CONFERENCE OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES

Geneva, 1968

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE FIRST TO THE
TWENTIETH MEETINGS

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
from 29 August to 28 September 1968

Acting President: i.r. WINSPEAR GUICCIARDI

Under-Secretary-General, Director-General of the
Office of the United Nations at Geneva

President: i.r. Arshad HUSAIN

Pakistan
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held on Thursday, 29 August 1968, at 3.15 p.m.

Acting President: Mr. WINSPEARE GUICCIARDI, Under-Secretary-General, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva

President: Mr. Arshad HUSAIN (Pakistan)
OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE (item 1 of the provisional agenda)

The Acting President declared open the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, convened in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2346 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967.

MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Acting President, reading a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, said that the successful attainment of a controlled nuclear chain reaction twenty-five years ago had opened the door to vast possibilities for both good and evil, and less than three years later had come the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The futility and senselessness of war as an instrument of international policy needed no stronger confirmation, and yet during the succeeding twenty years there had been an increasingly dangerous nuclear arms race. A group of eminent experts called on by the General Assembly to report on the effects and implications of nuclear weapons had unanimously concluded that the nuclear armories already in being represented a destructive power so vast that if such weapons were used in any number, it would mean the end of modern civilization. Yet there had been a steady escalation of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and of the stockpiles of nuclear arsenals.

Patient efforts within and outside the United Nations over the past decade had produced a number of limited agreements of significant impact in relation to the security of the peoples of the world: they included the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It was encouraging that the last-mentioned Treaty had already been signed by more than seventy states.

The security implications of the acquisition and further development of nuclear weapons had received considerable attention
and General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI) specifically stated that one question to be considered at the present Conference was how best to assure the security of the non-nuclear States. The nuclear experts had unanimously concluded that security could not be ensured by an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, by the retention of nuclear weapons by the powers currently possessing them. Security for all countries required the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament.

The Secretary-General hoped that the present Conference would examine new practical steps and measures in the field of disarmament, in line with the undertaking in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Perhaps the greatest challenge to international statesmanship was the utilization of nuclear energy for the peaceful uses of mankind as a whole. Remarkable progress had been made in that connexion in such fields as medicine, agriculture, power and industry, yet nuclear science and technology were still in their infancy. The present Conference was being held to examine, inter alia, the practical benefits to be derived from research and exploration in that field for the non-nuclear States, and one of the main aims of the Conference should be to identify means of ensuring that such benefits were used for the economic and social betterment of all countries, especially those in the developing areas of the world.

The more technologically advanced Powers should provide essential assistance to non-nuclear countries. In that connexion the importance of article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should not be under-estimated, since it reaffirmed the right of States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and because it provided an undertaking by all the parties to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and information.
Equally significant was article V, aimed at ensuring that the potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available without discrimination to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The major nuclear Powers had undertaken to be scrupulous in discharging their obligations under the Treaty and to give special attention to the needs of the developing nations.

The Secretary-General was confident that the Conference would strengthen co-operation between nuclear and non-nuclear States, facilitate the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and lead to further progress in disarmament and the sharing of the peaceful benefits of nuclear science and technology, and he extended to the Conference his earnest wishes for its success.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SWISS CONFEDERATION

Mr. BINDSCHIEDLER (Switzerland), reading a message from Mr. Spühler, President of the Swiss Confederation, said that his country was glad to welcome to its territory the first gathering of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The achievement of justice, stability and peace in the world was an age-old aspiration of mankind, and disarmament was one of the most arduous but also one of the most promising of the ways chosen by the international community for achieving that ideal. The present Conference convened by the United Nations - which had already done so much in that noble cause - would no doubt be an important step towards removal of the threat of destruction hanging over the world.

There were many subjects to be discussed, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, its related problems, its positive aspects, and the steps which would have to be taken towards disarmament, particularly by those States which were not
obliged by the Treaty to make any sacrifices. Neither could the Conference neglect the subject of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, to which it could contribute by encouraging co-operation among all countries and particularly the solidarity of developing countries. The tremendous possibilities for progress in that field should act as a stimulant, enabling bold new steps to be taken at the international level.

The participation of the nuclear Powers in the Conference would undoubtedly facilitate the establishment between nuclear and non-nuclear States of the close co-operation which the universal nature of the problems involved and the necessity to take full account of the interest, rights and duties of all made so indispensable.

The Conference should also provide an opportunity for the smaller Powers to draw together in defence of their common interests which, as recent events had shown, sometimes carried little weight with the major Powers. The imbalance in the relationship between the big and small Powers could be corrected only through the cohesion of the latter.

Although the Conference was beginning its work at a time of increased international tension, the President of the Confederation was certain that it would be able to contribute much to the solution of the thorny problems besetting the road to peace and well-being. Switzerland was honoured at having been chosen as the venue for yet another important international meeting; the President and the Swiss Federal Council extended a warm welcome to the Conference and wished it every success in its work.

ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT (item 2 of the provisional agenda)

The ACTING PRESIDENT invited nominations for the office of President of the Conference under rule 6 of the draft rules of procedure (A/CONF.35/L.1).
Mr. JULLER (Sweden) said that Pakistan had originally put forward the idea of holding the Conference. He therefore had great pleasure in nominating Mr. Arshad Hussain, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan and Head of the Pakistan Delegation, as President of the Conference.

Mr. TSURUMI (Japan), Mr. SOLARI CUYNE (Peru), speaking on behalf of the Latin-American countries, Mr. NABYERA (Kenya) speaking on behalf of many African delegations, Mr. JACOVESCU (Romania) and Mr. ALLAF (Syrian Arab Republic), speaking also on behalf of Syria and several Arab countries, supported the nomination.

Mr. Arshad Hussain (Pakistan) was elected President by acclamation. Mr. Arshad Hussain (Pakistan) took the Chair.

The President expressed his appreciation of the great honour the Conference had bestowed on him by electing him President. His dedication to the aims of the Conference was complete and he would be impartial in the discharge of his responsibilities. His election as President was a tribute to the initiative taken by his country two years previously in suggesting the convening of such a conference. He expressed his gratitude to all the delegations which had then supported the proposal and had since worked for its realization.

On behalf of all the participating delegations he thanked the Swiss Federal Government for the welcome it had extended to the Conference and for its hospitality; in particular, he thanked the President of the Swiss Confederation for his message of welcome and good wishes.

The Conference had as its objective the promotion of the interests of humanity as a whole and not parochial, regional or group interests. The agreement to hold the Conference was an expression of the awareness that the problems arising from the
existence of nuclear arsenals and the disposition of nuclear
technology had not been considered from the standpoint of the joint
interests of all nations. The cause of those problems was the gulf
which existed between the few who possessed nuclear devices and the
many who did not; he was sure that it would be possible to devise
systems ensuring the security and independence of the latter.

The Conference was unique in that it was the first concerted
attempt by the smaller Powers to participate together with the
great Powers in devising a system of collective security. It was
also the first of its kind, and its composition was not determined
by any type of regional or political alignment or affiliation. The
active interest shown by a large number of non-nuclear countries
from all continents was heartening and the work of the Conference
would no doubt reflect the firm resolve of all participants to adopt
a united stand in the face of the common peril.

He paid tribute to the four nuclear Powers whose acceptance
of the invitation to participate in the Conference without the right
to vote bore witness to their concern for the interests of non-
nuclear-weapon Powers. The Conference would benefit from their
counsel and co-operation and their presence would enable efforts
to be directed towards the harmonization of their interests with
those of the non-nuclear States. At the same time, it was
regrettable that objective circumstances had prevented the Conference
from being truly representative of all the nuclear Powers. The
circumstances leading to the absence of the People's Republic of
China had long existed, but there was reason to hope that the
situation with respect to co-operation of all the nuclear-weapon
Powers would evolve favourably in the not too distant future.

The Conference's main task lay in devising instruments to
ensure that nuclear weaponry would no longer determine status and
that the benefits of nuclear energy would not remain the privilege of the few. That posed a challenge to the Conference's ability to subject considerations of geographical location and political alignments to the elements of common interest which undoubtedly existed. The Conference, whose scope was both wider and more narrowly defined than that of the disarmament negotiations so far held, would certainly draw upon the experience and results of those negotiations, but would also have a fresh outlook on the specific problems before it. Its objectives included and exceeded those of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which could not be regarded as an absolute guarantee against the spread of nuclear weapons nor as ensuring the availability to all nations of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

The Conference was particularly significant in that its aim was to adjust the concepts of collective security embodied in the United Nations Charter to the realities of the nuclear age. As the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons would give rise to a situation which had not been anticipated in the Charter, the Conference might wish to give further consideration to the question of security assurances or guarantees.

The agenda included a number of questions which were closely inter-related and concerned the fundamental issues of survival, security and economic development. In discussing those items, it would be important to keep in mind present priorities and ultimate goals, as well as short-term objectives. While nothing short of complete nuclear disarmament would ensure security from the nuclear threat, it was not realistic to assume that total disarmament could be achieved immediately. The Conference had the more modest task of promoting agreements which would ensure a measure of security while awaiting disarmament, and of doing everything possible to end the nuclear arms race and reduce nuclear
weapon stockpiles.

In view of the heavy agenda before the Conference and the limited time available for its consideration, it might be desirable to concentrate on those aspects on which agreement could be reached in the form of recommendations of the Conference. Member States had had an opportunity at the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly to state their positions on the other manifold implications of the questions before the Conference and the time had now come to forge a consensus wherever possible. He was confident that all delegations were conscious of the need to relate their particular interests to the needs and requirements of others. The challenge facing the world was whether man, who had succeeded in harnessing atomic power, was capable of using that power for the good of mankind alone. Time was short, the risk was great, and the future of humanity was at stake. Recent developments in nuclear and traditional weaponry were disturbing not only because of the huge expenditure involved but also because of the possibility that the destiny of mankind might pass out of the control of man into the hands of computers. He therefore appealed to both nuclear and non-nuclear Powers to direct all their efforts towards eliminating the nuclear threat and harnessing nuclear power for constructive ends.

The meeting rose at 4.5 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE SECOND MEETING

held on Friday, 30 August 1968, at 10.45 a.m.

PRESIDENT: Mr. Arshad YUSAIN Pakistan
ADOPTION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE (item 3 of the provisional agenda) (A/CONF.35/L.1)

The President announced that, following informal talks, the participants in the Conference had informed him that they would like rule 6 of the draft rules of procedure (A/CONF.35/L.1) to be amended by the number of Vice-Presidents being increased from four to twelve. The African countries could be represented by three Vice-Presidents, the Asian countries by two, the Eastern European countries by two, the Latin American countries by two, and the countries of Western Europe and the other countries by three.

The draft rules of procedure, as amended, were adopted.

APPOINTMENT OF CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (item 4 of the provisional agenda)

The President called upon the Conference to appoint a Credentials Committee, in accordance with rule 4 of the rules of procedure. He suggested that it should be composed of the representatives of the following countries: Australia, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Costa Rica, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Madagascar, Morocco.

It was so decided.

ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN OF MAIN COMMITTEES (item 5 of the provisional agenda)

The President announced that, following informal talks, the participants in the Conference had agreed that one of the Chairmen of the Main Committees should be the representative of an African country and the other of a Latin American country. In accordance with the suggestions submitted to him by the two groups of countries, he proposed that Mr. Ndwiga (Kenya) and Mr. Grosespiell (Uruguay) should be elected Chairmen of the two Main Committees.
Mr. Nabwera (Kenya) and Mr. Grosspiell (Uruguay) were elected Chairman of the Main Committees by acclamation.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (item 6 of the provisional agenda)

The President suggested that the representatives of the following countries should be elected to the office of Vice-President, in accordance with the wishes expressed by the various regional groups: Ghana, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania (group of African countries); India and Japan (group of Asian countries); Romania and Yugoslavia (group of Eastern European countries); Colombia and Ecuador (group of Latin American countries); Austria, Italy and Spain (group of Western European countries and other countries).

It was so decided.

ELECTION OF OTHER CONFERENCE OFFICERS (item 7 of the provisional agenda)

The President said that he had not received any proposal concerning the election of other Conference officers. It therefore seemed that the Conference did not think it advisable to make any further appointments at the moment.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE THIRD PLENARY MEETING

held on Tuesday, 3 September 1968 at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Arshad HUSAIN Pakistan

later: Mr. VINCI Italy
MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY TO H.I.M. THE SHAHINSHAH OF IRAN AND THE IRANIAN PEOPLE

The PRESIDENT suggested that a message should be sent to H.I.M. the Shahinshah of Iran and to the Iranian people expressing the Conference's deep sympathy following the disaster which Iran had recently suffered and which had led to the loss of thousands of human lives.

It was so decided.

Mr. VAKIL (Iran) thanked the Conference for its expressions of sympathy towards his country.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA (item 3 of the provisional agenda)
(A/CONF.35/GC.1)

The PRESIDENT invited the members of the Conference to comment on the report adopted by the General Committee at its 1st meeting, on 2 September 1958 (A/CONF.35/GC.1).

Mr. AGIDE (Ethiopia) observed that item 11 of the revised agenda did not specify the measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. In his opinion, the question of the conclusion of an international convention under which nuclear-weapon States undertook not to use, or threaten the use of, nuclear weapons against States which had unconditionally renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons should be kept on the Conference agenda. That question had originally been item 11(§) of the provisional agenda.

The draft agenda prepared by the General Committee (A/CONF.35/GC.1) was adopted.

The PRESIDENT observed that the General Committee recommended the allocation of items 11, 12 and 13 of the agenda to Committee One, of which Mr. Rosespiell (Uruguay) would be Chairman, and item 14 to Committee Two under the chairmanship of Mr. Nabwera (Kenya). Item 15 would be considered by the Conference in plenary meeting.
The programme of work recommended by the General Committee was adopted.

Mr. BECK (Hungary) said that he wished to explain that although his delegation had refrained from opposing the adoption of the agenda so as not to delay the Conference's work, it had a number of reservations regarding some parts of the revised agenda. Furthermore, the programme of work did not take into account the fact that at its twenty-second session the General Assembly of the United Nations had adopted the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which had already been signed by more than seventy Governments, including the Government of Hungary. He had good reason to believe that other delegations shared his view, and he intended to revert to the matter during the discussions.

Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan) said his delegation had voted for the revised agenda on the understanding that all the items included in it would be considered in the light of the terms of reference given to the Conference by the General Assembly in resolution 2153 B (XXI) of 17 November 1966. Under these terms of reference, the Conference was to consider the following matters: (a) How can the security of the non-nuclear States best be assured? (b) How may non-nuclear Powers co-operate among themselves in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons? and (c) How can nuclear devices be used for exclusively peaceful purposes?

Moreover, the Conference should not lose sight of the need to maintain a balance between the position of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 10)

The PRESIDENT announced that the General Committee had recommended that eight to ten days should be devoted to the general debate, but that it had left the final decision to him. It had also
recommended that one of the two Committees should meet concurrently with the plenary meetings devoted to the general debate.

The list of speakers for the general debate would be closed at 12 noon on Friday, 6 September.

Mr. VAKIL (Iran) said that all the participants with a vote in the present Conference represented non-nuclear-weapon States. To maintain that status, they would have to undertake to renounce nuclear weapons as members of an international community in which the security of each State would be effectively safeguarded and in which every State would have the right of access, on a non-discriminatory basis, to the scientific and technological benefits of the nuclear revolution.

So far, some seventy non-nuclear-weapon States had signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. If the objectives of that Treaty were to be attained, it was essential that the Treaty should be signed by the vast majority of States. Many delegations had made it clear, however, during the debates in the First Committee of the General Assembly, that the Treaty did not match their hopes and wishes and that the security arrangements provided for therein were not satisfactory. Before signing a treaty, a Government should make sure that the provisions of the treaty took account not only of the general interest, but also of its country’s situation and peculiar needs.

It was a matter for regret that the present Conference had not been convened before the text of the Treaty presented to the General Assembly had taken final shape. Nevertheless, the Conference should seek to clarify the common interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States and to determine what a satisfactory non-proliferation régime should be. The questions which gave concern to the non-nuclear-weapon States were included in the Conference agenda, namely,
security guarantees, assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States to enable them to obtain the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in particular the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions, etc. The nuclear-weapon States were represented at the Conference and could make constructive suggestions during the discussion. The institution of more satisfactory security arrangements depended mainly on those States. It was in their power to ensure that the price to be paid for ensuring safety did not exceed the benefits to be derived from the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In the First Committee of the General Assembly, he had maintained that the declarations made by the nuclear Powers in the Security Council represented a backward step as regards the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. If the newspapers were to be credited, Mr. Dean Rusk, the United States Secretary of State, had even said in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the declarations in question did not entail any other obligation for the United States than those that already existed by virtue of its membership of the Security Council. To be sure, as a result of the First Committee debate, the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations had been referred to in the preamble to the Treaty. But it was questionable whether that reference to the Charter made the declarations of the nuclear Powers binding.

There were also serious problems of terminology. For instance, since it had not been possible to define the word "aggression", the non-nuclear-weapon States naturally wished to know in what circumstances an attack with nuclear weapons or a threat of such attack would constitute "aggression"? It was a matter not only of semantics, but of survival. As long as the declarations were founded on an undefined notion of aggression,
States would be able to invoke self-defence as a ground for objecting to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Was there not a notion which would make the declarations more credible and give more coherence to the international policy of which the Non-Proliferation Treaty was only a partial expression, and at the same time make it possible to give effect to the principles ceaselessly proclaimed by the international community in recent years? Since it was against nuclear weapons that the nations must be protected, the undertakings to be given by the nuclear Powers should turn on the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty would mean very little if it did not mark a step forward towards global nuclear disarmament. That, moreover, was the end that the General Assembly had had in mind when it had urged that nuclear energy should not be used for military purposes. The numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly showed that the principle according to which the nuclear States should not have recourse to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States had been firmly established. It was therefore unacceptable to call that principle into question by reverting to a notion which had been the subject of controversy for nearly forty years.

The Conference should endeavour, more especially, to reconcile the different viewpoints on security. It was in the common interest of all States that nuclear weapons should not be used against them. It was also in the common interest of all States that nuclear weapons should not be used by them.

The non-nuclear-weapon States were renouncing the manufacture, acquisition and control of nuclear weapons. The object of that renunciation was to eliminate the likelihood that they would ever feel impelled to use nuclear weapons. If States gave a reciprocal undertaking not to use nuclear weapons, the temptation to acquire
such weapons would be reduced, for any violation of the undertaking would trigger off a mutual-assistance mechanism.

Another ground for dissatisfaction was the effects which the non-proliferation safeguards to be accepted by the non-nuclear-weapon States would have on access by those States to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The serious divergencies of view concerning the complex technology of nuclear weapons and the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes made it difficult for some States to assume the obligations arising from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Nuclear explosions for the purpose of trying out weapons were certainly inconsistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes might prove beneficial to economic development. To avoid the undesirable consequences of the close relation between such explosions and nuclear-weapons technology, the nuclear powers had undertaken to conduct such explosions on favourable terms on behalf of the non-nuclear-weapon States bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The fear had been expressed that, under that arrangement, the non-nuclear-weapon States would be unable to benefit from the peaceful spin-offs from nuclear explosions, as they would be unable to acquire the scientific knowledge which accompanied an independent command of the technology of nuclear explosions. In his view, however, the terms of the preamble and of articles III, IV and V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty did not appear to justify that fear.

It had been said that by perpetuating the inequality between the nuclear Powers and the non-nuclear-weapon States, the Non-Proliferation Treaty deprived the latter of the means of bringing pressure to bear on the nuclear Powers to reduce their nuclear stockpiles and to achieve general and complete disarmament. But if the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons subsisted
the disarmament negotiations would become still more complicated. If a State which was at present not a nuclear State acquired nuclear weapons, the present nuclear Powers would see in that a justification for maintaining their arsenals, having regard to the justified or unjustified interests they defended on the world scene. Unless the non-nuclear-weapon States renounced the manufacture, acquisition or control of nuclear weapons, the nuclear Powers would no longer feel bound by their undertaking not to encourage the nuclearization of States which did not possess nuclear weapons.

As to regional or zonal denuclearization, it was to be hoped that it would lead to global denuclearization.

The nuclear Powers should contribute to the preservation of the unity of the non-nuclear-weapon countries by trying to understand the security problems with which those countries were faced. The States participating in the Conference should explore the difficulties of the situation and agree on measures for overcoming them.

The nuclear Powers should give the non-nuclear-weapon countries a detailed explanation of how they thought the latter could share in the benefits resulting from the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Conference should afford the nuclear Powers an opportunity of discussing with all the non-nuclear-weapon States ways and means of spreading the benefits resulting from the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Mr. TAIWICLI (Yemen) said he wished to associate himself with the words of sympathy expressed by the President following upon the natural disaster in Iran.

Before the Conference had met, the world had appeared to be divided into two groups of States, the developed countries and the developing countries. That physical division of the world had followed a line of demarcation between the northern hemisphere and the southern hemisphere. With the convening of the Conference,
the line had shifted and a large number of rich, highly developed and industrialized countries were now ranged alongside countries which had been placed at a disadvantage by an unfortunate combination of circumstances resulting from the colonial era. The developing countries were therefore meeting together with some rich and developed countries for the purpose of asking the nuclear countries for their co-operation and assistance in safeguarding the security of the non-nuclear countries and achieving better social and economic development through the utilization of nuclear energy.

In his message to the Conference (1st meeting), the Secretary-General of the United Nations had declared, inter alia that Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament. Those realistic words provided an answer to the question of security and stripped of all practical value any resolution concerning that cardinal problem which did not include the elimination of nuclear stockpiles within the framework of general and complete disarmament. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was a great step forward in that direction.

There was much for the Conference to do in connexion with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, i.e., the application of scientific and technological progress for the benefit of mankind as a whole and not for the exclusive advantage of the great nuclear Powers. In that connexion, the Conference should base itself on article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which laid down that the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States. Such benefits should be available to all countries, in particular those of the
developing regions of the world.

He endorsed the President's statement to the effect that all Powers, nuclear and non-nuclear, should co-operate to ensure that mankind no longer had to fear that prodigious force, but made of it an instrument of progress. The question was whether they were going to use their technological superiority and their nuclear monopoly as a means of obtaining certain political and military advantages designed to strengthen their hegemony and widen their zones of influence and exploitation.

It was essential that the Conference should elaborate practical measures for making fissile material and scientific and technological equipment and data available to the entire international community. That would necessitate setting up a special body or using an already existing international agency with a view, not only to facilitating the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by all the non-nuclear-weapon countries, but also to giving practical assistance to the least developed countries to enable them to reduce their economic lag thanks to the benefits of nuclear energy.

Mr. Berald (Federal Republic of Germany) stressed the historic nature of the Conference, where an overwhelming majority of States were united by the will to forgo the atom as a weapon, in such a way that that self-imposed restriction did not lead to any degradation of their nations, but served the peace and advancement of mankind.

The Conference could also be termed historic because it brought home the realization that it was not sufficient to prevent atomic chaos in order to ward off the dangers to the independence of States and to the inviolability of their sovereignty. The States which did not possess any nuclear weapons wanted more security; they wished to find out how the arms race could be limited and brought under control in order to preserve peace more effectively.
Those problems could not be solved unless realities were taken into account. Without confidence in certain fundamental principles on which the international order was based, there could be no control of the destructive forces inherent in nuclear energy; signatures were worth nothing unless they were founded on a minimum of reliability.

The task of the Conference was not to organize a sterile resistance against the nuclear powers, but rather to define the obligations which those Powers must accept. While it would be madness to strive to acquire the same destructive potential for all, it was necessary to try to achieve equality of rights and opportunities for all States. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany intended, for its part, to co-operate on a basis of partnership to bring about the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the establishment of a system for safeguarding the security of all States.

Nations feared for their independence, and the progress that had appeared to have been made towards establishing rules for the co-existence of States and the restoration of mutual trust was once again at stake. No matter what one might understand by the sphere of interests of a great nuclear Power, the universal and binding rules of general international law, as also embodied in the United Nations Charter, remained unrestrictedly valid: sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-violence, the self-determination of nations, and human rights.

The Conference could not discuss security guarantees, disarmament, and the perspectives for the peaceful use of nuclear energy with any prospect of success, unless common will and joint proposals put right the rules for the co-existence of States; and the success of this Conference would determine how the States assembled would be able to continue the work started there.
The Federal Republic of Germany had given an undertaking to its allies not to manufacture nuclear weapons and had accepted the appropriate international controls. It did not seek any national control over nuclear weapons, nor national possession of such weapons. Its security lay in an alliance, and, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, it was among those which stressed the need to exclude pressure and the threat of force.

The Security Council resolution of 19 June 1968, and the declarations made before the Council by the three nuclear-weapon Powers, fell far short of establishment of a well-balanced security system. Until nuclear weapons had been universally abolished, they could not be eliminated as a means of deterrence and collective self-defence. It was obviously not enough to ban nuclear aggression or the threat of it, for there was no doubt that a nuclear-weapon State could also endanger the security and independence of a non-nuclear-weapon State by using conventional weapons, even without threatening to use its nuclear potential. States must therefore undertake not to use force, with the only legitimate exception of the right of self-defence laid down in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The renunciation of force must not be confined to specific States, and the Federal Republic of Germany conceded to no one the right of intervention. The question was whether the principle of renunciation of force did not constitute the very point of departure for the Conference, a principle which might find its expression in a resolution or a convention on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

His delegation was prepared to submit its own proposals, or to support other delegations' proposals, for banning any aggression with nuclear, biological, chemical or conventional weapons, as well as any threat, direct or indirect, of such aggression. States should reaffirm the obligation assumed by them, under Article 2 of
the Charter, to base their international relations on the principle of the equality of all peoples, and to settle their disputes by peaceful means; they should equally take concrete steps to implement the principles of the United Nations Charter in the field of disarmament and arms control.

The Federal Republic of Germany had welcomed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and the decisions taken by the Organization of African Unity, which could have a similar effect. Europe was not in the happy position of being free from nuclear weapons; it would be a hard task, and one that could not be carried out quickly, to remove existing nuclear weapons without dangerously changing the over-all balance. The Federal Government, however, had advocated that Europe should be made into a zone of détente; and it had proposed a lessening of the confrontation, reciprocal renunciations of the use of force, the normalization of relations with the countries of eastern and south-eastern Europe, the establishment of a modus vivendi in Germany and the elaboration of a programme of exchanges in the cultural, economic and scientific fields. Although these efforts had recently been dealt a severe blow, the Federal Republic of Germany was still prepared to work for the establishment of a "European zone of peaceful neighbourliness" in which the dangerous confrontation could be diminished and, as he had pointed out in December 1967 in a speech before the Bundestag, to help to conclude an agreement which, in the course of a balanced reduction of all armed forces, would also lead to a step-by-step reduction of nuclear weapons in the whole of Europe.

In the present world situation, resolutions, declarations or conventions were by themselves insufficient, and the world must succeed in removing the basic causes of the insecurity of the non-nuclear-weapon States step by step, in other words, achieve real
nuclear disarmament together with a reduction of the conventional armaments potential of the nuclear-weapon States as well. The non-nuclear-weapon States should not in this respect, relieve the nuclear-weapon States of their obligations.

The Conference should also turn its attention to the elimination of certain delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. When the United States and the Soviet Union entered into negotiations on intercontinental missiles, those negotiations should also include the elimination of other long-range missiles in the whole of Europe.

The threat inherent in the existence of nuclear weapons should not cause representatives to forget that there were other weapons of mass-destruction - bacteriological and chemical weapons. In 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany had signed an international treaty by which it had renounced the production of all those weapons, and his country would appreciate it if other States were to follow suit. Since the Geneva Protocol of 1925 did not say exactly what chemical and bacteriological weapons were, a precise definition would be needed. The Federal Republic of Germany was prepared to support all efforts aiming at remodelling effectively and without discrimination the prohibition of bacteriological and chemical weapons.

One of the main tasks of the Conference was to promote research into and the development of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Freedom of research and development was essential in that field, and the Federal Government attached the greatest importance to the statement on that subject made by the United States Government on 15 May 1963.

Safeguards must be strictly confined to preventing the diversion of fissionable material to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany was making considerable efforts to control the flow of fissionable material at strategic points; the
pertinent work was being carried out, in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), at the Nuclear Research Centre at Karlsruhe. He invited interested representatives to visit that Centre.

The Federal Republic of Germany, in carrying out its nuclear research within the framework of the European Atomic Energy Community and applying the European Atomic Energy Community's safeguards system, which had been in operation for over ten years, and which would have to be retained in a verification agreement to be concluded with IAEA. His country was prepared to share the results of its work with all nations and to intensify as much as possible co-operation in the field of nuclear research, exchange of information, scholarships and the sending of experts.

After recalling the speech made by Gustav Stresemann in the League of Nations on 10 September 1926, he drew attention to the terrible price which many nations, and the German nation itself, had had to pay because Briand's and Stresemann's warnings had gone unheeded.

German foreign policy was exposed to much distortion and even defamation. Nobody could avoid distortions entirely, but, as a person whom nobody could associate with the crimes of Hitler and who in spite of that bore his share of the national responsibility, he strongly repudiated the defamation.

His country had learned from history, and was consistently pursuing a policy which aimed at establishing a peaceful order in Europe to replace the balance of terror; it had never sought armaments, and the Federal Armed Forces were not a national army, but rather an army integrated in the Atlantic defence alliance. To be sure, there were nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany, but the Government had no control over them, nor was it ambitious to gain such control. Regardless of setbacks for which
it was not responsible, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was determined to pursue its peace policy unwaveringly, and to take into account, in word and deed, the desire of all nations to live within secure boundaries - without treaties where they could be dispensed with, with treaties where that might be necessary.

In Central Europe there existed the largest accumulation of destructive military force ever known. That situation went against reason and the interests of the peoples. If others made a show of their strength, thus creating new and dangerous tensions, it was not for the Federal Republic of Germany to reply by aggravating those tensions.

In conclusion, he said he saw an opportunity for the non-nuclear-weapon States to combine their strength of will, their strength of reason and their moral strength, and to address on a plea to all nations and the responsible statesmen calling upon them to let every nation determine its own course, for only then would States join hands and find a solution to the immense problems which still faced mankind.

Mr. Vinci (Italy), Vice-President, took the Chair.

Mr. Boon (South Africa) said that the recent unprecedented scientific and technical progress had made it possible to enhance the wellbeing of the human race, but also to develop frightening means of destruction. All delegations were aware of the need to take objective, rational and constructive measures to limit the danger; the work of the Conference would have raised many hopes if, instead of discussing a non-proliferation treaty, it had had to prepare a nuclear-disarmament treaty.

While the Non-Proliferation Treaty had given rise to considerable scepticism, if it could nonetheless be regarded as a step towards nuclear disarmament it would have significant potential in terms of the promotion of international security. For its part, South
Africa subscribed fully to the concept of non-proliferation; it did not belong to any military alliance and relied on its own resources to the extent that a small country was able to do so.

Even the most superficial analysis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty made it plain that the non-nuclear weapon Powers were invited to repose complete confidence in the willingness of the nuclear Powers not only to safeguard their security but to ensure that their economic progress was not impeded by the denial to them of the right to develop their own nuclear technology in the field of peaceful application, even though international safeguards were applied.

South Africa was the third largest producer of uranium in the western world and possessed the second largest exploitable uranium reserves. It thus occupied a unique position amongst the non-nuclear-weapon States represented at the Conference. While firmly resolved not to exploit that position in any way which could endanger the objectives of non-proliferation, South Africa was - legitimately, he believed - concerned that the terms of the Treaty might be so interpreted as to limit the possibilities for peaceful applications of atomic energy. The Treaty in fact gave the nuclear Powers a quasi monopoly in certain fields of peaceful nuclear development, and no State comparatively advanced in the development of nuclear technology could lightly accept a restriction on the development of its potential unless it had complete confidence that it would not be denied, on political or other grounds, the means of using that potential and of sharing in the economic development which nuclear research would make possible during the period of twenty-five years for which the Treaty was to remain in force.

More importance, therefore, should be attached to the actions of the nuclear Powers than to their promises, and, though it was true that the Treaty had not yet entered into force, it could hardly
be said that the attitude of two of the nuclear Powers was calculated
to inspire confidence. One of the two Powers concerned, contrary
to its responsibilities under the Statute of IAEA had refused to
issue a visa for the attendance by the South African representative
at an Agency conference held in its territory. In the second
instance, a request for information had been refused on the grounds
that such information could not be made available to foreign
countries. These appeared to be two cases of contravention of
article IV of the Treaty; in themselves they were trivial, but
they illustrated a state of mind which had to be eradicated if
the Treaty was to be a success. The nuclear Powers should,
therefore, adopt an attitude which would win the confidence of
the other States, which were required to make great sacrifices
in acceding to the Treaty.

One of the main defects of the Treaty was its lack of clarity
concerning the obligations that would be incurred by a Party under
the agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with article
III. The manner of implementation of certain provisions of the
Treaty could be finally determined only by IAEA, and until the
Agency had given a detailed account of how it intended to discharge
its responsibilities under the Treaty, there could be no definition
of the extent and scope of the obligations which acceptance of
the Treaty would impose on a non-nuclear weapon State. The
system of safeguards, as elaborated by the Agency's Board of
Governors, was entirely based on the voluntary principle, but
it would now become mandatory for any State which acceded to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. A State could not be expected to subject
itself, for a period of 25 years, to a system of mandatory safe-
guards without knowing exactly what they entailed. It should
not now be beyond the ingenuity of the world's scientists to find
a means of concentrating the safeguards on certain essential points
in the production chain, instead of applying them on the whole cycle. Excessive expenditure would thus be avoided, and at the same time the diversion of atomic energy to military purposes would be prevented. The amount set aside for safeguards activities in the IAEA budget was less than $1 million, whereas, according to figures provided to the United States Senate during the debate on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cost would rise to nearly $30 million in 1971. The importance of the problem and the need for a realistic approach could be judged from the fact that the annual target figure of the Agency for aid to developing countries in the atomic energy field was $2 million.

The concentration of the safeguards system on key points in the production cycle raised the problem of industrial espionage. The non-nuclear-weapon States had to be prepared, if need be, to sacrifice commercial secrets - a sacrifice which the nuclear Powers were not obliged to make. They might be placed in an unfavourable position in the event of commercial competition with one or more nuclear Powers. It was essential to find a solution for that problem by preparing a very detailed safeguards research and development programme.

In undertaking the mammoth task of administering the control functions required by the Treaty, the Agency would be shouldering a very heavy responsibility, and the whole success of the Treaty would depend on how it carried out that task. It could not afford to discriminate against any of the Signatories to the Treaty and would have to display the greatest impartiality in ensuring that no State had cause for concern; it should also resist at all costs any attempt to use it as a platform for improper purposes. The South African delegation regarded those observations as so fundamental that it hoped the Conference would refer to its Final Act to the need for the member States of IAEA to observe the
exclusively technical character of the Agency.

South Africa supported the objectives of non-proliferation as strongly as ever. As a major uranium producer, it had always faithfully honoured its responsibilities. On the IAEA Board of Governors, it had endeavoured to contribute to the promotion of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It intended to continue so doing, but, in its opinion, the co-sponsors of the Treaty should give the non-nuclear-weapon States time for reflection and consultation and consider all constructive suggestions regarding procedures for implementation. Mutual trust and respect were essential prerequisites for the peaceful co-existence of all nations, and it was only through them that nuclear disarmament might, in the long run, be achieved.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE FOURTH MEETING

held on Wednesday, 4 September 1968, at 10.20 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Arshad HUSAIN Pakistan
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 10) (continued)

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) said that the Conference would have to take a number of factors into account, such as the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which had already obtained nearly eighty signatures, the debate on the subject which had taken place in the First Committee of the General Assembly some months earlier and the recent discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

The Mexican delegation had submitted two working documents on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes for the benefit of States which had renounced nuclear weapons (A/CONF.35/DOC.15) and on the establishment of nuclear-free zones (A/CONF.35/DOC.16) which, together with the problem of co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, were the three subjects which so far had been least studied. The proposals put forward in those documents might be of great practical use for the non-nuclear-weapon States and might lead to the formulation of generally acceptable recommendations.

During the consideration of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, the Mexican delegation had proposed a series of amendments to article V, concerning peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. The Mexican proposal, which had been supported by many delegations of Latin American countries, had requested that the special international agreement which would set forth the statute of the "appropriate international body" referred to in article V should be drawn up as soon as possible and adopted in due course by a representative organ of the international community and that the procedure for multilateral assistance through that international body should be mentioned before the mention of recourse to bilateral procedures. That proposal had been incorporated, in its essentials, in the revised text which had become the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons annexed to General Assembly
resolution 2373 (XXII) adopted on 12 June 1968. To make the meaning of the provisions of article V of the Treaty quite clear the representatives of the Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had made statements in which they had stressed the need to go ahead rapidly with the preparatory work on the basic international agreement concerning the international body referred to in article V, with the largest possible participation of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Mexican delegation thought that one of the most useful contributions the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States could make would be to draw up a preliminary draft special international agreement setting forth the statute and defining the structure, functions, powers and procedure of the appropriate international body, whose main objective would be to ensure that States which had renounced nuclear weapons would be able, through its intermediary, to benefit from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such States for the explosive devices used would be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

It was clear that the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions were going to be of incalculable importance, in particular for the developing countries. Similarly, the fate of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation would ultimately depend not only on the adoption of specific disarmament measures by the nuclear Powers, but also on the speed and exactitude with which they fulfilled the obligations they had entered into under the Treaty to contribute "to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" - including, of course, the benefits derived from nuclear explosions - "especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States" and naturally "with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world".
The Mexican delegation had drawn up a series of preliminary draft articles (A/CONF.35/3CC.15, annex II) which might serve as a basis for the adoption by the Conference of the preliminary draft of the special international agreement referred to in article V of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. There was already a treaty in existence — the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin-America, or Treaty of Tlatelolco — which went further than the Treaty on Non-Proliferation, since its object was to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States Parties to the Treaty. The African States also had repeatedly declared their intention of making Africa, too, a nuclear-free zone, by the conclusion of a treaty.

If the objective was that all States in the world should renounce nuclear weapons, it was clear that it would unfortunately be necessary to wait a long time for that ideal to be realized. Consequently, the international body through which the non-nuclear weapon States could benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be a body which would be open to all nuclear-weapon States that wished to belong to it but which as far as non-nuclear-weapon States were concerned, could be joined only by those which had effectively renounced nuclear weapons. As there was no body which met those two conditions at the present time it would be necessary to create one. While enjoying total autonomy, that body would have to operate within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and endeavour to take the maximum advantage of IAEA's assistance, and in particular of the services of the Agency's safeguards system. The structure proposed for the executive organ of the new body — a governing council — met the need for a widely representative body with as balanced a membership as possible.
nuclear-free zone comprising inhabited territories, namely the Treaty of Tlatelolco. From the review and the analysis it was possible to draw certain conclusions which might be of interest to the Conference. From the circumstances in which the four General Assembly resolutions - two dealing with the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Africa and two with the prohibition of those weapons in Latin America - were adopted it was obvious that in both cases the Assembly had been convinced that, in order to establish a nuclear-free zone, it was necessary to have a duly signed and ratified treaty or convention. That had been the opinion of the Latin American States when, in November 1963, they had submitted to the General Assembly the draft which had become resolution 1991 (XVIII), and the opinion of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity when they had adopted the declaration of July 1964 referred to in General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX).

The provisions of the Tlatelolco Treaty were extremely instructive and showed that, in order to establish nuclear-free zones, the obligations undertaken by the States Parties to the Treaty should be formulated in such a way as to make it impossible for them to evade the total prohibition of nuclear weapons in their respective territories; the Treaty should contain an objective definition of what was meant by "nuclear weapons"; an effective international control system should be provided to ensure the fulfilment of the Treaty obligations and for that purpose a body should be set up comprising representatives of all Parties to the Treaty and endowed with the means necessary for the exercise of its functions.

Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco clearly showed that, like the obligations of the non-nuclear weapon States, the undertakings to be made by the nuclear Powers in respect of nuclear-free zones should be included in an international instrument
The financial provisions of the Mexican preliminary draft were designed to ensure not only the observance of the provisions of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty but also the equitable sharing of the other expenditure entailed, according to criteria making due allowance for the wide difference between the resources of the nuclear powers and other highly industrialized States and those of the developing countries. The aim, in brief, was that the latter countries should have access, under the most favourable conditions, to that new form of application of nuclear energy, which could do so much to reduce the gap separating the peoples of the northern from those of the southern hemispheres. The creation of a special fund might be of assistance to countries which had valid reasons for requesting that peaceful explosions should be carried out in their territories but whose economic situation did not allow them to support the costs of such an operation.

The Mexican delegation had also submitted a document concerning nuclear-free zones, the establishment of which would constitute an effective measure of nuclear disarmament. The aim of a treaty establishing such a zone, unlike that of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation, would be to guarantee the total absence of nuclear weapons in the zone to which it applied, regardless of which State owned or controlled such weapons. Consequently, if a universal treaty similar to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin-America was concluded, the problem of nuclear disarmament would be automatically solved, since that would imply the elimination of the gigantic nuclear armaments existing at the present time.

In that document the Mexican delegation reviewed, from among the proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zones, only those referring to the two zones — Africa and Latin America — concerning which the General Assembly of the United Nations had adopted resolutions. The document made an analysis of the only multilateral treaty so far concluded for the establishment of a
having mandatory legal force, such as a treaty, a convention or a protocol. It was that conviction which had led the States members of the Preparatory Commission for the Deminorization of Latin America to reject any procedure other than a protocol; that conclusion was, moreover, the only one compatible with the basic principle of the sovereign equality of States. It was therefore natural that the General Assembly had invited the nuclear-weapon Powers to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as soon as possible. The United Kingdom and the United States had already signed the Protocol and the only signatures now missing among the nuclear-weapon Powers Members of the United Nations were those of France and the Soviet Union.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco had already entered into force for Mexico, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay; the process of ratification was already far advanced in most of the other signatory States, so that it was permissible to hope that, perhaps before the end of the year, the number of instruments of ratification accompanied by declarations of the waiver of all the requirements might reach eleven, so that the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America could be set up, as provided under article 28, paragraph 3, of the Treaty. He himself was going to Vienna on 6 September to sign, on behalf of his Government, an agreement with the Director-General of IAEA concerning the application of the safeguards system provided under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, an agreement which would be the first of its kind.

He hoped that, despite any shortcomings they might have, the documents submitted by his delegation would constitute a useful contribution to the work of the Conference and serve as a basis for fruitful recommendations.

Mr. GROSEPHELL (Uruguay) observed that the Conference had to study the problems arising from the division of the world into two groups of countries, the first comprising the few nuclear-weapon
States and the second a great number of States which did not possess those monstrous instruments of destruction. Thus the Conference should be as universal as possible, for by their very nature the questions on its agenda concerned mankind as a whole. For that reason, the participants in the Conference included some States which, not being Members of the United Nations, had not yet had an opportunity to express before the international community their views on the questions under study. The fact that the nuclear Powers were also present showed that the Conference, taking a realistic view of the present world situation, should seek ways and means of bringing about mutual understanding and a certain degree of collaboration.

Through their possession of nuclear weapons, the nuclear Powers bore heavy responsibilities before mankind. As was stated in resolution 1653 (XVI), adopted by the General Assembly on 24 November 1961, "Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization". The nuclear Powers' obligations went beyond the rules of positive international law; indeed, they stemmed from the general principles of law and universal morality. It was the duty of those States not to use such weapons save in self-defence. They should also, in principle, protect non-nuclear-weapon States against any nuclear aggression or threat of such aggression and provide them with any information and assistance which they might need in their scientific and technical research on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Of the non-nuclear-weapon States, some had signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and others had not. Uruguay, which had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) and was convinced that the Treaty was a step forward on the hard road to peace, felt that in a divided world all non-nuclear-weapon States
were united by identical interests and ideals. In return for the obligations which they assumed in signing the Treaty, they were entitled to expect the nuclear Powers signatories to the Treaty to recognize certain specific duties. The non-nuclear-weapon States which had not signed the Treaty had the right, as members of the international community, to receive guarantees of security and to enjoy the benefits of scientific and technical progress in the nuclear field. The Conference should take into account the reasons for which certain countries had not signed the Treaty on Non-Proliferation.

With regard to the work of the two Committees of the Conference, he did not think that it was necessary to make a legal examination of the Security Council resolution or to study the possible consequences of the joint declaration by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. That declaration merely expressed a political intention which could always be revoked. In common with the resolution adopted by the Security Council, it did not create any international obligation and consequently added nothing to the conclusions which were to be drawn from the United Nations Charter. For that reason, it was absolutely essential to draw up a convention under which nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. Article 3 of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America provided a guarantee of that nature. In resolution 2236 (XIII) the General Assembly invited Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify that Additional Protocol. The United Kingdom and the United States of America had already complied with the General Assembly's request. In preparing a general convention embodying such guarantees, the Conference should take into account the situation of the non-nuclear-weapon States which had not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Turning to item 12 of the agenda he said that the establishment of such zones would provide protection against a nuclear war. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had been signed by the twenty-one States members of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, had already been ratified by five States and was already in force in four of those States, namely Mexico, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay. The difference between the legal implications for non-nuclear-weapon States of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and those of the Treaty of Tlatelolco was an important factor which the Conference should take into account when examining the question of establishing other nuclear-free zones.

The Uruguayan delegation expected a great deal from the consideration of the question of programmes for co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear energy should not be the exclusive prerogative of one State but a resource of the international community as a whole, to be used for the benefit of all. The procedures laid down in article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should therefore be accelerated and the Conference should take steps to ensure that all the special international agreements provided for in that Treaty should be concluded as soon as possible.

Items 11 and 12 of the agenda were linked with the aim, stated in article VI of the above Treaty, of concluding a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Uruguay, inspired by the ideal of peace, fully subscribed to that aim.

It would certainly be difficult for the Conference to carry out its tasks in the time available to it. In order to ensure continuity in its work, the Conference could perhaps recommend that the General Assembly should instruct a small committee to draw up draft texts which could be considered at a second conference of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE FIFTH MEETING

held on Thursday, 5 September 1963, at 10.20 a.m.

President: Mr. Arshad HUSAIN Pakistan
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 10) (continued)

Mr. BELOVSKI (Yugoslavia) expressed his country's deepest sympathy with Iran in face of the recent disastrous earthquake there.

The Conference went well beyond the framework of a simple international gathering, in view of the problems it was to consider, the interests it reflected and the moment at which it was taking place. The growing demand by more and more countries, irrespective of social system or foreign policy, for an active role in international life was the predominant feature of the present-day world. Forces resisting alignment and domination were growing in number despite hesitations and difficulties and were showing greater readiness for action than ever before. Those processes were shattering the concepts of hegemony and monopoly and were shaking the foundation of relations based on the subjection of small and medium-sized countries. Most of the conflicts besetting the world were the result of the inability of the great powers to grasp the inevitability of such processes and their lack of readiness to adjust their policies to current developments. It was in that context that an explanation should be sought of the dangers facing the world.

Small and medium-sized countries were becoming an increasingly active factor in changing international relations. The convening of the Conference was itself a recognition of the need to explore ways of settling the capital issues of the day, such as disarmament and development, and it reflected an awareness that the dangers were universal and that peace and security were the common concern of all States, regardless of size, degree of development or social system.

Although the nature of the conflicts had become clearer and there were fewer illusions in that respect, the world had not moved far toward establishing conditions for peaceful and unhampered development. The national independence and integrity of small and medium-sized countries were under a permanent threat.
The arms race was disturbing international relations and deepening the divisions in an already unstable world. The use of force and the exercise of pressure, including intervention in independent countries, was becoming more general. Recent developments had reaffirmed that an elaborate concept of resort to force and intervention was involved, based either on strategical considerations or on socio-economic interests, within well-defined spheres of interest. By pursuing that policy, the existing blocs showed themselves to be instruments for preserving a certain "order of things". Such policies led to the militarization of the world and the unleashing of military force aimed at settling international differences by military logic alone.

The last two decades had seen numbers of armed conflicts directed against small and medium-sized countries. The question of collective security and the protection of the national independence of such countries was an international issue that was becoming increasingly acute. It was once again becoming obvious that security was unlikely to be ensured either through pacts or through unilateral and often qualified guarantees. Such countries must not be used as a function of the balance of power through their integration into respective spheres of interest.

The United Nations Charter had recognized the responsibilities of the great Powers. Negotiations among those Powers with a view to improving their mutual relations and averting the risk of confrontation could well remove the direct danger of a global thermo-nuclear conflagration and contribute to the general easing of tension. Such a relationship among the great Powers did not, however, necessarily mean peace for all and the strengthening of general security. The maintenance of lasting peace presupposed an active role for all nations, with respect for the sovereign rights of all to decide on their own development.
His Government attached great importance to the work of the Conference and expected it to initiate, through disarmament, the search for solutions to the vital problems of security of the international community. The Conference presented a unique opportunity for non-nuclear-weapon Powers to join in those efforts. No security measure would be lasting or efficient unless it was followed by adequate steps towards disarmament. That was a task which called for universal participation. His delegation therefore regretted that conditions had not been created for the participation of the People's Republic of China and of a number of other countries.

History had witnessed many talks on disarmament but it had never before been confronted with the danger of nuclear devastation. The dilemma of the contemporary world was "the world without armaments or armaments without the world".

Security problems had always been a matter of great pre-occupation to all countries, security being a basic prerequisite of independence, of sovereign actions of States in international affairs and ultimately of their sovereign existence in international relations. The classical formula emphasizing the primary concern of each State for its own security had not lost its validity. The growing interdependence of interests of States made it imperative for security problems to be solved in the context of broad relations, based on the principles embodied in the United Nations Charter and elaborated in the policy of peaceful co-existence. The full respect for and application of those principles would be decisive in establishing conditions for the attainment of an effective system of world security.

The United Nations Charter laid down the basic elements for a uniform system of collective security, but no substantial progress had been made towards devising a system which would be a reliable barrier to the use of force in international relations. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had not provided
satisfactory answers to that vital problem but had indeed made it even more pronounced. The endeavours of the majority of Member States to oppose acts endangering the security of individual nations had repeatedly been paralyzed. The existence of blocs had provided no reliable formula for individual, regional or general security but was rendering the creation of the system of collective security more difficult. The concept of neutrality in contemporary conditions was an understandable expression of the desire to remain aloof from armed conflict, but it did not necessarily provide a real guarantee of security. The disastrous consequences of a possible use of nuclear weapons would not bypass neutral countries, even if their status was formally respected.

Independent and non-aligned countries were constantly endeavouring to formulate a concept of collective security by which the international community could prevent any violation of the sovereign rights of nations and disturbance of peace. Those countries had also shown a readiness to support all other initiatives aimed at developing an effective collective security mechanism. In the absence of an efficient system of collective security the tendency of individual nations to rely on their own forces and to strengthen their own defences was of outstanding importance and was all the more necessary in that the world was faced with repeated attempts to make small and medium-sized countries yield to the concept that their fate was in the hands of the big countries. The system of security which the world needed must cover all kinds of assaults against sovereignty, independence and peace. It should not be limited to the danger of a possible use of nuclear weapons in the event of a direct confrontation of nuclear-weapon Powers but should encompass local conflicts with conventional arms, which always carried the danger of escalation into nuclear war.
The solution of the problems of contemporary international relations was a long-term task, demanding the participation of the entire international community, but he was confident that the conditions existed for taking some immediate steps towards establishing a system of collective security. That was the primary task of the Conference and would be in the common interest of all countries, particularly those not possessing nuclear weapons. Parallel efforts should be made towards bringing about a cessation of the arms race and disarmament. In some countries long-term programmes were being carried out to develop new weapons with an enormous capacity for mass slaughter and destruction. The arms race directly affected international relations and, far from contributing to the security of the countries engaged in it, it intensified the danger of arms becoming a power in themselves.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons did not adequately solve the issue of the security of non-nuclear weapon States. In spite of the Security Council resolution adopted on 19 June 1968, and of the declarations by the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, the problem remained open. The Treaty had not in fact solved the problem of either the active or the passive guarantees. The request that the Nuclear Powers should renounce the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons was a minimum step which should be followed up by others. It was necessary to specify clearly the obligation of nuclear-weapon States to refrain from using these weapons in any circumstances and to adopt such measures as the prohibition of nuclear tests and the discontinuance of production of nuclear weapons and of means for their delivery.

Many countries came within the action radius of the so-called tactical means for launching nuclear weapons. In the territories of the nuclear Powers and their allies, there were thousands of vectors capable of carrying their deadly burden towards already
determined targets at any moment. The danger was all the greater in that it was frequently stated that in a local war tactical nuclear weapons could be used without fear of provoking a global nuclear conflagration. His Government, which attached great significance to the establishment of non-nuclear weapon zones, saw two possibilities for a gradual elimination of nuclear weapons from individual regions. The first was to prevent the stockpiling of nuclear weapons where they did not at present exist; results achieved so far in that respect encouraged the continuation of action to prevent such proliferation. More complex, but no less significant and urgent, was the question of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from foreign territories, international waters and air space to the national boundaries of nuclear Powers. The present state of affairs was contrary to the basic objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A component part of the question was the cessation of training of the armies of the non-nuclear weapon States in the use of nuclear weapons. Yugoslavia's particular interest in the Balkans-Mediterranean area did not diminish its interest in other proposals with regard to regional nonnuclearization.

His Government also supported the initiative for a precise definition of the arsenal of chemical and bacteriological weapons and strongly advocated their prohibition and destruction. Large stocks of conventional weapons and their frequent use were also a direct threat to the independence of nations and world peace.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was intended to broaden the possibilities of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While the demand of many countries that their economic development should be accelerated through the use of nuclear energy was increasingly emphasized, co-operation and assistance in that field had remained at a minimum. The Conference should consider ways and means of stimulating such co-operation and should recommend the convening of a fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.
Another matter the Conference should consider was that of ways and means of promoting the use of nuclear energy in many countries. That would require large investments and trained personnel, which many of the less developed countries would have to obtain through international assistance. An international pool should therefore be established as early as possible. The International Atomic Energy Agency could assist in that respect.

There was also much room for improvement in the exchange of information on scientific achievements. His Government would like to see methods established for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy free from all discrimination, and in particular arrangements made for the exchange of scientific information on achievements resulting from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Such peaceful uses should be explored in connexion with the forthcoming second Development Decade. His delegation advocated a broad exchange of views on that subject.

The Yugoslav delegation was convinced that appropriate action with regard to questions of security of non-nuclear States and the general problems of development could be initiated at the Conference. His Government had signed the Treaty on Non-Proliferation though fully aware of its deficiencies and imperfections. The Treaty should be integrated into a definite move towards disarmament and should find its place in a system of measures for denuclearization of the nuclear Powers within the general context of disarmament. It would serve its purpose only in so far as it helped to accelerate action towards a world free of the atomic bomb and the exhausting arms race which was the basis of force and violence in relations between nations. The nuclear Powers were committed to make their contribution to that action.

The time had come to examine in a more practical way the need to ban the use of nuclear weapons through an international convention. The Conference should devote its full attention to the elaboration of
methods to that end. The solution of the problems could be found within the context of a dynamic disarmament policy. The ultimate objective was the renunciation of the use of force in relations between States and full respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. Progress towards that goal would depend mainly on whether a gradual and balanced course of action in the direction of disarmament could be secured.

The Conference should devote special attention to the formulation of a final act, in the form of either a declaration or a general resolution, expressing the anxieties and aspirations of the participants and their determination to promote the observance of the principles of the United Nations Charter and asserting the principle of co-existence as the highest obligation of all States. The final act should also embody the views of participants on the course of future joint efforts. He had in mind a possible agreement on the convening of a further session, which would be of particular importance if efforts to convene the world conference on disarmament, in accordance with the General Assembly decision of 1965, were not to be renewed.

Mr. MEDICI (Italy) associated himself with the previous speakers in offering his country's sympathy to the Government and delegation of Iran on the grievous calamity which had befallen the Iranian people. The Italian Government stood ready to participate in any international aid scheme which might be organized to assist the victims of the earthquake in eastern Iran.

For the first time the non-nuclear-weapon States were trying in concert to approach systematically the manifold problems raised by the development of nuclear energy, not only for the security and peaceful progress of mankind but also for the very structure of the international community in the next decades. The mortal danger which the existence of nuclear armaments represented for humanity must be eliminated. But to ban terror was not enough; nuclear energy must be harnessed solely as a means of social and economic
progress for the benefit of all peoples. The present state of international society, partly as a consequence of some of the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, might lead to a perpetuation of intolerable inequalities and thus prevent the emergence of a freer and more just international community.

The Italian Government was convinced that the Conference could make a major contribution towards the solution of those problems. There should be peaceful development and application of the resources of nuclear energy in conditions of equality and security for all nations. His country was determined to play a part commensurate with its historical traditions and its scientific and technological achievements for it would seem from the information available that Italy occupied the third place in the world in the amount of electricity produced by nuclear power stations. The success of the Conference did not, however, depend on the contribution of non-nuclear Powers alone. The States which possessed nuclear weapons had obvious and greater responsibilities.

Italy, which had contributed ideas and proposals towards the preparation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was convinced that the Treaty must prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and give greater impetus to the process of general and controlled disarmament, which in turn would redress the initial inequalities inherent in the Treaty. Thus an equitable foundation would be laid for the development of the international community in the nuclear era.

Recent events, which had seriously affected the international situation, had cast a dark cloud over the work of the Conference. The Italian Government hoped that the factors which had caused that disturbed situation would soon disappear and that once international life was restored to normality, the Non-Proliferation Treaty would gain wider acceptance, particularly among States close to the nuclear weapon threshold.
The Treaty constituted a basic instrument which needed to be supplemented in many respects. The problems that that entailed must be faced without delay. Of prime importance was the problem of security, especially of those States which were not protected by an alliance system. Italy considered the Security Council resolution 255 (1965) to be a first step towards the acknowledgement of vital requirements, the satisfaction of which constituted one of the basic prerequisites for accession to the Treaty by certain non-nuclear countries. Then there was the problem of disarmament. Although in a position to develop nuclear armaments, Italy had spontaneously refrained from doing so. It shared the view expressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his message to the Conference that security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament. In the meantime, it was essential to achieve at least the cessation of the arms race and the adoption of measures of nuclear disarmament, such as the banning of underground nuclear tests for military purposes and the elimination of production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

His delegation had followed with interest the suggestions made by previous speakers concerning other measures of disarmament, such as those related to chemical and bacteriological weapons and the creation of nuclear-free zones. It particularly welcomed the suggestions made by the head of the Mexican delegation on the entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It also viewed with keen interest the possible conclusion of arrangements for the denuclearization of the African continent.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty urged the Parties — and first of all the nuclear Powers — to pursue disarmament negotiations more constructively. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had already started to deal with the problems raised by the Treaty and
Italy considered that the Committee was the appropriate body to deal with disarmament problems before they were submitted to a wider forum.

There were, however, other fundamental problems on which it was imperative for the Conference to focus its attention. The most important was to define the measures to be adopted for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on which the Treaty provided only general indications. The Treaty itself, while imposing definite burdens on non-nuclear-weapon States, was intended to operate as an effective instrument of free access to the supply of nuclear materials and to the acquisition of all the necessary technological information. First of all, the Conference must identify the fields in which measures were needed, pursuant to articles IV and V of the Treaty. In particular, the following objectives should be secured: (a) development of nuclear research, of the production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in all countries, without discrimination, or economic penalization; (b) full participation for all in the exchange of technical and scientific information for peaceful uses; (c) free access for non-nuclear-weapon States to the supply of nuclear fuel and equipment as well as nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; (d) agreements ensuring to non-nuclear-weapon States, signatories to the Treaty, the benefits arising from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions; and (e) assignment to an appropriate international body, with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States, of responsibilities relating to peaceful explosions.

In connexion with the last point, his delegation had been interested to hear the proposals made by the Mexican delegation and intended to introduce a working paper on the subject within the next few days. The Conference should make a major effort towards establishing an effective instrument of co-operation that would help to narrow the nuclear gap. The Conference might indicate the specific international instruments which were needed, set forth
the basic principles of such instruments and draw up a timetable for the implementation of its proposals.

Another important point concerned the safeguard system provided for by article III of the Treaty. While the establishment of effective machinery to prevent possible evasions should be sought, each country must be protected against the risk of unwarranted interference and infringement of industrial secrets. The basic principle to be maintained was, therefore, that safeguards must be confined to source and special fissionable materials, as reaffirmed in item 13(a) of the agenda. The safeguards should, moreover be accepted by all States, so as to ensure that article III of the Treaty did not become an instrument of unjustified discrimination between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States.

As far as the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and safeguards were concerned, it would be difficult for the Conference within the time available to go beyond formulating general guidelines and principles. It should, however, make specific proposals on such points as the procedure for convening the quinquennial conference provided for by the Treaty, the clauses concerning the settlement of disputes on the interpretation and implementation of the Treaty and the definition of technical terms.

In his delegation's view, the Conference could hardly accomplish its immense task in a single session. It might therefore consider the desirability of providing for such future meetings as might be necessary. It might, for example, consider the establishment of a permanent committee, similar to those already created within the United Nations for outer space and the sea bed, to give continued consideration to the problems and to the implementation of any decisions taken. On all these points, his delegation intended to submit precise suggestions.
Above all, the conference must work to restore the atmosphere of détente which had helped to bring about the preparation of the Treaty. Notwithstanding recent events, the Italian Government believed that the interests and ideals by which nations were united were bound to prevail in the long run over those that divided them. It was therefore confident that the endeavours of the Conference would not fail to represent a positive contribution to the creation of the conditions necessary for the peaceful progress of mankind.

He appealed to all participants to ensure that the Conference, in which the representatives of so many countries were gathered together, would fulfil the hopes and expectations of the peoples throughout the world and thereby deserve the term "historic" bestowed upon it by the President.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE SIXTH MEETING

held on Friday, 6 September 1968, at 10.15 a.m.

President: Mr. Arshad EUSAIN Pakistan
later, Mr. TSUHOKA Japan
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 10) (continued)

Mr. MACOVESCO (Romania) said that the human race was faced with a crucial choice between using nuclear energy as a destructive force and harnessing it to serve progress and civilization. The Conference had on its agenda the two essential aspects of the problem created by nuclear fission: on the one hand, the need to eliminate the danger presented by nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, the existence of wide scope for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Human society was in a state of flux. Productive capacity was increasing at an explosive pace; the international division of labour was growing ever more marked; science and technology were making undreamed-of progress. The destructive capacity of modern weapons ruled out any attempt to solve international problems by means other than peaceful negotiation, and it was thus necessary to establish peaceful and co-operative relations among States without regard to their social system. The Romanian Government and people sought to do so on the basis of the principles of independence, sovereignty, equal rights, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other States, reciprocal respect and mutual advantage. The Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania had recently adopted a declaration affirming those principles, on which all States ought to base their relations with one another. In addition, Romania resolutely opposed the use or threat of force as a means of settling international differences.

The President of the State Council of Romania had recently described nuclear disarmament as the fundamental desideratum of the peoples. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been welcomed by many countries as a step towards disarmament, which helped to strengthen the security of all countries and to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was, however, only a beginning and must be followed up by new efforts in those three directions. For non-nuclear-weapon
States adhering to the Treaty, it was essential that those efforts should produce results quickly.

The Conference would have to study three interrelated groups of problems: security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, measures of nuclear disarmament, and international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The ultimate common goal was to free the world from the danger of war, and particularly nuclear war, but there was a long and arduous road to travel before it was reached. Under article II of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty undertook not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. In doing so, they were under a duty to their peoples to ensure that the commitment strengthened their security instead of diminishing it. They were therefore entitled to demand increased security guarantees pending the total liquidation of existing nuclear arsenals and the elimination of the nuclear threat.

That meant, first and foremost, that the nuclear Powers must assume a solemn obligation never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States not possessing them. That was a just demand because its fulfilment would provide a legal guarantee; it was fair, because its realization would establish a balance of obligations between the nuclear and non-nuclear States Parties to the Treaty; and it was realistic because its implementation was feasible. The request for such guarantees was in accordance with the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter, with universally accepted rules of international law, and with the aspirations of mankind to the elimination of force as a means of settling international differences; more specifically, it was a logical development of Article 2(4) of the Charter and of operative paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (a) and (d), of the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961.
The non-nuclear-weapon States understood the difficulty of reconciling the different interests at stake in a constantly changing international situation, but were prepared to do their part in seeking solutions to the advantage of all parties; and the Romanian Government would continue its efforts to that end. It saw in the Conference an opportunity to formulate specific solutions for consideration by the nuclear Powers.

The inclusion of item 13 in the agenda of the Conference marked the recognition by the international community of the need for decisive action to curb and finally eliminate the nuclear threat. The conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty marked a new phase in disarmament negotiations. For the first time, negotiations on general and complete disarmament and, in particular, on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament had been recognized as a legal obligation in an international instrument. The vital connexion between the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other disarmament measures was acknowledged in a number of clauses and, in particular, in article VI which provided the Conference with a useful guide for its discussions on nuclear disarmament measures. Under the Treaty, disarmament negotiations should be carried on as a continuous process; the Conference offered the opportunity for multilateral debate on the problem of nuclear disarmament. If that debate was broad and constructive, it would serve the cause of disarmament and might lead to further agreements.

Romania was in favour of banning the use of nuclear weapons, halting the testing and production of such weapons, and reducing and ultimately eliminating stocks of nuclear weapons and of means of delivering them. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, if accompanied by a guarantee on the part of the nuclear States not to use nuclear weapons against those not possessing them, would meet the wishes of the peoples. Such zones would promote mutual confidence and good neighbourly relations among States, and might be
gradually extended until the world was one vast denuclearized zone. Romania had accordingly welcomed the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and supported the proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world; it had itself made such a proposal for the Balkans.

In order to promote the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to render it viable, it was the duty of the nuclear weapon States to take resolute action to end the nuclear arms race and to reduce and finally eliminate their stocks of nuclear weapons. The many proposals for nuclear disarmament, including those made in the USSR memorandum of 16 July 1968 (EM/DC/227), provided a basis for the negotiation of further disarmament agreements. The USSR proposals were particularly important in that they came from a nuclear Power which had assumed obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The peaceful uses of atomic energy set new horizons of progress for human civilization and were of increasing interest to all States. Articles IV and V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty provided a legal setting for international co-operation to ensure that States which renounced nuclear weapons could share in that progress. The Conference could play a useful part in the examination and promotion of arrangements for the various aspects of such co-operation. Such arrangements must not be long delayed, and care must be taken not to impede the implementation of articles IV and V of the Treaty.

The outcome of the Conference, to which Romania attached great importance, depended upon the willingness of the participating States to co-operate in finding solutions for the problems on the agenda and to take into account the fundamental interests of all States namely, peace, security and international co-operation. Various formal and informal proposals had been made regarding ways and means of ensuring continuity in the efforts begun by the Conference, such as periodic meetings of a similar nature and the establishment of a preparatory committee for a further conference. His delegation would give these proposals careful attention.
Mr. Waldheim (Austria) said that the need to safeguard national security was particularly pressing for a country like Austria, which was located at the crossroads between East and West and committed to a policy of permanent neutrality. Austria had a special interest in the reduction of international tension and the promotion of international co-operation. To those ends, it strove to foster confidence among nations and deplored all acts of force likely to jeopardize such confidence.

The effort to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which had so far produced the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was as yet no more than an act of faith. Non-proliferation would become a reality only when the States which had renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons had confidence that they would not be exposed to the threat or use of force in the settlement of international disputes. The present Conference had the challenging task of making constructive proposals; that task had become even more important under the present circumstances.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty did not create a balance of mutual obligations, but bore more heavily on the non-nuclear-weapon States than upon the nuclear Powers. In article VI of the Treaty, however, the latter Powers had accepted a clear commitment to work for nuclear disarmament and collateral measures as a step towards general and complete disarmament under international control. Austria had signed the Treaty in the belief that it would be followed by such further measures on the part of the nuclear Powers, so as to strike the necessary balance of obligations.

One of the primary tasks of the Conference, therefore, was to foster the establishment of such a balance by making constructive proposals to the international bodies dealing with disarmament. It must consider the problem of assuring the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States, and formulate ideas and proposals to give effect to the provisions of articles IV and V concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy - a matter of decisive importance to the economic, technological and scientific development of the non-nuclear-weapon countries. It should not be overlooked that action by the nuclear powers to make the results of nuclear research and technology available to the non-nuclear-weapon countries would mean that the latter countries would receive great benefits without contributing to the cost involved. That consideration helped to offset the obligations laid on those countries by the Treaty. All States faced the same dangers, but they also shared the same prospects for a bright future.

All the foregoing considerations were reflected in the Conference agenda, which made a realistic approach to the problems arising in a new field of international co-operation. In dealing with those problems, the help of international bodies would be required. In his delegation's view, reliance should be placed on existing organizations rather than on the establishment of any new bodies, which was undesirable on practical, technical and budgetary grounds.

Progress in disarmament since the Second World War had been slow. However, since the Conference had first been suggested, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been adopted by the General Assembly and signed by more than seventy States; bilateral negotiations would soon be under way on the reduction of strategic delivery missile systems; and the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had decided to give priority to the question of further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Those developments encouraged the hope that the Conference would be successful.

The report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons (A/6052) reflected the attitude of his Government and, he was sure, of all Governments that the United Nations had the overriding responsibility to secure international agreement against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreements on measures of arms control and disarmament, so as to promote the security of all countries. It was to be hoped that the present Conference would be a milestone on the way to that objective.
Mr. TSUBOUCHI (Japan) noted the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the most noteworthy recent development in international co-operation relating to nuclear activities. The Treaty, however, left a number of problems unsolved and created some problems of implementation. The main problems were the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Under the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States were permitted to retain, and to continue to manufacture, nuclear weapons, while the non-nuclear-weapon States undertook not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons for twenty-five years. It was therefore natural that the latter States should demand guarantees for their security. The resultant declaration by the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/CONF.35/DOC. 12, Annex II) and Security Council resolution 255 (1968) were of great political significance but had not eliminated the fears of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Differences between States with regard to such factors as policies, geographical position and international environment made it extremely difficult to find a universal solution to the problem of security. His delegation believed that the only real solution to that problem was nuclear disarmament.

Under article VI of the Treaty, the renunciation of nuclear armament by the non-nuclear-weapon States was matched by an undertaking on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States had given repeated assurances that the Treaty would facilitate and expedite other nuclear disarmament measures. It was partly for that reason that countries were considering becoming Parties to it. Unfortunately there was no clear provision in the Treaty which guaranteed that the undertaking in Article VI would achieve positive results, and his delegation was deeply concerned that the nuclear-weapon States should faithfully keep their promises regarding nuclear disarmament. Hence he welcomed the agreement between the USSR and the United States to begin negotiations on ways to control and reduce the means of delivering offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons.
The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, for its part, should continue without interruption its efforts to produce tangible results, even if only by degrees.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty did not explicitly forbid the nuclear-weapon States to assist one another in manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Mr. strongly urged those States not to take advantage of that omission. Again, the treaty did not oblige the nuclear-weapon States to subject their peaceful nuclear activities to the international safeguards. It was desirable that they should accept the application of the safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a step towards nuclear disarmament. In December 1967 the United Kingdom and the United States had declared their intention to accept the IAEA safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities; doubtless the great majority of the non-nuclear-weapon States strongly desired that other nuclear-weapon States should declare a similar intention.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty had given the non-nuclear-weapon States legitimate grounds to hope for an end to the nuclear arms race, and to press the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear disarmament. Meanwhile the non-nuclear-weapon States should renew their own efforts to find a solution to the disarmament problem.

The military uses of nuclear energy had come before the peaceful uses; nuclear power generation had originated from the development of atomic bombs, and nuclear surface ships from that of nuclear submarines. It was thus possible that the prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices might prevent the non-nuclear-weapon States from acquiring the technical knowledge which could be derived from the process of developing and manufacturing such weapons and devices. As a result, the existing gap between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States in the field of peaceful nuclear activities might grow even wider. Participation in the Treaty thus entailed a sacrifice on the part of
the non-nuclear-weapon States, and that sacrifice was particularly great in the case of those which had the capacity to develop nuclear explosive devices. Access to such technical knowledge should therefore be granted to the non-nuclear-weapon States as a matter of due compensation. Articles I and II of the Treaty would not, in practice, restrict that access. For example, the technology of enriching uranium was common to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the development of peaceful nuclear activities; so long as enriched uranium was under the effective safeguards of IAEA, the non-nuclear-weapon States should be granted access to the relevant technology. That example showed how difficult it was to make a clear distinction between nuclear activities for peaceful and for military purposes.

It was not so difficult to facilitate the international movement of nuclear materials. Under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, such materials within the territory or under the jurisdiction of the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty were subject to the IAEA safeguards. Consequently the transfer of nuclear materials to those States could be liberalized completely. That step was particularly important in the case of special fissionable materials, which today could be supplied only by the nuclear-weapon States.

The non-nuclear-weapon States were anxious not to be denied the benefits of the peaceful application of nuclear explosions. Their right to those benefits was guaranteed by article V of the Treaty. In his delegation's view, those benefits were vital to the future welfare of mankind, and the non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon States should proceed as soon as practicable in IAEA to study the problems involved.

Under the existing arrangements, the IAEA safeguards applied to nuclear materials and nuclear installations explicitly covered by agreements between IAEA and the States concerned; the Non-Proliferation Treaty had opened a new phase by placing the entire nuclear fuel cycles of the non-nuclear-weapon States under IAEA safeguards. Nuclear weapons could be manufactured only from special fissionable materials such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium; hence the operation of the
safeguards depended upon accurate supervision of the movement of nuclear materials, and in particular that of special fissionable materials.

However, article III, paragraph 3, of the Treaty provided that the safeguards should be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the States concerned. Rigid supervision of the movement of nuclear materials at all points would hamper that development. The supervision should therefore be applied in accordance with the principle defined in the preamble to the Treaty, which referred to the "use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points". In the interests of equality the obligations to accept safeguards which the non-nuclear-weapon States would assume under the agreements to be concluded with IAEA should all be based on the same standard.

The General Assembly, at its resumed twenty-second session, had added a new paragraph to the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty reiterating the obligation of all States, under the Charter, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. It was a vital premise of the Treaty that all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would act in accordance with that principle of the Charter.

His delegation was prepared to participate constructively in all the deliberations of the Conference.

Hr. ODIAK (Uganda) said that the agenda adopted by the Conference was of great significance to the African continent, and his delegation was fully confident that the outcome of the Conference would be a significant step towards complete disarmament. The fact that the items of the agenda were essentially political meant that national and regional interests had to be taken into account, and also that an attitude of give and take should prevail in the deliberations.

As to the measures for assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, he recalled that when, in November 1966, the General Assembly had adopted its resolution 2153 B (XXI) calling for the convening of
the present Conference, the expectation had been that the question of security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States would be discussed by the States concerned before the Assembly adopted the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the accelerated submission of the draft treaty had overtaken the original plan to hold the Conference in January 1968. As a result, the Conference was now faced with the already declared security guarantees of the nuclear Powers, adopted by the Security Council soon after the General Assembly debate. In those circumstances, his delegation felt that the Conference should adopt proposals for security guarantees which would not be part and parcel of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

On that understanding, his delegation proposed that the question of security guarantees should be considered in relation to both nuclear and conventional weapons. With regard to nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear-weapon States expected a categorical pledge from the nuclear Powers that the latter would under no circumstances use those weapons on non-nuclear States. As to conventional weapons, his delegation's view that they should be similarly controlled and in due course eliminated had been strengthened by recent international events, which had clearly demonstrated that both nuclear and non-nuclear States could, if it suited their interests, employ conventional weapons against weaker and smaller countries.

The countries of Africa were more concerned about the use of conventional weapons than about that of nuclear weapons. The stockpiling of conventional weapons by South Africa and Portugal was a more immediate threat to them than the possible use of nuclear weapons. Indeed South Africa had already made threats against Zambia and Tanzania. The Conference should not take an academic view of those threats. It should reach decisions on conventional weapons and on aggression by countries which had stockpiled those weapons. His delegation therefore suggested that guarantees should cover conventional weapons also.
Turning to the question of establishing nuclear-free zones, he said that Uganda, as a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was committed to the realization of a nuclear-free zone for Africa in accordance with the resolutions adopted by that Organization and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 2033 (XX). His delegation proposed that OAU, in conjunction with the appropriate United Nations agency, should formulate those OAU resolutions into a binding treaty so as to ensure that Africa became a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

So far as concerned the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Uganda had already held preliminary discussions with its neighbours of East Africa. The Conference would be of great assistance if it concerned itself in particular with nuclear energy for the developing countries. His delegation would therefore wish to suggest the establishment of nuclear reactors or regional research bases to ensure that the developing African countries south of the Sahara reaped the benefit of that branch of modern science. In that task, rather than be constantly looking for foreign aid, the African countries would very much like to have the assistance of an international organization such as IAEA, under the auspices of the United Nations, for it was by training their nationals in self-sufficiency that the developing countries would in the long run achieve economic viability.

Lastly, on the question of general disarmament, he stressed his Government's view that all weapons, both nuclear and conventional, were dangerous to world peace and order: their stockpiling and improvement should be stopped. In particular, he appealed to the owners of nuclear weapons to cut their production, and he expressed the hope that countries which did not have nuclear weapons would exercise the utmost restraint in refraining from possessing or acquiring them.

An important obstacle to meaningful disarmament was the exclusion of one nuclear power from the world forum and the lack of interest displayed by another in nuclear disarmament talks. In Africa, which was basically a peaceful continent, the obnoxious policy of apartheid
in South Africa, Portugal's colonial policy and the usurpation of power in Southern Rhodesia by Smith and his rebels ran counter to the peace efforts of the Organization of African Unity.

In conclusion, he stressed the importance of the Conference to the developing countries, which were yearning for mutual confidence and hoping that a system of concrete and lasting securities would be established.

Mr. Tsuruoka (Japan), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

Mr. ÁSEREDO da SILVABRA (Brazil) said that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States was meeting at a time of grave tension to initiate a new stage in the negotiations aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The first stage had been the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlateloito, in the preparation of which Brazil had played an important part. Then there had been the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which, however, was unsatisfactory, as it did not contain any tangible commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon countries to proceed towards partial or total nuclear disarmament and did not recognize the right of non-nuclear States to make unrestricted use of nuclear research for peaceful purposes.

The Conference should therefore view its agenda in the broad perspective of the general question of non-proliferation, for a worldwide treaty was not necessarily the only way of achieving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In order to establish a balance of rights and obligations among all States, it was incumbent upon the Conference to take far-reaching political decisions. The first should be to request the General Assembly at its coming session to adopt resolutions recommending the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to prepare, within fixed time limits, draft conventions on the following subjects: (1) the freezing of the production of fissionable material for military purposes; (2) limitation of the production of nuclear weapons; (3) the banning of underground tests with nuclear weapons; and (4) reduction
of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. In that context, his delegation was pleased to note the decision of the two super-Powers to initiate negotiations for the non-development of anti-ballistic defensive systems.

So far as the banning of underground tests was concerned, he emphasized that nuclear experiments for peaceful purposes, whether conducted by nuclear or by non-nuclear Powers, should be allowed, provided they were conducted under a system of control similar to the one contemplated in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, for otherwise, the development of nuclear capability by non-nuclear countries in other than military fields might be hampered.

The second political decision of the Conference should be to recommend that all States should negotiate - within a given time-limit and in the forum of their choice - a general convention through which the nuclear-weapon Powers would give positive and negative guarantees to all non-nuclear States which had renounced nuclear weapons. For neither the Non-Proliferation Treaty, nor the existing system of collective security embodied in the Charter of the United Nations or based on regional arrangements provided binding and automatic political and juridical guarantees in the event of any attack, whether nuclear or not; while Security Council resolution 255 (1968) amounted to a mere declaration of intent and was limited to States that were members of the Council and signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The third major task of the Conference was to devise a régime of international co-operation for the dissemination of all the benefits deriving from the uses of nuclear energy, with stress on the interests of the developing countries. Nuclear energy had changed the rules of war: the Conference faced the challenge of making it change the rules which had so far presided over the prosperity of nations. Although the gap between the rich and poorer nations had grown wider, it was imperative to affirm - on the threshold of a new technological revolution whose magnitude it was still hard to assess - that in the potentialities of the atom might lie the tools to reverse what seemed to be an
inexorable process. It was therefore necessary to conceive a system of international co-operation commensurate with the great expectations that had been raised.

So far there had been no firm commitment on the part of the nuclear weapon Powers to channel through the United Nations for the benefit of developing countries a substantial part of the resources freed by measures of nuclear disarmament. The Conference should urge the nuclear weapon Powers formally to accept such a commitment. At the same time, the Conference should request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to designate a group of non-governmental experts to examine the question of the impact of nuclear technology in all its aspects on the economic and scientific advancement of developing countries and to report their conclusions to the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session.

The International Atomic Energy Agency should play the main role in the furtherance of co-operation in the field of nuclear technology. He therefore proposed that negotiations should be immediately entered into for the establishment of a system whereby IAEA would be enabled to make the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives available to non-nuclear-weapon countries. He also wished to reintroduce a suggestion, originally put forward in another context by the delegation of Italy, that a fund should be established to supply fissile material to meet the needs of non-nuclear-weapon countries, for the indications were that without some such arrangement those countries would be unable adequately to develop their technological infrastructures.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE SEVENTH MEETING

held on Monday, 9 September 1968, at 10.25 a.m.

President: Mr. Arshad KUSAIN Pakistan
Mr. SANI (Indonesia) said that his Government had wholeheartedly approved of the idea, put forward by Pakistan in 1969, of holding a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States. It considered, however, that the Conference should have been held before the United Nations General Assembly examined the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty and it could not help thinking that in that way certain imperfections in the final text of the Treaty could have been avoided. Since the Treaty had become a reality, however, it was for the Conference to study ways of bringing about complete nuclear disarmament as a prelude to total general disarmament and the best possible use of nuclear technology for the advancement of mankind.

Indonesia welcomed "the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used", (Security Council resolution 255 (1968)). It did not know, however, to what extent that constituted a real guarantee and it feared that national interest would prevail over intentions, however sincerely they had been expressed.

The essential thing was not so much to assist a country that was the victim of aggression as to prevent an attack and the best guarantee would certainly be to destroy all existing nuclear weapons. The circumstances did not suggest that such a result would be easy to achieve, but it was the duty of the Conference to find ways of securing an absolute guarantee.

The Conference could make a positive contribution to the safety of peoples by endeavouring to obtain from the nuclear Powers an undertaking not to use their nuclear weapons, to halt the production of such weapons and to put a stop to all nuclear tests; it should at the same time create the objective conditions in international relations to make those measures both possible and effective. The world should cease to
consider nuclear weapons as a means of preventing war and should take them for what they were: a mortal threat to the very existence of mankind.

So far as co-operation with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was concerned, the Non-Proliferation Treaty included provisions for safeguarding the interests of non-nuclear-weapon States; the effectiveness of those provisions would, however, depend on how they were applied. The non-nuclear-weapon States should have unconditional access to nuclear technology and methods should be devised to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from its peaceful uses. They expected to carry out their peaceful nuclear activities without being subjected to any discrimination whatever; he himself even felt that no discrimination should be established between States, whether or not they were signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, provided that those States agreed to subject themselves to a system of safeguards. In that respect, the Conference should give special consideration to articles III IV and V of the Treaty, having regard to the agreements concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Most of the non-nuclear-weapon States were developing countries for which nuclear energy was an important factor of economic progress. If nuclear technology remained largely the monopoly of the nuclear Powers the gap between rich and poor countries would become even wider, accentuating a division of the world which was itself a threat to peace.

Several delegations had suggested that new bodies should be set up within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but he thought that it would be better to make use of the existing bodies and to modify their structure and operation in keeping with whatever conclusions the Conference might reach.

Mr. Zein (Lebanon) recalled that at the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly his delegation had joined with other delegations in submitting the proposal, originating from Pakistan, for a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States.

In carrying out its task, the Conference would not be lacking in sources of inspiration, scientific or technical data and legal, moral or philosophic references. The success of its work, however, would
depend largely on the unequivocal determination of the participants to ensure the well-being of mankind. Lebanon was aware of its international obligations and would not content itself with merely manifesting that determination; it intended to collaborate actively in the work of the Committees and would spare no pains to ensure that the latest acquisitions of science and technology were made to serve the legitimate needs of mankind.

Mr. NAVA CAMRILLO (Venezuela) considered that some of the elements and ideas in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America could usefully be applied to other regions, particularly with regard to the obligations contracted by and the guarantees asked of the nuclear Powers. It also indicated the nature of, and the form in which the aforesaid guarantees by those Powers should be expressed.

Venezuela considered that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which it was a signatory, would not be genuinely effective unless steps were taken to prevent the "vertical" proliferation of nuclear weapons; the responsibility for preventing "horizontal" proliferation rested largely with the non-nuclear-weapon States.

If nuclear-free zones were created, nuclear-weapon stock-piles would exist only within the territory of the nuclear Powers. That should make it easier to maintain those stocks at their present level, whereupon production could be progressively limited until it ceased altogether.

His delegation had already suggested in the United Nations General Assembly that the nuclear Powers should conclude a "vertical" denuclearization agreement whereby nuclear weapons would be destroyed once all the nuclear Powers had adhered to it. Such a result could not, of course, be achieved all at once, but a programme could be adopted with priorities established according to the importance of each measure and the possibility of carrying it out.

The Conference had set itself two basic objectives: to ensure the safety of countries that had renounced the possession of nuclear weapons
and to foster international co-operation with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In order to achieve that second objective, his delegation advocated, as it had done at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the creation of international machinery to ensure that nuclear technology, which was so important for the progress of mankind, did not remain the monopoly of a group of Powers. Such a system, set up within the framework of existing bodies, would enable States which had renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Renunciation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons would help to free resources for development, and co-operation between the two leading nuclear Powers could then be extended to other fields such as the peaceful exploration and conquest of outer space. The accumulation of nuclear weapons was a constant threat to all countries and a system of safety based on the traditional notion of balance could lead to the almost total destruction of mankind.

If men were uniting their efforts to build better societies, it was certainly not in order that the results of those efforts might be destroyed as a result of ideological differences between the Powers; those differences had to be settled on the basis of principles and methods which excluded the use of arms. The Conference should respond to the hopes of youth, which wished to live in confidence and not in a world in which terror reigned.

Mr. AMERASINGHE (Ceylon) said that the approval of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons made it the compelling duty of non-nuclear-weapon States to persevere in their efforts to exert their moral authority to secure the progressive improvement and amplification of the provisions of the Treaty and of similar international instruments in order to obtain the total renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons and to achieve general and complete disarmament.
Nuclear energy was capable both of exterminating mankind and of stimulating economic and social progress. It was significant that military pre-occupations and interests served as the chief stimulus to nuclear research and that peaceful applications were merely by-products of such research.

Some States which had supported the Non-Proliferation Treaty, among them Ceylon, had expressed reservations concerning the scope of the Treaty's provisions, the effectiveness of the system of guarantees and the genuineness of the intentions expressed regarding future measures of disarmament. For the non-nuclear-weapon States, the questions of prime importance were those of security and of the progress resulting from the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

In discussing the problem of disarmament, there was a tendency to ignore the political, psychological and moral environment within which individuals and nations acted. The main obstacles to any form of disarmament were injustice, fear and mistrust. Fear and mistrust led to excesses which might threaten the independence of nations and imperil the fundamental human freedoms. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, however, like the Treaty of Tlatelolco, constituted a major step forward. The task of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States was to examine the situation created by the approval of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation and its entry into force in the near future.

The non-nuclear-weapon States should not lose sight of certain other aspects of the problem of nuclear weapons which affected the security, integrity and independence of States, especially small States lying within what were described as zones of influence or spheres of interest. It was not enough to discuss the use of nuclear weapons; it was essential to create satisfactory means of preventing the use of force, nuclear or conventional, as an instrument of national policy, for declarations purporting to renounce the resort to force lost their meaning if actions were not suited to words. In the debate on the Treaty on Non-Proliferation in the First Committee
during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, the Ceylonese delegation had stated that the approval of the Non-Proliferation Treaty made it incumbent on the major nuclear powers to address themselves immediately to the action referred to in article VI of the Treaty. On that occasion, the Ceylonese delegation had suggested that the nuclear powers should categorically undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, that a comprehensive test ban treaty should be concluded, that the manufacture of nuclear weapons should stop, that nuclear weapon stocks should be "frozen" and that the apparatus of nuclear terror should be gradually dismantled.

The Ceylonese delegation was glad to see that all those questions, together with those of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, had been included in the Conference agenda. The question of the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty should, however, have been made the subject of a separate agenda item and not simply included as a sub-paragraph of item 13.

The renunciation by the nuclear powers of the use of nuclear weapons was the crux of the whole problem. Unless assurances were given on that subject in the near future, the fate of the Non-Proliferation Treaty might itself be placed in the balance.

The Conference should concentrate on the means of obtaining from the nuclear force against non-nuclear-weapon States.

It was right that guarantees of security should be given to all non-nuclear-weapon States, whether or not they had renounced nuclear weapons, but only non-nuclear-weapon States which had renounced the production, acquisition or use of nuclear weapons would have the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. However, States which permitted nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territory, while renouncing the right to possess, acquire or control nuclear weapons, were still regarded as non-nuclear-weapon States.
In the opinion of the Ceylonese delegation, nuclear Powers which continued, after the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to place nuclear weapons in countries which were parties to the Treaty. The non-nuclear-weapon States had a right to demand the strictest adherence to the letter and the spirit of the Treaty. The installation of nuclear weapons on the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State which was not a party to the Treaty was equally objectionable and inconsistent with the spirit of the Treaty. The non-aligned nations had endorsed that principle some years earlier, when they had called upon all countries not to allow their territories to be used by nuclear Powers for the deployment of nuclear weapons. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States provided an occasion for the reaffirmation of that principle.

With regard to the security assurances which formed an adjunct to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and which were embodied in the Security Council resolution and in the declarations made by the three nuclear Powers, the Ceylonese delegation considered that the commitment on the part of the nuclear Powers to go to the aid of non-nuclear-weapon States that were victims of, or threatened with, nuclear aggression was limited by two factors. In the first place, the commitment was linked to a concept for which an internationally acceptable definition had not yet been found - the concept of aggression. Secondly, the Security Council resolution presupposed that, in any situation in which those assurances were to be evoked, the nuclear Powers which were permanent members of the Security Council would have a common interest in going to the assistance of the non-nuclear-weapon State or States concerned. Furthermore, the Security Council was constitutionally ill-designed to act with sufficient speed in circumstances calling for the fulfilment of the guarantees.

The fact that a country was threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons could not possibly induce a nuclear-weapon State to go to its aid unless the political relationship between the victim of aggression
and the nuclear-weapon State or States which were expected to help it was such as to make such protection natural. The decisive consideration was not the nature of the weapon used against the victim State.

The Ceylonese delegation hoped that the Conference would give serious attention to the question of the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The Non-Proliferation Treaty had imposed on the nuclear Powers the obligation to work towards nuclear disarmament. The first step in that direction should be the banning of underground tests. The Conference should support the suggestions made in 1966 by the non-aligned members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, and especially the suggestion that underground tests above a certain threshold should be banned by a treaty and that, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty, all underground tests should be suspended.

Item 14 of the agenda covered the whole question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For some time to come, however, most of the developing countries would be unable to benefit from the application of nuclear energy to economic development, since the projects they undertook could be executed by conventional sources of power. The intervening period should be used for the training of personnel from non-nuclear-weapon countries in the technology of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Arrangements for such training and for the exchange of information and the provision of equipment and scientific data should be placed under the auspices of an international organization.

The Ceylonese delegation had read with great interest the working document submitted by Mexico (A/C.35/DOC.15) and hoped that the provisions made in it would be carefully considered by the Conference.

The Ceylonese delegation supported the proposal made by the Brazilian delegation that the Conference should request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint a group of experts to examine and report on the impact of nuclear technology in all its aspects on the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries.
The Ceylonese delegation suggested that such a study should cover the resources likely to be released by nuclear disarmament and their application to economic development programmes in developing countries. It also supported the Brazilian proposal, originally put forward in another context by the Italian delegation, relating to the establishment of a fund or an international bank of fissile material to meet the needs of non-nuclear-weapon countries.

Mr. YASSEM (Iraq) said that the question of peace, particularly in the nuclear field, was a universal problem and that it therefore called for global solutions which embraced the whole world. Indeed, solutions which were not accepted by all States would not make it possible to eliminate all the dangers arising from nuclear explosions, whose extent it was difficult to limit and whose consequences were beyond control.

As was clear from operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) the aim of the Conference was nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was a considerable achievement. States were aware of the objections which had been raised to the Treaty, owing to the lack of any undertaking to disarm on the part of the nuclear Powers, the lack of measures to stop vertical proliferation, and, above all, inadequate guarantees of security. Nevertheless, the Treaty represented the balance which was possible in an imperfect international order; it could be an element of progress and its implementation could make it possible to achieve more effective solutions. No wonder, however, whether the negative or positive guarantees of security based on the system of the Security Council could not be supplemented by conventional guarantees of security. Security had to be based on certainty and conventional methods were a more certain source of juridical obligations in the international sphere.
He drew attention to what Mr. Albonetti had said in his report, namely: "It is indeed important to stress the fact that practically all nuclear technology is ambivalent, lending itself indiscriminately to peaceful and/or to military ends". That observation should be borne in mind throughout the whole process of exchanges and aid in the field of research into the uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and should govern the formulation and operation of the control system.

The International Atomic Energy Agency had acquired useful experience in that field and it would perhaps be desirable to confirm its role at the present juncture and to make use of its experience.

Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that, in supporting the Pakistani proposal for the convening of the present Conference, the Canadian delegation had understood that the Conference was to clear up questions affecting the interests of States which did not possess nuclear weapons, in a world which had agreed that no additional nations would seek to become nuclear Powers. Under General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI), the questions to be considered by the Conference were the following:

(a) How can the security of non-nuclear States best be assured? (b) How may non-nuclear Powers co-operate among themselves in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons? (c) How can nuclear devices be used for exclusively peaceful purposes? As the representative of Pakistan had said at the third plenary meeting, those three questions should be the framework for the general debate.

With regard to the agenda adopted by the Conference, he shared the Hungarian representative's view that the Conference should take account of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty had already been signed by eighty States, sixty-four of which were represented at the present Conference. In examining agenda item 11, the Conference should also take account of Security Council resolution 255 (1963). Although those two documents were not mentioned in the agenda, the international obligations set out in them should serve as a starting point for the Conference's deliberations.
One of the principal purposes of the Conference was to ensure acceptance of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation by the greatest possible number of States and to determine what steps should be taken to make it fully effective. The effectiveness of the Treaty could not, of course, be maintained unless the nuclear Powers adopted concrete measures to halt the arms race and then to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons from their arsenals.

The Canadian delegation had been much impressed by the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany explaining his Government's policy for peace, international cooperation and disarmament. The Minister had rightly stressed the need for scrupulous respect for the principle set forth in the United Nations Charter that States should abstain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

With regard to agenda item 13, he drew attention to the agenda which had been adopted by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (A/CONF.35/COC.14, p. 11). Under the heading "Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament", the Committee was to discuss the cessation of nuclear testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons, the reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, and the establishment of nuclear-free zones. That agenda gave priority to the measures considered necessary in order to meet the obligations implied in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty under which "each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". In addition, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was to examine other disarmament questions, including that of chemical and biological
means of warfare.

The Canadian Government considered that the establishment of nuclear-free zones was one of the best ways in which the security of States not possessing nuclear arms could be ensured. In present circumstances, the establishment of such zones seemed more likely in regions where there was no political and military confrontation between rival blocs. For example, the African States members of the Organization of African Unity could meet and complete their project for a treaty making Africa a nuclear-free zone, and they might well receive a guarantee equivalent to those in Protocol II of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

The Canadian delegation was particularly interested in programmes for co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In Committee Two it could explain its Government's policy in regard to assistance and co-operation in the field of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the developing areas of the world and would comment on the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses.

Mr. HODABAH (Southern Yemen) said that the objective of the participants in the Conference was to prevent any further proliferation of nuclear weapons and eventually to restore peace and security. The deadly atom must cease to be the object of research on the part of the great Powers, and the nuclear arms race must be brought to an end. That was why his delegation was happy to see that the fourth nuclear Power was present at the Conference, after a long absence from similar meetings. The four nuclear Powers should participate fully in the work of the Conference in order to harmonize their interests with those of the non-nuclear-weapon countries. It was for that reason that the delegation of Southern Yemen regretted the absence of the fifth nuclear Power, the People's Republic of China. It hoped that the international community would finally become aware of its obligations and would soon invite that Power to play its proper role in the United Nations.
Turning to the items on the agenda, he said that the Conference should pay great attention to the question of security and devote ample time to that point. His delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), even though it had felt that the security measures provided in the Treaty on Non-Proliferation and in the resolution adopted subsequently by the Security Council were inadequate.

It was also necessary to give a precise and practical definition of the term "aggression", without becoming involved in the academic fallacies which had characterized the Security Council's debates in June 1967 on the subject of Israel's aggression against the Arab States.

The nuclear Powers must renounce the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which had renounced the acquisition and manufacture of such weapons and had prohibited them in their territories. They must also renounce the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against each other and must respect the spirit of the provisions of article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation.

With regard to the question of the establishment of nuclear-free zones, he congratulated the Governments of the Latin American countries which had signed the Tlatelolco Treaty. His delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX), which sought to keep Africa a nuclear-free zone. His delegation also maintained that the Middle East should be a nuclear-free zone. In order to avoid a repetition of the tragedies which had befallen the peoples of the Middle East in 1948, 1956 and 1967, and in view of the special situation prevailing in that region, it was imperative that the Middle East should remain a nuclear-free zone. The establishment of nuclear-free zones in other parts of the world should also be encouraged, as a first step towards a world free from nuclear weapons.

With regard to the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it was clear that the non-nuclear-weapon States which had renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons should not be deprived of the advantages
offered by the peaceful uses of the atom. They should have access to scientific and technological information without discrimination and at the lowest possible cost and should share the benefits derived from the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions and research.

The Government of Southern Yemen had some reservations, however, with regard to the subject of bilateral co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Co-operation in that field should be multi-lateral and should be under the supervision and direct control of an international agency, in order to eliminate any possibility of a "black market in fissionable materials". The incident which had occurred near London demonstrated that such a market was possible. It took only thirteen pounds of plutonium to make an atomic bomb as powerful as that which had devastated Nagasaki. Scientists maintained that once the fissionable materials were obtained, the manufacture of a bomb was a relatively simple process.

In conclusion, he thanked the Mexican delegation for the excellent working document it had presented on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. The proposal in that document for the establishment of an international programme for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was of great value. That programme could be carried out within the framework of IAEA and thus benefit from the Agency's safeguards system. Similarly, an international school of inspectors should be established under the auspices of the Agency.

The meeting rose at 12.5 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE EIGHTH MEETING

held on Tuesday, 10 September 1968, at 10.20 a.m.

President: Mr. Arshad KUSAIN Pakistan
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 10) (continued)

Mr. MUGAI (Kenya) said that, but for the determined efforts of the members of the Preparatory Committee, the General Assembly resolution calling for the convening of the present Conference would never have been put into effect. He wished to convey to the members of the Committee the thanks of the Government of Kenya and of Mr. Nabwera, who had been its Chairman.

The essential question confronting the United Nations was nothing less than the survival or obliteration of the human race. Indeed, that problem was more than a United Nations responsibility, which was why certain non-member States were participating in the deliberations.

During the last twenty years, through many trials, the world had become conditioned to a new kind of morality based on national dignity and the freedom of the human spirit. At the same time, it had been assailed by a new kind of fear: the fear that mankind might be encompassed in an irreversible disaster through the unleashing of gigantic destructive forces. The task of the Conference was to awaken human conscience in order to avoid the irreparable.

The efforts of the past five years, which had led to the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and to the Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, were not enough. At the present day, a handful of nations had the power to annihilate mankind. In a world no longer segmented by time and distance, there were men who still placed a narrow national pride above their responsibility to the human race. Others clung to an ideology at the expense of mass starvation. Men imprisoned in their own dialectic and overwhelmed by the products of their own intellectual genius dominated human society, not because they were leading a new crusade for progress but because they brandished the instruments of world destruction. In modern language, those men and nations were described as "advanced".
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, approved by the United Nations General Assembly, had been opened for signature in July 1968. With a refreshing realism, the General Assembly had not expressed full satisfaction at that first step towards world security: it had urged the nuclear-weapon Powers to pursue their negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Together with more than seventy other Member States, Kenya had become a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The force of such an instrument depended, however, on the unanimous adherence of States. Without the signatures of France and the People’s Republic of China, the Treaty was largely meaningless. The Conference should therefore investigate the reasons why the Treaty had not been signed by all States. Moreover, the Treaty could not be taken seriously unless the nuclear Powers put an end immediately to the process of stockpiling nuclear weapons and responded to the General Assembly’s call for negotiations leading to genuine disarmament.

There was so much distrust between the major blocs and groupings, and even between allied States, that it sometimes seemed idle to expect the nuclear Powers to act in concert on that terrifying issue. Yet without harmony between them, no satisfactory result could be achieved.

Turning to the items on the agenda, he said that every combination of unilateral, bilateral or multilateral guarantees had been considered by many of the States represented at the Conference, but all had been rejected as unsatisfactory. Similarly, the safeguards offered by the Security Council were not watertight, although they were perhaps as definite as could be expected in the light of present world conditions. The United Nations, which was responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, must find an effective system of
guarantees which could form an intrinsic part of the Organization.

With regard to the question of the establishment of nuclear-free zones, he welcomed the initiative taken by the countries of Latin America. The establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Africa, extending from the Cape to Cairo, had been proposed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. The Government of Kenya had endorsed that proposal and hoped that provisions to that effect would soon be codified in the form of a treaty.

It was important that developing countries should have access to materials and to scientific and technical information, and that each continent should possess the necessary research and training institutes in all branches of the peaceful application of nuclear energy. That objective, which was mentioned in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would no doubt give rise to suspicions, but if the nuclear Powers would agree to submit annual reports on the nature and extent of their nuclear technical assistance to an international agency, the non-nuclear-weapon States would unhesitatingly accept the inspection of their nuclear plants by the same international agency.

Hankind must build a world where coexistence was possible. The greatest obstacle to the security of nations was the threat which had ironically been called the "nuclear deterrent". It had not prevented aggression in Viet-Nam or in Czechoslovakia - to give but two examples. The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were the supreme nuclear Powers. Unilateral disarmament was not conceivable, but if those two countries decided to place their nuclear stockpiles at the disposal of some United Nations agency, on condition that the other nuclear Powers did likewise, a new era would open for the world.

Mr. AL-SABAH (Kuwait) observed that the Conference was to examine the problems which had arisen following the release of the energy within the atom. That energy, which could be a magical source of prosperity and progress, had thus far been devoted exclusively to increasing the military power of certain States. That was why the world
was not witnessing, on the one hand, an accumulation of the means of destruction in the hands of nuclear Powers, and, on the other, an element of insecurity in non-nuclear-weapon States and increasing anxiety among the peoples of the entire world.

The Conference was not called upon to choose between the atom in the service of civilization and the atom used for its destruction, but rather between the balance of terror and the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. To choose in favour of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons meant, by the force of circumstances, to approve — it might even be said to ensure — the monopoly of the present nuclear Powers and their technological superiority. A choice in favour of the proliferation of nuclear weapons would mean a new stage in the nuclear arms race, huge unproductive investments and an upheaval of the foundations on which international relations were based.

It was with these considerations in mind that the Government of Kuwait had signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, despite the deficiencies and imperfections of that Treaty.

Turning to agenda item 11, he pointed out that the security of States Members of the United Nations was supposed to be guaranteed by the provisions of Article 2 (4) of the Charter. Nevertheless, the fact that the General Assembly had seen fit to consider the problem of security assurances at length on several occasions, that the Security Council had adopted a resolution on the subject and that three of the permanent members of the Council which possessed nuclear weapons had considered it necessary to make a special declaration showed that the security of non-nuclear-weapon States was not ensured by the United Nations Charter in so far as the threat or the use of nuclear weapons was concerned.

The declaration of the three Powers and Security Council resolution 255 (1963) could allay fears and provide a basis for future negotiations between non-nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear Powers and among those Powers themselves. Those texts, however, were too
imprecise and too qualified to constitute a valid guarantee of security for a non-nuclear-weapon State. In the event of a major crisis or imminent nuclear attack, it would be idle to rely on the procedure set forth in those texts, since the "immediate assistance" promised to any state that was a victim of "aggression" in which nuclear weapons were used could be provided only if the Council determined that there was truly "aggression", a term which, unfortunately, had not yet been given a clear and generally acceptable definition.

There was another aspect of nuclear power in respect of which non-nuclear-weapon States could obtain no safeguards, namely the political and psychological effect which was a by-product of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation and the Security Council resolution mentioned the "threat" and the "use" of nuclear weapons, but made no mention of the fact that the very existence of these weapons and the awareness of their destructive power could in some cases have a bearing on the political decisions of a non-nuclear-weapon State and thus considerably limit the extent of its sovereignty. In addition, the terror that nuclear weapons inspired sometimes assumed alarming proportions in the minds of peoples, thus affecting the moral health and political climate of those countries.

Referring to article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation, he called on the Conference to study the following questions and to take them into account in drawing up its recommendations: (a) Conclusion of a Treaty among the nuclear powers prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons; (b) complete cessation of nuclear tests for military purposes; (c) cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons; (d) destruction of existing nuclear weapons stockpiles; (e) strengthening of the collective security system.

With respect to agenda item 14, he said that the developing countries, which had not experienced the industrial revolution of the early nineteenth century because they had been under the colonial yoke at that time, did not wish to be subjected now to a new enslavement. Nuclear technical assistance would be a new weapon
capable of upsetting all the fundamental ideas of development strategy. The technical assistance which the nuclear powers might furnish would be provided, first of all, to countries possessing a sufficient degree of scientific and technological training to receive such assistance, i.e. the developed countries. The gap between the developing countries and the developed countries would therefore continue to widen. That danger could be avoided by ensuring improved co-ordination of technical assistance and close co-operation between the developing countries and the developed countries not possessing nuclear weapons. In that connexion, he welcomed the excellent study which had been prepared on technical assistance to non-nuclear-weapon countries for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He hoped that consideration would also be given to the question of assistance to developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Mr. KALLAF (United Arab Republic) recalled that his country had always served the cause of disarmament and that it had been one of the first to sign the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

As the President had pointed out in his opening statement, the Conference would have the benefit of the advice and co-operation of the nuclear powers. He was glad, too, to see the spirit of understanding prevailing among the non-nuclear-weapon States which would enable them to understand their respective positions and as far as possible to reconcile their interests.

There were a number of legal instruments available to the Conference to help it in its work: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the declarations of the three great nuclear powers concerning the security guarantees offered by those powers to the non-nuclear-weapon States signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was true that that Treaty was far from perfect but its provisions helped, up to a point, to ensure
the security of non-nuclear-weapon States which might find themselves threatened not only by one of the present nuclear Powers but by other countries which might acquire nuclear weapons if they were not prevented from doing so by the provisions of the Treaty. Moreover, for the first time in the annals of international law, a treaty imposed on the nuclear States the legal obligation to take the necessary steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to achieve disarmament. Lastly, the Treaty inaugurated an era of international co-operation in the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

In signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Government of the United Arab Republic felt that it had furnished further proof of its constant desire to maintain peace and that it had thus complied with the many resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and with the various declarations made by the Heads of State and Government in OAU and by the Heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries.

One of the most important items on the Conference agenda related to the measures required to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. There was no easy solution to the problem, for many reasons, and especially because of the conflicting interests of each of the States, but the threat looming over them incited them all to seek adequate safeguards. These safeguards should satisfy certain conditions. They should not be prejudicial to the independence of States or to the position adopted by certain States belonging to the group of non-aligned countries. Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the declarations of the three great nuclear Powers marked a certain progress but it was to be feared that these texts might share the fate of the many similar declarations and resolutions which had been adopted, for example, in connexion with the Middle East and had not been followed up.
He hoped that the so-called "positive" guarantee of security, the only guarantee dealt with in the Security Council resolution, could be supplemented by a so-called "negative" guarantee, which would be the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the countries which had renounced production, acquisition and possession of such arms. The Conference might also, with the help of the nuclear Powers, study the possibility of concluding an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

With regard to item 12 of the agenda, his country had welcomed the conclusion of the Tlatelolco Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America and it hoped that in the near future the circumstances would be propitious for the conclusion of similar treaties in other parts of the world, particularly in Africa.

With reference to item 13, the United Arab Republic considered that the Conference should seek the most practical means of establishing control over nuclear weapons and of achieving total disarmament. The problems in that respect were highly technical and the detailed study which they required should be entrusted by the General Assembly to the competent international agencies, and in particular to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, in which non-nuclear-weapon States played a large part.

Various forms of international, regional and bilateral co-operation had played an important part in the preparation and implementation of programmes for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly in the developing countries, and the assistance of the developed countries, especially of those which possessed nuclear weapons, was greatly appreciated. Nevertheless, such international co-operation had encountered many obstacles, such as fear of proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the political discrimination and difficulties which the developing countries experienced in financing their programmes of nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. Moreover, the absence of any effective international control over exchanges of fissionable
materials and nuclear equipment had in certain cases afforded opportunities for diverting nuclear energy from its peaceful uses.

Great progress was still being made in the field of nuclear technology, and the developing countries would not be able to benefit from that progress unless the developed countries accorded them assistance on a much greater scale than hitherto. Moreover, the countries signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be deprived, by the application of the Treaty's provisions, of the experience and knowledge to be derived from the development and production of nuclear explosives and they should therefore be given adequate compensation in the shape of extensive international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities. Such co-operation should be free from any political discrimination, and particular attention should be paid to the problem of financing nuclear energy programmes in the developing countries. Assistance to those countries should be regarded as an international obligation, while all organizational ways and means should be sought to render it fully effective. All assistance and co-operation programmes should be carried out under strict international control which would guarantee that the exchanges and provision of fissionable materials and nuclear equipment were for no other than peaceful purposes.

Mrs. de GILMALDO (Paraguay) pointed out that the Treaty of Tlatelolco was an example of the results which could be achieved by countries in the same area when they were determined to ensure their collective security.

At the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, her country's Minister for Foreign Affairs had stressed the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to use that nuclear energy to accelerate the economic progress of the developing countries. At the same session, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had submitted a draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and her delegation had joined with all the members of the Latin-American group in proposing certain amendments, which had been
accepted by the sponsors of the draft. Although that instrument was not enough to eliminate fears of a possible use of nuclear weapons, it nevertheless prevented these fears from being indefinitely increased.

Paraguay maintained excellent relations with the other countries of Latin America and had no reason to expect any aggression from them, but, as a result of technological progress, particularly in the field of nuclear armaments, no country, whatever might be its geographical situation, its devotion to peace and its economic and social development, could consider itself completely safe from nuclear aggression or a threat of nuclear aggression. Accordingly, her country, which had renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, felt that it was entitled to receive assurances from the nuclear Powers and it had welcomed the document submitted by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (S/8631), which gave a juridical form to those assurances.

In conclusion, she expressed the hope that it would one day be possible to achieve general disarmament without international control, as also the prohibition of the manufacture of new nuclear weapons and the destruction of the existing weapons.

Mr. CHASTOV (Bulgaria) observed that the great majority of peoples and their leaders had for long been convinced that, in order to prevent certain disaster, it was necessary to persevere in endeavours to put an end to the armaments race, in order to bring about complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. To be sure, the results achieved up to now in that field were far from satisfactory, but that was no reason to despair. The signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had aroused immense hopes and represented great progress in the right direction. All the criticism made of the Treaty ignored the fact that there was indeed a threat of the dissemination of nuclear weapons and that the more States there were which possessed those weapons, the greater would be the threat of a world nuclear conflict.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty provided a political and juridical basis for the search for the solution of nuclear problems, both in the field of disarmament and in that of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Treaty made possible a continuation of the discussion and genuine negotiations. The consideration of the problems on the agenda of the Conference came within the framework of that Treaty.

With respect to security, the discussion of that problem was bound up with Security Council resolution 255 (1960) and with the identical declarations of three nuclear powers.

With regard to disarmament, article VI of the Treaty provided an undertaking subscribed to by all the parties to the Treaty. Under that article, the nuclear powers had undertaken to pursue negotiations on measures relating to disarmament. The non-nuclear-weapon Powers which had accepted the Treaty would take a direct part in those negotiations and would consequently have their say with respect to the nature of those measures.

In the opinion of his delegation, the problems of disarmament and the cessation of the arms race were indissolubly linked to the problems on the agenda of the Conference. In other words, both the problem of security and that of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy depended on the solution of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and on the progress which could be made towards disarmament. The arms race constituted a major obstacle to the establishment of a climate of confidence which would be favourable to international collaboration in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The importance of the problem of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States was obvious. It was necessary, however, to take into account some aspects of the problem which arose from the very nature of atomic weapons. The problem of security, considered from the point of view of a possible resort to nuclear weapons, concerned all countries, great and small, whether they possessed nuclear weapons or not. While it was impossible to foresee the possible reactions to which a resort to nuclear weapons or a threat of resorting to them might give rise, it was
most unlikely that the country which was their immediate target would be
the only one concerned. In that context, Security Council resolution
255 (1968) and the declarations of three nuclear powers acquired particu-
larly significance and deserved the most careful consideration.

Nuclear energy used for peaceful purposes held out an immense hope
and offered an immediate solution to the serious problem of the con-
stantly increasing demand for energy. The importance of nuclear
explosions for peaceful purposes was probably justified, but most experts
were extremely reserved on that subject. The great majority of States,
however, were especially interested in the possibilities opened up to
them by article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which set forth the
obligations assumed by the parties to the Treaty with respect of the
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and it was that
collaboration which was of practical importance for the application and
utilization of nuclear energy. That text, as also the multilateral
treaty as a result of which the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) had been established, opened up prospects for the peaceful use
of atomic energy and afforded real opportunities for assisting in the
economic and technical development of countries. Apart from the actual
production of electric power from the atom, which had long since passed
beyond the experimental stage, the utilization of nuclear energy in the
fields of agriculture, geological prospecting, medicine, and in
particular the desalinization of sea-water was of prismatical importance.
The International Atomic Energy Agency had apparently already under-
taken a certain number of studies in all those fields, and many projects
were being applied in practice.

Bulgaria's foreign policy was a policy of peace. His Government
had repeatedly expressed its firm determination to contribute to the
solution of the problems of disarmament and to the conclusion of an
agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control. Fully aware of the obstacles standing in the
way of general and complete disarmament, his country had supported all
efforts aimed at encouraging partial measures of disarmament or measures calculated to facilitate international détente and to create a favourable atmosphere for disarmament negotiations. His Government therefore attached great importance to the proposals in the memorandum of 16 July 1968 of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament. His delegation felt that the problem of concluding a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons deserved particular attention. An international instrument of that kind would have exceptionally far-reaching political and moral effects. His country would support all efforts to reach an agreement on the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, the restriction and liquidation of existing stocks and limitation of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, and the cessation of underground tests.

The problem of establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world had always been of concern to his Government, and while supporting efforts of that kind, Bulgaria was taking an active part with regard to the proposals to make the Balkans and the Mediterranean area nuclear-free zones.

The terrible threat of nuclear weapons should not, however, lead to a disregard of such other means of massive destruction as chemical and biological weapons. The danger was all the greater in that a considerable number of countries might possess chemical and biological weapons and the proliferation of those weapons could be more rapid than that of atomic weapons.

The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should support General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI) and ask as many States as possible to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

He had the most explicit reservations with regard to the proposals for the establishment of new international bodies and he did not consider it necessary or desirable to set up a permanent body of the Conference. It would be premature, to say the least, to establish
special bodies to deal with the problems connected with the utilization of atomic energy through explosions for peaceful purposes before the possibilities of organizations such as IAEA, which possessed specialized staff and had been specifically created for that purpose, had been exhausted.

Mr. HILDESHEIM (Switzerland) pointed out that Switzerland, which, not being a member of the United Nations, had been unable to take part in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament or in the preparation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had stated its views in two memoranda, of 17 November 1967 and 9 May 1968, in which it had affirmed its conviction that the Treaty could not achieve its object unless it was approved by the largest possible number of States. That condition of universality would be more readily fulfilled if the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States succeeded in inducing the nuclear Powers to provide serious security guarantees and to embark upon the course of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, the Conference should improve the Treaty in areas where supplementary agreements were provided for and give practical form to some of the commitments in it.

The fact that military power continued to afford considerable political advantages made it all the more necessary to stress the primacy of law and the sovereign equality of States, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, in international life. It was in a way paradoxical that it should be the non-nuclear-weapon States which were first called upon to make major concessions in the field of nuclear disarmament. Switzerland, however, could not but welcome the convening of the Conference, which would enable the non-nuclear-weapon States to establish a common position on nuclear matters to govern their relations with the nuclear Powers.

The major responsibility which the nuclear Powers assumed for the maintenance of peace and security at the same time shielded them from the sanctions provided by the United Nations Charter. Unfortunately, the extent of their powers and responsibilities had not impelled all
the great Powers to respect the principles laid down by the Charter with regard to the equality of States, non-intervention and the renunciation of the use of force. Furthermore, the fact that the policies of those great Powers clashed had on several occasions involved mankind in the risk of a nuclear conflict and could do so again. It might be thought that it was in the first place the task of the nuclear Powers themselves to undertake nuclear disarmament, but a different disarmament objective had been selected, that of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There was no point in lamenting that now. To offset the sacrifices required of the non-nuclear-weapon States, the nuclear Powers should assume certain obligations. The General Assembly had drawn attention to the need for such an arrangement in resolution 2026 (XXV) of 19 November 1965, paragraph 2(b) of which stated that the Non-Proliferation Treaty should "embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers", a balance which had so far not been achieved.

In the first place, the nuclear Powers should afford effective security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States which agreed to be bound by the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, they should commit themselves to the effective limitation of their nuclear armaments and to offsetting the economic disadvantages suffered by the small and medium Powers as a result of their agreement not to produce, acquire or use nuclear weapons.

In order to afford security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States, the nuclear Powers should either undertake not to use or threaten to use such weapons in order to attain objectives at variance with the United Nations Charter, or help to bring about the adoption of an international instrument placing a particular ban on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against a country which had renounced such use and setting out the precise consequences of a violation. Such a treaty was by no means impracticable; a proposal along those lines had in fact been made by Mr. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in his statement of 1 February 1966. There was also a precedent,
that of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The Protocol provided that the nuclear Powers which were parties to the Treaty would respect the denuclearized status of Latin America. Article 3 of the Protocol stipulated that those Powers undertook not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Parties to the Treaty. The Protocol had been signed by two nuclear Powers, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The Swiss delegation entirely subscribed to the views expressed in the working document submitted by Mexico (A/CONF.35/DOC.16), which showed among other things, that the States members of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America had, after protracted discussion, decided against any procedure other than that of a Protocol. In the view of the Swiss delegation, a working party should be established to study that important question and to draw up a draft protocol. It was important that the great Powers should agree to take disarmament measures and should limit the enormous financial burden which the production of nuclear weapons entailed. The Conference should focus its main attention on effective control measures. The progress of technology in fields other than nuclear energy was causing justifiable concern to the small and medium countries. Although it was reasonably possible to refuse to contemplate the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons, it was nevertheless clear that conventional military equipment still enabled the great Powers to take sudden surprise action against weaker States. It was now possible to take a decision on the total prohibition of nuclear tests which the recent development of control techniques seemed to have made possible. In that respect, the proposal submitted by the United Kingdom to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, appearing in document E/DC/232 of 26 August 1963, seemed to be a realistic and constructive measure. Another measure which should be adopted was the limitation of nuclear weapons to the present-day level. The effect of those two measures would be to stabilize armaments at their present level and they could be taken in conjunction
with the proposal submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by Mr. Amintore Fanfani, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 1 August 1967, which suggested that the nuclear Powers should make available to the other States at least part of their fissile materials, in order indirectly to discourage the production of nuclear weapons.

The attitude of the non-nuclear-weapon States towards the Non-Proliferation Treaty was dictated by a concern for their sovereignty and dignity and the desire to foster the emergence of new ideas in the field of international co-operation. That was a measure of the importance which Switzerland attached to the Treaty provisions which were designed to promote such co-operation. It was in fact probable that the ability of many States to become parties to the Treaty would depend to a large extent on the spirit in which the application of its clauses was conceived.

The peaceful uses of nuclear energy stemmed from research carried out for military purposes; in developing a nuclear weapon, a State obtained technological knowledge which could be extremely useful to it in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The renunciation of the production of nuclear weapons therefore entailed economic drawbacks for the non-nuclear-weapon States. The nuclear Powers should compensate them for those disadvantages. In that connexion, his delegation considered that the nuclear Powers should undertake firstly to supply enriched fissile materials for peaceful uses, secondly to agree not to place any embargo on such materials in the future, and thirdly to facilitate access to nuclear techniques relating particularly to uranium enrichment, re-treatment of fuel elements and nuclear ship propulsion. It was necessary to provide machinery which would enable all States to benefit from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, on the basis of technical considerations and not of the political interests of the nuclear Powers.
Switzerland attached great importance to the establishment of effective and reliable controls designed solely to prevent fissile materials from being diverted to the production of nuclear weapons. In that respect it considered that the principles adopted by IAEA were valid. Switzerland considered that controls should be restricted to plutonium and highly enriched uranium, which were the only materials which lent themselves to military use. Moreover, those controls should be uniformly applied to all States which accepted them under the Treaty. They should be extended to the peaceful nuclear activities of the nuclear Povrs by means of an international instrument laying down legal obligations in order to reduce discrimination in economic competition. The preambular paragraph of the Treaty which referred to controls by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points should be speedily implemented. Until such time as the Treaty became genuinely universal, interim measures would doubtless have to be envisaged to prevent the various control systems from clashing. Machinery designed to encourage the development of exchanges in the nuclear field and to prevent the diversion of fissile materials to other than peaceful uses should be established as soon as possible.

Switzerland regretted the failure of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation to provide a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes as suggested by Switzerland. The safeguard which the possibility of referring a dispute to an impartial arbiter would have provided would have done much to allay the anxiety of the non-nuclear-weapon States. There was still time to include such safeguards in the instruments which many participants in the Conference apparently wished to attach to the Treaty. The Swiss delegation would not fail to advance proposals on the subject should the occasion arise.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE NINTH MEETING

held on Tuesday, 19 September 1968, at 3:25 p.m.

President: Mr. Arshad KUSAIN Pakistan
Mr. Laiglesia said that Spain had voted in favour of the General Assembly’s decision, in resolution 2153 B (XXI), to convene the present Conference. It had participated in the work of the Preparatory Committee; and in explaining its vote on General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), it had expressed the belief that the Conference could help to solve a number of problems involved in giving effect to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Many countries had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but there were many others, including some that had supported resolution 2373 (XXII), which hesitated to do so. Their hesitation was partly due to the recent international crisis; recent international events had done nothing to strengthen confidence in the provisions of the Treaty; but also those countries had gradually realized the serious nature of the obligations imposed by the Treaty, and the need to solve the problems which it created for those accepting it. The great majority of States Members of the United Nations were not given sufficient opportunities to discuss questions of disarmament; consequently the present Conference was most opportune. Its main tasks were to study the obstacles to general acceptance of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and find ways of removing them, so as to save mankind from the danger presented by the existence of such weapons. At the same time it was necessary to foster broad development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and thus end the division of the world into two groups of countries — on the one hand the nuclear Powers, which were exempt from any limitation in the development of such peaceful uses, and, on the other, those countries whose lack of desire to acquire nuclear weapons had the effect of impeding their attainment of the technological level required for satisfactory economic development and acceptable levels of living.

The present Conference was a sequel to the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The first substantive item on its agenda —
the problem of measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States — was of vital importance. Many countries, including Spain, were dissatisfied with the system of guarantees provided by General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), the Security Council resolution 255 (1968) (A/CONF.35/DOC. 12, annex 1) and the declaration by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States (ibid., annex II). The Security Council resolution had been adopted with five abstentions, including that of one permanent member of the Council, and Spain regarded that resolution and the associated declaration as no more than statements of intent which added nothing to the obligations imposed by the United Nations Charter. Unfortunately the binding nature of United Nations decisions had more than once been ignored, and consequently a system of guarantees based on Security Council procedures, which were always subject to the veto, was not easy to accept. Moreover, these guarantees were explicitly based on the very vague concept of aggression.

His delegation supported the idea of concluding a treaty under which the nuclear Powers would undertake to refrain from attacking or threatening the non-nuclear-weapon States with nuclear weapons, and to defend them against any such attack or threat by nuclear Powers not signatories of the treaty in question. Such a treaty would remove many of the obstacles to non-proliferation, and the idea deserved serious attention.

In order to establish a fair balance between the obligations and the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States, they should be given unlimited access to all information relating to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The system of safeguards was sufficient guarantee that no country could divert to military use technical information received from the nuclear Powers. Such information should be made available even if it was a by-product of military research and development. Every non-nuclear-weapon State should be enabled to
obtain what it needed in order to establish industrial or scientific nuclear installations, as well as the materials and fuels needed for their operation, which would of course be subject to the system of safeguards. That system should be made as nearly automatic as possible in order to avoid the risk of industrial espionage. Furthermore, the structure of the bodies responsible for applying the system of safeguards must be adapted to the new general system that would be required for non-proliferation. Spain had suggested to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly the establishment within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of a committee composed of representatives of all the countries subject to the system of safeguards, to which the IAEA Board of Governors would refer all questions connected with the safeguards.

Spain attached great importance to the cessation of the arms race and to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It was to be hoped that the Conference could achieve progress in that direction when it took up items 13 (c) and (d) of the agenda.

It was too early to say whether the present system of international co-operation would prove effective in putting nuclear energy to use in a manner satisfactory to all. However, if the Conference could make progress towards peace and well-being for the peoples of the world, it would be desirable to find some means of continuing the work thus begun. There was no need to establish another international body, but care should be taken to avoid any repetition of the two-year delay which had elapsed since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI). He suggested that on 23 September 1968 the Conference should be suspended rather than closed, and that a broadly representative standing committee should be established which would meet concurrently with the General Assembly or, in any case, at United Nations Headquarters, where most of the countries participating in the Conference maintained permanent missions.
The importance of technological development to the future of mankind was obvious to all. The technology of nuclear energy was the most difficult to channel into exclusively peaceful uses. Spain earnestly hoped that the Conference would make an effective contribution to peace and prosperity for all peoples.

Mr. Ali Dia (Senegal) said that, since the end of the Second World War, progress had been far more rapid in the scientific and technological field than in the political and legal field. The discovery of fissionable material had affected the behaviour of nations and influenced the shape of the world order. The political and military blocs formed at the end of the war had had their roots in the possession of nuclear weapons and the knowledge how to produce them. Nuclear energy and the new political and legal concepts associated with it had become matters of importance to all countries, and a global approach was needed to deal with them. The realization that no nation could act in any way without affecting others had led Governments to multiply their international activities.

Among those activities, the present Conference was of far-reaching importance to world peace and security, without which other efforts to improve the lot of mankind would be fruitless. While the immediate concern of the Conference was to deliver man from the threat of destruction by nuclear weapons, the world's ultimate goal was eradication of the fear of war, which could be achieved only through general and complete disarmament under effective international control; every nation, large or small, had the responsibility and the right to pursue that goal.

The two fundamental issues before the Conference were security assurances and the potential benefits of the peaceful application of nuclear energy. The collective security of peoples could be ensured only by total nuclear disarmament. That required the adoption of effective measures by both nuclear and non-nuclear States on the basis of the principle of sovereign equality of States and the
principle laid down in General Assembly Resolution 2026 (XX), operative paragraph 2(b), namely that of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. It was, however, clear that the main responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security lay with the nuclear-weapon States.

The recently concluded Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which had so far been signed by seventy-eight countries including his own, was the first direct step towards nuclear disarmament. It was to be hoped that all States would sign that Treaty, pending the adoption of more substantial measures to halt the nuclear arms race and institute disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. In that connexion his delegation welcomed the agreement between the United States and the USSR to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. It was to be hoped that those negotiations would lead to the speedy conclusion of an agreement on nuclear disarmament without which the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States would never be adequately guaranteed.

It was obvious that the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the declaration of intent made in the Security Council by three of the nuclear-weapon States were not sufficient to offset the obligations assumed by non-nuclear-weapon States on signing the Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States should give clear undertakings with regard to the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. First of all, they should give an explicit pledge to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against those States which renounced the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons. That would be consistent with operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2153 A(XXI). The assurances given in Security Council resolution 255 (1968) had two main shortcomings. Firstly, they were based on
the concept of aggression, which had never been precisely defined; secondly, they depended on action by the Security Council, which had often been paralyzed by its own procedure. Moreover, a nuclear attack would create a qualitatively new situation which had not been foreseen in the drafting of Article 51 of the Charter. The nuclear States should also give an undertaking to lend prompt assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State which fell victim to a nuclear attack or was the object of nuclear blackmail.

The non-nuclear-weapon States, for their part, should take the lead in the search for measures to bring about complete nuclear disarmament. The non-dissemination of nuclear weapons largely depended on the nuclear-weapon States; but the non-nuclear-weapon States could help to ensure the non-proliferation of these weapons. If the nuclear-weapon States undertook to desist from further production of nuclear weapons and to destroy their stock-piles, the non-nuclear-weapon States should reciprocate by renouncing the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons. The action taken by both groups of States must be simultaneous. It was encouraging to note that some disarmament measures, in the form of various treaties, had already been adopted; however, all the existing instruments needed expanding to make them comprehensive. For instance, the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests should be extended to include underground tests and should be accompanied by the application of techniques for the detection and identification of tests.

Denuclearization was a particularly effective measure of disarmament and offered good prospects of agreement. It was too early to expect the conclusion of a universal agreement on the subject, but it should be possible to increase the number and size of specific nuclear-free zones. The Antarctic Treaty was the most satisfactory instrument concluded so far, for it prohibited not only nuclear but all military activity in the Antarctic region. The Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was the first instrument of de-nuclearization in an inhabited region; he drew attention to General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) on that subject. Until such time as the proposed treaty for the denuclearization of Africa was concluded, that continent must be respected as a denuclearized zone in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI) and the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa made by the Heads of State and Governments of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 2033 (XX). A number of important proposals had been made concerning other parts of the world, and no effort should be spared in acting on them. In the interests of uniformity, the Conference should recommend some essential principles and measures for inclusion in all future denuclearization treaties: for example, total renunciation of the production, acquisition and use of nuclear weapons, and prohibition of the installation and storage of nuclear weapons in the territory of States in the denuclearized zone and of the transit of such weapons through such territory, including air, space and territorial waters.

With regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, two basic principles must be observed: firstly, all States must have access to the benefits deriving from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy; secondly, an effective system of safeguards must be established to prevent nuclear activities for non-peaceful purposes. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon States had expressed particular interest in the peaceful application of nuclear energy, which was the subject of articles IV and V of the Treaty and which should provide a unique opportunity for co-operation between nuclear and non-nuclear States. In addition to providing the non-nuclear States with scientific and technological information, the nuclear Powers should assist them, on request, in the installation of equipment, the training of
personnel and, where possible, the financing of projects. The establishment of a programme to further the peaceful development of nuclear energy would enable the nuclear Powers to pool their experience and resources for the benefit of the less advanced countries. His delegation considered that all such activities should be conducted through the international body referred to in article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty rather than through bilateral agreements. The question whether to adapt IAEA or to establish a new body would receive his delegation's full attention in the competent Committee.

Since nuclear technology could be used for both peaceful and non-peaceful purposes, an effective system of safeguards must be set up, but in such a way as not to hamper the scientific and technological development of the States to which the system was applied. A great deal of good faith and mutual trust would be needed on both sides if those objectives were to be attained.

Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands) said that, at the General Assembly's twenty-second session, some delegations had recommended that the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States should be held before final decisions were taken on the non-proliferation treaty, lest the special problems and legitimate interests of those States should be neglected. The Netherlands had not subscribed to that view. It had welcomed the submission of identical texts by the Soviet Union and the United States and was one of the signatories of the Treaty. The Netherlands delegation had told the General Assembly, however, that it accepted the treaty on the explicit understanding that the nuclear-weapon States signatories would spare no effort to agree on effective measures of arms control and disarmament; that they would honour their pledge to facilitate access to and the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the benefit of non-nuclear countries parties to the Treaty, in particular with a view to the needs of the developing nations; and that discrimination between nuclear-weapon
and non-nuclear-weapon States should be reduced and eventually eliminated in the course of a genuine process of arms control and disarmament.

The draft treaty had been thoroughly examined by the Assembly, and several amendments had been adopted. The resultant final text was not, of course, entirely satisfactory to all concerned, but a wide measure of agreement had been reached and the remaining areas of dissent had been clearly defined. His delegation hoped that the Conference would concentrate on the fundamental issues which remained to be resolved and, in particular — as the President had suggested (1st meeting) — on those aspects on which agreement should be reached in the form of recommendations. He welcomed the presence of representatives of four out of the five nuclear-weapon States, for such recommendations as might emerge from the Conference would depend for their effect on the attention paid to them by the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty.

In the course of the present debate, some delegations had suggested that the Conference should be the first of a series of meetings and that a permanent committee should be set up to provide, between such meetings, continuity in the consideration of the problems of non-nuclear-weapon States and the implementation of their decisions. In his delegation's view, future discussions on the problems of concern to the non-nuclear-weapon States would need the active participation of the nuclear-weapon Powers. In the first place, talks on arms control and disarmament in general, and on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in particular, ought to be pursued by the General Assembly, even though not all nations with a vital stake in those matters were yet able to participate in its proceedings. In the light of its resolution 2030 (XX) endorsing a proposal on the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited, the Assembly might wish to explore how best to promote,
under certain well-defined conditions, a general discussion between the
greatest possible number of participants on matters relating to arms
control and disarmament. In his opinion, the problems which some
delegations had suggested for referral to future meetings of non-nuclear-
weapon States could best be examined by the review conference for which
provision was made in article VIII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The negotiation of specific measures of arms control and disarmament
should be left to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

It had also been proposed that a new international body should be
established to give effect to article V of the Treaty. His Government
considered that the utmost restraint should be exercised in establishing
new international bodies. Many technical problems would have to be
solved before nuclear explosions could be put to peaceful uses on a large
scale, and there was no need for hasty decisions. To begin with, as
the Japanese delegation had suggested, the problems involved might be
studied in IAEA, which would then report to the General Assembly; he
was confident that such a preliminary study would facilitate negotiations
on a special international agreement or agreements in accordance with
article V of the Treaty. It was to be hoped that such agreements would
enable the Agency itself to help in making the peaceful uses of nuclear
explosives available to non-nuclear-weapon countries. It might, of
course, become necessary to adapt the Agency to perform new tasks under
articles V, III and IV of the Treaty.

In the light of recent events the Assembly had done well to include
the last preambular paragraph in the Non-Proliferation Treaty; if it
had foreseen those events, it would doubtless have included a reference
to its Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and
Sovereignty (resolution 2131 (XXI)) and to its resolution 2225 (XXI)
calling upon all States to carry out faithfully their obligations under
the Charter and under that Declaration.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE TENTH MEETING

held on Wednesday, 11 September 1968, at 10.20 a.m.

President: Sh. Arshad AUSEEM Pakistan
later, Mr. LAGLEUSIA Spain
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 10) (continued)

Mr. AGEHE (Ethiopia) said that history taught that a political structure based upon armament build-up had always ended in disaster. For that reason the present Conference had been rightly described as an unprecedented event. It was universally recognized that the security of States could best be assured through the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

However, the disarmament negotiations had not achieved the results expected of them and, in the main, the Treaties which had been concluded such as the Treaty imposing an incomplete ban on nuclear weapon tests and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons were either of a piecemeal nature or not real measures of disarmament. Nuclear weapons continued to be produced in large quantities, thus increasing destructive capability.

The Ethiopian Government's awareness of the incalculable dangers of nuclear weapons had prompted it, as far back as the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, to submit a proposal for the total prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. At the General Assembly's sixteenth session that proposal had found general acceptance and had been adopted as resolution 1653 (XVI) declaring the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons to be contrary to the United Nations Charter and a crime against mankind. Since then, at each successive session, the General Assembly had pressed for the convening of an international conference for the purpose of concluding a convention prohibiting the use of all nuclear weapons. The Ethiopian Government believed that the conclusion of such a convention would do much to alleviate the fears and enhance the security of States.

The Ethiopian Government had made its proposal because it had always believed that the nuclear-weapon States would have no motive for spending
astronomical sums of money on the development of weapons which they were forbidden to use. The non-nuclear-weapon States, for their part, would not seek to acquire extremely costly weapons for which they would have no use. Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would make it easier to halt the production of fissile material and to destroy the existing stockpiles, thus serving the cause of general and complete disarmament.

In the absence of practical measures of nuclear disarmament, the Ethiopian delegation urged the Conference to give fresh consideration to its proposal and to recommend the convening of an international conference for the purpose of concluding a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons.

In discussion on the Non-Proliferation Treaty paramount consideration had been given to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon countries which renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In his delegation's view, the most effective security assurance which could be given to the non-nuclear-weapon countries would be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. The signing of a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons would afford a security assurance for all nations, and particularly for non-nuclear-weapon States.

Ethiopia considered that the security assurances so far given by the three nuclear powers, in their formal declaration and the Security Council resolution, were insufficient. Without disputing the sincerity of the three great nuclear powers, it was possible to feel some misgiving about the practicability of the measures envisaged. It might be thought that the principle of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council would frustrate any immediate action.

From the legal standpoint, the essential problem was how to determine that a threat of aggression was imminent or that an act of aggression had actually been committed. It was true that, under
Chapter VII of the Charter, the competent organ of the United Nations in matters of world peace and security was the Security Council. However, the fact that two nuclear-weapon States were not Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that other States might remain outside it, would militate against prompt and immediate action by the Security Council.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty should be followed by other disarmament measures, in particular the prohibition of underground tests, cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes, cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles. The Non-Proliferation Treaty would not be complete until the nuclear Powers carried out the undertaking they had given to pursue with determination negotiations leading towards the final settlement of the disarmament issue.

His delegation could not but welcome the conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the declaration of 21 July 1964 by the African Heads of State and Government concerning renuclearization of the African continent.

His delegation attached great importance to the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the contribution they could make to economic development. It was impossible to overemphasize the need to secure for the non-nuclear-weapon States, without discrimination, the benefits to be derived from the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and to ensure that those countries participated in the exchange of scientific and technical information, obtained nuclear fuel and equipment, and had access to the benefits of nuclear explosive devices through an appropriate international organization.
Mr. Jacobs (Zoland) expressed the belief that the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had created a favourable climate for the efforts of the Conference which, it was to be hoped, would stimulate and consolidate co-operation between the nuclear Powers and non-nuclear-weapon States.

The success of the Conference would depend on a number of factors and, in particular, on the direction in which its deliberations progressed. The relevant resolutions of the General Assembly had closely linked the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Before the conclusion of that Treaty, the objective of the Conference had been to help in reaching an agreement on halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Now that the treaty had been concluded, the fundamental objective of the Conference was to contribute to the effective and rapid implementation of its provisions, particularly those relating to further measures of disarmament and to the problem of international co-operation in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. That interpretation of the objectives of the Conference was borne out by General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI).

In his opinion, discussions on matters outside the scope of the Conference would not facilitate the accomplishment of its allotted tasks. It must avoid doing anything that might disturb the well-established rhythm of the disarmament negotiations and adversely affect their prospects.

His delegation was sure that the work of the Conference would have a better chance of success if all States willing to participate could do so. It was regrettable that the German Democratic Republic, which had been among the first States to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and which was also a signatory of other, earlier disarmament agreements, was not taking part in the Conference. Any discrimination in that matter ran counter to the very idea of disarmament.
Poland favoured early implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for several reasons. Firstly, there was a real danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons as a result of the rapid development of the technological and economic capacity of a number of States. Secondly, any further proliferation would do irreparable harm to world security. That danger had been stressed by the Secretary-General, U. Thant, in his message to the Conference, in which he had said that "the solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons, or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them". Thirdly, it should be emphasized that the lack of progress in disarmament negotiations served to encourage those who opposed disarmament and who endeavoured to prevent, or at least to delay, its achievement. There were forces in the world rallying to prevent the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The States which opposed the Treaty were seeking pretexts to justify their refusal, or at least the postponement of their accession to the Treaty. Theories had been advanced which made disarmament dependent on prior political solutions and attempts were being made to turn the question of accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty into an instrument of pressure for obtaining political concessions. Such policies were a cause for particular concern when they were practised by a State which stubbornly refused to accept the post-war realities in Europe and was striving for their revision.

The Polish delegation was of the opinion that the most positive feature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the field of disarmament was that it incorporated a non-proliferation formula which effectively closed all roads to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. That was particularly important in view of the fact that certain States wanted
to keep the door open for acquiring nuclear weapons themselves at some later date. The ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons was of particular significance in Europe. The situation prevailing in that part of the world made the Treaty an important factor of peaceful stabilization in Europe. It was unfortunate that not all European countries appeared to recognize the need for such stabilization. In Europe, where the danger of a nuclear conflict was particularly great owing to the confrontation of two military and political alliances, a country's attitude towards the Treaty could be regarded as an indication of its readiness or unwillingness to proceed to measures of regional disarmament.

Poland supported the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the adoption of general disarmament measures in Europe, and it thought there was a close link between the two issues. That link had been stressed in the provisions of article VII of the Treaty, which recognized the right of States to establish nuclear-free zones. His delegation was confident that the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would favourably influence the possibilities for adopting measures of nuclear disarmament in Europe. Regional disarmament measures would be in keeping with the general principles of non-proliferation and would supplement them with regional denuclearization. In 1957 Poland had proposed the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe and in 1964 it had put forward a plan for freezing nuclear armaments in that area. Those proposals had covered the territories of four States, namely Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic. They had been accepted by the first three States and supported by a number of other States. They had been unable to materialize, however, owing primarily to the obstinate opposition of one State directly concerned. It could be said that, if the Polish proposals had been accepted, the European community would now feel
much more secure. Both proposals remained fully valid and Poland was prepared to continue its efforts to create conditions conducive to lasting security in Europe.

The problem of nuclear-free zones should not be approached solely in the European context. The concept of denuclearization replied to the need for security not only of individual countries, but of the international community as a whole. In accepting the principle of denuclearization, a State was exercising its right of self-defence against the effects of the nuclear arms race. The international community, for its part, had every interest in establishing nuclear-free zones in order to prevent nuclear war.

It would be wrong to say that fear alone should prompt the desire for early implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The potential positive effects of the Treaty upon disarmament and upon the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must not be overlooked. The balance of obligations and responsibilities of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States in those two fields offered favourable conditions for the development of international co-operation. It would hardly be realistic to expect benefits without making some sacrifices. Apart from its direct effect of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Treaty could play an important role in promoting the conclusion of further disarmament agreements, particularly in the nuclear field. The declaration of the intention of the Contracting Parties to pursue negotiations on disarmament, which appeared in the preamble, was reinforced by the provisions of article VI of the Treaty. That article also satisfied the desire of the non-nuclear-weapon States that a balance of the obligations and responsibilities of the Parties to the Treaty should be ensured. By the terms of that article, the nuclear Powers undertook to "pursue negotiations in good faith". The article further provided that the subject of negotiations should be concrete measures
of nuclear disarmament and it stipulated that the cessation of the nuclear arms race should be achieved "at an early date".

With respect to further disarmament measures, the Polish delegation thought that top priority should be given to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, cessation of their production, and reduction and eventual elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was capable of accomplishing the important tasks entrusted to it. The fact that it had decided to give priority to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament would certainly facilitate progress in its future work.

One of the most important tasks facing the Conference was to consider the implications of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and especially of the provisions of articles IV and V, in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In his delegation's opinion, the control system provided for in the Treaty should not prejudice the right of States freely to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, the control system should be uniform for all non-nuclear-weapon States; no allowances or privileges should be granted to a group of States. Uniform control could best be ensured by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was equipped for that task and had had great experience in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In order to make it possible for non-nuclear-weapon States to benefit from the advantages deriving from peaceful applications of nuclear energy and from peaceful nuclear explosions, the Non-Proliferation Treaty recognized the possibility of making use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. To ensure that the implementation of that provision did not run counter to the objectives of the Treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to try to produce or acquire such explosive devices; they should also accept
an effective control system. The Polish delegation felt that the control system provided for in the Treaty was adequate and that there was no reason to consider the establishment of a new control body. Lastly, the non-nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear Powers should undertake to carry out nuclear explosions in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty of Moscow of 5 August 1963.

In conclusion, he said that an effective solution to the problems of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy depended on radical progress in the field of disarmament. A plethora of organizations would not facilitate international co-operation on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Mr. de LAIGLESIA (Spain), Vice-President, took the Chair

Mr. RAKOTONIALA (Madagascar) noted that the item on the agenda of the Conference were closely linked to the questions which had been examined at the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly, before the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At that time, the Malagasy delegation had expressed its views on the questions which formed the subject of the Treaty, in particular the measures relating to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The international community had the right and the duty to take all the necessary steps to ensure its security and to promote co-operation among its members. There was therefore every justification for the present Conference, but the efforts of the United Nations organs which were concerned with the problem of disarmament should not be minimized. It was in that spirit that the Malagasy delegation had decided to participate in the work of the Conference.

With regard to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, he pointed out that all countries, large or small, needed nuclear energy for their development. Any initiative designed to ensure that the developing countries shared in the benefits derived from the progress
of science and technology was therefore to be encouraged. It should be noted, however, that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would not solve the problem of the relations between rich and poor countries, for the nuclear monopoly possessed by some Powers constituted a grave danger.

The provision of nuclear materials, equipment and plants should be accompanied by an effective system of control, to ensure that they would not be diverted for military purposes. It would also be necessary to make sure that the system of control did not hinder the economic development of the beneficiary countries. Moreover, the control applied in the non-nuclear-weapon countries should be extended to the nuclear Powers.

The idea of obtaining from the nuclear Powers an assurance that they would not use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon countries was attractive, but such an assurance, even if embodied in a legal instrument, would not ensure the security of the world unless the nuclear Powers also undertook not to use nuclear weapons against each other. No country could feel secure if an atomic war broke out among the nuclear Powers. As an African proverb said, "When two elephants fight, it is the grass which suffers". Furthermore, the danger which threatened the non-nuclear-weapon countries would not be averted so long as the use of force governed international relations. The United Nations Charter, of course, offered means of guaranteeing the security of countries, but it was none the less true that the political will of countries was a decisive and determining factor.

Mr. Liu (China) stressed that the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in no way detracted from the value of the Conference's work.

Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon States renounced the possession of nuclear weapons; hence the problem of ensuring the security of such States was of paramount importance.
The three great nuclear Powers had given assurances in that respect, but the Security Council's record in the achievement of results had not been such as to allay the fears of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The text of the declaration made by the three nuclear Powers in the Security Council and that of Security Council resolution 255 (1968) reaffirmed the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurred against a Member of the United Nations. That was an implicit recognition of the difference between the guarantees under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and those which had been built into military alliances.

With regard to the credibility of the guarantees, it varied in accordance with the risks involved in their enforcement. Given the terrible destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the Power according the guarantee could not carry out its obligations without examining the situation prevailing at the time, its own political objectives and its security. It was for that reason that it had been possible to say that nuclear arms were not weapons which could be used to defend a friendly country or in support of political desiderata. Since, however, it was the three major nuclear Powers which had offered the security guarantees and since they were also in possession of massive conventional forces, they were not obliged to rely solely on nuclear arms to achieve certain political or ideological objectives.

He recalled the endeavours which had culminated in the conclusion in 1928 of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. That Pact, to which nearly all the sovereign States of the world had adhered, had encouraged the illusion that recourse to force had become a thing of the past. That illusion had quickly been dispelled: a few years later the Second World War had broken out. A convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons would be no more effective than the Briand-Kellogg Pact unless it were accompanied by an effective system of control. Hence, in his
view it was not a question of how to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons but of how to control their production and stockpiling.

It was evident that the threat of nuclear destruction could be eliminated only by nuclear disarmament. The Republic of China had always advocated that course. It could only be accomplished gradually, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty served as an initial step towards that goal. Article VI provided that "each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". That text was merely a declaration of intention, but there was a sentiment among non-nuclear-weapon States that everything possible should be done to supplement the Treaty by measures to halt the nuclear arms race.

The establishment of denuclearized zones had been discussed for over a decade. The only result achieved so far had been the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The establishment of such zones presupposed the existence of a number of conditions - in particular, the existence of good relations between the countries concerned - which were not always to be found. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which represented a more direct approach to the problem, had to a certain extent diminished the importance of denuclearized zones.

The prestige which was attached to possession of nuclear weapons might surely incite some countries to acquire such weapons in one way or another and article X provided that "each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that external events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country".

The Non-Proliferation Treaty did not automatically put a stop to the spread of nuclear weapons nor did it obviate the danger of nuclear destruction. Rivalry among States was still the dominant factor in
international life and that rivalry extended even to areas which until recently had been relatively immune.

The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was another most important point on the agenda of the Conference, for it was called upon to assume a role of particular importance in the economic and social development of two thirds of the world’s population who lived in ignorance and poverty. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons laid emphasis on the need for international co-operation in order to enable all nations, and particularly those in the early stages of development, to share in the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Certain non-nuclear-weapon States which were perfectly capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons had voluntarily chosen not to do so. Thanks to the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty they could now take advantage of their technical knowledge to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The task of the Conference was to ensure that the provisions of the Treaty were scrupulously observed and to press for practical and effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the ultimate elimination of all existing stocks. It behoved all the non-nuclear weapon States participating in the Conference to wield their moral influence so that future generations could be spared the threat of total destruction.

Mr. JACINTO COBO (Ecuador) recalled that, true to its peace-loving traditions, Ecuador had signed the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. Its Parliament would shortly be ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons did not exorcize the danger of a nuclear war, any more than it gave adequate guarantees to States renouncing the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal, but it constituted a first essential and practical step and, in acceding
to it, Ecuador considered that it was morally entitled, at all international gatherings, to invite the nuclear-weapon Powers to reduce their arsenals and to require those Powers not to endanger natural resources, such as the sea, which were essential to mankind, through carrying out explosions.

His delegation, in common with others, considered that the Conference should seek to reach definite conclusions which would be followed up by practical measures. His delegation did not, therefore, think that the Conference should lay stress on the differences between the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its own principal objectives; the Conference should examine the problems raised by the Treaty and seek to improve it and widen its scope.

Negotiations should be conducted with a view to dispelling the legitimate anxiety that the non-nuclear-weapon States felt for their own security, and the few Powers which had a monopoly of these weapons should give the non-nuclear-weapon States a clear and precise legal guarantee in exchange for the act of renunciation on the part of the majority of the members of the international community, some of which had been on the verge of being able to produce nuclear weapons.

The passive attitude of the nuclear-weapon Powers since the opening of the Conference should not be a cause of discouragement. The delegations should seek the best ways and means of persuading those Powers to undertake not to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State, for all States, parties to the Treaty or not, were entitled to security guarantees.

The system of collective security provided for in the Charter did not unfortunately offer any mandatory and automatic guarantees in the event of nuclear or conventional aggression, as had recently been demonstrated yet again. Security Council resolution 255 (1963) was hardly more than an expression of good intentions.
The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could be an effective means of achieving nuclear disarmament. The Treaty of Tlatelolco included provisions relating to the use of nuclear technology for purposes of economic development, as also clauses banning the use of nuclear energy for military purposes; other regions of the world which did not propose to waste their resources in dangerous adventures could profitably follow the example of the Latin American countries.

Scientific and technical discoveries were an essential factor of development in a society which with every day that passed was becoming more and more dependent on science and its applications. The energy released by the fission of matter could not be the exclusive prerogative of one State but must be the common property of the entire international community. Fortunately, the exchange of knowledge in the field of nuclear physics was progressing and the Conference should endeavour to define the moralities of international co-operation in that field. The International Atomic Energy Agency was well qualified to play a major role in that domain, provided that substantial modifications were made in its structure and in its system for giving assistance to developing countries, which on account of the brain drain were losing human resources to the nuclear-weapon Powers.

With regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, Ecuador had adopted a prudent position of principle, for despite the scientific arguments advanced the risks of contamination were by no means negligible. Fishery resources could be endangered, as the Ecuadorian Government had pointed out at the time of the recent explosions in the South Pacific.

The Ecuadorian delegation could not support the idea of creating a new international body. Since the Conference had not enough time to reach definitive conclusions or agreements, his delegation felt that the Conference should content itself with defining general principles, leaving to a small committee the task of preparing texts which would be studied by a second Conference.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE ELEVENTH MEETING

held on Wednesday, 11 September 1968, at 3.25 p.m.

President: Mr. Arshed HUSAIN Pakistan
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 10) (continued)

Mr. SOLCÓN (Trinidad and Tobago) said that the decision to convene the present Conference had been taken before the General Assembly had received the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (MDC/236) and before it had adopted resolution 2373 (XXII) commending the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, the conclusion of the Treaty had not made the present Conference unnecessary; on the contrary, it had drawn attention to the difficulties in the way of complete nuclear disarmament, and to the imperfect nature of the guarantees offered to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Trinidad and Tobago had no nuclear ambitions but, being vulnerable to aggression, was anxious to contribute out of its slender resources to the creation of a world in which small countries would be protected against the intolerance of others. At present, in the absence of sure guarantees of protection against aggression or threats, small States were at the mercy of larger States with or without nuclear weapons, and there was a danger that some small countries – he was not referring to his own country – might be forced in self-defence to conclude agreements unfavourable to them with nuclear or potentially nuclear powers that had so far refused to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Trinidad and Tobago was protected both by its geographical position and by its membership of an international organization set up for the purpose. It was also a signatory of the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America which, despite its imperfections, was the best instrument in existence for the achievement of the great aims pursued by the participants in the Conference; it was to be hoped that those countries that were inclined to criticize that Treaty would nevertheless be willing to increase its effectiveness by following Latin America’s example. Although a world-wide demineralization treaty would solve all the problems confronting the Conference, it was not feasible at present. One step forward that could be taken,
would be for those nuclear Powers that had not already done so to sign Additional Protocol II to the Tlatelolco Treaty (A/CNF.35/DOC.16, annex VI). Few actions would be better calculated to show good will, particularly in the light of recent events in Europe.

The conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had shown how much still remained to be done and how dangerous it would be to delay. Although there were at present only five nuclear-weapon Powers, there might well be five times as many within fifteen or twenty years. The Conference must anticipate the inevitable demand by non-nuclear Powers for access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Even now, by pooling their resources, the non-nuclear Powers could provide what each of them independently could not afford; and there was a danger that they might proceed from peaceful to less peaceful uses. Scientists from many countries had learned nuclear technology in the United States, and there was now little in the technique of nuclear explosions which could really be regarded as secret. The possession of atomic weapons, with its awesome problems and responsibilities, could be as much a curse as a blessing, and any misunderstanding might lead to an accident that would leave no one alive to remedy it. Accordingly he welcomed the intensive negotiations taking place among the participants in the Conference and the general recognition that the meetings must produce tangible results. He also welcomed the working documents produced by the delegation of Mexico (A/CNF.35/DOC.15 and DOC/16) and by the delegation of Italy (A/CNF.35/C.2/1). There was every prospect that the Conference would make a valuable contribution to the cause of world disarmament, world peace and human progress.

Mr. SCOTT (Jamaica) said that his country had been a sponsor for General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI), under which the Conference could not be expected to solve all the problems facing the non-nuclear-weapon States, and he therefore hoped that it would be followed by further conferences of the same nature. Jamaica nevertheless expected
the present Conference to arrive at some specific proposals on the two fundamental issues of the nuclear age — security for non-nuclear-weapon States, and the acquisition by those States of the technical and scientific benefits to be derived from the use of nuclear energy. In the latter connexion, it should begin the task of drafting detailed provisions to give effect to articles IV and V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the representative of Mexico had presented a useful working document on the international body envisaged in article V.

There were two distinct groups of non-nuclear-weapon States: those with, and those without, the capacity and technical skills required to maintain a programme of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The first group might be termed the non-nuclear-weapon States, and the latter group the non-nuclear States; the distinction corresponded roughly to that between developed and under-developed countries. It was vital that the needs of the latter group should not be overlooked, since that group stood most in need of the possible benefits of nuclear technology. Jamaica therefore attached special importance to article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and hoped that the Conference would begin the task of laying down clear guidelines on the exchange of equipment and materials and on scientific and technological co-operation. It should be made clear what was meant by "the fullest possible exchange", taking into account the restrictions placed by various countries on the flow of information concerning nuclear energy. The Conference should consider how far such countries would have to adapt their domestic legislation in order to comply with their obligations under the Treaty. Additional protocols or conventions were needed to realize all the possibilities of articles IV and V. The Conference would not be able to draft such a convention, but should be able to perform some of the groundwork.

Jamaica was sceptical about the value of the security guarantee provided for non-nuclear-weapon States by the Security Council resolution of 19 June 1968 and the declaration of the three nuclear Powers
(A/CONF.35/Doc.12, annexes I and II). The only real guarantee against attack or threat of attack with nuclear weapons would be a complete ban on the production and stockpiling of such weapons and the destruction of those already in existence. Unhappily the time was not ripe for such a drastic measure. It had been argued that the existence of nuclear weapons in any territory was in itself a threat, and that the first step should be to withdraw such weapons from the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States. The merits of that suggestion had been severely undermined in recent weeks. Nevertheless, he suggested that the Conference should make recommendations on those matters for the General Assembly's consideration.

The Conference might find it necessary, during the discussion of item 15 of its agenda, to recommend that another conference should be held within one year or eighteen months, and that an interim committee should be set up to consider the questions raised at the Conference and the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such a committee should meet in New York.

Mr. SHAUS (Afghanistan) said that the purpose of the Conference was to find ways and means of strengthening non-proliferation, and with it the security of all nations, without depriving them of the benefits of the peaceful application of nuclear technology. The participants had met, not in order to deny the usefulness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to duplicate it, but to supplement it by other measures and to devise a more dependable system of security. The Treaty, although imperfect, was a step in the right direction and had the support of his Government on the grounds that universal acceptance was needed to make it effective. Given the co-operation and understanding of the nuclear-weapon States, the Conference should be able to make an important contribution to the task of improving upon the Treaty and enlarging its scope.
The non-nuclear weapon States which, by signing the Treaty, had voluntarily renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons were entitled to a more reliable and realistic system of security guarantees than those provided by the Treaty as it stood. The nuclear-weapon States had given no explicit undertaking that they would never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State signatory of the Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States which had renounced the acquisition and production of nuclear weapons but which were not Parties to the Treaty were in an even more doubtful situation; indeed, they seemed to be outside the scope of the security arrangements altogether. Such discrimination was inconsistent with the need for a collective system of security in the nuclear age.

The present arrangements were based on the assumption that the permanent members of the Security Council, when faced with a specific case, would find it possible to agree that nuclear aggression had occurred or was threatened. Since aggression had not yet been defined, it was unrealistic to assume that they would be able in all cases to reach such agreement and act with the necessary speed. It would have been better to make the security guarantee directly dependent upon the occurrence or threat of nuclear attack. Furthermore the Security Council resolution of 19 June 1962 provided that the permanent members of the Council which were nuclear-weapon States should act "in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter," thus making the assurances dependent on the procedures of the Council, whose inaction could paralyse the entire mechanism. The reference in the resolution to Article 51 of the Charter added nothing substantial to the rules governing the right of individual and collective self-defence. Article 51 itself had been given divergent interpretations, and its drafters had not anticipated the new situation created by the harnessing of nuclear energy and the development of nuclear weapons. In the event of a nuclear attack or threat of such attack, the rights upheld in Article 51 would
be meaningless for most non-nuclear-weapon States, although those
protected by military alliances with one or more nuclear Powers were
more secure than the rest. Furthermore it was obvious that any action
taken pursuant to the declaration made by three of the nuclear Powers
would be subject to the decisions of the Security Council. The value
of those declarations as security guarantees lay mainly in their deterrent
effect, which was subject to the vicissitudes of international life and
to the state of relations between the guarantors.

Since the Non-Proliferation Treaty contained no legally binding
 provision relating to positive guarantees, consideration might be given
as an initial step to the adoption by the nuclear Powers of a declara-
tion jointly or severally undertaking to protect effectively against
the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons all non-nuclear-weapon
States which had renounced the production, acquisition and use of such
weapons. This declaration could be followed by a convention at a later
stage. The danger of nuclear aggression demanded measures of preven-
tion, not of cure. Pending the conclusion of a treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
it was desirable to conclude an international convention giving the
force of law to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI).
Under such a convention, the nuclear-weapon States would undertake not
to use and not to threaten to use nuclear weapons against States which
had unconditionally renounced the production, acquisition and use of
such weapons; ideally, the convention should also prohibit the use
of nuclear weapons against nuclear-weapon States. Since a convention
of that nature could not be concluded and brought into force in the
immediate future, the nuclear-weapon States might, as a first step,
make a binding declaration to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons
in the settlement of international disputes; that would be consistent
with the principles embodied in General Assembly resolution 2153 A
(XXI).
The inclusion of a reference to Article 2 (4) of the Charter in the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had not met the expectations of the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States. The time had come for an entirely new approach by the nuclear-weapon States to the concept of non-use of nuclear weapons. It was necessary to devise means of enabling States to renounce their nuclear options, and thus draw closer to the system of universal collective security envisaged in the Charter.

The purpose and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be lost unless further steps were immediately taken towards disarmament and vertical non-proliferation. In order to establish a better balance of rights and obligations for all States, it was incumbent upon the nuclear Powers to enter into constructive negotiations and reach prompt agreement on such measures as a comprehensive test-ban treaty, limitation of the production of nuclear weapons and the reduction of existing stock-piles. It was to be hoped that those Powers would construe operative paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) as laying upon them a solemn obligation to agree on further constructive measures of disarmament over and above the provisions of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

His delegation believed that the establishment of nuclear-free zones would reduce international tension and strengthen the cause of peace.

The nuclear-weapon States bore heavy responsibilities towards the community of nations in matters of disarmament, and should give due consideration to the expectations of small countries which, in that community, formed the vast majority. More active co-operation was needed, not only between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States in the United Nations, but also among the nuclear-weapon States themselves. Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations would enable that nuclear Power to discharge its responsibilities in the matter of disarmament. The world community would also benefit from the co-operation of France in that matter.
Discussions on disarmament should not neglect the problem created by the proliferation of conventional weapons, which could upset the balance and create undue tension in a particular region. In addition to those dangers, the conventional arms race often placed an unbearable burden on the meagre resources of smaller countries, which they needed for their economic and social development.

The technological revolution wrought by the harnessing of nuclear energy had aroused new hopes and aspirations in the developing countries. It should be clearly understood that article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not intended to hamper the peaceful development and use of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapon States. That article should be read in conjunction with article IV, paragraph 1. The safeguards to be instituted under article III should be standard and uniform; a universal system of safeguards would undoubtedly facilitate acceptance of that article.

Since there was no technological difference between explosions for warlike and for peaceful purposes, there had been no alternative but to agree, in concluding the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that all peaceful nuclear explosions should remain under the exclusive control of the existing nuclear Powers. However, the view persisted in some quarters that the present system of safeguards would hamper the research and peaceful development of nuclear energy and that discriminatory practices might well cripple the system. The Conference could help to dispose of those misgivings; some interesting suggestions had already been advanced regarding the establishment of new machinery, or the improvement of existing machinery, in order to increase the freedom of access of the non-nuclear-weapon States to nuclear information and technology; and he was convinced that, if a spirit of compromise and co-operation prevailed, Committee Two would be able to solve that complex and important problem.
In the opinion of his delegation, further dissemination of nuclear weapons would increase fear and suspicion among nations. Any addition to the number of nuclear-weapon States would adversely affect the already precarious state of international relations. It was therefore his ardent hope that the Conference would achieve its aims.

Mr. Alfonso SAINTA (Chile) said that the Conference had met to consider how the development of nuclear armaments could be halted, how the safety of non-nuclear-weapon States could be guaranteed, and what measures should be taken to increase international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was far from satisfactory even to its signatories, and was considered inadequate by a number of other countries; but it was a step towards nuclear disarmament, without which the purposes of the United Nations would never be achieved. The Treaty would have little meaning, however, unless determined efforts were made to remedy its shortcomings and to establish nuclear-free zones. Chile was proud to have participated actively in the preparation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and hoped that those countries in other regions which had not yet done so would act on the invitation extended by General Assembly Resolution 2286 (XXII) to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II to that Treaty. It was encouraging to learn of the progress being made in negotiations to establish de-nuclearized zones in other parts of the world.

The Conference provided an opportunity to improve on the legal system established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Chilean Government attached great importance to measures designed to guarantee the safety of non-nuclear-weapon States from nuclear attack, and hoped that the Conference would agree on a satisfactory legal formula. One such formula might be the addition of a protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; but if that was not feasible at present, his delegation was open to other suggestions.
His delegation welcomed the Mexican working document on an international programme of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and had already found in it many acceptable ideas.

It would be absurd if a small minority of nations were to withhold from the majority the benefits of that new force, which could do much to improve the living conditions of under-privileged peoples. The question of access to nuclear technology and materials was, of course, complicated by the close relationship between the peaceful and the military development of nuclear energy. That merely meant that greater efforts must be made to find the right legal formulae; unless full use could be made of nuclear energy, the struggle to defeat under-development would be all the harder to win. He drew attention to the Secretary-General’s words on the subject at the 1st meeting.

In its endeavours to improve co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the first aim of the Conference should be to agree on an international programme; agenda item 14 provided a sound basis for such a programme. His delegation would prefer, in principle, that the programme should be executed by existing organizations: possibly by the International Atomic Energy Agency, given an increase in its financial resources and the necessary changes in its structure. The suggestion that the programme should be entrusted to the United Nations deserved consideration, along with other proposals, once it was clear exactly what work was involved and what resources Governments, particularly those of nuclear Powers, were prepared to contribute in fulfilment of the undertaking they had given to the world.

To discharge its duty, the Conference must at the very least reach agreements in principle and make specific recommendations to the General Assembly; the statements made during the debate encouraged the hope that the Governments represented would act as decisively and promptly as the situation required.
Mr. DÉE a DEH (Cameroon) said that his Government welcomed the convening of a Conference to find a way of averting nuclear annihilation and to establish co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Cameroon wished to be able to apply all forms of modern technology to its economic and social development; in order to do so it must rely upon sincere and unreserved international co-operation and strict respect for the sovereignty of every country.

The nuclear threat militated against such co-operation by keeping international relations in a constant state of tension. Side by side with inventions capable of providing happiness and prosperity for mankind, fearful weapons of mass destruction were developed. It was madness to continue the manufacture and stock-piling of such weapons. The time had come to begin a new era of co-operation in establishing a lasting peace and international security.

Cameroon's position on disarmament could be summarized as follows: firstly, all nuclear tests should be prohibited. Secondly, all existing nuclear weapons and devices should be destroyed by their possessors. Thirdly, the manufacture of nuclear weapons should cease, and nuclear arms should be renounced once and for all. Fourthly, nuclear information and technology should be made available to the non-nuclear States, and particularly to the developing countries, so as to enable them to accelerate their economic and social development; they should also be given assistance in putting the new knowledge to use. Fifthly, outer space and the ocean beds should be used solely for peaceful purposes. Sixthly, general and complete disarmament should be undertaken in order to create conditions of security and understanding in which all available resources and energies, including those released by disarmament, might be used for development and other peaceful purposes.

In addition, Cameroon strongly supported the establishment of nuclear-free zones. His country had been greatly encouraged by the
progress made in that direction in Latin America, and had supported General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI) calling upon Member States to consider Africa as a demilitarized zone. The recognition, in the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs of that resolution, that Africa should be kept clear of the ideological struggles between Powers and should give its uninterrupted attention to economic and social development should be followed by other positive steps to preserve the non-nuclear-weapon countries from the madness of others. The African States, for their part, had made it clear in the Organization of African Unity that they did not wish to have nuclear arms on their continent.

The measures he had mentioned necessitated a vast programme and prompt action. The agenda of the Conference was well designed to serve its two main purposes.

Cameroon had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in full awareness that its provisions were not commensurate with the scope and complexity of the problem. However, it was at least a step towards the removal of the nuclear threat; Cameroon would work with all like-minded countries for effective measures to that end.

It was encouraging to see that the majority of nuclear Powers were represented at the Conference; Cameroon earnestly appealed to them to embark resolutely and sincerely on a genuine programme of complete disarmament. They had often stated their willingness to do so, but their deeds had hitherto failed to allay the fears inspired in the world at large by the existence of nuclear weapons. It was to be hoped that the efforts of the Conference and the understanding and wisdom of the nuclear Powers would usher in a new era of peaceful cooperation among all countries.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE TWELFTH MEETING

held on Thursday, 12 September 1968, at 10.20 a.m.

President: Mr. Arshad HUSAIN  Pakistan
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 10) (continued)

Mr. ALHOLI (Finland) thought it was understandable that attention should be paid to the present international situation, which influenced the general atmosphere of the Conference. The international system did not yet, unfortunately, guarantee peace and security for all nations. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States was, however, a conference of co-operation, its principal task being to examine in a constructive spirit the problems common to all the non-nuclear-weapon States. His Government believed that the Conference might produce useful results for the international community. It did not see any contradiction in principle between the basic security preoccupations of the nuclear Powers and those of the non-nuclear-weapon States. It was in the interests of both groups of countries to prevent the incalculable risks that nuclear proliferation would involve for the whole of mankind.

The report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on nuclear weapons (A/6358) eloquently demonstrated the futility of attempts to increase national security through the acquisition of nuclear weapons. That truth should be brought home to public opinion in every country. His Government had publicized that report in Finland in accordance with the recommendation made to all Governments by the General Assembly.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty had not yet entered into force. The fact that it had been drafted, accepted by an overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations and signed by more than seventy States was nevertheless a remarkable achievement in the field of international relations. Despite the current difficulties in world politics, the impact of the Treaty should not be under-estimated. The Conference should endeavour to find ways and means of dispelling the doubts of those States which had not yet signed the Treaty. Finland had been one of the first countries to sign it and the Finnish
Government would submit it to Parliament for ratification.

Clearly, the existence of a minimum of understanding among the super Powers had been the prerequisite for the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation-Treaty. The nuclear Powers were, however, aware that the entry into force of the Treaty and the implementation of its provisions depended to a large extent on the confidence and co-operation of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

All parts of the Treaty should be implemented, those concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy as well as those concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and disarmament negotiations. The provisions of Security Council resolution 255 (1968) concerning the security assurances to be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should similarly be observed. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, that resolution and the relevant articles of the United Nations Charter constituted a new system of security assurances in the nuclear field.

Security risks and needs varied from country to country. Thus, a neutral country like Finland neither needed nor could accept guarantees other than those contained in the United Nations Charter. Finland’s neutrality was based on the firm determination of the Finnish Government and people to remain outside the conflicts of the world Powers.

It must be recognized that the basic principles of the Charter, whereby States must refrain from the use of force in their international relations or from intervention in the domestic affairs of other States did not yet govern international politics. Nevertheless, the application of those principles continued to be the goal towards which nations must strive. A sense of failure or frustration should not undermine their determination to reach that goal. The temporary obstacles to the relaxation of international tension should be overcome in a spirit of co-operation.
Consideration should be given to the apprehensions and doubts expressed by several delegations. The international situation involved unknown factors which might increase the need to seek appropriate measures to safeguard the security of the nations. New steps on the road to disarmament might be handicapped by the existing uncertainties in world politics. It was mainly for the nuclear Powers to find ways and means of renewing confidence in international security arrangements. No effort should be spared towards that end.

It was unfortunate that the prospects were darkening just when new arms control measures were most needed. That applied more especially to the prevailing situation in Europe. But the present difficulties had not lessened the need for regional arms control arrangements. The example given by the Latin American countries showed that such arrangements were possible. The arguments put forward by the President of Finland in May 1963 when he had proposed the establishment of a Scandinavian nuclear-free zone were still valid. The establishment of such zones was an effective measure and might do much to facilitate the solution of more far-reaching disarmament problems. Any arms control measure in Europe should be considered in the light of the needs of existing situations, and should not affect the political and military balance between the blocs.

During the discussions on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, special attention had been paid to the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The role of nuclear energy was becoming increasingly important in the world economy. The nuclear Powers had shown the way to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and several inventions essential to the development of such peaceful uses had been made as by-products of the development of nuclear weapons. That did not, however, mean that the economic benefits could be acquired only through the development of military activities. The undertaking given by non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons was not a
handicap to their economic development. The experience of Finland and other industrialized countries in the field of nuclear research showed that a knowledge of military technology was not essential in that connexion. The nuclear Powers were under an obligation to grant the developing countries assistance in the matter, as laid down in article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and all the industrialized countries shared that responsibility.

The Conference should not neglect the necessary preparatory work with a view to establishing the international framework for handling problems connected with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. With regard to the idea of setting up a new international body for that purpose, it seemed to him that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was already the competent body to carry out that task. If, at a later stage, it proved necessary to set up a new international body, the question could be reconsidered. It would be useful for the Conference to have a detailed picture of the Agency's present and future activities, so that it could give it all the support it needed. The forthcoming General Conference of IAEA would be able to consider all the practical aspects of the problem.

With reference to the question of nuclear arms control, his country had noted with great satisfaction the statements made concerning bilateral negotiations on an agreement to restrict strategic nuclear missile systems, both offensive and defensive. He hoped that, despite present difficulties, those negotiations would start as soon as possible, as they might make a decisive contribution towards halting the nuclear arms race.

Five years had elapsed since the conclusion, in Moscow, of the partial test ban Treaty. Unfortunately, no progress had been made towards achieving the discontinuance of "all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", as stated in the Preamble to that Treaty. Tests
in the atmosphere were taking place at an even faster rate, since not all countries had acceded to the Treaty. Underground tests of nuclear weapons were also very frequent. It was therefore of paramount importance that renewed efforts should be made to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

At its last session, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had decided to recommend the General Assembly to request the Secretary-General to appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. As such weapons constituted a danger to all mankind, it was necessary that the international community should be made aware of the possible effects of their use.

Mr. PELTZER (Argentina) said he thought that the main task of the Conference was to study the political and technological problems involved in the search for appropriate formulae to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had set itself the same task, but, in view of its limited composition, many States were unable to express their views in it. In other bodies such as the Preparatory Commission for the Non-nuclearization of Latin America, the task had been successfully accomplished, but such action concerned only limited geographical areas.

The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States provided an opportunity for the participating countries to submit constructive proposals for the establishment of a more satisfactory mode of international coexistence. Non-proliferation was one stage in the process of general disarmament under international control. The Conference should go further than the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The important point was that the renunciation of nuclear weapons should become general. The non-nuclear-weapon States had expressed their fixed intentions to renounce nuclear weapons either through international or regional
agreements, or through bilateral arrangements or unilateral declarations by authoritative sources. Those various procedures were equally effective in achieving the elimination of nuclear arms, and diversity of means did not rule out unity of goal.

Argentina had already defined its position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the basis of the experience gained during the formulation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, whose provisions made a vital contribution to the solution of various problems involved in non-dissemination agreements.

There were two basic assets which required protection: security and technological development. Security was the very cornerstone of the existence of sovereign States. That security could be ensured by general and complete disarmament under strict international control, including the elimination of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation was not an end in itself, but should lead to an international order in which the security of all was ensured. The reverse position would involve falling gradually into a form of nuclear feudalism in which unacceptable relationships of dependence would be established. In the absence of concrete measures of disarmament, non-proliferation would only "disarm the disarmed".

The second solution to the problem of security was the introduction of a safeguard system. That was an imperfect approach, which was temporarily acceptable but should not delay efforts to establish a satisfactory international order. Any safeguard system was, in the final analysis, based on the power of dissuasion, which involved a subjective process open to miscalculations. However, it was the only immediately applicable solution in the existing circumstances.

It was clear that non-proliferation measures aimed at creating conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace and security, but as every one was aware, many countries had no protection other than
the safeguards system provided for by Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and any concerted action by the members of the Council could be paralysed by exercise of the veto. Very recent events had shown that was so.

Non-proliferation presupposed a change in attitude and climate which benefited, in particular, the regions in which the great centres of power had confronted each other since the Second World War, and the Argentine Republic, which maintained close ties of friendship with the countries of those regions, could not remain indifferent in that connexion.

As the Argentine delegation had pointed out in the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Non-Proliferation Treaty must not be an instrument for the subordination of certain countries. A solution could be found only by the introduction of a genuine system of security those provisions would be juridically binding except in cases of individual and collective self-defence.

With respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, the States renouncing the production, acquisition and utilization of nuclear weapons should be entirely free to pursue peaceful nuclear activities. An international control system such as was provided for in the Treaty of Tlatelolco constituted an adequate guarantee that no State would violate the principles of non-proliferation, without the need to lay down prohibitions which would jeopardize freedom of research for peaceful purposes.

Modern technology, particularly in a field like nuclear energy, constituted one of the cornerstones of economic development and social advance. Peaceful nuclear explosions offered important possibilities and the right to undertake them under international control could not be prejudiced by measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Within the limits of its resources, Argentina was carrying out programmes
of co-operation in that field with many countries, especially other Latin American States, and it hoped that, thanks to a large-scale exchange of knowledge, it would be possible to use new discoveries to further the progress of mankind.

Argentina belonged to two denuclearized zones, one of which was defined in the Antarctic Treaty and the other in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In both cases, the circumstances peculiar to the areas had greatly facilitated the conclusion of the Treaties; in other areas, conditions were unfortunately less favourable. One of the prime conditions for the establishment of denuclearized zones was the maintenance of a strategic balance in the area and that condition was particularly important in areas where there had been frequent manifestations of international tension. That balance must be guaranteed in such a way that no State obtained strategic advantages contrary to the objective of security fixed by the regional denuclearization.

In conclusion, the Conference should be able, in defining its position on the essential problems of nuclear disarmament, to draw up measures which would translate the hopes placed in it into realities.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE THIRTEENTH MEETING

held on Thursday, 12 September 1968, at 3.25 p.m.

President:  Mr. Arshad HUSAIN Pakistan
later, Mr. RACOVESCU Romania
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 10) (continued)

Mr. Kim (Korea) said that, although the nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility for the security of nations and the progress of mankind, the non-nuclear-weapon States should be firm in the pursuit of their common goals: namely, their own security, nuclear disarmament and expansion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those goals could best be achieved by genuine understanding and co-operation between the two groups of States.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons marked a milestone on the road towards the genuine peace and security of mankind, but much remained to be done; the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States had not been fully assured by the Treaty, Security Council resolution 255 (1968) or the declaration by the three major nuclear-weapon States. For any country the safeguarding of its national security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and right of self-determination was a vital concern. That was particularly true of a country like Korea, a historic testing-ground of peace and freedom, where unprovoked armed attacks in violation of the 1953 Armistice Agreement were still almost daily occurrences.

Korea had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the belief that it would help to avert the dangers of the dissemination of nuclear-weapons while encouraging the widest use of nuclear energy for the economic and technical development of all peoples. That Treaty, however, was not an end in itself but merely a starting point for further measures in that field. Article IV of the Treaty was of special importance.

Although the guarantees embodied in Security Council resolution 255 (1968) were not absolute, Korea attached great importance to the fact that the resolution reaffirmed the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence.

With respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the main concern was that every nation that renounced the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons should be assured of full co-operation by the nuclear-weapon States in the field of nuclear research and development for peaceful uses. Appropriate steps should be taken as soon as possible to ensure that any benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to
non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty without discrimination. Article IV of the Treaty made it clear that the intention was to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy at both the national and the international level. Within a relatively short time nuclear energy would become a primary source of power. That prospect underlined the importance of international cooperation to the development of countries such as Korea which could not expect to rely exclusively on their national resources to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Korea had achieved rapid growth and modernization of its industries in recent years; since March 1962, when its first reactor had begun to operate, considerable results had been obtained in physics, chemistry, biology, agriculture and reactor engineering. Great efforts in nuclear power generation were being made in order to meet the increasing power demand from expanding industries.

It seemed clear that any State that produced a nuclear device for peaceful uses had the potential ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon, and only adequate safeguards could prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to military uses. It was to be hoped that impartial and effective safeguards would make progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy possible without weakening international nuclear arms control.

Mr. K.A. MANJUSH (India) said that the Conference was concerned with the problems of peace and development resulting from the spectacular advances in nuclear energy during the past quarter of a century. It was imperative to save mankind from the horrors of a nuclear holocaust and to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time it was necessary that nuclear energy, in all its forms, should be used to promote economic progress and growth, particularly in the developing areas of the world.

The Industrial Revolution had by-passed most of the southern hemisphere. After the Second World War, the hitherto under-developed world had begun to think in terms of vast industrialization programmes and agricultural modernization, but by that time the developed world had already leapt into the nuclear age. The developing nations did not wish to be left behind again. Their vast economic problems called for urgent and strenuous measures to enable them
to keep pace with the technological advances of the nuclear age. It was in that context that the Indian Government's policy of using nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes should be viewed.

As the President had observed in his inaugural address (1st meeting), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (resolution 2373(XXII)) could not be regarded as an absolute guarantee against the spread of nuclear weapons or as ensuring the availability to all nations of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. India had always maintained that any treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should concern itself with both horizontal and vertical proliferation and should not hinder the development of nuclear technology by all nations.

To take first the problem of peace, in the view of the Indian Government the real hope of security for non-nuclear-weapon States lay in nuclear disarmament. So long, however, as nuclear weapons remained in the armouries of a few countries, the nuclear-weapon States had a definite obligation to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States that their security would not be jeopardized by the use or threatened use of such weapons and that these weapons would not be used as instruments of pressure, intimidation or blackmail.

The Indian Government would welcome any steps that might be taken by the nuclear-weapon States in concert with non-nuclear-weapon States to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations in providing security. Any linking of security assurances to the signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or any other treaty, would, however, be contrary to the purposes and provisions of the United Nations Charter, which did not discriminate between the countries which might sign a particular treaty and those which might not. It was clearly the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States members of the Security Council to go to the assistance of any non-nuclear-weapon State threatened with or subjected to nuclear attack. To be credible, assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States should go beyond a mere declaration of intent. They should be
free from any ambiguity, from any impediment which might frustrate action by
the Security Council and from any discrimination towards any Member of the
United Nations. They should also guarantee prompt and effective action to
prevent the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons.

The security of the world could not be assured until States halted the
nuclear arms race and then proceeded to nuclear disarmament and, ultimately,
to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
It was a welcome development that the United States and the Soviet Union had
reached agreement, in principle, to hold bilateral talks on the limitation and
reduction of offensive strategic nuclear weapons, delivery systems and systems
of defence against ballistic missiles. As early as 1957, India had been of
the view that, if delivery vehicles were eliminated, the nuclear weapon
capacity for harm would be greatly reduced. Despite the growing concern of
the world, the nuclear arms race, rather than abating, was entering a new and
more dangerous phase. The lack of restraint in the development of ABM's and
offensive missiles equipped with MIRV's, and the fear that the Moscow Test Ban
Treaty might have to be broken in order to test a larger ABM system, was likely
to render step-by-step disarmament, and even the conclusion of non-armament
agreements such as a comprehensive test ban treaty, extremely difficult. It
was to be hoped, therefore, that the proposed bilateral discussions would take
place soon and would be fruitful.

A cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes
would be the most significant step towards a complete stoppage of the produc-
tion of nuclear weapons. The difficulty of verification could no longer be
cited as a reason for not reaching agreement on that measure, since an agree-
ment on control already existed and the obligations of the nuclear-weapon
States in respect of inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) could be made the same as those of States not having nuclear weapons.
An agreement on a cut-off in the further production of fissionable material
for weapon purposes should therefore be concluded without delay and be related
to a total cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
India had always attached the highest importance to a comprehensive test ban treaty. Despite the fact that the urgent need to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" was underlined in the undertaking given in the Moscow Test Ban Treaty by the three nuclear-weapon Powers, no progress had been made in that direction during the past five years. In their joint memorandum of 26 August 1968, the eight non-aligned countries members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had noted with concern that it had not so far been possible to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty and had urged that renewed and urgent efforts should be made to conclude such a treaty. India had consistently been of the view that, whatever might be the differences on the question of verification, all nuclear weapon tests should be immediately discontinued. Negotiations could then be undertaken to resolve outstanding differences with a view to making the existing partial treaty a comprehensive one. At the same time, steps should be taken to consolidate the success achieved by the international community in regard to a ban on tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water by inducing the States which had not yet done so to sign the partial test ban treaty. There was no justification for any action which might erode the partial test ban treaty. The proposals made by India and other non-aligned countries concerning verification of a comprehensive test ban should be studied without further delay.

The proposed convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would have considerable moral and psychological value and would help to establish confidence among nations. The Government of India was of the opinion that it would be of definite advantage if the nuclear-weapon Powers were to accept the principles embodied in General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI). To be effective, the proposed convention would have to be supported by all States, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons. Some States had expressed the view that, in the absence of means of control or measures of disarmament, the proposed convention would undermine their security. All such matters could be considered when a start was made on the drafting of the proposed convention.
Urgent consideration should be given also to the question of conventional disarmament and a renunciation of the use of force in international relations. The threat to world peace from conventional arms was as serious as that from nuclear weapons, and both questions should be considered simultaneously. The Indian delegation supported the views expressed on that subject at the 5th meeting by the representative of Yugoslavia.

An agreement on nuclear-weapon-free zones must provide for verification to ensure that no clandestine manufacture, receipt or storage of nuclear weapons occurred in such zones. Agreements on denuclearized zones would also require that nuclear-weapon Powers undertook to respect the status of such zones and to lend their full co-operation in implementing arrangements concerning their establishment. It was in keeping with that policy that India had voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions 1652 (XVI), 1911 (XVIII), 2033 (XX) and 2286 (XXII). The creation of denuclearized zones would help to reduce international tension. As, however, conditions for the establishment of such zones differed from continent to continent, it was not possible to devise a single formula or lay down general principles covering all cases. In Asia, for instance, it would not be possible to have a denuclearized zone unless China formed part of it.

An important item on the agenda was that relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation had already expressed the view that all States should have free access to the equipment, materials and knowledge necessary for the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy, and that the nuclear-weapon States should assist the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly the developing countries, in the development and application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As nuclear technology was destined to become a potent instrument of economic development and social progress, it would obviously be unjust for the greater part of the world to remain fully dependant on the good will of a few nuclear Powers for the knowledge and application of that technology. Such a situation would increase international tension and widen the existing economic and technological gap. It was therefore to be hoped that the Conference, together with its efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, would endorse the principle of the widest possible utilization of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis. His Government would co-operate fully in all such efforts.

Another important item on the agenda related to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. As had been stressed in the joint memorandum submitted by the eight non-aligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on 26 August 1968, that subject was closely linked with the question of a comprehensive test ban treaty. First, there should be a total ban on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The development of the technology of nuclear excavation projects must be promoted, not by modifying the Moscow Test Ban Treaty, but by a comprehensive treaty and a separately negotiated agreement incorporated into the international regime for peaceful nuclear explosions. The regime should be established within the framework of IAEA on a non-discriminatory basis and should ensure the right of all States, particularly developing States, to use the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. IAEA, which had been established for the sole purpose of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, was the organization most suited to undertake that responsibility. It must be remembered that the Agency provided services on request and that its Director-General had already offered full collaboration in that respect.

In its deliberations on peace and security, on the one hand, and development and progress on the other, the Conference should seek solutions based on the principles of sovereign equality of nations, non-interference in their internal affairs, renunciation of the use of force and non-discrimination and equality of opportunity. It was in the interests of the international community that the non-nuclear-weapon States were being encouraged to remain in that category and it was only through solutions based on those sound principles that progress could be achieved.

Mr. Nacovescu (Romania), Vice-President, took the Chair.

Mr. KIDRON (Israel) said that Israel had consistently supported both general and nuclear disarmament. It had been hoped that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States would take place in time to influence the discussion of the draft text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, so that the views of the non-nuclear-weapon States,
in particular those not represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, might be reflected more accurately. As a result of the delay in its convening, however, the Conference now had before it the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the identical declaration by three of the nuclear-weapon Powers, and was in a position to examine those three instruments in the light of the existing international situation in order to assess their political, security and economic implications for the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty was deliberately designed to perpetuate a situation in which five States, only three of which were associated with the Treaty, were recognized as nuclear-weapon States, in a position of power and privilege, while all other States were to be relegated for at least twenty-five years, and perhaps for ever, to an inferior position. In such a situation, the anxieties of the non-nuclear-weapon States could not be allayed by mere declarations which did not cover all the problems to be faced now and in the future. Although it was claimed that the three documents, while not embodying any binding commitment, had a moral authority, there would be greater confidence in their value if the non-nuclear-weapon States could be certain that those who subscribed to the documents accepted without reserve the principle set forth in the last paragraph of the preamble of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with respect to the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

Although all States were now living in the nuclear age, their political and security problems varied, and to many the immediate threat was from conventional rather than nuclear weapons. Consequently the Conference should recognize the dangers to world peace and to the political independence and territorial integrity of States from conventional as well as nuclear weapons, and concern with the nuclear threat should not confer legitimacy by default on other means of mass destruction. There was a striking inconsistency between flouting the United Nations Charter by threatening and attempting to destroy a State by the use of conventional weapons while at the same time making resounding declarations of support for nuclear non-proliferation.
In addition to their immediate interest in obtaining satisfactory assurances against direct threats to their security, the non-nuclear-weapon States were vitally concerned that more progress should be made towards general and complete disarmament, both nuclear and other, as the only way of guaranteeing the security of all States. The main responsibility lay with the great Powers, the nuclear-weapon States, but other countries could contribute, for example by means of regional arrangements. General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) provided in operative paragraph 2(b) that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. The most important obligation, that of achieving nuclear disarmament as an essential step towards general and complete disarmament, was obviously not shared between the two groups. Despite amendments to the preamble and to article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the disarmament obligations of the Treaty constituted not a binding commitment but an undertaking dependent on "good faith". Good faith, however, could flourish only in a climate of international confidence in which the Charter principle of respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of all States was rigorously observed by all States. Any failure to do so set back the cause of disarmament and affected the security of every State. Israel, like many other countries, was deeply concerned with the security question and looked to the Conference to ensure that the Non-Proliferation Treaty would contribute to the national security of the non-nuclear-weapon States individually and of all States collectively, and would not derogate from that security.

The Conference must also ensure that all countries, without discrimination, could enjoy the benefits of the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy. Those benefits now included the generation of low-cost electric power, desalinization of water and applications in medicine, agriculture, industry and hydrology, while in the foreseeable future atomic energy could be used for large-scale earth moving for the construction of dams and canals, for geological exploration and for mining and the extraction of petroleum. Research and development must be within the reach of all and their results accessible to all, with due regard for the dangers of industrial espionage. The poorer and less developed a country, the greater the potential benefits available to it, from the use of
nuclear power and the greater the obligation to ensure that those benefits were available to it without discrimination. Discrimination could take many forms, including secrecy over the results of research and development, or placing conditions on the provision of information and materials. Past experience respecting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy gave no assurance that there would be no discrimination against any Member of the United Nations and its agencies. Many speakers had suggested that the Non-Proliferation Treaty imposed upon the non-nuclear-weapon States restrictions from which the nuclear-weapon States were exempt, thus giving the latter inevitable advantages in the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy. Fears of being relegated to second-class status with respect to the non-military as well as the military aspects of atomic energy could only be allayed by a system of safeguards, applicable equally to nuclear and to non-nuclear-weapon States, which did not unduly interfere with legitimate nuclear activity for peaceful purposes. That system had yet to be achieved. Thus far the scientific and financial effort devoted to peaceful uses had been far too small, particularly when compared with the vast resources in money and manpower diverted to the production and perfection of weapons of total destruction. If mankind was not to live in fear of annihilation, that inhuman imbalance must be corrected.

A number of proposals had been made to give substance to the work of the Conference. With respect to the suggestion that permanent machinery should be established to supervise and administer the conclusions of the Conference pending the convening of another conference in the future, Israel had an open mind. It felt, however, that a word of warning was in place, lest the transfer to the vital field of disarmament of the regional group system, with its often discriminatory effects, should stultify United Nations work in that field as it had in some others.

To sum up, the Conference must first, by assuring the universal application of the Charter of the United Nations, inspire all States with confidence that there could be no threat to their existence or independence from the use of force of any kind, conventional or nuclear. Secondly, it must endeavour to devise means to ensure that all States, especially the developing countries, would have access to nuclear research and development and to their results, as
also to materials, equipment and information, without any form of discrimina-
tion. If the Conference stood firm on principle and faced the realities, a
vital advance could be made in the quest for general and complete disarmament
and for a universal system of security that would ensure peace, prosperity
and survival for all States and for all peoples.

Mr. MWAANGA (Zambia) remarked that the items on the agenda of the
Conference were all related to subjects which complemented or supplemented
the main provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Had the Treaty not been
dealt with in such regrettable haste by the General Assembly before the hold-
ing of the present Conference, there would have been a better chance of reach-
ing an agreement embodying all the minimum requirements laid down in General
Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).

He would not repeat his Government’s views on the Treaty, which were well
known, but it was impossible to discuss the security of non-nuclear-weapon
States without making direct reference to the provisions of the Treaty. In
the opinion of his Government, the Treaty would serve only to curb the
proliferation of nuclear-weapon States and would do nothing to curb the
proliferation of nuclear weapons themselves. It was above all the failure
to achieve general and complete disarmament which was undermining the security
of all nations, as had been clearly illustrated by recent events in both
Europe and Asia.

Zambia was situated in a region of the world where the political situ-
tion was extremely explosive and it was surrounded by hostile reactionary
forces. Zambia’s territorial sovereignty had on several occasions been
violated, but, despite appeals to the United Nations no assistance had been
forthcoming to correct the situation. Despite that real menace, however, his
Government had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which, as it stood,
was worthless as a guarantee of security to both nuclear and non-nuclear-
weapon States. It was therefore imperative that the present Conference should
devise a new formula which would inspire confidence in all States seeking
protection.
General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) laid down a number of reasonable minimum requirements to be included in any meaningful non-proliferation treaty. The wishes of the General Assembly as expressed in that resolution had been completely disregarded in the text of the Treaty. No curb was placed on the continuing production of both nuclear and conventional weapons by the nuclear-weapon States, whereas the non-nuclear-weapon States were prevented from using nuclear weapons. The very mention in Security Council resolution 255 (1968) of assistance to be afforded to any victim of "an act or .... a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used" clearly indicated that there was no binding obligation on nuclear-weapon States not to use nuclear weapons. Neither could the Treaty conceivably be described as even a modest step towards disarmament; indeed, the fact that not all the nuclear Powers had signed it and that some countries had voted against it while others had abstained had led to increased distrust between States, instead of to an easing of international tension. The disarmament negotiations must at all costs be prevented from deteriorating into exercises of political propaganda.

The Treaty would serve no useful purpose unless the obligations it placed on the non-nuclear-weapon States were reciprocated by binding commitments on the part of the nuclear-Powers Parties to the Treaty. His delegation advocated the adoption by the Conference of a resolution citing the necessary provisions of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) and recommending the re-examination of the text of the Treaty by the General Assembly in the light of recent events, with a view to either strengthening or supplementing the present text with a protocol or convention incorporating the recommendations of the present Conference.

With regard to security guarantees, the problem before the Conference was how the security of non-nuclear-weapon States could best be ensured. The inclusion of that item in the agenda was in itself an admission that the security assurances offered by the three nuclear Powers were ambiguous, misleading and of doubtful value. The wording of Security Council resolution 255 (1968) was vague and implied that only States which had signed and
ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be entitled to assistance if they were victims of nuclear aggression. Although that appeared to be a security guarantee offered outside the necessary machinery of the Charter, the resolution stated also that any assistance by the nuclear Powers Parties to the Treaty would be provided in accordance with the procedures laid down in the Charter; it was somewhat difficult to reconcile those two points. His delegation hoped that the Conference would consider adopting a resolution citing General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) and recommending the drafting by the General Assembly of a convention under which all nuclear-weapon States Members of the United Nations would renounce the production, acquisition and use of conventional and nuclear weapons against both non-nuclear-weapon States and each other. The convention should also provide for the application of sanctions against aggressor States on the decision of the General Assembly, using the "Uniting for Peace" formula. The adoption of such a convention would enable regional agreements for nuclearization to be dispensed with.

His delegation was concerned about the apparent abrogation by articles III, IV and V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of article 3 of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which provided that the Agency should "encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses". In the view of his delegation, the provisions of the Treaty must in no circumstances be allowed to prejudice the application of the IAEA Statute. The Agency, in granting economic development assistance to developing countries, had always followed the principle that such assistance should not be accompanied by foreign interference in the internal affairs of the countries concerned and should be provided as far as possible in the form desired by those countries. His delegation hoped that the Agency would continue to be guided by those principles and that the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and of future agreements would not prejudice the Agency's action by allowing nuclear strategy politics to influence decisions on technical assistance to developing countries. His delegation further recommended that all future programmes should include a reaffirmation of those principles, thus strengthening the important work done by the Agency in the cause of peace.
His Government appealed to all nations of the world to further the cause of complete and general disarmament by making every effort to improve international relations and to create a favourable climate for meaningful disarmament negotiations. Failing that, the grave danger of a nuclear destruction would continue to menace the world and any security guarantees would be meaningless. Culy increased trust and harmony would prevent the disarmament process from grinding to a halt, which was not the wish of any of the participants in the Conference.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE FOURTEENTH MEETING

held on Friday, 13 September 1968, at 10.20 a.m.

President: Mr. Arshad HUSAIN Pakistan
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 10) (continued)

Mr. LONGERSTAIE (Belgium) recalled that Belgium and its Benelux partners had stated that the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and their earlier international commitments were not incompatible. Belgium had signed the Treaty because it was aware of the need quickly to halt the horizontal proliferation and dissemination of nuclear weapons, but it regarded that as only one stage along the way to general and total disarmament.

The commitments made under the Treaty by the non-nuclear-weapon States and the nuclear Powers differed in scope, and the Treaty should not institutionalize that inequality. Measures should therefore be taken as soon as possible gradually to eliminate the nuclear-weapons monopoly through disarmament and to make it possible for the non-nuclear-weapon States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The solution depended on the nuclear Powers, since they held what was to be ceded.

Hence, those Powers were undertaking, by virtue of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in their capacity as permanent members of the Security Council, a responsibility which other States must remind them of, either at the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, at those of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or in other international bodies such as the present Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States or the reviewing conferences provided for by the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. The non-nuclear-weapon States could assert their rights without need for the establishment of a new body and, in the case of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it appeared superfluous to establish a new agency when the objective of IAEA was already to enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace and prosperity throughout the world.

The nuclear Powers, and particularly the two largest among them, must more than ever devote all their authority to safeguarding world security, not by exercising their domination, but by guaranteeing that all members of the international community might develop in perfect freedom and according to their own vocations, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty only added to their awesome responsibilities. The two great Powers must in particular jointly guarantee the security of Europe if that continent, from which war had twice
spread round the world, was definitively to consolidate the precarious peace which it had enjoyed since the beginning of the nuclear age.

Belgium was convinced that all countries would, like it, accede to the Treaty and would then wish to realize all its potentialities. Belgium had decided neither to produce nor to use nuclear weapons, not as an act of blind and comfortable renunciation, but in a spirit of confidence, which it hoped the facts would not prove unjustified.

Mr. CURBAY AYALA (Colombia) considered that the Conference discussions should not become a repetition of those preceding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The latter was not a perfect treaty, but it had been signed by twice as many States as needed to ensure its entry into force, and the Conference would not be able to modify it.

His delegation considered that the Conference should not deviate from the general lines of the Treaty. A political confrontation between the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon States should be avoided, and an attempt should be made to improve co-operation between the two groups.

Moreover, no decision should be taken which could render further accessions to the Treaty more difficult, or hinder any attempt to make a region a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

In opposing nuclear armaments, the non-nuclear-weapon States had been acting in conformity with the Treaty, and it was not up to them to make the principal contribution to the strengthening of world peace. Before the conclusion of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation, certain States, such as those of Latin America, had included in their regional convention even severer provisions against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was not impossible that States desiring to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones might decide to forbid the emplacement of nuclear weapons on their territories. There was still a long way to go between the Treaty on Non-Proliferation and the objective of general and complete disarmament under international control. There was no way of knowing when the nuclear-weapon Powers would be in a position to carry out the obligations laid down in article VI of the Treaty.

Clearly, the non-nuclear-weapon States were not responsible for the international tensions resulting from the fear of nuclear aggression or the threat
of such aggression. Those tensions should be eliminated, first of all through a formal undertaking by the major Powers to refrain, whatever the circumstances, from violating basic international principles. The main anxiety of present generations arose from the fear of nuclear confrontation - which, though improbable, was unfortunately possible. The subsequent steps taken should be those laid down in article VI of the Treaty.

The Colombian delegation felt that, if the nuclear-weapon Powers were to decide to undertake to refrain from committing nuclear aggression or threatening such aggression, it would not than be necessary for them to offer assistance to other States against that type of aggression. That reasoning would be just as valid in the event of the conclusion of an agreement by the five nuclear-weapon Powers on that crucially important problem. So long as there were nuclear-weapon Powers not covered by the agreement, Security Council resolution 255 (1968) would be fully justified.

His delegation regretted that the nuclear-weapon Powers signatories to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation had manifested their intention of assisting only those victims of an act or a threat of nuclear aggression which were also Parties to the Treaty. In his delegation's view, that guarantee should cover all States. It was understandable that technical assistance for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be given only to States Parties to the Treaty, but it was not fair to refuse succour to a country running the risk of being destroyed by atomic weapons, on the ground that it had not ratified the Treaty. It was to be hoped that that defect in the said Security Council resolution would be remedied.

The possibility should not be ruled out of a meeting for the purpose of discussing - preferably within the framework of the United Nations - the drafting of an international agreement establishing a surer system of guarantees than that provided for in resolution 255 (1968).

The Colombian delegation was persuaded that, as the nuclear-weapon Powers progressed on the road to a halt in the production of nuclear weapons and offered solid guarantees of security to the other States, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would be accepted more and more widely. Failing a system of adequate guarantees, States would be tempted to seek
outside the Treaty those essential guarantees needed to prevent violations of their territorial integrity or their political sovereignty.

The Conference, and then the United Nations General Assembly, could make known to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament their wish that urgent attention should be given to the study of the other agreements which must be concluded in the complex field of disarmament.

To help halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Conference could recommend the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones; that would lead to an increase in the number of States renouncing the manufacture or possession of such weapons.

The Colombian delegation considered that the working document submitted by the Mexican delegation (A/CONF.35/DOC.16) was a valuable contribution to the work of the Conference. It might perhaps be desirable to examine the possibility of giving preference, in considering requests for technical assistance, to those from less developed countries which had agreed to form nuclear-weapon-free zones; the spirit of articles IV and VII of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation would thus be more effectively harmonized.

An important problem to be considered was the designation of the international body to be responsible for safeguarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Those safeguards would carry all the more weight if the nuclear-weapon Powers were to accept them, as indeed the United States and United Kingdom had promised to do, for all their nuclear activities, save those relating to their national security.

The international body applying the safeguards should be above all suspicion of political partiality or discrimination. His delegation considered that the most suitable body in that respect would be IAEA, within whose framework the safeguards could be applied in a satisfactory manner. His delegation did not favour the creation of a new body and felt that the IAEA should be adapted to the conditions set out in the Treaty on Non-Proliferation, so that non-nuclear-weapon States would be ensured adequate representation in it. An international programme could be drawn up, in the framework of IAEA, for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. His delegation was not proposing that the agency's orientation should be modified, or that the number of
Governors should be increased, but it did feel that requests for technical assistance under that programme should be studied by an independent committee in which non-nuclear-weapon States would be adequately represented.

It was in the interest of all States to strengthen IAEA. The lack of funds sorely hampered the Agency's activities in the field of technical assistance, and it was essential that it should have sufficient funds to carry out its tasks in new fields of activity. International co-operation in the field of nuclear energy should not be confined to the mere supply of technical assistance; it was also necessary to give considerable credits to States requesting such technical assistance. On the world level, the time had come to commence nuclear planning, which would be an essential complementary component of economic planning.

Finally, his delegation supported the idea expressed, among others, by Uruguay and Italy, that the historic dialogue, which had begun in the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be continued directly or through the intermediary of a committee.

Mr. MISSALLATI (Libya) said that in the past two decades the world had seen enormous progress in science and technology and it was safe to assume that within the next decade scientific achievement would go beyond all imagination. Man had already walked in space and would soon follow the instruments he had sent to the moon and other planets. Despite those achievements, however, man had not yet achieved the one thing which was essential for his existence - peace and security from the destruction, in a few seconds or minutes, by nuclear or super-nuclear weapons which threatened mankind. It was therefore the duty of all nations, great and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, to accept their responsibility in the common task of ensuring peace and security for mankind.

His Government had signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which had been a bold step towards general and complete disarmament. The present Conference was another bold step along the same long and thorny road.

It was a source of satisfaction for the non-nuclear-weapon States to see the major nuclear Powers agree on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That Treaty had in fact been preceded by other important international instruments of
peace, such as the Moscow Treaty of 1963 on a partial nuclear test ban, the 1967 Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the unilateral declarations made in 1964 by the United States and the Soviet Union that they intended to reduce their production of fissionable materials for military purposes. However, the small countries were still urging the great Powers to give more concrete guarantees and agree to further concessions.

He repeated the appeal, made by his delegation in the First Committee of the General Assembly in December 1967, for prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the complete prohibition of nuclear tests and the destruction of all stocks of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles.

The Governments which had signed the Treaty on Non-Proliferation, thereby renouncing their right to produce or own nuclear weapons, needed more guarantees of their safety. The guarantees given in the resolution adopted by the Security Council were not enough. The Treaty on Non-Proliferation should be followed by other treaties banning all nuclear explosions for military purposes, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and banning the production of all kinds of nuclear weapons.

The agenda of the Conference included some very important items. Referring to item 11, he asked the nuclear Powers to take all the necessary measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against those States.

In connexion with agenda item 12, he expressed the hope that treaties similar to the one banning nuclear weapons in Latin America would be concluded in other parts of the world, particularly in Africa.

He hoped that the Conference would achieve positive results in regard to the issues raised in agenda item 13.

Agenda item 14 and its sub-items called for a programme of co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the representative of a developing country, he would support any technical assistance programme in the field of nuclear energy which would help developing countries to ensure the welfare of their peoples. He recommended that the financial and material resources of IAEA be increased to enable it to expand its activities to meet the needs of developing countries. Libya, having a vast desert, was particularly
interested in the Agency's studies of the possibility of providing drinking water by the desalination of sea water with power from nuclear reactors. The very useful activities and safeguard system of IAEA could be of great assistance to countries in their economic and social development.

*The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.*
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE FIFTEENTH MEETING

held on Friday, 13 September 1968, at 3.25 p.m.

President Mr. Arshad HUSAIN Pakistan
GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 10) (concluded)

Mr. GAUCI (Malta) said that the deliberations of the Conference could be considered a continuation of the discussions which had preceded the adoption by a large majority, of General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Before being brought before the General Assembly, the draft Treaty had been introduced in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by its two Co-Chairmen. That draft had been an improvement on previous ones in that it had incorporated some of the suggestions made by members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and accepted by the Co-Chairmen, with a view to ensuring a mutual balance of responsibilities in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX).

As there had not been sufficient time for further study of the text, which - in the view of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee - might have been further improved, it had been submitted as it stood to the General Assembly. After a long debate, during which conflicting views had been expressed, the feeling had prevailed that the text, although imperfect, represented a first step towards nuclear disarmament; the Treaty as drafted, with minor modifications, had thus been commended to the attention of Member States. Although almost eighty Governments had signed it, no ratifications had yet been forthcoming; that, together with the fact that a number of countries - including some members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and two of the nuclear Powers - had not signed it, indicated that further study was needed before the remaining doubts and preoccupations could be removed. One of the tasks of the Conference was to indicate where and how the necessary improvements could be made.

Criticism of the Treaty had centred mainly round the vital question of security for non-nuclear-weapon States. The main purpose of the Treaty was to stabilize the number of States possessing nuclear weapons and thus prevent a bad situation from becoming worse; resolution 2373 (XXII) had therefore been supported by his Government despite its imperfections, in the hope that the Treaty would not only curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons but also, by virtue of the obligations it placed on the nuclear-weapon States, serve as a
first step towards the cessation of the arms race. If the nuclear-weapon States continued to develop and accumulate nuclear arms, it might prove difficult for other Powers to refrain indefinitely from following suit; the responsibility of ensuring the viability of the Treaty clearly rested with the nuclear-weapon States which, because of the restrictions accepted by the non-nuclear-weapon States, had the power to subordinate the interests of the international community to their own national policies, if they so desired. In view of the urgent need for action, the slow rate of progress so far achieved could not but cause concern; indeed, the hopes of a moratorium on the development of anti-ballistic missile systems now seemed to be fading.

Certain areas of disarmament appeared to offer prospects of agreement on partial measures, pending the achievement of the ultimate goal, general and complete disarmament. It was reasonable, for example, to expect the nuclear Powers to reciprocate the concessions made under the Treaty by the non-nuclear-weapon States by freezing production of the delivery systems most dangerous to smaller countries and eventually scrapping such systems.

Now that the difficult negotiations which had led up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been concluded, his delegation hoped that real and rapid progress would be made in discussion of the disarmament questions on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Even limited progress on some measures would create the favourable psychological climate which was so sorely needed at present. In that respect, the responsibility for positive and early action rested almost exclusively with the major Powers, which must act speedily if they really wished to prevent the further spread of nuclear weaponry.

The non-nuclear-weapon States could make a modest but positive contribution towards solving the problems relating to their security. The Conference provided those States with the opportunity of making their preoccupations known and putting forward realistic proposals for urgent consideration by the international community. Participants in the Conference were united in the common aim of eliminating the threat of nuclear destruction and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
There was general agreement that the security guarantees offered by the three nuclear Powers, although constituting a step in the right direction, did not fully meet the preoccupations of the majority of States. The non-nuclear-weapon States would never be in total security while nuclear weapons existed. However, the Treaty and the accompanying Security Council resolution provided a useful basis for further negotiations in that it established a community of interests between at least three of the nuclear-weapon States. There was little doubt that the preoccupations and concerns of the major Powers prevailed in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament; that was natural, and perhaps even desirable, since the main responsibility for world peace lay with those Powers. Equally important, however, was the necessity to take full account of the vital interests and right to independent existence of smaller countries. It therefore appeared desirable that conferences such as the present one should, as provided in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, be held periodically for the purpose of reviewing the progress made in the implementation of disarmament measures agreed to by nuclear-weapon States on the recommendation of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, as such measures frequently had a profound effect on the interests of small countries. Such conferences should be preceded by a meeting of non-nuclear-weapon States at which the latter could adopt a common stand on matters in respect of which their vital interests had not been sufficiently taken into account. Such meetings would facilitate subsequent discussions in wider forums such as the General Assembly, the principal organ for discussion of disarmament questions.

The problems relating to security were complex and they varied according to circumstances and geographical situations. A comprehensive survey of these problems and the formulation of specific recommendations would require careful study by each country, and more time would elapse before agreed measures could be implemented; in that respect too, the holding of periodic conferences to review progress would be useful. In the meantime, groups of States in different regions might usefully discuss their particular security problems, with a view to devising short and long-term plans and reaching agreement on measures calculated to ease tension and increase trust and co-operation in the region.
Any security guarantees extended by the nuclear-weapon States must be sufficiently flexible to cover cases of violation of a State's integrity through the use of any kind of military force, including conventional weapons, and to ensure respect for the sovereignty of States as embodied in the United Nations Charter and endorsed by numerous General Assembly resolutions. Nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike must commit themselves to refrain from the use of force across national boundaries and to prevent others from committing such acts of force. Recent events had highlighted the necessity for more comprehensive and binding guarantees to ensure the independence and territorial integrity of smaller countries.

His delegation had warmly welcomed the establishment on the South American continent of the first inhabited nuclear-weapon free zone; it was to be hoped that similar steps would be taken in other regions. The nuclear Powers should encourage such initiatives and accord full recognition to nuclear-weapon-free zones established under treaties endorsed by the General Assembly. The conclusion of treaties on a regional basis would do much to ease international tension and alleviate the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation or confrontation.

It was also encouraging to note the increasing awareness of the dangers which accompanied the production and possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and of the inadequacy of existing international agreements in that respect. His delegation would continue to express concern on that question as well as on those relating to military uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor and the dimensions and effects of the conventional arms race.

His delegation welcomed the provision in Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty concerning contribution to "development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty"; however, that provision was not sufficiently specific, particularly with regard to the special needs of developing countries. It was to be hoped that the discussion in the Conference would help to clarify the matter.
The problems before the Conference were the symptoms of a disease, namely, the fear, mistrust and injustice created by the failure to solve the world's major political problems, particularly those arising from out-dated situations and conflicting ideological objectives. Failure to solve those problems meant that peoples were being denied their inherent right to unity, freedom, security and peace, and that feelings of discontent and resentment — the real causes of insecurity — were rife. Until those problems could be solved, a just world order and peaceful coexistence would never be achieved. Only the political will still seemed to be lacking, yet time was getting short.

Mr. BENGAZEI (Tunisia) said that the report by the nuclear experts (A/6858) had made clear the terrible danger of nuclear destruction which threatened the whole of mankind. The world was also threatened with the less known but fearful dangers of bacteriological and chemical weapons. Scientific and technical advances had given the great Powers access to those awesome forces of destruction, and the tensions that existed between those Powers had already brought the world more than once to the edge of the abyss. Such a situation must never be allowed to recur in the future.

The alternative was nuclear disarmament. Patient effort had led to a number of limited agreements that were nevertheless of great value because they represented steps towards the goal of denuclearization and nuclear disarmament. Perhaps the most notable of those agreements was the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It had a number of shortcomings, to which Tunisia had drawn attention in the General Assembly on 20 May 1968, in particular the surrender on the part of the non-nuclear Powers of some degree of sovereignty without any adequate quid pro quo by the nuclear Powers. Nevertheless, Tunisia had considered that it was worth some nominal sacrificio to see the two super-Powers take the first steps towards real disarmament.

At the meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at Cairo in 1964, African Heads of States had declared their intention of concluding an international agreement under United Nations auspices not to manufacture or possess nuclear arms, and that declaration had been supported and supplemented by General Assembly resolution 2033 (XXII) on the denuclearization of Africa.
Tunisia had consistently condemned the arms race and its dangerous effects both on international relations and on economic and social development. At the twenty-second session of the General Assembly it had expressed the view that it would be completely inconsistent for a developing country to have the ability to destroy millions of men with nuclear weapons while at the same time it was incapable of protecting its citizens against hunger and poverty. The developing countries could not remain indifferent to the squandering of astronomic sums on the arms race while development needs went unheeded.

The Governments and peoples of the world were becoming ever more sharply aware of the atomic threat. That was why over eighty States had agreed to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty despite all its imperfections. If the Treaty was properly applied it would mean the beginning of a programme that could lead eventually to a halt to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the undertaking of negotiations, as envisaged in article VI, relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The shortcomings of the Treaty were all too familiar. Firstly, only three of the five nuclear Powers were parties to the Treaty, and secondly the Treaty required the non-nuclear Powers to renounce the acquisition of weapons which they did not at present possess, without requiring any corresponding prior disarmament by the nuclear Powers, or any undertaking on their part not to use nuclear weapons against those not possessing them. That was not consistent with the requirements in operative paragraph 2(b) of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XXII) that the Treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. It should be one of the tasks of the present Conference or of subsequent meetings to seek means of ensuring such an acceptable balance. He hoped that the proposals put forward would result in the drafting of additions to the Treaty providing the guarantees that the non-nuclear Powers had every right to claim from the nuclear Powers: Tunisia was confident that the Conference would mark an important stage in the efforts of the international community to dissipate the nuclear threat and to harness the might of atomic energy in the service of peace, progress and world co-operation.
Mr. ALLAF (Syria) said that his country had been among the first to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which, despite its imperfections, provided hope of a possible containment of nuclear terror and represented a first step towards a restriction of membership of the nuclear club. The fact that some eighty countries had signed the Treaty proved clearly that most nations were determined to save themselves and mankind from nuclear suicide, no matter what the cost. It was perhaps too late to remedy the main shortcomings of the Treaty, namely, a lack of adequate guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, and too soon to amend it under the provisions of its article VIII. It was to be hoped, nevertheless, that all the nuclear-weapon Powers, whether parties to the Treaty or not, would undertake specific commitments concerning the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and not confine themselves to mere declarations of intent. The reasons why two great nuclear Powers had refused to sign the Treaty were understandable. However, since any commitments entered into by the nuclear Powers would clearly be independent from and outside the Treaty, they should in no way be affected by any nuclear Power’s attitude with respect to the Treaty. It should not be difficult to give an undertaking, either "negative" – not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States – or "positive" – to assist any non-nuclear weapon State attacked or threatened with attack by nuclear weapons – to those States which had renounced the acquisition, production and possession of nuclear weapons and which had no foreign-controlled nuclear weapons on their territory.

All States possessing nuclear weapons should be co-operating in efforts to save the world from annihilation. It was regrettable, therefore, that because of the ridiculous situation whereby it was deprived of its right to membership in the United Nations, the People’s Republic of China was not represented at the Conference. It was to be hoped that at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, the question of the membership of the People’s Republic of China would be considered in the light of what it could mean in the efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and secure disarmament and not from the standpoint of selfish national policies.
The United Nations and the Security Council must remain the core of any security-keeping formula agreed upon between the nuclear and non-nuclear States and between the nuclear States themselves. In the case of any nuclear aggression or threat of such aggression, however, the Security Council must act more speedily than it had been able to do hitherto. It did not seem necessary to amend the Charter, but a formula should be found whereby the Council would be freed from the restrictions imposed upon it by the delaying tactics or lack of unanimity of its permanent members. Unless the Security Council was able, in a case of nuclear aggression, to act more speedily than it had done in the Middle East war of 1967, when only so-called conventional arms had been used, the result would be disastrous.

All non-nuclear-weapon States should be assisted in developing the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but special consideration should be given to the needs of the developing countries. It was unnecessary to establish a new organization for that purpose; rather, responsibility in the matter should be entrusted to IAEA, appropriately strengthened and equipped.

His delegation did not agree with those who claimed that the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was inseparable from that of general or conventional disarmament. It would be foolish to leave mankind under the threat of nuclear destruction merely because comprehensive general disarmament was not yet possible.

It was essential that the Conference should reach agreement on the important question before it. The non-nuclear-weapon countries could not expect the nuclear-weapon States to respond unanimously to their recommendations unless they themselves were united. There was no room for discord or controversy.

Mr. BRILLANTES (Philippines) said that at the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly the Philippines had endorsed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the belief that it would improve humanity's chance of avoiding destruction by nuclear war. Despite its imperfections, the Treaty was a step towards nuclear disarmament. It would have been preferable had the nuclear States been clearly and categorically required to negotiate further
measures towards nuclear disarmament, such as a comprehensive test ban treaty, a halt in the production of fissionable materials, a reduction of offensive and defensive nuclear delivery vehicles, and the ultimate limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. In that way a gradual advance towards nuclear disarmament would have been defined and the Treaty strengthened. Obviously, the questions of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were interconnected. By taking definite steps towards nuclear disarmament, therefore, the nuclear States would concretize their own wish that the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be a viable instrument.

His delegation attached great importance to the provisions of articles IV and V of the Treaty. If the nuclear Powers complied with their obligations under those articles, a step towards closing the gap between rich and poor countries would have been taken. The nuclear and non-nuclear Powers and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should consider the feasibility of including the use of nuclear technology in the framework of the global strategy for development for the second and succeeding Development Decades. Studies should be undertaken with a view to the establishment in developing nations of self-contained agricultural and industrial nuclear complexes similar to those being proposed for the United States, Australia, Argentina and the Middle East.

After the Treaty had been in force for five years, the developing countries would review it in detail to determine the extent to which the purposes of its preamble were being realized and its provisions implemented. Particular attention would be paid to steps taken to achieve nuclear disarmament and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. By signing the Treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon States had placed their confidence in the nuclear Powers; those Powers would have to prove that the confidence was not misplaced.

The Conference, at which four nuclear Powers were represented, was an appropriate forum in which to continue the dialogue between nuclear and non-nuclear States. It would be recalled, in that connexion, that as a result of the debates in the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly, the United States and Soviet Union had agreed to certain changes in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
His delegation hoped that the Conference would lead not only to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons but eventually to complete and total disarmament under international control. There was an imperative link between peace and disarmament. At a time when efforts were being made to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, the nuclear powers had a responsibility to curtail their armaments, for unless they manifested their desire to live at peace with one another the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States would be in jeopardy.

The immediate task of the Conference was to build bridges of understanding and confidence between all member States. If it was necessary to broaden the avenues of contact in order to build such bridges, the possibility of increasing the membership of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament could be explored.

Mr. FORGÉT (Mauritius) said that his country was fully alive to the need to dispel the fears aroused by nuclear armament against a background of international conflicts and tensions. A climate of trust among nations must be restored without delay as a prerequisite to world peace. Mauritius, a small island isolated in the Indian Ocean, had now regained its former strategic importance, in the modern context of military defence, and therefore took a special interest in the fate of the less privileged nations which stood defenceless and vulnerable against the might of great Powers. He was convinced that international peace could not be achieved or maintained until the principle of equality among nations and their right of self-determination were consolidated, and the concepts of territorial integrity and sovereignty were no longer openly flouted.

The task confronting the Conference was one of great magnitude and the aims of the participants could not be achieved overnight. But the Conference itself constituted an act of faith in the possibility of building a more secure world. A number of efforts had been made by the international community to reduce the nuclear threat, culminating in the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nevertheless, all those measures represented only the initial steps, falling short of the ultimate aim of total disarmament under effective international control.
He earnestly hoped that the Conference would make every effort to render the Non-Proliferation Treaty more effective and more widely acceptable. The balance of mutual obligations between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States aimed at in the Treaty had not been achieved. Moreover, States that had voluntarily renounced the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons were not satisfied with the guarantees provided by the Treaty or by the declarations to the Security Council by three of the nuclear Powers, which were merely statements of intent and not binding commitments. A categorical renunciation by the Nuclear Powers of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States was indispensable as evidence of the good will of the former group, and would be in line with the renunciation made by the latter group.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty had other weaknesses. It did not prohibit the storing or transporting of nuclear weapons within the territories of the parties. Another perpetual threat not dealt with by the Treaty was the overflying of territories of non-nuclear-weapon States by bomb-carrying aircraft of nuclear States, which on more than one occasion had led to very serious situations. The non-nuclear-weapon States would welcome the banning of such flights, which seriously endangered security. Another threat was the presence of submarines armed with nuclear missiles in such regions as the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, where they endangered the security of the islands in those seas.

The establishment of nuclear-free zones was an invaluable step towards disarmament, and Mauritius had noted with satisfaction that article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty permitted the conclusion of regional treaties for that purpose. In that connexion, he referred to the Antarctic Treaty signed in 1959 in Washington, and to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, a most inspiring example to other regions. Since 1960, many efforts had been made to ensure that Africa remained a nuclear-free zone; Mauritius had just been admitted as a full member of OAU, and hoped that at the forthcoming meeting of the organization in Algiers further steps would be taken to maintain Africa's nuclear-free status.

With respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it was important that the relevant guarantees should apply to all parties to the Treaty, both
nuclear and non-nuclear States. The diversion of nuclear devices intended for peaceful uses to the production of nuclear weapons must be prevented at all costs. Mauritius supported the view that the IAEA could play an important part in furthering co-ordination in nuclear technology. The Agency, whose Statute empowered it to establish and administer a system of safeguards, was the ideal organization to be entrusted with the control system under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Mauritius supported the proposal that negotiations should be begun at once for the setting up of a system through which the Agency could make the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy accessible to non-nuclear-weapon countries. Responsibility for a better world was indivisible, and consequently nuclear-weapon States should make nuclear technology available to the non-nuclear-weapon States, under centralized control, for the betterment of the world as a whole.

He welcomed the prospect that the United States and the Soviet Union might be willing to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation of nuclear delivery systems. He hoped that that would bring nearer the day when the nuclear-weapon States would cease nuclear testing, cease the production of fissionable materials for weapons use, cease manufacturing nuclear weapons, and reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear stockpiles. He was convinced that man could and must solve the problems he had created.

The PRESIDENT declared the general debate concluded.

STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAN

Mr. VAHID (Iran) said that he wished to express on behalf of the Government and people of Iran, and on behalf of the Iranian delegation, their deepest gratitude for the sympathy which had been extended on the occasion of the terrible disaster which had struck his country. The cost of that disaster, in human life and material damage, had been enormous, but Iran had risen up behind its Sovereign to help the victims, and the words of comfort pronounced by the international community at the present Conference had gone straight to the hearts of the Iranian people.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE SIXTEENTH MEETING

held on Monday, 16 September 1968, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Arshad HUSAIN Pakistan
ELECTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE

The President said that in accordance with rule 47 of the rules of procedure the General Committee had proposed at its 2nd meeting that a drafting committee should be appointed, composed of the representatives of the following countries: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Ghana, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Switzerland and Zambia.

The proposal by the General Committee was adopted.

The meeting rose at 3.35 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE SEVENTEENTH MEETING

held on Thursday, 26 September 1968, at 3.25 p.m.

President: Mr. Arshad HUSAIN Pakistan
PROGRAMMES FOR CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (agenda item 14):

(a) ACCESS TO AND EXCHANGE OF EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION FOR THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AMONG NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES

(b) ASSISTANCE AND CO-OPERATION IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, IN THE TERRITORIES OF THE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES, WITH DUE CONSIDERATION FOR THE NEEDS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS OF THE WORLD

(c) THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL USES

(d) BENEFITS FROM PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TO NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES WHICH HAVE RENOUNCED THE PRODUCTION, ACQUISITION AND USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PURSUANT TO SPECIAL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT OR AGREEMENTS THROUGH AN APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL BODY OR THROUGH BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS

Report of Committee Two (A/CONF.35/6*; A/CONF.35/L.5 and L.6)

Mr. Alfonso SANTA CRUZ (Chile), Rapporteur of Committee Two, said that the Committee had been instructed to consider agenda item 14 and that its report contained the various proposals which had been considered in connexion with that item. Because of the close relationship between the various sub-items, several draft resolutions referred to matters that were relevant to more than one of them. Despite the shortness of the time available to the Committee, every point had been given careful study, and delegations had clearly demonstrated their desire to understand differing points of view and to accept suggestions. The resolutions adopted bore witness to an effort to advance international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He commended the report (A/CONF.35/6*) to the Conference for consideration.

The PRESIDENT, noting that item 14 had been fully discussed in Committee Two and that time was short, suggested that the Conference should dispense with a discussion of the report and proceed immediately with the vote on the draft resolutions recommended by the Committee, and that explanations of votes should be made after the vote.

It was so decided.
The President put draft resolution A to the vote. The result of the vote was 69 in favour and none against, with 1 abstention. Draft resolution A was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

The President put draft resolution C to the vote. The result of the vote was 70 in favour and none against, with 4 abstentions. Draft resolution C was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

The President put draft resolution D to the vote. The result of the vote was 57 in favour and none against, with 22 abstentions. Draft resolution D was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

The President put draft resolution E to the vote. The result of the vote was 47 in favour and none against, with 29 abstentions. Draft resolution E was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

The President, before putting draft resolution F to the vote, called upon the Conference to vote on the proposed amendment thereto contained in document A/CONF.35/L.5. The result of the vote was 57 in favour and none against, with 12 abstentions. The draft amendment was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

The President put draft resolution F, as amended, to the vote. The result of the vote was 61 in favour and none against, with 16 abstentions. Draft resolution F was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

The President invited the Conference to vote on draft resolution G.

Mr. Sole (South Africa) requested a separate vote on operative paragraph 3. Mr. Agide (Ethiopia) requested a separate vote on operative paragraph 5.

Mr. Bjørn Berntsen (Executive Secretary of the Conference) pointed out that, as stated in paragraph 6(c) of the report, the sponsors of the draft resolution A/CONF.35/C.2/L.13 would prefer the proposed new body to be referred to by the word "Service", as in the original Spanish text and in the French translation of the draft, rather than by the word "Department", the term used in the English and Russian translations.

It was so agreed.

At the request of the Brazilian representative, the vote on draft resolution G, operative paragraph 3, was taken by roll-call.
Czechoslovakia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

**In favour:** Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Iran, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia.

**Against:** Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Libya, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Southern Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada.

**Abstaining:** Ecuador, Ethiopia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Viet-Nam, Romania, Somalia, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Austria, China, Costa Rica.

The result of the vote was 31 in favour and 24 against, with 29 abstentions. Operative paragraph 3 was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority.

At the request of the Brazilian representative, the vote on draft resolution G, operative paragraph 5, was taken by roll-call.

Australia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

**In favour:** Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Malta, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Spain, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Argentina.
Against: Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Hungary,
Mongolia, Poland.

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Burma, China, Denmark, Finland,
Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Kenya,
Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar,
Mauritius, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea,
Republic of Viet-Nam, Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, South Africa, Southern Yemen, Sweden, Syria,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Republic,
United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Algeria.

The result of the vote was 30 in favour and 7 against, with 48 abstentions.
Operative paragraph 5 was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds
majority.

The PRESIDENT put draft resolution G, as amended, to the vote.

The result of the vote was 30 in favour and 21 against, with 27 abstentions.
Draft resolution G was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required
two-thirds majority.

The PRESIDENT put draft resolution H to the vote.

The result of the vote was 37 in favour and none against, with 43 abstentions.

Draft resolution H was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds
majority.

The PRESIDENT, observing that the proposed amendment to draft resolution B
was not yet ready for circulation, suggested that the meeting should be suspended
until the draft amendment had been circulated and studied.

It was so agreed.

The meeting was suspended at 4.30 p.m. and resumed at 5.10 p.m.
Mr. EDELSTAM (Sweden) said he would like the sponsors of the proposed amendment (A/CONF.35/L.6) to draft resolution B to explain why they had submitted it.

Mr. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA (Brazil) said that the sponsors of the draft amendment considered it self-explanatory. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was one international instrument, but there were others, such as the agreements concluded by certain States with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on safeguards and other aspects. The proposed amendment was therefore not restrictive; it amplified the concept included in all the safeguard agreements.

Mr. EDELSTAM (Sweden) thanked the representative of Brazil for his explanation. The sponsors of the draft resolution had asked him to inform the Conference that they would be unable to vote for the draft amendment. They did not consider that the wording in their draft resolution in any way prejudiced the opinion that any State might have regarding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; it left the matter entirely open.

Mr. OGISO (Japan) said that during the recess he had been shown the text of a draft amendment which differed from the one now before the Conference, and had expressed his willingness to accept it. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, he wished to make it clear that his delegation could not accept the present draft amendment.

Mr. LENDVAI (Hungary) said he would like the sponsors to make it clear whether the "existing safeguards" referred to in the draft amendment were to be understood to be international safeguards.

Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that he understood from the Brazilian representative's explanation that the safeguards referred to in the draft amendment as "existing" were the IAEA safeguards. He accordingly suggested that "IAEA" should be inserted between the words "existing" and "safeguards" in the third line.

Mr. SCHNIPPENKOETTER (Federal Republic of Germany), replying to the Hungarian representative's question, said that he understood the reference in the proposed amendment to be to international safeguards.
Mr. Burns (Canada) said that the reply by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany suggested that safeguards other than IAEA safeguards were contemplated under the wording "existing safeguards". If that were so, his delegation would be unable to accept the proposed amendment.

Mr. Schnippenkoetter (Federal Republic of Germany) explained that he had been referring only to what was stated in the IAEA Statute and the text on its safeguards system. Article XVI of the Statute provided for the conclusion of one or more agreements between the Agency and the organizations whose work was related to that of the Agency, and paragraph 28 (d) of the text on the safeguards system expressly provided for the acceptance of "safeguards other than those of the Agency but generally consistent with such safeguards".

Mr. Lendvai (Hungary) asked whether the observer for IAEA could inform the Conference whether any of the safeguards envisaged under the paragraph quoted by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany had already been negotiated.

Mr. Khalil (United Arab Republic) asked what was meant by safeguards "generally" consistent with those of the Agency.

Mr. Azevedo da Silveira (Brazil) asked the President whether it was proper for a question to be asked and answered when the Conference was in process of voting.

The President replied that voting had not yet begun. The Conference was considering a proposed amendment to a draft resolution. Since the Conference was in plenary session, the question could not be referred back to the Committee concerned and must therefore be discussed and then voted on by the Conference.

Mr. Morris (Australia) said that, while he had not been able to consult all the sponsors of the draft amendment, he wished to propose that it should be re-drafted to read as follows: "either the application of or the acceptance of safeguards as provided for in the existing IAEA system of safeguards or other appropriate safeguards as envisaged in Article III of the Treaty."

The President said that at the present stage it would be difficult for the Conference to consider amendments which had not been circulated.
Mr. SANDERS (Observer for the International Atomic Energy Agency) replied to the question asked by the representative of Hungary. Under Article XVI of the Agency's Statute, referred to by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Agency had concluded relationship agreements with seven organizations of the United Nations family, including the United Nations itself. It also had agreements with a number of other intergovernmental organizations, including the European Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for European Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS). With regard to the other aspect of the problem, relating to paragraph 26(d) of the Agency's safeguards system, none of the agreements alluded to, and which had already been concluded, referred particularly to safeguards. The sub-paragraph in question provided that the materials could under certain conditions be transferred even if they were subject to safeguards other than those of the Agency so long as those safeguards were generally consistent with the Agency's and were accepted by the Agency. The Agency Secretariat considered that it would be the Board's responsibility to decide what constituted "general consistency" in connexion with a relationship agreement.

Mr. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA (Brazil) said that the sponsors of the draft amendment were prepared to accept the amendment to it proposed by the Australian representative. He appealed to the President to allow that amendment to be discussed, in conformity with rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure.

The PRESIDENT invited the Conference to consider the amendment proposed by Australia.

Mr. EDELSTEN (Sweden) said that the proposed amendment was acceptable to his delegation and would, he believed, be acceptable to the other sponsors of the draft resolution.

Mr. KHALLAF (United Arab Republic) suggested that the meeting should be suspended to enable representatives to study the proposed amendment. He could not, for example, see the difference between "application" and "acceptance", nor did he know exactly what was meant by "appropriate".

The meeting was suspended at 5.45 p.m. and resumed at 6 p.m.
Mr. LAIDI (Algeria), Mr. KIMANI (Kenya), Mr. WARSAMA (Somalia), Mr. KHALLAF (United Arab Republic) and Mr. GROSESPIDEL (Uruguay) considered the wording proposed by the representative of Australia for Part III of draft resolution B unacceptable because it was not sufficiently clear.

Mr. WINKLER (Czechoslovakia) thought it would be inappropriate for the Conference to amend the draft resolutions which Committee Two had submitted in its report to the plenary Conference. In his opinion, only Committee Two could change their wording. The reference to "safeguards as envisaged in Article III of the Treaty" seemed to meet the purpose of the sponsors of the draft amendment, if the draft amendment was not intended to go against the provisions of Article III. If it was so intended, then his delegation could not accept it. He urged the Conference to vote on the draft resolution as it stood, without considering draft amendments submitted at such a late stage.

Mr. AZEREDE da SILVEIRA (Brasil) regretted that some delegations seemed to be trying to confuse the issue in order to bring pressure to bear on others. The sponsors of the draft amendment had already agreed to the change proposed by the representative of Australia.

Mr. MORRIS (Australia) said that, with the consent of the other sponsors of the draft amendment, his delegation withdrew the amendment it had proposed. The discussion had demonstrated how difficult it was to attempt to provide for generally acceptable technical safeguards; his delegation therefore favoured adhering to the IAEA system of safeguards.

The PRESIDENT put the draft amendment A/CONF.35/L.6 to the vote. The result of the vote was 37 in favour and 35 against, with 6 abstentions. The draft amendment was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority.

Mr. CHIPINGO (Zambia) requested a separate vote on Part V of draft resolution B.

The PRESIDENT put Part V of draft resolution B to the vote. The result of the vote was 44 in favour and 18 against, with 16 abstentions. Part V was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.
The **PRESIDENT** put draft resolution B as a whole to the vote. The result of the vote was 51 in favour and 15 against, with 10 abstentions. Draft resolution C was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

Mr. **MORRIS** (Australia), explaining his earlier votes, said that although his delegation had voted for draft resolution C it had had some misgivings, as it believed that Governments could not be committed to such a proposal pending an examination of its practicability by IAEA. His delegation had abstained on draft resolution F because it believed that bilateral arrangements should not be excluded, as seemed to be implied by the reference to "all nuclear explosions" in preambular paragraph (d). In Committee Two his delegation had drawn attention to the omission of a reference to the bilateral procedures for which provision was made in Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE EIGHTEENTH MEETING

held on Friday, 27 September 1968, at 10.25 a.m.

President: Mr. Arshad HUSAIN Pakistan
MEASURES TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES (agenda item 11)

ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES (agenda item 12)

EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION OF FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE CESSION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AT AN EARLY DATE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT (agenda item 13):

(a) SAFEGUARDS AGAINST THE DIVERSION OF SOURCE OR SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FROM PEACEFUL TO MILITARY USES, AND SAFEGUARDS AGAINST INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE

(b) SUBMISSION OF PERIODIC REPORTS BY COUNTRIES, TO AN INTERNATIONAL AGENCY, ON THE NATURE OF NUCLEAR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SPECIAL FISSIONABLE MATERIAL SUPPLIED BY THEM TO NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES

(c) CONCLUSION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

(d) FREEZE ON PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FOR WEAPON PURPOSES AND THE CESSION OF THE MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Report of Committee One (A/CONF.35/5)

Mr. CHAUS (Afghanistan), Rapporteur of Committee One, said that the Committee had considered agenda items 11, 12 and 13 very fully and had decided to recommend to the Conference the adoption of fourteen draft resolutions, contained in its report.

The PRESIDENT proposed that the Conference should vote on the draft resolutions without any debate on the substance, since they had already been discussed in Committee One.

It was so decided.

At the request of the Brazilian representative a vote was taken by roll-call on draft resolution A relating to agenda item 11.

Venezuela, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Laos, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Republic of Vietnam, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay.
Against: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Thailand.

Abstaining: Yemen, Austria, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Republic.

The result of the vote was 39 in favour and 20 against, with 25 abstentions. Draft resolution A was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority.

Mr. AZEVEDO da SILVEIRA (Brazil), supported by Mr. GROSESPIEHL (Uruguay), Mr. PEITZER (Argentina) and Mr. de LATIGUESIA (Spain) expressed the view that, since the number of representatives present and voting was 59, the two-thirds majority should be 38.

Mr. PAQUI (Dahomey) said that he had been absent during the vote, but had intended to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

Mr. BECK (Hungary) said that the two-thirds majority was exactly 39.3.

Mr. SEATON (United Republic of Tanzania) thought that any representative who had been absent during the vote might subsequently have his vote registered and that the Conference was entitled to change the decision of the Chairman.

The PRESIDENT pointed out that the vote had been taken in accordance with the regular procedure, and that the results had been announced.

Mr. AZEVEDO da SILVEIRA (Brazil) shared the Tanzanian representative's view. Moreover, to calculate the two-thirds majority, fractions of votes could not be taken into account.

The PRESIDENT said that, since the Dahomean representative had not taken part in the vote, it had not been possible to take his vote into account in calculating the two-thirds majority. The Conference, however, was quite free to contest the President's decision.
Mr. Balestra di Mottola (Costa Rica) noted that if the number of representatives present and voting, which was 59, was divided by 3 and the resultant figure multiplied by 2, the two-thirds majority was 38, not 39.

Mr. Nabwera (Kenya) thought that the two-thirds majority could be calculated either on the principle that a fraction of a vote corresponded to one vote, in which case the majority would be 40 votes, or on the principle that the fraction should be disregarded, in which case the majority would be 39.

Mr. Chrestov (Bulgaria), supported by Mr. Jaroszek (Poland), considered that the situation was perfectly clear. The Chairman had announced that the draft resolution was not adopted. From the point of view of both arithmetic and procedure, therefore the vote must be regarded as closed.

Mr. Shafi (Pakistan), supported by Mr. Brillantes (Philippines), suggested that the meeting should be suspended for ten minutes, in order to give delegations time to consult. Failing that, the Conference must itself decide whether or not a two-thirds majority had been obtained.

Mrs. Pena de Grimaldo (Paraguay) said she could not see how thirds of votes could be taken into account in calculating the required majority.

Mr. Amerasinghe (Ceylon) thought there must be a precedent in the procedure followed by the General Assembly to which the Conference could refer.

Mr. Azavedo da Silva (Brazil) said he did not think that countries' votes could be divided. In any event, the Brazilian delegation would accept the President's decision.

Mr. Laidi (Algeria) saw no need for suspending the meeting. It was completely unnecessary to refer to United Nations and General Assembly practice. The Conference had its own rules of procedure, and all it had to do was to apply them.

Mr. Asamte (Ghana) thought that the procedural discussion had lasted long enough. If the required majority had not been attained, his delegation would be sorry, but would bow before the fact.

Mr. Archibald (Trinidad and Tobago), supported by Mr. Paqui (Dahomey) and Mr. Grossepielli (Uruguay), proposed that the draft resolution should be put to the vote again.
The President pointed out that, under rule 32 of the rules of procedure, the Conference could not reconsider a proposal which had been adopted or rejected unless a two-thirds majority so decided.

Mr. Mawira (Kenya) appealed to the delegations to terminate a discussion which could only prejudice the work of the Conference. It was now the President's duty to take a decision which, it must be hoped, would be unanimously accepted.

The President pointed out that his announcement of the results of the voting had been contested. In those circumstances, he could only appeal to the Conference to take a decision by a simple majority.

Mr. Azeredo da Silveira (Brazil) thought that the President had taken no decision and that, consequently, his decision could not be appealed against. The President must first take a decision and announce it. Delegations so desiring could then contest it. The Brazilian delegation would accept it.

Mr. Khalil (United Arab Republic) considered that the announcement of the results of the voting by the President did not constitute a decision. Delegations were, however, perfectly within their rights in contesting the correctness of the results of the voting announced by the President.

The President suggested a brief suspension of the meeting so that delegations might consult among themselves.

The meeting was suspended at 11.40 a.m. and resumed at 12.15 p.m.

The President said that, after consultation, he had decided to maintain the results of the voting as he had announced them, namely that the draft resolution had not been adopted because it had not received twice as many positive votes as negative ones, or forty votes.

Mr. Grossepiell (Uruguay) asked the President whether the suggestion he had made before the suspension of the meeting that the Conference should be allowed to decide on the validity of the results announced was still open.

The President replied that his interpretation of the results could be contested under rule 22 of the rules of procedure. He asked whether the Uruguayan representative intended to appeal against the President's decision.

Mr. Grossepiell (Uruguay) said he did not so intend. Several delegations of Latin American countries would, however, like to be able to consult on
their attitude towards that decision. He therefore requested another suspension of the meeting so that the group could undertake the necessary consultations.

The PRESIDENT pointed out that, strictly speaking, he had taken no decision and had only acted in conformity with the practice followed by the United Nations.

The meeting was suspended at 12.20 p.m. and resumed at 12.40 p.m.

Mr. GROSESPIEL (Uruguay) informed the Conference that the Latin American group, which had met during the suspension of the meeting, had unanimously decided to reaffirm that the results of the voting which had been announced did not, in its opinion, reflect the true situation. None the less, since it was above all desirous of making an effective and decisive contribution to the success of the Conference, it would abstain from contesting those results. He wished to thank all those who had voted for the draft resolution.

Mr. NAGWERA (Kenya) asked that a separate vote should be taken on operative paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (iii) of draft resolution B, relating to agenda item 11.

The PRESIDENT put operative paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (iii), of draft resolution B to the vote.

The result of the vote was 48 in favour and none against, with 32 abstentions. Sub-paragraph (iii) of paragraph 1 was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

The PRESIDENT put draft resolution B, as a whole, to the vote.

The result of the vote was 52 in favour and 5 against, with 26 abstentions. Draft resolution B was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

The PRESIDENT put draft resolution C, relating to agenda item 12, to the vote.

The result of the vote was 74 votes in favour and none against, with 10 abstentions.

Draft resolution C was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

The PRESIDENT put draft resolution D, relating to agenda item 13, to the vote.
The result of the vote was 76 in favour and none against, with 8 abstentions.

Draft resolution D was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

The President put draft resolution E, relating to agenda item 13, to the vote.

The result of the vote was 79 in favour and none against, with 5 abstentions.

Draft resolution E was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

The President put draft resolution F, relating to agenda item 13 (a), to the vote.

The result of the vote was 34 votes in favour and 6 against, with 41 abstentions.

Draft resolution F was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

The President put draft resolution G, relating to agenda item 13 (a), to the vote.

The result of the vote was 34 in favour and 5 against, with 45 abstentions.

Draft resolution G was adopted, having obtained the required two-thirds majority.

The President expressed gratification at the adoption of the draft resolutions D - G recommended by Committee One. He especially thanked the Latin American countries for the co-operative attitude they had displayed.

Mr. Le-Van-Loi (Republic of Viet-Nam), explaining his vote, said that, in voting for draft resolution G, his delegation had wished to express its support of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its later extensions. He wished, however, to point out that such a treaty was feasible only in a region in which certain political conditions existed that were conducive to the harmonious co-existence of the States in the region. Such conditions were not currently present in South-East Asia, where the countries bordering on communist China were confronted with a constant nuclear threat; and it would be unrealistic to think that a treaty of that type, or any other disarmament measure, could be applied in that region so long as the communist Chinese threat continued.
Mr. Jaroszek (Poland), explaining why his delegation had abstained from voting for draft resolution C, recalled that the Polish Government attached great importance to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, and that it had in 1957 proposed to the General Assembly the creation of such a zone in Central Europe. Unfortunately, the Polish delegation thought that the resolution adopted had certain defects which reduced its effectiveness, and that it might even be regarded as regressive with respect to the progress hitherto made in international discussions. For instance, the resolution made no mention of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, whose article VII was, however, entirely devoted to the matter concerned; in view of the close bonds between the Conference and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that omission was particularly regrettable. Furthermore, operative part A recommended that studies "concerning the possibility and desirability of establishing by treaty the military demilitarization" of certain zones should be initiated or continued, "provided that political and security conditions permit". That last clause, however, considerably restricted the scope of the recommendation, for it was only too obvious that it could be used as an excuse by those who opposed the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, precisely in the regions in which the elimination of those weapons was most urgent. Furthermore, the expression "military demilitarization" used in part A was ambiguous and lent itself to very different interpretations. Lastly, the resolution was cast in too narrow a framework, and several of its provisions related only to certain countries. Hence, while it wholeheartedly favoured the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world, the Polish delegation had had to abstain from voting.

Mr. de Piedade Miranda (Portugal) said that when draft resolution A/CONF.35/C.1/L.13/Rev.1, which had become draft resolution B, had been considered in Committee One, his delegation had explained why it had abstained in the vote on operative paragraph 1(ii). It had not changed its mind since then, and if a separate vote had been taken on that sub-paragraph in plenary, it would have adopted the same position.

Mr. Lahoda (Czechoslovakia) said that the reason why his delegation had abstained in the vote on draft resolution D was that, as he had pointed out in Committee One, the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,
which accorded priority to all problems concerning nuclear disarmament, included not only the measures provided for in the resolution but also important collateral measures aimed at reducing the chances of a nuclear war and increasing the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular, by prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. He therefore deeply regretted that the resolution had failed to make any mention of such a prohibition. Furthermore, since the next resolution (draft resolution E) urged the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation of nuclear weapons delivery systems, his delegation regarded the wish to include the matter in the agenda of the next Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as illogical and contradictory. Those were the reasons for its abstention in the vote on draft resolution D.

Mr. ALLAF (Syria) recalled the reasons, which had already been stated in Committee One, why his delegation had abstained in the vote on draft resolution E. It was in no way opposed to the principles and ideas expressed therein, but there was no point, in its view, in including them in a resolution of the present Conference when for about twenty years the Arab States had been subject to repeated attacks by a country which constantly violated the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. SCHNIPPENKOEPPNER (Federal Republic of Germany) said that his delegation had voted in favour of draft resolution C particularly because of the recommendation contained in operative part A. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany had itself advocated the creation of a "zone of détente" in Europe as a preliminary step towards a lasting peace, as well as a balanced mutual reduction of armed forces. He was pleased to note in that connexion that his preoccupations had points of contact with those expressed by the representative of Poland. As its Minister for Foreign Affairs had solemnly reaffirmed, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was ready to conclude an agreement on the progressive reduction of the stockpile of nuclear weapons in Europe, and it was in that spirit that his delegation had voted in favour of operative part A.

Mr. de LEON (Mexico) thanked the representative of Poland for pointing out, in his explanation of vote, the ambiguousness of the expression "military denuclearization".

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE NINETEENTH MEETING

held on Friday, 27 September 1968, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. KHALLAF United Arab Republic
later: Mr. Arshad HUSAIN Pakistan
In the absence of the President, Mr. KHALIF (United Arab Republic), Vice-President, took the Chair.


Mr. de LAIGLESTÁ (Spain) said that his country should be added to the list of the sponsors of draft resolution A/CONF.35/L.3/Rev.1.

Mr. BURNS (Canada) said that the Conference had met in a situation not quite the same as that envisaged by the original proposers. It was asked to direct its attention to problems with a direct or indirect bearing on matters dealt with in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly in articles IV, V and VI.

Over the past month there had been useful discussions on important problems, and the views expressed by the Conference in the resolutions adopted would be given serious consideration by the various bodies concerned, the General Assembly, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The decision as to implementation of the Conference's recommendations now lay with the Secretary-General and the above-mentioned international bodies. With few exceptions, the States participating in the Conference were Members of the United Nations; the Eighteen-Nation Committee was also represented at the Conference, and eighty-two out of the ninety-four participants were member States of IAEA or had applied for membership. The non-nuclear-weapon States should therefore be able to continue the work begun at the Conference in those other bodies.

The Canadian Government was opposed in principle to the setting up of new international bodies in any sphere in which competent bodies already existed. In his view, the resolution under consideration called for such a duplication. Two interrelated questions had to be considered, one concerning the terms of the resolution, and the other the way in which the Conference was constituted. It seemed to him that the reference in the third paragraph of the preamble to the "affirmation of unity among the non-nuclear-weapon States" was likely to cause a more marked division between those States and the nuclear Powers. Canada considered that the aim of the Conference should be to remove the differences between States, and not to promote further division. The nuclear Powers had had no right to vote in the present Conference and had taken little part in the
proceedings. He considered that the discrimination between the two groups in the draft resolution was not in keeping with the United Nations Charter, of which Article 2, paragraph 1, emphasized the sovereign equality of all Members.

He did not wish, however, to give the impression that the Canadian delegation was unwilling to see the Conference's resolutions implemented; that was certainly not the case. Canada believed that the Conference's recommendations could be dealt with in the existing United Nations organs - the First Committee, and the other bodies to which he had referred previously. His delegation was not rejecting the possibility that another Conference of non-nuclear-weapon States might be needed, but it did not agree that a decision to hold one should be taken at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, as suggested in the draft resolution. Consequently, Canada would be obliged to vote against the draft resolution.

Mr. AMERASINGHE (Ceylon) said that his delegation considered it unnecessary to establish new arrangements or organizations for functions already dealt with by existing bodies. The draft resolution was seeking to establish a parallel authority to consolidate the unity among the non-nuclear-weapon States, which were already represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Presumably the intention was to establish an authority in which the nuclear Powers would not be represented, since if they were the arrangement would be merely wasteful duplication. If, however, they were not represented, the arrangement would necessarily be ineffectual.

He did not understand what was meant by the recommendation in operative paragraph 1 that the General Assembly should, at its twenty-third regular session, convene a Conference of non-nuclear-weapon States periodically; for it seemed impractical to suggest that the Conference should be convened while the twenty-third session was in progress.

As to the proposed Special Committee, he thought the purposes it was intended to promote could be adequately served by the non-nuclear-weapon States that were members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. He agreed that it would be necessary to enlarge the membership of that Committee and perhaps give it a new title, to reflect the changed membership. In such an enlarged Committee, the non-nuclear-weapon States that were members could form
a separate working group to pursue their common policy. That would be a more practicable arrangement than working out a common policy in some parallel authority and then having to go to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for that policy to be either endorsed or modified. In any case, the enlarged Committee should not be so large that it could not operate effectively. If, as had been maintained, questions of security and non-proliferation were not divisible, they could not be considered apart from the question of general and complete disarmament and the whole complex interrelationship and balance of power resulting from the Second World War. It was greatly preferable for such complicated questions to be discussed within one body and not within two parallel bodies with the same aim. Care should be taken to avoid any fracture or duplication of existing organs. The integrity of such organs must be ensured, and they should, if necessary, be reconstituted to improve their representative character and effectiveness.

Ceylon would not be able to vote for the draft resolution, but it would not vote against it, for it was anxious to participate in any future conference of non-nuclear-weapon States that might be convened.

Mr. BAKONYI-SEBESTYEN (Hungary) said that the draft resolution posed a difficult problem for his delegation, and apparently for some other delegations too. The draft resolution was intended to promote a system of international co-operation which, if it were established, would be a first step towards superseding the General Assembly and the Security Council. The new organization would be dealing with many important questions within the jurisdiction of the United Nations and its organs. The recommendations of the Conference were many and varied, and broad in scope; and to deal with such problems outside the United Nations system would damage that system and be in conflict with the United Nations Charter. Furthermore, the proposal was that the organization to be set up in rivalry with the United Nations should not include the permanent members of the Security Council, although the Charter laid down that the members of the Council had special rights and responsibilities in respect of international peace and security. Furthermore, there would be discrimination against certain countries that were not members of the United Nations. Moreover, the Hungarian delegation, among others, did not welcome a vote on a draft resolution submitted at the last moment. He therefore appealed to the sponsors not to press for a vote.
Mr. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA (Brazil) said that Brazil was a co-sponsor of the draft resolution and also a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. He did not believe that the resolution interfered with the functions of the Committee. The nuclear Powers and some other countries in the Eighteen-Nation Committee had always admitted that the non-proliferation process necessarily involved discrimination as a consequence of the admission that it was necessary to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That was discrimination, but it was unavoidable. The draft resolution was not discriminatory; for while the non-nuclear weapon States asserted the existence of discrimination in respect of nuclear weapons, they had their just claims regarding security, access to technology and so forth. Consequently, the Eighteen-Nation Committee was a negotiating body. It was not suggested that the proposed new Special Committee should negotiate on disarmament issues; its task would be to see that the conclusions of the Conference were implemented, and it would in no way conflict with the function of the Eighteen-Nation Committee undertaking detailed negotiation. A reading of the duties to be entrusted to the Special Committee made that point perfectly clear. Its functions would be to deal with the matters raised at the present Conference, make arrangements for the next Conference and prepare the necessary documents. Those participants in the Conference who were members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee were aware how very different those tasks were from the very precise and careful negotiations undertaken by the Committee. His delegation would certainly not co-sponsor any resolution that would interfere with the work of the Committee, but it considered that the non-nuclear weapon States had a right to indicate their wishes and views regarding that Committee. That had not, however, been done in the draft resolution. He himself, and he believed he spoke for the other sponsors, would be glad to accept any suggestions that would make it possible for the draft resolution to win majority support.

Mr. KOLO (Nigeria) said that although the draft resolution had some good points, his delegation's views were close to those of Ceylon. As the draft resolution stood, it left little discretion to the General Assembly in the matter of convening a second conference. Furthermore, it proposed the establishment of another agency, the Special Committee, on a permanent basis, to deal with questions already within the jurisdiction of existing United Nations bodies.
He proposed that the reference in the operative part to the twenty-third session should be deleted, and that the General Assembly should be recommended to convene a conference of non-nuclear-weapon States when it considered that necessary. Operative paragraph 2 should be deleted, for the reasons he had given above. The beginning of paragraph 3 should read: "Invites the General Assembly to consider requesting the appropriate United Nations agency".

Mr. VINCI (Italy), speaking as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution, said that the impression that the sponsors wished to establish a new agency or body was quite mistaken. It was common practice in the United Nations to use special committees to execute complex tasks. Such a committee was merely a working instrument, and not a specialized agency or special body. The work to be given to the Special Committee did not interfere with or duplicate the work of any existing agency. Italy, like Brazil, was a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and had no intention of taking any action that would detract from the authority of that body which was the appropriate forum for the discussion of disarmament problems. Agencies were executive bodies entrusted with specific tasks, and Italy supported their activities.

The non-nuclear-weapon States were at the present Conference to discuss their common interests, and their views reflected the concern they felt over the existing situation. Some instrument was needed to follow up the discussion at the Conference. It need not interfere with any existing bodies, but should reflect the interest of all countries. It should be able to give effect to the decisions taken at the Conference and should therefore also be of interest to the nuclear Powers. The main test of the Nuclear-Proliferation Treaty was whether it could establish conditions for co-operation in all fields relating to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

As the draft resolution was worded, it did not involve any decision by the Conference, but merely proposals to the General Assembly, which itself could decide on those proposals. Like Brazil, Italy was prepared to welcome suggestions that would make it possible for the draft resolution to win the support of the Conference. Although, however, he much appreciated the spirit of co-operation that had prompted the representative of Nigeria to make his suggestions, he felt that the changes they involved were too far removed from the
purpose of the draft resolution. The reference to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly should be maintained. He would accept a rewording of operative paragraph 2 that would make it more acceptable.

Mr. NABWEYA (Kenya) said he spoke as a representative of one of the countries that had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It was important to emphasize that, because the Conference seemed to be divided between those who believed that the Treaty must be defended at all costs and those who were not admirers of it. Unless, however, all delegations approached the draft resolution with an open mind it would not be possible to produce a serious resolution for submission to the General Assembly.

He hoped that the co-sponsors would be prepared to accept amendments that did not rule out the possibility of holding a future conference or conferences, and that they would be willing to accept the suggestions made by the Nigerian representative.

At the General Assembly, all countries, including those unable to participate in the present Conference, would have the opportunity to comment on the Conference's report. The Conference should speak as a Conference of non-nuclear-weapon States; it should not be too concerned about the possibility of damaging the interests of the nuclear Powers, which had much influence in the world and did not need to participate actively in the present Conference to make their position felt.

The possibility of holding a further conference of non-nuclear-weapon States would leave the door open for meetings with Member countries of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies which, although they had not ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, were nevertheless concerned about questions of security. It would be unwise to divide the Conference between the loyal supporters of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its critics.

Mr. Arshad HUSAIN (Pakistan), President, took the Chair.

Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands) said that his delegation had approached the question with an open mind and had no desire to rule out the possibility of a future conference. Nevertheless, it shared the doubts expressed by other delegations concerning the wording of the draft resolution. The Nigerian representative seemed to have found the solution. If his proposal were
accepted, however, there would be a lack of consistency between the preamble and the operative part of the resolution. He suggested, therefore, that the Nigerian proposal should be inserted in paragraph 8 of the Draft Declaration of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (A/CONF.35/L.4/Rev.1)

Mr. GROSSSPIEL (Uruguay) said he fully endorsed the views expressed by the representatives of Brazil and Italy. There was nothing in the draft resolution that encroached upon the competence of other international organizations or agencies. An objective reading of operative paragraph 3 made that quite clear.

He agreed with the representative of Italy that the intention was not to establish a new agency but merely to make possible the functioning of one more committee among the many that already existed in the United Nations.

Speaking as a co-sponsor of the draft resolution, he said he would accept any amendments or suggestions that were not contrary to the draft resolution's basic purpose.

He could not accept the statement that the draft resolution was in conflict with the United Nations Charter or was attempting to establish organs that would operate against the interests of the United Nations. If that were true, all the representatives who had voted in the General Assembly in favour of the convening of the present Conference would have been voting against the United Nations Charter. The aim was to establish a useful procedure within the United Nations in line with United Nations principles.

Nor was it true that the draft resolution embodied any discrimination. It merely recognized the plain fact that the world was divided into nuclear and non-nuclear States, and that in the interests of peace it was of the utmost importance that the non-nuclear States should take a firm and united stand—not a stand that was directed against the other countries, but one which would permit the non-nuclear States to hold consultations and discussions with the other countries and to co-operate with them. He proposed that the meeting should be adjourned to permit consultation among representatives with a view to the submission of an agreed revised text.

The PRESIDENT proposed that, in accordance with rule 19 of the rules of procedure, the meeting should adjourn to permit further consultations.

The meeting was suspended at 5.10 p.m. and resumed at 7.25 p.m.
Mr. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA (Brazil) said that the forty delegations which had taken part in the consultations proposed by the representative of Uruguay had agreed on a compromise wording for submission to the General Assembly. They proposed that the third paragraph of the preamble to draft resolution A/CONF.35/L.3/Rev.1 should be deleted, and that all the operative paragraphs should be deleted and replaced by one operative paragraph reading as follows:

"Invites the General Assembly, at its present session, to consider the best ways and means for the implementation of the decisions taken by the Conference, to examine the subjects dealt with by the Conference and, at a subsequent session, to consider the question of the convening of the second Conference of the non-nuclear-weapon States".

The PRESIDENT suggested that unless any delegation objected, the new text proposed by the Brazilian delegation be examined by the Conference.

Mr. BOLLIST (Nigeria) reminded the Conference that before the adjournment his delegation had submitted a proposal which it had not withdrawn.

The PRESIDENT said that the course of action he proposed to follow would not preclude discussion of the Nigerian amendment. He therefore suggested that the Conference should consider the revised text submitted by the Brazilian delegation.

It was so agreed.

Mr. BRILLANTES (Philippines) said he was gratified to note that the third paragraph of the preamble to draft resolution A/CONF.35/L.3/Rev.1 had been deleted. On behalf of his own delegation and that of Saudi Arabia, he proposed that the text of the operative paragraph proposed by the Brazilian representative should be amended to read as follows:

"Invites the General Assembly, at its next regular session, to consider, in the light of the discussions in the Conference, the adoption of such necessary measures and arrangements for the implementation of the decisions or resolutions of the Conference and the continuity of the work undertaken".

Mr. GAUCI (Valta) and Mr. AMRASINGHE (Ceylon) said that the words "next regular session" were ambiguous, since they did not make it clear whether the General Assembly was to consider the matter at its twenty-third session or at its twenty-fourth.
Mr. BRILLANTES (Philippines) said that the sponsors of the amendment had an open mind on that question. If the Conference thought that the question should be considered by the General Assembly at its current session, they would not object.

Mr. AMERASINGHE (Ceylon) said it was the sponsors of the amendment who should say what meaning was to be attached to the words in question.

Mr. Azeredo da Silva (Brazil) appealed to all delegations to express their views on the compromise formula he had read out.

Mr. GROSSEPIEL (Uruguay) said that his delegation accepted the text read out by the representative of Brazil.

Mr. Escauzín (Netherlands) said that his delegation was prepared to support the paragraph read out by the Brazilian representative. He suggested, however, that the word "the" before the words "second Conference" should be replaced by the word "a". It seemed necessary, too, in the revised text, to bring the operative paragraph into line with the preamble. He suggested, therefore, that the first paragraph of the preamble should end with the word "Conference", and that, in the second paragraph, the words "and the necessary continuance of its tasks", and the words "the existence of arrangements making possible", should be deleted.

Mr. Agide (Ethiopia) commended the sponsors of draft resolution A/CONF.35/L.3/Rev.1 on their spirit of understanding, and expressed his delegation's support for the compromise wording read out by the representative of Brazil. He also supported the drafting changes proposed by the Netherlands representative.

He urged the Philippine and Saudi Arabian delegations to show the same spirit of compromise and not to press their amendment.

Mr. Habwera (Kenya) joined in that appeal. Any attempt to water down the compromise wording would only lead to difficulties. He wholeheartedly supported that wording, with the Netherlands drafting changes to bring the preamble into line with the operative part.

Mr. Cordero Robledo (Mexico), Mrs. Benítez de Grimaldo (Paraguay), Mr. de la Rúa (Spain) and Mr. Balestra di Mottola (Costa Rica) said that the compromise wording was acceptable to their delegations.
Mr. BURHIS (Canada) said that, if the changes suggested by the Netherlands were accepted, he also would support the compromise wording.

Mr. KHALLAF (United Arab Republic) found the compromise wording acceptable, but felt it would be better to omit the words "to examine the subjects dealt with by the Conference". It was hardly necessary for the General Assembly to discuss once again the matters already dealt with at the present Conference.

Mr. BRILLANTES (Philippines), speaking also on behalf of the Saudi Arabian delegation, withdrew the joint amendment he had introduced earlier.

His delegation was prepared to accept the compromise wording, but proposed two amendments thereto: first, that the words mentioned by the representative of the United Arab Republic should be deleted; and, second, that the words "and the continuity of the work undertaken" should be inserted after the words "decisions taken by the Conference".

Lastly, he wished to make it clear that the stand he had thus taken was without prejudice to the right of the Philippines to reconsider its position at the General Assembly.

Mr. AGNELDO da SILVEIRA (Brazil) accepted the amendments proposed by the Netherlands and Philippines delegations and requested that the compromise text, with those amendments, should be given priority in the voting. If that text were adopted, the draft resolution A/CONF.35/L.3/Rev.1 would be withdrawn.

Mr. de LAIGLÉSLIA (Spain) and Mr. PEREZ-ROA (Dominican Republic), speaking as sponsors of draft resolution A/CONF.35/L.3/Rev.1, supported the statement by the Brazilian representative.

Mr. ESCHAUSSER (Netherlands) thanked the Brazilian representative for accepting his suggestions and wholeheartedly supported that representative's request for priority.

Mr. MABWERA (Zambia) also supported that request.
Mr. MAHAAF (United Arab Republic) thanked the Brazilian representative for accepting his suggestion.

Mr. NOLLIST (Nigeria) withdrew his amendment to draft resolution A/CONF.35/L.3/Rev.1 to facilitate adoption of the compromise text.

The PRESIDENT noted that there was no objection to the request for priority. He put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the Brazilian representative after the suspension, with the amendments later accepted by him.

The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 75 votes to none.

Mr. JARThIN CUBO (Ecuador), speaking on behalf of all the sponsors, withdrew the draft resolution A/CONF.35/L.3/Rev.1.

The meeting rose at 8.20 p.m.
SUMMARY RECORD OF THE TWENTIETH MEETING

held on Friday, 27 September 1968, at 11.5 p.m.

President: Mr. Arshad HUSAIN, Pakistan
Later, Mr. SEATON, United Republic of Tanzania
ADOPTION OF FINAL DOCUMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFERENCE DECISIONS (agenda item 15) (A/CONF.35/7; A/CONF.35/L.4/Rev.2 and A/CONF.35/L.7/Rev.1) (concluded)

Draft Declaration of the Conference

The President invited the Conference to consider the draft declaration of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (A/CONF.35/L.4/Rev.2), whose sponsors now included Mauritius.

Mr. Belovski (Yugoslavia), speaking on behalf of the sponsors, introduced the draft Declaration. In the second sentence of paragraph 6, the word "and" should be inserted after the word "appropriate". The last line in paragraph 6 should read: "including consideration of convening another Conference at an appropriate time". The second sentence of paragraph 9 had been deleted.

In preparing the draft declaration, the sponsors had endeavoured to express the common concerns and intentions of all States participating in the Conference. The text was intended to serve as an introduction to the resolutions and decisions of the Conference. In order to produce a balanced declaration, the sponsors had refrained from emphasizing their individual points of view. They had endeavoured to produce a text acceptable both to signatories and to non-signatories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In the course of drafting, the sponsors had consulted many delegations, and wished to thank them for their suggestions and advice. Suggestions made by the Canadian delegation, in particular, had been incorporated in the present text.

In view of the balanced nature of the draft Declaration and the spirit of co-operation in which it had been prepared, he hoped that it would be adopted unanimously.
Mr. AGISE (Ethiopia), speaking as a sponsor of the draft Declaration, commended it for adoption as the culmination of the work of the Conference. The text reflected the spirit of understanding and accommodation at which the Conference had aimed.

The support of the nuclear Powers was vital, and the sponsors had accordingly sought a basis for agreement between those Powers and the non-nuclear-weapon States. He joined the Yugoslav representative in appealing to the participating States to give the draft Declaration their unanimous support.

Mr. SHAHIC (Afghanistan), speaking as a sponsor of the draft Declaration, said that the discussions in the Committees and the plenary Conference had confirmed the universal concern felt at the threat to mankind represented by nuclear weapons, and had reflected the great hopes placed in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The participants had felt the need to make an appeal that mankind should be saved from nuclear holocaust, and the draft Declaration was designed to meet that need. He joined in the appeal for unanimous support.

Mr. GALLAN (Mexico) said that the draft Declaration was generally satisfactory to his delegation. However, he suggested that, at the end of the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 6, the words "to be formulated as soon as possible" should be inserted after the words "appropriate international arrangements".

Mr. BUCHS (Canada) thanked the sponsors for incorporating his delegation's suggestions in the draft Declaration. He accordingly withdrew the amendments submitted by his delegation to the previous text of the draft Declaration (A/CPL.35/L.4/Rev.1).

Mr. BLAESCHKELE (Switzerland) thanked the sponsors of the draft Declaration for an accurate and excellent expression of the concerns of the Conference. However, he was not convinced that nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament were a
necessary condition for the safeguarding of world peace and security, as was stated in paragraph 3. In his opinion, the opposite was true: peace and trust were necessary before disarmament could be achieved.

With regard to paragraph 3, Switzerland re-affirmed its adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, on which the contemporary international community was based. However, Switzerland, in view of its status as a non-member of the United Nations and its permanent neutrality, was not bound by the obligations imposed by the Charter.

Mr. ROLLIST (Nigeria) said that one of the most important matters discussed at the Conference was security. He agreed with the statement in paragraph 3 of the draft Declaration that disarmament was indispensable for the safeguarding of security. However, disarmament could not be achieved in the immediate future, and therefore other steps must be taken to afford at any rate some measure of security. To that end it was essential that the proliferation, including the horizontal proliferation, of nuclear weapons should be limited. His delegation therefore considered that the draft Declaration should mention renunciation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. He would prefer it to be mentioned in connexion with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but did not insist on linking the two. Such a reference would demonstrate the serious intention of the non-nuclear-weapon States to limit proliferation.

Mr. BELOVSKY (Yugoslavia) explained that, in preparing the draft Declaration, the sponsors had wished to convey an attitude favourable to security and to the cessation of the arms race. In their efforts to arrive at a balanced text, however, they had borne in mind that no decision on the subject had been adopted by the Conference, and they had therefore decided to make no reference to renunciation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The sponsors accepted the Mexican amendment.
Mr. Seaton (United Republic of Tanzania), Vice-President, took the Chair.

Prince Henri de LIECHTENSTEIN (Liechtenstein) said that his country adhered to the principles of the United Nations Charter. However, Liechtenstein was not a Member of the United Nations. Consequently, in voting for the draft Declaration, it was obliged to make a reservation with regard to the obligations assumed on the basis of the Charter, which were referred to in paragraph 9.

Mr. LOPEZ-HUENA (Colombia), speaking as a member of the Latin American group, said that he supported the draft Declaration because it reflected the principles and decisions of the Conference, especially with regard to security, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament. He hoped that another conference would continue the work which had been started.

Mr. VINCI (Italy) acknowledged the efforts made by the sponsors of the draft Declaration to reflect the main concerns of the Conference. He also appreciated their efforts to accept some of the changes suggested by his delegation. Like the Nigerian representative, he would have welcomed a more specific reference to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and especially to its articles III and VI.

Since the draft Declaration had been submitted, resolution II (draft resolution A/CONF.35/L.3/Rev.1, amended) had been unanimously adopted (19th meeting). He proposed that, in the light of the operative paragraph of that resolution, the last line in paragraph 8 of the draft Declaration should be amended to read: "including considering the best ways and means for the implementation of the decisions taken by the Conference, including the convening of another Conference at an appropriate time."

Mr. N.A. HUSAIN (India), speaking as a sponsor of the draft Declaration, pointed out that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was mentioned
in paragraph 4. A more detailed reference might have made it difficult for certain delegations to accept the declaration.

As to the Italian amendment, the sponsors had endeavoured to avoid summarizing Conference resolutions in the draft Declaration on the understanding that the resolutions as well as the Declaration would appear in the final document of the Conference.

Mr. Allaf (Syria) said that, although his delegation would have preferred a stronger reference to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the best means of renouncing the acquisition of nuclear weapons, it endorsed the general approach made in the draft Declaration.

Mr. Vinci (Italy) pointed out that resolution N was the only one unanimously adopted. Furthermore he had not suggested the incorporation of the whole operative paragraph of that resolution, but only of a few selected words which were more in keeping with the conclusions of the Conference than paragraph S as it stood.

Mr. Bublik (Canada) and Mr. JakoDzek (Poland) expressed the hope that the Italian representative would not insist on his amendment, which was not entirely consistent with the operative paragraph of resolution N.

Mr. Brillantes (Philippines) thought that the difficulty might be resolved by keeping as closely as possible to the wording used in the operative paragraph of resolution N.

Mr. Julius (Zambia) observed that the Declaration, together with the resolutions adopted, would be reproduced in the final document of the Conference.

The non-committal wording used in paragraph 4 of the draft Declaration with regard to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was probably the best that could be found. It had to be remembered that that Treaty was addressed to only a very limited number of non-nuclear-weapon States which were close to becoming nuclear-weapon States. It would be inappropriate to include in the draft Declaration a specific reference
to renunciation, since many States attending the Conference had no nuclear weapons to renounce.

Mr. K.A. KUSAIH (India) noted that, in the opinion of some delegations, the Italian amendment upset the delicate balance in the wording of paragraph 8. If the Canadian and Polish representatives maintained their objections to that amendment he would suggest on behalf of the sponsors of the draft declaration the following compromise wording for consideration by the Canadian, Polish and Italian representatives: "including the consideration of the question of convening another conference at an appropriate time".

Mr. DUNNS (Canada) and Mr. JACOBSZK (Poland) said that, although they preferred the original wording of paragraph 8, they were prepared to accept the wording suggested by the Indian representative.

Mr. VINC (Italy) saw no need to include the words "the consideration of". He would prefer the phrase in question to read: "including the convening of a second conference of non-nuclear-weapon States at an appropriate time".

Mr. JACOBSZK (Poland) said that he could not accept that wording.

Mr. H.A. KUSAIH (India) said that the wording just suggested by the Italian representative implied a considered decision, whereas the wording used in resolution N made it clear that further consideration should be given to the question of convening a second conference of non-nuclear-weapon States. The wording which he himself had suggested on behalf of the sponsors was that of the resolution.

Mr. VINC (Italy) accepted the wording suggested by the Indian representative.

In his opinion, the last paragraph of the draft Declaration conflicted with paragraph 17 of the draft of the final document of the Conference (A/CONF.35/7).
Mr. M.A. HUSAIN (India), speaking on behalf of the sponsors, announced that the last paragraph of the draft Declaration was deleted.

Mr. ENCINAS del PAMPO (Peru) said that, while he considered it right and proper for the Conference to adopt a declaration of the nature and scope of the text before it, he did not find that text entirely satisfactory either in substance or in form. In view of the lateness of the hour, however, he would refrain from submitting certain amendments of substance which he had intended to put to the Conference.

The draft Declaration (A/CONF.35/L.4/Rev.2), as amended, was adopted by 71 votes to none, with 1 abstention.

Mr. Arshad Husain (Pakistan), President, resumed the Chair.

Mr. HOKLAS (Australia), explaining his vote, said that his delegation interpreted the words "international control" at the end of the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 6 to mean international observation and such other health and safety measures and such safeguards responsibilities as may be given to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Furthermore, his delegation did not regard such international control as ruling out bilateral arrangements.

Mr. ALBERTO da SILVEIRA (Brazil) said that, if a separate vote had been taken on paragraph 4, his delegation would have abstained on that paragraph in conformity with the attitude which it had adopted towards General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII).

Mr. HOLLIST (Nigeria) said that he had abstained from voting on the draft Declaration because, in his delegation's view, the failure to refer to renunciation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons was a great mistake. Without effective non-proliferation there could be no security for anyone.

Mr. DUMONT (Argentina) said that his vote in favour of the draft Declaration in no way affected Argentina's attitude to General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII). It had abstained from voting on that resolution.
Mr. de LAIGLESIA (Spain) said that his delegation's position was the same as that of the Argentine delegation.

Draft final document of the Conference

Mr. BJORNSTEDT (Executive Secretary of the Conference), introducing the draft of the final document of the Conference (A/CONF.35/7), said that the text was based on a working paper prepared by the Secretariat, discussed in the Drafting Committee, and rewritten in the light of the discussion. There had not been time to complete some of the paragraphs, in particular paragraph 17.

Mr. VINCI (Italy), Chairman of the Drafting Committee, said that the document gave a factual account of the historical background to the Conference and briefly indicated some of its main features.

The Drafting Committee thought it best to reproduce the text of the various resolutions in the order of the agenda items, and follow them by that of the Declaration.

In the fifth line of paragraph 1, the word "many" should read "may".

In the third line of paragraph 9, after the words "Foreign Ministers", the words "and Cabinet Ministers" should be inserted.

He paid a tribute to the Secretariat for its invaluable assistance.

The draft of the final document of the Conference was adopted.

Mr. BJORNSTEDT (Executive Secretary of the Conference) stated that, as a number of the resolutions adopted referred to IAEA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Secretary-General of the United Nations would consult with the executive heads of those two bodies in order to coordinate the action to be taken on the recommendations made by the Conference.
STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AT THE TWELFTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE AGENCY

Mr. MARTINEZ COBO (Equador) said that he could not leave unanswered the statement by the Director-General of IAEA at the opening of the twelfth session of the General Conference of the Agency on 24 September 1963.

The Director-General of IAEA had said that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States had demonstrated an appalling ignorance and an apparent serious lack of co-ordination between the political and scientific organs in some of the countries represented. In his delegation's view that statement was not only unwise but intolerable; it justified the position taken by all those delegations to the Conference which had expressed the desire that drastic changes should be made in the Agency. He wished to remind the Director-General of the Agency that the Conference was not a strictly scientific conference but was fundamentally political in character. That was the import of General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI). He also wished to remind the Director-General of the Agency that the Conference was presided over by an eminent Minister for Foreign Affairs and attended by distinguished statesmen who directed the international policy of countries near to becoming nuclear States, and who rightly believed that peace could be achieved more easily through civilized discussions than through an increase in nuclear arsenals. Lastly, he wished to remind the Director-General of the Agency that IAEA was one of many intergovernmental organizations of the United Nations, composed of sovereign Governments which were entitled to elementary courtesy from international civil servants.

Mr. ALEJANDRO da SILVEIRA (Brazil) said that he too regretted that the Director-General of the Agency had seen fit to make that statement. He was convinced that the Conference had been very fruitful.
In his view, a conference attended by four ministers for Foreign Affairs should not be subject to such criticism.

Mr. GÓMEZ ROYLEDÓ (Mexico), Mr. FUALEE (United Arab Republic), Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan), Mr. GROSESFIELD (Uruguay), Mr. NADWERA (Kenya), Mrs. de GUIMARÃO (Paraguay), Mr. AYITE (Ghana) and Mr. de LAIGLESTIA (Spain) endorsed the statements made by the Ecuadorian and Brazilian representatives.

Mr. VINCI (Italy) asked whether it would be possible for the President of the Conference to make the views of the Conference known to the President of the General Conference of IAEA.

The President said that the statements made would be included in the records of the Conference. Those records would be transmitted in due course to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, whose attention would be drawn to them. Since the Conference had no connexion with the Agency it would not be proper for its President to transmit the views of representatives to the President of the General Conference of IAEA.

REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (A/C.17.35/Ch.1 and Add.1)

Mr. PANG Jin TAIK (Republic of Korea) stated that he wished to protest against the unprovoked political attack on his country made in the report of the Credentials Committee (A/C.17.35/Ch.1 and Add.1). In particular, the remarks of the Bulgarian representative as recorded in paragraph 5 were completely unacceptable. In view of the limited terms of reference of the Credentials Committee those remarks were also out of order, and had been rightly rejected by the representative of Australia, and by the representatives of other countries.

The Government of the Republic of Korea had been recognized twenty years earlier by the United Nations as the only legal Korean Government, and that position had repeatedly been reaffirmed by the United Nations.
Mr. HABEBA (Kenya) stated that he wished, on behalf of all the African representatives, to reiterate the reservation entered by Madagascar concerning the validity of the South African delegation's credentials. The present Government of South Africa was not representative of the people as a whole, since the overwhelming majority of the population were denied all participation in public life by the policy of apartheid. A delegation to such a Conference should be representative of all the people.

Mr. NAZIR (Pakistan) and Mr. NOAFAN (Southern Yemen) associated their delegations with the views expressed by the Kenyan representative.

Mr. SHAFIQ (Afghanistan), supported by Mr. NAZIR (Pakistan) and Mr. NOAFAN (Southern Yemen), said that his delegation recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the only Chinese Government entitled to send a delegation to the Conference. The present Chinese delegation's claim to represent the Chinese people was completely invalid.

Mr. ECOSCI (Rumania) said that, in his Government's view, only representatives appointed by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China were qualified to represent China in international affairs and at international meetings such as the present Conference. Those who claimed to represent China at the Conference had no authority to do so. For similar reasons, his delegation could not recognize the credentials of the persons sent to the Conference by the Saigon regime and the Seoul regime.

Mr. BULJIC (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation's acceptance of the Credentials Committee's report implied no change in the well-known position of the Yugoslav Government on such questions as the representation of the People's Republic of China, the policies pursued by the South African Government, and divided countries.
Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland) and Mr. DECK (Hungary) associated their delegations with the position taken by the Bulgarian representative as recorded in paragraph 5 of the Credentials Committee's report.

Mr. SOLE (South Africa) said that it was neither the time nor the place to discuss the reservations expressed by certain countries in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the report of the Credentials Committee, or the comments which had just been made. His delegation's credentials were perfectly valid and it would confine itself at the present time to rejecting the imputations of the representatives who had seen fit to challenge those credentials.

Mr. CHANG (Republic of China) said that it was improper and out of keeping with United Nations practice to discriminate against a delegation by calling upon its representative by name, as the President had just done. The delegation of the Republic of China had been invited to attend the present Conference pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 2153 B (XXI) and 2346 B (XXII). His delegation's credentials had been submitted in accordance with rule 3 of the rules of procedure (A/CONF.35/1) and had been duly confirmed by the Credentials Committee. His delegation regretted that some representatives had questioned its credentials, but it would vote for the adoption of the Credentials Committee's report.

Mr. LE-VAN-LOI (Republic of Viet-Nam) stated that he wished to refute the Bulgarian representative's observations, as recorded in the Credentials Committee's report, and the remarks just made by the Romanian representative.

The world well knew how the Governments of those countries construed the principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention in the affairs of other nations. His delegation could take but little account of the attitude of those countries toward the recognition or non-recognition of another State, since their
regimes were required by the political bloc to which they belonged to
assist the North Viet-Namese communist aggression against the Republic
of Viet-Nam.

The report of the Credentials Committee was adopted.

CLOSURE OF THE CONFERENCE

Mr. ALLAF (Syria), speaking on behalf of the Afro-Asian group,
thanked the President of the Conference for the able manner in which he
had directed its proceedings. The Conference marked a milestone in
mankind's attempts to find an alternative to destruction by nuclear
war. As a result of the Conference, the participants were now in a
better position to work towards that end, and it was to be hoped that
the United Nations would find ways of making further progress in that
direction.

Mr. CABRILES NICO (Bolivia), Mr. EDELSTAM (Sweden),
Mr. HAYASHIDA (Japan), Mr. KARSTEN (Bulgaria), Mr. TARCICCI (Yemen),
Mr. DOZIMOVIC (Yugoslavia), Mr. MALK (Pakistan) and Mr. NOAHAN (Southern
Yemen) associated their delegations with the Syrian representative's
statement.

The PRESIDENT thanked those representatives for their kind
remarks.

All delegations had realized at the outset that the Conference had
not been convened to act as a negotiating or decision-making body, and
that their deliberations would not produce any final solutions to the
complex problems involved. The limited purposes of the Conference had
been abundantly achieved. The general level of debate had been high
and many of the suggestions put forward had been extremely constructive.
The nuclear Powers had been represented and their interests had been
taken into account by the other participating States.

The most fruitful results of the Conference consisted in the
recommendations that the Governments of the USSR and the United States
should enter at an early date into discussions on the limitation of
offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of
defence against ballistic missiles (resolution E); that certain
collateral measures of disarmament should be negotiated in the near
future (resolution C); and that States should study the possibility of
establishing by treaty the military demilitarization of their respective
zones (resolution B). Importance also attached to the recommendations
that the IAEA system of safeguards should be accepted by all non-
nuclear-weapon States in order to prevent the diversion of source or
special fissionable material from peaceful uses to the production of
nuclear weapons (resolution E) and that IAEA should improve and simplify
its safeguards system (resolution F).

Among other significant achievements, the Conference had adopted
recommendations emphasizing the contribution which nuclear technology
might make to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing
countries (resolution G), and the need for the fullest possible
exchange of scientific and technical information on the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy (resolution H, part I). The Conference had also
endorsed the creation of a Special Nuclear Fund for financing nuclear
projects in developing countries (resolution I), and had recommended
that the membership of the Board of Governors of IAEA should be enlarged
so as to reflect equitable geographical distribution (resolution K,
part V).

The participants should not be discouraged by the fact that much of
the debate on security had proved inconclusive. A solid body of ideas
and knowledge had been created which would serve as a sound basis for
further consideration of the question of non-proliferation and security.
On behalf of the Conference, he expressed gratitude to the Director-
General and Secretariat of the Geneva Office of the United Nations for
their assistance and to the Swiss Federal Government for its hospitality.

He declared the Conference closed.

The meeting rose at 2:5 a.m. on Saturday, 28 September 1968.