CONFERENCE OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES

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MEASURES FOR THE CESSATION OF THE
NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Paper prepared by the Secretariat
INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I  INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II PAST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III DELIBERATIONS AT THE TWENTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) General comments</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Underground test ban</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Limitation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Cessation of production of nuclear weapons and</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liquidation of stockpiles</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vi) Cut-off in the production of fissionable material</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vii) Nuclear-free zones</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE RESUMED TWENTY-SECOND SESSION</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) United States-USSR agreement on bilateral talks on</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strategic delivery vehicles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) USSR Memorandum of 1 July 1968 to all governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V DEVELOPMENTS AT THE ENDC (JULY-AUGUST 1966)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

1. The debate on the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at the resumed session of the twenty-second General Assembly (24 April – 12 June 1968), made clear that the potential signatories considered the Treaty not as an end in itself but as a first step towards further and more substantive measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament. During the debate, many Members expressed the view that the durability and viability of the non-proliferation Treaty would largely depend on how vigorously and successfully negotiations on further measures of disarmament, as envisaged in Article VI of the Treaty, would be pursued. In the language of the Treaty "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." In this article, as in many previous documents, general and complete disarmament is the ultimate goal to be achieved.

2. The idea that, while efforts continue towards general and complete disarmament, limited measures of disarmament should also be pursued, was clearly formulated in the Joint Statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations by the USSR and the United States (A/4879). The statement, in part, reads as follows: "States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme."

3. One of the procedural innovations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) was the decision that concurrently with the elaboration of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, consideration would be given to various proposals on the implementation of limited, or collateral, measures of disarmament, i.e., of measures aimed at lessening international tension, consolidating confidence among States, and facilitating general and complete disarmament.1/

4. Among the many collateral measures of disarmament which have been proposed through the years2/, at least three emerged as major issues before the United Nations: the


discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the establishment of nuclear-free zones.\(^3\) The conclusion of a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons this year, has provided a means for the solution of the question of preventing a further spread of nuclear weapons. The 1963 Treaty to ban nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water has opened the way to a comprehensive test ban treaty, but, as shown in the following pages, much remains to be done to achieve such a comprehensive ban\(^4\). As regards nuclear-free zones, an important first step is undoubtedly represented by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The whole question of the establishment of nuclear-free zones is on the provisional agenda of the Conference\(^5\) and the subject is treated in a separate paper.\(^6\)

II. **PAST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY**

5. Following the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, efforts continued towards making the Treaty comprehensive by extending its provisions to underground tests as well. Thus, on 14 September 1964, the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC submitted a joint memorandum\(^7\) in which they expressed the hope that all States would adhere to the 1963 test ban Treaty; regretted that no progress had been made towards completing the ban; noted that all nuclear test explosions were condemned by General Assembly Resolution 1762 (XVII); and urged the nuclear Powers to press on with negotiations to extend the ban, noting that such steps could, in the view of the non-aligned members, be facilitated by an exchange of scientific and other information between the nuclear Powers or by the improvement of detection and identification techniques.

6. During the 1965 session of the ENDC, a number of proposals were submitted by the non-aligned delegations concerning an underground test ban. Sweeden\(^8\) formally proposed international co-operation in the detection of underground explosions by the exchange of seismic data ("the detection club"). In the course of the discussions, the United Arab Republic suggested that agreement be reached on a partial underground test ban covering events of seismic magnitude of 4.75 and above, coupled with a moratorium on underground testing below that magnitude and the exchange of scientific information among the nuclear Powers on the identification of underground tests.

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4/ See Section II below.
5/ A/CONF.35/L.2, point 11(e).
7/ ENDC/145.
8/ ENDC/154.
The Soviet Union declared itself ready to accept such a ban and moratorium. The United States supported the exchange of scientific information but reiterated its opposition to an unverified moratorium.

7. On 15 September 1965, the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC submitted a joint memorandum in which they urged the nuclear Powers to take immediate steps to reach agreement on banning all nuclear weapon tests; expressed the belief that agreement could be facilitated by the exchange of scientific and other information between the nuclear Powers or by the improvement of detection and identification techniques; and reiterated their appeal to the Powers concerned to suspend forthwith tests in all environments.

8. In the discussion at the 20th session of the General Assembly, in 1965, many countries endorsed Sweden's proposal for the establishment of a world-wide network of technically advanced seismological stations to form a "detection club". A number of countries urged the banning of underground tests above a specific threshold which could be policed by national means of detection, some linking their proposal to a moratorium on underground tests below the threshold.

9. At the 1965 session of the ENDC the non-aligned delegations submitted a number of suggestions in an attempt to overcome the differences between the USSR and the United States positions concerning verification of an underground test ban agreement. Among the suggestions were: (1) the idea that underground tests above a certain threshold should be banned by way of a treaty, and pending the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty, all other underground tests should be suspended; (2) the improvement, through international co-operation between national institutions, of the seismic data generally available, so as to create a better scientific basis for the evaluation of seismic events; (3) the idea of "verification by challenge", implying a system whereby a party suspected of underground nuclear weapon testing should find it in its interest to provide all available reassuring information, including possibly an invitation for inspection; this system to be related to rules for a possible withdrawal from the treaty if explanations, forthcoming after formal allegations have been made, were not found satisfactory.

10. The USSR, while expressing again readiness to accept the proposal for the cessation of underground tests above the "threshold" of seismic magnitude 4.75, to be accompanied by a voluntary moratorium on tests below the threshold, it rejected the verification-by-challenge proposal as a disguised form of international inspection. The United States repeated that it could not accept an unverified moratorium.

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9/ ENDC/159.
11. The dialogue on a comprehensive test ban continued in 1967. Sweden tabled in the ENDC a memorandum on the control of an underground test ban Treaty. The memorandum, containing technical data, was in support of the view that recent progress in the science of detection and identification of seismic events had made it possible to envisage a treaty without on-site inspection. Expanding on the memorandum, Sweden further said that, since a completely foolproof control system could never be devised, control should be based on deterrence created by the risk a prospective violator would entail of being discovered. Such a control system, based on deterrence and without obligatory on-site inspection, would be effective if it operated in conjunction with verification-by-challenge and with national stations exchanging data through the detection club.

12. The United States questions several of the conclusions contained in the Swedish memorandum and reiterated its position that some on-site inspection was still required to verify a comprehensive test ban.

III. DELIBERATIONS AT THE TWENTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

13. Among the measures of disarmament discussed at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, in addition to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, were the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the elimination of foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America, peaceful uses of the sea-bed and, of course, general and complete disarmament. At the resumed session of the General Assembly, discussion centred on the draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons.

14. At the resumed session of the General Assembly, Article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, pertaining to further measures of disarmament, was subject to comments by several delegations. Canada observed that the nuclear-weapon Powers could not be expected to make stronger commitments to further measures of disarmament than they had made in Article VI. On the other hand, Austria, China, Finland, Malta and Tanzania stated that Article VI was weaker than had been hoped for. India observed that obligations contained in Article VI had no sanctions behind them. Even the areas within which the negotiations were expected to be pursued had not been defined. What was required, in its view, was something in the nature of a nuclear moratorium. It said Article VI should make specific mention of urgent negotiations for the suspension of underground tests, a freeze in the production of nuclear delivery vehicles, and an agreement on the eventual reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals and the means 10/ ENDC/191.
of their delivery. States should move towards nuclear disarmament, thus preparing the way for general and complete disarmament within a reasonable time limit. Cyprus, Pakistan and Uganda said Article VI was only a declaration of intent and merely a commitment to negotiate.

15. The USSR stated that it was unrealistic to demand a radical solution of nuclear disarmament as a pre-condition for a separate measure for limiting the arms race, such as the non-proliferation Treaty. Insistence on such a demand would result in achieving neither a non-proliferation Treaty nor further nuclear disarmament measures. It would also be incorrect to think that after the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty, progress on further measures of nuclear disarmament would be automatic, even though disarmament prospects would improve.

16. The United States said that the language of Article VI indicated a practical order of priorities, headed by "cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date" and proceeding next to "nuclear disarmament" and finally to "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" as the ultimate goal. The United States believed that the permanent viability of the Treaty would depend to a large extent on the success of the United Nations in the further negotiations contemplated in Article VI.

(ii) Underground Test Ban

17. Nepal stated that once the non-proliferation Treaty was concluded, a ban on underground explosions could no longer be postponed. It was imperative that all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, be prohibited from conducting underground nuclear explosions. It proposed a five-year moratorium on all underground explosions - by all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, with the IAEA alone responsible for the management and control of peaceful explosions. Ghana supported this proposal. Other delegations which urged priority for an underground test ban following the non-proliferation Treaty were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Ceylon, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Jordan, Liberia, Malaya, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda, the United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

18. The USSR saw no reason why the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban should be postponed and that it was prepared to pursue negotiations on this question at the ENSO.

(iii) Limitation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles

19. The United Kingdom hold that both the USSR and the United States had a responsibility to abate the development of anti-ballistic missile systems which threatened to give an increased impetus to the nuclear arms race. Other Members also supporting this measure were the Netherlands and Sweden.
20. President Johnson in his statement in the General Assembly (A/741672) said that the United States urgently desired to begin early discussions on the limitation of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapon systems and pledged that it would search for an agreement that not only would avoid another costly and futile escalation of the arms race, but would de-escalate it.

21. The USSR stated that it was prepared to agree on concrete steps aimed at limiting and subsequently reducing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, to destroy the entire arsenal of those means, or to reduce it to an absolute minimum. India, Poland, Romania, Uganda and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic also supported this approach.

(iv) Cessation of production of nuclear weapons and liquidation of stockpiles

22. The USSR stated that it was ready to start, together with all nuclear weapon States, negotiations on stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons, reducing their stockpiles and subsequently banning and scrapping nuclear weapons under appropriate international control. In such negotiations it would seek agreement on the entire complex or on some of these measures. Also supporting this measure were Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Ceylon, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Poland, Romania, Uganda and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

(v) Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons

23. This measure, which was again proposed by the USSR, was also favoured by Albania, Ethiopia, India, Jamaica, Nepal, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Yugoslavia.

(vi) Cut-off in the production of fissionable material

24. Supporting this measure, proposed by the United States, were Afghanistan, Algeria, Canada, Cyprus, Ghana, Malta, Nepal, Pakistan, Sweden, Uganda, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.

(vii) Nuclear-free zones

25. Poland stated that the regional effectiveness of the non-proliferation Treaty could be increased by combining it with such far-reaching measures as demilitarization of geographical areas. Poland was traditionally interested in the realization of regional measures of disarmament in Europe. It stressed that the Rapacki Plan and the nuclear-freeze concept for Central Europe were still valid.

26. Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Guatemala, Guyana, Mexico, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Venezuela referred to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, an item fully discussed in the first part of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly.
27. **Ireland** observed that the General Assembly action with regard to denuclearization of Africa and Latin America blazed the trail for the non-proliferation Treaty and for the idea of security assurances. **Indonesia and Malta**, on the other hand, considered that Article VII of the Treaty, concerning nuclear-free zones, was of limited significance since it was not accompanied by an undertaking from nuclear States that they would support regional nuclear-free zones. Since the Treaty did not encompass all existing nuclear Powers, the security gained through such nuclear-free zones was rather doubtful.

28. **Sierra Leone** welcomed the Latin American Treaty as an example to other geographical regions, particularly Africa. **Tanzania**, while expressing its interest in Article VII of the non-proliferation Treaty and support for the denuclearization of Africa, stressed that the measure could not be formalized for Africa in view of the presence on African soil of alien governments which would undoubtedly cause problems whether they abstained from the treaty or wished to be signatories. **Canada**, on the other hand, felt that a widespread adherence of African States to the non-proliferation Treaty could facilitate a nuclear-free zone in Africa.

IV. **DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE RESUMED TWENTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

(i) **United States–USSR agreement on bilateral talks on limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive strategic delivery vehicles**

29. On 27 June 1968, Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, announced in the Supreme Soviet that the **USSR** Government was ready for an exchange of opinion with the United States on the question of mutual restrictions and subsequent reduction of strategic delivery vehicles. The **United States**, which had previously taken the initiative to bring about such an exchange of opinion, welcomed Mr. Gromyko’s statement. President Johnson, in a statement on 1 July 1968, at the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty in Washington, stated that he was gratified that agreement had been reached "between the Governments of the USSR and the United States to enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles".

(ii) **USSR Memorandum of 1 July 1968 to all governments**

30. The Memorandum of the **USSR** Government of 1 July 1968 "on some urgent measures for limitation of the arms race and for disarmament" calls for early agreement on nine
specific disarmament measures either simultaneously or separately. Some of those measures have been on the list of USSR disarmament proposals for a number of years, while others are quite new.\textsuperscript{11/}

v. DEVELOPMENTS AT THE ENDC (JULY-AUGUST 1968)

31. In his message to the ENDC, on 16 July 1968,\textsuperscript{12/} the President of the United States mentioned the halting of the strategic arms race as a measure that was "high on the disarmament agenda of mankind". In this connexion he reiterated the need to limit strategic delivery systems and referred to the agreement between the United States and the USSR to enter into bilateral discussions on the question. He also hoped that significant progress would soon be made on measures which had been the subject of past discussions. In addition, he also listed the question of arms limitation of sea-bed and regional limitations on armaments as measures which must soon be taken up.\textsuperscript{13/}

32. In his message to the ENDC, on 16 July 1968,\textsuperscript{14/}, Prime Minister Wilson stated that the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty had provided the ENDC with a "tremendous opportunity which must be exploited to the full" to turn its attention to other measures of disarmament. He hoped the present session of the Committee would initiate work that would enable further steps to be taken towards general and complete disarmament.

33. The Soviet Union circulated its memorandum of 1 July 1968 as an ENDC document\textsuperscript{15/} and said the proposals contained therein were based on the desire of peace-loving States which were in favour of the prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons and an end to the threat of nuclear war.

34. The ENDC gave considerable attention to further measures of disarmament and a large number of proposals were put forward in this regard. On 15 August 1968, the Committee adopted an agenda proposed by the Co-Chairmen which, they said, was done in recognition of the views expressed by the members of the Committee and in response to the recommendations of the General Assembly. They said that in proposing the agenda they had also taken into account the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and also the agreement between the United States and the USSR to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems. The agenda was as follows:

\textsuperscript{11/} For the full text of the USSR Memorandum, see Annex I to this paper.
\textsuperscript{12/} ENDC/228.
\textsuperscript{13/} For the full text of President Johnson's message, see Annex II to this paper.
\textsuperscript{14/} ENDC/229.
\textsuperscript{15/} ENDC/227.
(i) Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

The measures specified under this heading were the cessation of nuclear testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissile materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, and the establishment of nuclear-free zones.

(ii) Non-nuclear measures.

Under this heading specific mention was made of chemical and bacteriological warfare and regional arms limitations.

(iii) Other collateral measures.

Prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed was singled out for discussion under this heading.

(iv) General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

In this connexion the Co-Chairman noted the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament subject in any meeting of the Committee.

35. The Co-Chairman explained that the measure relating to the sea-bed was listed under the heading of "other collateral measures" because there existed a difference of opinion as to whether the question fell in the category of a nuclear measure or a non-nuclear measure. Its inclusion under a third category would obviate needless and lengthy discussion in this regard.
MEMORANDUM BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR ON SOME URGENT MEASURES FOR STOPPING THE ARMS RACE AND FOR DISARMAMENT

Since the very first days of its existence, the Soviet State has based its foreign policy on the struggle against the imperialist policy of aggression and war, the struggle to secure peace among the nations. Following the course mapped out by V.I. Lenin, the Soviet Government has perseveringly and consistently come out in favour of implementing a broad programme of measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament, in favour of translating into reality a plan of general and complete disarmament.

The active efforts of socialist countries, and of all peace-loving States, have resulted in a series of practical steps aimed at limiting the scope of the nuclear arms race and achieving disarmament. The Moscow Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was followed by the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in Outer Space, which blocked the way to outer space for nuclear weapons. Now drafted and ready for signature is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is of great importance for strengthening peace and creating favourable conditions for further efforts to stop the arms race and to implement effective measures for banning and destroying nuclear weapons.

The interests of safeguarding peace demand further steps to restrict the arms race and to achieve disarmament. This is the more important since, as a result of the intensified activities of aggressive circles, international tension has increased, the aggressive war waged by the United States in Viet-nam is growing in scope and the occupation by Israel of the territories, seized by force, of a number of Arab States continues.

After the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Soviet Government proposes that agreement should be reached to implement in the very near future the following urgent measures aimed at stopping the nuclear arms race and achieving disarmament.

1. **Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons**

Since the emergence of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has consistently advocated the prohibition and complete destruction of these weapons of mass annihilation. The conclusion of an international agreement banning the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step towards the solution of this problem and towards the removal of the threat
of nuclear war. Such an agreement would be a serious deterrent to all those who might wish to resort to nuclear weapons. By allaying the apprehensions of some States as to the intentions of others regarding the use of nuclear weapons, such an agreement would be conducive to the establishment of a healthy international atmosphere.

To facilitate a speedy solution of this problem, the Government of the USSR proposed for the consideration of the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-second session a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. A significant majority of the delegations at the Assembly concurred with the idea of the need for such an international convention. The Assembly called upon all States to examine the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Soviet Union as well as such other proposals as might be made on this question, and to conduct negotiations concerning the conclusion of an appropriate convention either through the convening of an international conference, or in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, or directly between States.

With a view to obtaining a practical solution of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Government proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament discuss as a matter of high priority the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of such weapons and exchange opinions on the convening of an international conference to sign an appropriate convention.

2. Measures for stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons and for reducing and destroying stockpiles

Desiring to deliver mankind from the danger of nuclear war, the Soviet Government proposes that all nuclear Powers should forthwith enter into negotiations on stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and on the reduction of stockpiles, to be followed by the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control. The Soviet Government declares its readiness to start such negotiations with all other nuclear Powers at any time. In so doing, the Soviet Government considers that in the course of such negotiations an agreement may be achieved both on the whole package of measures leading to the destruction of nuclear weapons and on some of the measures designed to achieve that aim.

3. Limitation and subsequent reduction of means of delivery of strategic weapons

The Soviet Government proposes that agreement should be reached on definite steps for the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government considers that the destruction of the whole arsenal of
strategic means of delivery, or at any rate the reduction of that arsenal to an absolute minimum, leaving — and that only temporarily — no more than a strictly limited quantity of such means of delivery, would be a measure conducive to the removal of the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet Government declares its readiness to undertake an exchange of views with the States concerned on the mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

4. Prohibition of flights beyond national borders of bombers carrying nuclear weapons. Limitation of navigation zones for rocket-carrying submarines

The Soviet Government has repeatedly drawn the attention of the Governments of other States and of world public opinion to the danger inherent in the flights of bombers with nuclear weapons on board beyond national borders. The increased number of accidents involving United States bombers with nuclear weapons on board outside the territory of the United States is a matter of legitimate concern to various countries. There is no guarantee that the next accident to a bomber armed with nuclear bombs will not result in a nuclear explosion, with all the ensuing consequences. In the present state of tension, such a nuclear explosion may lead to a whole series of grave events, to a conflict dangerous for all mankind. From the military point of view, such flights of bombers, given the existence of rockets carrying nuclear warheads, are devoid of sense. They can have but one aim — to increase international tension, regardless of the consequences of such a dangerous practice.

The Soviet Government proposes that flights beyond national borders of bombers with nuclear weapons on board should be banned without delay.

In order to reduce the risk of nuclear war, the Soviet Government also proposes that agreement should be reached to the effect that patrolling by submarines carrying nuclear missiles should be prohibited in areas from which the missiles can reach the frontiers of the contracting parties.

5. Ban on underground nuclear-weapon tests

The Soviet Union has been and continues to be a steadfast advocate of the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, believing that the banning of all tests will promote the consolidation of peace and the slackening of the arms race. The Soviet Government is prepared to reach agreement without delay on the banning of underground nuclear-weapon tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection to control observance of the ban.
6. **Prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons**

The Soviet Government has on several occasions drawn the attention of States to the threat posed for mankind by the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Voicing the general concern of nations over such a threat, the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-first session adopted a resolution calling for strict observance by all States of the principles of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare, condemning all actions contrary to that objective and inviting all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol.

By some countries, however, chief among them the United States of America, this important decision of the General Assembly is not being carried out. What is more, the United States is using chemical weapons in its aggressive war in Viet-nam. The Soviet Government therefore proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should consider ways and means of securing the observance by all States of the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare.

7. **Elimination of foreign military bases**

Foreign military bases in the territories of other States are a serious danger to peace. Such bases are a source of military conflicts and a threat to the freedom and independence of peoples. This is convincingly proved by the continuing aggressive war of the United States in Viet-nam and by the tension and conflicts in other parts of the world where foreign bases are situated.

The Soviet Government proposes that, in accordance with the mandate given by the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-first session, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should give urgent consideration to the question of the elimination of foreign military bases.

8. **Measures for regional disarmament**

The Soviet Government is in favour of establishing demilitarized zones in various parts of the world. It is of the opinion that the creation of such zones should effectively limit the area of distribution of nuclear weapons and be fully consistent with the objective of preventing their direct or indirect proliferation.

The Soviet Government considers that not only groups of States embracing whole continents or large geographical areas but also more limited groups of States and even individual countries may assume obligations to establish demilitarized zones.
The Soviet Government also supports proposals concerning the implementation of measures for regional disarmament and for the reduction of armaments in various parts of the world, including the Middle East. The question of such measures to restrict the arms race in the Middle East could, of course, be considered only subject to the elimination of the consequences of the Israel aggression against Arab countries and, above all, subject to the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories of Arab countries occupied by them.

9. Peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor

The interests of the restriction of the arms race are also served by the limitation of the military uses of the environments in which man lives and works and by the prevention of the extension of such uses to new spheres of human activity. The Soviet Government has consistently striven and is still striving towards the achievement of these goals, and it is gratified to note that important practical steps in this direction are to be found in the relevant limitations embodied in the Antarctic Treaty and in the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

The progress of research and the prospects for the development of the sea-bed and the ocean floor make it possible to raise the question of giving timely expression in appropriate form, to a regime such as would ensure the utilization of the sea-bed beyond the limits of the present territorial waters solely for peaceful purposes. That would, in particular, involve the prohibition of the establishment of fixed military installations on the sea-bed, as well as other activities of a military nature. The Soviet Government proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should start negotiations on the question of the utilization exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed beyond the limits of the present territorial waters.

* * *

In proposing the above measures, the Soviet Government draws attention to the need for making every effort to achieve concrete results in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to give a new impetus to the negotiations on this question in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. At the same time it is in favour of the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly's decision concerning the holding of a world disarmament conference, and it is
confident that the convening of such a conference will contribute to the solution of this most important problem confronting mankind.

Guided by its position of principle in questions concerning the struggle for peace, the Soviet Union, in co-operation with the socialist countries and with all peace-loving States, will work for removing the threat of nuclear war, for curbing the forces of aggression and for carrying out a broad programme of disarmament. The Soviet Government calls upon all States to do all that is necessary to achieve agreement on urgent measures for stopping the arms race, and on disarmament.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Message of President Johnson to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

Your conference has achieved singular success in negotiating the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty is a major step toward a goal which the United States has been seeking since the dawn of the nuclear age. It is a triumph of sanity in international affairs and a testament to man's will to survive.

The world looks today for a beginning of the negotiations called for by the Treaty -- "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament...".

This is the most pressing task which the treaty lays on its parties, and the nations meeting in Geneva today share a major responsibility in performing it. The United States takes this responsibility with the utmost seriousness.

High on the disarmament agenda of mankind is the need to halt the strategic arms race. Agreement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into bilateral discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. It is expected that the two sides will shortly reach a decision on the time and place for talks.

In the absence of agreement, the nuclear arms race could escalate to new levels. This would only result in higher and higher destructive power on each side and vast diversion of resources from peaceful pursuits - with no increase in security for anyone.

If we can make progress on limiting strategic delivery systems, the United States would be prepared to consider reductions of existing systems. By reducing these systems, we would cut back effectively - and for the first time - on the vast potentials for destruction which each side possesses.
The United States and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility to head off a strategic arms race. The fate of mankind could well depend on the manner in which our two nations discharge that responsibility.

Progress on limiting strategic delivery systems will also facilitate the achievement of various related measures of nuclear arms control and disarmament. A number of such measures has been suggested by the United States. Additional measures have been proposed by other nations and recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The United States hopes that your conference will soon be able to make significant progress on measures which have been the subject of past discussions. But these are not the only subjects of interest to the conference.

We must soon take up the question of arms limitations on the seabed in the light of the consideration being given by the General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabeds to a number of proposals for arms limitations on the seabed. Your conference should begin to define those factors vital to a workable, verifiable and effective international agreement which would prevent the use of this new environment for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction.

Meaning must soon be given to the language of the Non-Proliferation Treaty dealing with sharing potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. In the view of the United States, the International Atomic Energy Agency is the "appropriate international body" through which the non-nuclear-weapon parties to the treaty may obtain these benefits under Article V of the Treaty if they choose to do so. We also believe that the IAEA is the appropriate forum for development of procedures and agreements relating to the furnishing of the peaceful nuclear explosive services obtained through the IAEA.

Finally, we must be alert to opportunities for achieving regional limitations on armaments. We have seen that co-operation at the regional level to limit armaments is not only possible but is in fact a promising path to progress. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a worthy example of what can be achieved when neighbours collaborate in safeguarding their national security interests and in promoting their common welfare. In signing Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States had demonstrated its intention to respect the denuclearized status of Latin America which will be established by that Treaty. We hope that all nuclear powers will respect this great achievement of Latin American diplomacy.
We have also seen the consequences of the failure of nations to effect regional arrangements to inhibit the growth of arsenals of conventional weapons. Resources continue to be diverted from critical human needs to the acquisition of armaments and the maintenance of military establishments that in themselves feed fears and create insecurity among nations.

The United States attaches particular importance to halting non-nuclear arms races. We must achieve regional limitations on conventional armaments.

Representatives of the United States are under standing instructions to search out any initiatives for regional restraints coming from the areas concerned. If arrangements acceptable to the nations involved can be concluded, they will be respected by the United States. We stand ready to support any reasonable measure affecting the activities of the major weapons-producing that would make a regional agreement more effective, including a requirement that suppliers publicize or register their arms shipments to a particular region.