Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

Geneva, 1968

Committee 2

Working Paper of the Italian Delegation concerning the proposal for the reduction of military stocks of nuclear materials through the transfer of fissionable materials to the peaceful uses of non-nuclear countries

1. On 1 August 1967, the Foreign Minister of Italy presented, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, a proposal for the limited transfer of fissionable materials from military stocks of nuclear weapon States to the peaceful uses of non-nuclear weapon States.

2. The Italian Delegation thinks it should be appropriate for the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to consider this proposal, which would in its opinion:

(a) be a positive step towards partial disarmament. The nuclear weapon States, in fact, would make available, on a yearly basis, a limited amount of fissionable materials, taken from the materials stock-piled or being produced for military uses;

(b) represent a practical incentive for developing peaceful application of nuclear energy in the non-nuclear-weapon States. The amount of fissionable material made available under the terms of the proposal of the Italian Delegation, would be transferred to non-nuclear-weapon States at a lower price than its market value;

(c) represent an incentive for economic progress of developing countries.

The proposal foresees that part of the payment due by the States acquiring said fissionable materials, would be devolved to a fund of the United Nations to support projects for practical application of nuclear energy beneficial to the economic progress of developing countries.
3. The details of the proposal are indicated below. If acceptable in principle, they could be a useful basis of discussion.

- Nuclear weapon States would make available to non-nuclear-weapon States a yearly amount of fissionable materials equivalent to ...... Kg. of U-235 content for the period of 5 years. The material could be supplied either under form of highly enriched (weapon grade) uranium or of uranium at the enrichment needed for a specific application.

Nuclear weapon States would undertake to agree among themselves the respective quotas of fissionable material to be made available. For each subsequent 5-year period, the yearly amount of fissionable materials to be made available would be larger and proportional to the progress of nuclear disarmament and the increased need for peaceful uses in the non-nuclear weapons States. To this effect the increase in the total nuclear power installed in the non-nuclear-weapon countries, from the beginning to the end of the preceding 5-year period, should be considered as the main deciding factor.

- The yearly amount of fissionable materials would be divided each year among the non-nuclear-weapon States according to their respective needs. Non-used parts of the yearly amount of fissionable materials would increase the quota of the following years.

- The non-nuclear-weapon States would pay, for the fissionable materials made available to them, a price equal to the market value per Kg. of U-235 content, whatever its enrichment, reduced by an amount equal to ......% of the market value per Kg. of U-235 content for highly enriched (weapon grade) uranium. One half of the sum would be paid to the supplying State, and one half into a special United Nations Fund. This Fund would be used to support the carrying out of projects for peaceful applications of nuclear energy in developing countries, intended to be of special significance for their economic progress.

- The laying down of rules covering the supply procedures, the allocation of fissionable materials among the non-nuclear weapon States, and financial operations related to payments, would be entrusted to a Committee to be created by the General Assembly of the United Nations or by any other competent body which might be agreed upon.

- The fissionable materials to be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States, would be subject to the safeguards rules set forth by the IAEA.