CONGRESS OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES

Geneva, 1968

Committee I

Spain and Switzerland: draft resolution

The Conference

Considering that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is regarded as a step towards effective nuclear disarmament and a contribution to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

Recalling that both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States carry the responsibility of acting in accordance with the principles of the Charter, including the principle that the sovereign equality of all States should be respected,

Considering that, because of the present structure of the International Atomic Energy Agency, many countries are not adequately represented in the Board of Governors, which is the organ responsible for safeguards in that Agency,

Considering that any system of collective inspection must be based on the principle that every country inspected must be adequately represented in the body responsible for carrying out the inspections,

Emphasizing the desirability of promoting activities for the establishment of a modern and efficient safeguards system based on supervision of the flow of fissionable materials by means of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

1. Recommends the establishment, within the International Atomic Energy Agency, of a special committee on safeguards to which member countries possessing nuclear facilities or supplying nuclear materials shall belong if they so wish. This special committee on safeguards shall be responsible for setting up and, if necessary, modifying the Agency's system of safeguards as well as for supervising the agreements concluded with the Agency;

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2. **Recommends** that, *inter alia*, the following principles, which supplement and render more specific the Statute of IAEA, should be observed:

   (a) The safeguard procedures should be simplified, in particular with a view to limiting them to the flow of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the only materials which can be used for military purposes;

   (b) Instruments and other technical devices should be brought into use at certain strategic points as soon as possible;

   (c) Fissile materials in small quantities for use in scientific research should be exempt from the safeguards;

   (d) The rules laid down against industrial risks, including industrial espionage, by the Statute of IAEA, the decisions of the Board of Governors and directives of the Director General, particularly with regard to the possibility of challenging inspectors, should be strengthened in the agreements;

   (e) The access of inspectors to certain strategic points should be restricted;

   (f) The cost of the safeguard procedures should be charged to the IAEA budget;

3. **Urges** the nuclear-weapon Powers to conclude with IAEA safeguard agreements consistent with the foregoing principles and applicable to their nuclear activities for peaceful purposes;

4. **Considers it essential** that rules should be drawn up to avoid duplication of safeguard procedures and consequent commercial discrimination;

5. **Invites** the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Secretary-General of the Conference, to communicate this resolution to the International Atomic Energy Agency.