the terms of the United Nations resolution — but even the slightest control.

I do not wish to enlarge further on this point but I reserve the right to revert to these questions after reading the record. I would not, however, like to close without telling Mr. Crumby-Gore that I agree with his opinion regarding the measures contained in the first stage of the Western plan. I should add that we have never ventured to be so harsh in our criticisms, I can only welcome the fact that it is he who said it.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Our discussion today has touched upon a number of questions and I assume that at this late hour it would not be possible to dwell upon many of
them, as they each relate to problems which should be subjected later to more
detailed consideration. Questions for instance like time-limits, forecasts and
dates have been touched upon, the question of the meaning of unilateral measures,
the features of the plans submitted to us, the stages contained therein, and many
other such matters have been raised which, I repeat, could be usefully discussed
further; and after we have been able to study the verbatim record -- I take it
that we shall be able to do so.

Today a number of statements and admissions have been made which help
somewhat to clarify the positions of a number of delegations on some matters of
substance. And, if Mr. Mosb said that it was not enough to refer to a statement
made by a particular representative -- he mentioned me, in particular -- in
order to be sure that a particular position was correct, well, I can say too that
it is not enough for Mr. Ormsby-Gore simply to say that it is impossible to fix
time-limits, and that is that. The word "impossible" is still not enough of an
argument for us to take a decision. I think we shall revert to this matter again.
At any rate, I do not accept as a basis for our decision this categorical statement
unbacked by arguments.

Many statements have also been made which need to be answered and reacted to
but I think that this is not what is so important now. I believe that the most
important points of substance have been raised in the statement made by the
representative of Canada. They are essentially important from the standpoint
of the direction that our work should take. That is why I believe it is
worth while to dwell upon two of the points that he made.

The representative of Canada said that in his view -- and I think he was
speaking not on his own behalf only -- we cannot discuss disarmament measures
alone or control measures alone; that it was necessary, as could be gathered
from his remarks, to discuss both subjects. However, when I listened carefully
to what he went on to say, I began to doubt whether the representative of Canada
was actually proposing a course that would eliminate this one-sidedness in our
discussions? He went on, for instance, to say that it would advance matters
if we were to set aside for the moment all controversy over the precise figure
of the reduction of armed forces and take up the consideration of control
procedures. I cannot help asking immediately, why "set aside for the moment
all controversy"? Why should we consider control procedures only? Is this
how you refuse to discuss control measures alone?
In actual fact, though, you are proposing to discuss only control measures and to defer discussion of the essential question of the reduction of armed forces, of numbers. Possibly you have not stated all you wanted to say. But from what you did say it does not follow that you intend to abide by the course of action that you announced in the beginning. And I feel that this is not mere accident. I have this feeling because, when we study carefully the record of our meeting of 25 March, where the representative of the United States himself expressed his views on the course of our future work -- the very views which the representative of Canada defended and expanded today -- he said:

"Rather than embark on a discussion at this juncture on what the figure for the United States and Soviet force levels and related conventional armaments should be, the United States delegation proposes an approach which can be used as a non-controversial basis for concrete discussion of control arrangements." (TNCD/IV.9, page 26)

I draw your attention to the first and the last words. Mr. Eaton proposed that, instead of discussing the substance of disarmament problems and the concrete measures involved and the figures that would be accepted by us for the reduction of armaments we should engage in a concrete discussion of control arrangements. What then happens to your view that it is impossible to discuss control measures alone? You are suggesting that, instead of discussing the substance of the problems we should take up measures of control. In other words, after making the general statement that we cannot discuss disarmament measures alone or control measures alone, you now propose to go on along a path which excludes one of these two alternatives -- discussion of the problem of disarmament measures -- and you propose to pass on to the consideration of control measures only.

This is also borne out by the statement made yesterday by the representative of Italy. He too enlarged on the statement made by the representative of the United States and proposed that we should begin by considering the question of the whole system of control measures, of an international control organization in all its details. Yesterday I asked the representative of Italy: When are we going to take up the question of the measures to be taken on disarmament and discuss the treaty on general and complete disarmament? The representative of Italy said he would study the verbatim record of my statement and would then answer my question. I shall wait in patience for that answer.
However, with this question unanswered, I must say that the programme for our work remains unclear. What the representative of Canada said this morning again confirms, alas, that the representatives of the Western Powers want us to discuss only control measures.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore -- feeling probably that the statements on our future course of action were making a rather poor impression -- tried to indicate this morning that the United States proposal talks about concrete disarmament measures, and about the fact that questions of control apparently should be considered in conjunction with disarmament measures. However, much as I respect you, Mr. Ormsby-Gore, I cannot agree with you, for if you look yourself at the verbatim record of the meeting of 25 March you will see that nothing is said there about discussing and reconciling positions on questions pertaining to concrete disarmament. Nothing of the kind. From the same passage that I have just quoted it will be seen that we are being asked, instead of considering the question of concrete figures for reduction, to deal with control. As regards the disarmament measures to which you referred, it said:

"Let us take as an example of a concrete disarmament measure the force level figure of 2.1 million men..." (TNCD/FV.9, page 28)

and, further, Mr. Eaton said:

"Whatever eventual agreements may be reached, it seems reasonable to suppose that at some point in the process of reduction both the United States and the Soviet forces will be found in the vicinity of 2.1 million men... ." (Ibid.)

This is precisely what the representative of Bulgaria was talking about this morning. A hypothetical case is taken, that agreement may at some future date be reached. It is proposed that, as an example, we now discuss this future agreement which will be arrived at nobody knows when. Why? For the concrete elaboration of all control measures. What does that mean? What it means is discussing control without disarmament. That is what I claim. Can you prove the contrary?

If the representatives of the Western Powers believe that I am stating their position wrongly, I apologize, but I ask for clarification. I do not insist that the clarification should be given now, as the hour is very late, but I think that clarification is needed.
The second point on which I wish to enlarge is this:

At the end of his statement the representative of Canada said, in passing, that we, i.e. this Committee, had no mandate to draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I would like this point clarified. Why have we no mandate to draft such a treaty? After all, the representative of Canada himself said this morning — and I was very glad to hear it — that Canada too voted for the General Assembly resolution and continued to support it. If this is so, what then should we be doing here? The resolution calls upon us to achieve a "constructive solution" of the problem of general and complete disarmament. Later Mr. Burns also referred to the third point of the resolution, which says that "measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control" should be "worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time". How are we going to do that? Are we or are we not going to draft an agreement on measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament?

The representatives of the Western Powers have tabled a plan in which concrete measures are laid down. It is true that Mr. Ormsby-Gore described the measures contained in the first stage of this plan as "measures on paper". I am obliged to him for that clarification, but still measures have been propounded to us on which agreement is necessary. Or do you think perhaps that these measures can be carried out without an agreement? But they cannot be carried out unless there is an agreement or some kind of treaty. You are proposing, therefore, that there should be some kind of treaty or agreement. Why, then, do you say that we have no mandate to draft a treaty? If, perhaps, you believe we have no mandate to draft a treaty on general and complete disarmament, what other mandate do we have? Tell us clearly what it is that you are prepared to work on: a treaty on general and complete disarmament, or a treaty on some other measures? Please explain. Incidentally, this question arose yesterday when you proposed that we should work on an agreement or a treaty for the establishment of an international disarmament organization. When you proposed to us that we should work on such a treaty, we asked ourselves, of course, the question: but when are we going to work on a treaty for general and complete disarmament, which is our goal, and the measures leading thereto which we have to work out?

After the Canadian representative's statement our doubts of yesterday became even greater. First, how are we going to work? Are we going to work on disarmament measures or are we not? If we are, let us examine concrete figures,
concrete proposals for the measures to be taken at each stage of general and complete disarmament. Along with those we will consider control measures also. We do not refuse to do this. But let us consider figures, concrete disarmament measures, and so forth. However, we are not prepared to deal with controls instead of considering figures and disarmament measures. We are not prepared to do that. We will not do that. What is more, that does not seem to be your position either, since only this morning you told us that you do not want control only, without disarmament. Since that is what you said, let us join in working on disarmament measures and control measures side by side. We are agreeable to that. In that case though, we must consider a concrete plan for general and complete disarmament. If you say that you have no mandate to draft such an agreement, such a treaty on general and complete disarmament, please tell us what you think we have a mandate for. We want clarification. We are repeating this request for clarification today because, apparently, this clarification could not be given yesterday, and the statement made this morning by the representative of Canada has aroused still greater doubts in our minds.

Those are the remarks I wanted to make in connexion with our discussion this morning.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Does any other representative wish to speak? Then I should just like to say a word in my capacity as representative of the United States. Mr. Zorin was kind enough to grant me some time in which to answer his question. I shall avail myself of that in order to answer it more fully but so that there may be no doubt here today, as I had hoped there was no doubt yesterday, the figure of 2.5 million and the figure of 2.1 million are concrete disarmament proposals which, along with other concrete disarmament proposals indicated in the first part of our plan, my Government is prepared to accept on the conditions set forth in the plan, and one of those conditions is that there be adequate verification machinery established when we go to 2.1 million men. There seems to be some doubt as to whether these figures constitute concrete measures. They strike us as being concrete measures, and I would therefore not like the delegations to go away today in any doubt as to the fact that we consider them to be concrete measures, that we are prepared to agree to those concrete measures along with the others indicated in the first part of our plan, and that when we indicated that we now wanted to get on with
the business of discussing control we felt we were doing this in terms of really concrete measures. We also suggested that the provision with respect to the reduction of armaments be included. We thought those were concrete measures.

That is all I have to say in answer to the question addressed to me by Mr. Zorin but I would like to avail myself of his kind suggestion by making a fuller reply at a later date.

If there are no other comments from any of the delegations I will read the draft of the communique:

"The eleventh meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 29 March 1960 under the chairmanship of the representative of the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 30 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m."

I take it that this communique is acceptable.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.