

Amendment Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

New York, 7–18 January 1991

REPORT

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Part I

ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

I. ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

Introduction

1. At the request of more than one third of the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the depositary Governments, in accordance with article II of the Treaty, convened a Conference to consider the amendment to the Treaty proposed by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. Thereafter, informal consultations among the parties to the Treaty were held in New York.

2. At its forty-fourth session the General Assembly of the United Nations, in its resolution 44/106, recommended that a preparatory committee, open to all parties to the Treaty, should be established to make arrangements for the Amendment Conference and that such preparatory committee should meet at United Nations Headquarters from 29 May to 1 June 1990, followed by a one-week session of the Conference from 4 to 8 June 1990 and a second substantive session from 7 to 18 January 1991.

3. Thereafter, 6 meetings of the States parties to the Treaty and 15 open-ended informal consultations took place between 12 January and 25 May 1990. At their meeting on 8 March 1990, the States parties decided to hold the Amendment Conference in New York from 7 to 18 January 1991, preceded by the Meeting for the Organization of the Conference from 29 May to 8 June 1990.

4. The following 74 States parties participated in the work of the Meeting, which took place at United Nations Headquarters in New York, from 29 May to 8 June 1990:

Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

5. The Meeting was opened by Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, who represented the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

6. At its 1st meeting, the Meeting elected by acclamation Mr. Edmond Jayasinghe, Ambassador of Sri Lanka, as President of the Meeting. Ms. Jill Bernardine Courtney, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations, and Mr. Ivan Sotirov, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the United Nations, were elected by acclamation as Vice-Presidents of the Meeting.

7. At the same meeting, the Meeting confirmed the nomination of Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, Principal Officer of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, as Secretary-General of the Meeting. The nomination had been made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in response to a request of the States parties that he designate an official as provisional Secretary-General of the Meeting and of the Conference, such nomination to be confirmed by those bodies respectively.

8. At subsequent meetings, the Meeting adopted, inter alia, the provisional agenda and the draft rules of procedure of the Amendment Conference, and decided upon the financial arrangements for meeting the costs of the Meeting and the Conference (see PTBT/CONF/1, paras. 14 to 16 and part IV). It also requested the Secretariat to prepare a background paper, which was later issued as a document of the Conference (PTBT/CONF/5). In addition, the Conference decided to invite the parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, to submit to the provisional Secretary-General of the Conference for distribution before the Conference their views regarding the verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The views received on this subject were reproduced as document PTBT/CONF/4 and Add.1 and 2.

9. At the final plenary meeting, on 8 June 1990, the States parties participating in the Meeting adopted the final report, which was subsequently transmitted to the Amendment Conference as document PTBT/CONF/1.

10. On 4 December 1990, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 45/50, entitled "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water", by which the Assembly noted with satisfaction that the Amendment Conference would be held in New York from 7 to 18 January 1991; called upon all parties to the Treaty to participate in, and to contribute to the success of, the Amendment Conference for the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban at an early date, as an indispensable measure towards implementation of their undertakings in the preamble to the Treaty; reiterated its conviction that, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should suspend all nuclear-test explosions through an agreed moratorium or unilateral moratoria; recommended that arrangements be made to ensure that intensive efforts continue, under the auspices of the Amendment Conference, until a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was achieved; recommended also that the Amendment Conference establish a working group, or other means it deemed appropriate, to study, inter alia, the organization of control, institutional mechanisms and legal aspects of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and to report its conclusions to the Conference; stressed the importance of ensuring adequate co-ordination among the various negotiating forums dealing with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; and decided to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session the item entitled "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water". The full text of resolution 45/50 is contained in document PTBT/CONF/11.

Organization of the Conference

11. In accordance with the decision taken by the States parties to the Treaty at their meeting on 8 March 1990, the Conference was convened on 7 January 1991 at United Nations Headquarters in New York. After the opening of the Conference by Ambassador Edmond Jayasinghe of Sri Lanka, President of the Meeting of the States Parties for the Organization of the Amendment Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations made the opening statement. Thereafter, the Conference elected by acclamation as its President the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Mr. Ali Alatas.
12. At the same meeting, the Conference confirmed the nomination of Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, Principal Officer of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, as Secretary-General of the Conference.
13. A message from President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, addressed to the Conference, was read out by the representative of the USSR.
14. Also at the opening meeting, the Conference took note of the final report of the Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water for the Organization of the Amendment Conference (PTBT/CONF/1) and adopted the recommendations contained therein.
15. At the same meeting, the Conference adopted its provisional agenda as contained in document PTBT/CONF/2 and proceeded to adopt its rules of procedure as contained in document PTBT/CONF/3.
16. At that meeting, in accordance with its rules of procedure, the Conference elected by acclamation 10 Vice-Presidents from the following States parties: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela. In addition, it elected Ambassador Jan Groop of Finland as Chairman of the Credentials Committee. Subsequently, at its 8th plenary meeting, on 11 January 1991, the Conference elected Ambassador Satteeanund Peerthum of Mauritius as Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee and, upon the proposal of the President, appointed the following States parties as members of that Committee: Belgium, Botswana, Colombia, Fiji and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
17. Also at the opening meeting, having adopted the cost-sharing formula for the Meeting and the Conference referred to in rule 12 of the rules of procedure and the recommendations in that respect contained in the final report of the Meeting as well as having approved the revised estimates for the costs of the Meeting and the Conference (PTBT/CONF/9), which would later be adjusted to reflect the actual expenditures incurred, the Conference adopted the arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference.

Work of the Conference

18. The Conference held nine plenary meetings between 7 and 18 January 1991.
19. During the course of the general debate, which took place in plenary meetings from 8 to 11 January 1991, the following 63 States parties made statements:

Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

In addition Cameroon, a signatory State, made a statement.

20. During the course of the Conference, the General Committee held three meetings.

21. In accordance with the decision of the Conference, the Committee of the Whole held two meetings devoted to an exchange of views on item 12 of the agenda, entitled "Consideration of the Proposed Amendment to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water as provided for in its article II, including reports of the Committees". The proposed amendments are contained in documents PTBT/CONF/6 and Add.1 and PTBT/CONF/8.

22. A draft decision was submitted on 17 January 1991 by Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela and Yugoslavia and circulated as document PTBT/CONF/L.1. Subsequently, it was also co-sponsored by Senegal.

23. The Credentials Committee held two meetings, on 14 and 17 January 1991. At its 2nd meeting, the Committee adopted its report to the Conference on the credentials of representatives of States parties participating in the Conference (PTBT/CONF/12). At its 9th plenary meeting, on 19 January 1991, the Conference took note of the report.

24. At its 3rd meeting, on 18 January 1991, the Committee of the Whole adopted the draft report of the Conference as contained in document PTBT/CONF/L.2 and decided to transmit it to the conference for consideration and adoption.

25. At its 9th plenary meeting, on 18 January 1991, the Amendment Conference adopted its report as contained in document PTBT/CONF/L.2, as orally amended (PTBT/CONF/13).

Decision of the Conference

26. At its 9th plenary meeting, on 18 January 1991, the Amendment Conference adopted the draft decision referred to in paragraph 22, as orally revised by Mexico on behalf of the sponsors, by a recorded vote of 74 to 2, with 19 abstentions. The decision reads as follows:

Acknowledging the complex and complicated nature of certain aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, especially those with regard to verification of compliance and possible sanctions against non-compliance, the States parties

were of the view that further work needed to be undertaken. Accordingly, they agreed to mandate the President of the Conference to conduct consultations with a view to achieving progress on those issues and resuming the work of the Conference at an appropriate time.

27. The following States parties gave explanations of vote on the draft decision: Argentina, Austria, Canada, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

Participation at the Conference

28. Of the 117 States parties to the Treaty, the following 100 participated in the Conference:

Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia.

29. In accordance with paragraph 1 of rule 44 of the rules of procedure, the following five signatory States also participated in the Conference: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia and Portugal.

30. In accordance with paragraph 2 (a) of rule 44, the following nine States were granted Observer status: Albania, Angola, Bahrain, Cuba, Guyana, Holy See, Lesotho, Mozambique and Vanuatu. In accordance with paragraph 2 (b), Palestine was granted Observer status.

31. Under paragraph 3 of rule 44, the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency attended the Conference.

32. Under paragraph 4 of rule 44, the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Organization of African Unity and the World Meteorological Organization were granted Observer Agency status.

33. Under paragraph 5 of rule 44, which provided for the attendance of non-governmental organizations at the Conference, 123 such organizations attended. On 9 January 1991, representatives of 33 such organizations spoke at an informal meeting held to enable the participants of the Conference to hear statements presented by the non-governmental organizations.

34. A list of participants at the Conference, including representatives of States parties, States signatories, Observers, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the secretariat of the Conference, specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations, is contained in annex III to the present report.

Documentation

35. Annexes I and II to the present report contain, respectively, the list of the documents of the Conference and the texts of the documents of the Conference. Annex III contains the list of participants.

Annex I

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

PTBT/CONF/1	Final report of the Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water for the Organization of the Amendment Conference
PTBT/CONF/2	Provisional agenda of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water
PTBT/CONF/3	Draft rules of procedure for the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water
PTBT/CONF/4 and Add.1 and 2	Views regarding the verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban
PTBT/CONF/5	Background paper by the Secretariat
PTBT/CONF/6 and Add.1	Letter dated 30 November 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of Indonesia, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia and the Deputy Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference, submitting the text of draft Protocol II on the verification of the amendment proposed to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water
PTBT/CONF/7	Letter dated 14 December 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of Chile and Colombia and the Deputy Permanent Representatives of Ecuador and Peru to the United Nations addressed to the provisional Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting a text on behalf of the members of the Permanent South Pacific Commission
PTBT/CONF/8	Letter dated 17 December 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of Mexico, Venezuela and Yugoslavia and the Chargés d'affaires a.i., Deputy Permanent Representatives of Indonesia, Peru and Sri Lanka to the United Nations addressed to the provisional Secretary-General of the Conference, submitting the text of the proposed amendment to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (Protocol I)
PTBT/CONF/9	Revised estimated cost of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water: Note by the Secretariat

PTBT/CONF/10	Letter dated 7 December 1990 from the Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) addressed to the provisional Secretary-General of the Amendment Conference, transmitting in writing the comments of the Agency in accordance with rule 44 (4) of the draft rules of procedure
PTBT/CONF/11	Letter dated 10 January 1991 from the Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference, requesting the circulation of General Assembly resolution 45/50 as an official document of the Amendment Conference
PTBT/CONF/12	Credentials of representatives of the Conference: Report of the Credentials Committee
PTBT/CONF/13	Report of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water
PTBT/CONF/L.1	Draft decision by Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela and Yugoslavia
PTBT/CONF/L.2	Draft report of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

SUMMARY RECORDS OF PLENARY MEETINGS

PTBT/CONF/SR.1-9	Summary records of the 1st to 9th plenary meetings

INFORMATION DOCUMENTS

PTBT/CONF/INF/1 and Add.1 and 2	Provisional list of participants

Annex II

DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE

**Amendment Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water**

PTBT/CONF/1
18 July 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

7-18 January 1991
New York

FINAL REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE
TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN
OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
AMENDMENT CONFERENCE

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Part I. Organization and work of the Meeting

1. At the request of more than one third of the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the depositary Governments, in accordance with article II of the Treaty, convened a Conference to consider the amendment to the Treaty proposed by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. Thereafter, informal consultations among the parties to the Treaty were held in New York.
2. At its forty-fourth session the General Assembly of the United Nations, in its resolution 44/106, recommended that a preparatory committee, open to all parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, should be established to make arrangements for the Amendment Conference and that such preparatory committee should meet at United Nations Headquarters from 29 May to 1 June 1990, followed by a one-week session of the Conference from 4 to 8 June 1990 and a second substantive session from 7 to 18 January 1991.
3. Thereafter, 6 meetings of the States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and 15 open-ended informal consultations took place between 12 January and 25 May 1990.
4. At their meeting on 8 March 1990, the States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water decided to hold the Amendment Conference in New York from 7 to 18 January 1991, preceded by the Meeting for the Organization of the Conference from 29 May to 8 June 1990.
5. The following 74 States parties participated in the work of the Meeting which took place at United Nations Headquarters in New York, from 29 May to 8 June 1990:

Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.
6. The composition of the delegations participating in the Meeting has been issued in PTBT/CONF/M/INF/2.
7. During the course of the Meeting, the States parties held 13 plenary meetings, as well as a number of meetings devoted to informal consultations.

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8. The Meeting was opened by Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, who represented the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

9. The States parties then elected by acclamation Mr. Edmond Jayasinghe, Ambassador of Sri Lanka, as President of the Meeting.
Ms. Jill Bernardine Courtney, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations, and Mr. Ivan Sotirov, Deputy Permanent Representative of Bulgaria were elected by acclamation as Vice-Presidents of the Meeting.

10. In response to a request of the States parties to designate an official as Secretary-General of the Meeting and of the Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations nominated Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, Principal Officer of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, as the provisional Secretary-General of the Meeting and of the Conference to be confirmed respectively by those bodies themselves. At its 1st meeting on 29 May, the States parties confirmed the nomination of Mr. Sohrab Kheradi as the Secretary-General of the Meeting.

11. At its 1st meeting, on 29 May 1990, the Meeting adopted its provisional agenda as contained in PTBT/CONF/M/1, which was orally amended at the 12th meeting on 8 June 1990 and is contained in PTBT/CONF/M/1/Rev.1.

12. At the 1st meeting, the States parties adopted the rules of procedure of the Meeting as contained in PTBT/CONF/M/2.

13. Also at the same meeting, the States parties adopted the programme of work as contained in PTBT/CONF/M/5.

14. At their 9th meeting, on 5 June 1990, the States parties decided to accept the estimated costs of the Meeting and the Amendment Conference as set out in PTBT/CONF/M/4. In that respect, the President also noted that the figures contained therein would be revised prior to the Amendment Conference in order to reflect the actual costs of the Meeting as well as any adjustments in the estimated costs of the Conference, and that a document containing these revisions would be provided to the Conference for its consideration.

15. During the course of consideration of the arrangements for meeting the costs of the Meeting and the Conference as contained in PTBT/CONF/M/7, the States parties adopted the following cost-sharing formula:

I. The costs of the Conference, including the Meeting for its organization, will be met by the States parties to the Treaty who participate in the Meeting or the Conference and by the States which have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty and which accept the invitation to participate in the Meeting or the Conference.

II. The costs will be shared in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments, subject to the adjustments below:

(a) The three Original Parties specified in article III (2) of the Treaty will pay, as offered by them, one third of the cost;

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(b) No State party or signatory will be required to pay more than the largest contributor under the United Nations scale of assessment.

III. The outstanding costs arising from the above will be met by voluntary contributions.

16. With respect to the cost-sharing formula as specified above (see PTBT/CONF/M/4 and Add.1, which now constitutes part IV of the present report), it is understood that the President of the Meeting will appropriately advise the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the modalities involved in meeting 100 per cent of the costs of the Meeting and the Conference. He also noted the understanding that these financial arrangements for the Meeting and the Conference do not constitute a precedent.

17. Under item 9 of the agenda of the Meeting, a general exchange of views took place between 30 May and 4 June 1990, during the course of which the following 28 States parties made statements:

Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

18. Under item 10 concerning organization of the Conference, the Meeting, inter alia, considered issues related to: (a) provisional agenda, (b) draft rules of procedure, and (c) background documentation.

19. At the 7th meeting, on 31 May, in connection with agenda item 10, the States parties decided to establish two open-ended working groups on: (a) "Draft rules of procedure", chaired by Mr. Sotirov, Vice-President of the Meeting; and (b) "Background documentation", chaired by Ms. Courtney, Vice-President of the Meeting. The first working group held six meetings and the second working group held three meetings. The Chairmen of the working groups presented oral reports on the work of their respective working groups to the States parties at the 10th and 11th meetings, on 6 and 7 June 1990.

20. At the 13th meeting, the States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water decided to transmit to the Conference for its consideration, and information as appropriate, the following documents:

- (a) Provisional agenda (PTBT/CONF/M/10) (see annex I);
- (b) Draft rules of procedure (PTBT/CONF/M/11) (see annex II);
- (c) Background documentation (PTBT/CONF/M/12) (see annex III).

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21. At its 13th meeting, the Meeting decided to invite the parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, to submit to the provisional Secretary-General of the Conference for distribution before the Conference their views regarding the verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

22. Documents containing a record of decisions have been issued under the symbols PTBT/CONF/M/DEC.1 to 6. (See part III below.)

23. Other documents have been issued under the symbols PTBT/CONF/M/1 to 13.

24. At its 13th plenary meeting, on 8 June, the Meeting adopted its final report to be transmitted to the Amendment Conference for the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. The report consists of five parts: I. Organization and work of the Meeting; II. Summary records; III. Record of decisions; IV. Estimated costs of the Meeting and the Amendment Conference; and V. Other documents of the Meeting (see annex IV).

Part II. Summary records

Summary records of the Meeting of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water for the
Organization of the Amendment Conference*

(29 May-8 June 1990)

Part III. Record of decisions**

Decision 1

At their 1st meeting, on 29 May 1990, the States parties decided:

1. To elect, by acclamation, Mr. Edmond Jayasinghe, Ambassador of Sri Lanka, as President of the Meeting.

2. To elect, by acclamation, Ms. Jill Bernardine Courtney, First Secretary of Australia, and Mr. Ivan Sotirov, Deputy Permanent Representative of Bulgaria, as Vice-Presidents of the Meeting.

* Issued separately as PTBT/CONF/M/SR.1 to 13.

** Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/DEC.1-6, respectively.

3. To confirm the nomination of Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, of the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, as Secretary-General of the Meeting.

4. To adopt the agenda of the Meeting as contained in document PTBT/CONF/M/1.

5. To adopt the rules of procedure for the Meeting as contained in document PTBT/CONF/M/2.

6. To adopt the programme of work for the Meeting as contained in document PTBT/CONF/M/5.

7. To adopt the arrangements for meeting the costs of the Meeting and the Conference as contained in document PTBT/CONF/M/7. In that respect the President also referred to the understanding reached at the informal meeting of the States parties held on 25 May 1990. He also noted the understanding that these financial arrangements for the Meeting and the Conference do not constitute a precedent.

Decision 2

At their 3rd¹ meeting, on 30 May 1990, the States parties decided that rule 7 of the rules of procedure would be interpreted to mean that press releases would not be issued for any closed meetings.

Decision 3

At their 7th meeting, on 31 May 1990, the States parties decided:

1. To establish an open-ended working group to consider the draft rules of procedure for the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, to be chaired by Mr. Ivan Sotirov (Bulgaria), Vice-President of the Meeting.

2. To establish an open-ended working group on background documentation for the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, to be chaired by Ms. Jill Bernardine Courtney (Australia), Vice-President of the Meeting.

Decision 4

At their 9th meeting, on 5 June 1990, the States parties decided to accept the estimated costs of the Meeting and the Amendment Conference as set out in document PTBT/CONF/M/4. In that respect, the President also noted that the figures contained therein would be revised prior to the Amendment Conference in order to reflect the actual costs of the Meeting as well as any adjustments in the estimated costs of the Conference, and that a document containing these revisions would be provided to the Conference for its consideration.

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Decision 5

At their 12th meeting, on 8 June 1990, the States parties decided:

1. To adopt the provisional agenda of the Amendment Conference as set out in PTBT/CONF/M/10. In regard to item 1 of the Agenda, an understanding was reached among the States parties that the President of the Meeting will declare open the Amendment Conference, invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations to make the opening statement and, after the Secretary-General concludes his statement, proceed with the item concerning the election of the President of the Conference. The President of the Meeting noted that it was his intention to extend, in advance, an invitation for that purpose to the Secretary-General.

2. To adopt the draft rules of procedure of the Amendment Conference as set out in PTBT/CONF/M/11, with the following recommendations and understandings related thereto:

(a) To use the same procedure as was used in connection with the Meeting with regard to attendance by relevant intergovernmental organizations. Under such a procedure, the President of the Meeting will request the provisional Secretary-General of the Conference to transmit appropriate communications to the relevant intergovernmental organizations concerning attendance at the Amendment Conference on the basis of a list to be provided by the President of the Meeting;

(b) To recommend that an informal meeting during the Conference should be allocated to enable participants to hear statements from non-governmental organizations. The Meeting notes that the time allocated to each speaker representing a non-governmental organization may need to be limited, depending upon the number of representatives wishing to speak;

(c) In regard to paragraph 2 (b) above:

(i) To request the provisional Secretary-General of the Amendment Conference to communicate this proposal to the NGO Committees on Disarmament in New York and Geneva and request them to arrange a suitable timetable for the above purpose;

(ii) To provide conference services, including interpretation;

(iii) That, in accordance with the normal procedure for informal meetings, there would not be summary records;

(iv) That non-governmental organizations would be able to make their views available in writing separately.

(See also PTBT/CONF/M/SR.13.)

3. To request the Secretariat to prepare for the Amendment Conference a brief background document covering the points set out in PTBT/CONF/M/12 and drawing on, as far as possible, relevant existing documentation. In that connection, it

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was noted that an indicative list of already existing relevant documents would be provided to the Secretariat by the Chairperson of the open-ended Working Group on Background Documentation for the Amendment Conference with a view to facilitating the preparation of the above background document. (See also PTBT/CONF/M/SR.13.)

4. To add a new item entitled "Adoption of the final report of the Meeting" to the agenda of the Meeting. (See PTBT/CONF/M/1/Rev.1.)

5. To accept annex II entitled "Arrangements for meeting the costs of the Meeting and the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water", as contained in PTBT/CONF/M/4/Add.1.

Decision 6

At their 13th meeting, on 8 June 1990, the States parties decided:

1. To adopt the draft decision submitted by Yugoslavia on behalf of the Non-Aligned States parties as contained in document PTBT/CONF/M/9.

2. To adopt the final report of the Meeting contained in document PTBT/CONF/M/13, as orally amended. (See PTBT/CONF/M/SR.13.)

Part IV. Estimated costs of the Meeting and the Amendment Conference*

A. Estimated conference-servicing costs

1. The preliminary figures for the conference-servicing costs given below are based on estimates for the Meeting for the Organization of the Amendment Conference and on the forecast of the work-load for the Amendment Conference.

2. In accordance with the rules of procedure for the Meeting, the working languages will be Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish. Summary records will be provided under item 9 (General exchange of views) of the agenda of the Meeting, as well as for the opening and concluding meetings. In addition, records will be issued for all decisions made and a record of decisions and recommendations taken at the Meeting will be transmitted to all States parties and to the Conference.

3. On this basis, the conference-servicing requirements are at present estimated as follows:

* Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/4 and Add.1.

	<u>Estimates</u> (\$)
Meeting (New York, 29 May-8 June 1990)	223 100
Amendment Conference (New York, 7-18 January 1991)	<u>457 500</u>
Total	680 600

4. The breakdown of the conference-servicing costs estimated for the Meeting and the Amendment Conference is set out in table 1 below.

Table 1*

ESTIMATES OF CONFERENCE- AND NON-CONFERENCE-SERVICING COSTS OF
THE MEETING FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMENDMENT CONFERENCE
AND OF THE AMENDMENT CONFERENCE

	Meeting (Estimates) (\$)	Amendment Conference (Estimates) (\$)	Total (\$)
I. <u>Conference-servicing costs</u>			
A. Pre-session documentation	32 900	83 500	116 400
B. Meeting services	60 600	70 400	131 000
C. Summary records	97 200	224 900	322 100
D. In-session documentation	16 700	37 700	54 400
E. Post-session documentation	15 700	41 000	56 700
Total I	223 100	457 500	680 600
II. <u>Non-conference-servicing costs</u>			
Total II	1 200	88 400	89 600
Total I, II	224 300	545 900	770 200
III. <u>Programme support costs</u>			
Total III	29 200	71 000	100 200
Grand Total I, II and III	<u>253 500</u>	<u>616 900</u>	<u>870 400</u>

* Initially issued as annex I to PTBT/CONF/M/4.

B. Estimated non-conference-servicing costs

5. These costs are estimated as follows:

	<u>Estimates</u> (\$)	
Secretary-General of the Conference		3 100
Fees and travel of consultants	42 000	
Temporary assistance	29 700	
Information kits	8 400	
Miscellaneous supplies and services		<u>6 400</u>
Total	89 600	

6. An estimated amount of \$3,100 is required for the Secretary-General of the Conference to cover the customary special post allowance from the D-1 to D-2 level and representation allowance.

7. The preparation of documents for the Conference which might be requested at the Meeting would involve the equivalent of about six months of work between June 1990 and the actual holding of the Conference in January 1991. The regular staff of the Department for Disarmament Affairs will devote to this task as much time as their other mandatory activities permit, but as on previous occasions, it would be necessary to entrust the bulk of the writing work to consultants. In the light of the experience gained to date, the amount involved is estimated at \$42,000, which covers fees (\$30,000) and travel and subsistence (\$12,000) in connection with the preparation of background papers.

8. In addition, in order to assist in all administrative arrangements related to the Conference and owing to the very limited level of clerical/secretarial resources in the Department for Disarmament Affairs, an estimated amount of \$29,700 is included under temporary assistance for clerk-typists for 12 work-months.

9. The production of an information kit containing various background materials in English and French is estimated at \$8,400.

10. The provision for miscellaneous supplies and services to cover the costs of stationery, office equipment and communications costs (such as cables, telexes, telefaxes and long-distance telephone calls) is estimated at \$6,400.

C. Estimated programme support costs

11. The provision for reimbursement of programme support costs is based on the practice of the Organization with respect to activities financed from extrabudgetary sources. The percentage applied, namely 13 per cent, reflects the

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standard rate approved by the General Assembly. Accordingly, a provision of \$100,200 is included to offset the cost of administrative and other support provided by the United Nations to the Conference.

D. Aggregation of the estimated conference- and non-conference-servicing costs of the Amendment Conference and the Meeting

	<u>Estimates</u> (<u>\$</u>)
Meeting	253 500
Amendment Conference	<u>616 900</u>
Total	870 400

12. The cost of the Amendment Conference and the Meeting will depend, inter alia, on the actual work-load of the Meeting and the Conference. After the closure of the Conference, each participating State will be advised of its share of the total final cost, which will be in accordance with the arrangements for the cost-sharing formula agreed upon by the States parties to the Treaty.

13. Since the costs associated with the preparation and holding of the Amendment Conference should not have financial implications for the regular budget of the United Nations, deposits are required in accordance with United Nations Financial Rule 114.3 (b).

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Table 2*

ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETING THE COSTS OF THE MEETING AND THE
CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY BANNING
NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE
AND UNDER WATER

PTBT scale of assessments

(1)	(2)	(3)
	Existing United Nations scale	PTBT scale for assessed contributions

(In percentage)

Part A - Original Parties

1	United States of America	25.00	
2	United Kingdom	4.86	33.333
3	USSR	9.99	

Part B - States parties

4	Afghanistan	0.01	0.011
5	Antigua and Barbuda	0.01	0.011
6	Argentina	0.66	0.713
7	Australia	1.57	1.695
8	Austria	0.74	0.799
9	Bahamas	0.02	0.022
10	Bangladesh	0.01	0.011
11	Belgium	1.17	1.264
12	Benin	0.01	0.011
13	Bhutan	0.01	0.011
14	Bolivia	0.01	0.011
15	Botswana	0.01	0.011
16	Brazil	1.45	1.566
17	Bulgaria	0.15	0.162
18	Byelorussian SSR	0.33	0.356
19	Canada	3.09	3.337
20	Cape Verde	0.01	0.011
21	Central African Republic	0.01	0.011
22	Chad	0.01	0.011
23	Chile	0.08	0.086
24	Colombia	0.14	0.151
25	Costa Rica	0.02	0.022
26	Côte d'Ivoire	0.02	0.022
27	Cyprus	0.02	0.022

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(1)	(2)	(3)
	Existing United Nations scale	PTBT scale for assessed contributions
	(In percentage)	
28 Czechoslovakia	0.66	0.713
29 Denmark	0.69	0.745
30 Dominican Republic	0.03	0.032
31 Ecuador	0.03	0.032
32 Egypt	0.07	0.076
33 El Salvador	0.01	0.011
34 Equatorial Guinea	0.01	0.011
35 Fiji	0.01	0.011
36 Finland	0.51	0.551
37 Gabon	0.03	0.032
38 Gambia	0.01	0.011
39 German Democratic Republic	1.28	1.382
40 Germany, Federal Republic of	8.08	8.726
41 Ghana	0.01	0.011
42 Greece	0.40	0.432
43 Guatemala	0.02	0.022
44 Guinea-Bissau	0.01	0.011
45 Honduras	0.01	0.011
46 Hungary	0.21	0.227
47 Iceland	0.03	0.032
48 India	0.37	0.400
49 Indonesia	0.15	0.162
50 Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.69	0.745
51 Iraq	0.12	0.130
52 Ireland	0.18	0.194
53 Israel	0.21	0.227
54 Italy	3.99	4.309
55 Japan	11.38	12.289
56 Jordan	0.01	0.011
57 Kenya	0.01	0.011
58 Kuwait	0.29	0.313
59 Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.01	0.011
60 Lebanon	0.01	0.011
61 Liberia	0.01	0.011
62 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	0.28	0.302
63 Luxembourg	0.06	0.065
64 Madagascar	0.01	0.011
65 Malawi	0.01	0.011
66 Malaysia	0.11	0.119
67 Malta	0.01	0.011
68 Mauritania	0.01	0.011
69 Mauritius	0.01	0.011

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(1)	(2)	(3)
	Existing United Nations scale	PTBT scale for assessed contributions
	(In percentage)	
70 Mexico	0.94	1.015
71 Mongolia	0.01	0.011
72 Morocco	0.04	0.043
73 Myanmar	0.01	0.011
74 Nepal	0.01	0.011
75 Netherlands	1.65	1.782
76 New Zealand	0.24	0.259
77 Nicaragua	0.01	0.011
78 Niger	0.01	0.011
79 Nigeria	0.20	0.216
80 Norway	0.55	0.594
81 Pakistan	0.06	0.065
82 Panama	0.02	0.022
83 Papua New Guinea	0.01	0.011
84 Peru	0.06	0.065
85 Philippines	0.09	0.097
86 Poland	0.56	0.605
87 Republic of Korea	0.22	0.238
88 Romania	0.19	0.205
89 Rwanda	0.01	0.011
90 Samoa	0.01	0.011
91 San Marino	0.01	0.011
92 Senegal	0.01	0.011
93 Seychelles	0.01	0.011
94 Sierra Leone	0.01	0.011
95 Singapore	0.11	0.119
96 South Africa	0.45	0.486
97 Spain	1.95	2.106
98 Sri Lanka	0.01	0.011
99 Sudan	0.01	0.011
100 Swaziland	0.01	0.011
101 Sweden	1.21	1.307
102 Switzerland	1.08	1.166
103 Syrian Arab Republic	0.04	0.043
104 Thailand	0.10	0.108
105 Togo	0.01	0.011
106 Tonga	0.01	0.011
107 Trinidad and Tobago	0.05	0.054
108 Tunisia	0.03	0.032
109 Turkey	0.32	0.346
110 Uganda	0.01	0.011
111 Ukrainian SSR	1.25	1.350

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(1)	(2)	(3)
	Existing United Nations scale	PTBT scale for assessed contributions
	(In percentage)	
112 United Republic of Tanzania	0.01	0.011
113 Uruguay	0.04	0.043
114 Venezuela	0.57	0.616
115 Yemen, Republic of	0.02	0.022
116 Yugoslavia	0.46	0.497
117 Zaire	0.01	0.011
118 Zambia	0.01	0.011
Part C - States signatories		
119 Algeria	0.15	0.162
120 Burkina Faso	0.01	0.011
121 Burundi	0.01	0.011
122 Cameroon	0.01	0.011
123 Ethiopia	0.01	0.011
124 Haiti	0.01	0.011
125 Jamaica	0.01	0.011
126 Mali	0.01	0.011
127 Paraguay	0.03	0.032
128 Portugal	0.18	0.194
129 Somalia	0.01	0.011
Subtotal	92.60	90.299
Voluntary contributions		9.701
Total		100**

* Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/4/Add.1.

** In connection with the cost-sharing formula contained in rule 12 of the draft rules of procedure of the Amendment Conference, it is the understanding that the President of the Meeting will appropriately advise the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the modalities involved in meeting 100 per cent of the costs of the Meeting and the Conference.

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Part V. Other documents of the Meeting

In addition to the documents contained in parts III and IV above, and annexes I to III below, the Meeting also had before it other documents as set out in annex IV below.

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Annex I

PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF THE AMENDMENT CONFERENCE OF THE STATES
PARTIES TO THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE
ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER

1. Opening statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Election of the President.
3. Final report of the Meeting for the Organization of the Amendment Conference.
4. Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Conference.
5. Adoption of the agenda.
6. Adoption of the rules of procedure.
7. Credentials of representatives to the Conference:
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
8. Election of other officers.
9. Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference.
10. Programme of work.
11. General debate.
12. Consideration of the Proposed Amendment to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water as provided for in its article II, including reports of the Committees.
13. Other matters.
14. Adoption of final document/report of the Conference.
15. Closure of the Conference.

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Annex II

DRAFT RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE AMENDMENT CONFERENCE OF
THE STATES PARTIES TO THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON
TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER

I. REPRESENTATION AND CREDENTIALS

Delegations of parties to the Treaty

Rule 1

1. Each State Party to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty") may be represented at the Conference by a head of delegation and such other representatives, alternate representatives and advisers as may be required.

2. The head of delegation may designate an alternate representative or an adviser to act as a representative.

Credentials

Rule 2

The credentials of representatives and the names of alternate representatives and advisers shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the Conference, if possible not less than one week before the date fixed for the opening of the Conference. Credentials shall be issued either by the Head of the State or Government or by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Credentials Committee

Rule 3

The Conference shall establish a Credentials Committee composed of the Chairman, one Vice-Chairman elected in accordance with rule 5, and five members appointed by the Conference on the proposal of the President. The Committee shall examine the credentials of representatives and report to the Conference without delay.

Provisional participation

Rule 4

Pending a decision of the Conference on their credentials, representatives shall be entitled to participate provisionally in the Conference.

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II. OFFICERS

Election

Rule 5

The Conference shall elect the following officers: A President and 10 Vice-Presidents as well as a Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee.

Acting President

Rule 6

1. If the President is absent from a meeting or any part thereof, he shall designate a Vice-President to take his place.

2. A Vice-President acting as President shall have the same powers and duties as the President.

Voting rights of the President

Rule 7

The President, or a Vice-President acting as President shall not vote, but shall appoint another member of his delegation to vote in his place.

III. GENERAL COMMITTEE

Composition

Rule 8

1. The General Committee shall be composed of the President of the Conference, who shall preside, 10 Vice-Presidents and the Chairman of the Credentials Committee. No two members of the General Committee shall be members of the same delegation and it shall be so constituted as to ensure its representative character.

2. If the President is unable to attend a meeting of the General Committee, he may designate a Vice-President to preside at such meeting and a member of his delegation to take his place. If a Vice-President is unable to attend, he may designate a member of his delegation to take his place. If the Chairman of the Credentials Committee is unable to attend, he may designate the Vice-Chairman to take his place, with the right to vote unless he is of the same delegation as another member of the General Committee.

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Functions

Rule 9

The General Committee shall assist the President in the general conduct of the business of the Conference and, subject to the decisions of the Conference, shall ensure the co-ordination of its work.

IV. CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

Duties of the Secretary-General of the Conference

Rule 10

1. There shall be a Secretary-General of the Conference. He shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Conference, its committees and other appropriate bodies established under rule 35, and may designate a member of the secretariat to act in his place at these meetings.

2. The Secretary-General of the Conference shall direct the staff required by the Conference.

Duties of the secretariat

Rule 11

The secretariat of the Conference shall, in accordance with these rules:

- (a) Interpret speeches made at meetings;
- (b) Receive, translate and circulate the documents of the Conference;
- (c) Publish and circulate any report of the Conference;
- (d) Make and arrange for the keeping of sound recordings and summary records of meetings;
- (e) Arrange for the custody of the documents of the Conference in the archives of the United Nations and provide authentic copies of these documents to each of the depositary Governments, and
- (f) Generally perform all other work that the Conference may require.

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Costs

Rule 12*

1. The costs of the Conference, including the Meeting for its organization, will be met by States parties to the Treaty who participate in the Meeting or the Conference and by States which have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty and which accept the invitation to participate in the Meeting or the Conference.

2. The costs will be shared in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, subject to the adjustments below:

(a) The three Original Parties specified in Article III (2) of the Treaty will pay, as offered by them, one third of the cost;

(b) No State party or signatory will be required to pay more than the largest contributor under the United Nations scale of assessment.

3. The outstanding costs arising from the above will be met by voluntary contributions.

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Quorum

Rule 13

A majority of the States parties to the Treaty participating in the Conference shall constitute a quorum.

General powers of the President

Rule 14

1. In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by these rules, the President shall preside at the plenary meetings of the Conference; he shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting, direct the discussion, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, ascertain consensus, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. He shall rule on points of order. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings and over the maintenance of order thereat. The President may propose to the Conference the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each State

* It is understood that the financial arrangements for the Amendment Conference and the Meeting for its organization do not constitute a precedent.

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may speak on a question, the adjournment or the closure of the debate and the suspension or the adjournment of a meeting.

2. The President, in the exercise of his functions, remains under the authority of the Conference.

Points of order

Rule 15

A representative may at any time raise a point of order, which shall be immediately decided by the President in accordance with these rules. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote, and the President's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the representatives present and voting. A representative may not, in raising a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Speeches

Rule 16

1. No one may address the Conference without having previously obtained the permission of the President. Subject to rules 15, 17 and 19-22, the President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

2. Debate shall be confined to the subject under discussion and the President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant thereto.

3. The Conference may limit the time allowed to speakers and the number of times the representative of each State may speak on a question; permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. In any event, the President shall limit interventions on procedural questions to a maximum of five minutes. When the debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call him to order without delay.

Precedence

Rule 17

The Chairman of a committee may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the conclusions arrived at by his committee.

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Closing of list of speakers

Rule 18

During the course of a debate, the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Conference, declare the list closed. When the debate on an item is concluded because there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure pursuant to rule 22.

Right of reply

Rule 19

Notwithstanding rule 18, the President may accord the right of reply to a representative of any State participating in the Conference. Such statements shall be as brief as possible and shall, as a general rule, be delivered at the end of the last meeting of the day.

Suspension or adjournment of the meeting

Rule 20

A representative may at any time move the suspension or the adjournment of the meeting. No discussion on such motions shall be permitted and they shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Adjournment of debate

Rule 21

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of the debate on the question under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing the adjournment after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Closure of debate

Rule 22

A representative may at any time move the closure of the debate on the question under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

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Order of motions

Rule 23

The motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- (a) To suspend the meeting;
- (b) To adjourn the meeting;
- (c) To adjourn the debate on the question under discussion;
- (d) To close the debate on the question under discussion.

The Amendment to the Treaty and submission of other proposals and substantive amendments

Rule 24

1. The Amendment to the Treaty to be considered by the Conference is the amendment proposal submitted in accordance with Article II of the Treaty by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia (PTBT/CONF/M/3).

2. Other proposals and substantive amendments thereto shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretary-General of the Conference, who shall circulate copies to all delegations. Unless the Conference decides otherwise, such proposals and substantive amendments shall be discussed or decided on no earlier than 24 hours after copies have been circulated in all languages of the Conference to all delegations.

Withdrawal of proposals and motions

Rule 25

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before a decision on it has been taken, provided that it has not been amended. A proposal or a motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Decision on competence

Rule 26

Any motion calling for a decision on the competence of the Conference to adopt a proposal submitted to it, shall be decided upon before a decision is taken on the proposal in question.

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Reconsideration of proposals

Rule 27

Proposals under rule 24, paragraph 2 adopted by consensus may not be reconsidered unless the Conference reaches a consensus on such reconsideration. When such a proposal has been adopted or rejected by a majority or two-thirds vote, it may not be reconsidered unless the Conference, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, so decides. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be immediately put to the vote.

VI. VOTING AND ELECTIONS

Adoption of decisions

Rule 28

1. Approval of the Amendment Proposal referred to in rule 24 (1) shall be in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article II (2) of the Treaty which reads:

"Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all the Original Parties".

2. Every effort should be made to adopt decisions by consensus. If this is not possible, then decisions on matters of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority of the representatives present and voting. Decisions on other matters shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting, without prejudice to paragraph 1.

3. If the question arises whether the matter is or is not one of procedure, the President of the Conference shall rule on the question. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote and the President's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a simple majority of the representatives present and voting.

4. In cases where a vote is taken in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, the relevant rules of procedure relating to voting of the General Assembly of the United Nations shall apply, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.

Reconsideration of decisions

Rule 29

Decisions adopted by consensus may not be reconsidered unless the Conference reaches a consensus on such reconsideration. When a decision has been adopted or rejected by a majority or two-thirds vote, it may not be reconsidered unless the Conference, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, so decides.

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Voting rights

Rule 30

Every State party to the Treaty shall have one vote.

Meaning of the phrase "representatives present and voting"

Rule 31

For the purposes of these rules, the phrase "representatives present and voting" means representatives casting an affirmative or negative vote. Representatives who abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

Elections

Rule 32

All elections shall be held by secret ballot, unless the Conference decides otherwise in an election where the number of candidates does not exceed the number of elective places to be filled.

Rule 33

1. If, when only one elective place is to be filled, no candidate obtains in the first ballot the majority required, a second ballot shall be taken, confined to the two candidates having obtained the largest number of votes. If in the second ballot the votes are equally divided, the President shall decide between the candidates by drawing lots.

2. In the case of a tie in the first ballot among the candidates obtaining the second largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held among such candidates for the purpose of reducing their number to two; similarly, in the case of a tie among three or more candidates obtaining the largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held; if a tie again results in the special ballot, the President shall eliminate one candidate by drawing lots and thereafter another ballot shall be held in accordance with paragraph 1.

Rule 34

1. When two or more elective places are to be filled at one time under the same conditions, those candidates, in a number not exceeding the number of such places, obtaining in the first ballot the majority required and the largest number of votes, shall be elected.

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2. If the number of candidates obtaining such majority is less than the number of places to be filled, additional ballots shall be held to fill the remaining places, provided that if only one place remains to be filled the procedures in rule 32 shall be applied. The ballot shall be restricted to the unsuccessful candidates having obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot, but not exceeding twice the number of places remaining to be filled. However, in the case of a tie between a greater number of unsuccessful candidates a special ballot shall be held for the purpose of reducing the number of candidates to the required number; if a tie again results among more than the required number of candidates, the President shall reduce their number to that required by drawing lots.

3. If such a restricted ballot (not counting a special ballot held under the conditions specified in the last sentence of paragraph 2) is inconclusive, the President shall decide among the candidates by drawing lots.

VII. OTHER APPROPRIATE BODIES OF THE CONFERENCE

Rule 35

The Conference may establish appropriate bodies. As a general rule each State party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be represented in those bodies unless otherwise decided.

VIII. COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Rule 36

The Conference shall meet as a Committee of the Whole under the chairmanship of the President of the Conference for such purposes as the Conference may determine.

IX. OFFICERS AND PROCEDURES

Rule 37

The rules relating to officers, the Conference secretariat, conduct of business and voting of the Conference (contained in chapters II (rules 5-7), IV (rules 10-11), V (rules 13-27) and VI (rules 28-34) above) shall be applicable mutatis mutandis, to the proceedings of committees and other appropriate bodies, except that:

(a) Unless otherwise decided, any body established under rule 35 shall elect a chairman and such other officers as it may require;

(b) The Chairmen of the General Committee and the Credentials Committee and the chairmen of bodies established under rule 35 may vote in their capacity as representatives of their States;

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(c) A majority of the representatives on the General Committee or the Credentials Committee shall constitute a quorum; the same may apply to any body established under rule 35 if the Conference so desires.

X. LANGUAGES AND RECORDS

Languages of the Conference

Rule 38

Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be the official languages of the Conference.

Interpretation

Rule 39

1. Speeches made in a language of the Conference shall be interpreted into the other languages.

2. A representative may make a speech in a language other than a language of the Conference if he provides for interpretation into one such language. Interpretations into the other languages of the Conference by interpreters of the secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first such language.

Language of official documents

Rule 40

Official documents shall be made available in the languages of the Conference.

Sound recordings of meetings

Rule 41

Sound recordings of meetings of the Conference and of all committees shall be made and kept in accordance with the practice of the United Nations. Unless otherwise decided, no such recordings shall be made of the meetings of any other appropriate body established under rule 35.

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Summary records

Rule 42

1. Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Conference shall be prepared by the secretariat in the languages of the Conference. They shall be distributed in provisional form as soon as possible to all participants in the Conference. Participants in the debate may, within three working days of receipt of provisional summary records, submit corrections to summaries of their own interventions to the secretariat; in special circumstances, the presiding officer may, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the Conference, extend the time for submitting corrections. Any disagreement concerning such corrections shall be decided by the presiding officer of the body to which the record relates, after consulting, where necessary, the sound recordings of the proceedings. Separate corrigenda to provisional records shall not normally be issued.

2. The summary records, with any corrections incorporated, shall be distributed promptly to participants in the Conference.

XI. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MEETINGS

Rule 43

1. The plenary meetings of the Conference and the meetings of the Committee of the Whole shall be held in public unless the body concerned decides otherwise.

2. Meetings of other organs of the Conference shall be held in private.

XII. PARTICIPATION AND ATTENDANCE

Rule 44

1. Signatories

Any State signatory to the Treaty which has not yet ratified it shall be entitled to participate, without taking part in the adoption of decisions, whether by consensus or by vote, in the deliberations of the Conference, subject to prior written notification to the Secretary-General of the Conference. This means that any of those signatory States shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend plenary meetings and those of the Committee of the Whole; to address such meetings; to receive the documents of the Conference and to submit its views in writing to the Conference, which shall be considered as Conference documents.

2. Observers

(a) Any other State which, in accordance with Article III of the Treaty, has the right to become a Party thereto but which has neither signed nor ratified it may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for Observer status, which

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will be accorded on the decision of the Conference.* Such a State shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Committee of the Whole other than those designated closed meetings, and to receive documents of the Conference. An Observer State shall also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Conference.

(b) Any national liberation organization entitled by the General Assembly of the United Nations** to participate as an Observer in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly, all international Conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly, and all international Conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations, may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for Observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. Such a liberation organization shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Committee of the Whole other than those designated closed meetings, and to receive documents of the Conference. An Observer organization shall also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Conference.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency or their respective representative or representatives shall be entitled to attend plenary meetings, meetings of the Committee of the Whole and those of any other appropriate body established under rule 35 and to receive the Conference documents. They shall also be entitled to submit material, both orally and in writing.

4. Specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations

The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, other relevant intergovernmental organizations and any specialized agency of the United Nations may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for Observer Agency status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. An Observer Agency shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend plenary meetings, meetings of the Committee of the Whole and those of any other appropriate body established under rule 35 other than those designated as closed meetings and to receive the documents of the Conference. At their request, the Conference may authorize the Observer Agencies to present, orally or in writing, their views and comments on aspects falling within their competence. Those which are submitted in writing will be circulated as documents of the Conference.

* It is understood that any such decision will be in accordance with the practice of the United Nations General Assembly.

** Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 and 3280 (XXIX) of 10 December 1974.

5. Non-governmental organizations

Representatives of non-governmental organizations who attend plenary meetings and meetings of the Committee of the Whole will be entitled upon request to receive the documents of the Conference.

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Annex III

BACKGROUND DOCUMENT*

The Secretariat should prepare for the Amendment Conference a brief background document covering the following points and drawing on, as far as possible, relevant existing documentation:

- I. An account of the convening of the Amendment Conference.
- II. Compilation of material on:
 - A. A historical review of the role ascribed to a comprehensive test ban in contributing to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race.
 - B. Nuclear-weapon-test explosions and any other nuclear explosions conducted since 5 August 1963.
 - C. United Nations General Assembly resolutions relevant to the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and a moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing.
 - D. Multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements and other initiatives related to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.
 - E. 1980 Report of the Secretary-General on a CTB (A/35/257).
- III. The implications of a comprehensive test ban for:
 - A. The nuclear-arms race and the development of new weapon systems that involve nuclear testing, including those for outer space.
 - B. The environment, including social and economic aspects.
 - C. All aspects of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
 - D. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- IV. Verification of a comprehensive test ban.
- V. Any other relevant documents.

* Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/12.

Annex IV

OTHER DOCUMENTS OF THE MEETING

	<u>Page</u>
A. Provisional agenda of the Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water for the Organization of the Amendment Conference	35
B. Agenda of the Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water for the Organization of the Amendment Conference	35
C. Draft rules of procedure for the Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water for the Organization of the Amendment Conference	36
D. Proposal submitted by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia	38
E. Draft programme of work	39
F. Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia: working paper on background documents	41
G. Draft decision on the arrangements for meeting the costs of the Meeting and the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	41
H. Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia: working paper on the draft provisional agenda of the Amendment Conference to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	42
I. Yugoslavia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water: draft decision	43
J. Draft final report of the Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space under Water for the Organization of the Amendment Conference ..	43
K. List of participants	47

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A. Provisional agenda of the Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water for the Organization of the Amendment Conference*

1. Opening of the Meeting by the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Election of the President.
3. Election of two Vice-Presidents.
4. Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Meeting.
5. Adoption of the agenda.
6. Adoption of the rules of procedure.
7. Programme of work.
8. Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Meeting and the Conference.
9. General exchange of views.
10. Organization of the Conference:
 - (a) Provisional agenda;
 - (b) Draft rules of procedure;
 - (c) Background and other documentation.
11. Other matters.

B. Agenda of the Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water for the Organization of the Amendment Conference**

1. Opening of the Meeting by the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Election of the President.

* Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/1.

** Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/1/Rev.1.

3. Election of two Vice-Presidents.
4. Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Meeting.
5. Adoption of the agenda.
6. Adoption of the rules of procedure.
7. Programme of work.
8. Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Meeting and the Conference.
9. General exchange of views.
10. Organization of the Conference:
 - (a) Provisional agenda;
 - (b) Draft rules of procedure;
 - (c) Background and other documentation.
11. Adoption of the final report of the Meeting.
12. Other matters.

C. Draft rules of procedure for the Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water for the Organization of the Amendment Conference*

1. Participation and attendance:

a. States parties

Participation at the Meeting will be limited to States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.

b. Signatories

Any State signatory to the Treaty which has not yet ratified it shall be entitled to participate, without taking part in the adoption of

* Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/2.

decisions, in the deliberations of the Meeting, subject to prior written notification to the Secretary-General of the Meeting.

c. Observers

Any other State which, in accordance with article III of the Treaty, has the right to become a party thereto but which has neither signed nor ratified it may apply to the Secretary-General of the Meeting for observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Meeting. a/

d. The United Nations

The Secretary-General of the United Nations or his representative or representatives shall be entitled to attend meetings and to receive the Meeting's documents. They shall also be entitled to submit material, both orally and in writing.

e. Specialized agencies, regional intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations

Attendance at the opening and closing meetings and during consideration of the agenda item devoted to a general exchange of views will be allowed to specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, regional intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, upon their request.

2. Every effort will be made to adopt decisions of the Meeting by consensus.
3. The working languages of the Meeting will be Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish.
4. Records will be issued for all decisions made.
5. Summary records will be provided under agenda item 9, as well as for the opening and the concluding meetings.
6. A record of decisions and recommendations taken at the Meeting will be transmitted to all States parties and to the Conference.
7. Press releases will be issued at the United Nations Headquarters in New York and at the United Nations Office at Geneva at the conclusion of each meeting.

a/ It is understood that any such decision will be in accordance with the practice of the United Nations General Assembly.

D. Proposal submitted by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka,
Venezuela and Yugoslavia*

AMENDMENT PROPOSAL

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water shall be amended by the addition of the following article and protocols:

ARTICLE VI

Protocols annexed to this Treaty constitute an integral part of the Treaty.

PROTOCOL I

States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, in order to achieve the permanent
prohibition of all nuclear explosions, including all such explosions underground,

- installation of special seismic detection networks on the territory of the nuclear-weapons States Parties to the Treaty,
- non-interference with national technical means of verification and non-use of concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means,
- on-site inspections, and
- a permanent consultative mechanism to consider questions of compliance and ambiguous situations.)

E. Draft programme of work*

<u>Date</u>	<u>Item</u>
<u>First week</u>	
<u>29 May, Tuesday</u>	
10 a.m.-1 p.m.	Opening of the Meeting by the Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
	Election of the President
	Election of two Vice-Presidents
	Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Meeting
	Adoption of the agenda
	Adoption of the rules of procedure
	Programme of work
	Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Meeting and the Conference
<u>30 May, Wednesday</u>	
10 a.m.-1 p.m.	General exchange of views
3 p.m.-6 p.m.	General exchange of views

* Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/5.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Item</u>
<u>31 May, Thursday</u>	
10 a.m.-1 p.m.	General exchange of views
3 p.m.-6 p.m.	General exchange of views
<u>1 June, Friday</u>	
10 a.m.-1 p.m.	General exchange of views
3 p.m.-6 p.m.	General exchange of views
<u>Second week</u>	
<u>4 June, Monday</u>	
10 a.m.-1 p.m.	General exchange of views
3 p.m.-6 p.m.	Organization of the Conference
<u>5 June, Tuesday</u>	
10 a.m.-1 p.m.	Organization of the Conference
3 p.m.-6 p.m.	Organization of the Conference
<u>6 June, Wednesday</u>	
10 a.m.-1 p.m.	Organization of the Conference
3 p.m.-6 p.m.	Organization of the Conference
<u>7 June, Thursday</u>	
10 a.m.-1 p.m.	Organization of the Conference
3 p.m.-6 p.m.	Organization of the Conference
<u>8 June, Friday</u>	
10 a.m.-1 p.m.	Organization of the Conference
3 p.m.-6 p.m.	Other matters/conclusion of Meeting

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F. Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and
Yugoslavia: working paper*

BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS

The Secretariat should be requested to prepare the following background documents for the Amendment Conference:

1. An account of the convening of the Amendment Conference.
2. A historical review of the role of a comprehensive test ban in contributing to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race.
3. Compilation of nuclear-weapon tests since August 1963.
4. United Nations General Assembly resolutions relevant to the question of a nuclear-test ban, and the 1980 Report of the Secretary-General.
5. Multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements, and unilateral initiatives related to a CTB.
6. Nuclear testing and its implications on the nuclear-arms race and the development of new weapon systems, including those for outer space.
7. Pending a CTB treaty, a moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing.
8. Relationship of a CTB to the vertical, geographical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.
9. The effects of nuclear testing on the environment, including social and economic aspects.
10. Implication of a CTB on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
11. Verification of a CTB.

G. Draft decision on the arrangements for meeting the costs of
the Meeting and the Conference of the States Parties to the
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and under Water**

1. The costs will be shared among all States Parties and States signatories participating in the Meeting or the Conference.

* Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/6.

** Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/7.

2. The costs will be shared in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, subject to the adjustments below.
3. The three Original Parties will pay, as offered by them, one third of the cost.
4. No State will be required to pay more than the largest contributor under the United Nations scale of assessment.
5. The outstanding costs arising from the above will be met by voluntary contributions.

H. Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and
Yugoslavia: working paper*

DRAFT PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF THE AMENDMENT CONFERENCE
TO THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE
ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER

1. Opening of the Conference by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Election of the President.
3. Submission of the final report of the Meeting for the Organization of the Amendment Conference.
4. Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General of the Conference.
5. Adoption of the agenda.
6. Adoption of the rules of procedure.
7. Credentials of representatives to the Conference:
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
8. Election of Vice-Presidents.
9. Election of Chairmen of Committee(s).
10. Adoption of arrangements for meeting the cost of the Conference.
11. Programme of work.

* Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/8.

12. General debate.
13. Consideration of the Amendments to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water as provided for in its Article II (including reports of the Committee(s)).
14. Other matters.
15. Adoption of final document of the Conference (Final Act).
16. Closure of the Conference.

I. Yugoslavia*: draft decision**

At its ____ meeting, the Meeting decided to invite the parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, to submit to the provisional Secretary-General of the Conference for distribution before the Conference their views regarding the verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

J. Draft final report of the Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water for the Organization of the Amendment Conference***

Organization and work of the Meeting

1. At its forty-fourth session the General Assembly of the United Nations, in its resolution 44/106, recommended that a preparatory committee, open to all Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, should be established to make arrangements for the Amendment Conference and that such preparatory committee should meet at United Nations Headquarters from 29 May to 1 June 1990, followed by a one-week session of the Conference from 4 to 8 June 1990 and a second substantive session from 7 to 18 January 1991.
2. Following the adoption of resolution 44/106, six meetings of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer

* On behalf of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.

** Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/9.

*** Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/13.

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Space and under Water and 15 open-ended informal consultations took place between 12 January and 25 May 1990.

3. At their meeting on 8 March 1990, the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water decided to hold the Amendment Conference in New York from 7-18 January 1991, preceded by the Meeting for the Organization of the Conference from 29 May to 8 June 1990.

4. The following 70 States parties participated in the work of the Meeting which took place at United Nations Headquarters in New York, from 29 May to 8 June 1990:

Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

5. The composition of the delegations participating in the Meeting has been issued in document PTBT/CONF/M/INF/1 and Add.1.

6. During the course of the Meeting, the States parties held 13 plenary meetings, as well as a number of meetings devoted to informal consultations.

7. The Meeting was opened by Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, who represented the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

8. The States parties then elected by acclamation Mr. Edmond Jayasinghe, Ambassador of Sri Lanka, as President of the Meeting. Ms. Jill Bernardine Courtney, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations, and Mr. Ivan Sotirov, Deputy Permanent Representative of Bulgaria, were elected by acclamation as Vice-Presidents of the Meeting.

9. In response to a request of the States parties to designate an official as Secretary-General of the Meeting and of the Conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations nominated Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, Principal Officer of the Department for Disarmament Affairs as the Provisional Secretary-General of the Meeting and of the Conference to be confirmed respectively by those bodies themselves. At its 1st meeting on 29 May, the States parties confirmed the nomination of Mr. Sohrab Kheradi as the Secretary-General of the Meeting.

10. At its 1st meeting, on 29 May 1990, the Meeting adopted its provisional agenda as contained in document PTBT/CONF/M/1, which was orally amended at the 12th meeting on 8 June 1990 and is contained in document PTBT/CONF/M/1/Rev.1.

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11. At the first meeting, the States parties adopted the Rules of Procedure of the Meeting as contained in document PTBT/CONF/M/2.

12. Also at the same meeting the States parties adopted the programme of work as contained in document PTBT/CONF/M/3.

13. At their 9th meeting, on 5 June 1990, the States parties decided to accept the estimated costs of the Meeting and the Amendment Conference as set out in document PTBT/CONF/M/4. In that respect, the President also noted that the figures contained therein would be revised prior to the Amendment Conference in order to reflect the actual costs of the Meeting as well as any adjustments in the estimated costs of the Conference, and that a document containing these revisions would be provided to the Conference for its consideration.

14. During the course of consideration of the arrangements for meeting the costs of the Meeting and the Conference as contained in document PTBT/CONF/M/7, the States parties adopted the following cost-sharing formula:

- I. The costs of the Conference, including the Meeting for its organization, will be met by the States Parties to the Treaty who participate in the Meeting or the Conference and by the States which have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty and which accept the invitation to participate in the Meeting or the Conference;
- II. The costs will be shared in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments, subject to the adjustments below:
 - (a) The three Original Parties specified in Article III (2) of the Treaty will pay, as offered by them, one third of the cost;
 - (b) No State Party or signatory will be required to pay more than the largest contributor under the United Nations scale of assessment.
- III. The outstanding costs arising from the above will be met by voluntary contributions.

15. With respect to the cost-sharing formula as specified above (see PTBT/CONF/M/4 and Add.1, which will be part of the final report to be submitted to the Amendment Conference), it is understood that the President of the Meeting will appropriately advise the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the modalities involved in meeting 100 per cent of the costs of the Meeting and the Conference. He also noted the understanding that these financial arrangements for the Meeting and the Conference do not constitute a precedent.

16. Under item 9 of the agenda of the Meeting, a general exchange of views took place between 30 May and 4 June 1990, during the course of which 29 States parties made statements.

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17. Under item 10 concerning organization of the Conference, the Meeting, inter alia, considered issues related to: (a) provisional agenda, (b) draft rules of procedure, and (c) background documentation.

18. In connection with agenda item 10, the States parties at the 7th meeting, on 31 May, decided to establish two open-ended working groups on: (a) "Draft Rules of procedure", chaired by Mr. Ivan Sotirov (Bulgaria), Vice-President of the Meeting and (b) "Background documentation", chaired by Ms. Jill Bernardine Courtney (Australia), Vice-President of the Meeting. The first Working Group held six meetings and the second Working Group held three meetings. The Chairmen of the Working Groups presented oral reports on the work of their respective working groups to the States parties at the 10th and 11th meetings on 6 and 7 June 1990.

19. At its 13th meeting, the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water decided to transmit to the Conference for its consideration and adoption the following documents:

- (a) Provisional agenda (document PTBT/CONF/M/10);
- (b) Draft rules of procedure (document PTBT/CONF/M/11);
- (c) Background documentation (document PTBT/CONF/M/12).

20. Documents containing a record of decisions have been issued under the symbols PTBT/CONF/M/DEC.1 to DEC.6.

21. Other documents have been issued under the symbols PTBT/CONF/M/1 to 13.

22. At its 13th plenary meeting, on 8 June, the Meeting adopted its final report to be transmitted to the Amendment Conference for the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. The report consists of five Parts: I. Organization and Work of the Meeting; II. Summary Records; III. Record of decisions; IV. List of other documents and V. Estimated costs of the Meeting and the Amendment Conference (PTBT/CONF/M/4 and Add.1).

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K. LIST OF PARTICIPANTS*

A. State Parties

Afghanistan

H.E. Mr. Noor Ahmad Noor
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Mr. Mohammad Eshaq Roshan-Rawaan
Minister Counsellor
Permanent Mission

Mr. Mohauddin Taeb
First Secretary
Permanent Mission

Argentina

H.E. Dr. Jorge Vazquez
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Roberto García Moritan
Ambassador
Special Representative for Disarmament

Sr. Héctor Raúl Peláez
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission

Sr. Gustavo Zlauvinen
Third Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Australia

Ms. Jill Bernardine Courtney
First Secretary
Permanent Mission

* Initially issued as PTBT/CONF/M/INF/2. The provisional list was issued as PTBT/CONF/M/INF/1 and Add.1.

Austria

H.E. Dr. Peter Hohenfellner
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Dr. Gerhard Jandl
First Secretary
Permanent Mission

Bahamas

H.E. Mr. James B. Moultrie
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Ms. Sandra P. Carey
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission

Ms. Sally E. Moss
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission

Belgium

H.E. M. Paul Noterdaeme
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative to the United Nations

M. Frans van Daele
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
Deputy Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

M. Raoul Delcorde
First Secretary
Permanent Mission

Bhutan

Mr. Lhatu Wangchuk
Counsellor
Deputy Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

Mrs. Kunzang C. Namgyel
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission

Bolivia

H.E. Sr. Natalio Fernandez
Ambassador
Alternate Representative to the United Nations

Brazil

H.E. Mr. Sergio de Queiroz Duarte
Ambassador
Ministry of External Relations

/...

Mr. Flávio Miragaia Perri
Minister Plenipotentiary
Permanent Mission

Mr. Antonio Francisco Da Costa e Silva Neto
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission

Bulgaria

H.E. Mr. Boyko Tarabanov
Ambassador
Deputy Head of the United Nations and
Disarmament Department
Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Ivan Sotirov
Minister Plenipotentiary
Deputy Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

Mr. Stanimir Alexandrov
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission

Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic

Mr. Oleg N. Pashkevich
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
Deputy Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

Mr. Sergei N. Martynov
Deputy Head of Department
Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Aleksandr V. Vasilyev
Counsellor
Permanent Mission

Canada

H.E. Ms. Peggy Mason
Ambassador for Disarmament

Col. Douglas A. Fraser
Counsellor
Permanent Mission

Mr. Perry Calderwood
Department of External Affairs

Chile

H.E. Mr. James Holger
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative
to the United Nations

/...

Mr. Julio Piol
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission

Colombia

H.E. Dr. Enrique Peñalosa
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Sra. Graciela Uribe de Lozano
Counsellor
Permanent Mission

Costa Rica

H.E. Emilia Castro de Barish
Ambassador
First Alternate Representative
to the United Nations
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Czechoslovakia

H.E. Mr. Eduard Kukan
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Mr. Petr Vocetka
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission

Denmark

Mr. Nils Jaeger
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Tunisia	H.E. M. Ahmed Ghezel Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations /...

Credentials Committee

Rule 3

The Conference shall establish a Credentials Committee composed of the Chairman, one Vice-Chairman elected in accordance with rule 5, and five members appointed by the Conference on the proposal of the President. The Committee shall examine the credentials of representatives and report to the Conference without delay.

Provisional participation

Rule 4

Pending a decision of the Conference on their credentials, representatives shall be entitled to participate provisionally in the Conference.

II. OFFICERS

Election

Rule 5

The Conference shall elect the following officers: A President and 10 Vice-Presidents as well as a Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee.

Acting President

Rule 6

1. If the President is absent from a meeting or any part thereof, he shall designate a Vice-President to take his place.

2. A Vice-President acting as President shall have the same powers and duties as the President.

Voting rights of the President

Rule 7

The President, or a Vice-President acting as President shall not vote, but shall appoint another member of his delegation to vote in his place.

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III. GENERAL COMMITTEE

Composition

Rule 8

1. The General Committee shall be composed of the President of the Conference, who shall preside, 10 Vice-Presidents and the Chairman of the Credentials Committee. No two members of the General Committee shall be members of the same delegation and it shall be so constituted as to ensure its representative character.

2. If the President is unable to attend a meeting of the General Committee, he may designate a Vice-President to preside at such meeting and a member of his delegation to take his place. If a Vice-President is unable to attend, he may designate a member of his delegation to take his place. If the Chairman of the Credentials Committee is unable to attend, he may designate the Vice-Chairman to take his place, with the right to vote unless he is of the same delegation as another member of the General Committee.

Functions

Rule 9

The General Committee shall assist the President in the general conduct of the business of the Conference and, subject to the decisions of the Conference, shall ensure the co-ordination of its work.

IV. CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT

Duties of the Secretary-General of the Conference

Rule 10

1. There shall be a Secretary-General of the Conference. He shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the Conference, its committees and other appropriate bodies established under rule 35, and may designate a member of the secretariat to act in his place at these meetings.

2. The Secretary-General of the Conference shall direct the staff required by the Conference.

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Duties of the secretariat

Rule 11

The secretariat of the Conference shall, in accordance with these rules:

- (a) Interpret speeches made at meetings;
- (b) Receive, translate and circulate the documents of the Conference;
- (c) Publish and circulate any report of the Conference;
- (d) Make and arrange for the keeping of sound recordings and summary records of meetings;
- (e) Arrange for the custody of the documents of the Conference in the archives of the United Nations and provide authentic copies of these documents to each of the depositary Governments, and
- (f) Generally perform all other work that the Conference may require.

Costs

Rule 12*

1. The costs of the Conference, including the Meeting for its organization, will be met by States parties to the Treaty who participate in the Meeting or the Conference and by States which have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty and which accept the invitation to participate in the Meeting or the Conference.

2. The costs will be shared in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, subject to the adjustments below:

(a) The three Original Parties specified in Article III (2) of the Treaty will pay, as offered by them, one third of the cost;

(b) No State party or signatory will be required to pay more than the largest contributor under the United Nations scale of assessment.

3. The outstanding costs arising from the above will be met by voluntary contributions.

* It is understood that the financial arrangements for the Amendment Conference and the Meeting for its organization do not constitute a precedent.

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

Quorum

Rule 13

A majority of the States parties to the Treaty participating in the Conference shall constitute a quorum.

General powers of the President

Rule 14

1. In addition to exercising the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by these rules, the President shall preside at the plenary meetings of the Conference; he shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting, direct the discussion, ensure observance of these rules, accord the right to speak, ascertain consensus, put questions to the vote and announce decisions. He shall rule on points of order. The President, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings and over the maintenance of order thereat. The President may propose to the Conference the closure of the list of speakers, a limitation on the time to be allowed to speakers and on the number of times the representative of each State may speak on a question, the adjournment or the closure of the debate and the suspension or the adjournment of a meeting.

2. The President, in the exercise of his functions, remains under the authority of the Conference.

Points of order

Rule 15

A representative may at any time raise a point of order, which shall be immediately decided by the President in accordance with these rules. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote, and the President's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the representatives present and voting. A representative may not, in raising a point of order, speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Speeches

Rule 16

1. No one may address the Conference without having previously obtained the permission of the President. Subject to rules 15, 17 and 19-22, the President shall call upon speakers in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

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2. Debate shall be confined to the subject under discussion and the President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are not relevant thereto.

3. The Conference may limit the time allowed to speakers and the number of times the representative of each State may speak on a question; permission to speak on a motion to set such limits shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing such limits, after which the motion shall be immediately put to the vote. In any event, the President shall limit interventions on procedural questions to a maximum of five minutes. When the debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the President shall call him to order without delay.

Precedence

Rule 17

The Chairman of a committee may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the conclusions arrived at by his committee.

Closing of list of speakers

Rule 18

During the course of a debate, the President may announce the list of speakers and, with the consent of the Conference, declare the list closed. When the debate on an item is concluded because there are no more speakers, the President shall declare the debate closed. Such closure shall have the same effect as closure pursuant to rule 22.

Right of reply

Rule 19

Notwithstanding rule 18, the President may accord the right of reply to a representative of any State participating in the Conference. Such statements shall be as brief as possible and shall, as a general rule, be delivered at the end of the last meeting of the day.

Suspension or adjournment of the meeting

Rule 20

A representative may at any time move the suspension or the adjournment of the meeting. No discussion on such motions shall be permitted and they shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

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Adjournment of debate

Rule 21

A representative may at any time move the adjournment of the debate on the question under discussion. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives in favour of and to two opposing the adjournment after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Closure of debate

Rule 22

A representative may at any time move the closure of the debate on the question under discussion, whether or not any other representative has signified his wish to speak. Permission to speak on the motion shall be accorded only to two representatives opposing the closure, after which the motion shall, subject to rule 23, be immediately put to the vote.

Order of motions

Rule 23

The motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all proposals or other motions before the meeting:

- (a) To suspend the meeting;
- (b) To adjourn the meeting;
- (c) To adjourn the debate on the question under discussion;
- (d) To close the debate on the question under discussion.

The Amendment to the Treaty and submission of other
proposals and substantive amendments

Rule 24

1. The Amendment to the Treaty to be considered by the Conference is the amendment proposal submitted in accordance with Article II of the Treaty by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia (PTBT/CONF/M/3).

2. Other proposals and substantive amendments thereto shall normally be submitted in writing to the Secretary-General of the Conference, who shall circulate copies to all delegations. Unless the Conference decides otherwise, such proposals and substantive amendments shall be discussed or decided on no earlier

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than 24 hours after copies have been circulated in all languages of the Conference to all delegations.

Withdrawal of proposals and motions

Rule 25

A proposal or a motion may be withdrawn by its sponsor at any time before a decision on it has been taken, provided that it has not been amended. A proposal or a motion thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any representative.

Decision on competence

Rule 26

Any motion calling for a decision on the competence of the Conference to adopt a proposal submitted to it, shall be decided upon before a decision is taken on the proposal in question.

Reconsideration of proposals

Rule 27

Proposals under rule 24, paragraph 2 adopted by consensus may not be reconsidered unless the Conference reaches a consensus on such reconsideration. When such a proposal has been adopted or rejected by a majority or two-thirds vote, it may not be reconsidered unless the Conference, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, so decides. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider shall be accorded only to two speakers opposing the motion, after which it shall be immediately put to the vote.

VI. VOTING AND ELECTIONS

Adoption of decisions

Rule 28

1. Approval of the Amendment Proposal referred to in rule 24 (1) shall be in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article II (2) of the Treaty which reads:

"Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all the Original Parties".

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2. Every effort should be made to adopt decisions by consensus. If this is not possible, then decisions on matters of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority of the representatives present and voting. Decisions on other matters shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting, without prejudice to paragraph 1.

3. If the question arises whether the matter is or is not one of procedure, the President of the Conference shall rule on the question. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote and the President's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a simple majority of the representatives present and voting.

4. In cases where a vote is taken in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, the relevant rules of procedure relating to voting of the General Assembly of the United Nations shall apply, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.

Reconsideration of decisions

Rule 29

Decisions adopted by consensus may not be reconsidered unless the Conference reaches a consensus on such reconsideration. When a decision has been adopted or rejected by a majority or two-thirds vote, it may not be reconsidered unless the Conference, by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, so decides.

Voting rights

Rule 30

Every State party to the Treaty shall have one vote.

Meaning of the phrase "representatives present and voting"

Rule 31

For the purposes of these rules, the phrase "representatives present and voting" means representatives casting an affirmative or negative vote. Representatives who abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

Elections

Rule 32

All elections shall be held by secret ballot, unless the Conference decides otherwise in an election where the number of candidates does not exceed the number of elective places to be filled.

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Rule 33

1. If, when only one elective place is to be filled, no candidate obtains in the first ballot the majority required, a second ballot shall be taken, confined to the two candidates having obtained the largest number of votes. If in the second ballot the votes are equally divided, the President shall decide between the candidates by drawing lots.

2. In the case of a tie in the first ballot among the candidates obtaining the second largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held among such candidates for the purpose of reducing their number to two; similarly, in the case of a tie among three or more candidates obtaining the largest number of votes, a special ballot shall be held; if a tie again results in the special ballot, the President shall eliminate one candidate by drawing lots and thereafter another ballot shall be held in accordance with paragraph 1.

Rule 34

1. When two or more elective places are to be filled at one time under the same conditions, those candidates, in a number not exceeding the number of such places, obtaining in the first ballot the majority required and the largest number of votes, shall be elected.

2. If the number of candidates obtaining such majority is less than the number of places to be filled, additional ballots shall be held to fill the remaining places, provided that if only one place remains to be filled the procedures in rule 32 shall be applied. The ballot shall be restricted to the unsuccessful candidates having obtained the largest number of votes in the previous ballot, but not exceeding twice the number of places remaining to be filled. However, in the case of a tie between a greater number of unsuccessful candidates a special ballot shall be held for the purpose of reducing the number of candidates to the required number; if a tie again results among more than the required number of candidates, the President shall reduce their number to that required by drawing lots.

3. If such a restricted ballot (not counting a special ballot held under the conditions specified in the last sentence of paragraph 2) is inconclusive, the President shall decide among the candidates by drawing lots.

VII. OTHER APPROPRIATE BODIES OF THE CONFERENCE

Rule 35

The Conference may establish appropriate bodies. As a general rule each State party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be represented in those bodies unless otherwise decided.

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VIII. COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Rule 36

The Conference shall meet as a Committee of the Whole under the chairmanship of the President of the Conference for such purposes as the Conference may determine.

IX. OFFICERS AND PROCEDURES

Rule 37

The rules relating to officers, the Conference secretariat, conduct of business and voting of the Conference (contained in chapters II (rules 5-7), IV (rules 10-11), V (rules 13-27) and VI (rules 28-34) above) shall be applicable mutatis mutandis, to the proceedings of committees and other appropriate bodies, except that:

(a) Unless otherwise decided, any body established under rule 35 shall elect a chairman and such other officers as it may require;

(b) The Chairmen of the General Committee and the Credentials Committee and the chairmen of bodies established under rule 35 may vote in their capacity as representatives of their States;

(c) A majority of the representatives on the General Committee or the Credentials Committee shall constitute a quorum; the same may apply to any body established under rule 35 if the Conference so desires.

X. LANGUAGES AND RECORDS

Languages of the Conference

Rule 38

Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be the official languages of the Conference.

Interpretation

Rule 39

1. Speeches made in a language of the Conference shall be interpreted into the other languages.

2. A representative may make a speech in a language other than a language of the Conference if he provides for interpretation into one such language.

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Interpretations into the other languages of the Conference by interpreters of the secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first such language.

Language of official documents

Rule 40

Official documents shall be made available in the languages of the Conference.

Sound recordings of meetings

Rule 41

Sound recordings of meetings of the Conference and of all committees shall be made and kept in accordance with the practice of the United Nations. Unless otherwise decided, no such recordings shall be made of the meetings of any other appropriate body established under rule 35.

Summary records

Rule 42

1. Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Conference shall be prepared by the secretariat in the languages of the Conference. They shall be distributed in provisional form as soon as possible to all participants in the Conference. Participants in the debate may, within three working days of receipt of provisional summary records, submit corrections to summaries of their own interventions to the secretariat; in special circumstances, the presiding officer may, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the Conference, extend the time for submitting corrections. Any disagreement concerning such corrections shall be decided by the presiding officer of the body to which the record relates, after consulting, where necessary, the sound recordings of the proceedings. Separate corrigenda to provisional records shall not normally be issued.

2. The summary records, with any corrections incorporated, shall be distributed promptly to participants in the Conference.

XI. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MEETINGS

Rule 43

1. The plenary meetings of the Conference and the meetings of the Committee of the Whole shall be held in public unless the body concerned decides otherwise.

2. Meetings of other organs of the Conference shall be held in private.

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XII. PARTICIPATION AND ATTENDANCE

Rule 44

1. Signatories

Any State signatory to the Treaty which has not yet ratified it shall be entitled to participate, without taking part in the adoption of decisions, whether by consensus or by vote, in the deliberations of the Conference, subject to prior written notification to the Secretary-General of the Conference. This means that any of those signatory States shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend plenary meetings and those of the Committee of the Whole; to address such meetings; to receive the documents of the Conference and to submit its views in writing to the Conference, which shall be considered as Conference documents.

2. Observers

(a) Any other State which, in accordance with Article III of the Treaty, has the right to become a Party thereto but which has neither signed nor ratified it may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for Observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference.* Such a State shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Committee of the Whole other than those designated closed meetings, and to receive documents of the Conference. An Observer State shall also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Conference.

(b) Any national liberation organization entitled by the General Assembly of the United Nations** to participate as an Observer in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly, all international Conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly, and all international Conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations, may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for Observer status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. Such a liberation organization shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend meetings of the Plenary and of the Committee of the Whole other than those designated closed meetings, and to receive documents of the Conference. An Observer organization shall also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Conference.

* It is understood that any such decision will be in accordance with the practice of the United Nations General Assembly.

** Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 and 3280 (XXIX) of 10 December 1974.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency or their respective representative or representatives shall be entitled to attend plenary meetings, meetings of the Committee of the Whole and those of any other appropriate body established under rule 35 and to receive the Conference documents. They shall also be entitled to submit material, both orally and in writing.

4. Specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations

The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, other relevant intergovernmental organizations and any specialized agency of the United Nations may apply to the Secretary-General of the Conference for Observer Agency status, which will be accorded on the decision of the Conference. An Observer Agency shall be entitled to appoint officials to attend plenary meetings, meetings of the Committee of the Whole and those of any other appropriate body established under rule 35 other than those designated as closed meetings and to receive the documents of the Conference. At their request, the Conference may authorize the Observer Agencies to present, orally or in writing, their views and comments on aspects falling within their competence. Those which are submitted in writing will be circulated as documents of the Conference.

5. Non-governmental organizations

Representatives of non-governmental organizations who attend plenary meetings and meetings of the Committee of the Whole will be entitled upon request to receive the documents of the Conference.

**Amendment Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water**

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**VIEWS REGARDING THE VERIFICATION OF A
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN**

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INTRODUCTION

1. On 8 June 1990, the Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water for the Organization of the Amendment Conference decided to invite the parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, to submit to the Provisional Secretary-General of the Amendment Conference, for distribution before the Conference, their views regarding the verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban (PTBT/CONF/M/DEC.6).

2. Pursuant to that decision, the Provisional Secretary-General of the Amendment Conference, in a communication dated 26 July 1990, invited all States parties to the Treaty to submit their views, by 15 October 1990, regarding the verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. To date, replies have been received from the following States parties: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. These views are reproduced below. Further views will be issued as addenda to the present document.

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM STATES PARTIES

BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]

[31 October 1990]

The Byelorussian SSR reaffirms once again its profound interest in the speedy, complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. All possible ways and means must be used to achieve this goal, whose significance is crucial to the cause of nuclear disarmament.

One such way, in the opinion of the Byelorussian SSR, is the possible extension of the scope of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the subject of the forthcoming Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty.

A complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests, by whatever specific means it is implemented, must indisputably be accompanied by the elaboration and adoption of adequate verification procedures.

The problem of verification of a full comprehensive ban on nuclear tests is not a simple one, but the Byelorussian SSR is convinced that a solution can be found on the basis of sincere combined efforts by interested States. This is attested both by the joint Soviet-American experiments in this field and by the recently signed verification protocols to the 1974 Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and the 1976 Treaty between the United States and the USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. A great deal of work on verification of a nuclear-test ban has

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also been done within the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. All this allows us to conclude that up-to-date scientific and technical capabilities make it possible to verify adequately a full and comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

As to developing verification procedures for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban in connection with the extension of the scope of the 1963 Treaty, the Byelorussian SSR takes the view that the forthcoming Amendment Conference of States Parties to the Treaty should address a request to the Conference on Disarmament to include that issue in its programme of work under the agenda item dealing with the nuclear-weapon-test ban.

Such a solution would make it possible to utilize the potential which the Conference on Disarmament has already accumulated in the field of nuclear-test-ban verification and to funnel the international community's efforts in this field into a single channel, avoiding their dispersion.

CHILE

[Original: Spanish]

[26 October 1990]

The Government of Chile notes that discussions have been continuing for a long time now on the need to amend the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water to include underground tests, thereby extending it to encompass all areas capable of being used for nuclear tests.

The basic obstacle preventing this from being achieved has been the problem of how to verify such an agreement. For a long time there has been discussion of different mechanisms and procedures for ensuring that all the States involved in a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban agreement only comply with its provisions.

Chile, as an acknowledged non-nuclear-weapon State with no intention of possessing nuclear weapons, wishes to contribute through its opinions and proposals to achieving, as soon as is realistically possible, a complete cessation of all types of nuclear tests, whether belligerent or peaceful in intent, while at the same time satisfying the political and security requirements of the States concerned.

In the opinion of the Government of Chile, in order to establish a mechanism for the verification of all types of nuclear tests, it is essential that sufficient political will should exist for the mechanism to be realistic and applicable to the object to be monitored.

From a strictly technical point of view, the best available technology should be used so as to, on the one hand, obtain the best possible information with regard to a particular fact and, on the other, avoid hindering the normal development of the scientific or any other work of the States.

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In this regard, the delicate balance desired would appear to lie in a combination of the following elements:

- (a) Seismic monitoring;
- (b) Measurement of atmospheric radioactivity;
- (c) On-site inspections.

With regard to seismic monitoring, the Government of Chile has given its consent for the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events to make use of the information concerning the seismic activity which affects Chile. In this respect, it may be noted that the said information is being accumulated at the National Earthquake Information Centre (NEIC), located in Colorado, United States of America, and that it will be in the second phase of the Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test (GSETT-2), concerning the exchange and processing of digital seismic data.

It is also worth drawing attention to the contribution which is being made by the United Nations through this Group of Experts, which forms part of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and whose objective, that of determining the minimum technical requirements for the development of a system of seismic monitoring, will constitute the first element of a verification system for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Chile is a member of this Group of Experts and is prepared to contribute its extensive experience in the fields of seismic detection and investigation and the creation of sources of seismic data.

With regard to the measurement of atmospheric radioactivity, Chile considers that this is justified for the measurement of possible test explosions of less than one kiloton yield, the level currently recognized as the lower limit of sensitivity as far as existing methods of seismological measurement are concerned. For such a system to be effective, it should include on-site and remote equipment, the latter meaning equipment located outside the territory of the State in question. Mention should be made in this regard of satellite technology as a first approach to solving the problem.

With regard to on-site or invasive methods of inspection, only those capable of being used both to provide first-hand information and also to calibrate the measuring equipment to be used once a verification system is operational need be considered.

In the development of these mechanisms, it is essential that all States, without exception, should contribute with their capabilities and resources to determining the optimum performance of which these mechanisms and any other proposed systems must be capable, with a view to securing the best possible verification system.

The most sensitive matter to be decided is by whom, how and under what mandate the verification system will be administered. The mechanism decided upon in this

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regard must be simple, effective, equitable and non-discriminatory as regards the rights and the duties of the different States parties to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

This aspect of the matter needs to be considered and discussed in relation to the various possible verification mechanisms proposed. It should be emphasized that, in view of the hoped-for universal accession of States to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban agreement, the mechanism for monitoring compliance with the agreement must provide also for the participation of all States in the process of gathering information. Such participation will, furthermore, ensure a greater commitment to maintaining the agreement in force indefinitely.

The Government of Chile is of the opinion that in the time remaining before the Amendment Conference is held in January 1991 the bodies and/or working groups of experts concerned with disarmament matters in the United Nations system should

A further possibility of assisting in the solution to this matter and turning the attention of the world public to it is also afforded by the Amendment Conference to the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water of 1963, which will be held in New York in January 1991.

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, as an initial participant in the Moscow Treaty, considers it - similar to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - one of the most important documents of the contemporary international juridical régime of arms limitation and disarmament.

We can state to our satisfaction that, during the 25 years since the Moscow Treaty entered into force, not a single case of its violation could be noted. On the other hand, however, the Moscow Treaty is not yet universal - as regards both its membership and the scope of its activity. To rectify this state of affairs is essentially a political matter reflecting the will of the individual countries aimed at fostering international security, and at arms limitation and disarmament.

In the context of efforts to reach a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, it will also be necessary in future adequately to solve the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

A universal problem which must be taken into account in discussion at any disarmament forum is posed by the question of verification. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic assumes that a future modification of the nuclear-test ban will probably require its new estimation. It considers the summing up of all previous experience from bilateral and multilateral discussions and its further elaboration to be rational.

In the broad system of verification of the future treaty on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, the following methods could be used in the view of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: seismic control, registration of pressure changes in the air and water, measurement of atmospheric radiation, satellite measurement, and on-site inspection. The question of data transmission and evaluation of the data will be of fundamental importance. For these purposes, the past experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency could be used to a certain extent, first of all in regard to the application of its safeguard system.

In this spirit the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is ready to further actively participate in relevant international negotiations aiming at the final goal: a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapons.

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SWEDEN

[Original: English]

[25 October 1990]

Sweden considers that there are no insurmountable technical obstacles to concluding a treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. Existing scientific and technical capabilities should make it possible to verify adequately a comprehensive test ban.

In 1983 Sweden presented in the Conference on Disarmament a draft treaty, including verification, banning any nuclear-weapon-test explosion in any environment (CD/381 of 14 June 1983) and three years later, in the same forum, a working paper on nuclear-test-ban verification (CD/712 of 14 July 1986).

Considerable progress has been achieved on the important issue of verifying a comprehensive test ban by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) in the Conference on Disarmament, which, in close international co-operation, has developed a concept for a global seismic verification system.

The concept, which is based on the extensive exchange of seismic waveform data, will be evaluated in the second technical test conducted within the Conference on Disarmament by the GSE. The widest possible participation in the final experimental phase will be of crucial value. The second technical test will be concluded in the spring of 1991 with eight weeks of continuous operation of the entire experimental network.

A successful completion of this test will ease the way towards the implementation and operation of a global seismic system for the effective monitoring and verification of compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Important complementary measures to be considered in relation to the monitoring and verification of compliance with such a treaty include on-site inspections and an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity.

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]

[7 November 1990]

The Ukrainian SSR consistently advocates the comprehensive banning of nuclear tests. The complete cessation of such tests is one of the most urgent tasks of our time. It would place a reliable barrier in the path of the further refinement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons, assist the strengthening of the international régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, improve the ecological state of our planet and do much to strengthen confidence among States. The Ukraine takes the view that the United Nations and other relevant multilateral bodies must concentrate their efforts on this problem in order to arrive at a definitive solution.

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The Ukrainian SSR considers that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban agreement must also incorporate reliable monitoring measures. We are convinced that the level of development reached in science and technology makes it entirely feasible to find an effective solution to this problem and to ensure appropriate verification of compliance with the agreement and confidence in its observance. The achievements of modern science and technology and the experience gained make it possible to monitor reliably the most drastic limitations imposed on nuclear explosions, up to and including their complete cessation.

This is convincingly attested by the successful creation on a bilateral basis of sufficiently strict and reliable machinery for monitoring compliance with the Soviet-American Treaties on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests of 1974 and on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes of 1976. The Ukrainian SSR considers that the verification measures agreed on between the USSR and the United States, particularly seismic monitoring methods and on-site inspections, can be used effectively in future machinery for monitoring compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and can become integral parts of machinery for monitoring compliance with the appropriate multilateral treaty.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]

[17 October 1990]

The Soviet Union considers the task of fully and completely banning nuclear tests one of the priority goals of its foreign policy, as was again emphasized in the appeal by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the parliaments and people of the world adopted on 9 October 1990 following the ratification of the Soviet-American Treaties on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests of 1974 and on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes of 1976.

The Soviet Union reaffirms its dedication to the speedy resolution of the urgent problem of banning nuclear tests and is prepared to use all possible means to achieve that goal, including the extension of the scope of the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in three environments to cover underground nuclear tests, too.

It goes without saying that the question of working out effective verification machinery for a full and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests is of very great importance for the preparation of the corresponding international agreements. However, as the experience gained shows, verification has ceased to be an obstacle to the solution of this problem and the movement towards the complete banning of nuclear tests is based on the solid scientific and technical capabilities available to the countries of the world.

The Soviet Union's basic approach to the problem of verification of a nuclear-test ban was reflected in the document it submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in June 1987 on "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and

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General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests", which not only brought together the positive results of the many years of work on the preparation of a verification régime but also proposed extensive monitoring measures. Together with the use of national technical means of verification, it envisaged the creation of an international system of seismic verification, the exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity, systematic verification with the help of international inspectors and the possibility of conducting mandatory on-site challenge inspections without the right of refusal.

Significant experience in the development of verification machinery was also gained in the course of working out the verification protocols to the two above-mentioned Soviet-American treaties of 1974 and 1976, the basic elements of which, seismic and on-site inspection, could also be utilized in the verification machinery for a complete nuclear-test ban. The Soviet Union is prepared to share the experience it has gained in this field.

The Soviet Union believes that the establishment within the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee on the banning of nuclear tests would make it possible to initiate a real negotiating process to work out a treaty on the complete and comprehensive banning of nuclear tests. In its opinion, full use should be made of the potential of that body for working out verification measures for a nuclear-test ban in the interests, inter alia, of resolving the problems facing the forthcoming Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the 1963 Treaty.

Amendment Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
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VIEWS REGARDING THE VERIFICATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE
NUCLEAR-TEST BAN

Addendum

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FINLAND

[Original: English]

[10 December 1990]

Ever since the beginning of underground nuclear testing in the 1950s, seismic methods have been considered to provide a tool for global monitoring of such tests. Many national and international efforts have been undertaken in order to improve seismological means by which to detect and discriminate between earthquakes and explosions. Recent progress in this field is mainly due to the rapid development of technology for automatic signal detection, processing and communication.

These developments have been reflected in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Ad Hoc Group, working under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, is planning a global seismological monitoring system for the verification of a comprehensive test ban. Finland has participated actively in the work of the Ad Hoc Group since its inception in 1976. Finnish participation is greatly assisted by the existence of a sophisticated national network of seismic stations and the requisite expertise as well as by the fact that the bedrock in Finland provides optimal conditions for seismic detection.

In 1984, Finland began a special research project of seismological verification managed by the Institute of Seismology of the University of Helsinki. The project is funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and its sole purpose is to contribute to developing the technical means for the detection and identification of seismic events in the context of a future comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Seismic verification facilities are not equally distributed around the globe. As their density in the southern hemisphere, particularly in Africa, is much lower than in the northern hemisphere, Finland has for the past decade co-operated with Zambia in establishing a seismic network in that country.

Finland will, at the Conference itself, make available to the delegations information concerning Finnish activities in the field of seismological verification of nuclear tests.

Based on our own research, Finland has concluded that seismological methods together with other relevant means, including on-site inspections, are sufficient to meet the requirements of verifying compliance with a ban on underground testing.

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NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA

[Original: English]

[13 December 1990]

INTRODUCTION

1. New Zealand and Australia share a common commitment to the achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. The resolution submitted jointly by Australia and New Zealand at this year's General Assembly emphasizes that:

"an end to nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time is an essential step in order to prevent the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and their further proliferation, and to contribute, along with other concurrent efforts to reduce nuclear arms, to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons."

2. Despite overwhelming endorsement in the United Nations of the call for the early achievement of a CTB, there has been little substantive progress towards this goal. New Zealand and Australia share the sense of frustration felt by many countries that the major achievements of recent years in disarmament and arms control have not been matched by comparable progress on a nuclear-test ban. The two countries intend to participate positively and constructively in the partial test-ban Treaty Amendment Conference (PTBTAC). We see the PTBTAC as providing a good opportunity to discuss in depth ways of furthering the objective of a CTBT, particularly on the important issue of verification.

3. The achievement of an effective CTBT is of course a global concern, and the need for verification clearly is not confined to the existing nuclear-weapon States. New Zealand and Australia firmly believe that a CTBT has an essential role in preventing the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The achievement of a verifiable nuclear-test ban would considerably strengthen the non-proliferation régime based on the NPT, IAEA safeguards and nuclear-free zones.

VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

4. One fundamental argument that has been put forward against a CTBT is that a nuclear-test ban would not be verifiable. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand do not accept this view. Substantial scientific evidence is now available establishing the feasibility of verifying a nuclear-test ban, particularly through seismic monitoring. It is technically possible to detect underground nuclear tests with a high degree of confidence down to very low levels.

5. In the view of New Zealand and Australia the development of an effective verification mechanism is an important part of the process of creating an effective, widely supported, and verifiable CTBT. Effective verification is, however, only part of the whole process which will need to involve a political will on the part of a number of key players before it can be achieved. In the mean time we see great value in taking as far as we can the development of an effective verification mechanism.

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SEISMIC VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES

6. The two countries consider that the work carried out within the Conference on Disarmament by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) is of fundamental importance in demonstrating that technical means exist for the verification of a CTBT.

7. The first report of the Ad Hoc Group in 1978 (CCD/558) presented the results of a study of the detection ability of a hypothetical global network (network III (SRO)) of digital broad-band seismographs located at then-existing seismograph stations. It was estimated that this network would have a 90 per cent chance of detecting an event of magnitude 3.8 to 4.2 (or greater) in the northern hemisphere and of 4.0 to 4.6 (or greater) in the southern hemisphere. Magnitude 4.0 corresponds to an explosion of less than 10 kilotons in most geological environments and much less than this level in some environments.

8. The third report of the Group (CD/448) in 1984 pointed to significant developments in seismic instrumentation, including the installation of more seismic arrays. Since that date, there have been still greater improvements, particularly in response to the initiatives of the Ad Hoc Group. While further study is needed to evaluate accurately the capability of the present global network, it is clearly very close to that projected in 1978, and may well be significantly better.

GSETT-2

9. New Zealand and Australia both strongly support, and are participating in, the second technical test on the global exchange and analysis of seismic data being conducted by the Group (GSETT-2). The two countries are contributing data from monitoring stations in Australia and New Zealand, and also from stations as far apart as the Cook Islands and Antarctica. All together, this seismic monitoring system covers a major part of the southern hemisphere, and represents an essential component in the global scope of the experiment.

10. Both New Zealand and Australia have recently upgraded their seismic monitoring and data transmission equipment as a further part of their contribution to GSETT-2. Australia is acting as one of the four international data centres for this experiment. The seismic arrays operated by Australia have the facility for enhancing weak signals by data processing techniques, which makes a major contribution to the global network's detection ability, particularly in the southern hemisphere.

11. The two countries are also well placed to contribute to the experiment because of their extensive experience in using seismic detection to monitor nuclear tests. Both New Zealand and Australia have for many years been closely monitoring France's nuclear testing programme at Mururoa atoll in the South Pacific. Scientists in New Zealand and Australia have accordingly developed considerable practical expertise in the seismic monitoring of underground nuclear tests of varying magnitude.

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12. New Zealand's monitoring of explosions in French Polynesia, using a seismograph station in the Cook Islands, has demonstrated the particular sensitivity of such stations to tests in oceanic areas. This would be an important factor in a global monitoring network.

13. Based on this collective experience, it is the considered view of the Australian and New Zealand Governments that seismic monitoring offers a reliable means of verifying a CTBT. The successful conclusion of GSETT-2 will further strengthen confidence in the effectiveness of a global seismic monitoring and data transmission system down to a very low level.

EVASION

14. The possibility of evasion has been put forward as a reason to doubt that a CTBT could be adequately monitored. Various technical scenarios have been put forward for ways in which countries might evade detection, primarily through "decoupled" explosions in underground cavities. However, the technology to attempt such evasion is unlikely to be available outside the existing nuclear-weapon States, and the risk of detection would be extremely high and would increase with each test.

15. With in-country networks of seismographs to enhance the detection capability of the global network, it is likely that even the most elaborate precautions would not prevent the detection of explosions at levels as low as 1 kiloton. Attempts to evade a nuclear-test ban would therefore be confined to a level at which the military advantages to be gained from clandestine explosions would be minimal and the chances of escaping detection would be extremely low.

OTHER VERIFICATION TECHNIQUES

16. While seismic detection would be a vital factor in the monitoring of a CTBT, verification need not depend on this alone. A network for monitoring airborne radiation, as proposed by Sweden, would provide valuable collateral support to a global seismic monitoring network. Satellite surveillance data would also help confirm international adherence to a CTBT.

17. A recent development has been the increased acceptance of on-site verification in other areas of arms control, following the precedent first established by the IMF Treaty. This could also be extended to verification of a nuclear-test ban. The ratification of the Protocols to the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty has now set a further example for co-operation on verification procedures.

18. On-site verification, which is already widely accepted as an important component of arms control agreements, might also provide further assurance of compliance with a CTBT. The international disarmament process has advanced dramatically since the seismic monitoring network was first proposed, when national technical means were considered the only effective means of verifying compliance.

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Co-operation on measures for on-site verification, such as the placement of seismometers at possible test sites, would strongly reinforce a teleseismic verification system.

WIDER PARTICIPATION IN SEISMIC CO-OPERATION

19. In order to develop a global seismic monitoring capability down to a very low level, it will be necessary to improve the coverage of seismic stations in Africa, South America and Antarctica. The involvement is therefore necessary of a wider group than is currently involved in the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) in the Conference on Disarmament.

CONCLUSION

20. In summary, New Zealand and Australia consider that there already exists compelling scientific evidence that a nuclear-test ban is verifiable using technology currently available. The ongoing work of the Group of Scientific Experts is providing substantial technical corroboration for that view. The argument advanced by some nuclear testing States, that a nuclear-test ban is not possible because it could not be verified, has consequently become increasingly difficult to sustain.

21. New Zealand and Australia consider that considerable progress has already been made towards the development of an adequate mechanism to verify a nuclear-test ban. The ongoing work of the Group of Scientific Experts is important in this respect and the Group needs to continue its work with the benefit of a wider membership.

22. The two countries believe that a significant achievement from the partial test-ban Treaty Amendment Conference would be the recognition by States party of the progress made towards a fully effective international verification system, the endorsement of the efforts of the Group of Scientific Experts to demonstrate the technical feasibility of such a régime, and a call on more States to participate in the GSC to improve in particular coverage of seismic stations in Africa, South America and Antarctica.

POLAND

[Original: English]

[29 November 1990]

Verification of compliance with a nuclear-test-ban treaty is unquestionably a very complex matter. It requires an extensive set of sophisticated sensors, emplaced spatially in various environments; it necessitates amiability to assess and to communicate the data provided by the sensors. Because it deals with physical, that is, basically seismic phenomena any measurements used in the process

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of verification are by definition only approximations, dependent on a number of variables (quality of a sensor, quality of computing system, geological medium at the site of a seismic event and between the site of an event and a site of a sensor, distance between the two sites, nature of a seismic event, and many others). It is thus always open to subjective assessment or to error, especially as the quality of technology used and the level of knowledge about the subject-matter are not evenly distributed internationally. Verification of a nuclear-test ban is therefore highly dependent on international co-operation and as such it is very sensitive to a political atmosphere between the parties which established a given system of verification. In the opinion of the Government of Poland it is this political environment and not the complicated nature of nuclear-test-ban verification which has, until now, thwarted the international efforts to halt and ban all kinds of nuclear tests. However, the political developments in the international relations of the last year raise hopes for a tangible change in this area. These developments not only facilitate the international acceptance of the very intrusive verification methods but, what seems much more important, they open the prospects for a substantial decrease of the political and military importance of nuclear weapons.

Poland notes with great satisfaction the ratification by the United States and the Soviet Union of the threshold and PNE treaties, together with protocols on their verification. The verification systems established by these treaties are based on a variety of methods including the calibration tests, seismic and hydrodynamic instruments and on-site inspections. The extent of information to be exchanged prior to and after the prospective nuclear explosions, as well as the provisions on long-term co-operation in the verification activities create a sound basis for a further expansion of mutual confidence and expertise. The achievement, embodied in the verification system of these two treaties, has been made possible by a wide involvement of not only governmental but also private scientific organizations and personalities. The scope of co-operation in the application of the highly intrusive verification methods, adopted in the protocols to these two treaties, indicate clearly that the two nuclear States would be able to monitor effectively a ban on nuclear testing on a considerably lower level of the explosive yield. However, it should be stressed that the bilateral arrangements, commendable and politically very helpful, seem not readily applicable for a prospective multilateral agreement banning nuclear tests. The verification system of a multilateral measure would have to cope with a possibility of an explosion taking place in an unknown location, hence the need for a global network of seismic arrays and an appropriate system of data transmission. The organization of the verification system would have to be more structured. The greater probability of a false alarm or an occurrence of a suspected event would require a pre-determined system of international response.

A number of States already possess a remarkable level of expertise and sophisticated technology applicable to monitoring and identification of seismic events. However, to be effective and credible the truly comprehensive nuclear verification system has to be based on a wide international spread of this technology and expertise. Owing to various political, technical and financial reasons, this postulate is still far from being realized. It is incumbent upon States desiring a comprehensive test ban to take a much more active part in the

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preparation of a global network for seismic monitoring. In this regard Poland considers as vital a wide international participation in the technical tests carried out by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts under the aegis of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. The establishment and development of several national monitoring facilities, the setting up of the international data centres, the amelioration of an international data transmission network - all these efforts will gradually bring the international community closer to a technical preparedness to verify a global nuclear-test ban. An international seismic monitoring network should constitute an important part of an effective verification system of a nuclear-test ban.

In addition to seismic monitoring, proper consideration should be given to other possible means of verifying the compliance with a future CTBT. Among such means to be considered could be atmospheric radioactivity surveillance; satellite remote sensing and on-site inspections. Adequately designed monitoring techniques could reinforce the reliability of the whole verification system.

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**VIEWS REGARDING THE VERIFICATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE
NUCLEAR-TEST BAN**

Addendum

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CANADA

[Original: English]

[11 January 1991]

Canada and the Seismic Verification of a Nuclear-Test Ban

INTRODUCTION

1. The priority which the Canadian Government accords to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban (CTB) on nuclear explosions is well known. Equally important, however, is to recognize that it is necessary to develop adequate global verification techniques with which to ensure compliance with such a ban. A feasible global seismic verification system does not exist at this time. Canada, with other nations, continues to search actively to identify the parameters within which such a system could operate effectively.

CANADIAN APPROACH

2. Recent indications suggest that such a system could be developed if it were given the full-fledged support of all nations. Canada is pursuing this objective in a number of ways:

(a) Focusing existing expertise in the seismic field directly on the verification issue. The international application of this aspect is achieved through participation in the Conference on Disarmament and its Group of Scientific Experts (GSE);

(b) Upgrading national systems in support of a global commitment;

(c) Undertaking original research to improve detection capabilities. Results of this research are shared internationally through the hosting of international seminars by the Canadian Government and professionally through a number of academic journals.

EMPLOYING EXISTING EXPERTISE

3. Canada has a long tradition in geophysics and in the monitoring of earthquakes. Canadian experts who have spent their careers studying such matters believe that Canada has a unique role to play in the development of a reliable verification system that would be an essential prerequisite to the conclusion of any comprehensive test-ban treaty. Canada's size, geographical position and geological similarity with the great continental rock mass that underlies much of Europe and Asia, as well as our own technical expertise, make this possible.

4. Canadian seismic experts have been involved in arms control efforts since it was realized that seismology could contribute to the monitoring of underground

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explosions. In 1958-1959, for example, seismologists of the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources were represented in a conference of experts that met at Geneva to discuss the possibility of seismic monitoring of a future test-ban treaty. Canadian scientists have continued to work in this area since that time.

5. To sharpen the Canadian capability to monitor underground tests, an intergovernmental programme was established in 1986 wherein the Department of External Affairs' Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Research Unit undertook to provide funding to the Geological Survey of Canada, a sector of Energy Mines and Resources, for additional personnel and hardware. As part of this programme, technical experts from the Geological Survey have continued to work closely with diplomats of External Affairs on the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in multilateral forums. More than \$200,000 per year is being expended to supplement personnel to participate in such activities as the global exchange of seismic data. As part of this programme, the Geological Survey now produces for interdepartmental use a Global Seismic Event Bulletin which summarizes events, categorizing them by geographic location, magnitude and type.

6. Canadian seismic experts have been involved in the Geneva negotiations on this subject for several decades. They stress that the problem of verification is a highly complex one that still involves many unknowns on the technical side. Continued research is, therefore, essential.

UPGRADING SEISMIC FACILITIES

7. As a national contribution to an eventual global seismic monitoring system, Canadian scientists have, since the early 1960s, used the Yellowknife seismological array and other Canadian and global seismograph facilities to undertake research on the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions. During the period 1986-1989, the Canadian Government initiated a \$3.5 million upgrade of the Yellowknife array using state-of-the-art seismographic, computing and data communications technology.

8. The Yellowknife area was selected to house the array because of its location with respect to known nuclear test sites; its remoteness from coastlines, urban areas and other sources of cultural seismic noise; its good communications facilities; and its location on the stable Canadian Shield. The initial installation was completed in late 1962. The Yellowknife array is operated, and seismic verification research conducted, by the Geological Survey. These activities support the arms control and disarmament policies of External Affairs and International Trade Canada.

9. The new upgraded configuration of the Yellowknife array has preserved the "cross" layout of the original teleseismic array, but the outstation equipment - consisting of seismometer, power supply and radio telemetry hardware - has been completely replaced. The most notable improvements are high-resolution digitization of the seismometer output at the site and UHF digital radio telemetry to transfer these data to the Control Centre.

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10. In addition, four new "broad-band" stations have been installed in tunnel vaults, each equipped with three-component seismometers that are sensitive to ground motions over a very large range of frequencies and amplitudes. In one of these new vaults, a set of three-component high-frequency seismometers, sampling ground vibrations 100 times per second, has also been established. The signals from all these sensors are, like those from the teleseismic array, digitized on site and relayed to the Control Centre by radio telemetry.

11. Through Yellowknife's teleseismic window, the array can monitor many of the active earthquake zones of the Earth, and all of the explosion test sites currently being used by the five nuclear-weapon States. The newly modernized array permits a more detailed view through this window.

12. To complement the refurbishment of the Yellowknife array, additional funding was also made available to provide compatible software for the Mould Bay Seismic Station located in Canada's High Arctic. Mould Bay and Yellowknife are two of the three Canadian stations which contributed significantly to GSETT I. Of the 70 seismological stations which took part in GSETT I, the three Canadian stations provided between 10 and 15 per cent of the data collected. Together with an updated processing capability in Ottawa, reliability and accuracy will be significantly increased. This constitutes an important factor from the Canadian perspective in improving the end results of GSETT II which is now in progress.

UNDERTAKING ORIGINAL RESEARCH

13. The Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs has funded research by the University of Toronto's Geophysics Division to investigate the further development of seismic monitoring methodologies for reliable verification of compliance with nuclear test-ban treaties. This research includes studies that entail propagation characteristics of waveform data, analysis of mislocation vectors for the Yellowknife array, theoretical developments, and application of wavefield decomposition techniques as applied to the Yellowknife array.

14. During the initial 1985-1988 period, the Canadian research team at the University of Toronto devised a new method for measuring and correcting for the station site effect and the path attenuation properties for one of the kinds of seismic wave (the Lg phase). The Lg phase is the one that is most important for monitoring tests in the regional distance range of 200-2000 kilometres. The new method has much potential for greatly improving yield estimates and also for improved discrimination of explosion seismic events from earthquakes. Its efficiency has been demonstrated using earthquakes and mine explosion recordings from the stations of the Eastern Canada Telemetered Network (ECTN) which is operated by the Geological Survey.

15. Further work has focused on three areas:

(a) Calibration of the ECTN with the goal of transforming it into a network which sets the performance standard in seismic monitoring for all other modern

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seismograph networks. This was needed to facilitate research into regional monitoring networks which could be used to monitor a very low threshold or comprehensive nuclear-test ban;

(b) Using the advanced capabilities of the calibrated ECTN, to attempt to resolve a hotly debated, ongoing controversy over a theoretical model which characterizes key differences between the seismic characteristics of earthquakes and underground explosions. Once a model can be established, then the capabilities of, and requirements of, regional networks in seismic verification can be established; and

(c) Precision calibration of the improved Yellowknife array to increase its accuracy in determining the event magnitude and depth of events taking place at known test sites. The determination of the complex Yellowknife array site responses allow a direct comparison, in the time domain, between the structures of the explosion - generated P waves and those generated by natural earthquakes in the vicinity of the nuclear-test sites.

16. While the final results of this and ongoing research are not as yet available, progress reports have been made to technical experts at an international level at both the 1986 Ottawa Seismic Workshop and the 1989 Yellowknife Workshop. Further information continues to be made available through articles produced by the University of Toronto under funding by External Affairs and appearing in professional and academic publications. A list of articles published to date is provided in the annex below.

CONCLUSIONS

17. Canada's past and present commitment to global nuclear non-proliferation, and its policy promoting a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear explosive devices, remains a key priority.

18. Seismology is crucial to monitoring nuclear-test explosions and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Combined with other verification methods, it could constitute the basis of a system to ensure that a comprehensive test-ban treaty could be adequately and effectively verified.

19. Upgrading of national facilities and continued funding in areas of original research will combine, over time, to make a significant impact in the effectiveness of a global verification capability. Given the genuine desire mentioned above, Canada believes that a comprehensive test ban is both achievable and verifiable.

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Annex

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**Amendment Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water**

PTBT/CONF/5
20 December 1990

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7-18 January 1991
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Background paper by the Secretariat

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INTRODUCTION

1. The States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water participating in their Meeting for the Organization of the Amendment Conference to the Treaty, held in New York from 29 May to 8 June 1990, ¹/ invited the Secretariat to prepare for the Amendment Conference a brief background document covering the following points and drawing, as far as possible, on relevant existing documentation:

- I. An account of the convening of the Amendment Conference
- II. Compilation of material on:
 - A. A historical review of the role ascribed to a comprehensive test ban in contributing to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race
 - B. Nuclear-weapon-test explosions and any other nuclear explosions conducted since 5 August 1963
 - C. United Nations General Assembly resolutions relevant to the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and a moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing
 - D. Multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements, and other initiatives related to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban
 - E. 1980 report of the Secretary-General on a comprehensive test ban
- III. The implications of a comprehensive test ban for:
 - A. The nuclear-arms race and the development of new weapon systems that involve nuclear testing, including those for outer space
 - B. The environment, including social and economic aspects
 - C. All aspects of the proliferation of nuclear weapons
 - D. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
- IV. Verification of a comprehensive test ban
- V. Any other relevant documents

The present paper is submitted in response to that request.

2. On the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, and especially on the question of amending the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (generally known as the partial test-ban Treaty, or PTBT) into a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT), there are divergent views between the various States and groups of States. As a result, the present paper

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deals not only with issues of great complexity and sensitivity, but also with issues that are controversial in many respects. Under these circumstances, every effort has been made to draft the paper in a balanced and factual manner, and to give it a purely descriptive character. Efforts have also been made to base the paper, as far as possible, solely on documents of the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament and other sources within the United Nations framework.

I. AN ACCOUNT OF THE CONVENING OF THE AMENDMENT CONFERENCE

3. The question of an amendment to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water that would convert it into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was first discussed in conjunction with the question of the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions at the fortieth session of the General Assembly in 1985. At that session, a proposal to that effect was made by Mexico. According to that initiative, the States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty would avail themselves of the provisions of its article II for amending the Treaty. At the same session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 40/80 B by a majority. It reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the determination, proclaimed since 1963 in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Bearing also in mind that in 1968 the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalled such determination and included in its article VI an undertaking by each of its parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date,

Recalling that in its resolution 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, adopted unanimously, it had stressed that one of the basic principles on which the treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear-weapons should be based was that such treaty, which was then to be negotiated, should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers,

Recalling also that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration adopted by consensus on 21 September 1985, expressed its deep regret that a comprehensive multilateral nuclear-test-ban treaty had not been concluded so far and called for the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority,

Noting that article II of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water provides a procedure for the consideration and eventual adoption of amendments to the Treaty by a conference of its parties,

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Recommends that States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water carry out urgent consultations among themselves as to the advisability and most appropriate method of taking advantage of the provisions of its article II for the conversion of the partial nuclear-test-ban treaty into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

4. At its forty-first session, in 1986, the General Assembly adopted by a majority resolution 41/46 B, recommending that the States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty undertake practical steps leading to the convening of a conference to consider amendments to the Treaty to convert it to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and requested the States parties to the Treaty to report on the progress of its efforts to the Assembly at its forty-second session.

5. In 1987, the General Assembly by a majority adopted resolution 42/26 B, recommending that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty submit an amendment proposal to the Depositary Governments with a view to convening a conference at the earliest possible date to consider amendments to the Treaty that would convert it into a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

6. In 1988, identical letters signed by the representatives of Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia were submitted to the three Depositary Governments, 2/ requesting them to circulate the proposal to all the parties to the Treaty, so that such a conference might be convened following the request of one third of the parties, in accordance with article II of the Treaty, and the Depositary Governments (United Kingdom, United States and USSR) circulated the proposal to all the parties. The General Assembly, by a majority, welcomed in resolution 43/63 B the submission of an amendment proposal to the three Depositary Governments for consideration at a conference of the parties to the Treaty to be convened for that purpose in accordance with article II of the Treaty.

7. At the request of more than one third of the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Liberia, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia), the Depositary Governments, in accordance with article II of the Treaty, took steps to initiate the convening of a Conference to consider the amendment to the Treaty proposed by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

8. In 1989, informal consultations among the parties to the Treaty were held in New York. In addition, the General Assembly, in resolution 44/106, adopted a majority, recommended that a preparatory committee, open to all parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, should be established to make arrangements for the Amendment Conference and that such preparatory committee should meet at United Nations Headquarters from 29 May to 1 June 1990, followed by a one-week session of the Conference from 4 to 8 June 1990 and a second substantive session from 7 to 18 January 1991.

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9. Thereafter, six meetings of the interested States that are party to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and 15 open-ended informal consultations took place between 12 January and 25 May 1990.

10. At their meeting on 8 March 1990, the interested States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water decided to hold the Amendment Conference in New York from 7 to 18 January 1991, preceded by the Meeting of the Organization of the Conference from 29 May to 8 June 1990. In accordance with that decision, the Meeting, in which 74 States parties participated, took place at United Nations Headquarters in New York, from 29 May to 8 June 1990. The States parties agreed: to adopt the provisional agenda of the Amendment Conference, to adopt the draft rules of procedures of the Amendment Conference and to request the Secretariat to prepare for the Amendment Conference a brief background document. Furthermore, the Meeting invited the parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, to submit for distribution before the Conference their views regarding the verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The Meeting adopted by consensus its final report to be transmitted to the Amendment Conference. 3/

11. At its forty-fifth session, in 1990, the General Assembly adopted by a majority resolution 45/50 on the Amendment Conference. Its operative part reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

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"1. Notes with satisfaction that the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water will be held in New York from 7 to 18 January 1991;

"2. Calls upon all parties to the Treaty to participate in, and to contribute to the success of, the Amendment Conference for the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban at an early date, as an indispensable measure towards implementation of their undertakings in the preamble to the Treaty;

"3. Reiterates its conviction that, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should suspend all nuclear-test explosions through an agreed moratorium or unilateral moratoria;

"4. Recommends that arrangements be made to ensure that intensive efforts continue, under the auspices of the Amendment Conference, until a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is achieved;

"5. Recommends also that the Amendment Conference establish a working group, or other means it deems appropriate, to study, inter alia, the organization of control, institutional mechanisms and legal aspects of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and to report its conclusions to the Conference;

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"6. Stresses the importance of ensuring adequate co-ordination among the various negotiating forums dealing with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

"7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session the item entitled 'Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water'."

II. COMPILATION OF MATERIAL ON:

A. A historical review of the role ascribed to a comprehensive test ban in contributing to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race

12. Throughout the nuclear era, and in particular since the advent of the thermonuclear weapon in the early 1950s, the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests has been one of the most prominent issues on the disarmament agenda. No other question in the field of disarmament has been the subject of so much international concern, discussion, study and negotiation as that of stopping nuclear-weapon tests. The suggestion of concluding an agreement to ban the testing of nuclear weapons was first made by India in 1954, when it called for a "standstill agreement" with regard to nuclear explosions. It was, thereafter, discussed in the General Assembly of the United Nations, the five-Power Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, in the three-Power Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear-Weapon Tests, in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) as well as in the Conference on Disarmament either as an independent measure or as part of a broader disarmament agreement.

13. The discussions in all these various forums during the past decades revealed that, as in other fields of nuclear disarmament, the views on the role of a comprehensive test ban in contributing to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race widely differed between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, and among the nuclear-weapon States themselves.

14. The development and atmospheric testing of thermonuclear weapons in the early 1950s spurred demands for the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. Many avenues have been explored in efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban. Over the years, many non-nuclear-weapon States have, however, increasingly questioned whether there was sufficient determination to bring about a cessation of all nuclear-weapon testing. A number of non-nuclear-weapon States have stated that they view the issue of a comprehensive test ban as a litmus test of the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to halt the nuclear-arms race.

15. In 1955, the Soviet Union called for an early and separate agreement suspending or banning all tests as one of the first measures within a programme for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. 4/ In 1957, it formally proposed agreement on the immediate cessation of all atomic and hydrogen tests, if only for a period of two or three years. 5/ Memoranda suggesting various ways of dealing with the regulation or cessation of nuclear-weapon tests were

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submitted by India, Japan, Norway and Yugoslavia. 6/ The Western Powers regarded the limitation and eventual banning of nuclear testing, with adequate supervision, as part of a comprehensive disarmament programme and maintained that any temporary suspension of tests must be linked to the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

16. In 1958, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to convene a conference of experts to study the possibility of detecting violations of an agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. The Conference was held from 1 July to 21 August 1958 at Geneva. The work of the Conference and its report paved the way for the convening of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear-Weapon Tests, with the participation of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Conference was held at Geneva from October 1958 to January 1962. A voluntary suspension of nuclear-weapon tests by the negotiating Powers went into effect at about the time negotiations commenced (the last United States test was on 30 October, the last USSR test was on 3 November). The suspension came to an end in the course of 1961.

17. At the outset of the work of the Conference, the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty which provided for an obligation by the three nuclear Powers involved to cease all tests of nuclear weapons. 7/ On 11 February 1960 the United States, supported by the United Kingdom, submitted to the Conference a proposal for "a phased treaty" which called for a ban on all tests in those environments where effective control could be established. 8/ The Soviet response was positive, in principle, but its counter-proposal of 19 March 1960 9/ did not provide for on-site inspection as proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom. In a joint declaration of 29 March 1960, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to the Soviet proposal, provided that the moratorium proposed by the Soviet Union would be for a fixed period only. 10/ Nevertheless, little progress was made at the Conference owing to differences which arose in connection with other sensitive issues, such as the composition of the control commission and the question of decision-making in that body. On 18 April 1961, the United States and the United Kingdom submitted a draft treaty which incorporated a number of new elements. 11/

18. The deterioration in political relations between the two sides, which became apparent in the second half of 1961, had a strong bearing not only on the progress of the negotiations but also on the conduct of their respective nuclear programmes. Thus, on 30 August 1961, the Soviet Government declared that it had been compelled, in order to strengthen its security, to take a number of steps, including the carrying out of experimental nuclear-weapon explosions. The Soviet Union resumed nuclear tests in the atmosphere on 1 September 1961. The United States resumed underground testing on 15 September.

19. Upon the resumption of the Geneva Conference on 28 November 1961, the Soviet Union reiterated its opposition to any test-ban treaty under international control while the arms race continued, and said that a new approach was necessary. To this end, it put forward a draft agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, which provided for supervision of the ban to be carried out through existing national means of detection and also for a moratorium on underground tests until a control system had been developed as

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part of a system of control over general and complete disarmament. ^{12/} The United States and the United Kingdom rejected the proposal because, *inter alia*, in their opinion it contravened the recommendations of the 1958 Conference of experts, and also the terms of Assembly resolution 1649 (XVI) calling for the establishment of international control over a test-ban agreement and found the idea of an unverified moratorium on underground tests unacceptable.

20. After the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear-Weapon Tests adjourned in January 1962, the question of nuclear-weapon tests was taken up in the ENDC when it started its work in March that year. In order to break the impasse in the negotiations, the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC - Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic - submitted, on 16 April 1962, a joint memorandum ^{13/} in which they emphasized the possibility of establishing a system for continuous observations and effective control of nuclear tests on a purely scientific basis. All three nuclear Powers accepted the memorandum as one of the bases for negotiations at the Conference.

21. On 27 August 1962, the United States and the United Kingdom submitted two alternative draft treaties. One was a comprehensive treaty envisaging a ban on tests in all environments and making provision for a quota of on-site inspections in the case of suspicious underground events. ^{14/} The other contemplated a test ban in the three non-controversial environments - in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water - without international verification. ^{15/} The Soviet Union rejected the proposal for a comprehensive treaty on the grounds that it ran counter to the eight-Power memorandum of 16 April and did not depart from the principle of compulsory on-site inspection. The Soviet Union also rejected the partial treaty on the ground that it excluded underground tests, but was not opposed to considering such a partial treaty if underground tests were voluntarily suspended until a comprehensive solution of the problem was reached. It supported a Mexican proposal that there should be cessation of all tests from 1 January 1963. ^{16/} Still expressing its preference for a comprehensive ban, the Soviet Union, on 10 December 1962, offered a new guarantee for effective control of such agreement. ^{17/} In addition to existing manned national means of detection, it proposed the use of automatic seismic stations ("black boxes"). The United States agreed that the "black boxes" might be a useful adjunct to manned detection stations if used in sufficient numbers and if properly equipped, operated and located. The United Kingdom formally proposed that the whole question be examined by experts, without any pre-condition.

22. When the ENDC reconvened on 12 February 1963, it again concentrated on a comprehensive treaty banning tests in all environments. While there was agreement on basic principles, there was disagreement on the number of annual inspections and on the number of automatic seismic stations. The Soviet Union proposed 2 to 3 annual on-site inspections and the United States proposed from 8 to 10, but later reduced the figure to 7. The Soviet Union proposed 3 automatic seismic stations and the United States 7. On 10 June 1963, the non-aligned members of the Committee - Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic - submitted a joint memorandum suggesting that for the time being "three, four or so yearly truly effective inspections - or an adequately proportionate figure spread over more

years", might be needed to dispel mutual suspicions and to facilitate reaching a settlement. 18/

23. On 10 June, it was announced that the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States had agreed to hold talks in Moscow in mid-July on the cessation of nuclear tests. On 2 July, the Soviet Union stated that the insistence of the United States and the United Kingdom on on-site inspections made an underground ban impossible, and that the Soviet Union was therefore prepared to sign a limited treaty banning tests in the three non-controversial environments - in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. 19/ The negotiations, which began in Moscow on 15 July ended on 25 July when the text of the Treaty was initialled. It was signed by the three nuclear-weapon Powers and opened for signature on 5 August 1963. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (partial test-ban Treaty - also known as the Moscow Treaty) entered into force on 10 October 1963 and, as of 25 October 1990, had 117 parties. In the second preambular paragraph, the original parties to the Treaty, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union stated that they sought to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and expressed their determination to continue negotiations to that end.

24. The General Assembly, by resolution 1910 (XVIII) OF 27 November 1963, noting with approval the Treaty, requested the ENDC "to continue with a sense of urgency its negotiations to achieve the objectives set forth in the preamble of the Treaty". After the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, efforts towards achieving a comprehensive test ban continued in the General Assembly and in the negotiating bodies, in particular the ENDC (until 1969), the CCD (1969-1978), the Committee on Disarmament (1979-1983) and the Conference on Disarmament (since 1984). In these bodies, a large number of suggestions and proposals for achieving a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty were submitted over the years, by both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States. Many of them have stressed the impact that, in their view, a comprehensive test ban would have on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race.

25. On 14 September 1964, the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC submitted a joint memorandum 20/ on the partial test-ban Treaty in which they expressed the hope that all States would adhere to it; regretted that no progress had been made towards completing the ban; and urged the nuclear Powers to press on with negotiations to extend the ban. On 15 September 1965, the eight non-aligned countries represented in the ENDC submitted a joint memorandum on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. They stated that a comprehensive test ban "will not only consolidate the partial test ban Treaty but also in itself constitute a measure towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapons". 21/ Again, in a joint memorandum submitted one year later, on 17 August 1966, the eight non-aligned States expressed their concern over the lack of progress on an underground test ban and stressed the danger of continued atmospheric and underground testing. 22/

26. In a message to the ENDC on 27 January 1966, President Johnson stated that the United States "persists in its belief that the perils of proliferation would be materially reduced by an extension of the limited test ban treaty to cover underground nuclear tests". 23/

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27. The representative of the United Kingdom, on 16 July 1968, stated in the ENDC that the banning of underground nuclear tests, while closely related to any agreement on the limitation of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons and an associated cut-off of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, was a measure of cardinal importance because the real danger of vertical proliferation lay in the development of more sophisticated weapons systems. Purely quantitative control, he added, would achieve nothing if the nuclear weapons that were permitted became more costly and more deadly. The merit of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was that it would prevent the development of more sophisticated weapon systems. 24/

28. On 5 December 1968, the United States representative stated in the United Nations General Assembly that foremost among the arms control issues was the problem of nuclear disarmament. The ENDC had recognized the pre-eminence of this area of concern in the programme of work it had adopted at its previous session. From the discussion in the Committee it was also clear that, within the broad and complex field of disarmament, the question of further limitations on nuclear-weapon testing stood as a priority item. 25/

29. On 30 July 1968 the representative of Sweden stated in the ENDC that the completion of a ban on nuclear testing would be a very important disarmament measure, which had been promised in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. The cessation of the further development and refinement of nuclear weapons - that is, qualitative nuclear disarmament - now seemed the most timely of the possible nuclear disarmament measures. Since "overkill" capacity had been reached by the main nuclear-weapon Powers, it was the race concerned with changing the quality of the weapon systems that was threatening to upset the precarious balance in which the world was living. 26/

30. In 1973, at a special meeting of the CCD held on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the partial test-ban Treaty, nearly all speakers underlined the importance of the Treaty and the need to complete it with an underground test ban. The three nuclear-weapon Powers, in particular, stressed the role that the Treaty had played in reducing world tensions, curbing nuclear-arms proliferation and promoting arms limitation measures. At the same time, several non-aligned members of the CCD, supported by a number of Western countries, expressed dissatisfaction that the goal of discontinuing all nuclear-weapon tests had not been fulfilled.

31. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, identified the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests as a most important initial measure in working towards the priority requirement of nuclear disarmament. It stated that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make an important contribution to the goal of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons, and of preventing their proliferation. 27/ The issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban was also discussed extensively at the second and third special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1982 and in 1988, respectively. At those sessions, however, it was not possible to agree on a substantive final document.

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32. The parties to the Six-Nation Initiative (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania), in their Delhi Declaration of 1985, 28/ urged the nuclear-weapon States to halt immediately the testing of all kinds of nuclear weapons, and to conclude, at an early date, a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-test ban. In their view, such a treaty would be a major step towards ending the continuous modernization of nuclear arsenals. In the Mexico Declaration of 1986, 29/ they, inter alia, stated their conviction that no issue was more urgent and crucial than bringing to an end all nuclear tests. Both the qualitative and the quantitative development of nuclear weapons, they stated, exacerbated the arms race, and both would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear-weapon testing. The same countries, in the Stockholm Declaration of 1988, 30/ affirmed that agreements to reduce existing nuclear arsenals must be backed up by decisive measures to check the unbridled development of new generations of ever more dreadful and sophisticated nuclear weapons. In their view, the single most effective measure would be to end all nuclear-weapon tests, by all States; such a step, they held, would be of crucial importance for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which had so far refrained from acquiring them. Referring to the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations on gradually establishing lower limits on nuclear tests, the six countries stated that any agreement that left room for continued testing would not be acceptable.

33. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, on numerous occasions, has raised the issue of a nuclear-test ban. For instance, in a statement to the then Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, on 29 February 1972, 31/ he expressed his belief that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was necessary in order to achieve final agreement. There was an increasing conviction among the nations of the world, he stated, that an underground test ban was the single most important measure, and perhaps the only feasible one in the near future, to halt the nuclear-arms race, at least with regard to its qualitative aspects. In his foreword to the 1980 United Nations study on a comprehensive test ban, the Secretary-General stressed the vital importance of a general and complete test ban as an indispensable first step towards halting the nuclear-arms race. Addressing a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 12 December 1984, 32/ after appealing for a renewed effort towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the Secretary-General emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty was the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament. In his 1987 report on the work of the Organization, 33/ the Secretary-General pointed to the desirability of early agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which for many years had been viewed in the United Nations as a measure having cardinal importance. He observed that testing directed at developing new weapons or perfecting those deployed would perpetuate competition and mistrust and reduce the value of agreements in force on the elimination of certain types of weapons. In 1990, speaking on the occasion of the observance of Disarmament Week, the Secretary-General, inter alia, reiterated the desirability of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and urged all sides to seek to make progress on that sensitive issue.

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B. Nuclear-weapon-test explosions and any other nuclear
explosions conducted since 5 August 1963

34. All five nuclear-weapon States conduct nuclear tests as part of their weapons programmes. It has been reported that between 1963 and 1989 there were 1,271 internationally recorded tests (see table below).

35. In addition to testing related to weapons programmes, some of the nuclear-weapon States have also carried out tests related to civilian activities. Five major treaties on arms limitation and disarmament (the Antarctic Treaty; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; the non-proliferation Treaty; the PNE Treaty between the United States and the USSR; and the Treaty of Rarotonga) deal in whole or in part with the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions. The United States and the Soviet Union began conducting peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) in the 1960s. The United States terminated its programme in 1977. The Soviet Union has had an active PNE programme and has conducted over 100 detonations beginning in 1965. However, in recent years the programme has been decisively scaled back. France has carried out research on peaceful nuclear explosions but never conducted any such test. China and the United Kingdom have never expressed any interest in peaceful nuclear explosions, and there are no indications that they have ever had such programmes. In 1974 India announced that it has carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion. With regard to South Africa, the question has been raised whether that country will no longer continue to pursue the goal of nuclear-weapon capability and from now on focus exclusively on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. ^{34/} Obviously, this would be in the general interest of non-proliferation, as long as an effective non-proliferation régime is maintained.

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Table

Estimated number of nuclear explosions 6 August 1963-31 December 1989

a = atmospheric

u = underground

	<u>USA a/</u>		<u>USSR</u>		<u>UK a/</u>		<u>France</u>		<u>China</u>		<u>India</u>		
Year	a	u	a	u	a	u	a	u	a	u	a	u	Total
6 Aug.-31 Dec.													
1963	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	1					16
1964	0	38	0	6	0	1	0	3	1	0			49
1965	0	36	0	9	0	1	0	4	1	0			51
1966	0	43	0	15	0	0	5 <u>b/</u>	1	3	0			67
1967	0	34	0	17	0	0	3	0	2	0			56
1968	0	45 <u>c/</u>	0	13	0	0	5	0	1	0			64
1969	0	38	0	16	0	0	0	0	1	1			56
1970	0	35	0	17	0	0	8	0	1	0			61
1971	0	17	0	19	0	0	5 <u>b/</u>	0	1	0			42
1972	0	18	0	22	0	0	3	0	2	0			45
1973	0	16 <u>d/</u>	0	14	0	0	5	0	1	0			36
1974	0	14	0	18	0	1	7 <u>b/</u>	0	1	0	0	1	42
1975	0	20	0	15	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	38
1976	0	18	0	17	0	1	0	4	3	1	0	0	44
1977	0	19	0	18	0	0	0	8 <u>e/</u>	1	0	0	0	46
1978	0	17	0	27	0	2	0	8	2	1	0	0	57
1979	0	15	0	29	0	1	0	9	1 <u>f/</u>	0	0	0	55
1980	0	14	0	21	0	3	0	13	1	0	0	0	52
1981	0	16	0	22	0	1	0	12	0	0	0	0	51
1982	0	18	0	31	0	1	0	6	0	1	0	0	57
1983	0	17	0	27	0	1	0	9	0	2	0	0	56
1984	0	17	0	29	0	2	0	8	0	2	0	0	58
1985	0	17	0	9	0	1	0	8	0	0	0	0	35
1986	0	14	0	0	0	1	0	8	0	0	0	0	23
1987	0	14	0	23	0	1	0	8	0	1	0	0	47
1988	0	14	0	17	0	0	0	8	0	1	0	0	40
1989	0	11	0	7	0	1	0	8	0	0	0	0	27
Total	0	590	0	458	0	19	41	128	23	11	0	1	1 271

(Source and footnotes on following page)

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(Source and footnotes to table)

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament (New York, Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 56 and 57 (table 2A.3).

a/ All British tests from 1962 have been conducted jointly with the United States at the Nevada Test Site. Therefore, the number of United States tests is actually higher than indicated here.

b/ One more test was conducted this year, but it did not cause any detonation.

c/ Five devices used simultaneously in the same test are counted here as one explosion.

d/ Three devices used simultaneously in the same test are counted here as one explosion.

e/ Two of these tests may have been conducted in 1975 or 1976.

f/ This explosion may have been conducted underground.

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C. United Nations General Assembly resolutions relevant to the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and a moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing

36. The complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests has been a prime objective of the General Assembly of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The question has been considered by the General Assembly every year since 1954. Since 1957, it has been a separate item on the agenda of the Assembly. The Assembly has adopted some 70 resolutions related to nuclear-weapon testing - far more than on any other issue of disarmament.

37. Among the early resolutions relevant to the question of nuclear testing, which were adopted by the General Assembly prior to the conclusion of the PTBT, the following should be mentioned: 913 (X), 914 (X), 1148 (XII), 1252 (XIII), 1379 (XIV), 1402 (XIV), 1577 (XV), 1578 (XV), 1632 (XVI), 1648 (XVI), 1649 (XVI), 1762 (XVII).

38. Following the conclusion of the PTBT in 1963 (see para. 23 above), the General Assembly, by resolution 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, noted the Treaty with approval and requested the CCD to continue negotiations for a comprehensive test ban. After the conclusion of the PTBT, efforts were directed towards achieving a comprehensive test ban. Debates in the General Assembly have reflected continuing disagreement regarding the way a test-ban objective might best be achieved.

39. Since 1965, the General Assembly has annually adopted resolutions on the subject of nuclear testing, including the following: 2032 (XX), 2163 (XXI), 2343 (XXII), 2455 (XXIII), 2604 (XXIV), 2663 (XXV), 2828 (XXVI), 2934 (XXVII), 3078 (XXVIII), 3257 (XXIX) and 3478 (XXX). Most resolutions adopted by the General Assembly over the last 15 years on the issue of nuclear testing have called for action on the part of the Geneva negotiating multilateral body (see paras. 40 to 42 below); others, since 1985, have envisaged the possibility of converting the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive instrument (see paras. 1 to 11 above). The General Assembly has also adopted resolutions calling for notification of nuclear tests (see para. 42 below).

40. With regard to action by the Geneva negotiating body, the General Assembly has adopted a number of resolutions, originally initiated by Mexico and Sweden under the agenda item entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions". 35/ By these resolutions, the General Assembly, inter alia, reiterated its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continued unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States; reaffirmed its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time was a matter of the highest priority; reaffirmed its conviction that such a treaty would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race; urged once more all nuclear-weapon States, in particular the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to expedite negotiations to that end; repeatedly appealed to all members of the Conference on Disarmament to promote the establishment by the Conference of an ad hoc committee with the

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objective of carrying out multilateral negotiations of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions.

41. By another series of resolutions, initiated by Australia and New Zealand under the agenda item entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty", 36/ the General Assembly, inter alia, urged the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban, to intensify its consideration of that question and to initiate substantive work on all its aspects. Furthermore, States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and all other States should co-operate in order to facilitate and promote such work; the nuclear-weapon States, especially those possessing the most important nuclear arsenals, were urged to agree promptly to appropriate verifiable and militarily significant interim measures, with a view to realizing a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; and those nuclear-weapon States which had not yet done so should adhere to the partial test-ban Treaty. Finally, the Conference on Disarmament was urged to take immediate steps for the establishment, with the widest possible participation, of an international seismic monitoring network with a view to the further development of its potential to monitor and verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

42. Between 1982 and 1987, the General Assembly, under the agenda item entitled "Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", adopted resolutions initiated by the Soviet Union and/or Hungary. 37/ By those resolutions, the General Assembly, taking note of the "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", 38/ inter alia, urged the Conference on Disarmament to proceed promptly to negotiations on all aspects of a multilateral treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, including adequate measures of verification, with the aim of preparing without delay a draft treaty that would effectively ban all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States everywhere and would contain provisions, acceptable to all, preventing the circumvention of such a ban by means of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; urged all States, especially all nuclear-weapon States, to exert maximum efforts and exercise political will for the elaboration and conclusion of such a treaty.

43. In 1986 and 1987, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 39/ initiated by Australia. By those resolutions, the General Assembly, inter alia, called upon each of the States conducting nuclear explosions to provide to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within one week of each nuclear explosion, the geological characteristics of the site of the explosion and the estimated yield of the explosion. Furthermore, it invited all other States to provide to the Secretary-General any such data on nuclear explosions they might have available. The Secretary-General, in accordance with these resolutions, makes available to all Member States the information received and submits to the General Assembly annually a register of the information provided on nuclear explosions during the preceding 12-month period.

44. A large number of General Assembly resolutions specifically dealt with the issue of a moratorium, including the following: 1252 A (XIII); 1402 A and B (XIV); 1577 (XV) and 1578 (XV); 1648 (XVI); 1762 A (XVII); 2163 (XXI); 2343 (XXII);

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2455 (XXIII); 2604 B (XXIV); 2663 B (XXV); 2828 B and C (XXVI); 2934 (XXVII); 3078 A (XXVIII); 3257 (XXIX); 3466 (XXX); 31/66, 32/78; 33/60; 33/71 C; 34/73; 35/145 A; 36/84; 37/72 and 37/85; 38/62 and 38/72; 39/52 and 39/60; 40/80 A and 40/88; 41/46 A and 41/54; 42/26 A; 43/63 A; 44/105.

D. Multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements and other initiatives related to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban

45. In the partial test-ban Treaty, the States parties expressed their determination to pursue further negotiations aimed at the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons in all environments for all time. At the multilateral level, the matter was dealt with in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors. The Soviet Union and the United States for their part also conducted bilateral negotiations. There were also tripartite negotiations among the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. These negotiations have in some cases led to agreement (multilateral, regional or bilateral) as recorded below.

1. Multilateral agreements

46. (a) The Antarctic Treaty (1959)

Article I reads as follows:

"1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapons."

(b) Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (partial test-ban Treaty) (1963)

The preamble and articles I and II of the Treaty read as follows:

"The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the 'Original Parties',

"Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

"Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

/...

"Have agreed as follows:

"Article I

"1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear-weapon-test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

"(a) In the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or

"(b) In any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

"2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear-weapon-test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article.

"Article II

"1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such amendment.

"2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the Original Parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the Original Parties."

(c) Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (non-proliferation Treaty) (1968)

The tenth preambular paragraph reads as follows:

"Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,"

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Article VI reads as follows:

"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

(d) Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (sea-bed Treaty) (1971)

Article I, paragraph 1, of the Treaty reads as follows:

"1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a sea-bed zone, as defined in article II, any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons."

(e) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (outer space Treaty) (1967)

Article IV, second paragraph, reads as follows:

"The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited."

(f) Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Agreement on celestial bodies) (1979)

Article 3, paragraph 4, reads as follows:

"4. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on the moon shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration and use of the moon shall also not be prohibited."

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2. Regional agreements

47. (a) Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) (1967)

Article 1, subparagraph 1 (a) and paragraph 2, read as follows:

"1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories:

"(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way,

"...

"2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon."

(b) South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) (1985)

Article 6 reads as follows:

"Each Party undertakes:

"(a) To prevent in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device;

"(b) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State."

3. Bilateral and trilateral agreements and activities

48. As a result of their bilateral negotiations on the banning of all nuclear testing, the Soviet Union and the United States, in 1974, signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (threshold test-ban Treaty - TTBT). The Treaty prohibits any underground nuclear-weapon test having a yield in excess of 150 kilotons and restricts testing to specified areas. Each party agreed to use its national technical means of verification and not to interfere with the means of verification of the other party. The parties also agreed to exchange information necessary to improve the assessments of the yields of explosions. In 1976 the two States signed the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNET). This Treaty regulates the explosions which they might conduct outside their nuclear-weapon test sites and which may, therefore, be presumed to be for peaceful purposes. Both Treaties established a yield threshold of 150 kilotons for individual nuclear explosions. The Treaties were not ratified because of differences over the verification provisions, but since 1987 the United States and the Soviet Union have negotiated new verification protocols. The Protocols were

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signed in June 1990, thus paving the way for the approval of both Treaties by the legislative bodies of the United States and the USSR. In spite of their arms regulation features, critical observations have been made about the Treaties by a number of Member States on the ground that the threshold level is too high and would not contribute to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, that the threshold exceeds by many times the verification capabilities, and both Treaties assume the continuation of nuclear tests.

49. In addition to the tripartite talks described in paragraphs 16 to 20 above, between 1977 and 1980 trilateral negotiations were held among the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to negotiating a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and a protocol covering peaceful nuclear explosions. A progress report on the trilateral negotiations was submitted to the then Committee on Disarmament on 30 July 1980 40/ and resubmitted by the three negotiating parties at the Second Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty. 41/ In the report, the three negotiating Powers recorded that considerable progress had been made in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty and provided information on the scope of the treaty, the provision of verification procedures and an accompanying protocol on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. According to the report, the negotiating parties, inter alia, agreed that the treaty would require each party to prohibit, prevent and not to carry out any nuclear-weapon-test explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control in any environment, and to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear-weapon-test explosion anywhere. The three negotiating parties were determined, they stated, to exert their best efforts and the necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion. The negotiations were not continued, however, after 1980.

50. On 20 July 1982, the United States stated that it was not prepared to resume the trilateral negotiations. Nuclear-weapon testing, it explained, was vital to the security of the United States in order to maintain confidence in its nuclear deterrent. The United States reaffirmed that concluding a comprehensive test ban remained its long-term goal and stated its belief that such a ban should be considered in the context of broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures and improved verification capabilities.

51. From July 1986 to July 1987, USSR/United States expert meetings on nuclear-testing issues took place at Geneva. In November 1987, the two sides began actual negotiations on nuclear testing. They agreed to conduct those negotiations on a stage-by-stage basis, with the aim of reaching agreement, as a first step, on verification measures to make possible a ratification of the 1974 and 1976 test limitation Treaties (see para. 48 above). Thereafter, they would proceed to negotiate further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing, leading ultimately to its complete cessation as part of an effective disarmament process.

52. The Soviet Union, beginning on 6 August 1985, unilaterally halted all its nuclear testing until 1 January 1986 and called upon the United States to do so as well. The Soviet moratorium, subsequently renewed four times, was maintained for a period totalling 18 months, until February 1987. The United States, however, together with some other countries, did not accept the idea of an unverified,

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unilateral, revocable moratorium. The United States in particular has continued to regard the agreed reduction of numbers of nuclear weapons on the basis of verifiable, binding treaties as a more urgent issue than a comprehensive test ban.

53. A number of proposals, ideas and other initiatives by individual States as well as by various groups of States relating to a comprehensive test ban were put forward over the years. Among them were:

- "Draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" submitted by the Soviet Union in 1975, amended in 1976, and resubmitted, as amended, in 1977; 42/
- "Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Test Explosions in all Environments" submitted by Sweden in 1977; 43/
- "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", submitted to the General Assembly by the Soviet Union in 1982; 44/
- "Draft treaty banning any nuclear-weapon test explosion in any environment", submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by Sweden in 1983; 45/
- "Documents of the parties to the Six-Nation Initiative (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania); the Joint Declaration of May 1984; 46/ the Delhi Declaration of January 1985; 47/ the Mexico Declaration of August 1986; 48/ and the Stockholm Declaration of January 1988; 49/
- "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" (new version), submitted to the Conference on Disarmament by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States in 1987; 50/
- "Action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order", submitted by India to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session in 1988. 51/

E. 1980 report of the Secretary-General on a comprehensive test ban

54. Following the adoption of General Assembly decision 34/422 of 11 December 1979, the Secretary-General prepared, with the assistance of consultant experts, a study on the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, and pursuant to the decision, submitted it to the Committee on Disarmament, at its spring session of 1980, and subsequently to the General Assembly itself. 52/

55. The report gave a background summary of the development of the issue, described the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty

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and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the deliberations and negotiations in the General Assembly and in negotiating bodies from 1963 to 1979, as well as the trilateral negotiations of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States on a comprehensive test ban, held between 1977 and 1979. The report also discussed the major unresolved issues, inter alia, the verification, scope and duration of a comprehensive test ban.

56. The experts concluded, inter alia, that it was essential to intensify negotiations in order to achieve a comprehensive test ban. They also agreed that a comprehensive test ban could serve as an important measure of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertical and horizontal, and that verification of compliance no longer seemed to be an obstacle to reaching agreement. They further noted that, in the view of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, a comprehensive test ban would reinforce that Treaty by demonstrating the awareness of the major nuclear Powers of the legal obligation under article VI of the Treaty, and that the benefits of a comprehensive test ban for arms limitation could be enhanced if it were followed by restrictions on the qualitative improvements of nuclear delivery vehicles.

III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN FOR:

A. The nuclear-arms race and the development of new weapon systems that involve nuclear testing, including those for outer space

57. The question of the impact that a comprehensive test ban would have on the nuclear-arms race and particularly on the development of new types of nuclear weapons is one of the most controversial issues regarding a nuclear-test ban. One reason why States are so divided on this problem is rooted in the different security perceptions of individual States. Nuclear-weapon testing has continued since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty because certain States have felt that, in the existing circumstances, the security interests of those States are promoted by developing new weapons, further refining existing ones, confirming the effectiveness of their stocks, and enhancing the safety and security features of nuclear weapons. Those States regard the agreed reduction of numbers of nuclear weapons on the basis of negotiated, binding treaties as a more urgent issue than a comprehensive test ban. Nevertheless, the great majority of States consider a comprehensive nuclear-test ban as the key to halting the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and to progressive nuclear disarmament. In brief, the continued testing of nuclear weapons remains a major unresolved issue. In this connection, the view has also been expressed that the state of stockpiled nuclear weapons can be checked without nuclear testing.

58. The divergence of views among various States and groups of States on the impact that a nuclear-test ban would have on the nuclear-arms race has also characterized the work of the Conference on Disarmament, where the multilateral efforts towards a nuclear-test ban have mainly centred. In 1982, 1983 and again in 1990, the Conference on Disarmament established a subsidiary body on a test ban, but entrusted it with only a limited, non-negotiating mandate.

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59. Over the years, in the Conference on Disarmament, members of the Group of 21 (mostly neutral and non-aligned countries) have continued to attach the utmost importance to the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons as well as of reversing the nuclear-arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. Commenting on the negotiations between the two major nuclear-weapon States on nuclear testing on a stage-by-stage basis, they reiterated their view that the existing bilateral thresholds did not preclude the modernization of nuclear weapons and thus failed to contribute to the cessation of the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. Rather than verifying those thresholds, what was required, in their view, was that all nuclear tests be prohibited. Intermediate agreements to limit testing would have a useful purpose only if they served to curb the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and constituted steps towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

60. Members of the Group of Eastern European and other States continued to regard the earliest elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests among the most urgent and significant measures for halting the nuclear-arms race and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They expressed their conviction that a prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests was the key to halting the nuclear-arms race and to checking considerably the refinement of nuclear weapons, thus bringing closer the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

61. The USSR, in particular, repeatedly stressed its continued commitment to an early achievement of a comprehensive test ban and its readiness to use all possibilities leading to that objective, and believed that a step-by-step approach to the achievement of a comprehensive ban was justifiable. In the First Committee of the General Assembly, at its forty-fifth session, the Soviet Union stated that it had reviewed its programme of nuclear testing, reducing the number and yield of explosions, and had not conducted any tests since October 1989. The Soviet Union was prepared to extend the 12-month pause in nuclear testing for ever, if the United States would join in that move. ^{53/} Subsequently, on 24 October 1990, the Soviet Union announced that it had carried out an underground nuclear test on that date, its first in a year.

62. The United States has repeatedly affirmed that a comprehensive test ban remains its long-term objective, to be seen in the context of a time when it is no longer necessary to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability. In its view, the following is needed before agreement on a comprehensive ban can be reached: broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions; greatly improved verification capabilities; expanded confidence-building measures and greater balance in conventional forces. Until that had been achieved, nuclear weapons would continue to play a critical role in its national security strategy and a sensible test programme ensuring the credibility and safety of its forces would be required. In that context, the United States has not identified any further limitations on nuclear testing, beyond those now contained in the TTBT, that would be in its national security interest. ^{54/} In a statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly, on 16 October 1990, the United States noted that

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the verification protocols to the threshold test ban Treaty and peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty had been signed by the Presidents of the United States and the USSR and that the United States Senate had given its advice and consent to their ratification. In reiterating its testing policy, the United States further stated: "As we put into practice the new verification protocols, the United States will be ready to propose negotiations on possible further nuclear testing limitations that make sense from a national security standpoint, contribute to stability, and still permit the certainty of a reliable, safe, and effective deterrent. The President is firm in his commitment to the step-by-step process and to a comprehensive test ban as a long-term objective of the United States. We are convinced, however, that as long as the United States must rely upon nuclear weapons for deterrence, we must also have a sensible test programme. The United States must test nuclear weapons to ensure that we will always meet the highest safety, security and reliability standards. To do otherwise would create uncertainty about our stockpile and could render us unable to make security, safety or survivability improvements. This would erode stability, not enhance it." 55/

63. The United Kingdom maintains the view that its security will depend for the foreseeable future on deterrence based, in part, on nuclear weapons, making it necessary to conduct underground nuclear tests to ensure that its nuclear weapons remained effective and up to date. In the view of the United Kingdom, a comprehensive test ban remains a long-term goal, while an immediate move to a comprehensive test ban would be premature - even destabilizing. 56/ The complete cessation of nuclear testing should occur as part of an effective disarmament process which should pursue as a first priority deep and verifiable reductions in the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons. 57/

64. France holds that international commitments in the field of nuclear testing can be considered only in the overall context of nuclear disarmament and has stressed that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing is not a pre-condition for progress towards nuclear disarmament but, on the contrary, could become significant at the end of a long-term process resulting in real and effective nuclear disarmament. France has emphasized that it could not agree to the obsolescence of its limited nuclear deterrent and that only the nuclear explosions necessary to maintain its credibility have been conducted. France has also stressed that, in the context of deep reductions of nuclear weapons, the problem of reliability of the remaining weapons would only become more important. 58/

65. China has repeatedly stressed that it has always stood for a comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, including the cessation of nuclear tests, and that it would be prepared to take corresponding measures in the process of cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in which the two States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead in halting the development, production and deployment of all nuclear weapons and drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals. 59/

66. The 1980 United Nations study on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban (see sect. II.E above), in its conclusions, regarded a comprehensive test ban "as the first and most urgent step towards a cessation of the nuclear-arms race, in particular, as regards its qualitative aspects". 60/ According to the study, a

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comprehensive test ban would have a major arms limitation impact in that it would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty to develop new designs of nuclear weapons and would also place constraints on the modification of existing weapon designs. 61/ The 1980 United Nations study also noted:

"97. On the occasion of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, the CCD, at the request of the General Assembly, submitted a special report on the state of the various questions under consideration by the Committee, including the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. In the report, the CCD stated that 'the Committee's highest priority remains the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban'."

67. The subject was also discussed in the 1980 United Nations Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons. 62/ The experts stated, in paragraph 86 of the study, that a clear understanding of the influence nuclear-weapon tests might have on the future development of warheads was crucial to efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban. They recalled, in paragraph 87, the view emphasized in particular by the United States that the purposes for which nuclear tests were conducted included: improvement of yield-to-weight ratios; reduction of warhead cost and special nuclear material and consumption; enhancement of warhead safety; increase of weapon control to prevent unauthorized use; tailoring of weapons effects to specific military needs; understanding of long-term chemical and structural stability.

68. The study then continued:

"89. Those favouring a comprehensive test ban claim that it will impede the evolution of nuclear-weapon technology among the existing nuclear Powers, contribute to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations which do not now possess them and generally de-emphasize nuclear weaponry.

"90. Those opposing a comprehensive test ban argue that nuclear stockpiles would become less reliable, and that one would have to forgo nuclear-weapon developments leading to nuclear weapons which are safer against accident and more controllable. The view is also expressed that the nuclear-weapon Powers would need to continue to test in order to stay ahead of those nuclear Powers that have not signed the partial test-ban treaty.

"91. It might be technically possible for a nuclear-weapon Power to maintain a stockpile (without improving it) by non-nuclear testing and remanufacture of components which age, corrode or otherwise become unacceptable for use in the stockpile. Still, as long as nuclear weapons exist, there would be pressures for changes in the stockpiles that may require nuclear-weapon testing.

"92. From the discussion above, one may conclude that a comprehensive test ban would make more difficult the continued development of sophisticated weapons within the established nuclear Powers and thus have an inhibiting effect on the arms race."

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69. According to the 1989 United Nations study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditures: 63/

"26. The modernization of nuclear weapons is based on technical innovations which require the testing of nuclear explosives and their delivery vehicles. Nuclear-weapon tests are also said to be needed to maintain and confirm the reliability of existing warheads. ..."

70. On the same subject, the 1990 United Nations comprehensive study on nuclear weapons 64/ stated:

"235. ... It is probable that a workable first-generation fission weapon could be developed without testing, although it is uncertain how reliable this device would be. The Hiroshima bomb was not tested, and design and construction may well be easier today with the use of supercomputers. To develop advanced nuclear weapons, such as fusion weapons, would, however, require testing."

71. On the relationship between nuclear testing and the continued development of warheads, the study points out the following:

"236. The testing of nuclear warheads is a critical element in the production of nuclear weapons, because each new type of nuclear weapon typically requires the development of a new warhead. It is believed that most testing is done to develop specific new warheads, with half a dozen explosions required to develop a brand new design. Further tests are conducted to check weapons as they come off the production line, and also for their reliability when they reach the stockpile. Nuclear-test explosions are also used to research new kinds of nuclear weapons. 'Weapons effects' tests are also carried out to measure the effect of radiation on military equipment. Most details of nuclear tests are kept secret."

"239. The nuclear-weapon States have based their decisions to develop new nuclear weapons, upgrade and test new nuclear-weapon systems on the following grounds: to ensure effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent by continued modernization of the nuclear stockpiles; to allow the nuclear Powers to subject command and control equipment to nuclear effects; to permit development of smaller warheads with potentially limited collateral effects.

"240. The nuclear-weapon States have used testing to amass a vast amount of weapons expertise and a wide range of nuclear weapons. They feel that nuclear weapons must be tested if they are to remain credible. While some nuclear explosions have been used to test trigger and safety mechanisms, many nuclear warhead components can be tested without an explosion."

"471. Since nuclear testing is an inherent part of the process of development of nuclear weapons, many States have given highest priority to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban (CTB), i.e. a prohibition of all tests, in all environments. They point out that such a ban would introduce uncertainties in the qualitative development of nuclear weapons that would make the development of

these weapons more difficult; that it would also largely prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by States that do not have them; and that it would therefore contribute to the goal of nuclear non-proliferation. Nuclear-weapon States, with the exception of the Soviet Union, are not prepared to accept a nuclear-test ban, because they assess nuclear testing as essential for the credibility, reliability and survivability of their nuclear deterrent forces."

72. In its conclusions, the study states:

"523. Most countries in the world consider that an early end to nuclear testing by all States in all environments would be an essential step towards preventing the qualitative improvement and the development of new nuclear weapons and would also contribute to the goal of non-proliferation. Most nuclear-weapon States consider that reliance on nuclear weapons for their security requires their continued testing and do not agree that a comprehensive test ban is an urgent necessity."

73. The question of preventing an arms race in outer space has been a major concern both within and outside the United Nations. The issue was included as a separate item on the agenda of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, in 1981. Since 1983, it has been possible to merge the ideas presented by various Member States and to adopt one resolution annually on the subject. 65/ The item of the prevention of an arms race in outer space has also been considered in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). There continues to be general recognition in the Ad Hoc Committee of the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and readiness to contribute to that common objective. According to the CD report to the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the Committee continued its examination of existing proposals and gave preliminary consideration to a number of new proposals and initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and ensuring that its exploration and use will be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes in the common interest and for the benefit of all mankind. 66/

74. The implication of a comprehensive test ban for the development of new weapons systems for outer space has mainly been considered in connection with one component of the United States Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) programme, the X-ray laser. According to the research report Disarmament: Problems related to Outer Space, prepared by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in 1987, 67/ the X-ray laser is a laser weapon pumped by a nuclear explosion. In contrast to optical lasers, which derive their beam energy from the stimulated release of energy stored in excited atoms or molecules, the radiative energy emitted by an X-ray laser originates from excited states in the shell structure of the nuclei of atoms, such as excited states in the high-energy K and L shells of atoms. According to academic sources, the pumping of X-ray lasers requires very intense radiation like that emitted from a nuclear explosion. 68/

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B. The environment, including social and economic aspects

75. Besides political and security considerations, it was above all anxiety about the effects of radioactive contamination that spurred world-wide efforts aimed at the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests almost four decades ago. Radioactive materials from atmospheric testing occasionally caused strong local contamination and were also distributed globally. Except for a few underwater tests, the early tests were carried out in the atmosphere. However, since the signing of the PTBT, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States have not conducted atmospheric tests. France continued to carry out atmospheric tests on French territory in the South Pacific till 1974, when it changed to underground testing only. China ended atmospheric testing in 1980.

76. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), established in 1955 on the initiative of India, throughout the years has studied the short-term and long-term effects of radiation upon man and his environment and has periodically reported to the General Assembly.

77. Referring to underground tests, the 1980 United Nations Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons 69/ stated:

"261. When a nuclear device detonates underground an almost spherical cavity is formed and at somewhat larger distance the rock is cracked. The radius of the crack zone depends on the explosion yield and the properties of the surrounding rock, but is of the order of a few hundred metres. At larger distances the only effects of a fully contained underground nuclear explosion are the outgoing seismic waves. Close to an explosion, these signals can be quite strong but they decrease rapidly with increasing distance from the explosion point. Even from large explosions, seismic signals at great distances are smaller than those generated by earthquakes occurring several times a week in various parts of the world. Thus, there is no evidence that underground nuclear explosions have initiated any earthquakes in areas at great distances from the explosion point. Neither is there any physical process suggested by which such triggering could be possible. The seismic effects of underground nuclear explosions are confined to a fairly limited area around the explosion point, and there is no evidence that such explosions could generate secondary events in other areas.

"262. If an underground nuclear explosion takes place comparatively close to the surface, the explosion might break through the surface and release some of the radioactive fission products into the atmosphere. A few cases of such 'venting', of such a magnitude that it could be detected outside the borders of the country where the test was conducted, did occur during the first years of underground testing. Underground test explosions in later years seem to have been contained to a higher degree, although of course any leak would contribute slightly to the total radioactive contamination of the biosphere."

78. In a report entitled "Protection of nature from the pernicious effects of the arms race" prepared by the Secretary-General for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, 70/ it is stated that "the testing of

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nuclear weapons has seriously contaminated the atmosphere with radioactive materials and has damaged significant areas of desert. Detonation of weapons in the 10 kiloton range causes complete or severe destruction of vegetation over some 400 to 1,300 hectares." The report recommended, inter alia, the possibility of developing a comprehensive nuclear-test ban by all States as a means of ensuring security against major destruction of the environment.

79. On the subject of physical, medical and environmental effects of testing, the 1990 United Nations comprehensive study on nuclear weapons 71/ states:

"273. The effects of underground testing depend on the yield and depth of the blast as well as the geological character of the test site. The bulk of the radioactive debris is trapped within vitrified rock, which is formed in the explosion chamber during the test. Immediate releases of radioactive substances can occur by the venting of gas to the surface through the shattered rock above the chamber. While it is normal for rigorous safety precautions to be in force at underground test sites, instances of venting, of varying seriousness, have occurred. The health of test site workers, who work in close proximity to a range of radiation hazards, is closely monitored.

"274. For testing to be safe in the longer term, rock formations at test sites must be sound enough to prevent the leakage of high-grade radioactive material into the ground water over several thousand years. Critical factors include the leachability of the radioactive waste, the flow rate of the ground water, the absorption character of surrounding rock and the isolation of the site itself. Scientific studies have reached various conclusions on the likelihood and severity of future leakages. However, there is a natural and widespread concern that test sites may not prove able to contain radioactive waste and that serious leaks could have environmental and medical consequences.

"275. Underground nuclear tests also produce geological disturbances. The underground cavity formed by the explosion soon collapses, causing some surface disturbance. Seismic waves from the blast may affect the whole test site, adding to concerns about its long-term integrity and causing other damage in some cases, such as marine landslides. Small seismic waves can be detected from great distances. However, underground nuclear tests are not thought to trigger larger earthquakes."

C. All aspects of the proliferation of nuclear weapons

80. The tenth preambular paragraph of the non-proliferation Treaty reads as follows:

"Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, ...".

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Thus, there is a high degree of similarity between that paragraph and the second preambular paragraph of the partial test-ban Treaty. In addition, article I of the partial test-ban Treaty states that the parties seek to achieve the conclusion of "a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions".

81. The relationship between a comprehensive test ban and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was extensively discussed at all four review conferences for the non-proliferation Treaty that have taken place so far. In the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference, 72/ held in 1975, the relevant paragraph reads as follows:

"The Conference affirms the determination expressed in the preamble to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and reiterated in the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The Conference expresses the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. It expresses the hope that the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty will take the lead in reaching an early solution of the technical and political difficulties on this issue. It appeals to these States to make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban. To this end, the desire was expressed by a considerable number of delegations at the Conference that the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty should as soon as possible enter into an agreement, open to all States and containing appropriate provisions to ensure its effectiveness, to halt all nuclear weapon tests of adhering States for a specified time, whereupon the terms of such an agreement would be reviewed in the light of the opportunity, at that time, to achieve a universal and permanent cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. The Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States signatories of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, meanwhile, to limit the number of their underground nuclear weapons tests to a minimum. The Conference believes that such steps would constitute an incentive of particular value to negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons test explosions for all time."

82. The Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference, 73/ held in 1985, contains, under "Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8-12", section B, the following paragraphs referring to a nuclear-test ban:

"5. The Conference reaffirms the determination expressed in the preamble of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, confirmed in Article I (b) of the said Treaty and reiterated in preambular paragraph 10 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

"6. The Conference also recalls that in the Final Document of the First Review Conference, the Parties expressed the view that the conclusion of a Treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests was one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. The Conference stresses the important contribution that such a treaty would make toward strengthening and extending

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the international barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons; it further stresses that adherence to such a treaty by all States would contribute substantially to the full achievement of the non-proliferation objective."

"12. ... The Conference except for certain States whose views are reflected in the following subparagraph deeply regretted that a comprehensive multilateral Nuclear Test Ban Treaty banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time had not been concluded so far and, therefore, called on the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and called on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such a Treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament.

"At the same time, the Conference noted that certain States Party to the Treaty, while committed to the goal of an effectively verifiable comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, considered deep and verifiable reductions in existing arsenals of nuclear weapons as the highest priority in the process of pursuing the objectives of Article VI.

"The Conference also noted the statement of the USSR, as one of the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty, recalling its repeatedly expressed readiness to proceed forthwith to negotiations, trilateral and multilateral, with the aim of concluding a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the submission by it of a draft Treaty proposal to this end."

83. At the Second and Fourth NPT Review Conferences, in 1980 and 1990, respectively, a thorough exchange of views on progress towards fulfilment of the Treaty's objectives was held. 74/ Neither Review Conference was able, however, to agree on a final declaration.

84. When the non-proliferation Treaty entered into force, on 5 March 1970, the Secretary-General of the United Nations made an appeal for action to contribute to the universality of the Treaty. He also made clear that the Treaty must not be viewed as an end in itself, but as a step towards disarmament. In the course of the 20 years since the entry into force of the Treaty, concerns have arisen with regard to realizing the purposes enunciated in its preamble and substantive provisions. The main divergences of opinion have concerned the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. In general, the non-nuclear parties have stressed the need to strengthen the non-proliferation régime through conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and through nuclear disarmament. The Depositary Governments have, for their part, drawn attention to their efforts on a number of issues, including drastic reductions in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The strong convergence of the interest of the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States in checking the further spread of nuclear weapons has so far helped the parties to maintain a positive view of the fundamental aims of the Treaty, and of the possibility of fully achieving its basic objectives.

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D. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

85. Within the framework of the consideration of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban the question of peaceful nuclear explosions has been discussed in a number of deliberating and negotiating bodies within the United Nations framework. The problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes arises because it seems not to be possible to develop nuclear explosive devices which would be capable only of peaceful application, and in practice it would be extremely difficult to differentiate between a nuclear-weapon test and a peaceful nuclear explosion. Therefore, it is generally felt that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would have to contain provisions, acceptable to all, which would prevent the circumvention of the nuclear-weapon-test ban by means of explosions for peaceful purposes.

86. Referring to the issue of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the research report The Verification Issue in United Nations Disarmament Negotiations, 75/ prepared by UNIDIR in 1987, states the following:

"The question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes remains to be resolved. The question involved is what system of control might be established to prevent military benefit from accruing to a State conducting peaceful nuclear explosions. The Soviet Union has stated that a comprehensive test ban treaty must contain provisions allowing peaceful nuclear explosions. There would be a moratorium on such explosions until procedures for conducting them could be agreed upon. The United States and other countries have argued that they do not see how a nation could be prevented from deriving military benefit from these explosions and have asked those nations which support their inclusion to present their views on this question. If no means are found to prevent military benefits from accruing to a State conducting peaceful nuclear explosions, the objectives of a comprehensive test ban could be circumvented by nations conducting military tests under the guise of peaceful nuclear explosions."

87. In 1975 the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) established an intergovernmental Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. The Group elaborated a list of principles or matters to be considered in formulating international arrangements for providing nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the form of four main alternative international legal instruments for providing PNEs. 76/ The Advisory Group has not met since then. It could be reconvened at any time that new developments or requests by Member States made this appropriate. According to IAEA, no requests for PNE-related services have been received by the Agency, nor has the Agency been informed of any requests directed to those States parties to the NPT which possess nuclear explosive devices for PNE-related services. 77/

88. Article V of the non-proliferation Treaty explicitly calls on the parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty. However, as the Third Review Conference to the non-proliferation Treaty in 1985 stated, the potential benefits

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of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions have not been demonstrated. So far, no requests for services related to the peaceful application of nuclear explosions have been made by any non-nuclear State party to the non-proliferation Treaty.

89. In a recent statement, the United States noted that during the previous five years it had not conducted any nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. ^{78/} The Soviet Union declared that it remained ready to carry out its obligations under article V of the non-proliferation Treaty; it believed in that respect that IAEA was the international organ through which services connected with peaceful nuclear explosions could be made available under appropriate international observation. However, for economic and environmental reasons, interest in receiving such services had decreased during recent years. ^{79/} The United Kingdom stated that it had not detonated any nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes and saw no useful role for peaceful nuclear explosions, as any benefit could be achieved in other ways. ^{80/}

90. The Conference on Disarmament has occasionally considered the implications of peaceful nuclear explosions and other relevant matters, primarily in the context of a comprehensive test ban. The main questions continue to be (a) whether the carrying out of a peaceful nuclear explosions programme by a non-nuclear-weapon State is compatible with the objective of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, and (b) whether a comprehensive test ban should ban nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

91. A number of proposals and ideas for comprehensive nuclear-test ban, put forward by various Member States in the past - including the report on the trilateral negotiations between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom held between 1977 and 1980 (see para. 49 above) - referred to the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In the course of the trilateral negotiations, the three parties agreed that the comprehensive test-ban treaty would be accompanied by a protocol on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would be an integral part of the treaty and would take into account the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In the protocol, the parties would establish a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Without delay after entry into force of the treaty, the parties would keep under consideration the subject of arrangements for conducting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which could be made effective by appropriate amendments to the protocol.

92. The basic provisions of a CTBT proposed by the Soviet Union in 1982 and in 1987 and a draft treaty proposed by Sweden in 1983 also refer to the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. They suggest that arrangements concerning peaceful nuclear explosions might take the form of a special agreement - possibly a protocol - or agreements constituting an integral part of a CTBT. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), which entered into force in 1986, is the first international treaty specifically banning peaceful nuclear explosions.

IV. VERIFICATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

93. Throughout the years, the verification issue has figured prominently in all deliberations and negotiations on the subject of a nuclear test ban. The 1990 United Nations comprehensive study on nuclear weapons, 81/ referring to the verification issue, states:

"479. The verification aspects of a comprehensive test ban have received considerable attention. A variety of means, including satellite data and radiation monitoring, have allowed the international community to verify adherence to the ban on atmospheric tests. Underground testing has traditionally been monitored using seismic techniques although other techniques have been devised as a complement. Efforts are being made in the Conference on Disarmament to design a global seismic network for acquisition and exchange of data. Many believe that seismic monitoring, backed up by other methods, could detect and identify tests down to very low yields (1-2 kilotons) and that this testing threshold would impose severe constraints on nuclear-weapons development. However, there is some concern that no verification system would be able to detect sub-kiloton explosions."

94. In the concluding part of the study it is stated:

"524. The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to continue to co-operate in the field of monitoring nuclear-weapon tests. Multilateral and bilateral efforts to perfect verification methods for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban are important for achieving the ultimate complete cessation of such tests."

95. According to the 1987 UNIDIR research report The Verification Issue in United Nations Disarmament Negotiations, 82/ the main verification problem to be resolved was the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions. On the subject it stated:

"The verification methods that have been proposed to resolve this problem are: national technical means, principally seismic monitoring, but also including the possible use of satellite surveillance and monitoring of hydroacoustic waves and airborne radioactivity; the establishment of an international seismic data exchange; the establishment of a system for the international exchange of data on airborne radioactivity; the use of tamper-proof automatic seismic stations, or 'black boxes'; and on-site inspection, either voluntary, on-challenge, or mandatory."

96. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has also touched upon the question of verification of a nuclear-test ban. In 1988, in his statement at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, he stressed that, with international co-operation, the technological revolution, instead of being applied to the development of ever more sophisticated weapons, could be made available for peaceful objectives, such as arms limitations and disarmament agreements. In this area, he stated, the United Nations might be able to make an important contribution. At the request of the General Assembly, an expert study

has now been completed on the question of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. 83/ The study suggests, inter alia, that the United Nations involvement in verification should be an evolutionary process and that the United Nations will need to address the multilateral aspects of verification with increasing attention.

97. In the course of their trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty (see para. 49 above), the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed that a variety of verification measures should be provided to enhance confidence that all parties to the treaty were in strict compliance with it. It was agreed that the parties would use national technical means of verification at their disposal, in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, to verify compliance with the treaty, and that each party would undertake not to interfere with such means of verification. The negotiating parties agreed to provisions establishing an international exchange of seismic data which would be transmitted through the global telecommunication system of the World Meteorological Organization or through other agreed communication channels. A committee of experts would be established to consider questions related to the international seismic data exchange and also to serve as a forum in which parties to the treaty might exchange technical information and co-operate in promoting the effectiveness of the international exchange. Finally, the negotiating parties agreed to other co-operative measures, such as provisions in the treaty for direct consultations and for the exchange of inquiries and responses among parties to the treaty in order to resolve questions that might arise concerning treaty compliance. If a party had questions regarding an event on the territory of any other party, it might request an on-site inspection for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the event was a nuclear explosion.

98. The verification arrangements agreed upon in the verification protocols to the TTBT and the PNET signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in June 1990 (see para. 48 above), include hydro-dynamic yield measurement (the so-called CORTEX method), on-site inspections and seismic monitoring on the territory of the testing party as well as national technical means.

99. As was the case in the bilateral and trilateral negotiations, the question of adequate verification procedures has remained one of the major problems in the multilateral considerations of a comprehensive test ban. Over the years, a number of proposals have been made in order to solve the issue.

100. Following a proposal by Sweden, which believed that adequate means to deter any clandestine testing under an agreement could be provided by a global seismic monitoring system, the then Conference of the Committee on Disarmament set up in 1976 an ad hoc group of scientific experts to study that possibility. The mandate of the Group was to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events.

101. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events has regularly submitted progress reports to the Conference on Disarmament. Specifically, the Group has worked on:

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development of the scientific and technical aspects of a global seismic data exchange system; elaboration of instructions for experimental tests of such a system; and co-operation in the review and analysis of national investigations by States participating in the Group. Over the years, the Ad Hoc Group has systematically defined the elements of an international co-operative data exchange system and elaborated in detail its basic scientific and technical aspects.

102. In 1986, the Group reported on the results of and experience gained from the large-scale technical test conducted by it during 1984. That test, which had been termed the Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test (GSETT), had comprised exchange and analysis of parameter (Level I) data using the Global Telecommunications System of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on the regular-use basis authorized by WMO in 1983.

103. In 1989, the Group submitted a description of initial concepts for a modern international seismic data exchange system based on the expeditious exchange of waveform (Level II) and parameter (Level I) data and the processing of such data at international data centres (IDCs). The Group also finalized detailed and technical material related to the future system and agreed upon preliminary technical specifications for modern prototype "CD-Stations", able to collect and expeditiously exchange high quality waveform data from seismic events at all distances. After testing and evaluation of these preliminary specifications, this CD-Station concept could form the basic standard for stations in the global network. The Group has agreed that national data centres (NDCs) will be responsible for providing agreed seismic data to IDCs for processing according to agreed procedures, and distribution of results to all participants. Current plans are to establish a minimum of four IDCs, to be located in Canberra, Stockholm, Moscow, and Washington, D.C. The envisaged global system incorporates the concept of rapid, reliable high-capacity international data communications, using modern technology.

104. Furthermore, the Ad Hoc Group had proposed in 1986 to conduct a large-scale experiment to test the proposed concepts, in order to provide an opportunity for the Group to evaluate their performance and to make recommendations for changes to these concepts as appropriate. The initial phase of this large-scale experiment, which is called the Group of Scientific Experts' Second Technical Test (GSETT-2), was completed in 1989. The second phase of GSETT-2 started on 16 January 1990. Twenty-one countries participated in the first stage of that second phase, which lasted until 6 March 1990. Twenty-five countries participated in the 19-27 June trial test, which was undertaken as part two of a gradual build-up to the envisaged full-scale operation. The main phase of GSETT-2, involving continuous full-scale operation over an extended period of time, will be conducted during the first half of 1991.

105. In 1986, the parties to the Six-Nation Initiative (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania) circulated in the United Nations General Assembly their Mexico Declaration 84/ in which they declared their readiness to co-operate with the USSR and the United States in monitoring a nuclear-test moratorium. The proposed verification measures included the establishment of temporary monitoring stations at existing test sites, arrangements

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For utilizing existing stations in the United States and the Soviet Union for monitoring their territories outside the test sites, as well as inspections of large chemical explosions.

Notes

- 1/ For the final report of the Meeting, see PTBT/CONF/1.
- 2/ CD/852 and CD/860.
- 3/ PTBT/CONF/1.
- 4/ DC/71, annex 15.
- 5/ DC/112, annex 12, para. 1.
- 6/ Ibid., annexes 10, 3, 6 and 4, respectively.
- 7/ GEN/DNT/PV.1, pp. 25-27.
- 8/ GEN/DNT/PV.170, pp. 3-9.
- 9/ GEN/DNT/PV.188, pp. 10-14.
- 10/ GEN/DNT/PV.191, pp. 3-7.
- 11/ GEN/DNT/110.
- 12/ GEN/DNT/122.
- 13/ ENDC/28.
- 14/ ENDC/58.
- 15/ ENDC/59.
- 16/ ENDC/72.
- 17/ ENDC/PV.90, pp. 13-27.
- 18/ ENDC/94, para. 6.
- 19/ ENDC/112.
- 20/ ENDC/145.
- 21/ DC/227, annex 1, sect. F (document ENDC/159), para. 5.
- 22/ DC/228, annex 1, sect. O (document ENDC/177).

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Notes (continued)

- 23/ ENDC/165, point 4.
- 24/ ENDC/PV.381, para. 74.
- 25/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, First Committee, 1630th meeting.
- 26/ ENDC/PV.385, para. 34.
- 27/ General Assembly resolution S-10/2, paras. 45-51.
- 28/ A/40/114-S/16921, annex.
- 29/ A/41/518-S/18277, annex I.
- 30/ A/43/125-S/19478, annex.
- 31/ CCD/PV.545.
- 32/ A/39/PV.97.
- 33/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/42/1).
- 34/ See "South Africa's nuclear-tipped ballistic missile capability", report of the Secretary-General (A/45/571 and Corr.1). The views of South Africa on the subject are contained in document A/C.1/45/9.
- 35/ See, for example, resolutions 35/145 A, 36/84, 37/72, 38/62, 39/52, 40/80 A, 41/46 A, 42/26 A, 43/63 A, 44/105.
- 36/ See, for example, resolutions 31/66, 32/78, 33/60, 34/73, 35/145 B, 36/85, 37/73, 38/63, 39/53, 40/81, 41/47, 42/27, 43/64, 44/107.
- 37/ Resolutions 37/85, 38/72, 39/60, 40/88 and 41/54.
- 38/ A/37/243, annex (see also General Assembly resolution 37/85, annex).
- 39/ Resolutions 41/59 N and 42/38 C.
- 40/ CD/130.
- 41/ NPT/CONF.II/13.
- 42/ CCD/523.
- 43/ CCD/526 and Rev.1.

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Notes (continued)

- 44/ A/37/243, annex (see also General Assembly resolution 37/85, annex).
- 45/ CD/381.
- 46/ A/39/277-S/16587, annex.
- 47/ A/40/114-S/16921, annex.
- 48/ A/41/518-S/18277, annex I.
- 49/ A/43/125-S/19478, annex.
- 50/ CD/756.
- 51/ A/S-15/12.
- 52/ A/35/257.
- 53/ A/C.1/45/PV.4.
- 54/ See NPT/CONF.IV/20.
- 55/ See A/C.1/45/PV.4.
- 56/ See NPT/CONF.IV/9, para. 27.
- 57/ A/C.1/45/PV.10, p. 53.
- 58/ NPT/CONF.IV/9, para. 24.
- 59/ NPT/CONF.IV/9, para. 25.
- 60/ A/35/257, para. 152.
- 61/ Ibid., para. 156.
- 62/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.11.
- 63/ A/43/368.
- 64/ A/45/373.
- 65/ See, for example, resolutions 40/87, 41/53, 42/33, 43/70 and 44/112.
- 66/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/45/27), p. 323, para. 63.
- 67/ United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.87.0.7.

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Notes (continued)

- 68/ See B. Jasani, ed., Space Weapons - The Arms Control Dilemma (SIPRI, 1984), p. 18.
- 69/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.11.
- 70/ A/S-12/9, para. 20.
- 71/ A/45/373.
- 72/ NPT/CONF/35/I, annex I, p. 8.
- 73/ NPT/CONF.III/64/I, annex I, p. 13.
- 74/ See NPT/CONF.II/22/II and NPT/CONF.IV/...
- 75/ United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.87.0.4, p. 93.
- 76/ NPT/CONF.II/8, annex H.
- 77/ NPT/CONF.IV/14, sect. III.
- 78/ NPT/CONF.IV/20.
- 79/ NPT/CONF.IV/19.
- 80/ NPT/CONF.IV/21.
- 81/ A/45/373.
- 82/ United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.87.0.V, p. 93.
- 83/ A/45/372.
- 84/ A/41/518-S/18277, annex I.

**Amendment Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water**

PTBT/CONF/6
12 December 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

7-18 January 1991
New York

Letter dated 30 November 1990 from the Permanent Representatives
of Indonesia, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia and
the Deputy Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference

We have the honour to submit the attached draft Protocol II on the verification of the amendment proposed to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. On request of our respective Governments, the document has been prepared by a group of independent experts. We request that it be distributed as soon as possible as a document of the Amendment Conference. This preliminary draft might be revised before the beginning of the Conference in the light of comments received and it is our hope that it will be the object of careful consideration at the Conference itself.

(Signed) Nana SUTRESNA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Indonesia to the
United Nations

(Signed) Jorge MONTAÑO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Mexico to the
United Nations

(Signed) José Antonio ARROSPIDE
Minister
Deputy Permanent Representative
of Peru to the
United Nations

(Signed) Daya PERERA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Sri Lanka to the
United Nations

(Signed) Andrés AGUILAR
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Venezuela to the
United Nations

(Signed) Darko SILOVIĆ
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Yugoslavia to the
United Nations

Annex

DRAFT PROTOCOL II OF AMENDMENT TO THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON
TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER

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PROTOCOL II

PREAMBLE

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon the following measures to assist in the verification of compliance with the obligations assumed.

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Part I: Treaty institutions

Article I. The Organization

1. The Parties hereby establish an Organization for the purpose of assisting in the verification of compliance with the Treaty.
2. The Organization shall compile information and make observations pertinent to the Treaty, and shall report the information and observations to each Party to the Treaty.
3. Each Party shall co-operate fully with the Organization.
4. The principal organs of the Organization shall be the Assembly and the Secretariat.
5. Costs of the Organization shall be borne by the Parties in the same ratio as established by the annual assessment of United Nations dues, unless the Assembly, by a majority of two thirds, establishes a different schedule of charges.
6. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each Party the legal capacity and the privileges and immunities appropriate for the exercise of its functions. Representatives of the Organization and Parties' representatives to the Organization shall enjoy the privileges and immunities appropriate for the exercise of their functions.

Article II. The Assembly

1. Each Party shall be a member of the Assembly.
2. The Assembly shall meet at least once annually, and shall also meet whenever requested by the Secretary-General or by at least one tenth of the Parties.
3. The Assembly shall approve or modify the budget of the Organization.
4. The Assembly shall establish the policies and practices of the Organization.
5. The Assembly shall elect the Secretary-General for a five-year term.
6. The Assembly shall create a Technical Committee to assist in its work.
 - (a) Each member of the Assembly shall have the right to designate a representative to the Technical Committee.
 - (b) The Technical Committee shall review the technical operations of the Secretariat, assess the Secretariat's reports and recommendations, evaluate the performance of the Secretariat, and make recommendations to the Assembly regarding

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possible revision of the verification measures with a view to enhancing their effectiveness or reducing their cost.

(c) The Technical Committee shall meet at least four times per year.

(d) The Technical Committee shall be organized into Sub-Committees, with each Sub-Committee having principal responsibility for one branch or verification technology or means of Treaty verification.

7. The Assembly shall approve, modify or reject the recommendations of the Technical Committee and shall determine whether to alter the Organization's procedures.

8. Each Party shall have one vote in the Assembly. All decisions shall be taken by a majority of those voting, unless the Assembly, by a majority of two thirds, approves a different standard. The Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

Article III. The Secretariat

1. The Secretariat shall implement the verification measures contained in this Protocol and the additional measures that may be approved by the Assembly.

2. The Secretariat shall be headed by a Secretary-General.

3. The Secretariat shall have appropriate staff and resources to carry out the daily functions of the Organization, to compile and maintain the data gathered and received by the Organization, and to make observations pertinent to the Treaty.

4. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

5. In the performance of their duties, the Secretariat and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect upon their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization. Each Party undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretariat and staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

6. The Secretariat shall present an annual report to the Assembly and periodic reports to the Technical Committee.

7. The Secretariat shall prepare a proposed budget for approval by the Assembly.

8. The Secretariat shall designate appropriate senior staff officials to provide expert assistance to the Technical Committee.

9. The Secretariat shall establish the following Sections responsible for implementing verification measures pertinent to the prohibition of nuclear explosions in various environments:

- (a) Section A, in the atmosphere;
- (b) Section B, in outer space;
- (c) Section C, under water; and
- (d) Section D, under ground.

The Secretariat may establish other Sections and offices, as appropriate.

10. Each Section of the Secretariat shall develop a working description of the phenomena associated with nuclear explosions in each environment, which are observable by global monitoring networks, by localized monitoring, by on-site inspections or by other means. Each Section shall compile a data set recording every actual observation of such phenomena, together with a summary of available technical and other data regarding them.

11. Each Section of the Secretariat shall compile similar working descriptions of other phenomena associated with natural and legitimate events, activities and conditions that might create ambiguity or uncertainty regarding Treaty compliance, which are observable by global monitoring networks, by localized monitoring, by on-site inspections or by other means. Each Section shall compile a data set recording every actual observation of such phenomena, together with a summary of available technical and other data regarding them.

12. The Secretariat shall compile a registry of reports submitted by the Parties regarding their planned or completed activities that might generate the phenomena described in paragraphs 10 and 11.

Part II: Operating procedures

Article IV. Monitoring techniques

1. The Secretariat shall establish permanent global monitoring networks, as specified in annex 1.

2. The Secretariat shall consider and, as appropriate, shall implement temporary, localized monitoring, as specified in annex 2.

3. The Secretariat shall consider and, as appropriate, shall implement on-site inspections, as specified in annex 3.

4. The Secretariat shall consider and, as appropriate, shall implement inspections to corroborate the information reported to it by the Parties, as specified in annex 4.

5. The Secretariat shall undertake research related to the Treaty. Parties shall co-operate with the Secretariat in the design, conduct and analysis of research projects that could contribute to the improvement of the technology of verification.

6. The Secretariat shall investigate the feasibility of establishing additional monitoring stations or equipment, including satellite-based or aircraft-based systems, and of obtaining prompt access to relevant data collected by individual States. States shall co-operate to the maximum extent possible in providing relevant data.

Article V. Reports

1. Each Section of the Secretariat shall report monthly regarding:

- (a) Additions and changes to the working descriptions, data sets, and registries it compiles;
- (b) Observations it makes through permanent global monitoring networks, temporary localized monitoring, on-site inspections, and other means; and
- (c) Decisions it makes regarding the application of various monitoring mechanisms and the corroboration of information supplied to it by Parties.

2. Each Section of the Secretariat shall report immediately whenever, in the exercise of its functions, it detects evidence related to a possible violation of the Treaty.

3. Each Section report shall be provided to each Party and to each representative on the Technical Committee.

4. The Technical Committee shall review the reports and make recommendations to the Assembly.

Part III: Obligations of the Parties

Article VI. Co-operative measures

1. Each Party shall permit the establishment and operation on its territory of permanent global monitoring networks as specified in annex 1.

2. Each Party shall permit the establishment and operation on its territory of temporary localized monitoring as specified in annex 2.

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3. Each Party shall permit on-site inspection of its territory and activities, as specified in annex 3.

4. Each Party shall provide information to the Secretariat, and shall permit the Secretariat to corroborate such information, as specified in annex 4.

5. Each Party shall assist the Secretariat in conducting monitoring activities in areas outside the jurisdiction of any Party. Each Party shall promptly provide equipment, personnel and other support requested by the Secretariat for the conduct of such operations.

6. Each Party shall co-operate fully and in a timely fashion with the Secretariat's requests for information, support or other assistance in conducting the verification procedures of this Protocol.

7. Each Party shall designate a competent national organization for the purpose of serving as liaison with the Secretariat, providing the required information, and responding to requests for assistance.

Article VII. Additional monitoring procedures

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Parties operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

4. Two or more Parties may agree upon additional arrangements for the purpose of enhancing confidence in compliance with the Treaty, to be effective only among themselves, provided that those arrangements do not in any way interfere with the operations of the Organization.

5. If a multilateral verification system is established within the framework of the United Nations, the Organization shall determine the appropriate relationship between the current Treaty structures and the new agency or institutions thereby created.

Part IV: Final provisions

Article VIII. Annexes

The Annexes and Appendices shall be integral parts of this Protocol.

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Annex 1: Permanent global monitoring network

Article I. Monitoring stations

1. The permanent global monitoring network shall initially include stations as indicated in appendix 1. Thereafter, additional stations may be added, as the Assembly or Secretariat determines to be necessary.
2. The Secretariat shall determine what types of monitoring equipment shall be emplaced at each station. As appropriate, the Secretariat may designate sensors capable of performing seismic monitoring, radioisotope air and precipitation sampling, ionospheric disturbance active sensing, outer space monitoring, and other monitoring functions approved by the Assembly.
3. The equipment included in the stations shall be of the best available quality and reliability, as determined by the Secretariat. The Secretariat may upgrade the equipment at the stations as improved equipment becomes available and financially feasible.
4. The network shall have at least the reliable capability to detect, locate and identify a tamped explosion of 500 tons or more of TNT equivalent anywhere in the world and of 5 tons or more of TNT equivalent within the limits of national jurisdiction of any State which has conducted more than one nuclear explosion.
5. The network shall have the capability to detect the release of significant quantities of relevant radioisotopes anywhere in the world.
6. The Secretariat shall procure the equipment for the stations. Any Party may donate stations or equipment to the global network.
7. The Secretariat shall field test the operation of the global monitoring network, assessing the accuracy and sensitivity of the equipment. Each Party shall co-operate in the conduct and evaluation of these tests.

Article II. Station operations

1. Each Party shall operate and maintain all stations on its territory. The Secretariat shall operate and maintain all stations not based on the territory of a Party.
2. The Secretariat shall train the personnel who operate and maintain the stations.
3. The Secretariat shall have immediate access to the stations and equipment at all times. The Secretariat shall inspect the stations and equipment to ensure appropriate operation and maintenance.

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4. If the Secretariat finds that the host State is unable to operate and maintain a station appropriately, the Secretariat shall perform the operation and maintenance functions until the host State is able to do so.

5. Each station shall transmit its acquired data to the Secretariat headquarters in real time through a high-quality satellite-based data system designated by the Secretariat. Data shall be transmitted in unencrypted form, and a secure authentication procedure shall be implemented to reveal any tampering or degradation in the quality of the data stream.

6. All data transmitted to the Secretariat shall be promptly available to all Parties.

7. Each station and its equipment shall be tamper-resistant and tamper-indicating.

8. Each station shall be equipped with back up sensors, recording equipment, power supplies and other items as directed by the Secretariat.

Article III. Site selection

1. The Secretariat shall designate a large area (approximately 200 square kilometres) within which the permanent global monitoring station shall be located.

2. The host State shall then designate five small areas (each approximately 10 square kilometres) within that large area.

3. The Secretariat shall then designate one of the five small areas for establishment of the station. The Secretariat shall then select the specific site for the station, after consultation with the host State.

4. Areas and sites shall be selected based upon their suitability for performing the missions of the station. Sites shall be seismically quiet and shall if possible provide access to bed-rock.

5. Similar procedures shall apply to the relocation of a station that the Secretariat has found to be inadequate or inappropriate, and to the addition of supplementary stations to the global network.

6. The host State shall construct the station and install the equipment at the direction and under the supervision of the Secretariat.

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Annex 2: Temporary localized monitoring

Article I. Initiation of local monitoring

1. The Secretariat may decide to undertake temporary localized monitoring whenever:

(a) There have been two or more events in an area for which the data acquired by the global monitoring network did not fit some elements of the Secretariat's working description of a natural or legitimate event, activity or condition;

(b) There have been one or more events in the area for which the data acquired by the global monitoring network did fit some elements of the Secretariat's working description of a nuclear explosion;

(c) There has been an on-site inspection in the area, and additional information-gathering would help confirm the nature of the ambiguous event or events; or

(d) The Secretariat otherwise determines that confidence in compliance with the Treaty would be enhanced by operation of additional localized monitoring.

2. The purposes of the temporary localized monitoring shall be to clarify an ambiguous situation, to supplement the data provided by the global network, and to demonstrate the good faith compliance of all Parties to the Treaty.

Article II. Station equipment and operations

1. The Secretariat shall determine what types of localized monitoring shall be undertaken, what equipment shall be utilized, where the equipment shall be emplaced, what the capabilities and sensitivities of the equipment shall be, and what local stations shall be constructed to support the operations. Equipment may be similar to that operated at the global network, and additional types of equipment may be installed and operated as appropriate.

2. The Secretariat shall procure, install, operate, and maintain the equipment and the station. If the Secretariat determines that construction or modification of local buildings is necessary, the host State shall perform those services at the direction and under the supervision of the Secretariat. If the Secretariat determines that the station should be operated for a sustained period of time, the Secretariat may delegate the operation and maintenance to the host State, under terms similar to those applicable to the operation of the permanent global monitoring network stations.

3. Data from the temporary stations shall be duplicated on the site and a copy provided to the host State. Data shall be transmitted promptly and securely to the Secretariat headquarters.

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4. Procedures for ensuring that the data are authentic and secure shall be similar to those adopted for the permanent global monitoring network.

5. When the Secretariat determines that localized monitoring is no longer necessary, the station may be dismantled or the host State may elect to maintain its operations or convert it to other purposes. Any equipment supplied by the Secretariat shall be returned to it.

Article III. Site selection

1. The Secretariat shall designate a large area (approximately 20 square kilometres) within which the temporary localized monitoring station shall be located.

2. The host State shall then designate five small areas (each approximately 1 square kilometre) within that large area.

3. The Secretariat shall then designate one of the five small areas for establishment of the station. The Secretariat shall then select the specific site for the station, after consultation with the host State.

4. Areas and sites shall be selected based upon their ability to perform the missions of the station. Sites shall be seismically quiet and shall if possible provide access to bed-rock.

5. Similar procedures shall apply to the relocation of a station that the Secretariat has found to be inadequate or inappropriate.

Annex 3: On-site inspection

Article I. Initiation of on-site inspection

1. Any Party may submit to the Secretariat information that it believes may be relevant to compliance with the obligations of the Treaty and that may concern the necessity for conducting an on-site inspection. Any Party may suggest that the Secretariat undertake an on-site inspection of the territory or activities of another Party.

2. The Secretariat shall consider all information submitted to it and shall promptly respond to all suggestions for on-site inspection. If the Secretariat decides not to undertake on-site inspection, it shall report its decision to the Assembly along with all other reports. If requested to do so by one fifth of the Parties to the Treaty, the Secretariat shall make a special report on the subject within twenty-four hours.

3. The Secretariat shall undertake on-site inspection, whether or not a Party has suggested it, whenever:

(a) Data from the global permanent monitoring network or the temporary localized monitoring indicate the occurrence of an event that does not conform entirely to the Secretariat's working description of a natural or legitimate event, activity or condition and that does conform at least in part to the working description of a nuclear explosion; and

(b) The data suggest that the energy released in the event is either:

(i) Over 1,000 tons of TNT equivalent yield, or

(ii) A smaller event for which the selection algorithm indicates that on-site inspection should be conducted.

4. The selection algorithm for smaller events shall rely upon probabilistic sampling such that the likelihood of on-site inspection is higher when:

(a) The event is larger;

(b) There are important respects in which the event does not conform to the working description of a natural or legitimate event, activity or condition;

(c) There are important respects in which the event does conform to the working description of a nuclear explosion;

(d) There have been other similar events in the area that have not been the subject of on-site inspection or temporary localized monitoring; and

(e) The event occurs on the territory of a State, that has conducted more than one nuclear explosion.

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5. If the Secretariat determines to undertake an on-site inspection, the host State may appeal the decision to the Assembly, which shall consider the matter immediately. The inspection shall proceed while the Assembly is considering the appeal. If the Assembly concludes by a two thirds vote that the on-site inspection is not warranted, then the on-site inspection shall be abandoned promptly.

6. The Secretariat may issue an order requiring the host State:

(a) To leave all, or specified, vehicles, buildings, personnel, equipment and other items in place in the inspection area; and

(b) To refrain from undertaking any, or specified, other changes in the circumstances of the inspection area, pending the arrival of the inspection personnel.

7. The Secretariat shall provide the following information to the host State twenty-four hours prior to the scheduled arrival of the inspectors at the host State's point of entry:

(a) The point of entry to be used;

(b) The estimated time of arrival and means of arrival at the point of entry;

(c) The full names of the inspectors and the transport crew, each person's gender, date of birth, place of birth, and passport number;

(d) The location to be inspected.

8. The host State shall transport the inspectors from the point of entry to the location of the inspection within twenty-four hours after the inspectors' arrival at the point of entry.

Article II. Conduct of on-site inspection

1. The Secretariat shall determine the area to be inspected, the duration and dates of the inspection, and the size and composition of the inspection team. The Secretariat shall designate the individual members of the inspection team.

2. The host State shall provide the inspectors with immediate and uninhibited access to the entirety of the inspection area, and to all vehicles, buildings, personnel, equipment and other items within it. The host shall provide the inspectors with transportation to, from, and within the inspection area; with appropriate housing and sustenance during the inspection; with the best quality maps available of the inspection region; and with additional logistical and safety support as necessary.

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3. The inspectors shall supply their own tools and equipment for use in the inspection. The host State may examine the tools and equipment in the presence of the inspectors at the start of the inspection, and all tools and equipment shall be kept in secure storage facilities while not in use.

4. Inspectors shall be entitled to gather information they consider relevant, including, but not limited to:

(a) Taking photographs with ordinary visible-light cameras and other equipment (including video equipment);

(b) Collecting samples of air, soil, water, flora, and fauna;

(c) Surveying the area via helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft, and suitable terrestrial vehicles;

(d) Digging holes for the emplacement of sensing equipment. The data acquired in the inspection shall be used exclusively for purposes of Treaty inspection.

5. The inspectors shall have the diplomatic privileges and immunities customarily accorded to persons of their status performing similar functions under other international agreements.

6. The inspection team shall enjoy prompt, secure communications with the Secretariat headquarters. The inspection team may elect to bring its own communications equipment or to rely upon that provided by the host State.

7. The host State may designate personnel to accompany the inspectors during the performance of their duties, including the gathering of information under paragraph 4 of this article, and to replicate their observations and measurements, provided that these personnel do not interfere with the expeditious and effective conduct of the inspection.

8. If the host State considers that particular aspects of the inspection are inappropriately infringing upon its sovereignty or rights, it may lodge a complaint with the Assembly, which shall consider the question promptly. Unless the Assembly determines otherwise, by a two-thirds vote, the Secretariat shall be authorized to continue with the questioned inspection procedures.

9. Before leaving the inspection area, the inspection team shall complete a brief written report summarizing its activities and the data it has collected. A copy of this report shall be provided to the host State before the team's departure. The host State may append a commentary, either at that time or subsequently.

10. The Secretariat may include public or journalistic members on the inspection team. The inspections will be further open to public and journalistic observation as the host State considers appropriate, provided that the observers do not inhibit the expeditious and effective conduct of the inspection.

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Annex 4: National data provided to the Secretariat

1. Within one year after the entry into force of the Protocol, each Party shall provide to the Secretariat the following information regarding every nuclear explosion undertaken by it or within its national jurisdiction:

- (a) The geographic co-ordinates and height or depth of the explosion;
- (b) The nature of the surrounding medium and seismic transmission materials;
- (c) The type, yield, nature, and purpose of the explosion;
- (d) The date and time of the explosion.

2. Within one year after the entry into force of the Protocol, and within one month after each subsequent incident, each Party shall provide to the Secretariat the following information regarding every natural and legitimate event, activity and condition undertaken by it or occurring within its territory that might create ambiguity or uncertainty regarding Treaty compliance:

- (a) The date and time of the incident;
- (b) The geographic co-ordinates and height or depth of the incident;
- (c) The nature of the surrounding medium and seismic transmission materials;
- (d) The nature and size or extent of the incident.

3. Within one year after the entry into force of the Protocol, and within one month after the discovery or creation of any subsequent items, each Party shall supply the Secretariat with the following information regarding any large underground cavities created or discovered by it or occurring within its territory:

- (a) The geographic co-ordinates and depth of the cavity;
- (b) The size and rough shape of the cavity;
- (c) The date of creation or discovery of the cavity;
- (d) The nature of the surrounding medium and seismic transmission materials;
- (e) The purpose or function of the cavity;
- (f) The nature of any contents of the cavity.

4. Each Party that has conducted more than one nuclear explosion shall provide to the Secretariat the following information regarding all chemical explosions greater than 3 tons of TNT equivalent occurring anywhere under its jurisdiction and control; and each other Party shall provide the following

information regarding all chemical explosions greater than 300 tons of TNT equivalent occurring anywhere under its jurisdiction and control:

- (a) The geographic co-ordinates and depth of the explosion;
- (b) The nature of the surrounding medium and seismic transmission materials;
- (c) The nature and quantity of the explosive used;
- (d) The purpose of the explosion;
- (e) The explosive power of the event;
- (f) The date and time of the explosion;
- (g) The mode of explosion (ripple fire or otherwise).

5. The Party shall provide the information specified in paragraph 4 to the Secretariat one month before the scheduled explosion. If the planned parameters are altered, the Party shall notify the Secretariat one week before the event. If the planned parameters are altered again, the Party shall notify the Secretariat twenty-four hours before the event. If the actual event departs from the planned and reported parameters, the Party shall notify the Secretariat within twenty-four hours after the event. If there is an accidental, unauthorized or natural explosion of comparable force, the Party shall notify the Secretariat immediately and shall provide the same types of information as soon as possible and no later than one month after the event.

6. Within twelve hours after any Party launches a space vehicle, it shall provide to the Secretariat all the registry information specified in the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.

7. Each Party shall notify the Secretariat immediately whenever a vertical shaft greater than 1 metre in diameter and greater than 200 metres in depth is drilled at any location within its jurisdiction and control.

8. Each Party shall notify the Secretariat immediately whenever a horizontal tunnel greater than 1 metre in diameter and having an overburden of greater than 200 metres is drilled at any location within its jurisdiction and control.

9. The Secretariat shall develop and promulgate standardized forms through which the Parties shall report the information required by this annex. The Secretariat shall advise Parties regarding conformity with reporting forms and procedures, provide training and assistance in completing the forms, and modify the forms as appropriate.

10. The Secretariat shall have the power to undertake corroboration visits, to confirm the accuracy of the information reported under this annex and to observe activities and circumstances reported.

**Amendment Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water**

PTBT/CONF/6/Add.1
15 January 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

7-18 January 1991
New York

Letter dated 30 November 1990 from the Permanent Representatives
of Indonesia, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia and the
Deputy Permanent Representative of Peru to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference

Addendum

DRAFT PROTOCOL II OF AMENDMENT TO THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR-WEAPON-
TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER

Appendix 1: Stations of permanent global monitoring network

Preliminary List of Seismic Monitoring Stations

From a seismic monitoring perspective, there are two basic types of geophysical terrain: (a) cratons and shields, stable platforms, and deep ocean islands; and (b) rift zones, orogenic belts (active mountain building areas), salt domes, and unconsolidated sedimentary deposits.

Non-nuclear-weapon States

Protocol II calls for the seismic monitoring of non-nuclear States at the level of 0.5kt tamped. A yield of 0.5kt corresponds to a seismic wave magnitude of 3.5mb, assuming the shot to be full tamped in hard rock. Thus, the network must be capable of detecting a magnitude 3.5mb event anywhere.

In the non-nuclear States "quality-2" stations would be used for monitoring. Quality-2 stations are current off-the-shelf high-technology stations. They consist of a nine element broad-band and three component low-noise seismometers. The individual elements are typical of a modern station, including feedback broadband seismometers and direct digital recording. As part of a global network, quality-2 stations can monitor 3.20 million sq. km. of type-A terrain and 1.57 million sq. km. of type-B terrain down to the magnitude of 3.5mb.

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1.1. One hundred and two of the Parties are smaller than 1.57 million sq. km. and may therefore be monitored by a single seismic monitoring station. Indeed, in places where several small States border each other it may not be necessary that each State host a station. Mutually agreed regional arrangements that reduced the total number of stations without diminishing overall monitoring capability could be submitted to the Assembly for approval.

1.2 Four African States are larger than 1.57 million sq. km. but smaller than 3.2 million sq. km. (Algeria, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Sudan and Zaire); since they consist of primarily type-A terrain, they can each be monitored with a single quality-2 station as well.

1.3 The remaining eight non-nuclear States would require more than one station:

Argentina	2 stations
Australia	3 stations
Brazil	4 stations
Canada	4 stations
India	2 stations
Indonesia	2 stations
Iran	2 stations
Mexico	<u>2 stations</u>
Total	21 stations

The cost for the stations and instrumentation placed in non-nuclear States would be approximately \$US 50.8 million (\$US 0.4 million per quality-2 station).

Nuclear-weapon States

The protocol calls for seismic monitoring of nuclear-weapon States at the level of 0.005kt fully tamped explosion in hard rock. This yield was selected to correspond approximately to a 0.2kt nuclear explosion in a large cavity (ie. decoupled). A network capable of detecting down to 1.7mb is required in this case.

"Quality-1" stations would be installed in the nuclear testing States. Quality-1 stations are state-of-the-art research tools. They utilize a three component broad-band borehole seismometer supplemented by four single-element outstations and a three component surface seismometer at the top of the borehole. Quality-1 stations are capable of monitoring 0.438 million sq. km. of type-A terrain and 0.220 million sq. km. of type-B terrain down to the magnitude of 1.7mb.

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2. The nuclear testing States would require:

United Kingdom	1 station*
United States	20 stations
Soviet Union	<u>38 stations</u>
Total	59 stations

* The normal requirement for a nation of the size and terrain of the United Kingdom would be one quality-1 station. It may be, however, that good, low-noise sites will be difficult to find in the United Kingdom, necessitating one or two more stations.

The cost for the stations and instrumentation placed in nuclear testing States will be approximately \$US 59 million (\$US 1 million per quality-1 station).

International territory

3. Thirty-three quality-1 stations would be placed in international territory, primarily to monitor ocean areas, at a cost of approximately \$US 33 million.

Summary

1. Seismic stations for non-nuclear States	127 stations
2. Seismic stations for nuclear testing States	59 stations
3. Seismic stations for international territory	<u>33 stations</u>
Total number	219 stations
1. Cost for stations in non-nuclear States	\$US 50.8 million
2. Cost for stations in nuclear testing States	\$US 66.0 million
3. Cost for stations in international territory	<u>\$US 33.0 million</u>
Total cost	\$US 149.8 million

By comparison, a single nuclear-weapon-test explosions cost \$US 30-100 million.

**Amendment Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water**

PTBT/CONF/7
17 December 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

7-18 January 1991
New York

LETTER DATED 14 DECEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES
OF CHILE AND COLOMBIA AND THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES
OF ECUADOR AND PERU TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
PROVISIONAL SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE

On behalf of the members of the Permanent South Pacific Commission, we have
the honour to request that the enclosed text be circulated as a document of the
Amendment Conference of the 1963 Moscow Treaty, which is scheduled to take place
here in New York from 7 to 18 January 1991.

(Signed) Enrique PEÑALOSA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Colombia to the United Nations

(Signed) Juan SOMAVIA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Chile to the United Nations

(Signed) Abelardo POSSO SERRANO
Minister
Deputy Permanent Representative of
Ecuador to the United Nations

(Signed) José Antonio ARROSPIDE
Minister
Deputy Permanent Representative of
Peru to the United Nations

Annex

The countries members of the Permanent South Pacific Commission reaffirm their full support for the objectives of the Commission, in particular, a total ban on nuclear testing in the Pacific basin and prevention of pollution of the marine environment and its resources from whatever source.

With this aim in view, the Permanent Commission decided in 1984 to establish an automatic procedure for protesting against situations relating to the above-mentioned objectives. What this has entailed in practice has been the sending of 17 forceful protest notes to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the dates indicated below:

DATE OF EXPLOSION	DATE OF PROTEST
26 April 1986	7 May 1986
28 May 1986	11 June 1986
13 November 1986	24 November 1986
7 December 1986	12 December 1986
6 May 1987	19 June 1987
24 October 1987	30 October 1987
6 November 1987	13 November 1987
12 May 1988	20 May 1988
26 May 1988	8 June 1988
24 November and 1 December 1988	12 December 1988
12 May 1989	30 May 1989
11 June 1989	22 June 1989
3 June 1990	3 June 1990
7 June 1990	3 July 1990
27 June 1990	6 July 1990
15 November 1990	16 November 1990
22 November 1990	26 November 1990

**Amendment Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water**

PTBT/CONF/8
20 December 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

7-18 January 1991
New York

LETTER DATED 17 DECEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF
MEXICO, VENEZUELA AND YUGOSLAVIA AND THE CHARGES D'AFFAIRES A.I.,
DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF INDONESIA, PERU AND SRI LANKA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PROVISIONAL SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE CONFERENCE

We have the honour to submit the attached proposed amendment to the Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. We
request that it be distributed as soon as possible as a document of the Amendment
Conference.

(Signed) Amb. Jorge MONTAÑO
Permanent Representative of
Mexico to the United Nations

(Signed) Amb. Nugroho WISNUMURTI
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative of
Indonesia to the United Nations

(Signed) Amb. Andrés AGUILAR
Permanent Representative of
Venezuela to the United Nations

(Signed) Minister J. Antonio ARROSPIDE
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative of
Peru to the United Nations

(Signed) Amb. Darko SILOVIC
Permanent Representative of
Yugoslavia to the United Nations

(Signed) Amb. Edmond JAYASINGHE
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative of
Sri Lanka to the United Nations

Annex

PROPOSED AMENDMENT

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water shall be amended by the addition of the following article and protocols:

Article VI

The protocols annexed to the present Treaty constitute an integral part of the Treaty.

Protocol I

States Parties of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, in order to achieve the permanent banning of all nuclear explosions, including all such explosions underground, have agreed that, in addition to their undertakings in article I of the Treaty:

1. Each of the Parties of the present Protocol undertakes to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any nuclear-weapon-test explosion or any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction and control:

(a) Underground; or

(b) In any other environment not described in article I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (a) of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.

2. Each of the Parties to the present Protocol undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear-weapon-test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described in paragraph I of the present Protocol.

**Amendment Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water**

PTBT/CONF/9
3 January 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

7-18 January 1991
New York

REVISED ESTIMATED COST OF THE AMENDMENT CONFERENCE OF THE STATES
PARTIES TO THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN THE
ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER

Note by the Secretariat

1. In paragraph 14 of the Final Report of the Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water for the Organization of the Amendment Conference, 1/ it was noted that a document containing any revisions to the estimated costs of the Meeting and the Amendment Conference, as set out in document PTBT/CONF/M/4, would be provided to the Conference for its consideration.

2. Revised estimates of the costs of the Meeting, which are based on preliminary actual figures, are given below.

I. Conference-servicing costs

	<u>Initial estimates</u> \$	<u>Revised estimates</u> \$
Pre-session, in-session and post-session documentation	65 300	42 400
Meeting services	60 600	43 800
Summary records	<u>97 200</u>	<u>84 300</u>
Total I	223 100	170 500

II. Non-conference-servicing costs

	<u>Initial estimates</u> \$	<u>Revised estimates</u> \$
Total II	1 200	1 200

III. Programme support costs

	<u>Initial estimates</u> \$	<u>Revised estimates</u> \$
Total III	29 200	22 300
Grand total I, II and III	<u>253 500</u>	<u>194 000</u>

3. The requirements of the Amendment Conference have been reviewed and the revised estimates are shown below.

I. Conference-servicing costs

	<u>Initial estimates</u> \$	<u>Revised estimates</u> \$
Total I	457 500	457 500

II. Non-conference-servicing costs

	<u>Initial estimates</u> \$	<u>Revised estimates</u> \$
Secretary-General of the Conference	3 100	3 100
Fees and travel of consultants	42 000	36 900
Temporary assistance	29 700	29 700
Information kits	8 400	8 400
Miscellaneous supplies and services	<u>5 200</u>	<u>5 200</u>
Total II	88 400	83 300

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III. Programme support costs

	<u>Initial estimates</u> \$	<u>Revised estimates</u> \$
Total III	71 000	70 300
Grand total I, II and III	<u>616 900</u>	<u>611 100</u>

4. The overall cost of the Amendment Conference, including the Meeting for its organization, is now estimated at \$805,100. The actual cost, however, will be established only after the closure of the Conference when the exact work-load will be known.

Notes

1/ PTBT/CONF/1.

**Amendment Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water**

PTBT/CONF/10
7 January 1991
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/SPANISH

7-18 January 1991
New York

Letter dated 7 December 1990 from the Secretary-General of the
Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
and the Caribbean (OPANAL) addressed to the Provisional
Secretary-General of the Amendment Conference

You will find enclosed herewith in writing the comments of the Agency to be circulated as a document of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, as rule 44 (4) of the draft rules of procedure requires.

(Signed) Dr. Antonio Stempel Paris
Secretary-General OPANAL

Annex

Comments by the Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

One of the international instruments in effect at the time the wording of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, particularly article 18 thereof, was being discussed, was the Moscow Treaty of 5 August 1963, and it was taken very much into account. Indeed, in resolution 9 (II) of the Preparatory Committee for the Denuclearization of Latin America (COPREDAL/19), which contained preliminary draft articles on verification, inspection and control, it was proposed that participating Governments should adopt article "L" entitled "Explosions for peaceful purposes" which I shall proceed to quote: "The Parties agree not to trigger any explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes or to collaborate with third parties for that purpose, save if they do so in conformity with the provisions of this article and with those of the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963; and any amendments thereto. Any explosion carried out on the basis of the provisions of this article will not be considered as violating article "A" of this Treaty." (Article "A" referred to the obligations inherent to the Treaty and is now article 1 of the Treaty.)

The co-ordinating committee for the drafting of the treaty commented on the above-mentioned article "L" as follows: "The purpose of this article is to ensure the following: (a) that this Treaty in no way hampers the development of activities for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and (b) that no explosion for peaceful purposes may be used for the acquisition of military advantages" ... "As a result, utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would not be affected by the prohibitions of the Treaty. This article refers only to explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons. It is worth pointing out, as part of the background to these provisions that, at the 1960 Conference for the suspension of nuclear tests in all areas, it was considered necessary to include such a provision, since otherwise all types of nuclear explosions would have been banned."

It is true that, at the time, the multiple consequences of such explosions were totally disregarded; the desire was to safeguard the right of parties to the Treaty to carry out such explosions in relation to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, no account was taken of the fact that, given the provisions of article 1 of the Treaty, a nuclear device could not be produced within the nuclear-weapon-free zone since the method used to produce such a device was no different from the method used to produce a device for military purposes. In any event, the phrase "including explosions which involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons" was accepted and forms part of article 18.

Later on the Co-ordinating Committee for the drafting of the Treaty of Tlatelolco commented on article 18 as follows: "In paragraph 1, the reference to the Moscow Treaty has been deleted being considered superfluous since that Treaty contains no express provision on the subject to which this article relates. The

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purpose of the amendments to this same paragraph 1, which is now worded positively, is to make it quite clear that the Treaty in no way prohibits explosions for peaceful purposes - including, as was stated specifically in the debates during the second session of COPREDAL, without any disagreement, the opening of canals linking oceans - but simply regulates such explosions so that they do not adversely affect implementation of the provisions of the Treaty."

Article 29 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco again demonstrates how account was taken of both the Moscow Treaty and the draft articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The above-mentioned co-ordinating committee commented on this matter as follows: "This article proposes a revision procedure similar to that contained in the Treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963 and to those proposed in the draft treaties to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons submitted by the United States of America and the Soviet Union respectively to the United Nations General Assembly at its twentieth session."

After the signing of the Moscow Treaty, the subsequent chain of underground nuclear explosions carried out by the nuclear-weapons States resulted in the improvement of these weapons; the military secrecy surrounding their purposes meant that the only ones to benefit from those tests were those same major Powers.

There is no doubt that between 1945 and 5 August 1963, the date on which the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union signed the partial test-ban Treaty, those three States conducted, on average, 30 tests per year; however, since 1963 that average has been over 40 tests per year.

Prior to 1963, the strategic nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers consisted primarily of a fleet of heavy long-range bombers and some intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). Today, these arsenals are made up of countless ballistic projectiles, missiles, communications and warning systems that defy the imagination. The destructive power of these arsenals has increased hand in hand with their qualitative improvements.

This uncontrolled arms race which has continued apace, notwithstanding the existence of the Moscow Treaty and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has steadily strengthened the initiative of a few countries that do not possess nuclear weapons to bring about the amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty so as to turn it into a total test-ban treaty; this clearly would have a beneficial impact on general and complete disarmament and on the complete eradication of nuclear weapons.

We are fully aware of the difficulties which an initiative of this nature encounters; however, we believe that sooner or later it will triumph and that the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, which is responsible for ensuring that the obligations of the Treaty of Tlatelolco are carried out, must lend the initiative its warmest support within the terms of the preamble to the Treaty itself where the signatories declare their firm intention to "contribute, so far as lies in their power, towards ending the

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armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and towards strengthening a world at peace, based on the sovereign equality of States, mutual respect and good neighbourliness."

While it is true that article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco permits the conducting of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, under strict conditions, fortunately, in practice, no such explosions have been carried out to date. Moreover, it has become evident at the scientific level, that there is no difference between a device to conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and one used for purposes of war.

It is also true that article 18 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been subject to many interpretations, but we hope that, sooner rather than later, the proposed amendment to the Moscow Treaty, which would ban all nuclear explosions without exception, will put an end to all controversy.

The drafters of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and of the non-proliferation Treaty alike lacked the experience which we now have concerning the radiation effects of each nuclear explosion, which are undoubtedly affecting Earth. There will be much to talk about and to discuss before reaching agreement on the subject, but the fact is that there are five nuclear Powers, and several more countries are on the way to becoming nuclear Powers or have already done so but are not admitting to it, and we cannot look on passively while vertical and horizontal proliferation continues, and while the vast majority of countries in the world are forced to suffer the serious present and future consequences of this uncontrolled race.

In addition, it is worth pointing out that the will of Latin America for peace and general and complete disarmament has been constant and consistent, not only because Latin America established the first nuclear-weapons-free zone in a densely populated region but also because it contributed to the declaration of the "zone of peace and co-operation of the south Atlantic" and because plans are currently under way to formulate a treaty on a zone of peace and co-operation in Central America and the Caribbean and another on a zone of peace of South America.

All this is perfectly in line with the climate of détente in which we are now living, following the end of the cold war, which is certainly strengthening and consolidating the prospects for a world that will finally be free from the threats that have terrorized our planet for a number of decades.

We hope that all this will bring the great Powers which possess this terrible nuclear arsenal to understand that the time has come to put an end to nuclear tests.

**Amendment Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water**

PTBT/CONF/11
10 January 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

7-18 January 1991
New York

LETTER DATED 10 JANUARY 1991 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE

I would like to request that resolution 45/50 on the "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Test in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water" be circulated as an official document for the present Amendment Conference.

The text of the resolution is annexed hereto.

(Signed) Sedfrey A. ORDONEZ
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/45/769)]

45/50. Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 44/106 of 15 December 1989,

Reiterating its conviction that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is the highest-priority measure for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for the achievement of the objective of nuclear disarmament,

Recalling also its resolution 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, in which it noted with approval the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, 1/ signed on 5 August 1963, and requested the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament 2/ to continue with a sense of urgency its negotiations to achieve the objectives set forth in the preamble to the Treaty,

Recalling further that more than one third of the parties to the Treaty have requested the Depositary Governments to convene a conference to consider an amendment that would convert the Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty,

Reiterating also its conviction that such a conference will facilitate the attainment of the objectives set forth in the Treaty and thus serve to strengthen it,

Noting with satisfaction that the Meeting for the organization of the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was held in New York from 29 May to 8 June 1990, and taking note of the report of that Meeting, 3/

1. Notes with satisfaction that the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water will be held in New York from 7 to 18 January 1991;

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964.

2/ The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated the Conference on Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.

3/ PTBT/CONF/1.

2. Calls upon all parties to the Treaty to participate in, and to contribute to the success of, the Amendment Conference for the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban at an early date, as an indispensable measure towards implementation of their undertakings in the preamble to the Treaty;

3. Reiterates its conviction that, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should suspend all nuclear-test explosions through an agreed moratorium or unilateral moratoria;

4. Recommends that arrangements be made to ensure that intensive efforts continue, under the auspices of the Amendment Conference, until a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is achieved;

5. Recommends also that the Amendment Conference establish a working group, or other means it deems appropriate, to study, inter alia, the organization of control, institutional mechanisms and legal aspects of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and to report its conclusions to the Conference;

6. Stresses the importance of ensuring adequate co-ordination among the various negotiating forums dealing with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session the item entitled "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water".

54th plenary meeting
4 December 1990

**Amendment Conference of the States Parties
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
under Water**

PTBT/CONF/12
17 January 1991

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

7-18 January 1991
New York

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE

Report of the Credentials Committee

1. Rule 3 of the rules of procedure for the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water provides that:

"The Conference shall establish a Credentials Committee composed of the Chairman, one Vice-Chairman elected in accordance with rule 5, and five members appointed by the Conference on the proposal of the President. The Committee shall examine the credentials of representatives and report to the Conference without delay."

2. In accordance with rule 5 of its rules of procedure, the Conference unanimously elected Mr. Jan Henrik Groop, Ambassador of Finland, as Chairman of the Credentials Committee and Mr. Sattéanund Peerthum, Ambassador of Mauritius, as Vice-Chairman of the Committee.

3. In accordance with rule 3 of the rules of procedure, cited in paragraph 1 above, the Conference, on the proposal of the President, appointed the following countries as members of the Credentials Committee: Belgium, Botswana, Colombia, Fiji and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

4. The Committee held its 1st meeting on 14 January 1991. At that meeting, the secretariat of the Conference informed the Committee that, of the 91 States parties to the Treaty participating in the Conference as of 14 January 1991, credentials in due form, as provided for by rule 2 of the rules of procedure, had been received by the Secretary-General of the Conference from the following States parties: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Korea, Republic of, Malaysia, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Swaziland,

Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

5. At the same meeting, the Committee took note of the above information provided by the secretariat and invited those States parties participating in the Conference that had not yet done so to submit the credentials of their representatives to the Secretary-General of the Conference, in accordance with rule 2 of the rules of procedure.

6. Subsequently, at the Committee's 2nd meeting, on 17 January 1991, the secretariat informed the Committee that, further to the information it had provided to the Committee on 14 January 1991, credentials in due form, as provided for by rule 2 of the rules of procedure, had been received from Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, India, Luxembourg, Kenya, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey.

7. Thus, of the 94 States parties participating in the Conference as of 17 January 1991, 46 had submitted credentials in due form, as reflected in paragraphs 4 and 6 above.

8. At the same meeting, the Committee examined and accepted the credentials of the representatives of all the participating States parties referred to in paragraphs 4 and 6 above, on the understanding that those States parties that had not yet submitted formal credentials for their representatives as required by rule 2 of the rules of procedure should communicate them to the Secretary-General of the Conference as soon as possible.

9. The Committee, at the same meeting, unanimously adopted its report to the Conference.

Annex III

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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Part II
SUMMARY RECORDS

Monday, 7 January 1991, at 3.40 p.m.

OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE BY THE TEMPORARY PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT OF THE MEETING FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMENDMENT CONFERENCE

1. The TEMPORARY PRESIDENT declaring open the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, said that the Amendment Conference was a historic occasion for the entire international community. The discontinuance of all nuclear-test explosions for all time was a high-priority goal which had been tenaciously pursued over the past three decades, and a fresh attempt would now be made at the Conference to speed up progress towards a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, as part of the international effort to establish and develop an effective multilateral disarmament process.

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

2. The SECRETARY-GENERAL said that the Conference was taking place at a particularly critical stage in contemporary world history. One era had just ended. A new international order had yet to take shape. The global political landscape was undergoing rapid transformation. The adversarial security concepts and doctrines which had underlain the attitudes of the two major military alliances had lost their relevance to the emerging world situation. The remarkable developments in Europe and the growing co-operation between the two Powers had naturally raised expectations that a new era of peace was about to begin.

3. However, continued violence and unresolved disputes in many parts of the world, and the Persian Gulf crisis in particular, had dampened much of the elation generated by the end of the cold war. Once again, the question of the existence and possible use of weapons of mass destruction had been brought to the international community's attention in an ominous manner. The international community was reminded that freeing the world of such weapons must proceed hand in hand with the creation of conditions of stability in international relations, based on full respect for the Charter of the United Nations and genuine co-operation among Member States. That alone could lead to a firm and stable international security order.

4. Despite the uncertainties that still lay ahead he remained optimistic, since great strides, unthinkable only a few years earlier, had been made in the field of arms limitation and disarmament - a crucial issue for international peace and stability. It was to be hoped that the historic Treaty of 1987 Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), eliminating one whole category of nuclear weapons from those States' military arsenals, would be supplemented soon by the START agreement, which was expected to cut significantly their strategic nuclear forces. In Paris, just seven weeks earlier, Europe, which still had the largest concentration of armaments and armed forces in the world, had taken momentous steps towards enhanced stability and security at a much lower level

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(The Secretary-General)

of forces. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the new set of confidence- and security-building measures adopted in the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe had truly established a new basis for growing co-operation in a vast area extending from the Urals to the Atlantic. Those positive developments would have a lasting impact on international peace and security, if they were pursued world wide to bring benefits to all members of the community of nations.

5. It was encouraging to observe that the progressive elimination of the world's military arsenals, including nuclear weapons, had already begun. The qualitative development of nuclear armaments had now been limited to a few technical areas. The principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had gained a momentum through specific actions and declarations by a number of Member States which had reiterated their renunciation of the nuclear option. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament was making meaningful progress in the consideration of various technical issues related to the verification of a nuclear-test ban. The United States and the Soviet Union had, for their part, at long last resolved the difficulties related to the verification of their bilateral agreements concerning the limitation on the scale of nuclear-weapon tests. All that augured well for the consideration of the issues related to the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests.

6. Over the years the General Assembly had adopted numerous resolutions calling for a comprehensive test ban so as to achieve the goal envisaged in the preamble to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (partial test-ban Treaty), as well as in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (non-proliferation Treaty): the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. He had consistently supported achievement of that goal.

7. But the intensive deliberations of the past and reaffirmations of adherence to existing treaty obligations were not enough. He urged the States parties to work together to identify practical measures to preclude horizontal as well as vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Through concerted negotiated efforts, steps could be taken which would contribute to the early realization of the goal of a comprehensive test ban.

8. Given the complexity of the issues before delegations, the Amendment Conference was a valuable opportunity for all parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to participate collectively in a constructive endeavour to advance the prospects for a comprehensive test ban, with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, and thus to help lay a firm foundation for a safer and more secure world.

9. The opportunities that were offered to create new patterns of co-operation must not be squandered. A revitalized multilateral disarmament process could play an important role in that context. He urged all participants in the Conference to do their utmost to overcome the difficulties which stood in the way of advancing the cause of nuclear disarmament.

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ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

10. Mr. Alatas (Indonesia) was elected President by acclamation.

11. Mr. Alatas (Indonesia) took the Chair.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

12. The PRESIDENT said that, at the beginning of the post-cold-war period of historic global political and economic change, the long-overdue process of nuclear disarmament was finally under way. However, although it was encouraging to note the recent developments in the areas of strategic arms, chemical weapons and conventional forces, the world was still beset by unresolved tensions and violent conflict, by resort to armed force and military intervention, and by deeply-rooted inequities and imbalances in inter-State relations. The Persian Gulf crisis was a stark reminder of all that. Despite the improvement in the global political climate, the arms race had assumed a momentum of its own, especially in its qualitative aspects. Weapons of the future would be more destabilizing, impart greater vulnerability, increase the probability of war and complicate efforts to reverse the arms race. Technological innovation was therefore central not only to the qualitative arms race but to global security as well.

13. The partial test-ban Treaty, which had been in existence for 27 years and to which 117 States were now parties, had borne witness to the resolve to achieve an eventual comprehensive nuclear-test ban, as had the 1968 non-proliferation Treaty. Yet today such a comprehensive ban appeared as elusive as ever, despite sustained effort on the part of the non-nuclear States and of the international community at large, and despite the adoption of some 70 United Nations General Assembly resolutions on that issue alone. Although some progress had been made in trilateral negotiations for a comprehensive test ban among the three original parties to the partial test-ban Treaty, those negotiations had been adjourned in 1980 and had not been resumed. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, also known as the threshold test-ban Treaty, signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in 1974 was concerned not so much with achieving a comprehensive test ban as with the setting of agreed limits on the explosive yields of underground tests, thus allowing for continued testing.

14. In the view of the overwhelming majority of the members of the international community, the depositary States had so far failed to fulfil their obligations under existing treaties and other agreed commitments. Realization of the goal set 27 years earlier - the banning of all nuclear tests, by all States, in all environments and for all time - was more than overdue. In view of the propitious conditions created by the fundamental changes now taking place in the world, there was no reason for any further delay nor any justification for the perpetuation of the arms race and for continued testing. The non-nuclear States and the overwhelming majority of the members of the international community had long been convinced that an early end to all nuclear testing was an essential step towards

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(The President)

preventing the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new ones and would further the goal of horizontal as well as vertical non-proliferation.

15. Questions of verification, which had been the major obstacle to agreement on a comprehensive test ban, had been practically resolved, as current technological capabilities were considered quite effective in detecting any tests of military significance. Confidence in the reliability and safety of nuclear weapons could be obtained by advanced technical means, eliminating the need to resort to actual weapon tests. What was needed now, therefore, was the political determination to move ahead. Governments should no longer seek refuge in arguments long since shown to be untenable or irrelevant.

16. Although the recent progress in disarmament and arms limitation was to be welcomed, it must be realized that unless the relevant agreements were backed up by an early cessation of all testing, ever more destructive and sophisticated nuclear weapons would continue to be added to existing arsenals, even as their numbers were being reduced. There was also the danger that continued testing and development of nuclear weapons could undermine the recent positive trends in international relations. The cessation of nuclear testing by all States was now more urgent than ever.

17. The Amendment Conference had come about after decades of efforts to attain a comprehensive test ban had failed. Recourse to the amendment procedure contained in the partial test-ban Treaty had appeared to be the only remaining avenue open to the international community. In many ways the Conference broke new ground, especially in that it constituted the first truly multilateral negotiating forum on a nuclear-arms treaty, in which all concerned countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, could participate fully on an equal footing. While the task before the Conference should not be underestimated, he believed that all parties realized the critical need for progress towards the commonly-agreed goal of a complete cessation of nuclear testing and the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. Success in the endeavour in question would not only represent a major step towards the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, but would also constitute a significant contribution to the maintenance of the credibility and viability of the multilateral negotiating process. In the world of today and in the years to come, multilateral co-operation was no longer an option but a necessity.

FINAL REPORT OF THE MEETING FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMENDMENT CONFERENCE
(PTBT/CONF/1)

18. The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to take note of the final report of the Meeting for the Organization of the Amendment Conference and to adopt the recommendations set out in the final report.

19. It was so decided.

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CONFIRMATION OF THE NOMINATION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE

20. The nomination of Mr. Kheradi, Principal Officer, Department for Disarmament Affairs, as Secretary-General of the Conference was confirmed.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA (PTBT/CONF/2)

21. The agenda was adopted.

ADOPTION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE (PTBT/CONF/3)

22. The rules of procedure set out in document PTBT/CONF/3 were adopted.

23. The PRESIDENT said that, pursuant to rule 44, paragraphs 2 and 4, of the rules of procedure, the Secretariat had received requests for Observer status at the Conference from Albania, Cuba, Guyana, the Holy See, Lesotho and Mozambique, and requests for Observer Agency status at the Conference from the Organization of African Unity, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), and the World Meteorological Organization.

24. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to grant Observer status to those States and Observer Agency status to those organizations.

25. It was so decided.

26. The CHAIRMAN said that, in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 4, of the rules of procedure, OPANAL had requested circulation of its written comments as a document of the Conference.

27. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference agreed to grant that request.

28. It was so decided.

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE

(a) APPOINTMENT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE

29. Mr. Groop (Finland) was elected Chairman of the Credentials Committee by acclamation.

ELECTION OF OTHER OFFICERS

30. The representatives of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, the United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela were elected Vice-Presidents of the Conference by acclamation.

ADOPTION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETING THE COSTS OF THE CONFERENCE

31. The revised estimates of the costs of the Conference as set out in document PTBT/CONF/9 were approved.

32. The PRESIDENT said that the cost-sharing formula for the Conference, which was referred to in rule 12 of the rules of procedure, the relevant recommendations contained in the final report of the Meeting, and the revised estimates of the costs of the Conference had now all been adopted. If he heard no objection, he would therefore take it that the Conference wished to adopt the arrangements for meeting the costs in question.

33. It was so decided.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

34. The PRESIDENT suggested that the general debate should begin the following morning and end on Friday morning.

35. It was so decided.

MESSAGE FROM MR. M. S. GORBACHEV, PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

36. Mr. GOLOVKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) read out a message to the participants in the Conference from the President of the Soviet Union, reaffirming both the Soviet policy of promoting achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban without delay, as a crucial step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, and the Soviet Union's readiness to stop its nuclear tests at any time if the United States did likewise and to amend the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty. In concluding his message, the President of the Soviet Union indicated that the Soviet Union called upon other States to support conversion of the Treaty into a comprehensive test ban.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.

Tuesday, 8 January 1991, at 11.15 a.m.

OBSERVER STATUS

1. The PRESIDENT said that the Secretary-General of the Conference had received a request for Observer status at the Conference from Bahrain in pursuance of rule 44 (2) of the rules of procedure. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the participants at the Conference agreed to grant Observer status to the State of Bahrain.

2. It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE

3. Mr. ROZENTAL (Mexico) congratulated the representative of Indonesia on his election to the post of President and highly commended the untiring efforts of his country to achieve stable peace and its efforts in the field of disarmament. For more than 30 years Mexico had been striving to bring about a complete nuclear-test ban and considered that now, with the end of the "cold war" and the start of an era of co-operation and mutual understanding, it was necessary to take advantage of the international situation in order to free the world of nuclear weapons. Broadening the scope of application of the Moscow Treaty to include a ban on underground nuclear tests would be instrumental in carrying out that task.

4. The signing of the Moscow Treaty had been a response to the demands of world public opinion, which had been frightened by the threat posed by nuclear weapons to the planet's future. Nevertheless, underground nuclear tests were still being conducted and since 1963 approximately 1,300 had been carried out, 85 per cent of which by the three Depositary States of the Moscow Treaty.

5. For more than 30 years, the General Assembly had given particular attention to the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. It should be pointed out that verification of compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty constituted a special problem. Although many proposals had been put forward in that regard, none of them had completely satisfied the parties directly concerned. Nevertheless, in recent years many of those difficulties had been overcome and the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed on a number of measures concerning verification of compliance with the threshold test-ban Treaty (1974) and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty (1976). With the necessary political will it would be possible to settle that question and, in that connection, the clarification of the positions of the Depositary Governments was one of the tasks facing the Conference.

6. A second task was to ensure universal accession to the future treaty. It was necessary to see to it, on the one hand, that the States that had not signed the 1963 Treaty acceded to it and, on the other hand, that all other countries in the world did likewise.

(Mr. Rozental, Mexico)

7. There was also a need to consider the advisability of including in the amendment to the Treaty provisions for ensuring its observance, in other words, providing for both verification of compliance with the Treaty as well as sanctions for violating it.

8. The Conference provided a unique opportunity to make such an amendment to the 1963 Treaty in order to provide the international community as a whole with a multilateral document which would ensure a complete halt to nuclear testing.

9. Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan) said that his country had consistently advocated the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Japan had been actively striving to support and strengthen the régime of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. It had also sought to bring about speedily a nuclear-test ban, particularly in view of the enormous danger of radioactive fallout resulting from such tests in the atmosphere. His country had welcomed the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty in 1963 as an important step towards a comprehensive test ban. Agreement on such a test ban had not yet been achieved because it was not simply a matter of halting tests, but was an extremely complex problem involving the security of nations.

10. The same could be said of the Amendment Conference. One might be given to believe that it was only a question of whether or not to adopt an amendment to the Treaty in order to prohibit underground testing. In reality, however, before adopting such an amendment, one would have to consider carefully whether a test ban at the current stage would indeed enhance the security of each State. Everyone, therefore, was well aware that an amendment was unlikely to be adopted at the Conference. Furthermore, they should bear in mind there were two nuclear-weapon States that were not States parties to the Treaty. The reason for convening the Amendment Conference might be that it was the most effective way to put international pressure on the nuclear-weapon States to take steps to achieve a comprehensive test ban. That problem must be tackled through joint efforts. All the States concerned must engage in a sincere dialogue and thoroughly discuss the real reasons for continued nuclear tests. When a common understanding had been reached through such a dialogue, it would be possible to work out realistic ways to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

11. It would be a mistake to overlook the rôle of the Conference on Disarmament as a forum for such a dialogue. As was well known, in 1990 the Conference on Disarmament had re-established the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Japan sincerely hoped that the work begun by the Ad Hoc Committee would be continued in 1991. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that the Conference on Disarmament was a body whose members included all five nuclear-weapon States.

12. The Amendment Conference was of unique importance because it was attended not only by most of the member States of the Conference on Disarmament, but also by a large number of other States parties to the Treaty. The current Conference could serve as an important catalyst for real dialogue and play a constructive role in facilitating the substantive work of the Conference on Disarmament on the question

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(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

of a comprehensive test ban. Japan stressed the importance of a step-by-step approach as a realistic way to achieve a comprehensive test ban and considered that the question of the practicability of such an approach should be fully addressed at an appropriate stage.

13. Another fundamental aspect of the issue of a comprehensive test ban that required thorough discussion was the question of whether or not nuclear tests could be stopped in spite of the continued presence of nuclear weapons or, in other words, in spite of the need of various States to rely on nuclear deterrence. It had been argued on numerous occasions that as long as nuclear testing continued, the nuclear arms race would continue and that, therefore, a comprehensive test ban was a matter of greater priority and urgency than the reduction of nuclear arms themselves. On the other hand, it was also argued that continued testing was needed in order to ensure the reliability of existing stocks of nuclear weapons.

14. There were also other issues related to a comprehensive test ban that had to be discussed. For example, there was the question of the effectiveness of a comprehensive test-ban régime and, in that regard, the question of the verifiability of such a ban would have to be fully considered. In that connection, in the Conference on Disarmament the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events had been concentrating its efforts on a technical study relating to the establishment of a network of stations to detect underground nuclear tests by utilizing seismic detection methods. In particular, the Group planned to complete in 1991 a large-scale experiment that would make it possible to detect nuclear tests with greater accuracy. His country intended to participate actively in that project by conducting relevant experiments in Japan and by submitting a report on the results of such experiments to the Group of Scientific Experts.

15. The successful conclusion and subsequent ratification of the verification protocols to the two nuclear-test limitation agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union should be duly noted. Those two States were actively engaged in efforts to achieve a quantitative reduction in nuclear weapons. The international community should not only encourage that endeavour by the United States and the Soviet Union, but should also bear in mind the fact that there were a number of things to be learned from those negotiations.

16. The lack of meaningful progress in achieving a comprehensive test ban might well be due to the lack of real dialogue among the nations concerned. Japan was of the view that there was no problem that could not be solved if the States in question tried to arrive at a common understanding through genuine dialogue. His country sincerely hoped that the Amendment Conference would serve as an important catalyst for a meaningful and constructive discussion of the problem at the Conference on Disarmament.

17. Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden) said that a ban on all nuclear testing was long overdue. Therefore, the fact that all five nuclear-weapon States had carried out nuclear-test explosions in the past six months was deeply disappointing. In spite

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(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

of the determination expressed by States in 1963 and reaffirmed in 1968 to seek a halt to all nuclear-weapon tests for all time, there were still no negotiations on the cessation of nuclear-test explosions.

18. There was strong public opinion in many parts of the world against nuclear testing. In that connection, she cited a number of facts from the report Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons (document A/45/373), demonstrating the adverse effects of tests conducted in the Semipalatinsk region in Kazakhstan on the health of the population and the environment. Owing to the pressure of public opinion, nuclear tests were no longer conducted in the Semipalatinsk area. On the other hand, the latest Soviet test had taken place in Novaja Zemlja, about which the Nordic countries had expressed their grave concern. An independent international study with full access to all relevant data on the effects of nuclear testing on health was urgently called for.

19. Since nuclear weapons posed a threat to all human beings and all States, nuclear disarmament should be dealt with at a global, multilateral level. The question of a comprehensive test ban had been on the agenda of the General Assembly for 33 years. The repeated calls for an urgent halt to underground nuclear explosions reflected the massive support for prompt action in that area. The Conference on Disarmament had a special responsibility in negotiating a treaty for that purpose. It was therefore highly regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament - the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum where all five nuclear-weapon States were represented - had not as yet been mandated to conduct negotiations on a comprehensive test ban.

20. Sweden had consistently taken an active part in international efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and had repeatedly made proposals and sponsored draft resolutions on various aspects of that question and had put forward corresponding draft treaties.

21. Verification was a key factor in all disarmament agreements. Since 1976, Sweden had chaired the Group of Scientific Experts in the Conference on Disarmament, co-ordinating efforts to set up a global seismological verification system.

22. The Group was currently conducting the second technical test to evaluate the concept of such verification and, to that end, it appeared necessary to ensure broader international participation in carrying out the test. Its successful completion would prepare the way for the establishment of a global seismic system for verifying compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Other significant means of verifying compliance with such a treaty might include an international network for monitoring atmospheric radioactivity and on-site inspections.

23. Although the partial test-ban Treaty worked well, it did not contain provisions prohibiting underground nuclear explosions or verification provisions. The Amendment Conference provided an opportunity to discuss issues related to the

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(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

banning of all nuclear tests. Her delegation hoped that the spirit of compromise in the search for practical solutions, which had characterized the preparatory stage of the Conference, would also prevail during the course of its work and that after the Amendment Conference, machinery would be set up to enable the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which could be achieved only on a multilateral basis.

24. Substantive progress in the work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty would reinforce other multilateral disarmament efforts. It would greatly facilitate the taking of a decision to extend the period of validity of the non-proliferation Treaty in 1995, while lack of speedy progress might endanger the future of that Treaty.

25. A comprehensive test-ban treaty would without doubt create considerable obstacles to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Although the quantitative cuts in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States were welcome, such reductions were not enough. Furthermore, continued nuclear testing ran counter to the intention declared by the super-Powers in 1985 to seek the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. There was no reason to develop new types of nuclear weapons if the ultimate goal was their complete elimination.

26. The environmental and health hazards associated with underground testing were an additional reason for concluding a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Furthermore, since any nuclear explosion, even if designed for peaceful purposes, could be exploited for military purposes, it was necessary to eliminate the possibility of circumventing a ban on nuclear-test explosions by means of so-called "nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes".

27. In the current international atmosphere, the nuclear-weapon States should declare a nuclear-test moratorium. A fixed time-frame for the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be established at the same time. Sweden did not accept the view that a comprehensive test ban should be a long-term goal. A gradual approach to the cessation of nuclear tests was acceptable only when it was directly linked to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty at an early and specified date. The challenges presented by verification could no longer be used as a pretext for not negotiating a nuclear-test-ban treaty. Today there were no technical obstacles to the conclusion of such a treaty - there were only political barriers. Since the political situation had totally changed and the process of nuclear disarmament was under way, the time had come to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

28. Mr. ORDOÑEZ (Philippines) said that today in the world there were about 50,000 nuclear weapons, which were much more powerful than those used in the nuclear explosions 45 years earlier. While certain steps had been taken in recent years to reduce the nuclear threat, other developments continued to cause concern.

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(Mr. Ordoñez, Philippines)

29. In 1987, the INF Treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the United States had signalled the end of the policy of confrontation, which had been the hallmark of the "cold war" era. Events in Eastern Europe had served to confirm that. Nevertheless, as everyone knew, that euphoria had not lasted very long. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq had been the first major challenge of the post-confrontational era, bringing to the fore the question of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, which would be considered at the Amendment Conference.

30. The Middle East had long been a volatile region where the introduction of nuclear weapons could only exacerbate long-standing conflicts. Concern about that nightmarish possibility had been reflected in the many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly as well as the initiatives undertaken in other United Nations bodies and multilateral forums. Among the initiatives that the Philippines had strongly supported was the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. For similar reasons, the Philippines had supported intensified efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia as well as other regions of the world. The establishment of such zones, however, was merely an interim measure. It did not deal with the basic issues of drastically reducing existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons or preventing their modernization and qualitative development.

31. When the partial test-ban Treaty had been signed 27 years earlier, the world had been recovering from the shock of a near-nuclear confrontation. Today the world was facing no less insidious threats - planetary overcrowding, environmental problems, AIDS, drug addiction, and economic instability.

32. After the prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, on land and under water, such experiments had begun to be conducted underground. Nevertheless, the effects of such testing could not have been kept hidden for long. The major accidents and incidents that had occurred in various parts of the world served to remind the world about the detrimental effects of nuclear testing on human society, health and the environment.

33. In 1990, 17 nuclear tests had been conducted, bringing to a total of 1,288 the number of such tests since 1963. Such testing could only serve as a negative example to would-be nuclear Powers. The Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in Geneva in 1990, had highlighted the fact that the issue of continued nuclear testing was central to efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

34. The world had heard time and again that the goal of some nuclear-weapon States was deep and mutually verifiable cuts in nuclear weapons. For years, the issue of verification had remained unresolved; without definite parameters, nations had been able to enhance and develop their nuclear weapons without any fear of being detected. Today, however, science and technology and the more open political environment were helping to resolve that question. A recent United Nations study on verification confirmed the current availability of various methods for verifying nuclear tests. As for the question of testing to ensure the safety and reliability

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of nuclear weapons, certain studies showed that actual testing need not take place in most instances. The best way to ensure safety and reliability would be to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely.

35. The Amendment Conference provided an opportunity to create a formidable barrier to the development and spread of nuclear weapons. Unlike the non-proliferation Treaty, the 118 parties to the partial test-ban Treaty also included nations that were considered to be on the nuclear threshold. Any decision taken at the Conference, for example, on prohibiting underground testing, would be automatically binding on those countries as well.

36. The work of non-governmental organizations could not be overestimated in achieving a nuclear-test ban. They had been in the forefront of efforts to keep public awareness focused on that issue. The coalition of grass-roots movements, parliaments, congresses and heads of government would be essential in order to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The world was at the dawn of a new era in which ideas that had been under discussion for decades might finally bear fruit.

37. If it was not possible to reach agreement on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban at the current Conference, the Philippines would be in favour of reconvening in New York no later than June 1992 in order to continue work. In the interim, a working group or sub-committee established by the Conference could consider a number of questions related to the organization of control, institutional mechanisms and the legal aspects of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

38. Mr. VERGAU (Germany) said that a comprehensive test ban had long been one of the most important issues on the multilateral disarmament agenda. In view of the rapidly changing international situation, the Amendment Conference should be used to assess once again possible ways to achieve that goal.

39. The subject under discussion, however, could not be viewed in isolation from the overall context of disarmament and arms control. The remarkable success of the recent disarmament agreements, which would hardly have been considered possible a few years earlier, were still fresh in the minds of Europeans. In Europe, the process of creating mutual confidence and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order was under way. The signing of the Charter for a New Europe in Paris in November had marked the culmination of that process.

40. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in Paris on the same occasion, was the most extensive agreement in the history of disarmament and arms control. An essential element of the Treaty was an unparalleled system of verification involving the comprehensive exchange of information and far-reaching rights and duties with regard to inspection.

41. Germany welcomed the forthcoming conclusion of the START Treaty, which would lead to deep cuts in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union in the interest of all countries. His Government advocated the earliest possible commencement of negotiations on short-range nuclear systems. The

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fundamentally changed security situation in Europe called for the complete elimination of land-based short-range nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery ammunition in Europe. The Geneva negotiations on a global, complete ban on chemical weapons were coming to the forefront of arms control efforts. The negotiations on a convention completely banning chemical weapons should be concluded as soon as possible. Progress in all those individual fields of disarmament would improve chances for taking further steps towards a comprehensive test ban.

42. Germany was a non-nuclear State. At the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in August 1990, his country had reaffirmed its solemn, unilateral pledge not to produce, possess or have control over nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. In the discussions on nuclear disarmament, Germany had on various occasions stated its position on a nuclear-test ban, stressing that it did not consider a test ban to be a substitute for tangible reductions of existing weapons.

43. Germany advocated reaching agreement as speedily as possible on an effectively verifiable nuclear-test ban at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. It considered a step-by-step approach to achieving that goal necessary and expedient. In that connection, he welcomed the fact that the signing in June 1990 of the verification protocols to the threshold Treaties had paved the way for the ratification of those Treaties the previous autumn. The greater the progress in the field of nuclear disarmament and the more successful the step-by-step approach on the part of the main nuclear-weapon countries, the better the prospects were for making further tangible headway in the multilateral efforts to achieve a test ban.

44. His Government considered the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to be the appropriate international forum for dealing with a test ban. The Conference on Disarmament had wide-ranging expertise in the development of verification procedures for nuclear tests. During the past session it had proved possible, after a long hiatus, to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban. The Committee should continue to work constructively in 1991.

45. One of the objectives of the Amendment Conference was to increase understanding of the complex subject-matter related to a test ban. He hoped that the Conference would stimulate future work in Geneva.

46. Germany deemed it expedient to pursue the goal of a comprehensive test ban by concluding agreements on a step-by-step basis. In its view, the following interim steps were conceivable. The countries which tested nuclear weapons might undertake to observe specific minimum periods between tests. The observance of such intervals should lead to a further reduction in the number of tests. For the same purpose, it might also be possible to envisage specifying a maximum number of test explosions per year. The feasibility of such a limitation was borne out by the trend in the frequency of tests in recent years. In 1990, 17 nuclear-test explosions had been carried out world wide, which was considerably lower than the average number of tests conducted annually between 1960 and 1990.

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47. The further reduction of explosion yields might also be conceivable. An important role in that respect was played by a reliable world-wide verification system that also covered low-yield explosions. The advances achieved in those efforts confirmed the view that test explosions with considerably lower yields could be reliably detected and monitored in the near future. Further progress towards the goal pursued by the Amendment Conference was clearly possible.

48. Mr. EDWARDS (Australia) said that his country's approach to the Amendment Conference was based on its commitment to the earliest possible cessation of nuclear testing by all countries in all environments for all time. The current climate was more conducive to progress towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Important developments in that regard were the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the ratification by the United States and the Soviet Union of the protocols to the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty, progress in the strategic arms reduction talks (START), the re-establishment, after a seven-year hiatus, of the Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament; the strong support for the recent General Assembly resolutions on a comprehensive test-ban treaty; and the almost universal support for the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.

49. It was very pleasing to note that the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil had recently announced that the two countries would co-operate more closely on nuclear issues through, inter alia, the establishment of a system of mutual inspections and the negotiation of a nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. They would also consider the question of bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco into full effect.

50. Australia had been one of the first parties to the partial test-ban Treaty. Although it was not a comprehensive test-ban treaty, it, nevertheless, made an important contribution to nuclear non-proliferation, the prevention of significant categories of nuclear testing, and the prevention of radioactive pollution of the sea, the atmosphere and outer space. A central element in Australia's approach to achieving the goal of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests was the early conclusion of a widely supported and verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva was the proper forum for negotiations in that regard.

51. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty had proved to be a difficult challenge, not only because of the need to persuade all the nuclear-weapon States that they should stop testing, but also because there was much work to be done on issues such as scope, verification and compliance in order to ensure that such a treaty was effective and lasting.

52. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in the Conference on Disarmament had been a positive development. The participants in the Amendment Conference should not lose sight of the way in which the Ad Hoc Committee, even without a negotiating mandate, could continue the work carried out in the process of achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The events of recent

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(Mr. Edwards, Australia)

years, which had transformed the international security climate, demonstrated that what had seemed impossible or unlikely could be achieved if there was the political will and if the necessary effort was made.

53. At the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly the States parties had not reached consensus on convening the Amendment Conference and other related questions. It was important that the Conference should make a constructive contribution in areas such as verification. To that end, Australia and New Zealand had submitted a paper to help focus discussion on that subject as an important adjunct to the work being conducted by the Group of Scientific Experts in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

54. Mr. JAYASINGHE (Sri Lanka) said that for more than four decades mankind had been faced with the nuclear threat. The efforts of the international community in that respect, however, had not yielded the desired results and nuclear capability fuelled by "cold war" competition had grown to alarming proportions. Today the nuclear Powers possessed deadly arsenals capable of destroying human civilization several times over. That had been recognized in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, in 1978. Numerous studies in that field had identified the intrinsic relationship between the reversal of the nuclear arms race and banning nuclear tests. Leading scientists, experts, politicians, representatives of non-governmental and other organizations and people from all walks of life had stressed the importance of a nuclear-test ban as an integral part of the process of reversing the nuclear-arms race. They had always emphasized the urgent need to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the positive contribution that such a treaty could make to slowing down the nuclear-arms race and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons.

55. Those appeals, however, had fallen on deaf ears. The nuclear Powers continued to engage in nuclear-arms competition, claiming that a nuclear-weapon capability was essential for ensuring their national security. They were also under the delusion that nuclear deterrence provided greater security. Enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons had been accumulated and their total strength was equivalent to more than 1 million of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima.

56. That gave rise to the moral and practical question of whether such destructive power was needed and, if so, for whose benefit. At the current stage, collective action was necessary in order to eliminate the nuclear threat. The Amendment Conference focused on an important aspect of that question. His delegation believed that the time had come to address that question in a serious manner, taking into account the positive developments in the international arena and the destruction and suffering that such weapons could inflict on the human race. The fear and suspicion brought about by the "cold war" had become deeply rooted in the minds of contending parties. That fear and suspicion had made some parties believe that the only way to avert a nuclear war was to arm themselves to the teeth with those deadly weapons. Although in the past many volatile situations had not led to war, unless meaningful and speedy action was taken, the threat of a nuclear catastrophe would remain. Recently, the "cold war" atmosphere had given way to

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warmer relations between the two super-Powers. Today there was talk of co-operation instead of confrontation. That had brought about an unprecedented improvement in East-West relations. Such co-operation had resulted in the settlement of regional conflicts and a greater readiness to work within the framework of the United Nations in ensuring international peace and security.

57. His delegation took the opportunity to appeal to the three nuclear Powers that were parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to take a serious look at their treaty obligations and to enter into negotiations with a view to achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty as envisaged in both the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968. The commitments made in those Treaties were commitments that had to be fulfilled not only by the nuclear Powers but also by other parties to them. In keeping with those obligations and the desire of the international community to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty, Sri Lanka had joined Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and Yugoslavia in proposing an amendment to the partial test-ban Treaty with a view to converting it into a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

58. Twenty-seven years had gone by without the parties making any serious effort to fulfil their treaty obligations. While earlier their excuse had been the prevailing political and military situation, such arguments were of no value in the context of current developments on the international scene. The dramatic changes that were taking place had been made possible largely by the increasing willingness of the super-Powers to work together for their mutual benefit. The super-Powers had demonstrated that they were prepared to provide leadership in settling pressing issues that threatened international peace and security. It was reasonable to expect the nuclear Powers that were parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to not only reassess their negative policies towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty but also provide the requisite leadership to achieve such a treaty within a reasonable time-frame.

59. Sri Lanka's decision to play a leading role in the Amendment Conference process had also been influenced by other considerations related to the social and economic consequences of the nuclear-arms race. In the modern age, it was against all civilized standards and moral convictions that billions of people were being deprived of such basic needs as food, clothing, shelter, health care, sanitation and education that were fundamental for them to live in dignity. Thousands of children died of starvation and malnutrition every day, while the international community spent billions of dollars for destructive purposes. It was estimated that worldwide military expenditures in 1989 had amounted to more than \$US 900 billion.

60. His delegation wished to point out that some nuclear Powers were of the view that a step-by-step approach should be taken to efforts to curb the nuclear-arms race. In explaining their policies, they said that in the foreseeable future nuclear testing would continue to be indispensable to their national security and that nuclear weapons would also continue to play a critical role in their national security. They claimed that a comprehensive nuclear-test ban remained a long-term objective and must be viewed in the context of a period when they would not have to

(Mr. Jayasinghe, Sri Lanka)

depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure national as well as international security and stability, when there would be broad, deep and effectively verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures and a greater balance in conventional forces.

61. In the view of his delegation, such policies would lead nowhere and would only make matters worse. The time had come to move away from those outdated policies and strategies, which had been designed to meet cold-war conditions. All nuclear Powers must review their policies and assist the world community in launching a process whereby all human beings could be assured of living in peace and friendship. The recent agreements between the super-Powers and among the European countries under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe were ample testimony to the ability of the international community to work together for the common interest.

62. There was also a view that the Amendment Conference should end with the current session. His delegation wished to place on record that it had never been the intention of the convenors of the Conference that it should end with one session. If that was the case, the Conference would fail to fulfil its mandate. In his delegation's assessment, there was an overwhelming desire among the parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to continue the process until a comprehensive test ban was achieved. That did not mean that such a ban should be achieved at the present Conference. The process should, however, continue until a comprehensive test ban was achieved. That was the first time that the parties, in keeping with their treaty obligations, had gathered to address the question of a comprehensive test ban, and his delegation therefore appealed to those parties which had difficulties with the continuity of the process to reconsider their position and adopt a more constructive attitude. His delegation would spare no effort in the search for modalities that might be acceptable to all parties, so that collectively they could work towards a comprehensive nuclear-test ban for the common benefit of mankind. If they failed in that endeavour, they would not only continue to face the threat of nuclear war and other adverse effects of the nuclear-arms race but would also be encouraging horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation.

63. States parties that had near-nuclear capability and were not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty were of the view that the latter Treaty was discriminatory. The failure of the nuclear Powers to work towards the achievement of a comprehensive test ban and their continued stockpiling of nuclear weapons, while advocating the abandonment of nuclear capability by others, was seen as hypocritical. Unless that discrepancy was remedied, countries which had near-nuclear-weapon capability were determined to reserve their right to acquire nuclear weapons. Such a development would make the control of nuclear weapons an extremely difficult proposition and bring the threat of nuclear war even closer.

64. Mr. SAETHER (Norway) said that the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water had been a major achievement. It had not, however, solved the problem of underground nuclear explosions. The international community had for many years sought a comprehensive test-ban treaty and Norway had actively supported that call.

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(Mr. Saether, Norway)

65. There had been promising developments in recent years in the field of arms control and disarmament, such as the agreement on conventional forces in Europe, the mutual reduction by the United States and the Soviet Union of their nuclear arsenals and the ratification of the verification protocols to the 1974 threshold test-ban Treaty and the 1976 peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. However, Norway had been particularly disappointed with the lack of progress on the test-ban issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

66. An effective system of verification was of the utmost importance in any international arms control and disarmament agreement. His Government had devoted considerable resources to conducting seismological research for that purpose. There were two seismic array stations in Norway, and a global network capable of analysing weak seismic signals was of crucial importance in verifying compliance with a test-ban treaty. That was the rationale behind Norway's proposal that the global seismological network should incorporate such arrays.

67. His Government was greatly concerned about the risks associated with underground nuclear testing, particularly in ecologically vulnerable environments such as the Arctic. Norway saw that as an additional important reason for halting all nuclear-test explosions. Full use should now be made of the momentum that had been created bilaterally between the United States and the Soviet Union and regionally in Europe in the field of disarmament and arms control, and the main objective of the Amendment Conference should be to give further impetus to the work being done on that issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

Tuesday, 8 January 1991, at 3.35 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mrs. LOZANO (Colombia) said that the question of a complete ban on nuclear tests should not be viewed as a theoretical exercise, but, rather, as a major undertaking offering unprecedented benefits in terms of quality of life. Her delegation endorsed the view expressed by the Secretary-General at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, that Governments had a duty to ensure the survival and security of their citizens, and that, given the catastrophic effect which a nuclear exchange would have on the peoples of all countries, the international community must insist on a reduction in and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

2. For many years her delegation had been convinced that the most effective means of halting the nuclear arms race would be a complete ban on nuclear tests. Such a development would drastically reduce the qualitative rivalry between the nuclear Powers and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The 1963 partial test-ban Treaty had always been considered the first step towards the attainment of that objective. Numerous General Assembly resolutions supported by the non-nuclear-weapon countries condemned nuclear-weapon tests in all environments and reminded nuclear-weapon States of their special obligation to discontinue such tests pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Failure to conclude such a treaty undermined the credibility of disarmament agreements, and refusal by any nuclear-weapon State to accept the proposed amendment to the partial test-ban Treaty could only be interpreted as a clear statement of intent to continue the development of nuclear-weapon systems.

3. The international community could not accept cosmetic agreements that did not eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons. It therefore could not permit a small number of countries to arrogate to themselves the capability of unleashing universal destruction in a world which had created the United Nations in order to promote peaceful coexistence. Without a ban, the new world security order advocated by the nuclear-weapon Powers was simply an illusion. The three quarters of mankind living in substandard conditions could not continue to wait while human aspirations were sacrificed to the madness of the arms race. The Amendment Conference provided an opportunity to change the terms of peaceful coexistence among nations.

4. Mr. MACKAY (New Zealand) said that all the participants in the Amendment Conference shared the objective of ending nuclear testing for all time, as had been foreseen in the preamble to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty. That objective had been reiterated in the preambles to other treaties limiting the testing and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

5. New Zealand had long considered that there was an urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty prohibiting all tests in all environments for all time, and had promoted resolutions along those lines for some 20 years. A

(Mr. Mackay, New Zealand)

comprehensive test ban was the most effective way of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

6. The Conference was taking place against a mixed backdrop of improved relations between the major nuclear Powers and progress in restricting the possession of nuclear weapons, offset by reminders of the dangers of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It provided the first opportunity in almost 30 years for all parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to discuss the issues involved in a comprehensive test ban. Some had already made clear their opposition to such a step, while many others, including New Zealand, had no such reservations. The Conference provided an opportunity to discuss those differences and address some of the difficulties encountered in earlier negotiations on nuclear testing.

7. Verification was one such issue. It had frequently been argued that a comprehensive test ban would not be verifiable and thus would not be practicable. It was, however, now technically possible by seismological means to detect underground tests, with a very high degree of confidence, down to very low levels. His delegation, together with that of Australia, had submitted a paper on verification (PTBT/CONF/4/Add.1). In that connection he commended the work carried out within the Conference on Disarmament by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, and urged all countries to support work in that field. The recent ratification by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of verification protocols to the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (threshold test-ban Treaty) and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty) was encouraging, particularly with regard to acceptance of the utility of such verification procedures as hydrodynamic-yield measurement and seismic monitoring and of the principle of intrusive on-site verification.

8. New Zealand welcomed China's participation in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban re-established by the Conference on Disarmament, and hoped that all nuclear-weapon States would seek representation on it. His delegation supported the expansion of the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate. The New Zealand Government welcomed the broader dialogue now under way among nuclear-weapon States in Geneva, and trusted that the Amendment Conference would contribute to progress in resolving what were issues of vital importance.

9. Mr. MOUSSA (Egypt) said that the convening of the Amendment Conference reflected an overwhelming desire to consolidate accomplishments in the field of nuclear disarmament. The various international instruments in that domain clearly indicated the existence of an obligation for States parties to those instruments to work towards the discontinuance of all nuclear-weapon tests. Such a goal was essential in order to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, since, in practical terms, it would result in the cessation of the nuclear-arms race.

10. Notwithstanding the divergent views of States at the Conference, all should display a spirit of accommodation so as to enable progress to be made towards the goal of eliminating the nuclear-arms threat. The timing of the Conference was

(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

propitious, given the recent positive developments in international relations; there was now an opportunity to address the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons rather than merely regulate nuclear armaments. With the emergence of the new world order, all nuclear-weapon States should seriously reassess the nuclear policies that had cast a shadow over the world for half a century.

11. Since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty in 1963, nuclear arsenals had taken on monstrous proportions, a development made possible by energetic and ongoing test programmes. The prohibition of underground tests would constrain the development and deployment of new generations of nuclear arms, reduce reliance upon nuclear arsenals, reinvigorate efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and substantially reduce the risk of future radioactive contamination of the environment. Accordingly, his Government supported the amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty, with a view to making the test ban comprehensive. Indeed, his Government favoured the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

12. It was regrettable that the role of the Conference on Disarmament had been limited and that no substantial progress towards a comprehensive test ban had been made. Nevertheless it remained the primary multilateral negotiating body for the conclusion of disarmament treaties. His delegation would like the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to be accorded the negotiating mandate necessary for it to formulate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. He agreed with the representative of Sweden that following the conclusion of the Amendment Conference, machinery should be established to enable the Conference on Disarmament to initiate treaty negotiations leading to that end. Such an agreement would constitute the corner-stone of an effective international security system and would be an essential step in halting the nuclear-arms race.

13. The Conference provided a unique opportunity to expand and fortify the international non-proliferation régime. The relationship between the amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty and that of the non-proliferation Treaty was self-evident, since all items on the disarmament agenda were interrelated and progress in one area enhanced the possibilities of improvement in all other areas. That balance should be maintained so as to reaffirm the universality of the issues and goals of disarmament.

14. Since the non-proliferation Treaty would expire in only four years, emphasis should be placed on securing compliance with its provisions by all States. Vertical proliferation was a particular cause for concern, in view of the danger posed by existing nuclear arsenals. Egypt was attempting to consolidate regional non-proliferation through its initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Nuclear proliferation was the greatest security challenge of the 1990s, and a comprehensive nuclear test ban was a vital means of containing both horizontal and vertical proliferation.

15. A comprehensive test-ban treaty must include the necessary verification mechanisms and confidence-building measures to guarantee compliance with its provisions. He hoped that substantive negotiations would lead to an agreement on

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(Mr. Moussa, Egypt)

draft Protocol II of the Amendment to the partial test-ban Treaty, which dealt with that intricate and important issue. The recent conclusion of agreements and the advances in verification techniques should facilitate the effective verification of a comprehensive test ban. His delegation strongly disagreed with the arguments of some nuclear-weapon States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty that a comprehensive test ban would not be verifiable or that nuclear deterrence was an appropriate security measure that called for continued testing.

16. To date, all progress in the field of disarmament had been the fruit of a political will to further the goals of disarmament and to respond to both the security requirements of the negotiating parties and developments in international relations. He hoped that the current negotiations would be characterized by such a convergence of will. While some delegations had suggested pursuing a step-by-step approach to a comprehensive test ban, relying primarily on bilateral agreements, his delegation was convinced that such a course of action had not, as yet, proved its effectiveness in achieving the desired goal. Previous limited agreements, such as the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty, had required lengthy negotiation and were founded on the concept of the limitation rather than the elimination of nuclear arms. Such a concept was illogical in view of the positive developments in international relations.

17. The adverse environmental, social and economic effects of nuclear testing could no longer be ignored. The health and well-being of a large segment of the world's population was being unjustifiably endangered by continued nuclear testing and the environmental degradation it caused. The widespread public support for a comprehensive test-ban treaty had become evident through the growth of such organizations as Parliamentarians for Global Action and Greenpeace International. The world economy also suffered from nuclear testing, since vast amounts of resources were being used for testing programmes instead of for more constructive purposes.

18. The current international climate reinforced the belief that co-operation and dialogue, not policies of deterrence or force, were the essential factors in ensuring security and peace for all States. He hoped that the successful conclusion of the Conference would reaffirm that belief.

19. Mr. GROOP (Finland) said that a comprehensive nuclear-test ban was a priority of the international community in the field of disarmament, for both security and environmental reasons. His delegation was prepared to contribute constructively to the general purpose of the Conference by participating in discussions on the requirements of an eventual comprehensive test-ban treaty, particularly in terms of verification. However, his delegation was not comfortable with the specific purpose of the Conference, i.e. to consider an amendment to the partial test-ban Treaty. It believed that successful disarmament measures should not be opened for renegotiations. In addition, successful disarmament negotiations required an appreciation of the security concerns and interests of all States, as defined by the States themselves. A flexible, step-by-step approach to a comprehensive test ban was a more realistic objective.

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(Mr. Groop, Finland)

20. The threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty were examples of progress towards disarmament goals. The non-proliferation Treaty had also been successful, and although its goals would be furthered by the cessation of nuclear tests, its functioning should not be damaged by an artificial linkage of the Treaty to any extraneous issue.

21. Although there was an absolute need for an eventual comprehensive test ban to be verifiable, doubts about the effectiveness of current verification methods should not constitute an obstacle to such a ban. The results of research conducted in Finland on the seismological verification of nuclear tests had convinced his delegation that existing methods could ensure adequate detection of nuclear explosions. That research project, which relied on a sophisticated national network of seismic stations with facilities for data transmission and processing, was Finland's contribution, as a member of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament, to the task of laying the technical groundwork for the verification of a test ban. The Amendment Conference provided an opportunity for those who participated in such activities to explain the technical requirements of a nuclear-test ban to a wider audience. It was important for all parties concerned to understand that global verification of a test ban would be a highly complex and technically demanding undertaking.

22. His delegation felt that the Conference on Disarmament, as the negotiating body of the international community for disarmament questions, was the appropriate forum for negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty. However, the Amendment Conference would serve its general purpose if it gave a political impetus to the cause of banning all nuclear tests. A serious discussion of the test-ban issue and of verification in particular, which could subsequently be continued at the Conference on Disarmament, would constitute an important contribution by the Amendment Conference.

23. Mr. SARDENBERG (Brazil) said that at a time when examples abounded of close co-operation between former rivals and of coherent and positive international responses to remaining sources of conflict, it was regrettable that disagreement persisted in the important area of nuclear testing. Despite the urgency of the goal of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, the international community was remarkably late in its efforts to conclude a treaty to that effect. Brazil had signed the partial test-ban Treaty on the day on which it had been opened for signature in 1963, in token of its commitment to the eventual discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. Moreover, Brazil had unilaterally waived its right to develop and use peaceful nuclear explosive devices, as part of the international effort to ban all nuclear explosions.

24. Since the conclusion of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, which contained a clear commitment to the goal of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, no progress had been made towards that goal. Underground nuclear testing continued unabated; between 1963 and 1989, more than 1,200 nuclear tests had been recorded internationally, more than 1,000 of which had been conducted by the two main nuclear-weapon States. Apart from their political and security implications, those

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figures reflected the extremely grave risks to which the environment continued to be exposed. As the international community prepared for the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, it should be recalled that the complete cessation of nuclear tests would be a fundamental step towards ensuring a safer and cleaner world environment, free from contamination by radioactive substances.

25. Multilateral consideration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, particularly at the Conference on Disarmament, had shown no significant progress, yet the overwhelming majority of States had expressed unequivocal support for the cessation of all nuclear tests. Each year, the General Assembly had called upon the nuclear-weapon States to renounce nuclear testing in all environments, to no avail. The reasons given to justify continued testing, such as the need to maintain a credible deterrent nuclear power, were unacceptable; such arguments appeared to question the commitment expressly undertaken in the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty eventually to ban all nuclear-test explosions. The partial test-ban Treaty had been intended as a first step towards the goal of a complete ban on testing. The proposed amendment set out in the annex to document PTBT/CONF/8 had been endorsed by a wide majority of the States parties to the Treaty, and he therefore supported its adoption.

26. The question of verification was the issue which had blocked agreement on a comprehensive test ban in 1963. Since then, the international community had acquired vast experience in the verification of disarmament agreements. There was currently a virtual technical consensus that it was possible to verify a comprehensive test ban with the highest degree of confidence. For instance, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts had accumulated considerable experience in seismic detection techniques which could serve to verify a complete ban. Other possible techniques were also available and should be examined thoroughly, bearing in mind that the question of on-site inspections no longer appeared to be an intractable issue. The technical and political feasibility of verification had been underscored by recent bilateral agreements. The various aspects of the question should be given careful consideration in the context of the proposal to convert the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In that connection, he wished to refer to document PTBT/CONF/6, whose annex contained draft Protocol II of Amendment to the Treaty. Other issues relating to legal aspects of the proposed amendment should also be studied, particularly with regard to the question of peaceful nuclear explosions.

27. If the aim of the Amendment Conference was to make possible a serious consideration of all the issues involved, the time which had been allocated was clearly insufficient. General Assembly resolution 45/50 provided a possible solution to that problem. While not all delegations had supported the procedures outlined in that resolution, he felt that, with the necessary political will, a solution could still be found which would allow for a meaningful outcome of the Conference. On the other hand, if the international community failed once again to take practical steps towards the fulfilment of the commitments embodied in the partial test-ban Treaty, it would undermine the validity of that instrument, with negative consequences for nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

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28. In a new and peaceful era, it was not enough to say that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. The threat of nuclear war implicit in the very existence of nuclear weapons and in their continued development and testing must be eliminated. The record of negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty was one of frustrated aspirations and missed opportunities. Never before, however, had the international climate been so favourable to progress in the field of disarmament. A firm commitment towards the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would send a clear signal that international peace and security were no longer to be based on the threat of mass destruction.

29. Mr. MUNTEANU (Romania) said that his country, which had undergone a process of fundamental change after the December 1989 revolution, was firmly committed to the goal of arms control and disarmament, both nuclear and conventional.

30. Nuclear disarmament was one of the highest priorities for the international community. That objective could be achieved only through sustained and progressive efforts aimed at nuclear-arms limitation and disarmament. He therefore welcomed the INF Treaty and supported the speedy conclusion by the United States and the Soviet Union of a treaty on a reduction in strategic offensive arms. He also welcomed the decision by the United States and the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces in Europe, as well as the agreement on the verification protocols to the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty, which had paved the way for the entry into force of those instruments.

31. The complete cessation of nuclear testing was a goal to which the three nuclear-weapon States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty had clearly committed themselves. His country supported a complete ban on nuclear testing, which would have a positive impact on efforts to end the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament and would strengthen the non-proliferation régime. He therefore shared the concern that, despite all the efforts made during more than a quarter of a century, the world had come no closer to achieving that goal. However, the new international situation offered better prospects for success.

32. His Government, which was committed to the principle that a complete ban on testing should be approached gradually, would welcome any new steps towards the further limitation of underground nuclear tests. The proposal to amend the partial test-ban Treaty was one possibility; on the other hand, the adoption of an additional protocol to the Treaty or the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty were also valid options. What was essential was the initiation of a genuine process of negotiations, to which the Conference could give an important political impetus.

33. It was extremely important for the Conference to ensure a climate favourable to constructive solutions. In that context, he welcomed the decision to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at the beginning of the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament. In the same spirit, his country was participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

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34. Mr. ELIASSEN (Denmark) said that since the entry into force of the partial test-ban Treaty, the international community had hoped and expected that it would also be possible to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. However, nearly 28 years after the signature of the Treaty, and despite many international efforts, that goal had still not been achieved.

35. The bilateral efforts made by the two major nuclear Powers were of great importance, and the step-by-step process of limiting nuclear tests, agreed on in 1987 by the United States and the Soviet Union, had been a welcome development. The process had led to the conclusion in June 1990 of two important verification protocols to the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty, thus paving the way for the ratification of those two instruments. The negotiations should be continued and intensified with a view to achieving a comprehensive test ban.

36. With regard to multilateral efforts, the Conference on Disarmament was clearly the most appropriate forum for negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. He therefore looked forward to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at the beginning of the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Substantial work remained to be done on a number of relevant issues, including verification and compliance.

37. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, in which his country had participated for several years, had achieved significant results in developing a concept for a global seismological monitoring system with a view to the verification of a comprehensive test ban. Verification techniques had advanced to the point where the outstanding problems in that area seemed to call for political, rather than technical, solutions.

38. A comprehensive test ban, while not an end in itself, would be an important step towards nuclear disarmament, especially as it would impede the development of new generations of nuclear weapons. The environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear testing were an additional reason for the suspension of all test explosions.

39. The Amendment Conference would provide a valuable opportunity for a wide-ranging discussion of a comprehensive test ban and related issues. The objective of the Conference should be to give an impetus to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. It was important to uphold the principle of consensus in the work of the Conference, since a constructive outcome could be ensured only through decisions adopted by consensus.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.

Wednesday, 9 January 1991, at 10.35 a.m.

OBSERVER STATUS

1. The PRESIDENT said that the Secretary-General of the Conference had received requests for Observer status at the Conference from Angola and Vanuatu in pursuance of rule 44 (2) (a) of the rules of procedure. The Secretary-General of the Conference had also received a request for Observer status at the Conference from Palestine in pursuance of rule 44 (2) (b) of the rules of procedure. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the participants in the Conference agreed to grant Observer status to Angola, Vanuatu and Palestine.

2. It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

3. Mr. PENNANEACH (Togo) said that the Amendment Conference was important first of all because of the urgent need to strive tirelessly to create a world free of the spectre of the destruction of civilization. Ensuring international peace and security required co-ordinated efforts at the national, bilateral, regional and international level in order to promote general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In that connection, any initiative that helped to halt the arms race and bring about nuclear disarmament should be given proper attention.

4. The Amendment Conference not only demonstrated the commitment of its initiators to the spirit and letter of the 1963 Moscow Treaty, but also reflected the profound concern of the international community at the continuation of nuclear testing and also its growing material interest in an immediate halt to the arms race.

5. In the preamble to the Treaty, its original parties had proclaimed their commitment to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, their determination to continue negotiations to that end and their desire to halt the radioactive contamination of the environment. The fact that 118 States were parties to the Treaty undoubtedly served as clear evidence of the commitment of States to halting the nuclear-arms race and to the gradual and complete cessation of nuclear tests. Nevertheless, contemporary policy for ensuring security had not made it possible to realize the hope linked to that international document for a slow-down in the nuclear-arms race - after the signing of the Treaty, the number of tests had even increased. Before its signing, an average of 30 tests had been conducted annually, while in the period afterwards the number had increased to 48. The fact that 85 per cent of all tests were being conducted by the three original parties to the Treaty was also noteworthy.

6. Furthermore, by means of testing and stepped-up scientific research in the military field nuclear weapons were being qualitatively improved, making it possible to modernize nuclear warheads and, in particular, reduce their size and weight in absolute terms and increase strike accuracy and reliability.

(Mr. Pennaneach, Togo)

7. Transforming the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty seemed to be necessary in view of the following four reasons: there was an urgent need to ensure strict compliance with the spirit and letter of the Treaty and strengthen the non-proliferation régime; the countries of the world had an increasing material interest in a comprehensive nuclear-test ban; the technical means for verification were available; East-West relations had considerably improved; and prospects had opened up for building a new international order based on the principles of trust, solidarity and co-operation.
8. Amending the Treaty would considerably assist efforts to halt the nuclear-arms race and prevent in a non-discriminatory way the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The indivisible link between the obligation of some States not to acquire nuclear weapons and that of others to halt the growth and qualitative improvement of their nuclear arsenals must, first and foremost, constitute the basis for a truly reliable and effective non-proliferation régime.
9. The advent of the thermonuclear era had threatened to obliterate civilization and the problem of ensuring security had become global in nature. Henceforth, the question of halting the nuclear-arms race had constantly been the focus of attention of the States Members of the United Nations. Numerous General Assembly resolutions dealt with that question and the efforts undertaken at the Conference on Disarmament were designed to achieve that goal. Nevertheless, the growth and modernization of nuclear capabilities contradicted the noble intentions proclaimed in the Moscow Treaty concerning the cessation of nuclear-test explosions and the holding of negotiations to that end. The purpose of amending the Treaty was indeed to eliminate that contradiction.
10. Current technical verification means made it possible to register nuclear-weapon tests, as was demonstrated by the data provided in the 1990 SIPRI annual report, and opposition to an immediate and comprehensive test ban was today due more to political and military considerations, particularly adherence to the concept of nuclear deterrence. He stressed the wide-ranging possibilities for verification, which had been demonstrated during the two technical tests successfully conducted by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, considering measures to promote international co-operation in order to detect and identify seismic events. Increasing the number of countries participating in other technical tests would help to improve that verification method and establish a global network of seismic stations.
11. A step-by-step approach to a test ban not only did not prevent the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, but also jeopardized the multilateral negotiations on an immediate and comprehensive ban. Viewing a comprehensive test ban as a long-term goal was tantamount to ignoring the global nature of ensuring security, legitimizing the policy of nuclear deterrence and maintaining the military strategic advantage which the possession of nuclear weapons gave certain States. Such an approach was fraught with the danger of encouraging the acquisition of nuclear weapons as the ideal way to ensure security.

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(Mr. Pennaneach, Togo)

12. The significant improvement in East-West relations was opening up prospects for developing and intensifying disarmament efforts. That unique opportunity should be used in order to redefine policy for ensuring security in order to adopt a defensive doctrine based on the total rejection of the policy of nuclear deterrence. It was necessary to proceed from words to deeds and make a choice in favour of amending the Moscow Treaty in order to ensure the survival of mankind.

13. Mr. HOEKEMA (Netherlands) said that his country continued to support the goal of a comprehensive test ban in accordance with the obligations under the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty. Such a ban should be framed in the broader context of the process of disarmament and, in particular, nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons for years had contributed to stability and had helped prevent an East-West conflict. Even in the changed political conditions in Europe nuclear weapons could be considered a stabilizing element. That fact, however, should not preclude a substantial reduction of nuclear-weapon stocks to minimum levels. The recent successes at nuclear-arms reduction negotiations and the prospects for further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrated that the parties concerned were on the right track.

14. A further reduction in the number of tests to a minimum level was technically feasible and politically desirable. Nevertheless, nuclear forces in their limited future role and in drastically reduced numbers would have to be kept up to date. That might imply a certain number of nuclear tests, but their number and yield should be kept to a minimum. In that context, the Netherlands called on the United States and the Soviet Union to take further steps in their phased approach to nuclear testing and start negotiations as soon as possible on effective limitations on the number of their tests.

15. While the merits of a comprehensive test ban had been studied in depth, very few publications had been devoted to the minimum level of testing required to keep nuclear weapons reliable and up to date. His delegation, therefore, would welcome a further study of the possibility of using "dry testing" procedures and, at the same time, limiting actual explosions.

16. The Netherlands continued to believe that the number of nuclear tests could and should be rapidly reduced along with further reductions in nuclear weapons. That might be a more fruitful approach to bringing about a ban on all tests, which the international community so eagerly sought. His country was fully committed to the obligations under the Treaty to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons.

17. The international community had the right to be properly informed about possible environmental and health hazards of nuclear tests.

18. Another important question concerned the way a comprehensive test ban could be verified. There was substantial evidence that underground nuclear explosions were detectable, particularly through seismic monitoring. In that regard, his

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(Mr. Hoekema, Netherlands)

delegation welcomed the paper on verification drafted by Australia and New Zealand, and considered that the ongoing work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be encouraged.

19. His delegation hoped that the discussions at the Amendment Conference would result in increased understanding among delegations on issues where they differed. The Netherlands firmly believed that further discussions should take place in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban of the Conference on Disarmament.

20. Mr. GOLOVKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that, in recent years, the process of practical disarmament had gained unprecedented momentum. The Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles was being carried out successfully, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe had been signed and a treaty between the USSR and the United States on a radical reduction of their strategic arms would be next. In such circumstances, the Soviet Union considered the achievement of a nuclear-test ban to be one of the priority goals of its foreign policy.

21. A token of the Soviet Union's unswerving policy in that area had been the appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued on 9 October 1990, in which it drew the attention of parliaments and the world community to the urgent need for the prompt cessation of all nuclear tests as one of the most important measures for strengthening the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their destruction, and also called upon those States which were conducting nuclear-weapon tests to express their clear and unambiguous support for a complete and general cessation of nuclear tests.

22. Drawing attention to the Soviet Union's approach to possible ways of solving that problem, he said that the USSR was prepared to make use of every opportunity for a complete nuclear-weapon-test ban, which would be facilitated by constructive parallel efforts at the bilateral and multilateral levels.

23. While the ongoing Soviet-American dialogue was a step-by-step process, it nevertheless represented progress towards a final goal. In the summer of 1990, bilateral protocols to the 1974 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (the threshold test-ban Treaty) and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes had been signed. After ratifying those treaties, the USSR and the United States had confirmed at the highest level their intention to adhere to their agreement to undertake negotiations on further limitations of nuclear tests with a view to their ultimate cessation. The 1974 and 1976 treaties had entered into force on 11 December 1990. Provided that its partners were also in agreement, the Soviet Union was ready to proceed, immediately after the completion of the first stage, to an agreement on the complete cessation of nuclear tests.

24. Considering the problem of nuclear tests to be transboundary, the Soviet Union fully supported multilateral steps towards the complete cessation of tests and

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(Mr. Golovko, USSR)

placed great hope in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban of the Conference on Disarmament. The Amendment Conference could be an important milestone on the way to a complete test ban. The partial test-ban Treaty, to which more than 110 States had become parties, had marked the first major success in efforts to limit the nuclear-arms race. Unfortunately, two of the five nuclear Powers, China and France, had not yet acceded to it. The conclusion of the Treaty had impeded the qualitative improvement and creation of new types of nuclear weapons and had helped to strengthen the international non-proliferation régime and to improve the human environment throughout the world.

25. The Soviet Union considered that the adoption by the parties to the partial test-ban Treaty of a consensus decision on the extension of that Treaty's effect to underground nuclear tests would make it possible to achieve, in practical terms, a complete nuclear-weapon-test ban. While it was hardly realistic to expect that the current Conference would reach agreement on an amendment to the Treaty, that should not be a reason to play down its importance. The convening of the Conference had placed the need for a complete nuclear-test ban at the centre of the world community's attention and had provided an impetus for the development of specific ideas and suggestions on ways of verifying a complete nuclear-test ban.

26. Of key importance for the preparation of an international agreement in that area was the question of an effective verification mechanism. Experience gained in recent years demonstrated that it was possible to create, within sufficiently short time-limits, a verification mechanism acceptable to all parties. The Soviet Union's approach to the problem of verification had been reflected in the document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests", which had been submitted for consideration to the Conference on Disarmament in 1987. In addition to the use of national technical means of verification, there were provisions for the creation of an international seismic monitoring system, the exchange of data on the radioactivity of air masses, and systematic verification by international inspectors, as well as the possibility of conducting mandatory on-site inspections upon request without the right of refusal. Both the proposals which were already before the Amendment Conference and those which would be submitted to it in the course of its work deserved very serious consideration.

27. A moratorium on nuclear tests was a very useful measure which facilitated the conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty, and his delegation confirmed, once again, the Soviet Union's repeated assertions that it was ready at any time to discontinue its nuclear tests provided that the United States agreed to do likewise.

28. His delegation hoped that the Conference would provide an impetus for a rapid breakthrough which would help achieve a complete nuclear-test ban, and it was prepared to consider any constructive ideas for completing the work of the Conference.

29. Mr. SILOVIĆ (Yugoslavia) said that, ever since the explosion of the first atomic bomb and the advent of the nuclear age, a comprehensive nuclear-test ban had

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(Mr. Silović, Yugoslavia)

been one of mankind's most sought-after and as yet unattained goals. The first, and so far the only, successful effort to limit nuclear tests had been the partial test-ban Treaty. Since then, nuclear tests, carried out underground since that was not prohibited by the Treaty, and the nuclear-arms race had continued unabated. For the first time since its entry into force, States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty had gathered together at the Amendment Conference in order to make a contribution towards achieving the goal which had eluded them for so many years: a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

30. The very fact that the Conference had been convened was an important step forward and reflected the interest of the international community in tackling that serious problem. The results achieved so far in the bilateral negotiations on disarmament between the Soviet Union and the United States, particularly their intention to sign a treaty on strategic arms in the near future, was particularly encouraging. Equally important was the signing of the bilateral protocols to the 1974 threshold test-ban Treaty and the 1976 Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.

31. The consideration of disarmament problems, particularly at the multilateral level, was not an end in itself. It related to problems in many other areas of international life, and the emerging new world order would be long in coming if disarmament problems were left unattended. The central issue was the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. In the opinion of his delegation, the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban would consolidate the international non-proliferation régime and would virtually preclude vertical or horizontal proliferation.

32. The partial test-ban Treaty was one of the rare treaties which had been concluded for an indefinite period and for which no regular review conferences were held. The Amendment Conference was therefore also a useful opportunity to exchange views on a number of other pertinent issues, in particular the issue of verification. In the opinion of his delegation, the amending of the partial test-ban Treaty should be accompanied by a systematic exchange of views on the problem of verification, so that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would help bring about a complex system of verification under effective international control. The United Nations was well equipped to make that happen. All nuclear-weapon States must become parties to the test-ban treaty and the resultant system of verification.

33. The holding of the Conference was not limited to the amendment of a disarmament treaty; it should also provide a fresh impetus to the overall efforts of the international community to ban nuclear-weapon tests. The Conference could also be of great importance to the progress of the negotiations which were being conducted within the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

34. The threat to use nuclear weapons again had never been removed. The only way and the first step to eliminate that threat was the adoption of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

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35. Mr. KHARRAZI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the Amendment Conference was taking place in a changing world situation. Positive developments in the relationship between East and West, marked by the reunification of Germany and the proclamation upon the conclusion of the negotiations within the CSCE of the Paris charter, were opening up highly promising vistas.

36. Unfortunately, the process of limiting arms and of disarmament had still not struck deep roots in many parts of the world. Clear evidence of that was the concentration of sophisticated weapons systems, including weapons of mass destruction, in volatile areas, specifically in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

37. One of the central issues on the disarmament agenda was the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. The existence of an indissoluble link between nuclear-test explosions and the development of nuclear weapons could not be doubted. His delegation was convinced that, in order to remove the threat of nuclear weapons and to stop the qualitative improvement and build-up of nuclear stockpiles, it was absolutely essential to supplement the partial test-ban Treaty with a ban on underground testing, which must be preceded by the discontinuance of all nuclear-test explosions. A comprehensive test ban could be an important measure for ensuring the vertical and horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

38. The three depositaries of the partial test-ban Treaty had undertaken an obligation to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear-test explosions for ever. They had proclaimed as their main purpose the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Experience showed, however, that nuclear Powers that had signed the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty were not fulfilling their commitments and as a result were helping to intensify the nuclear-arms race and the accumulation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

39. To expect to achieve genuine progress in the elimination of nuclear weapons was unrealistic at a time when nuclear-test explosions continued unabated. The unbridled build-up of nuclear arsenals must be halted. The most basic measure for the purpose was a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The successful conclusion of the current Conference would be the best way to achieve that lofty goal and might significantly enhance the effectiveness of the non-proliferation Treaty. Discussions within the framework of the Conference might also represent a prelude for the reassessment of nuclear doctrines.

40. In conclusion, he expressed the sincere hope that the participants in the Conference would succeed in achieving unity of will between the non-nuclear States and the nuclear Powers.

41. Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan) said that the current Conference was taking place at a time of major changes in the world: the cold war was virtually over; the United States and the Soviet Union had reached agreement on a substantial reduction of their conventional armaments in Europe; German unification had been achieved; and some regional conflicts were gradually responding to attempts at a peaceful

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(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

solution. At the same time, one could not ignore the major political, economic and regional contradictions that might frustrate efforts to create a new world.

42. In looking back at the developments since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty the conclusion was inescapable that the expectations of mankind had not been fulfilled. The goal of a comprehensive test ban was still not within reach and the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States were far larger than they had been in 1963. The question of a nuclear-test ban remained the most pressing item on the disarmament agenda. There was no need to remind anyone that such a ban would be another step towards nuclear disarmament: it would stop the development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons, impede their acquisition by other countries and, most important of all, would help protect the environment for future generations.

43. For a long time the main problem in the negotiations had been verification. There were no longer any technical or scientific obstacles to a verifiable ban. It was possible to identify nuclear explosions of even less than one kiloton.

44. Some nuclear States claimed that tests were necessary for as long as nuclear deterrence was one of the corner-stones of their defence policy. The banning of nuclear tests would in no way diminish the value of deterrence; it would do no more than prevent the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons. The reluctance to discuss the problem of banning tests might possibly be explained by the wish to retain technological superiority.

45. A comprehensive test-ban treaty was closely linked to the non-proliferation régime. Pakistan was convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons among other States would still further undermine international security.

46. Nuclear disarmament was a global problem but it also had regional dimensions. He noted in that connection the recent agreement between Argentina and Brazil to protect their region from the risk of the introduction of nuclear weapons and to create an atmosphere of mutual trust in the nuclear field. Pakistan had put forward a number of initiatives in that field, including a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and the convening of a conference on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Pakistan also remained ready to make a joint declaration with India renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons.

47. The partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty had raised hopes for the discontinuance of all nuclear-test explosions. Until a comprehensive test-ban treaty was concluded, the nuclear-weapon States must, obviously, be asked to declare a moratorium on nuclear testing, including so-called peaceful nuclear explosions.

48. Mr. PAWLAK (Poland) said that nuclear weapons constituted a threat to all States and peoples and that for that reason the problem of nuclear weapons must be solved at the multilateral level. That, of course, did not mean that bilateral

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(Mr. Pawlak, Poland)

agreements had no role to play. On the contrary, the recent agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union established a solid basis for future negotiations in broader areas of disarmament. The remarkable improvement of the international climate eliminated the very need for weapons of mass destruction.

49. Poland had repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and had initiated a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. It was firmly convinced that the non-proliferation Treaty was still the main instrument for reducing the nuclear threat and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

50. The question of a comprehensive test ban was of extreme importance in the field of nuclear disarmament. His country felt that the path to such a treaty lay through unanimity of action by the States depositaries of the 1963 Treaty. The Conference's main task was to stimulate negotiations between those States.

51. The problem of verifying compliance with a future treaty was undoubtedly a complex one, and his country's Government had submitted to the secretariat of the Conference its detailed views on the subject. In its opinion, verification of compliance with a nuclear-test ban depended mainly on international co-operation, and hence, on the political atmosphere among the States that had established a given system of verification. His Government felt that bilateral agreements on verification could not replace a multilateral agreement. A truly comprehensive system of verification must be based on widespread dissemination of appropriate technology and expertise. States interested in a comprehensive test ban should take a more active part in preparing a global network for seismic monitoring. Besides seismic monitoring, other possible means of verification of compliance with a future treaty must also be examined, and the United Nations must play a specific role in doing that endeavour.

52. Mr. NYAKYI (United Republic of Tanzania) said that although efforts to convert the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty had begun some six years previously, the international campaign for a comprehensive test-ban treaty had begun far earlier still. An understanding of the efforts of past years would make it possible better to evaluate the historical significance of the current initiative, and especially of the Amendment Conference. As already noted, the Conference was the culmination of six years of efforts by the non-nuclear States and the international community as a whole. The partial test-ban Treaty, which the participants in the Conference sought to amend, had been in force for 27 years already. Very few disarmament issues had been the subject of such persistent attention and debate on the part of the international community as the campaign for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. At the same time, however, the world had also witnessed inconclusive negotiations and partial agreements that in effect had legitimized the continued nuclear testing and plunged the world into a spiralling nuclear-arms race.

53. The partial test-ban Treaty had always been regarded as an interim measure. The idea of preparing a further treaty had matured a long time ago. Article 1 (b)

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(Mr. Nyakyi, United Republic
of Tanzania)

of the partial test-ban Treaty required all parties to the Treaty to seek to extend the ban to underground nuclear testing, and the preamble expressed their determination to continue negotiations to that end. Thus the obligation of Member States to work for a comprehensive test-ban treaty within the context of the partial test-ban Treaty needed no confirmation. Yet, the nuclear Powers had done little to fulfil that obligation.

54. The same applied to their obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty concluded in 1968. Article VI of that Treaty provided for the negotiation at an early date of measures to end the arms race. There was an undeniable link between the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Even if the provisions of the treaties did not establish such a link, it was obvious that it would be a contradiction to prevent one form of proliferation while tolerating another form.

55. Moreover, two nuclear-weapon States had not honoured their obligations under their own bilateral treaties. Both the threshold test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes committed the contracting parties to work for the cessation of underground nuclear explosions using a step-by-step approach. Many parties had never regarded those agreements as measures leading to the discontinuance of nuclear testing. By legitimizing nuclear testing, they undermined efforts to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty instead of facilitating them. As far as the threshold test-ban Treaty was concerned, there was no evidence of any movement towards agreement on yields below 150 kilotons.

56. A number of positive developments in the past few years had given reason for hope that renewed efforts in the field of disarmament could help to halt and reverse the arms race. At the same time, despite the improved international climate, a comprehensive test ban, which had rightly been characterized as a litmus test of the commitment of the nuclear Powers to meaningful nuclear disarmament negotiations, remained a distant goal. To persuade them to move in that direction, it had therefore become imperative for the world community to initiate multilateral negotiations on such a treaty. That again underlined the significance of the Conference.

57. The role of public opinion could not be overemphasized. In that context his delegation paid special tribute to the non-governmental organizations for waging a relentless campaign to sensitize world public opinion to the urgent need for a comprehensive test ban. Their actions had undoubtedly helped to increase the world community's awareness and had helped to draw attention to the problems posed by nuclear weapons.

58. The international community had been trying to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty for 27 years already. It would be self-delusion to expect that it could be achieved at the current Conference. Nevertheless, with the necessary political will, the goal could be achieved in the not-too-distant future. No

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of Tanzania)

single treaty or agreement had been concluded in one meeting. The current conference should be viewed as the start of a process of serious negotiations to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

59. Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia) said that the Conference was taking place at a time of rapid and fundamental changes that were transforming the global political and economic landscape and ushering in a new phase in international relations. Concurrently, the easing of East-West tensions and of ideological struggle had opened up new possibilities for progress in arms limitation and disarmament.

60. It should not be forgotten, however, that the production of weapons of great destructive force and the modernization and re-equipment of armed forces continued unabated, thereby undermining world stability. The international community's preoccupation with the qualitative aspects of the arms race had been fully reflected in more than 70 General Assembly resolutions on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. When the partial test-ban Treaty had been signed in 1963, it had been hailed as an event ushering in a promising era of concrete nuclear-arms limitations. Even though the inclusion in the Treaty of provisions for the discontinuance of underground nuclear tests had proved elusive at that time, its preamble had affirmed the determination of the States parties to continue negotiations to conclude a comprehensive test-ban agreement. Later that provision had been reiterated in the preamble to the non-proliferation Treaty.

61. However, the nuclear Powers had continued to conduct tests. There had been a dramatic increase in the number of warheads, and the improvement in means of delivery and the development of new nuclear weapons systems had continued. The test-ban issue had therefore been accorded priority in all four review conferences on the non-proliferation Treaty. It was pertinent to note that the trilateral negotiations between the depositary States that were held in 1977-1980 had achieved progress in several crucial respects, but those talks had been suspended and had still not been resumed.

62. In the Conference on Disarmament, serious and substantive negotiations had been held in abeyance by contrived obstacles. In the bilateral negotiations a partial approach to the question of a test ban had been stressed. The signing of the INF Treaty had been welcomed as the beginning of a process of fulfilling the obligations undertaken in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, but those who had hoped for significant cuts in existing or planned strategic weapons or even for a slowdown in the introduction of new and more dangerous technologies had little grounds for optimism. Even after the scheduled signing in the following month of an agreement on a 30 per cent reduction of strategic weapons, the two major Powers would still have many more such weapons than they had in 1963 and 1970 when the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty had gone into effect.

63. That lack of progress could be ascribed to the failure of the depositary States to fulfil their obligations. The non-nuclear-weapon States were concerned that the weapons of the future would be more potent and less verifiable and that

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(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

they would also complicate the conclusion of future accords. Hence the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing was an essential step to prevent the emergence of a new generation of weapons systems and its horizontal and vertical proliferation.

64. From the perspective of the developing countries, the continuing arms race exacerbated their plight because the continuation of the qualitative or quantitative arms race undermined the prospects for the economic well-being of their peoples. In addition, vast resources were being diverted at a time when they were most needed for development purposes.

65. His delegation believed that the dramatic changes in East-West relations and the progress achieved in the treaties on INF, strategic offensive arms and conventional forces in Europe were creating favourable circumstances for ending the arms race. Continued testing and the development of new weapons systems could reverse the positive trends of recent years and exacerbate the nuclear threat. To solve the problem of verification, which had become technically feasible, it was necessary to supplement the national technical means of test-ban verification with an international exchange of seismic data and to establish a network of seismic stations that would vastly improve existing verification capabilities. Hence the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States had become a compelling objective that could brook no further delay. That goal could be achieved, not by a step-by-step approach, but only by a comprehensive one.

66. Indonesia had long ago joined other States in condemning nuclear explosions and calling for their total ban. It was one of the organizers of the Amendment Conference. Because of its global significance and the need for universal support, the question should be dealt with in a multilateral context. The convening of the current Conference was therefore a momentous landmark on the long road towards a global nuclear-test ban. For the first time, States parties to a nuclear-arms treaty had initiated multilateral negotiations for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The outcome of those negotiations would predetermine future prospects for disarmament and security.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

Thursday, 10 January 1991, at 10.35 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. HAYES (Ireland) said his Government believed that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was an urgent necessity. That was because of its view that true security could not be based on mutual fear deriving from military rivalry. In order to change that situation, there must be an approach to security based on the building of confidence among nations and the removal of the fear of attack. In that context, the elimination of nuclear weapons was of primary importance.
2. Recent developments in international relations, especially the relaxation of East-West tensions, seemed to indicate that the potential offered by a co-operative approach to security was increasingly being recognized. In the European context, the signing of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe at the Paris Summit Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in November 1990, the unprecedented agreement on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe, and the package of security- and confidence-building measures presented to the Summit Meeting provided good examples of such a co-operative approach to security.
3. The world now had a unique opportunity to move away from an approach to security based on nuclear deterrence. His delegation considered that at the present juncture in international relations, the arguments in favour of a comprehensive test-ban treaty were particularly compelling and relevant. Firstly, a comprehensive test-ban treaty was the most important step required to halt the qualitative nuclear-arms race, in other words, the development of new and more destructive weapons. While the quantitative growth in the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States had apparently halted, qualitative development of those weapons and of their delivery vehicles was continuing and could continue under the terms of the START Treaty. Secondly, it had to be admitted that there were no grounds for arguing that testing of nuclear weapons was necessary to ensure their continued reliability, for their reliability could be ensured without recourse to further testing. Thirdly, the problem of ensuring reliable verification, which had been presented as an obstacle to the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, was no longer insoluble.
4. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events was carrying out extremely useful work on the development of an international seismic monitoring network. Other verification techniques, such as satellite photography, monitoring of airborne radioactive materials and hydrodynamic measurement, had been identified as measures which would contribute to the development of confidence in a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The draft verification protocol circulated by the sponsors of the amendment proposal also emphasized on-site inspection.
5. Fourthly, a comprehensive test-ban treaty would provide a real barrier to the further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as to the proliferation

(Mr. Hayes, Ireland)

of more sophisticated and destructive thermonuclear weapons, which could not be developed without testing. In that context, his Government believed that a halt to testing, followed by a rapid conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, would be the clearest proof which the nuclear-weapon States could offer of their commitment to complete nuclear disarmament and of their determination to control the qualitative development of the nuclear-arms race. Total prohibition of nuclear testing should be seen as the first step towards disarmament - not as the final stage, to be undertaken only after the other elements of disarmament had been agreed. A universal production cut-off in weapons-grade fissionable material was also required.

6. The key question at the current Conference was how a comprehensive test-ban treaty could best be achieved. His delegation believed that the Conference on Disarmament was the best forum for discussion of that issue. All the nuclear-weapon States participated in the Conference on Disarmament, although all were not parties to the partial test-ban Treaty. However, discussions in the current Amendment Conference and in the Conference on Disarmament did not have to be mutually exclusive. The current Conference could give an impetus to the work under way in the Conference on Disarmament, and could undertake useful work on the verification issue, in particular by considering and refining, if necessary, the draft verification protocol submitted by the sponsors of the amendment.

7. Mr. HOHENFELLNER (Austria) said that the conclusion of the partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty in 1963 had been a step forward in arms-control and disarmament efforts. In the assessment of the general framework of the Treaty régime, one had to bear in mind that the Treaty limited itself to the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests or any other nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, including the territorial waters and the high seas. Nuclear tests or explosions in any other environment were prohibited only if they caused radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosions were conducted. The limits of the existing régime were obvious. No verification provisions were incorporated. Furthermore, at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty, agreement had not been reached on the prohibition of underground testing or on verification, because the then prevailing environmental interests had been limited to above-ground testing. In addition, no quantitative or qualitative thresholds for permissible nuclear testing had been adopted. Such shortcomings in the partial test-ban Treaty clearly showed the need for a more elaborate and comprehensive system in order to deal with all related problems.

8. Major progress could be achieved in the framework of the Group of Scientific Experts, which had been established in 1976, to deal with the technical aspects of verification and the feasibility of a global seismological monitoring network to detect any major underground tremors. Such a monitoring system would constitute the corner-stone of the verification régime of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at the Conference on Disarmament was also an encouraging sign for the possible early conclusion of such a treaty.

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(Mr. Hohenfellner, Austria)

9. The halting of nuclear-weapon tests in the context of non-proliferation was another important issue to be dealt with. In that regard, the recent Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons demonstrated the close relationship between the two subjects, even though divergent positions with regard to a comprehensive test-ban treaty had made it impossible to reach agreement on a final document. Since nuclear-weapon testing was mainly related to the modernization of nuclear weapons, the complete halting of all nuclear tests would bring about a major breakthrough in efforts to stop the nuclear-arms race and promote vertical and horizontal non-proliferation. The question of halting nuclear-weapon tests should also be considered in the wider framework of general and complete disarmament.

10. The current Conference provided the opportunity to review the functioning of the partial test-ban Treaty and draw conclusions about a future comprehensive régime. It could also make a political contribution to efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban and promote greater awareness of that issue on the part of the international community. In that context, his delegation welcomed the participation of the large number of non-governmental organizations at the Conference. Lastly, the Amendment Conference should elaborate concrete proposals for consideration by the Conference on Disarmament. The political will to solve outstanding verification-related questions would be of great importance. That was especially true for the consideration of concrete questions concerning the overall pattern of verification and the interrelationship between its different aspects, such as the global seismological network, exchange of information, on-site inspection, technical means of verification and so forth. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the future comprehensive test-ban treaty, improved international co-operation and adequate financial means were necessary. Consultations with States which were not parties to the Treaty should be intensified in order to ensure universal adherence to the partial test-ban Treaty and the future comprehensive test-ban treaty. In that connection, the Conference on Disarmament should redouble its efforts to resolve the outstanding issues.

11. Mr. AKSIN (Turkey) said that the Amendment Conference was taking place at a time of dramatic transformations in the international political arena. The momentous developments in Europe had fundamentally changed the nature of East-West relations. That in turn had created a political environment conducive to progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in Paris in November 1990, and the new set of confidence- and security-building measures adopted at the CSCE Paris Summit had laid the foundation for a new era of co-operation in a region extending from the Atlantic to the Urals. In the field of nuclear disarmament, the historic INF Treaty was expected to be complemented shortly by the START Agreement, which would entail significant reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two major nuclear-weapon States. In that context, the Geneva negotiations on a global and complete ban on chemical weapons were of utmost importance.

12. With regard to the issue of a nuclear-test ban, his delegation shared the view that progress in the various fields of disarmament would contribute to the eventual

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(Mr. Aksin, Turkey)

achievement of a comprehensive test ban. His country viewed disarmament as an integrated process encompassing multiple interrelated elements, including nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons, together with the necessary verification mechanisms and confidence- and security-building measures.

13. Turkey supported the goal of halting all nuclear-weapon tests for all time and noted with satisfaction that the Conference on Disarmament at its 1990 summer session had reached agreement on a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. His delegation looked forward to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament. The Ad Hoc Committee had to carry out substantive work on issues related to a comprehensive test ban, inter alia, the vital question of verification and compliance. He also wished to pay tribute to the Group of Scientific Experts, which had achieved considerable progress towards the establishment of a global network for the monitoring and exchange of seismic data. The network would be an important element in the future verification system of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

14. He hoped that at the current Conference there would be a constructive exchange of views on various aspects of the test-ban issue, which would make it possible to focus attention on the search for mutually acceptable solutions, rather than on the differences which existed among the States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty.

15. Mr. GHEZAL (Tunisia) said that the Amendment Conference was being conducted at a time marked by the end of the "cold war" and the strengthening of détente and sincerely hoped that the spirit of co-operation, which had led to considerable progress in the field of disarmament and arms control both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis, would also be reflected in the work of the Conference and make it possible to achieve positive results.

16. It would hardly have been possible to conclude the 1963 Moscow Treaty, if the non-nuclear-weapon countries, particularly the non-aligned ones, had not called for a nuclear test ban. Unfortunately, it had not been possible to achieve a complete ban at that time and, furthermore, the Treaty had not provided for verification measures which would ensure its implementation. As a result, underground nuclear explosions continued to be conducted: according to data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, since the signing of the Treaty 1,237 underground tests had been carried out, not to mention undeclared or unregistered explosions. In addition, 64 nuclear tests in the atmosphere had been registered.

17. Today, as never in the past, all States must demonstrate political will and seriously undertake the building of a non-violent world, free of nuclear weapons. As early as 1972, the Secretary-General, on the basis of a detailed analysis of the scientific and technical aspects of the problem of nuclear-weapon tests, had expressed confidence that a political decision would suffice in order to ban them definitively. Subsequently, the Secretary-General had repeatedly pointed out that the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would constitute convincing proof of a real desire for nuclear disarmament.

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(Mr. Ghezal, Tunisia)

18. In the view of specialists in the field of disarmament, existing technical possibilities made it feasible to halt nuclear tests in the atmosphere and replace them with laboratory tests. In that connection, it was becoming a matter of priority to step up negotiations aimed at a complete test ban, which would be a significant obstacle to both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and help strengthen the Treaty itself.

19. It should be stressed that in a world dedicated to the philosophy of equitable relations among States, the continued possession of nuclear weapons by some of them inevitably motivated others to follow their example. At the same time, it was common knowledge that when there were gigantic arsenals of both nuclear and conventional weapons, no State would be able to escape the terrible consequences resulting from their use. Accordingly, the very survival of mankind increasingly depended on speedy general and complete disarmament.

20. The vicious circle of conducting tests to verify the reliability of nuclear weapons was completed with the development of new, improved, more destructive and more lethal types of nuclear weapons. A comprehensive nuclear-test ban in all environments therefore would be a way of depriving States of the possibility of verifying the quality of their arsenals and would significantly lessen the desire of non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire such weapons.

21. Environmental pollution resulting from nuclear tests was also a cause of great concern for all mankind. Over the course of many years, the countries of Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America had advocated declaring their regions nuclear-weapon-free zones. At its forty-fifth session, the General Assembly had adopted a resolution prohibiting the dumping of toxic and radioactive wastes on the African continent, which demonstrated the extreme importance attached to the link between ensuring disarmament and environmental protection.

22. The reduced tension in East-West relations was today opening up new opportunities for taking political and diplomatic measures aimed at ensuring the security of the countries that ranked low in the hierarchy of military strength. His delegation considered that a comprehensive nuclear-test ban was an important integral part of the general process of arms limitation and disarmament and hoped that the current Conference would help promote constructive dialogue and mutual understanding, leading to the adoption of the proposed amendment to the Treaty.

23. Mr. RANA (Nepal) said that the current Conference was taking place at a decisive moment in the history of international relations. The "cold war" had finally come to an end and a new international order was being established. There was reason to hope that the issues of international peace, security and stability would now be pursued democratically and with a global perspective. The INF Treaty, prospects for the conclusion of an agreement on significant reductions in the strategic offensive weapons of the two super-Powers, the recently concluded agreement on conventional forces in Europe, the strengthening of the CSCE process, the rejection of a doctrinaire approach to relations between States and the growing tide of pluralism had reinforced hopes for a stable and democratic world order.

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(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

The Amendment Conference was providing yet another historic opportunity to strengthen the process of building a safer and more peaceful world.

24. An equitable international security system could be predicated only on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the elimination of nuclear weapons. The adoption of measures to halt the qualitative improvement and development of new systems of nuclear weapons and prevent their proliferation would be the first steps towards that goal. With that in mind, a majority of the members of the international community had, for more than three decades, been pursuing the goal of a comprehensive treaty on the complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments. The 1963 partial test-ban Treaty had been the first global step towards nuclear disarmament. One should not, however, forget that that Treaty set forth the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States parties to seek to achieve a comprehensive test ban and continue negotiations to that end. It was therefore difficult to understand why after almost three decades of trilateral and bilateral negotiations, some major Powers were now speaking of a comprehensive test ban only as a long-term objective. The failure to make any progress towards a comprehensive test ban clearly jeopardized the future of the non-proliferation Treaty. That was clear from the results of the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1990.

25. He expressed deep gratitude to non-governmental organizations around the world. Their valuable work had created a well-informed public opinion on the need to achieve a comprehensive test ban at an early date.

26. His delegation welcomed the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at the Conference on Disarmament in 1990. He earnestly hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would once again establish the Ad Hoc Committee in 1991 with a clear negotiating mandate.

27. The question of reliable verification had long held up negotiations in that field. Nevertheless, the results of studies by experts had conclusively established that the lack of credible verification techniques for a comprehensive test ban was no longer an impediment. The Group of Scientific Experts at the Conference on Disarmament had carried out important work in that regard.

28. The pursuit of a comprehensive test ban in a multilateral forum in no way diminished the importance of the bilateral negotiations that had already produced very important results. The ratification of the verification protocols to the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty had established the technical possibility of verification. Furthermore, the six initiators of the Amendment Conference as well as Australia and New Zealand had put forward proposals for consideration by the participants in the Conference. Those proposals deserved careful study.

29. The question of a comprehensive test ban was immensely complex and touched on the fundamental security perceptions of some States. His delegation also believed that the end of the cold war called for a new thinking and for greater willingness

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(Mr. Rana, Nepal)

to compromise. As a firm supporter of the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, Nepal believed that the current Conference offered yet another necessary forum to examine the issue in all its aspects. While it would not be realistic to expect to achieve a comprehensive test ban in two weeks, the current Conference could be made an integral part of the ongoing efforts at various levels towards the same goal. Given the political will, it would be possible, at the Conference, to agree on measures to continue negotiations.

30. Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria) said that by its very nature and scope, the partial test-ban Treaty had been the first real disarmament treaty. It was quite significant that the Treaty contained the commitment by the depositary Powers to seek, with maximum speed, a comprehensive test ban through further negotiations.

31. The special importance of the Amendment Conference derived not only from the unique character of adherence to the Treaty, but also from the fact that the question of a comprehensive test ban had consistently been on the agenda of the General Assembly, and of many other multilateral disarmament bodies. Nigeria hoped that the depositaries of the partial test-ban Treaty would participate constructively in the Amendment Conference.

32. The Conference reflected the failure of the three depositary Powers to live up to their obligations under the partial test-ban Treaty, the threshold test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty. It also reflected the failure of the Conference on Disarmament and bilateral, trilateral or other negotiating forums to achieve a comprehensive test ban over the years.

33. The history of the Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, reflected the many failures and the frustration over the lack of progress towards a comprehensive test ban. Even as late as July 1990, the Conference on Disarmament had established an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, but it had failed to gain a negotiating mandate on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

34. No time was more appropriate than the present time to focus international attention on the question of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing. Since the organizational meeting for the current Conference in June 1990, there had been a number of developments - democratic transformations in Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, the reintegration of Europe, the cessation of ideological confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the end of the cold war, and the official proclamation of a new world order.

35. Nigeria had long appreciated how valuable a nuclear-test ban would be to the peace, security and environment of poor, weak and defenceless nations. The fact that South Africa, through its acquisition of nuclear weapons, had frustrated regional efforts to make Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone, further reinforced Africa's overwhelming support for the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty, whose ultimate objective was the realization of a global, effective and verifiable comprehensive test ban.

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(Mr. Adeyemi, Nigeria)

36. Nuclear weapons did not promote and could not guarantee any nation's security. If they did, there would be no need for the nuclear-weapon States to continue adding to the existing nuclear weapons in their arsenals. If vertical proliferation by the nuclear Powers continued, horizontal proliferation by additional States would also proceed apace, with greater threats to international security and the security of the nuclear Powers themselves.

37. Nigeria strongly believed that the unique opportunity of the favourable international climate and the end of the cold war should be seized in order to achieve a comprehensive test ban without further delay. Since the advent of nuclear weapons and the pursuit of the nuclear-arms race were products of the Second World War and its attendant cold war, the effective end of the cold war should be used to begin taking real steps towards the elimination of those weapons before the end of the century. The advantages of a comprehensive test-ban treaty within the framework of the Amendment Conference were enormous: the three Powers that were the depositaries of both the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty would be living up to their obligations; a comprehensive test-ban treaty would put an end to the discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation Treaty; it would be a decisive step towards curbing the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons; it would halt the emergence of new, third-generation nuclear weapons; it would mark an unprecedented global pronouncement on one of the most important disarmament issues of the day. In short, a comprehensive test-ban treaty would accelerate the emergence of a new world order based on common security and the abandonment of the threat or use of force in international relations, and foster disarmament measures in other key spheres, including the early multilateral prohibition of chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction.

38. His delegation had no illusion that a comprehensive test-ban treaty could be achieved during the two weeks allocated for the Amendment Conference. There were several vital questions of verification and compliance which needed to be addressed, including the structure and functions of control, institutional mechanisms, legal issues of relationships to existing treaties, review procedures, financial aspects, and the question of securing adherence of all the nuclear Powers and non-nuclear-weapon States to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It was hardly possible to discuss all those issues in the current forum in two weeks. His delegation believed that there was an obvious need to keep the amendment initiative alive in the Conference by exercising certain options, including the establishment of a standing working group or committee that would be mandated by the Conference to continue serious negotiations after the recess. In addition, a future session of the Amendment Conference should be envisaged for the near future, possibly in 1992, in order to take stock of negotiations and give the necessary political impetus.

39. The current Conference had a duty to stand firm against any attempt, subtle or overt, to shift the focus of attention or future action to the Conference on Disarmament or any other limited negotiating forum. The Amendment Conference was the most viable negotiating forum for the achievement of a test ban. Nigeria

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(Mr. Adeyemi, Nigeria)

called on the three depositary Powers to suspend all nuclear testing for the period of negotiations within the framework of the Amendment Conference, until a comprehensive test-ban treaty was concluded. It also called on the Soviet Union, which, of those three nuclear Powers, had been the leading proponent of a comprehensive test ban, to declare a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests from January 1991 until 1995, so as to intensify international pressure and increase the momentum for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

40. Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) said that at the adoption of the Moscow Treaty in 1963, the only three nuclear Powers signing the Treaty had pledged to promote the cessation of underground testing. Twenty-seven years had since elapsed, but that commitment, like others, had not yet been honoured. There had been a definite change for the better in 1977, with the achievement of an agreement in principle on a number of major issues, but in the few years since, the trilateral negotiations had come to a standstill.

41. The problem of verification had for some time constituted a major obstacle to talks. It was now known that, with the help of existing technical devices, the nature and origin of any seismic event could be ascertained with a minimum degree of error. In addition, the two major nuclear Powers had agreed to the idea of on-site inspection, which definitely meant significant progress in the elaboration of other indirect means of control and verification. The view was now being expressed that the idea of nuclear deterrence must still be retained, that tests could not be abandoned and that a comprehensive nuclear-test ban was a long-term objective which could only be achieved step by step. It was surprising that such arguments should be advanced at a time when the international situation had changed radically, when the "cold war" had given way to co-operation and mutual understanding between the super-Powers and the concept of nuclear deterrence had already lost its prior significance.

42. His country believed that the achievement of a test ban was an urgent task of paramount importance. The reasons were, firstly, that underground nuclear explosions also caused radioactive pollution of the atmosphere and, secondly, that underground testing played a considerable part in prolonging the nuclear arms race by making it possible to develop new and more effective forms of weapons. Underground nuclear tests were therefore one of the major factors behind horizontal proliferation.

43. The task of achieving a complete test ban was twofold. On the one hand, the nuclear Powers must be persuaded to change their position and to accept that testing must be stopped; on the other, it was necessary to elaborate a sufficiently effective and reliable system of verification. There could of course be no guarantee of 100-per-cent reliability, but it would be possible to establish a sufficiently effective system of verification for each country to be assured that others were also conscientiously abiding by their commitments.

44. It was essential that the current Conference should constitute a decisive step forwards on the path to achieving the desired goal. It would obviously not be

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

possible to make any amendment to the Treaty so long as it remained necessary, to solve a whole array of complicated legal, technical and political issues, in order to eliminate all the obstacles which had arisen over the last 27 years. It was, however, vital that a firm commitment should be made at the Conference to continue talks on the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

45. Mr. ERDOS (Hungary) said that the 1963 Treaty was the first practical step to curb nuclear testing. It had, however, proved ineffective. The figure of over 1,300 nuclear-test explosions since the signing of the Treaty spoke for itself.

46. His country had always consistently called for a ban on all nuclear explosions in all environments. A treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban would put an end to the continuous modernization of nuclear weapons, which fuelled the qualitative arms race. It would be instrumental in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and would strengthen the existing non-proliferation régime.

47. The current Conference could and should become an important landmark on the route to the conclusion of a Treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban by creating and upholding a constructive dialogue and atmosphere for further practical steps in that direction in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. All the nuclear-weapon States were represented at the Conference on Disarmament, and it was in that forum that they could make their contribution to the achievement of the desired goal. Further progress could be made to that end if the nuclear-weapon States were to decide to reduce the number and yield of their test explosions. It was also important at the current Conference to avoid any political, organizational or procedural decisions which might jeopardize or weaken the partial test-ban Treaty and the existing non-proliferation régime.

48. The toughest problem at talks on a nuclear-test ban was the problem of verification. The nuclear-weapon States which maintained that a comprehensive test ban was a long-term objective, to be preceded by substantial and verifiable arms reductions, also held the view that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban Treaty required greatly improved verification capabilities. A completely new approach to the question of verification had emerged in recent years, with the result that verification of compliance with such a Treaty was no longer so much a political as a technical issue. In addition to seismic means of verification, it was possible to begin elaborating a complex and reliable system by which to verify a future Treaty, and interesting suggestions to that effect had been submitted in the course of the Conference.

49. His delegation was firmly convinced that with good will and flexibility towards the positions of other parties, it was possible to solve the problems relating to a comprehensive test ban.

50. Mr. GISLASON (Iceland) noted that the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban had long been high on the priority list of United Nations disarmament issues. The various treaties concluded in that area had had a considerable positive impact on international security and environmental protection. The remaining unresolved issue was that of underground nuclear explosions with yields of up to 150 kilotons.

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(Mr. Gislason, Iceland)

51. In the context of the East-West arms race, the prevalent attitude was that a test ban would slow down the nuclear arms race and the development of nuclear weapons. With the end of the "cold war" and the introduction of deep cuts in arsenals of both conventional and nuclear weapons, the significance of a comprehensive test ban lay primarily in its capacity to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, which had significantly contributed to international stability and security. Given that the further proliferation of nuclear weapons was labelled as the main security challenge of the 1990s, his country considered the non-proliferation Treaty to be the single most important multilateral agreement on disarmament.

52. Technically speaking, a test ban might hold back the development of more sophisticated types of nuclear arms but would not prevent their production. On the other hand, a ban would put pressure on all States not to test nuclear weapons and might persuade the so-called "threshold" States to refrain from developing and acquiring such weapons, which would also curb the qualitative competition in nuclear weaponry.

53. A test ban would also facilitate provision of the necessary support for a substantial extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. However, despite the evident political relationship between non-proliferation and a comprehensive test ban, his country believed that a deliberate linkage of progress towards a comprehensive test ban to an extension and strengthening of the non-proliferation régime might endanger that régime and produce the opposite of the desired effect.

54. A ban would alleviate concerns about the environmental consequences of nuclear testing, which were a source of particular anxiety for peoples living in the far north.

55. The 1987 agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to adopt a step-by-step approach and the specific results obtained on that basis appeared to show that, if an immediate test ban was not feasible, a phased approach would certainly be preferable to a standstill.

56. In that connection, his country suggested that, in addition to limiting the number of tests and the yield of permitted explosions, consideration might also be given to the question of test areas and the possibility of excluding such tests in the vicinity of densely populated and ecologically vulnerable areas.

57. If it were to prove possible to convert the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test ban, amendments must be adopted by consensus. His delegation hoped that the current Conference would give a political boost to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and thus contribute constructively towards the goal of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

Thursday, 10 January 1991, at 3.20 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Ms. HOINKES (United States of America) said that her country did not support the proposed amendment to the Treaty for both substantive and procedural reasons. While a comprehensive test ban remained a long-term objective of the United States, such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when nuclear deterrence would no longer be needed to ensure international security and when verifiable arms reductions, improved verification capabilities and a greater balance in conventional forces had been achieved.

2. Her country's opposition to the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban went to the very heart of its national security and that of its allies. The United States relied upon a credible nuclear deterrent and nuclear testing was essential to maintain that deterrent. As the member States of NATO had recently reaffirmed, nuclear weapons would continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there were no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. As long as nuclear weapons continued to play a critical role in its national security, the United States must have a sensible testing programme to ensure the credibility and safety of its forces. Testing had made it possible to correct weaknesses in weapon safety and effectiveness, lessen the risk of accidental detonation and substantially reduce the total number of weapons in the stockpile since the 1960s. A halt to testing would not prevent the production of nuclear weapons and would not eliminate a single existing nuclear weapon. It could however create uncertainty concerning the safety and credibility of the stockpile and make it impossible to introduce safety improvements or react to new threats. A comprehensive test ban, therefore, could erode stability, not enhance it.

3. The partial test-ban Treaty had served the parties well. It would be unwise to create a new and wholly different treaty because that might seriously jeopardize the continued viability of the existing Treaty régime. The United States believed that it was a very serious mistake to propose that the partial test-ban Treaty should be eliminated and replaced by a comprehensive test ban that would not include all nuclear-weapon States. When the amendment proposal had been made, her country had informed the other parties that, in accordance with its rights as an original party, it would not allow the proposed amendment to be adopted. It had urged other parties to oppose the proposal to convene an Amendment Conference as a questionable and costly means of addressing the question of a comprehensive test ban. Accordingly, the United States would not participate in, or provide financial support to, any continuation of the current Conference beyond the scheduled two-week session and urged other parties to join in bringing that process to a close.

4. Over the past decade, the United States had demonstrated its commitment to arms control and was proud of its record both in bilateral talks with the Soviet Union and in multilateral forums. Her country had concluded a number of arms

(Ms. Hoinkes, United States)

control agreements in 1990 and, even more recently, its initiatives in the strategic arms reduction talks had accelerated progress towards an agreement in the near future.

5. The United States believed that the subject of further limitations on nuclear explosions warranted very careful attention and was prepared to participate in work on issues related to a comprehensive test ban in the Conference on Disarmament. Her Government, with the Soviet Union, had a step-by-step approach to further limits on nuclear testing. Nevertheless, the United States had not identified any further limitations on nuclear weapons tests, in addition to those set forth in the threshold test-ban Treaty, that would be in its national security interest. Barring unforeseen circumstances, however, the United States remained ready to support the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in the Conference on Disarmament on the same non-negotiating basis on which the Committee had been established in 1990. Bilaterally, her country would be ready to propose to the Soviet Union negotiations on possible further steps in the area of nuclear testing.

6. The United States shared the deep concern of other countries about the need to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The primary means of doing so was to support and strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty régime. That Treaty had played an important role in advancing international security and stability and should be extended indefinitely in 1995. Further legal restraints on nuclear testing were unlikely to affect the motivation of States seeking to acquire nuclear weapons or inhibit their ability to do so. Such States were likely to be driven more by their own perception of regional threats and rivalries than by the United States testing programme or the absence of a comprehensive test ban.

7. Her Government hoped that those who had indicated their support for the proposed amendment would reconsider the matter. It was important to ask whether the discussion of a comprehensive test ban at the Amendment Conference was in the best interest of the partial test-ban Treaty and the parties to it. The United States believed that it was not. The consideration of testing limitations must be undertaken in a serious manner and should not become the subject of political gamesmanship or create dissension among parties to a smoothly functioning treaty régime. The time had come to separate consideration of the issues related to a comprehensive test ban from the partial test-ban Treaty once and for all. Her country would continue to seek further arms reductions as part of a responsible, overall effort to achieve peace, stability and international security.

8. Mr. KATSIGAZI (Uganda) said that the Amendment Conference was an important step towards achieving a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Far-reaching changes were occurring in the international political arena. Throughout the world, people desired freedom and did not want to be held hostage to the constant fear of annihilation by weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weapons must be banished.

9. The single driving force of the nuclear-arms race was nuclear-weapon testing. Since the conclusion of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and the 1968

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(Mr. Katsigazi, Uganda)

non-proliferation Treaty, there had been an incredible increase in the number of nuclear weapons. Those weapons had also become more powerful and more accurate, making a nuclear war more likely and more difficult to prevent. The world was well aware of the devastating effects of nuclear testing on human health and the environment. Unfortunately, warnings about those dangers, which threatened the very existence of the human race, were not heeded.

10. With the changed circumstances in international relations, the old military doctrines must be discarded. Appropriate security structures must be set up to replace the adversarial strategies of the past. The position of NATO that nuclear weapons were indispensable for security against conventional attack simply encouraged more and more States to seek to acquire them. It was time for the United Kingdom and the United States to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty with the other nuclear Powers, without further delay. Lastly, he expressed appreciation to the non-governmental organizations concerned and Parliamentarians for Global Action for making the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty a matter of global concern. Efforts must continue until such a treaty was concluded.

11. Mr. BERENGER (Mauritius) said that, although there had been a significant improvement in the overall international political climate, the quantitative and qualitative growth of nuclear weapons was continuing. Furthermore, the Persian Gulf crisis had made the danger of the use of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts even more acute. Mauritius believed that the ultimate goal must be the total elimination of nuclear weapons and disagreed with those who maintained that a balance of nuclear terror was forever inevitable. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was long overdue, and the conclusion of such a treaty was the "litmus test" of the real willingness of the nuclear-weapon States and others to pursue nuclear disarmament.

12. Continued nuclear-weapon testing was not necessary to maintain the reliability and safety of existing stockpiles, and appropriate verification of a complete test ban was not impossible. Experts had demonstrated that the reliability of existing weapons could be ensured by a careful programme of non-nuclear testing and replacement. Although compliance with a complete test ban could not be verified with total certainty, a monitoring threshold for detecting militarily significant tests was technically possible. Nuclear testing served no other purpose but to develop new and more effective nuclear weapons. Nuclear tests demonstrated the discriminatory nature of the current non-proliferation régime, which permitted some States to improve their nuclear arsenals while others must forgo nuclear weapons. Mauritius favoured extending the non-proliferation Treaty beyond 1995 and hoped that all nuclear-weapon States would sign the Treaty and that it would become universal as soon as possible. To that end, an informal dialogue should be initiated to examine proposals for improving the non-proliferation Treaty and considering the possibility of convening an amendment conference by 1995 for that purpose.

13. Regional treaties prohibiting the acquisition, manufacture, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons had a vital role to play. In that context, Mauritius

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(Mr. Berenger, Mauritius)

was actively promoting the concept of a south-west Indian Ocean and southern Africa nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty along the lines of the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

14. It had never been the intention of the sponsors of the Amendment Conference that only one session should be held; in fact, the General Assembly, in its resolution 45/50, had recommended the setting up of a working group. The mandate of any such working group need not overlap with that of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which should continue its work, with the participation of the five nuclear-weapon States parties. The working group should deal with ensuring compliance with an eventual comprehensive test-ban treaty and the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Should the Amendment Conference fail to establish the proposed working group, the second best option would be for the Conference to meet again in 1992 to review developments.

15. His delegation had taken note of the statement by the United States that, further to its ratification of the new verification Protocols to the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty, it was willing to propose negotiations on further nuclear testing limitations consistent with its national security and with stability.

16. Whatever approach was adopted, the fact remained that a comprehensive test-ban treaty was long overdue. His delegation hoped that the work of the Amendment Conference and of the Ad Hoc Committee, together with bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union, and possible discussions involving the other nuclear-weapon States, would enable progress to be made.

17. Mr. KUKAN (Czechoslovakia) said that the establishment of a pan-European security system, as now seemed possible, was one of the prerequisites for a new concept of global security. His Government sought radical reductions in the level of conventional weapons in Europe and the adoption of further confidence-building measures. In that connection, Czechoslovakia advocated the prohibition of chemical weapons as well as a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the limitation and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

18. The partial test-ban Treaty had become an important international instrument. It had prevented the emergence of new nuclear-weapon States, reduced the danger of an environmental disaster, and paved the way for the non-proliferation Treaty and bilateral and multilateral disarmament instruments. Yet it had not ended the nuclear-arms race, had not become universal, and had not led to a comprehensive test ban.

19. It was obvious that those goals would not be easy to attain. Progress had been hampered by an all-or-nothing approach, and his delegation thought it preferable to seek a test ban on a step-by-step basis. The bilateral dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union could be broadened in due course to include other nuclear-weapon States, while multilateral deliberations should be conducted at the Conference on Disarmament.

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(Mr. Kukan, Czechoslovakia)

20. Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union had led to the acceptance by those two countries of verification systems, in the context of the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty, which could form an acceptable basis for more radical limitations of testing in the future. The next step should be for the two Powers to agree to limit the calibre of nuclear charges and to reduce the number of explosions per year. Negotiations to that end should be conducted without delay.

21. At the multilateral level, the Conference on Disarmament was best suited for the drafting of an instrument on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was a welcome development; all nuclear-weapon States should join in its work.

22. Czechoslovakia was an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts which was engaged in devising a verification system. Nevertheless, a comprehensive test ban would require a wider range of verification methods. A special expert group should be set up within the Conference on Disarmament to consider verification measures. The Amendment Conference should not seek to create any kind of alternative forum, but should provide renewed impetus to work within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

23. Mr. HOLGER (Chile) said that the conduct of nuclear tests affected the survival of mankind as a whole. Their complete prohibition could not be obstructed by a small group of States. The failure to ban all nuclear tests had simply allowed the further development and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

24. Chile, together with the other countries members of the Permanent South Pacific Commission, categorically rejected the conduct of nuclear tests in the Pacific Basin.

25. It would be unrealistic to think that it was possible to amend the partial test-ban Treaty in the two weeks available to the Amendment Conference, but the process could not continue indefinitely. Accordingly, constructive negotiations should be conducted within the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, while consideration should be given to reconvening the Amendment Conference in 1992 or 1993, and to the establishment of a working group or the granting of a specific mandate to the President of the Conference so as to ensure the continuation of its work.

26. Mr. MacKay (New Zealand), Vice-President, took the Chair.

27. Mr. ERDENECHULUUN (Mongolia) said that his delegation hoped that the Amendment Conference would serve to galvanize the international community into attaining the objective of a comprehensive test ban. Despite a more positive pattern of inter-State relations and the important progress made in the field of disarmament, States still retained the vast bulk of their arsenals, both nuclear and conventional. The security value of reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons was more than offset by the continuing technological development of such weapons and by the threat of their proliferation.

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(Mr. Erdenechuluun, Mongolia)

28. While the conclusion of the 1974 threshold test-ban and 1976 peaceful nuclear explosions Treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union had usefully established a yield threshold for nuclear-weapon tests, those instruments did not preclude the modernization of nuclear weapons. The depositaries of the partial test-ban Treaty had thus far failed to honour their obligation to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions, and two of those Powers had stated their intention to continue nuclear testing, even though a great number of experts took the view that maintaining the reliability and safety of nuclear weapons no longer required such testing. There was a growing sentiment that failure to reach agreement on a comprehensive test-ban Treaty would undermine the non-proliferation Treaty and the status of the review conference. It should also be noted that the two nuclear-weapon States which were not parties to the partial test-ban Treaty had, in practice, been observing its provisions for some time, and his delegation trusted that they would find it possible to accede to the Treaty.

29. Opposition to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty on the ground of verification was no longer tenable, since an effective solution to the verification issue was now within reach. It was not possible for the Amendment Conference to settle the issues which remained unresolved, in view of which an appropriate body should be established to continue the Conference's work.

30. His delegation commended the adoption by the United States House of Representatives of a resolution urging the United States Government to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and the suggestion by Greenpeace that a world parliamentary referendum should be conducted, since such a referendum would serve to mobilize world public opinion against the continuation of testing. He trusted that all participants in the Amendment Conference would work to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and contribute to the complete prohibition of nuclear testing.

31. Mr. BURAVKIN (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the goal of a universal, comprehensive nuclear-test ban challenged States to reassess their choice of either a narrowly national or a global approach to security questions. The States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 had complied strictly with its provisions for almost three decades, but the Treaty would be further strengthened by universal adherence to it, particularly by all nuclear-weapon States.

32. The failure to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty was a notable shortcoming of the international disarmament movement, since a comprehensive ban would halt the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and eliminate the most important stimulus to nuclear confrontation. The prohibition of nuclear tests would also strengthen the non-proliferation régime. The benefits of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban for the environment, for international security and for international relations could scarcely be exaggerated.

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(Mr. Buravkin, Byelorussian SSR)

33. The new climate in international relations and the implementation of disarmament agreements, particularly the agreement to reduce conventional weapons in Europe, had fundamentally changed many circumstances which had previously hampered an agreement on a comprehensive test ban. The urgent need for such a ban called for all possible efforts to achieve it, including bilateral talks, joint efforts by all nuclear Powers and broader multilateral efforts in various forums. He welcomed the beginning of substantive work on the issue at the Conference on Disarmament, as well as the bilateral treaties concluded in 1974 and 1976 between the Soviet Union and the United States. He hoped that additional bilateral negotiations between the two Powers would further limit yields and the number of nuclear tests. The regularly-confirmed readiness of the Soviet Union to renew, on a reciprocal basis with the United States, a moratorium on nuclear tests at any time strengthened the prospects for a comprehensive test ban.

34. The amendment of the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty was a promising means of achieving that goal, and his delegation favoured that approach, together with the continuation of efforts through other channels. However, international efforts aimed at a comprehensive ban would be enhanced through their concentration in a single channel. The important ideas and documents presented at the Conference should not be put aside after its conclusion, but should serve as an important basis and impetus for substantive work by the appropriate multilateral organ, namely the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban of the Conference on Disarmament.

35. Mr. CHOWDHURY (Bangladesh) said that his country supported a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty because of its concern about the nearly 1,300 nuclear tests which had been conducted since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, as well as its conviction that the complete elimination of nuclear stockpiles was a requirement for lasting peace. Each of the arguments presented by those delegations in favour of nuclear testing (the need to monitor the reliability of existing nuclear weapons; the economic advantage of producing weapons that prompted proportionally greater expenditure by adversaries; the need to develop greater numbers of nuclear weapons to enhance security; the need to adapt military equipment to the effects of nuclear weapons) could be countered by a more compelling argument, i.e. the need to discourage the use of nuclear weapons; the economic advantage of using resources for development; the superfluity of large numbers of weapons in excess of need; and the destabilizing effects of signalling aggressive preparedness by adapting military equipment.

36. The main purpose of a nuclear test ban was to impede the development of an inherently destabilizing technology. Among nuclear-weapon States, continued vertical proliferation outweighed the benefits of reductions in the number of nuclear weapons. Among non-nuclear-weapon States, a ban on nuclear tests would discourage the acquisition of nuclear capability, thereby limiting horizontal proliferation. Moreover, only a fraction of the intellectual and material resources currently expended on the refinement of weapons would be sufficient for the implementation of an effective verification system. A comprehensive test ban would undoubtedly strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty, and that objective

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(Mr. Chowdhury, Bangladesh)

should not be hindered by discrimination on the part of nuclear-weapon States against non-nuclear-weapon States.

37. International security could not result from the further development of nuclear weapons, but only from disarmament and a spirit of détente, justice, maintenance of international law and order, the triumph of democratic values, a system of global ethics and economic development. The need for confrontational policies on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States had been greatly reduced by the current climate of international understanding, while the danger of the acquisition of nuclear capability by non-nuclear-weapon States should not be underestimated. The time had come for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, and the international community could not afford to waste the opportunity offered by the Amendment Conference to achieve that goal.

38. Miss MANTILLA (Ecuador) said that those countries which claimed that it was inappropriate for non-nuclear-weapon States to call for the renunciation of a technology which they lacked and which was in their security interests because they were not self-reliant were the very same countries which refused to recognize that the testing of nuclear weapons was not indispensable to the initial development of nuclear activity and that such testing constituted an ever-increasing threat to world peace by necessitating the escalation of destructive capabilities. In the post-cold war period, there was no longer any justification for continued nuclear testing. Although advances in nuclear technology and the relatively easy access to such technology by moderately developed countries might prompt nuclear-weapon States to pursue the qualitative development of their arsenals, consideration should be given to the example of those countries which had freely chosen not to develop nuclear capability but to use their resources for activities to benefit humanity. Such a decision deserved a positive response from the nuclear-weapon States, in the spirit of true international co-operation, in order to realize the goals of nuclear non-proliferation and a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.

39. Her delegation was convinced that the efforts being made at the Amendment Conference were fully consistent with the current needs of the international community. In 1963, political considerations and the limited development of nuclear technology had appeared to justify the continuation of certain nuclear tests under a partial test-ban Treaty, but those factors had been definitively superseded by new global realities, by advances in technology and by practical considerations.

40. The connection between a comprehensive test ban and security necessitated the establishment of adequate reciprocal guarantees of compliance. To that end, three factors were necessary: the guarantee that the new commitments would not be used to gain unfair advantages in order to maintain a balance of terror; assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States that their commitment not to develop such weapons in the future would be duly compensated; and an example of good conduct in international relations which, duly provided by the international community, could have better deterrent effects than a nuclear-arms race. In addition, a uniform, general,

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(Miss Mantilla, Ecuador)

universally-accepted verification system would be a necessary confidence-building measure for the implementation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

41. Environmental protection concerns, which had appeared exaggerated in 1963, could no longer be ignored, especially since the environmental degradation of the previous three decades had made the planet more fragile than ever. It was unrealistic to believe that nuclear testing in any given environment would not have tremendous repercussions on other environments. The countries of the South Pacific were justified in protesting that continued nuclear testing was damaging the marine environment and its resources. The automatic procedure established by the Permanent South Pacific Commission for protesting against situations relating to nuclear testing should be made universal as a means of channelling international pressure for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

42. The establishment of co-ordination and monitoring mechanisms was a desirable means of consolidating the efforts of the international community. In that regard, her delegation welcomed the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. However, the Committee's mandate should be defined more precisely so that its work could effectively support initiatives aimed at the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

43. Ms. MASON (Canada) said that her delegation's annual sponsorship of a General Assembly resolution entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty" reflected the importance which her Government attached to that issue. A ban on nuclear testing would discourage the development of new weapons that might have a destabilizing effect on international security. During the cold war, unbridled military competition among nuclear-weapon States had engendered suspicion and had detracted from efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. Fortunately, however, the United States and the Soviet Union had embarked on a course of intensive bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, which had acquired considerable momentum. Those historic achievements were welcome, but they did not obviate the need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

44. In addition to impeding the nuclear-arms race, such a treaty would help to discourage the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In a world where a number of non-nuclear-weapon States had yet to forgo the nuclear-weapon option by signing a binding international instrument, a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be of inestimable value.

45. Concern about the environmental effects of nuclear testing had played a decisive role in the negotiation of the partial test-ban Treaty. The contamination that was still being caused by underground nuclear testing, particularly in fragile environments, was a hazard that could not be dismissed. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was the only way to eliminate categorically that significant environmental threat.

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(Ms. Mason, Canada)

46. Her country, like many others, regretted that progress towards the goal of a comprehensive test-ban treaty had been very slow for a number of years, reflecting dissimilar approaches with regard to the type of efforts needed and the appropriate timing for the implementation of such a treaty. Nevertheless, recent developments offered hope that significant progress on reducing and ultimately banning nuclear tests was within reach.

47. Her country had long advocated a step-by-step approach as the most realistic means of achieving that goal. Such a process fostered mutual confidence among the parties and offered concrete experience with regard to key issues, such as compliance and verification, that were crucial to the implementation of an effective comprehensive test ban.

48. The mechanism for such a process had been in place since 1987, when the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to initiate full-scale negotiations on nuclear testing. Those negotiations had led, as a first step, to the conclusion of verification protocols to the 1974 threshold test-ban Treaty and the 1976 peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. The ratification of those treaties provided a solid basis for negotiations on further testing restrictions. Her Government urged the two States concerned to negotiate limits on the number and yield of tests as intermediary steps towards the early conclusion of an effective and verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty.

49. Efforts to advance towards that goal should also be made in the relevant multilateral forums. She noted with satisfaction that the Conference on Disarmament had finally succeeded, at its 1990 session, in establishing an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. She looked forward to the re-establishment of that body at the beginning of the Conference's 1991 session with a view to its continuing the work undertaken in the previous year.

50. The Conference on Disarmament had also undertaken important work over several years in the area of verification, particularly seismic verification. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, in which her country had participated, had made commendable efforts to devise a conceptual design for an international seismic data exchange system. The Ad Hoc Group's work would play a central role in the verification régime of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

51. The Amendment Conference could provide a useful forum for a focused discussion of the nuclear testing issue among the parties to the partial test-ban Treaty. The general debate was useful in clarifying the positions of all the delegations in attendance. It was to be hoped, however, that the Amendment Conference could proceed beyond a general exchange of views and give detailed consideration to some of the concrete problems associated with a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

52. The issue of verification was one area in which useful work could be done, and her delegation looked forward to sharing its experience and expertise in that field. In that connection, Canada took note of draft Protocol II on verification, which had been submitted by six State parties (PTBT/CONF/6). The document was the

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(Ms. Mason, Canada)

product of much careful thought and would stimulate consideration of the issues relating to verification.

53. Mr. CHABALA (Zambia) said that, with the end of the cold war, the climate was conducive to negotiations to convert the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

54. The record of nuclear testing since 1945 was one of unfulfilled commitments, deceit and a trust betrayed. The 1963 partial test-ban Treaty had engendered sincere hopes for nuclear disarmament and had embodied a categorical commitment to the achievement of that goal. However, since 1945, the number of nuclear test explosions had grown, as had the number of bombs. There were currently some 50,000 warheads in the world, possessing the explosive yield of roughly 20 billion tons of TNT.

55. It had become increasingly clear that the significance of those bombs transcended war and all its causes and outcomes. In numerous policy statements, Soviet and American leaders had acknowledged the supreme importance of the nuclear peril.

56. However, such high-level acknowledgements of the grave danger facing mankind had not been translated into practical measures on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. The failure to fulfil commitments under the partial test-ban Treaty had undermined the non-proliferation Treaty, which had entered into force in 1970.

57. His delegation shared the widespread view that the responsibility for the bleak record in the field of nuclear disarmament rested with the depository nuclear-weapon States, which had failed to meet the obligations undertaken in existing treaties. Moreover, a comprehensive test ban did indeed constitute the litmus test of a demonstrable commitment to nuclear disarmament and the de-escalation of the nuclear-arms race.

58. The imperative need to address seriously the cessation of all nuclear testing in all environments for all time could not be over-emphasized. No other question in the field of disarmament had been the subject of so much international concern, discussion and study. The ominous consequences for mankind in the event of an accident at a nuclear-weapons facility should be at the forefront of the international community's concerns and should underlie its consideration of the proposed amendment to the partial test-ban Treaty, an amendment which he fully supported.

59. If the international community could not reach agreement on halting underground nuclear tests, it could not expect to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As long as the nuclear-weapon States continued testing, non-nuclear-weapon States would feel compelled to develop such weapons.

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(Mr. Chabala, Zambia)

60. His country, a non-nuclear-weapon State, had not yet acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty. In his region, only racist South Africa - which had not acceded to the Treaty either - had the capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons. In the recent past, South Africa, in response to international pressures to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, had insisted that it could do so only if the front-line States signed the Treaty first. That position was preposterous, since the front-line States did not have nuclear capability and remained committed to peace, stability and democracy in the region. South Africa should cease to use the front-line States as a pretext for its failure to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty.

61. As a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), his country respected the OAU Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, which was a step in the right direction.

62. Article II of the partial test-ban Treaty provided for its amendment. Issues relating to verification had been used as a pretext for further delay in the progress towards a comprehensive test ban. Yet it had been established by many countries in possession of the necessary technology that the problem could be solved by the establishment of an international seismic verification system. It was therefore clear that those who objected to the proposed amendments were doing so for political reasons.

63. If real progress could not be achieved at the Amendment Conference, he would support the proposal for its reconvening in 1992. Furthermore, the Amendment Conference should provide a much-needed impetus to the Conference on Disarmament to pursue its work within the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, thus complementing the work of the Amendment Conference.

64. Lastly, he expressed appreciation for the contribution made by non-governmental organizations to the work of the Amendment Conference. Those organizations played a vital role in raising public awareness, especially in the nuclear-weapon States.

65. Mr. CHENAUX-REPOND (Switzerland) said that his Government supported the efforts to achieve a comprehensive and verifiable ban on nuclear testing. The technical reasons which were cited to justify the continuation of testing did not appear to be convincing. The current nuclear arsenals contained a sufficient number of warheads with a high probability of functioning. Testing should not be used to improve existing weapons or to develop new generations of weapons. It was difficult to justify the prohibition on the spread of nuclear weapons if those States which already possessed nuclear arsenals continued to develop them.

66. Although the ecological consequences of underground tests were not as severe as those of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, underground tests were not free of danger to the environment. For that reason, also, he hoped

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(Mr. Chenaux-Repond, Switzerland)

that rapid and effective progress could be made towards the achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

67. His country was participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and was willing to help in the establishment of a world-wide verification system.

68. The search for a multilateral agreement on a comprehensive test ban was meaningful only to the extent that all the parties concerned participated in it. The partial test-ban Treaty was therefore hardly a suitable framework, since it excluded two of the five States which conducted nuclear tests. Furthermore, an agreement on a comprehensive ban would be incomplete and would have little likelihood of being ratified by a majority of States if the question of verification was not settled in a satisfactory manner. However, the technical

Friday, 11 January 1991, at 10.30 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Ms. RIVERA (Costa Rica) said that the Amendment Conference was a historic event. Costa Rica believed that, in order to halt the nuclear-arms race and subsequently eliminate such weapons, it was necessary to halt nuclear tests, including underground ones.
2. Costa Rica urged the original parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to undertake joint efforts in order to carry out the tasks facing the Conference. Otherwise, future generations would be confronted by the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and the destruction of the entire planet.
3. A comprehensive test-ban treaty was an urgent necessity, and Costa Rica wished to state that it would vote in favour of amending the Moscow Treaty.
4. Mr. KAKOURIS (Cyprus) said that the Conference was being held against the backdrop of major changes on the international political scene, the end of the cold war, which had been the root cause of the spiraling arms race. Nevertheless, the prospects for the establishment of a new world order were being overshadowed by regional conflicts, the very real threat of war in the Gulf and continued nuclear-weapon testing.
5. The commitment undertaken by the original States parties to the Moscow Treaty to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and continue negotiations to that end was as relevant today as in 1963. The urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban had been repeatedly emphasized in various United Nations resolutions. Nevertheless, despite the general recognition of the destructive nature of nuclear weapons and the fact that a nuclear war could not be won, nuclear testing continued.
6. The emerging international political structure was increasingly being based on dialogue and co-operation, not confrontation and mistrust. That, together with the signing of a number of disarmament and arms-reduction agreements, was creating conditions for a transition towards complete nuclear disarmament by transforming the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Cyprus welcomed all initiatives and agreements designed to make the world safer and expressed particular satisfaction at the recent agreement between Argentina and Brazil pledging not to pursue the development of nuclear weapons. All those agreements, however, would remain half-measures, if testing continued since that would lead to the further improvement of nuclear weapons and a new spiral in the arms race and also have a negative impact on the prevention of horizontal nuclear proliferation.
7. There was a direct link between a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and the non-proliferation régime. One of the dangers of continued testing by the nuclear Powers was that it might induce countries on the threshold of acquiring nuclear weapons to join the nuclear club and their example might be followed by other

(Mr. Kakouris, Cyprus)

States. Current technological and scientific methods made it possible to solve the problem of verification, which in the past had been the stumbling block to attaining a comprehensive test ban. His delegation hoped that the signing of the verification protocols to the 1974 and the 1976 Treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union would help solve that problem. The significant efforts of the Group of Scientific Experts, established by the Conference on Disarmament and also the findings set forth in the study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification (document A/45/372) should be given greater attention.

3. Public awareness of the inherent dangers of a nuclear disaster, for example, including those linked to the Chernobyl tragedy, had been heightened in recent years. The adverse effects of tests on health and plant and animal life had been clearly identified in the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons (document A/45/373). The active contribution by the various non-governmental organizations that promoted the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty helped focus public opinion on that problem.

9. The task of concluding such a treaty was not an easy one. Although divergent views continued to exist, his delegation felt that under current circumstances words could be transformed into deeds with the necessary political will. In 1984, the Secretary-General had pointed out that a comprehensive test-ban treaty was the litmus test of the real willingness of States to pursue nuclear disarmament. The Amendment Conference was also such a litmus test and the opportunity that it provided should not be missed.

10. Mr. LUNA (Peru) said that six non-aligned non-nuclear countries, including Peru, had assumed the historic responsibility for resuming international negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and had proposed an amendment to the Moscow Treaty. The new international situation demonstrated that there was no longer any need to conduct nuclear tests. In that regard, it should be stressed that the resources allocated for the development of nuclear weapons could be utilized in order to expand the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Since 1963, the nuclear threat had only increased and nuclear tests were very closely linked to the development of nuclear capability. Accordingly, Peru advocated the complete cessation of such tests.

11. Although his country recognized and respected the obligations under the Moscow Treaty, it considered that all States had an equal right to seek to change or amend the Treaty, particularly in view of the fact that it was a question involving the entire international community. Peru was prepared to consider constructively all proposals that helped to achieve the goals of the Conference. Consideration should be given to questions relating to a draft protocol on verification, although the discussion of the amendment should not be linked to success in other areas. It should be kept in mind that the participants at the Conference would be discussing not merely a legal document, but the prospects for a new international order.

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12. Mr. OUDOVENKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed at Moscow in 1963, had been the first step towards halting the refinement of nuclear weapons, one of the corner-stones of the nuclear-arms race. Its significance could not be overestimated and the Treaty would be greatly strengthened if all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, adhered to it.

13. Settling the issue of the complete cessation of nuclear testing had become a priority for mankind and demanded immediate action. His Government attached the utmost importance to that issue. The declaration on the State sovereignty of the Ukraine, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on 16 July 1990, proclaimed the country's intention of becoming a permanently neutral State in future, one which did not take part in military blocs and adhered to three nuclear-free principles - not to take, not to produce and not to acquire nuclear weapons. The Ukraine was resolutely in favour of banning nuclear tests at the earliest date. It was not convinced by the arguments of those States that claimed that a comprehensive test ban was a "long-term goal". Such an approach was reflected in the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ukraine in the First Committee at the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

14. The main reason for the failure to settle the issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban was lack of political will on the part of some nuclear States to take that step. Any problems in that connection could be solved through joint efforts and to everyone's satisfaction. The proposal under discussion at the present Conference - to extend the 1963 Moscow Treaty to cover underground testing - would mean a complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests. It was important that discussion of the issue in that forum should be geared from the outset towards a joint search for the best solution and the elaboration of universally acceptable practical measures. The Ukrainian SSR believed that use must be made of all possible channels that would enable progress to be made towards early settlement of the issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. To that end, both bilateral and multilateral negotiating channels must be put into operation and must complement each other organically. A step-by-step approach was also possible, provided that it was aimed at the early achievement of a comprehensive ban.

15. His delegation placed great hopes in the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear-test ban established within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. One very useful measure would be a moratorium on testing to which all the nuclear Powers would adhere on a reciprocal basis. The proposal on the immediate cessation of nuclear testing and the holding of a parliamentary referendum in that connection deserved attention. His delegation was prepared to support any verification measures which would create reliable guarantees of compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such measures must include the methods enumerated in the draft basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon-tests: a seismic verification system, verification of airborne radioactivity and on-site inspections. In addition, use could be made of the corresponding elements of the verification mechanisms for the 1974 and 1976 Treaties recently worked out at the Soviet-American talks.

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16. Mr. TAEB (Afghanistan) noted that the convening of the Amendment Conference reflected the desire of the majority of States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to achieve the goal proclaimed in its preamble, namely "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" in all environments and by all States. The many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations and the activities of the Conference on Disarmament and the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban established thereunder in 1990 were all designed to contribute to the attainment of that goal.

17. The present favourable international climate offered an historic opportunity to settle that fundamental issue in the field of the nuclear-arms race, and the signing of the INF Treaty, the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 threshold test-ban Treaties paved the way for further movement towards general and complete disarmament. All that was needed was the necessary political will.

18. There were no longer any technological obstacles to a comprehensive test ban: a verification mechanism could be set up that included seismic monitoring, the measurement of atmospheric radioactivity and on-site inspections.

19. A comprehensive ban on nuclear tests would also strengthen the non-proliferation régime and its universality. Some non-nuclear States refused to adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty, alleging that it was discriminatory. While that position was totally unacceptable, it should be noted that the nuclear States were not fulfilling their commitment to work seriously for a comprehensive test ban.

20. His country supported the amendment proposed by the six countries and believed that the international community should continue its efforts to secure the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

21. Mr. FRANCESE (Italy) said that in the course of the negotiations that had led to the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, it had been perceived that the opportunity of concluding a comprehensive test ban already existed. Attempts made at the time to achieve that goal had failed for two basic reasons: limited verification possibilities and the distrust prevailing in East-West relations.

22. By now, verification technologies had greatly progressed, making the detection of underground nuclear explosions far more reliable than in the 1950s or 1960s. Moreover, the political environment had largely changed. As a result, on-site inspections now appeared acceptable and the principle of co-operation in the field of verification had replaced the earlier distrust and confrontation. A comprehensive test ban was therefore a more realistic goal now than at any time in the past 30 years. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee at Geneva in 1990 was a politically significant step in that direction.

23. Despite its limited achievements, the Conference on Disarmament remained the appropriate forum for in-depth consideration of the issue of a comprehensive test ban in all its aspects. The experience acquired in recent years and the unprecedented progress achieved in arms control, especially within the framework of

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(Mr. Francese, Italy)

East-West relations, had proved that a step-by-step approach was essential in order to achieve concrete and lasting results.

24. With the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the seeds had been sown for an irreversible reduction, at least in numbers, in the two largest nuclear arsenals; a START agreement was expected to further limit the size of those arsenals. With the ratification of the threshold test-ban Treaties, the United States and the Soviet Union had begun a process of joint control and further limitation of nuclear tests.

25. Although the process of reducing nuclear weapons had been initiated by the visible efforts of the two depositories of the largest arsenals on earth, it could not continue without the determined support of the whole international community. A comprehensive test ban could be achieved only through comparable and proportionate efforts by all parties concerned.

26. His Government believed that the Conference would best serve its objective if it reached a better understanding of the motives for States parties' common adherence to the partial test-ban Treaty and of the reasons why they all subscribed to the principle that a comprehensive test ban was necessary.

27. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syrian Arab Republic) said that a comprehensive test ban had been called for by all countries and peoples seeking to promote peace and stability and that the success of the current Conference would create favourable conditions for preparing for and holding the Fifth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995.

28. The questions of a comprehensive test ban and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were indivisibly linked. The refusal to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty was at variance with obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty and other international agreements and conventions. The Amendment Conference, therefore, was part of the overall effort to achieve general and complete disarmament, particularly with regard to nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

29. As a non-aligned country, Syria fully complied with the provisions of the partial test-ban Treaty. Nevertheless, the shortcoming of the Treaty was that the nuclear Powers had not been able to reach agreement on halting underground tests in spite of all the efforts of the non-aligned countries in that regard. Failure to adopt the amendment to the Treaty would weaken the non-proliferation régime and encourage certain States not to carry out its provisions.

30. At their meeting at the highest level in Belgrade in 1989, the non-aligned countries had called upon the three Depositary States of the Treaty to demonstrate greater flexibility in order to guarantee the continued effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime. Most delegations at the current Conference had pointed out that a speedy halt to testing would be an important step towards eliminating the threat of the qualitative improvement and development of new weapon systems and

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(Mr. El-Fattal, Syrian Arab Republic)

would promote the non-proliferation of such weapon systems. The amendment proposed by the six countries should be considered and adopted because it was in keeping with the interests of all participants at the Conference. Furthermore, it was necessary to step up the work of the Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament in order to follow up the implementation of General Assembly resolution 43/50.

31. A comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons and the non-proliferation régime constituted the basis for establishing a new system of international security. At the current Conference, it was necessary to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, which was a further measure for increasing the effectiveness of a comprehensive test ban.

32. Since the partial test-ban Treaty expired in four years, negotiations should be conducted in order to reach agreement on banning tests in all environments and for all time in order to prevent the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

33. Syria had proposed the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East at the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. In 1990 in Algeria, the Mediterranean countries had adopted the Egyptian initiative and the proposal by Syria concerning the transformation of the Mediterranean region into a nuclear-weapon-free zone under effective international control. It was paradoxical that Israel, which had signed the partial test-ban Treaty in 1963, had not yet signed and ratified the non-proliferation Treaty, apparently in order to plan and carry out nuclear-weapon tests. That created a threat to peace and security in the region.

34. The world community was increasingly aware of the danger which nuclear testing posed to the environment and health. Nevertheless, since 1963, 1,300 nuclear-weapon tests had been conducted, 85 per cent of which by the Depositary States. In the Pacific Ocean basin alone, 17 nuclear explosions had been carried out, resulting in contamination of the Ocean, destruction of marine resources, and also damage to the health of the population in the region.

35. Syria was prepared to contribute to the work of the bodies to be set up at the Conference and had high regard for the work of non-governmental organizations in providing valuable information and informing the general public.

36. Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria) said that his delegation was participating in the Conference in the belief that the nuclear threat remained one of the foremost global challenges facing mankind. Bulgaria welcomed the beginning of real nuclear disarmament initiated by the Soviet Union and the United States. The elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons, the signing of the agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and the anticipated conclusion of a treaty on strategic offensive weapons had demonstrated what could be achieved by means of political vision and statesmanship.

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(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

37. Bulgaria had acceded to the partial test-ban Treaty on the day on which it had been opened for signature. The Treaty had played and was continuing to play a substantial role in limiting nuclear-weapon tests, especially from the ecological point of view. At the same time, his country remained firmly committed to the goal of a comprehensive test ban in full conformity with the provisions and obligations set forth in the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty.

38. For almost three decades, the question of a comprehensive test ban had occupied an important place on the international disarmament agenda. It was clear, however, that the failure to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty would not be due to a lack of awareness of the importance and urgency of that problem. The Treaty had always been regarded as an effective means of curbing the arms race and the qualitative development and proliferation of nuclear weapons.

39. A comprehensive test-ban treaty could be achieved in one step or in several steps. Bulgaria felt that the second approach was more realistic. His delegation welcomed the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. Furthermore, that problem had a direct bearing on the basic security interests of many States and alliances and that fact should also be taken into account.

40. Bulgaria hoped that the conclusion in June 1990 of the protocols to the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty would lead to further progress towards the achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

41. The question of verification was undoubtedly very important. It was now quite clear that the technical questions relating to the monitoring of compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty had been largely resolved.

42. Bulgaria approached the issue of a comprehensive test ban in the broader context of nuclear weapons and nuclear non-proliferation. It supported the constant efforts to achieve the goals in that important area and was in favour of the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty on the basis of a stage-by-stage approach. His delegation shared the view expressed by many delegations that the nuclear-weapon States should consider reducing the number and yield of their test explosions.

43. Bulgaria regarded the Conference as a starting-point for realizing a noble goal and hoped that it would generate specific ideas and the determination to move forward at the bilateral and the multilateral levels.

44. Mrs. DIALLO (Senegal) said that despite the significant efforts of the international community since the conclusion of the 1963 Moscow Treaty to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, there had still been no success in ending underground tests. Understanding the complexity of the issue, and taking into consideration the commitment of a number of States to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and the problems of verification, her delegation none the less was convinced that political will and constructive dialogue would enable the ultimate goal to be achieved. Another important factor facilitating progress towards a

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(Mrs. Diallo, Senegal)

comprehensive nuclear-test ban was the positive change in the international situation, the rapprochement between East and West and the progress in Soviet-American negotiations on disarmament and arms control. At the same time the crisis in the Gulf recalled to mind the serious dangers that still threatened peace and security and underscored the need for further efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban. In that connection, her delegation noted with satisfaction the commitment of the Soviet Union to facilitating a comprehensive ban.

45. Senegal, which like other African countries was facing many serious problems, felt a special concern over the serious threat of nuclear weapons and the fatal consequences of nuclear testing. It had always favoured the reallocation of resources expended on military requirements to the fight against hunger, disease, poverty and indebtedness. Supporting all initiatives and efforts aimed at achieving a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, Senegal consistently endorsed the establishment of nuclear-free zones and particularly the declaration of the African continent as such a zone.

46. Amendment of the 1963 Treaty and the establishment of effective verification machinery would facilitate the achievement of those goals and the strengthening of a non-proliferation system. In recognition of the fact that the Conference would not have enough time to achieve that goal, it would be useful to envisage the establishment of a working group to continue consideration of the issue. In conclusion, she urged the States parties to the Treaty to do their utmost to ensure that the Conference would pave the way for a compromise, with due regard for the specific interests of the respective States and the need to strengthen peace and international security.

47. Mr. GHAREKHAN (India) said that, when the partial test-ban Treaty had been signed in 1963, the international community had hoped that it would be followed by other agreements, including a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Unfortunately those hopes had failed to materialize. Even though the signing of the Treaty had resulted in a significant reduction in the radioactive contamination of the atmosphere, oceans and land, an end to the qualitative and quantitative nuclear-arms race had not been achieved. It had been estimated that in the period from the signature of the Treaty until 1989 more than 1,270 tests had been conducted and that over the past five years the nuclear-weapon States had conducted 172 nuclear tests.

48. The Conference was the appropriate forum for considering the problem of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. All aspects of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty had already been studied in detail and all that remained for the Conference to do was to stimulate sufficient political will on the part of the States parties for the amendment to be adopted. The key to success was held by the nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations were under way between the United States and the Soviet Union on a number of nuclear arms control agreements, but none of them prohibited the upgrading of existing weapons systems.

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(Mr. Gharekhan, India)

49. In the earlier consideration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, peaceful nuclear explosions had always been assigned a separate role. The original intention had been to maintain a dividing-line between nuclear explosions for military purposes, which were to be prohibited entirely, and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, to be allowed under certain conditions. At the same time doubts had been raised in recent years about the utility of peaceful nuclear explosions.

50. His delegation felt that a comprehensive test ban played a positive role and that an opportune moment had arrived to achieve agreement on the drafting of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

51. Mr. NOTERDAEME (Belgium) said that Belgium supported a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. That had been demonstrated with the utmost clarity in the General Assembly and in other international forums. Belgium was a State party to the partial test-ban Treaty and to the non-proliferation Treaty. It had refrained from possessing any nuclear explosive devices. That, however, did not mean that it was not interested in the discontinuance of nuclear tests. On the contrary, the Belgian Government regarded the conclusion of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear tests as one of the goals of arms limitation. The tasks of the Government of Belgium in the area of disarmament, which had been defined in 1988, were active support for the reduction of arsenals of strategic nuclear weapons to achieve a balance at the lowest possible level and the conclusion of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

52. Those goals, together with the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons, fell within the framework of a general policy of peace and security, which also provided for co-operation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and defining security in Western Europe.

53. Belgium felt that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, verification of which would be ensured only with the help of seismic means of verification, did not provide guarantees comparable to those in the non-proliferation Treaty. That treaty could not be considered an alternative to the non-proliferation Treaty. An effective international system for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was still an integral component of international security.

54. A comprehensive test-ban treaty did not solve the problem of the reduction of nuclear arsenals. His Government fully supported negotiations on strategic offensive arms and favoured the reduction of nuclear-weapon stockpiles in Europe.

55. As for the problem of verification, the most appropriate forum for considering it was the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, especially if renewal of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was taken into consideration.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

Friday, 11 January 1991, at 3.25 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded)

1. Mr. BILOA TANG (Cameroon) said that, since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty, the number of nuclear tests had in fact increased. Despite the commitments made by the parties to the Treaty, no decisive measures had been adopted, either by the Conference on Disarmament or within the framework of bilateral or trilateral negotiations, to bring and end to nuclear-weapon testing. The continuation of an unbridled arms race, based on the policy of nuclear deterrence, had consumed vast economic and financial resources, while the countries of the third world continued to face non-nuclear threats such as hunger, poverty, debt, illiteracy and disease.
2. Accordingly, the Amendment Conference offered the first opportunity in many years to initiate into serious multilateral negotiations with a view to the adoption of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In view of the marked improvement in the international climate, the time had come to adopt such a treaty. That was the only way to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to prevent the pollution of the seas, the atmosphere and outer space. He welcomed the progress made in recent years in the field of disarmament, as shown by the INF Treaty and the verification protocols signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. On that basis, the Amendment Conference should be able to overcome difficulties and differences in approach so as to achieve the goal of a comprehensive test ban.
3. The international community had acquired solid experience in the verification of compliance with disarmament agreements. It was now recognized that, with existing technology, compliance with a comprehensive test ban could be verified with a high degree of accuracy.
4. For that reason, he was convinced that a comprehensive, universal and verifiable nuclear test ban could be achieved. The Amendment Conference was the only forum in which States parties could discuss the conversion of the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It was important, therefore, to seize the opportunity thus afforded to strengthen international co-operation and dialogue with regard to such a crucial issue, rather than deferring consideration of the matter to other, small bodies or choosing the so-called step-by-step approach. That approach had two drawbacks: it did not prevent the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, and it postponed indefinitely the multilateral negotiations which could lead to a complete and immediate ban.
5. U THAUNG TUN (Myanmar) said that, 27 years after the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty and 20 years after the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty, the world was no closer to a comprehensive test ban. That was all the more disappointing in that the parties to the partial test-ban Treaty had committed themselves to seeking an end to nuclear-weapon-test explosions for all time. Discussions of a comprehensive test ban had been carried on bilaterally, trilaterally and multilaterally, but the meetings in question had been unproductive.

(U Thaung Tun, Myanmar)

6. His country, like the majority of States attending the Amendment Conference, attached great importance to a nuclear test ban and had supported all efforts to achieve a comprehensive and verifiable ban since 1962. If such a vital step towards disarmament had not been taken, it was not for lack of sustained efforts on the part of the international community; rather, it was because the depository States had failed to fulfil their obligations under the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty. Regrettably, those States still regarded a comprehensive test ban as a goal to be achieved later rather than sooner. That was why no tangible results had been achieved despite the General Assembly's adoption of some 70 resolutions on the issue. Similar efforts within the Conference on Disarmament had also been thwarted, and even the establishment within that body of an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban with a proper negotiating mandate had persistently been blocked. Although mention was frequently made of the successful bilateral negotiations which had led to the signing of the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty, those instruments were more concerned with setting agreed limits to the explosive yields of underground tests than with banning such tests.

7. Paradoxically, the States which currently counselled a step-by-step approach were the very ones which in 1962 had stated that a comprehensive test-ban treaty was the key to disarmament, since it would be an important first step in bringing the arms race under control. Despite such declarations, a comprehensive test ban had not been achieved, allegedly because of differences with regard to the number of on-site inspections.

8. For the first time since the invention of nuclear weapons, serious efforts were being made to curb the unbridled nuclear-arms race. Negotiations on the reduction of strategic arms were making encouraging headway. While recent developments had given rise to hopes for a more peaceful world, the international community should not lose sight of the dangers that still lay ahead. The world was threatened with conflicts which might destabilize global peace. The threat of war looming over the Gulf region served as a reminder of the possibility that weapons of mass destruction might be used in an open conflict. The task of achieving nuclear disarmament was therefore more urgent than ever.

9. At the current stage, nuclear tests served only to develop new and more effective weapons of mass destruction. The time had come to discard outmoded doctrines and overcome suspicions bred by ideological rivalry and military confrontation. There was broad agreement that a comprehensive and verifiable test ban would be a vital step towards bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons. Although the difficulties relating to verification were real and formidable, they were not insurmountable and should no longer be used as a pretext for failing to take action. Accordingly, current efforts must continue in order to bring about a breakthrough towards a comprehensive test ban.

10. Mr. ALCANTARA (Dominican Republic) said that, while his country had never participated in the nuclear-arms race, it had always expressed its concern at the threat which nuclear weapons posed to mankind and to the world environment. His country had voiced its opposition to the nuclear-arms race in all international

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(Mr. Alcantara, Dominican Republic)

forums and had unconditionally supported the non-proliferation Treaty and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco).

11. As a result of nuclear weapons, the world was divided in various ways: between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States; between nuclear-weapon States which believed that testing was necessary and States which believed that all nuclear tests should be discontinued in order to prevent the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and to discourage their inclusion in military deterrence strategies; between States which could not agree to a comprehensive test ban because they did not trust the existing verification mechanisms and States which feared that in the future only nuclear weapons would be reliable, and that they would be used on the battlefield at the first opportunity; between nuclear-weapon States which were determined to prevent other countries from developing such weapons, even at the risk of nuclear war, and other States - the majority - which were promoting the concept of a comprehensive test ban as an important step towards the ultimate goal of world-wide nuclear disarmament.

12. Until such time as a comprehensive test-ban treaty could be signed, the nuclear-weapon States should unilaterally suspend all nuclear-test explosions and pursue all efforts to negotiate such a treaty under the auspices of the Amendment Conference, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 45/50. He also supported the idea of including in the provisional agenda of the Assembly's forty-sixth session an item entitled "Amendment to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water". The prohibition of underground nuclear tests would help to slow the development of new nuclear weapons and would substantially reduce nuclear arsenals. It would also strengthen the efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and would reduce the risks of future environmental pollution.

13. In view of the complex and sensitive nature of the issues under discussion at the Amendment Conference, particularly the question of verification, there was a need for prolonged discussions and negotiations in order to persuade the nuclear-weapon States to declare a moratorium on testing while the details of verification were being worked out. For that reason, the Amendment Conference should not take a final vote on the question under consideration, but should agree to reconvene in a year or two, having established a working group to co-ordinate matters in the mean time.

14. Mr. ALMUAKKAF (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that the accumulation of nuclear arsenals, far from constituting a deterrent, increased the risks of a devastating war. The objective to which all must aspire was a comprehensive nuclear-test ban subject to effective international verification.

15. The cold war had given way to an era of unprecedented harmony in international relations, yet it had still not been possible to eliminate the threats posed to international peace and security by the existence of enormous quantities of weapons of mass destruction. Those threats were increased by the continued production,

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(Mr. Almuakkaf, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya)

development, stockpiling and testing of nuclear arms by the nuclear-weapon States. His delegation therefore attached particular importance to the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty had stated their determination to conclude such a treaty at the earliest opportunity but the nuclear-weapon States were not displaying the political will required for such action. His delegation urged all States to take appropriate measures to end the testing of nuclear weapons as a matter of urgency.

16. The considerable progress made in negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning reductions in their strategic offensive arms, as well as their conventional forces in Europe, was to be welcomed. The Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, had a major role to play in bringing about a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. His delegation hoped that the newly re-established Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban would begin work immediately with a broader mandate. It also supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world.

17. Noting the complementary relationship between the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty, his delegation hoped that the current Conference would succeed in formulating a comprehensive test-ban treaty which would provide similar support for the non-proliferation Treaty. Such hopes would, however, remain remote so long as two nuclear-weapon States refused to join in the agreement on such a ban. In that connection, his delegation regretted that the Fourth Review Conference for the non-proliferation Treaty had failed to agree on a final declaration.

18. In conclusion, his country attached particular importance to the establishment of machinery for the effective verification of all nuclear tests. Following the improvement of seismic techniques, which constituted the best means of monitoring tests at the international level, there could be no justification for the arguments against a comprehensive ban advanced by certain nuclear-weapon States.

19. Mr. FUENTES IBAÑEZ (Bolivia) said that, since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty, no progress had been made towards banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Furthermore, the formal commitment to establish verification of underground nuclear tests, which was now feasible, had not been carried out. With the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency it would not be difficult to set up a data bank in order to ensure reliable verification.

20. The countries that conducted nuclear-weapon tests invoked security reasons to justify such tests. However, now that the cold war had come to an end, there was no justification for increasing nuclear arsenals to serve as a deterrent to war. Nuclear deterrence was based on terror and constituted a violation of State sovereignty. In view of the preliminary disarmament agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union and the new atmosphere of international co-operation

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(Mr. Fuentes Ibañez, Bolivia)

and mutual trust, conditions were propitious for amending the partial test-ban Treaty. To that end, the structure of the Amendment Conference should be maintained and work should continue so that the Conference could be reconvened at the latest in 1992.

21. Mr. PEDAUYE (Spain) said that Spain had supported the vast majority of United Nations resolutions calling for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, particularly the proposals put forward by Australia and New Zealand in the First Committee every year since 1972. Since 1964, Spain had been a party to the partial test-ban Treaty. In 1986, it had acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty.

22. The partial-test-ban Treaty was outstanding in that the number of States parties to it had steadily increased and its provisions had never been violated. One reason for its success was that it was realistic and pragmatic. Operating on the premise that a complete cessation of nuclear testing could not be achieved overnight, its approach was less ambitious and sought to achieve the desired goal in stages.

23. Perhaps the most substantive obstacle to a comprehensive ban had to do with the complex and delicate balance of current international security arrangements. His delegation was convinced the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was closely linked to achieving progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. In that connection, the best approach would be a gradual one. Therefore, the sudden conversion of the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear test-ban Treaty did not seem realistic for the time being. For one thing, it would exclude two of the five nuclear-weapon Powers, which were not parties to the partial test-ban Treaty. Moreover, a total cessation of testing which left arsenals intact until they became obsolete, could actually be destabilizing and increase nuclear risks.

24. His delegation had actively participated in the preparatory work for the Conference out of support for its underlying ideals. Spain was convinced, however, that in the immediate future the Conference served more as a valuable forum for the exchange of views than as a means to achieving a comprehensive ban.

25. Recent years had witnessed historic developments in the quest for disarmament. Outstanding among those developments was the conclusion of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), signed at Paris eight weeks earlier, the joint declaration by States parties of the two major military alliances, and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe, also signed at the Paris Summit Meeting of Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The INF Treaty, concluded in 1987, and its verification protocols had given fresh impetus to the disarmament process after 20 relatively uneventful years. The imminent conclusion of the first treaty substantially reducing strategic nuclear arms (START) and the re-establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban were also encouraging signs.

26. In the light of those developments, the Conference could serve as a catalyst for achieving a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenals and fostering specific

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(Mr. Pedauye, Spain)

measures for a comprehensive test ban. Initiatives proposed by a number of delegations could be explored, such as timing of nuclear testing at greater intervals, reducing the thresholds permitted in each explosion and setting a nuclear-test ceiling which would decrease annually.

27. Mr. LEGWAILA (Botswana) said that his country attached the utmost importance to the partial test-ban Treaty and believed that the Amendment Conference provided an opportunity to explore ways of achieving a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The Conference was taking place at a time of dynamic change throughout the world. The end of the cold war and other positive developments had given rise to the hope that mankind had emerged from the era marked by the balance of terror.

28. The ultimate objective of the Conference should be a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Halting all nuclear tests was the only credible way to ensure nuclear non-proliferation. While not wishing to establish a linkage between the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty, Botswana stressed the need to recognize that a situation in which the nuclear-weapon States were allowed to have a monopoly on nuclear weapons was neither desirable nor fair. His country had an open and constructive approach towards the proposed amendment. The Conference should initiate the process of negotiations leading to the signing of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Botswana would have no difficulty accepting a step-by-step approach to a comprehensive test ban, if the nuclear-weapon States were prepared to commit themselves to that goal.

29. While his delegation was fully aware of the complex relationship between a comprehensive test ban and reliable verification arrangements, as well as the difficulties involved in the verification of compliance with obligations, it was nevertheless, convinced that the advances in science and technology would make it possible to ensure a verifiable nuclear-test ban. Botswana believed that the Amendment Conference had an important role to play in negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and appealed to States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to ensure that that process was brought to its logical conclusion.

30. Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom) said that, with the total withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and the implementation of the CFE Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had agreed that it could reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons. NATO members had also agreed, however, that since the future was uncertain, an appropriate combination of nuclear and conventional forces should be maintained. For the United Kingdom, that meant that security would continue to depend on deterrence, based, in part, on nuclear weapons - and that would entail a measure of nuclear testing.

31. While certain delegations might invoke the third preambular paragraph of the partial test-ban Treaty in that regard, his delegation wished to draw attention to the Treaty's second preambular paragraph, which placed a nuclear-test ban in the context of wider disarmament, and seemed to constitute the only realistic approach. The painful truth was that there was no instant means of dismantling nuclear-weapon systems, and that States dependent on such systems required time to

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(Mr. Kenyon, United Kingdom)

ensure their security by other means. None the less, his delegation noted the encouraging progress in the area of arms control, including the INF Treaty, the CFE Treaty and the ongoing work towards a START treaty.

32. His delegation disagreed with the view that the possession of nuclear weapons by some States might prompt other States to pursue the same course. A State could develop a crude and highly dangerous weapon without testing, regardless of whether current nuclear-weapon States retained their capability. If the non-proliferation Treaty - to which Iraq was a party, moreover - was already supposed to protect against that eventuality, there was no guarantee that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would afford greater security. A more promising solution had been demonstrated in recent months by two nuclear-threshold States which had cast aside competition in favour of co-operating for peaceful purposes.

33. He now wished to comment on the statements by some delegations about the environmental impact of nuclear testing. The partial test-ban Treaty had laid the groundwork for the cessation of testing above ground, and the technology for containing underground testing was highly sophisticated. As a result, the problem of environmental damage at the testing site had been minimized. Indeed, according to a 1989 report from the United States Congress Office of Technology Assessment, total radioactive releases since 1970 would not pose a threat to public health, even in the immediate vicinity of the Nevada test site.

34. With regard to the question of nuclear-test moratoria, and, in particular, the proposal by President Gorbachev, the United Kingdom was not at present prepared to give up testing. A moratorium would be a poor substitute for a properly-negotiated and effectively-verifiable treaty. Moreover, a moratorium without verification provisions could in itself undermine security.

35. While his delegation did not support converting the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, it did believe that the exchange of views at the Amendment Conference was a useful exercise. As his delegation had indicated at the Conference on Disarmament, it was not clear that verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would be fully reliable. While it was possible to distinguish between an earthquake and a nuclear-test explosion at relatively high yields, covert testing remained a distinct possibility. Further discussion of such highly-technical matters should be pursued at the Conference on Disarmament and, in particular, in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. For the past 15 years, the United Kingdom had actively participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament. While the United Kingdom Government was committed to a comprehensive test ban in the long term, it believed that confidence - in both the technical and the political sense - was a pre-condition for achieving that goal.

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CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE (continued)

(a) APPOINTMENT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (concluded)

36. Mr. Peerthum (Mauritius) was elected Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee by acclamation.

37. Belgium, Botswana, Colombia, Fiji and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were appointed members of the Credentials Committee.

38. The PRESIDENT appealed to States parties participating in the Conference that had not already done so to submit their representative's credentials to the Secretary-General of the Conference.

39. Mr. KHERADI (Secretary-General of the Conference) requested States parties that had participated in the Meeting for the Organization of the Conference and those participating in the Amendment Conference which had not already done so to pay their contributions in order to defray the cost of the Conference and the Meeting. Thus far, only a limited number of contributions had been paid. The Conference was not financed from the regular budget of the United Nations but was self-financing. In that connection, he wished to draw attention to rule 12 of the rules of procedure, on cost-sharing, and to the letter dated 20 August 1990 transmitted by the Controller of the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.

Friday, 18 January 1991, at 5.05 p.m.

1 TRIBUTE TO THE MEMORY OF HIS MAJESTY OLAV V, KING OF NORWAY

1. On the proposal of the President, the participants in the Amendment Conference observed a minute of silence in tribute to the memory of His Majesty Olav V, King of Norway.

CREDENTIALS OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONFERENCE (concluded)

(b) REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (PTBT/CONF/12)

2. The PRESIDENT said that, following the preparation of the report of the Credentials Committee, credentials in due form had been received from the representatives of Colombia and Costa Rica.

3. Mr. GROOP (Finland), speaking as Chairman of the Credentials Committee, introduced the report of that Committee (PTBT/CONF/12). In paragraph 8, the reference to "paragraphs 4 and 6 above" should be amended to read "paragraphs 4, 6 and 7 above". The report indicated that at its second meeting the Credentials Committee had examined and accepted the credentials of the representatives of all 94 participating States parties, on the understanding that those States parties that had not yet submitted formal credentials for their representatives would communicate them to the Secretary-General of the Conference as soon as possible.

4. The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference decided to take note of the report of the Credentials Committee.

5. It was so decided.

ADOPTION OF FINAL DOCUMENT/REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE (PTBT/CONF/L.1 and 2)

6. Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) said that there had unfortunately been no agreement on the content of a final declaration of the Conference or a statement by the President reflecting the outcome of the Conference. Draft decision PTBT/CONF/L.1 had therefore been proposed by 9 States, which had now been joined by Senegal. Following consultations on the draft decision, the sponsors had decided to revise the text so that it read:

"Acknowledging the complex and complicated nature of certain aspects of a comprehensive test ban, especially those with regard to verification of compliance and possible sanctions against non-compliance, the States parties were of the view that further work needed to be undertaken. Accordingly, they agreed to mandate the President of the Conference to conduct consultations with a view to achieving progress on those issues and resuming the work of the Conference at an appropriate time."

7. He requested a recorded vote on draft decision PTBT/CONF/L.1, as orally revised.

8. Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom), speaking in explanation of vote before the vote, said he regretted that the Conference had failed to reach a consensus, owing to disagreement as to whether the amendment process was an appropriate means of achieving a comprehensive test ban. His delegation believed that the question of a comprehensive test ban would be best handled by the Conference on Disarmament. The international community had the opportunity to review the progress of the Conference on Disarmament through the annual report it submitted to the General Assembly. He wished to reaffirm the United Kingdom's adherence to the partial test-ban Treaty and its desire for an eventual comprehensive test ban. The United Kingdom would, however, vote against the draft decision under consideration.

9. Mr. GARCIA-MORITAN (Argentina) said that it was most regrettable that a vote was needed on the draft decision. His delegation would vote in favour of the revised draft.

10. Mr. SALANDER (Sweden) said that he regretted the Conference's inability to reach a consensus. However, he valued the intense efforts that had resulted in the revised draft decision, which took a variety of positions into account. Although the new text was not in complete conformity with his Government's position, he would vote in favour of it.

11. Mr. BEN-RAFAEL (Israel) said that, although a consensus had not been achieved, the Conference had provided a focus and impetus for the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

12. He had planned to state that the current international climate was conducive to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; however, disarmament priorities had shifted because of the eruption of war in the Persian Gulf two days earlier and the missile attacks that Iraq was currently launching against Israel. Those events underscored the urgency of the regional objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, particularly in view of the recent revelations of Iraq's nuclear aspirations. Although some Arab States had claimed they were in favour of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, they refused to open a dialogue with Israel on the issue. He urged all the States in the region to conduct direct negotiations with Israel to achieve that end.

13. With regard to the draft decision, his delegation had reservations on the modalities for achieving a comprehensive test ban, and would therefore abstain in the vote.

14. Mr. ERDOS (Hungary) said that the Conference had been unable to follow the usual pattern of adopting a final document by consensus, but its failure to reach a consensus was not without precedent. However, he was deeply disappointed by the unprecedented need to put the draft decision to a vote. Decisions relating to international security and disarmament should be adopted solely on the basis of the principle of consensus. His delegation could not accept the idea of voting on the issue, and would therefore abstain in the vote.

15. At the request of the representative of Mexico, a recorded vote was taken on draft decision PTBT/CONF/L.1, as orally revised.

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In favour: Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Guatemala, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey

16. Draft decision PTBT/CONF/L.1, as orally revised, was adopted by 74 votes to 2, with 19 abstentions.

17. Mr. JESUS (Cape Verde) said that, if his delegation had been present at the time of the vote, it would have voted in favour of the revised draft decision.

18. Ms. MASON (Canada), speaking in explanation of vote after the vote, said that her delegation attached great importance to the objective of an effective and verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. Although the failure to reach a consensus was regrettable, the Conference had provided a useful opportunity for an exchange of views on the issue. She had been unable to support the draft decision because the text inaccurately stated that the States parties had agreed to mandate the President to take certain measures, when no such agreement had been reached. The voting process could not create an agreement, nor could it obviate the need for one. The full participation of all parties was essential to the multilateral disarmament process. She had therefore abstained in the vote on the draft decision.

19. Mr. HOEKEMA (Netherlands) said he regretted the lack of substantive results through consensus on such an important issue. Although his delegation had disagreed with the idea of holding a conference to consider an amendment that was unlikely to be adopted, it had participated in view of the importance of reviewing the question. He would have welcomed a declaration expressing the commitment of the States parties to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as well as the need for the Conference on Disarmament to continue its work in that area with determination. However, the revised draft decision went too far in referring to a "mandate" for the President of the Conference. His delegation had therefore abstained in the vote.

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20. Mr. FRIEDRICH (Switzerland) said that his Government supported all efforts to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty. However, it believed that the Conference on Disarmament was the most appropriate multilateral forum in which to pursue such efforts, because all five nuclear-weapon States were represented in that body. He had therefore abstained in the vote on the draft decision. It was regrettable that the Amendment Conference had been unable to adopt a final document by consensus. He hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would take into account the views expressed at the Amendment Conference, and that more countries would participate in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts at the Conference on Disarmament.

21. Mr. KEMPEL (Austria) said that his country continued to attach the highest importance to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and to the need to examine a variety of unsolved problems relating to such a treaty. He had abstained in the vote on the draft decision because it sought to continue the work of the Conference in an unacceptable way and to reflect an agreement which had not, in fact, been reached. Although the ideal outcome of the Conference would have been the adoption of a final document by consensus, the Conference had nevertheless provided catalytic input for efforts to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

22. Ms. HOINKES (United States of America) said that her negative vote on the revised draft decision in no way reflected a lack of appreciation for the President's work during the Conference. Her Government attached the highest importance to the partial test-ban Treaty, and its opposition to the idea of amending the Treaty had been clear from the beginning of the Amendment Conference, which had not contributed to the continued viability of the partial test ban currently in effect. As a depositary of the Treaty, the United States had recognized the right of one third of the States parties to the Treaty to require the convening of the Amendment Conference. Despite its opposition to the amendment on both procedural and substantive grounds, the United States, as a party to the partial test-ban Treaty, had participated in the Amendment Conference and had listened carefully to the widely-varying views of the other States parties.

23. Although the United States remained committed to the long-term objective of a comprehensive test ban, such a ban could not be viewed in isolation from the current world situation and from the continued dependence of the United States on nuclear deterrence. However, her country looked forward to a world in which nuclear arsenals could be reduced and nuclear testing would not be required, and would therefore contribute to the efforts being made in the Conference on Disarmament to achieve an eventual comprehensive test-ban treaty.

24. Mr. GROOP (Finland) said that his country had long supported the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. His abstention in the vote on the draft decision reflected his views on the best means of achieving such a treaty, not on the desirability of the goal itself. Although the lack of consensus was regrettable, the Conference had provided a useful forum for an exchange of views on the issue. He trusted that the Conference on Disarmament would continue its work to achieve the goal of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

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25. Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) said that, as a sponsor of both the original and the revised version of the draft decision, his delegation had voted in favour of the draft, on the understanding that the consultations to be conducted by the President would include a working group to consider verification of compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty; ideally, the working group would meet during the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly. In addition, his delegation believed that the appropriate time for the resumption of the Amendment Conference would be no later than September 1993, or two years before the fifth and final review of the non-proliferation Treaty.

26. Mr. PAWLAK (Poland) said he regretted that, despite all efforts, it had been impossible to reach agreement on the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The decision just adopted did not offer a useful approach, and his delegation had therefore abstained in the vote.

27. Mr. KAYSER (Luxembourg) said that further negotiations would be needed in order to produce a comprehensive test-ban treaty. His delegation had abstained in the vote because it felt that the consultations in question must include all five major Powers and not just the three represented at the Conference.

28. Mr. FRANCESE (Italy) said that the Amendment Conference had proved useful as a review conference. Although his delegation had abstained in the vote because of the lack of consensus, it looked forward to future progress on a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the context of the Conference on Disarmament.

29. The PRESIDENT invited participants to take up consideration of the draft report of the Conference (PTBT/CONF/L.2).

30. He suggested that a new paragraph dealing with the draft decision just adopted should be inserted into part I of the report, after paragraph 23, under a heading reading "Decision of the Conference".

31. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt his suggestion.

32. It was so decided.

33. The PRESIDENT suggested the addition of a new paragraph 25 along the following lines: "At its 3rd meeting, on 18 January 1991, the Committee of the Whole adopted the draft report of the Conference, as contained in document PTBT/CONF/L.2.

34. If he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt that suggestion.

35. It was so decided.

36. Mr. KHERADI (Secretary-General of the Conference) said that after consultations it had been decided that the asterisk in current paragraph 24 was no longer needed and should therefore be omitted.

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37. Mr. NAIMI-ARFA (Iran) proposed that a list of the countries that had participated in the general debate should be included in paragraph 19.

38. Mr. KHERADI (Secretary-General of the Conference) suggested that a text along the following lines should be inserted, as paragraph 19: "During the course of the general debate, which took place in plenary meetings from 8 to 11 January 1991 the following 63 States parties made statements". An appropriate list of States parties would follow. The next text for paragraph 19 would end with the following sentence: "In addition, Cameroon, a signatory State, also made a statement".

39. The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the new text for paragraph 19 suggested by the Secretary-General of the Conference.

40. It was so decided.

41. Mr. MELENDEZ (El Salvador) said that his delegation had not been included among the participants listed in current paragraph 24. The total number of participants was in fact 95, not 94.

42. The PRESIDENT said that an appropriate correction would be made in current paragraph 24.

43. Ms. HOINKES (United States of America) proposed that current paragraph 24 should also list the names of delegations that had made statements both before and after the vote.

44. The PRESIDENT said that, if he heard no objection he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt the proposal put forward by the representative of the United States.

45. It was so decided.

46. The draft report in document PTBT/CONF/L.2, as orally amended, was adopted.

47. Mr. GOLOVKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said he regretted that the Conference had failed to reach a consensus. However, through the extensive exchange of views that had taken place, it had made a constructive contribution to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. He hoped that a continuing political process would supplement negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament and the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.

48. Mr. GROOP (Finland), speaking on behalf of the Group of Western European and Other States, said that, since there were deep divisions among delegations on the subject dealt with by the Conference, it should come as no surprise that States parties had concluded that further work needed to be undertaken before a consensus could be achieved on the question of a comprehensive test ban. The President had paved the way for a most useful discussion of compliance and verification problems relating to a test ban. The Conference had thus been able to engage experts in the field in a meaningful exchange of views, which would be continued elsewhere.

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CLOSURE OF THE CONFERENCE

49. The PRESIDENT said that the cessation of nuclear testing by all States for all time was a vital global objective, one that needed to be pursued at various levels, but especially at the multilateral level, so that a comprehensive test ban, when achieved, would be universally supported. The Amendment Conference had contributed in a very important way to that objective by bringing States parties together for the first time to discuss the obstacles to agreement on the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons. It had been the result of several years of intensive efforts on the part of many States parties, and had been supported by a large segment of international public opinion. Out of that sustained effort and within the focus provided by the Amendment Conference, it had been possible to hold an invaluable exchange of views. As a result, the Conference had highlighted the urgent need to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

50. The purpose of the Conference had been to widen the scope of the partial test-ban Treaty to include underground nuclear testing and to ensure compliance - in other words, to convert the partial test-ban Treaty into a viable and effective comprehensive test-ban treaty. The debate both in the plenary meeting and in the Committee of the Whole had shown that, while most States parties favoured the immediate conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the proposal for the amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty could not be accepted in terms of the requirements of article II of the Treaty. States parties acknowledged the complexity of such issues as verification and sanctions, but at the same time showed a firm and continuing commitment to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

51. He too would have wished to end the Conference's work with an agreement on substance, but none the less appreciated the constructive contributions that participants had made. The Conference had entrusted him with certain responsibilities, and he would fulfil them to the best of his ability. Despite the fact that the threat of nuclear confrontation had significantly diminished, nuclear weapons continued to be developed and refined, and weapons of mass destruction continued to accumulate. He therefore hoped that the work done by the Conference would be built upon, so that it would be possible to move forward with a renewed sense of urgency and responsibility.

52. After an exchange of courtesies, the PRESIDENT declared the Conference closed.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.