CONFERENCE OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES

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SECURITY ASSURANCES IN THE CONTEXT OF MEASURES TO PREVENT
THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Paper prepared by the Secretariat
CONTENTS

I. Initial Steps
II. Draft Security Council Resolution
III. Deliberations of the Twenty-Second Session of the General Assembly
IV. Action by the Security Council

Page
1
2
3
5
SECURITY ASSURANCES IN THE CONTEXT OF MEASURES TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. An essential element of a non-proliferation agreement is the assurance that States which have foregone the right to acquire nuclear weapons will never become the victims of a nuclear attack or a threat thereof. Since the beginning of negotiations on a treaty to ban the further spread of nuclear weapons in 1965, the States not possessing nuclear weapons have repeatedly called attention to the need of security assurances. Their position has generally been that a realistic non-proliferation treaty should meaningfully safeguard the security of States which voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons.

I. Initial Steps

2. Attempts to find a solution to the problem of security assurances were made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States early in 1966. On 27 January 1966, President Johnson, in a message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), stated: "So that those who forswear nuclear weapons may forever refrain without fear from entering the nuclear arms race, let us strive to strengthen the United Nations and other international security arrangements. Meanwhile, the nations that do not seek the nuclear path can be sure that they will have our strong support against threats of nuclear blackmail" (ENDC/165).

3. On 1 February 1966, Chairman Kosygin declared that, in order to facilitate agreement on the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Government was willing to include in the treaty "a clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons in their territory" (ENDC/167).

4. These proposals and the question of security assurances in general were subsequently discussed at some length in the ENDC and also at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. On 17 November 1966, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2153A (XX) which, inter alia, (a) called upon all nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which may conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories; (b) requested the ENDC to "consider urgently the proposal that the nuclear-weapon Powers should give an assurance that they will not use or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories, and any other proposals that have been made or may be made for the solution of this problem."
5. The identical draft treaties tabled by the United States and the Soviet Union in the ENDC on 24 August 1967 (ENDC/192 and 193) did not include any provision for security assurances. However, in tabling the draft treaty, the United States representative said:

"We recognize that the problem of security assurances, which is of concern to some non-aligned countries, remains to be considered. The United States maintains the view that this is a matter which, because of its complexity and the divergent interests involved, cannot be dealt with in the treaty itself. We are, however, exploring various possible solutions, including action which could be taken in the context of the United Nations, whose primary purpose is the maintenance of peace and security. We expect that the Co-Chairmen will be exploring this problem further with a view to presenting recommendations to this Committee in the course of our consideration of the treaty." (ENDC/FV.325)

6. On that same occasion, the USSR representative said:

"The Soviet Union ... attaches great importance to the question of guarantees of security for the non-nuclear-weapon States which will assume the obligation not to manufacture and not to acquire nuclear weapons. It is well known that ... in 1966 the USSR proposed the inclusion in the treaty of a provision that the nuclear Powers should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States which have no nuclear weapons on their territories. In submitting the draft treaty, the Soviet delegation is acting on the basis of the understanding reached between the Co-Chairmen to continue the exchange of views on the guarantees of security for the non-nuclear-weapon States in order to find a positive solution of this urgent and important problem." (ENDC/FV.325)

II. Draft Security Council Resolution

7. On 7 March 1968, the representatives of the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States reported to the ENDC that they had agreed on a mutually accepted formula on security assurances in the form of a draft Security Council Resolution. By this draft resolution the Security Council would: (1) recognize that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter; (2) welcome the intention expressed by certain States that they would provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that was a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used; and (3) reaffirm in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurred against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council had taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
8. The United States stated (ENDC/PV.375) that the three nuclear Powers had searched for a solution "which would be credible, and therefore effective, in the face of unforeseen circumstances". The solution had been found within the framework of the United Nations and, in particular, of the Security Council, the organ of the United Nations bearing primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The key paragraph of the draft Security Council Resolution envisaged declarations of intention in support of the provision of assurances to parties to the non-proliferation treaty. These declarations would give increased significance to the action of the Security Council. They would serve as a warning and have a deterrent effect against a potential nuclear aggressor. The USSR and the United Kingdom made statements along the same lines.

III. Deliberations of the Twenty-Second Session of the General Assembly

9. The question of security assurances was debated at length at the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly (24 April to 12 June 1968) in conjunction with the draft Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

10. In the course of the debate, the United States said that the resolution was a deterrent factor and was the most appropriate and effective solution to the problem of security assurances within the framework of the United Nations Charter. Experience had shown that when three nuclear nations had joined in support of a proposed action by the Security Council, such action had usually been forthcoming and effective. The vital interests of the three guarantor nations dictated that there be no nuclear aggression from any quarter.

11. The USSR said that the renunciation of the use of force provided for under the United Nations Charter, when linked with the proposed security assurances, would more reliably ensure the security of non-nuclear States. The Security Council resolution would serve as a deterrent to a potential aggressor, and the re-affirmation of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter should allay doubts of those who wondered what would happen if the Security Council failed to take action.

12. The United Kingdom stated that the Security Council was the proper forum in which security assurances should be given, since nuclear aggression, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear State, would be a threat to the whole international community. Moreover, once the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force, the credibility of the security assurances would become part of the vital self-interest of the three nuclear Powers that offered them.
13. Several Members, including Congo, Cuba, Iran, Jamaica, Mauritania, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, questioned the credibility of the proposed security assurances. Afghanistan, Colombia, Dahomey, Ghana, Lesotho, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia hold that the possibility of the use of veto in the Security Council contributed to the lack of credibility in the draft resolution.

14. Some Members (among them, Afghanistan, Cyprus, Dahomey, Iran, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia) questioned the use of the word "aggression" in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Security Council draft resolution inasmuch as that word had eluded definition in the United Nations.

15. Brazil, Dahomey, Panama, Spain, Tanzania and Uganda stated that the resolution imposed no obligation on the nuclear Powers which they had not already assumed under the United Nations Charter.

16. El Salvador and Chile thought that the main shortcoming of the proposed assurances lay in the fact that only three nuclear Powers were offering them. Turkey urged the nuclear members of the Security Council not adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to make a declaration that they would abide by the resolution. Australia emphasized that the validity of the assurances depended upon harmonious relations among the three nuclear Powers. Albania charged that the resolution was aimed primarily at the People's Republic of China and had to be viewed as a military alliance aimed against that country. Also Albania, Nepal and Zambia felt that the resolution might be construed to be directed against the People's Republic of China and urged that its rights in the United Nations be restored. Indonesia and Sierra Leone expressed concern that the People's Republic of China and France had not been involved in the question of security assurances.

17. Nepal rejected the idea of security assurances completely and was therefore opposed to the draft resolution. Afghanistan and Liberia believed that the solution of the problem lay in the prevention of aggression and not in retaliation to the aggression. Sudan held that the peace-keeping abilities of the United Nations should be improved. Cyprus wanted the security assurances to cover all armed aggression or threat of aggression, both nuclear and non-nuclear.

18. Several Members, including Barbados, Colombia, Kenya, Panama, Rwanda, Spain, Tanzania and Trinidad and Tobago, believed that security guarantees should have been incorporated in the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself.
19. The idea that the nuclear Powers should undertake an obligation never to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States was supported by many Members, including Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Hungary, India, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Romania, Rwanda, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

20. Following the conclusion of the debate in the General Assembly and the adoption of resolution 2373 (XXIII) condemning the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the question of security assurances was taken up by the Security Council pursuant to a letter dated 12 June 1968 (S/8630), addressed to the President of the Council by the representatives of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States. The letter requested an early meeting of the Council to consider the draft resolution (S/8631)\(^1\) which the three nuclear Powers submitted on the same date.

IV. Action in the Security Council

21. The Security Council considered the tripartite draft resolution from 17 to 19 June 1968. In conjunction with the tabling of the draft resolution, the representatives of the three countries also made formal declarations on behalf of their Governments.\(^2\)

22. In his statement, the representative of the USSR pointed out that the three-Power draft resolution proceeded from the generally recognized fact that any act of aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security of all States. The key provision of the draft resolution was contained in operative paragraph 1 which provided the solution to the question of strengthening the security of the non-nuclear countries within the framework of the Security Council, upon which the United Nations Charter placed the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The draft resolution proposed to express a positive attitude towards the intention of certain States to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that became a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used. The Soviet Union stood among those countries which intended to provide or support, if necessary, immediate assistance to the countries concerned.

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1/ Annex I to this paper.
2/ Annex II to this paper.
23. The representative of the United Kingdom stressed four points which his delegation regarded as being of primary importance in connexion with the security assurances embodied in the draft resolution and the declaration: (1) the assurances were given as a result of representations made by non-nuclear-weapon States, to which his Government and others had readily responded; (2) the assurances had deliberately been made without any limitation in time and to meet world-wide diversity of interests, and for that reason, they were, and must be, in general terms; (3) the three co-sponsors considered it right that the assurances be given in the Security Council and within the framework of the Charter, as to do otherwise would have derogated from the authority of the United Nations and from the obligations as members of the United Nations; and (4) it should be clear that any country contemplating nuclear aggression, or the threat of it, against a non-nuclear signatory of the Treaty would be deterred by the assurances given in common by the most powerful nuclear States in the world. No one could doubt that the deterrence of East and West to prevent any act or threat of nuclear aggression, was a development of the utmost importance in world affairs.

24. The President of the Security Council, speaking as the representative of the United States, said that the three-Power draft resolution and the declaration made in conjunction with it would lay a firm political, moral and legal basis for ensuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Charter. Those assurances, combined with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would give each State, if not perfect security, more security than it would otherwise enjoy. In that context, the adoption of the draft resolution would be a major contribution to international peace and security.

25. The representative of France declared that his delegation's position on the draft resolution was in line with that taken in the General Assembly, when France abstained on the resolution of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although the adoption of the draft resolution would in no way alter the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, his Government could not join the sponsors of the draft or the declaration because it believed that the only solution to the nuclear menace lay in the cessation of the production and the destruction of the stockpiles of nuclear arms. The nations of the world would not be secure until the nuclear Powers agreed upon and achieved nuclear disarmament. France was prepared to accept any initiative towards that end.

26. The representative of Canada said his Government had supported the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to expect security assurances in return for renouncing nuclear weapons. The proposal now made by the nuclear Powers fell squarely within the framework of the United Nations Charter and seemed to be the best answer at present to this
difficult and complex question. His delegation hoped that the other two nuclear Powers would follow suit in due course. The resolution reaffirmed Article 51 of the Charter concerning the right of States to individual and collective self-defence until the Council took action. This was an important assertion that a non-nuclear party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty threatened with or subjected to nuclear attack could expect assistance from one or more of the nuclear Powers supporting the resolution pending Council action.

27. The representative of Denmark welcomed the agreement of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States embodied in the draft resolution before the Council and in their statements. The political significance of this agreement went far beyond the text of the guarantee formula embodied in it. His delegation was satisfied that the solution proposed provided such global security as might be obtained in the prevailing international situation. At any rate, it provided a greater measure of security than was now at hand.

28. The representative of Paraguay stated that although the Non-Proliferation Treaty did not entirely meet the wishes of the Latin American States, the advantages of the Treaty had led his Government to support it. Paraguay had thus pledged to undertake all the obligations of the Treaty and was therefore entitled to special guarantees from the nuclear Powers. Although no guarantee could provide absolute security, guarantees were preferable to none at all. It was therefore in his Government’s interest to accept them.

29. The representative of Hungary observed that the draft resolution constituted an important step in applying the United Nations Charter to the realm of nuclear weapons — a contingency not envisaged when the Charter was drafted. It would provide meaningful implementation of the Charter provisions for the maintenance of international peace and security. The three identical declarations and the draft resolution provided for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty and strengthened the collective security system under the Charter. They were also a powerful deterrent to nuclear aggression. The non-nuclear countries could hardly expect stronger assurances.

30. The representative of Senegal said that the fact that East and West had achieved an agreement was an historic event. The draft resolution and the declaration were obviously made in good faith and were aimed at protecting the security of non-nuclear States. In any case, it was necessary to evaluate objectively what would happen in case of nuclear aggression in the absence of any security assurances.
31. The representative of Algeria stated that the draft resolution gave the treaty the nature of a collective security covenant from which only the signatories would benefit. It was unprecedented for the Council to act as guarantor for any covenant. Moreover, while the United Nations Charter placed the responsibility for safeguarding and maintaining peace on the five permanent Members of the Security Council, the draft resolution required the agreement of only three permanent Members, thus calling into question a balance worked out when the Council was created. This was a biased approach and implied an indirect alteration of the Charter. The draft resolution seemed to be directed against the People's Republic of China. The restoration of its rights in the United Nations would be the decisive test of the effectiveness of the resolution. China had repeatedly declared that it would under no circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons and France did not envisage offensive use of its nuclear arsenal. However, these two nuclear Powers were not ready to enter into commitments similar to those assumed by the other three nuclear Powers. Consequently, the assurances were either inadequate or unnecessary.

32. The representative of Brazil said the United Nations Charter set up a universal security machinery which included all Members of the Organization without exception. However, the guarantees referred to in the draft resolution were offered by only three of the five nuclear Powers and would apply only to parties to the Treaty on non-proliferation. Moreover, while the Charter established juridical obligations, the draft resolution and the unilateral declarations of the three great Powers were only statements of intention. The draft resolution, therefore, fell short of assuring the guarantees against all kinds of aggression already contemplated in the Charter. The proposed assurances also failed to meet the objective of establishing an acceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities between nuclear and non-nuclear States.

33. The representative of Ethiopia observed that the question of security assurances was one of re-adapting the collective security system established under the Charter to meet the exigencies of the atomic age and not of establishing yet another competing collective security system on the sole behalf of those States accepting the non-proliferation Treaty. Under the United Nations Charter all Member States, including all permanent members of the Security Council, assumed the obligation to come to the assistance of a victim of aggression. The fact that aggression is committed by means of atomic weapons or that the use of atomic weapons is threatened could not change the character of that obligation. The collective security guarantee inherent in the United Nations Charter must be applicable to all Member States without discrimination. At the same time, his delegation appealed to all Member States to
adhere to the non-proliferation treaty. The best means to ensure the security of all nations was to sign a convention prohibiting the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and pending signature of such a convention, a clear undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. It was regrettable that such a pledge was not forthcoming as was also the failure to refer to the General Assembly resolution calling on the nuclear Powers not to use these weapons.

34. The representative of China said that neither the draft resolution nor the declarations had added anything to the provisions of the Charter. In that light, one might question whether the draft resolution was necessary. The record of the Security Council with regard to the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression was unfortunately not such as to lend credibility to the proposed security assurances. There also remained the problem of arriving at a consensus on what constituted aggression, nuclear or otherwise. But no system of security guarantees could be absolute and watertight. The guarantees embodied in the draft resolution, though far from perfect, were better than none and gave the non-nuclear States more protection than they would otherwise. His delegation attached great importance to the fact that both the draft resolution and the declarations reaffirmed the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence. This was vital to all who relied on regional arrangements or other multilateral or bilateral arrangements for their national security.

35. The representative of Pakistan stated that the question of security assurances required the most careful consideration and his delegation had hoped that the vote would be deferred until after the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. In view of the absence of an agreed definition of aggression, the draft resolution should have rather dealt with the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. The existence of the veto made the assurances uncertain and the declarations were only declarations of intent. It seemed only just that if non-nuclear States forewore nuclear weapons for defence, the nuclear Powers should in return renounce the use of such weapons against them. The draft resolution by making a State's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty a condition for receiving protection against nuclear aggression or the threat thereof, gave preferential treatment to States adhering to the Treaty. The draft resolution and the declarations reaffirmed the inherent right, recognized in the Charter, to individual and collective self-defence. That right existed independently of the Charter and could not limit a State's option in obtaining assistance to prevent or counter a nuclear attack. The provisions of Article 51 of the Charter were no longer adequate to the requirements of the right of self-defence in an age of nuclear weapons. Such a right could hardly be restricted to the actual occurrence of a nuclear armed
attack. Few non-nuclear-weapon States would be able to survive a nuclear strike to exercise the right of self-defence. The draft resolution opened the possibility of the three nuclear powers acting to deter or suppress a nuclear attack before the Council could act or when it was unable to act. At the same time, few of the non-nuclear-weapon States could realistically expect that the possibility would become an actuality. 36. The representative of India said the real hope of security for non-nuclear-weapon States lay in nuclear disarmament. However, it was obvious that action in that field would take time and would have to be sought through stages. Until then, and purely as an interim measure, the nuclear-weapon States had a definite obligation to assure non-nuclear-weapon States that their security would not be endangered in any way by the use or threat of use of such weapons, and that these weapons would not be used as instruments of pressure, intimidation or blackmail. Any security assurances the nuclear-weapon States might offer should not be regarded as a quid pro quo for signing a non-proliferation treaty. Any linking of security assurances to the signature of a non-proliferation treaty would be contrary to Charter provisions since the Charter did not discriminate between those who might adhere to a particular treaty and those who might not. The Charter was clear that the assistance of the Security Council should be available in equal measure to all States and not merely to the signatories of a particular treaty. It would be inappropriate, therefore, for the Council to welcome the partial assurances mentioned in operative paragraph 3. It was to the interest of the international community that non-nuclear-weapon States be encouraged to remain in that category. That could be done only by ensuring the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States in conformity with the Charter, regardless of whether or not they signed the non-proliferation Treaty. The draft resolution did not fully accord with the basic principles which should govern the problem of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. 37. The draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 10 in favour to none against, with 5 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, France, India, Pakistan).
ANNEX I

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: JOINT DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of States to subscribe to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thereby to undertake not
to receive the transfer from any transferee whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly,
or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that, in
conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons
would endanger the peace and security of all States,

1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such
aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the
Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have
to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter;

2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will provide or
support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon
State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim
of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;

3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of
the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.
ANNEX II

DECLARATION BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

"The Government of the (USSR, United Kingdom, United States) notes with
appreciation the desire expressed by a large number of States to subscribe to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

"We welcome the willingness of these States to undertake not to receive the
transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

"The (USSR, United Kingdom, United States) also notes the concern of certain of
these States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard
their security. Any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons would
endanger the peace and security of all States.

"Bearing these considerations in mind, the (USSR, United Kingdom, United States)
declares the following:

"Aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a
non-nuclear-weapon State would create a qualitatively new situation in which the
nuclear-weapon States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council
would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures
necessary to counter such aggression or to remove the threat of aggression in
accordance with the United Nations Charter, which calls for taking 'effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace'. Therefore, any State which
commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or which threatens such
aggression must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures
to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression
or remove the threat of aggression.

"The (USSR, United Kingdom, United States) affirms its intention, as a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council
action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon
State, Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

"The (USSR, United Kingdom, United States) reaffirm in particular the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

"The (USSR, United Kingdom, United States) vote for the resolution before us and this statement of the way in which the (USSR, United Kingdom, United States) intend to act in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations are based upon the fact that the resolution is supported by other permanent members of the Security Council who are non-nuclear-weapon States and are also proposing to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and that those States have made similar statements as to the way in which they intend to act in accordance with the Charter."