CONFERENCE OF THE TEN NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

UNITED NATIONS
CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT
DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL AND SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS
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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 28 March 1960, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom)
PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Bulgaria:
Mr. M. TARABANOV
Col. K. SAVOV
Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Canada:
Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. A. G. CAMPBELL
W/Cdr. R. J. MITCHELL

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. J. HOSEK
Lieut.-Gen. J. HRČKO
Mr. Z. TRHLIK

France:
Mr. J. MOCH
Mr. M. LEGENDRE
Col. L. CONVERT

Italy:
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. L. DAIMELLI
Cdr. A. SENZI

Poland:
Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Brig.-Gen. J. SLIWINSKI

Romania:
Mr. E. MEZINCESCU
Mr. C. BOGDAN
Col. C. POPA

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V. A. ZORIN
Col.-Gen. A. A. GRYZLOV
Mr. A. A. ROSCHCHIN
PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

**United Kingdom:**
- Rt. Hon. D. ORMSBY-GORE
- Miss B. SALT
- Maj.-Gen. RIDDELL

**United States of America:**
- Mr. F.M. EATON
- Mr. C.C. STELLE
- Rear-Admiral P.L. DUDLEY

**Secretariat:**
- Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:
- Dr. D. PROTITCH
- Deputy Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:
- Mr. W. EPSTEIN
The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare the tenth meeting of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament open.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): In speaking today, on behalf of the Italian delegation, I should like first of all to stress once again the spirit and the will with which my delegation is taking part in this work.

In connexion with certain remarks made by Mr. Zorin in his statement last Friday, I should like to reaffirm, so that no one may be in any doubt on the matter, that my Government is deeply attached to the ultimate objective which all really peace-loving States must set themselves to attain.

Italy was one of the co-sponsors of Resolution 1378 (XIV) of the United Nations General Assembly, all of which perfectly reflects the desires of my Government. We fully share the hope expressed in that resolution and are desirous that measures leading to the goal fixed should be worked out and form the subject of a common agreement in the shortest possible time.

That being the spirit which guides us, our sense of realism and our attachment to the truth prompt us to be patient and prudent and to subject each problem to rigorous examination, in order to avoid rendering more difficult, by untoward haste or rashness, the long road leading towards the great hope set before us by the United Nations General Assembly.

I shall now, if I may, refer in a more general manner to the interesting discussion which took place here last Friday, after the statement by Mr. Eaton, the representative of the United States of America. That statement, which was of obvious importance, was followed by a long exposition by Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, to which my delegation also gave the greatest attention.

In this connexion, I recall that Mr. Moch, the representative of France, at once observed that Mr. Zorin's statement had unfortunately contained many negative elements. However, with his usual wit, Mr. Moch added that after the cold douche he had the impression that a tap had been turned and the water had become warm.

That warmth is most welcome! It is true that the considerations put forward by Mr. Zorin in the first part of his speech and the negative reply he gave so hastily to Mr. Eaton's proposal give cause for pessimism... We sincerely trust,
however, that the points made in the last part of Mr. Zorin's statement leave us some grounds for hope -- the hope that we may really be able to pass on to a new and still more constructive phase of our work, as suggested by the United States representative.

In this connexion, I would remind you that towards the end of his speech Mr. Zorin said, *inter alia*:

"We are obviously not refusing to discuss the general problems of how control is to be organized as well: the creation of an international control organ, the general principles on which the control apparatus will function, and so forth. We are ready to discuss these matters too; that is to say, we are ready to discuss what Mr. Eaton was talking about earlier today. But we consider that all this must be examined in connexion with concrete stages in disarmament, which will in their entirety constitute a programme of general and complete disarmament." (TNCD/PV.2, page 37)

I am convinced that Mr. Eaton, when he made his well-known proposal to the conference last Friday, did not intend to isolate control, either from disarmament measures or from the context of our plan. What the United States representative suggested to us was that, in order to make our discussions more specific and to increase their rate of progress, we should -- for practical reasons and taking a specific example -- make a preliminary examination of part of the indissoluble and basic duality constituted by the union of concrete disarmament measures and the corresponding effective control.

What did Mr. Eaton actually propose? He suggested that we should study the organization of control, not in a vacuum, but by starting with concrete examples for discussion. Is that separating control from disarmament?

Nobody denies that the undertaking to disarm and the undertaking to accept methods of verification should be simultaneous and complementary; they should be two parts of one and the same legal instrument, two sides of the same coin.

But the basis of any agreement on disarmament must always be that each contracting party shall be able, at any time, to know that all the other parties are scrupulously observing its provisions. On that point, I wish to make it quite clear that such an assurance could not be based on a subjective assessment by the parties concerned; it would have to be based on concrete evidence and on the impartial findings of an independent body.
If we wish -- as we certainly all do -- to hasten disarmament, we must provide for and establish without delay the means for reciprocal assurance that the undertakings given by each party are being honestly and effectively carried out by all. For that purpose, certain preparatory arrangements are clearly essential, since without them, at the very time when forces or armaments were being reduced, there could be no control, because the control institutions would not have been set up.

That is why such institutions, while constantly widening their scope as disarmament proceeds, must exist from the outset and be provided with the necessary organs, adequate for their task.

I would remind you, moreover, that the plan submitted by Mr. Khrushchev also provides for a control organization, but we do not yet know its composition or structure. Mr. Zorin has not yet given us any details on that point; he has merely confirmed that on the Soviet side there is no refusal to study the establishment of a control organization.

In the light of these few considerations, and with a view to further elucidation of the five-Power plan, I think it would now be useful, if the Chairman will allow me, to describe briefly -- and I hope I shall also be expressing the views of my Western colleagues -- the main lines of development of the plan for an international disarmament organization, the establishment of which, in accordance with the organic concept of our plan, is provided for in the first stage, while its subsequent functions form the subject of several provisions in the succeeding stages.

In our view, the international disarmament organization should set up a body capable of performing, among others, the following functions:

(a) receiving prior notification of proposed launchings of space vehicles and data obtained from "available tracking facilities";

(b) collecting information (mainly on the basis of declarations by States according to predetermined and mutually agreed criteria) on present force levels on and conventional armaments pertaining to land, sea and air forces possessed by the various powers;

(c) verifying by means of agreed arrangements and procedures, the co-ordinated reduction or limitation of force levels and agreed types and quantities of conventional armaments bearing a relationship to the agreed force levels;

(d) collecting and verifying data submitted by the various States relating to

(1) the operation of their financial system as it affects military expenditure;

(2) the amount of their military expenditure;
(3) the percentage of their gross national product earmarked for military expenditure;

(a) installing and preparing to operate an agreed control system to prohibit vehicles capable of mass destruction being placed in orbit or stationed in outer space;

(f) receiving prior notification of proposed launchings of missiles and declarations of locations of launching sites and places of manufacture of such missiles; and carrying out measures of verification including on-site inspection of launching sites of such missiles;

(g) installing and operating an agreed control system to verify compliance with an agreement to stop the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(h) verifying the transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable material from existing stocks to non-weapons uses, including stockpiling, and maintaining surveillance over material so transferred;

(i) establishing appropriate measures to give participating States greater protection against surprise attack;

(j) following accession of other States having significant military capability to the disarmament agreement, carrying out measures to verify force level ceilings for all military significant States, and supervising the placement in storage depots of agreed types and quantities of armaments in agreed relation to force level ceilings.

Apart from these functions the Organization, by reason of its competence and if it is in a position to function soon enough, could be consulted when some of the joint studies provided for in the Western plan are being made and thus play a constructive part in furthering our agreement.

As you see, the functions in question are very comprehensive and very important, and they go beyond control in the strict sense of the term; that is why we are calling this body the international disarmament organization.

Of course, provision would have to be made for links between the international disarmament organization and the United Nations, and we are in favour of suitable collaboration with the United Nations Secretariat. It is likewise clear that in the present legal situation, if perchance Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter were to be invoked as a result of violations reported by the international disarmament organization, the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations would be seized of the matter immediately, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter, by an approved procedure.

As I have already said, in order to proceed as quickly as possible with the application of the most urgent disarmament measures provided for in the first and second stages of our plan, we consider it necessary to set up the international disarmament organization at the outset and in the shortest possible time.
That is why we envisage a special, rapid procedure, which might be as follows:

The Ten Nation Committee would transmit to the United Nations an agreement negotiated by the States concerned in the light of a joint study. Once that agreement had been concluded, any State could accede to it.

The agreement would lay down the composition, functions and procedures of two bodies: an interim commission which would function from the entry into force of the agreement until the international disarmament organization was established; the international disarmament organization itself, which would be established when the States of significant military capacity and the majority of the States Members of the United Nations had acceded to the agreement.

The interim commission would include a small executive committee, and an administrative department under the authority of an executive director appointed by the committee, possibly in consultation with the office of the United Nations Secretary-General.

The international disarmament organization should, in our view, comprise a council of Member States, an executive committee and a director. The executive committee would consist of the representatives of some 14 States, including a small number of permanent members. The non-permanent members would be chosen at appropriate intervals by the council of States in the light of strategic, technical and geographical considerations. Groups of States would probably designate eligible States to represent the strategic area to which they belonged.

The procedures of the institutions contemplated, and of any other regional inspection organization that might possibly be attached to the international disarmament organization, would be established in the light of considerations relating either to inspection requirements in respect of the measures provided for in the agreement, or to experience of verification in other fields, or to the following basic principles, which would be equally valid for the interim commission and for the international disarmament organization itself.

The organization would be a technical organization. Its functions would, so far as possible, be specified in detail in the agreement signed by the participating Powers. Decisions relating to the implementation of the agreement would be taken by the Director, by virtue of specific terms of reference, and possibly under the general supervision of the executive committee. The voting procedure in the executive committee would be such as automatically to prevent any member of the committee from opposing the system of inspection or decisions on controversial matters.
Such — in necessarily brief and schematic outline, which can be filled in later by means of joint studies, with the collaboration of all — are the ideas underlying the Western plan, as regards the establishment of the international disarmament organization.

We regard this organization as being necessary, from the outset, as a means of rendering effective and operative all the disarmament measures provided for, and of creating an atmosphere of ever-increasing trust and fraternity among the peoples of the world by removing all reciprocal suspicion and misunderstanding.

That is an essential goal which, I am sure, we all have at heart.

I therefore venture to hope that the establishment of an international disarmament organization, such as we have in mind, may receive favourable and earnest consideration from all members of this Committee.

Mr. MEZINCEFSCU (Romania) (translation from French): The discussion we have had so far has to some extent enabled us to get a better knowledge of the views on the problem of general and complete disarmament held by the different countries making up our Committee. It has also brought out certain points of principle on which these views have already become, if not identical, at least closer to one another. At last Friday's meeting there seemed to be a general wish to proceed to an examination of concrete disarmament measures. It was suggested that the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament could regard the general discussion stage as finished, and could properly proceed to discuss the measures which the General Assembly resolution with which we are so familiar requires us to work out.

But even if we all agree on this point — and we can be — we are not in agreement when called on to determine the proper subject matter for our discussions at the present stage of our work.

The United States representative, for example, has suggested that the Committee ought now to proceed to work out in detail the system for controlling some abstract disarmament measure, since the countries concerned have as yet reached no agreement on a concrete measure. Other Western delegations have suggested that we start discussing certain partial disarmament measures, in isolation from the problem of general and complete disarmament.
My delegation considers that either of the roads indicated by these delegations would take the Committee away from and not nearer to the purpose defined by resolution 1378 (XIV) of the fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The third operative paragraph of that resolution expressed the hope "that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time" [A/RES/1378(XIV)].

The nature of the measures which we ought now to start discussing is defined by the very objective laid down for our work in the actual words of this third operative paragraph of the resolution. The effectiveness of measures intended to lead to general and complete disarmament can be judged solely in relation to that ultimate objective. The complicated process of abolishing all armed forces and all armaments cannot be carried out by adopting partial and mutually isolated measures, but by a series of balanced and progressive measures following one another in a well-defined order and designed to get rid of all armed forces and all armaments under wide and effective international control.

It must be admitted that there is a qualitative difference between isolated disarmament measures and measures which form part of a whole. The adoption of partial measures does not in any way guarantee steady progress towards the objective laid down for us, that is to say general and complete disarmament. If we confine ourselves to the adoption of partial disarmament measures, there can always be the fear that the partial measures, isolated from the context of a single whole, may be set aside and that consequently the armaments race will begin all over again, particularly as the proposal to shelve the task of working out an overall plan and to proceed by partial measures is bound to indicate a wish to avoid commitment to the ultimate objective. What guarantee of progress towards general and complete disarmament will there be if we start by repudiating the final goal assigned to the work of our Committee?

The representative of the United States said in his speech of 17 March: "General disarmament will not come like Venus, springing out of the waves off the Island of Cythera without any proper period of gestation ..."

(TNCD/PV.3, page 9)

I must thank the United States representative for attributing so poetic an imagination to us who advocate an agreement on general and complete disarmament. But this is not the point. I must admit that he was quite right to put the problem in this way.
I might even say that it was hardly necessary to remind us of this, because we all know it; but that is precisely why we should start by working out the complex programme of measures which could, stage by stage, lead to the goal set before us.

This programme ought to comprise totality of measures designed to remove from the arsenals of States, progressively but surely and under effective international control, all armed forces and other material means for waging war.

Since such a programme would have to be adopted and put into effect by sovereign States, it would have to be given the legal form of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

In this connexion I must say that the proposal put forward by the Socialist countries for the conclusion of such a treaty has been wrongly interpreted as an expression of "all or nothing" tactics, or as a proof of intransigence or unwillingness to negotiate.

There is clearly some confusion.

If we still agree that our purpose is general and complete disarmament, we must proceed to work out the whole group of measures which can lead us towards this end: that is to say, we must start by drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I do not think anyone can imagine that general and complete disarmament could be achieved, in the present state of the world, by any other means, by taking any other road than precisely that of such a treaty on general and complete disarmament as we propose. To believe this would be tantamount to believing in a miracle much more astonishing than the birth of Venus emerging from the clear waves of the sea. Our view is precisely that we ought henceforward to concentrate our efforts on formulating the principles of such a treaty, by comparing our positions in order to find potential common ground—and there is already a certain amount of evidence that such ground exists. This is certainly the first of the measures mentioned in the third paragraph of resolution 1378 (XIV), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its fourteenth session.

It is not proof of intransigence or refusal to negotiate to say that no other manner of approaching the problem of general and complete disarmament could bring us nearer to this objective. Not long ago the United States representative said: "It is our feeling that if we spend our early hours here, our early weeks, our early months in the discussion of those measures which, in the course of events, can only appear when the early measures have been agreed, we shall only tend to frustrate our efforts." (TWCD/PV.3, page 8).
I should say that this is almost correct if one infers from it that the first task to which we ought to devote ourselves is to work out the principles which would enable us to pass on to the discussion and adoption of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The United States representative added:

"Past conferences have fallen down on the fences that lay across many fields ahead. I would urge that we should initially address ourselves to those early measures which all of us can agree must be taken, adopted and assured before the final steps of disarmament can be attained." (ibid.)

He continued:

"In the normal course of events one must walk before one can run -- and none of us has really learnt to walk in this field of disarmament." (ibid.)

In order to distinguish between initial measures and final measures, however, we must outline the plan as a whole and the manner in which we intend to approach solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. Of necessity we must reach agreement on such a plan as a whole. Moreover, I do not think that the causes of deadlocks in past negotiations on disarmament can apply to the present negotiations.

Circumstances are now indeed very different. Such reasoning does not take into account the new features present in the negotiations we are conducting today, as compared with previous discussions on disarmament. Today, general and complete disarmament is not a mere wish, an abstract ideal; it has been recognized by the 82 Member States of the United Nations as the realistic and pressing solution to the most serious problem that faces mankind today — the armaments race. If one wishes to be consistent one cannot admit the realism of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and the necessity for it, and at the same time cast doubt on the possibility of establishing a plan of measures for attaining this end. Obviously, all the details of the successive stages of such a plan cannot be foreseen; but this is precisely the duty of us all, to help work out a plan which is as concrete as possible, a unified plan, adaptable to unforeseen circumstances, and at the same time providing for the accomplishment of the ultimate objective within a defined period.
(Mr. Mezinescu, Romania)

Once the principle has been accepted, we cannot plead lack of experience of disarmament to excuse us from the need to work out a well-defined programme of general and complete disarmament.

Must disarmament be tried in order to see if it is possible?

I thought we had concluded that this was the only way out of the situation in which the world finds itself.

Is there an idea that it may prove inconvenient? What then is the alternative? To abandon the attempt? To resume the armaments race — which in any case has not stopped?

The Western plan, in its first two stages — which, as its authors themselves say, are really only one stage — proposes first to state that the force levels of the Soviet Union and the United States would soon be 2.5 million men, and then to make a small reduction and reduce the force levels of these two Great Powers to 2.1 million.

According to the Western plan, in the next stage — the second or third stage, it is not very clear which — further reductions "should be negotiated and put into effect as rapidly as possible" in order to reduce armed forces "by progressive safeguarded steps (after such further joint studies as may be necessary) to levels required by internal security and fulfilment of obligations under the United Nations Charter ...." (TNCD/3, III, A, page 4). The plan also provides for the negotiation at this stage of other measures, enumerated in paragraph B I-8. We are thus given, not an overall plan with which to approach and solve the problem of general and complete disarmament, but a list of questions which would have to be the subject of negotiations or separate agreements. Agreements on partial and isolated disarmament measures obviously cannot lead towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament; first, because this objective as formulated by the United Nations disappears, and secondly because, as the Western plan is conceived, implementation of the measures laid down for one stage is not a condition for the application at the next stage of further progressive measures leading towards the defined objective.

Take as an example the force levels which I have already mentioned. Let us assume that we have agreed to reduce the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union to 2.1 million men. Would this measure bring us nearer to general and complete disarmament? Not at all. At the very best it would only
necessitate the start of negotiations to agree upon further "progressive safe-
guarded steps" towards further reductions which would in turn have to be spread
over an indeterminate period. Moreover, nobody would be able to tell us even
when this new stage in the disarmament negotiations would have to start, since no
time-limit is laid down for implementation of the measures provided for in the
first two stages.

If then we adopted the trial disarmament proposed by certain Western
representatives, it would not get us any further towards general and complete
disarmament, and nobody could say where it was leading. The United States,
having agreed to reduce its force level to 2.1 million, could very well decide
later to go back to the earlier figure or even to increase it. There would be
no guarantee of progress from one stage to another towards a strictly "definite
and openly declared final goal", to use Mr. Ormsby-Gore's words (TNOD/PV.2,
page 6), but rather a refusal to undertake to move towards the objective which the
Western Powers have at times appeared to accept.

To reject the idea of a treaty on general and complete disarmament and to
substitute the idea of advancing by small steps, by partial and isolated measures,
is equivalent to discarding the idea of general and complete disarmament as the
purpose of our Committee's negotiations. The adoption of partial and isolated
measures would not end the arms race. It would not oblige certain Powers to
stop developing undoubtedly aggressive strategic devices such as the possession
of military, naval and air bases on foreign territory, particularly as the Western
plan makes no mention of these.

We cannot help finding it significant that, while we are talking about
disarmament here, one of the NATO countries, Western Germany, is establishing
military and air bases in Balkan countries bordering Romania, and is thereby
aggravating the threat that such bases represent for the peace of the Romanian
people.

In my delegation's opinion it would be a fraud on world public opinion if we
persuaded it that the end desired by all peoples, general and complete disarmament,
could be attained by adopting certain partial and isolated measures while the
arms race and the development of aggressive strategic devices continued.
(Mr. Mezinoescu, Romania)

If certain delegates have doubts about the reality of the task which they accepted when they drafted and accepted Resolution 1378 (XIV) of the United Nations General Assembly, it would be better if they said so openly so that we could know where we stand.

That, in any case, would be more useful for the future of our discussions on general and complete disarmament than to let us embark on a discussion of measures concerned with the detailed functioning of a control system based on a hypothesis about its work or a sample of abstract disarmament measures.

Shall we be able to learn how to walk in the disarmament field if we start now by examining the problems enumerated by the United States representative at the ninth meeting of our Committee; if, that is, we start with a detailed study of organization and all related problems -- I might even say down to the personal life of the future international disarmament inspectors -- at the stage we are now in, before we have even started the discussion proper on concrete disarmament measures, let alone agreed on them?

If we want to learn how to walk along the road of disarmament, we had better first have some ground under our feet.

If we want to consider the general possibility of agreeing on the concrete problem of control, it is not abstract samples that we must discuss.

What has happened at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests is a matter of general knowledge: agreement has not yet been reached there, not because of failure to agree on the control system, but because the United States Government has not yet decided to accept cessation of nuclear tests.

If we tried to find a universally-valid control system by discussing abstract sample disarmament measures which have not yet been adopted by anybody or even discussed, this method would be valueless, because for every disarmament measure there would have to be a special control system.

Nobody knows how much time might be spent in detailed discussion of all the problems connected with the control of all the hypothetical measures which would have to be accepted in order to put us on the road to general and complete disarmament.

The achievement of general and complete disarmament is indissolubly bound up with the existence of a unified complex of successive and balanced measures of disarmament and control.
I want to make myself very clear. We do not deny the value of partial disarmament measures for improving the international atmosphere, reducing tension and strengthening peace; but we do think that things should be given their right names. If the Western Powers do not yet think they are ready to start discussing general and complete disarmament, if they lack confidence in this aim, which, not so long ago, they accepted it would be better to say all this as clearly as possible. In any case we shall not be able to agree to commit ourselves to discussing partial and isolated disarmament measures while at the same time giving public opinion the illusion that we are negotiating general and complete disarmament.

I think it would be most useful for the future course of our work if the representatives of the Western countries would be so good as to state their precise position with regard to the objective laid down for our Committee by Resolution 1378 (XIV) as clearly as Mr. Ormsby-Gore did the other day when he said:

"I should like to say, on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation, that we voted for that resolution. We accepted it in toto. All paragraphs of it represent the policy of the United Kingdom Government in this sphere." (TNCD/FV.5, page 25).

I can only welcome the statement to the same effect just made by the representative of Italy.

In view of the difficulties that still remain to be overcome on the road towards an agreement on complete and general disarmament, we suggest that we might now make the first steps towards the conclusion of such a treaty by turning to a discussion of its fundamental principles.

We might, for example, try to agree on the scope of the measures entailed by the programme of general and complete disarmament; the number and duration of the stages which a plan for general and complete disarmament should include; the principal content of each stage; the general principles of control, including the need for an international control organ which the socialist countries propose should be set up; and the possibilities of achieving peace and security in a disarmed world within the framework of the Charter.

As many delegations have already emphasized, a wide area of agreement already exists on the general principles of control, that is to say on one of the most controversial aspects of the problem of general and complete disarmament.
I am convinced that if our Committee concentrated its efforts on drafting an agreement on the fundamental principles of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, it would be complying with the spirit and the letter of the General Assembly resolution.

Conversely, I might add that to propose that we should now concentrate our attention on a detailed discussion of a system for controlling hypothetical, imaginary disarmament measures, or of the organizational details of the international disarmament organ or of the international control organization as we advocate them, seems to me to invite a continuation of the general discussion which I had the impression was what Mr. Eaton, the United States representative, last Friday proposed should be brought to an end. I do not mean that we refuse to continue the general discussion on the problem before us; but we believe it is high time we started discussing the principles of the future treaty on general and complete disarmament, the only measure whereby we can achieve the goal we have all set ourselves.

In conclusion, I should like to thank the representative of Canada for the explanations he saw fit to give concerning the problems I had raised in connexion with the international police force.

I am sorry to have to say that those explanations have not helped me to modify the views I have already expressed on an international police force.

I gathered that the representative of Canada did not suppose that such a force would be equipped with nuclear weapons; hence it could not, in the opinion of those who propose its creation, have any effect if peace and international law and order were disturbed by acts of a nuclear Power. It would therefore be designed as an instrument with which a foreign will could be imposed upon small and moderate-sized countries. That is an idea we have always rejected.

On the other hand, such a force would "only need to enter its peace-keeping functions when disarmament had progressed to such a state that there were few nuclear weapons in the world and those under strict control in the hands of the great Powers, eventually to disappear". (TNCD/FV.9, page 12).

None of this, in my opinion, is very clear. To our knowledge only the Soviet Union and three Western great Powers now possess nuclear weapons. So far as we know, the Western Powers keep these weapons under the strictest possible control and do not seem at all inclined to share them with other Powers. Are we to think, with the Canadian representative, that the stage at which the international police
force would enter its functions is the stage we have already reached? Or are we perhaps to understand that its entry into operation, like the banning and elimination of nuclear weapons, is deferred by the Western plan to a stage which would come after the third stage of the proposed plan and which, according to J.F. Stone's Weekly, is jestingly called in official United States circles, the "millenium stage"?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):
We have listened carefully to the statements made today by the representative of Italy and the representative of Romania. In connexion with what the Italian representative said we could not help asking ourselves one question.

The representative of Italy spoke in some detail about the proposed international disarmament organization which, according to him, would exercise not only control functions but also some other functions.

At the same time, however, he said nothing about our Committee considering the concrete disarmament measures which, as the representative of Romania clearly explained, must form the whole of the programme of general and complete disarmament we are all striving for.

The representative of Italy also said that it will be the task of our Ten Nation Committee to prepare in great detail an agreement for setting up an international disarmament organization, and transmit it to other States for them to accede to it.

Involuntarily we asked ourselves the question: does the representative of Italy assume that we will have to work out an agreement or a treaty on general and complete disarmament as such — on all the disarmament measures which, taken together, will constitute the programme of general and complete disarmament? How does the representative of Italy think we should handle this matter in the Ten Nation Committee, and draw up such an agreement which will be acceded to, or discussed in some way with other States? If it is his idea that we ought to prepare such an agreement, when does he think it should be done? When are we to get busy on the elaboration of such an agreement, or, to begin with, on drafting the basic provisions at least of such an agreement?

I am only asking this question in order to get a clearer idea, as it were, of the way the representative of Italy views the substantive problem underlying our work, because, after all the discussions we have had, he made no reference to our practical task, a task which, in our opinion, clearly stems from the same General
Assembly resolution which he has just said that Italy had helped to sponsor, and that for Italy the resolution in question formed the basis, so we gathered, of the work of our Committee. If that is so, we should like to have some clarification on this point from the representative of Italy and, of course, from the other Western States. But since in his detailed speech today the representative of Italy was speaking, as I understand, on behalf of all the Western States participating in our Committee, the question is naturally addressed to him. I do not insist, of course, on the representative of Italy answering the question today; that might be difficult. But if it is possible, it would, in our opinion, be useful to do so, so that we could get a clear idea of how the whole work of our Committee is envisaged by the representatives of the Western States.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): I do not know what the views of the Italian Government are with respect to the question which Mr. Zorin has asked, but he has included the words "all the Western States" in his final remark. I can speak without any question as to my own Government. We do envisage that we would address ourselves here to all the measures of disarmament. But if we cannot agree on a single measure and its verification in its specific details, it is useless to go on to a discussion of many, many other measures.

If there is any doubt in the mind of anyone here as to the views of the importance which my Government attaches to the question of verification — verification in terms of a specific measure — there seems to have been some misunderstanding of my words on Friday, which I tried to make abundantly clear: verification of a specific measure. This position was set forth in unequivocal terms by our Secretary of State as late as last week in a Press conference held in Washington. And I think it would be useful to our work if I quote from this Press conference, although the quotation is not verbatim as I do not have the record before me.

The Secretary, in response to a general question on the conditions which the United States Government attaches to agreement on disarmament:

"... reaffirmed that the United States Government could not accept any agreement on disarmament without substantial inspection and control."

He went on to say:

"... that in his view, failure to face up to the vital question of adequate control had led to the failure of earlier disarmament conferences."
It is for this reason that I have so earnestly implored that we do attack this question and that we attack it at the earliest possible time. This is not only of concern to us, it must be of concern to all who are here; perhaps, even more, it is of concern to those nations of the world that are not as well armed or as well defended as we are.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): As the representative of the USSR has referred to the statement I made this morning, I should like to thank him for the attention he paid to it. I, myself, have also listened to his statement very carefully and I must confess that I did not quite understand all the doubts he expressed. I should therefore like to reserve my right to give him a reply later, after I have studied carefully the text.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian: I am most grateful to Mr. Eaton and to Mr. Cavalletti for the way in which they dealt with the question we raised in connexion with the statement made by the representative of Italy. May I say again that it is perfectly natural and reasonable for him to want to make a careful study of the substance of the question which interests us, and he will, of course, be able to answer our question after studying the verbatim record. I cannot obviously object to this, as I said already at the very beginning.

I am also grateful to Mr. Eaton for a certain clarification supplied in connexion with my question. I note only that he has not yet given any answer to the question which interests us. At any rate, it is still not clear to us whether the United States is prepared to begin working out a concrete treaty on general and complete disarmament which will include all the elements, that is, both the disarmament measures proper and also the control measures linked with such disarmament measures? That is precisely the kind of treaty that we are seeking to achieve, and we are endeavouring to help in framing such a treaty or, to begin with, to agree at least on the basic provisions of such a treaty. The answer to this question is not quite clear to me.

On the other hand, the explanations given by Mr. Eaton deepen our doubts as to whether the United States is prepared to begin working out such a treaty. The passage from Mr. Herter's statement quoted by Mr. Eaton does not quite supply an
answer to the substance of our question either. As the quotation shows, Mr. Hortor once again confirmed that the United States Government cannot accept any agreement on disarmament unless it embodies a satisfactory system of inspection and control. Put in that general way, I see no contradiction here with our position. We also want to see a disarmament treaty, i.e., a treaty embodying agreed disarmament measures for each stage, that will contain an adequate inspection and control system. We are in favour of that too. Naturally, however, in order to work out such an agreement we shall have to start discussing the actual disarmament measures on which we can agree, and therefore all control questions.

That is why, when Mr. Eaton, having read this quotation from Mr. Hortor's statement, appeared to draw the conclusion that that was why it was necessary to proceed at once to consider all matters of control, we could not help but ask the same question: are you going to consider disarmament measures or are you not? And will you consider those disarmament measures as forming an integral part of the whole programme of general and complete disarmament and will you consider those measures from the point of view of what we can agree upon in this programme as a whole, or will you consider them as partial and isolated measures, a point dwelt upon today in some detail by Mr. Mozinescu, or finally, will you regard these measures merely as examples which may be accepted or not accepted when the treaty on general and complete disarmament is being drafted? All these questions are still far from clear.

I realize that we may not be in a position to clarify all these questions today but it seems to the Soviet delegation that if they were cleared up it would facilitate our moving forward towards a solution of our main problem on apparently which, our points of view are beginning to get closer. In any case, today's statement by the representative of Italy also confirmed that the Italian delegation takes the General Assembly resolution as its basis. That being so, we must obviously try to work out some kind of joint agreement, a treaty on general and complete disarmament and we must begin to work out such an agreement.

We suggest starting now to formulate the fundamental principles, the basic provisions of the treaty. We could begin by agreeing on the general scope of the measures to be included in the treaty and then consider how these measures can be spread over the stages and what approximate periods of time would be needed for their implementation. This seems to be a practical approach to the matter. As we examine each individual stage we would, of course, consider also the control measures and the whole control system which would be necessary for verifying the execution of all those measures.
We felt that such an approach to the question should be acceptable to us all, because we would have both disarmament measures and also control measures. In this way we shall be able to move forward. If, on the other hand, we accept the point of view that we must now deal only with the elaboration of control measures and with what was suggested today by the representative of Italy, namely, to elaborate in all its details a control system, a system of an international disarmament organization, then of course, the question inevitably arises: where are the disarmament measures? where are the measures for general and complete disarmament?

We consider that that is what we have to do. That is why I asked my question: when are we going to take up the question of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, that is, when shall we begin to work out the basic content of the disarmament measures and of the control measures connected with them?

These were the additional explanatory remarks which I wished to make in the hope that, at our next meetings, of course, we shall obtain an exhaustive reply to these questions.

Mr. Eaton (United States of America): I do not wish to take up more of this most interesting morning except to say one thing. I think that we must be suffering from the interpretations and the language difficulty in which we always find ourselves. A doubt has been expressed here as to what the intentions of my Government are. They were very clearly reflected in the United Nations resolution to which all of us here were parties and in which we were asked by the United Nations to work out the measures for general and complete disarmament. I had thought that we assumed this to be one of our tasks. I should like to add quite hastily that the definition of general and complete disarmament which has been adopted by the Soviet Union and which is reflected in Mr. Khrushchev's plan is not a definition to which we subscribe, but the objective is certainly one to which all of us here subscribed last autumn. Then again, lest there be any doubt, I will read from a letter which I received from our President at the time of the opening of our meeting and which I had hoped would make abundantly clear what my instructions were as well as giving words of welcome on the opening day of this Conference. He said:
"I want to take this opportunity to emphasize that the United States is prepared to explore every possible avenue to find a way toward general disarmament ... it should be our objective in these negotiations to contribute by carefully balanced, phased and safeguarded arms control agreements to the ultimate objective of a secure, free and peaceful world in which international disputes will be settled in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." (TNCD/2)

Mr. MEZINOCSCU (Romania) (translation from French): I understood from what the United States representative said just now that he does not agree — that he has different views on the definition of general and complete disarmament as proposed in the plan submitted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly. I must say I find that quite natural. But I think our conclusion from this fact should be different from the one drawn by the United States representative.

Precisely because there are differences of opinion between the countries represented here on what "general and complete disarmament" means, one of our first tasks under the third operative paragraph of Resolution 1378 (XIV) should be to compare our views and try to make the necessary efforts to arrive at an agreed definition of the scope of the disarmament measures to be adopted, of what the world will be like when the process of general and complete disarmament has been completed, and so forth.

What the United States representative said just now appears to encourage us in this course and to show that working out such basic principles for our future work should be the next immediate task after the exploratory exchange of views that took place during the first fortnight of discussion.

I venture to point out, however — and this time I cannot hold our able interpreters in any way responsible if I have misunderstood, since I listened without interpretation and any misunderstanding must be due to my poor knowledge of English — that, if I understood him right, Mr. Eaton just now declared the United States' continued support, as a sponsor, of Resolution 1378 (XIV). If that is so, if I am right in understanding that the United States Government still regards this resolution as expressing its policy, then I cannot see why — when the
General Assembly resolution says that "general and complete disarmament" is the most important question facing the world today, calls upon Governments to enter into negotiations and to take measures leading towards that goal, and transmits to us the records of the discussion that took place in the General Assembly on an item entitled "General and complete disarmament" placed on the agenda by the Soviet Union -- I cannot see why Mr. Eaton, quoting his own statement at the first meeting of this Conference, should speak of "general disarmament" only.

I should like to ask the United States representative whether "general and complete disarmament" is to be understood as meaning the same thing as "general disarmament". What exactly are his delegation's views on this point? Does it subscribe to the ideas in Resolution 1378 (XIV), as embodied in a document whose reference number I could give and which everyone knows, or is it now advocating a general disarmament which would, in short -- I will not go into the title of the Western plan in detail -- be different in content from general and complete disarmament and thus different from the goal which, as the United States representative recognized just now, was set for us by the General Assembly?

Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): I think that, should anyone chance to read the record of the end of this meeting, he will find that it took place in an atmosphere that was confused, dull and laden with implied meanings.

Can we try to make things a little clearer? Are we all, at least, determined to try to get things clear? That is what I wish to do.

I think that if we are asked to begin by defining what we mean, on each side, by general and complete disarmament, we shall revert to a general discussion that will lead to nothing. For the Soviet Union and its associates, the only plan of general and complete disarmament will be the plan submitted to the United Nations. For the Western Powers it will be the Western plan. We shall say that one plan is unrealistic and we shall be told that the other is not complete, and so the discussion will go on. We are used to that, but it does not do us much credit.

So can we leave aside for the moment this goal towards which all of us who voted in favour of the General Assembly resolution wish to advance, in order to see what we could do in a first stage towards that goal, then in a second stage,
and so on, at each step, of course, associating disarmament measures with the corresponding measures of control? If we take that course, if we draw up an agreed list of measures -- even a very short one at first, should we be unable to reach more comprehensive agreements -- and if we also make a list of the studies to be undertaken, whether by the international disarmament organization or by groups of experts appointed by ourselves (it comes to the same thing -- the studies have got to be made), we shall perhaps be doing useful work. I therefore ask each of you the following question: are we prepared to try to find out what points we can agree on for an initial stage?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation thanks Mr. Moch for his attempt to introduce clarity into the atmosphere, as he put it, of confusion that prevails here. I am not, however, fully convinced that those who have participated in today's discussion would agree with Mr. Moch's description of their statements. I in any case do not agree with it -- I cannot speak for the others. To my mind we have made a sincere attempt to introduce genuine clarity, and it was certainly not our intention to confuse the discussion this morning. I think that, if Mr. Moch goes carefully through today's record, he will see that there has really been an attempt to clarify the purpose of our labours, the task set before us and the specific steps we ought to take now and in the future. That is one comment I have to make.

My second comment concerns the opinion he has expressed about the plans that have been submitted and that are being discussed. I am afraid that Mr. Moch himself has attempted to introduce a little confusion into this matter by his statement to the effect that we consider the "Khrushchev Plan" to be the only possible plan. That is not our position. It seems to me that it is Mr. Moch who is somewhat confused here and is apparently anxious to spread the confusion to all the rest of us.

We do not consider the "Khrushchev Plan" as the only possible plan. This we have stated repeatedly in the past. We are prepared to study most carefully any concrete proposals that aim at achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament on which, as Mr. Eaton said this morning, we seem to have a common viewpoint. Our purpose is the same, but we differ in the way we approach the problem. There is a difference in the plans that have been submitted, but we
are precisely in favour of comparing the plans that are before us and trying to find common ground, a common point of view, we are for trying to reach agreement and agreeing on both the basic content of a future treaty of general and complete disarmament and the main stages of its implementation.

Therefore, in order to make the matter crystal clear, I want to say that we do not consider that we can discuss only the proposals submitted to the United Nations by Mr. Khrushchev. Not at all. We are prepared to discuss any amendments that may be proposed to the plan and would precisely like to find out what it is in this plan that is acceptable to the Western Powers and what is not acceptable.

Mr. Eaton said this morning that the "Khrushchev Plan" is not a definition and the Western representatives agree with that, but that the objective of general and complete disarmament is the sole aim we have. We would be very grateful if Mr. Eaton could give us some idea of what it is that is unacceptable in the definition of general and complete disarmament contained in the Khrushchev Plan. That is precisely what we would like to discuss; we are prepared to listen and, perhaps, we shall arrive at a common understanding of the scope and nature of the measures, the Soviet view on which was put very clearly in the Soviet Government's Declaration presented to the General Assembly by Mr. Khrushchev. This is precisely what we wish to discuss. It is entirely different from what Mr. Moch has ascribed to us.

My third comment is as follows: Mr. Moch proposes that we try to discuss what can be done during the first stage, and then the second stage. What he does not go on to say is what these stages are. Are they stages of a general and complete disarmament or of something else? If he agrees that it would be the first stage of general and complete disarmament, we are prepared to discuss this. We proposed that it should be discussed. We have spelled out in concrete terms what the first stage, the second stage, the third stage and so on would consist of. If anyone has views on the first stage, the stage of general and complete disarmament, we are prepared to listen. If Mr. Moch agrees with this, I think we might begin considering this at our next meeting. We certainly do not object to that.

These are the remarks I consider it necessary to make.
Mr. MOCH (France) (translation from French): Three very brief replies to the three comments which have just been made:

First reply: I never ventured to say that my colleagues' statements were confused. It was not the speeches at the end of the meeting that were confused, but the order in which they were made, their contradictions and their inconclusiveness.

Second reply: I take note of this emphatic repetition by Mr. Zorin that the Khrushchev Plan is not the only one that reflects the Soviet position. Mr. Zorin said, and I quote:

"We do not consider the Khrushchev Plan as the only possible plan ...
We are prepared to study ... any concrete proposals that aim at achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament ..." (page 25 above).

He believes the difference lies in the approach to the question, and that is borne out by his third comment, referring to my suggestion that we should try to see what could be done in a first stage. Mr. Zorin asked: in a first stage of what?

But a first stage must always be one of partial disarmament, unless general and complete disarmament is to be achieved in a single stage. The first stage of any plan, however far it goes, does not go as far as the subsequent stages; otherwise there would only be one stage. Thus the first stage is necessarily one of partial disarmament.

Perhaps I should interpret Mr. Zorin's question as meaning something different, which would need much more consideration: namely that when discussing the first stage we must at once commit ourselves to going right on to the end, to total disarmament -- we must at once work out all the subsequent stages, which would follow mechanically whatever the degree of completion of the previous ones and whatever the world situation at the time of transition from one stage to the next. If that is what he means, I am bound to say that I cannot commit myself to that course. If we are to repeat, as a sort of prologue, that we wish to achieve general and complete disarmament, within a period which incidentally we cannot forecast, and that consequently, in accordance with the formula adopted by the General Assembly, we are taking "measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control" (A/RES/1378 (XIV)), the French delegation for its part is prepared to work out the first stage of those measures in detail, and possibly the second stage; but I cannot say how far we shall be able to go; that will depend on our reciprocal requirements.
Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I am grateful to Mr. Moch for his explanations because it helps to clarify at least to some extent his position in connexion with the question of general and of partial disarmament. I think that, after studying the verbatim record, we shall be able to form a better judgement of his explanation.

I should like only to make one small clarification regarding the second point in his today's intervention when he referred to the Khrushchev Plan.

Mr. Moch repeated my statement "that we do not consider the Khrushchev Plan as the only possible plan for discussion here" but he introduced into it the phrase that "it is not the only plan that reflects the Soviet position." This is of course a very free interpretation of my position. The Soviet position is certainly expressed by the Khrushchev Plan. This is perfectly clear, and I was not referring to that when I said that the Soviet delegation had, as it were, two positions. The Soviet position is expressed by the Khrushchev Plan. But we have before us for discussion not only the Khrushchev Plan. That is what I referred to. From this point of view it is not, of course, the only plan, and we are prepared to discuss any proposals which will lead to general and complete disarmament.

That is the clarification which I deem it necessary to give so that there should be no ambiguities on this point.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Does anyone else wish to speak?

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, before you read out the communique, I should like to announce that we have now received the original of Mr. Khrushchev's message to our Committee which I read out at the first open meeting of our Committee. I shall hand this original to the Secretariat of our Committee to be kept in the archives of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I shall read the draft communique.
"The tenth meeting of the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament was held on 28 March in the Palais des Nations in Geneva, under the Chairmanship of the representative of the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 29 March, at 10.30 a.m."

Are there any objections?

The communique is adopted.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.