STRENGTHENING OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

Report of the Secretary-General

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1. On 12 December 1975 the General Assembly adopted resolution 3484 B (XXX), the operative part of which reads, *inter alia*, as follows:

"The General Assembly,

..."

"1. Invites all States to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 1 May 1976, their views and suggestions on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament;

"2. Decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, which shall be a committee of the General Assembly, open to the participation of all Member States, to carry out a basic review of the role of the United Nations in that field;

"3. Decides that the review should, *inter alia*, focus on the following objectives:

"(a) Possible new approaches for achieving more effective procedures and organization of work in the field of disarmament, thereby enabling the United Nations to exercise its full role in multilateral disarmament efforts;

"(b) Ways and means of improving existing United Nations facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues, in order to keep all Governments, as well as world public opinion, properly informed on progress achieved in the field of disarmament;

"(c) Ways and means to enable the Secretariat to assist, on request, States parties to multilateral disarmament agreements in their duty to ensure the effective functioning of such agreements, including appropriate periodic reviews;".

2. By a note verbale dated 19 January 1976, the Secretary-General invited all States to communicate to him, not later than 1 May 1976, their views and suggestions pursuant to paragraph 1 of the resolution.

3. The replies received from States, as of 7 May, are reproduced below.

/...
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

(1) Belgium, like very many countries, is concerned about the stagnant state of proceedings and negotiations at the international level on matters relating to disarmament and arms control.

It considers that one of the major reasons for this situation is the absence of dialogue between the main military States and, in particular, between all the nuclear States.

(2) Doctrinal differences between the latter States are particularly profound in the matter of nuclear disarmament. Without necessarily accepting the argument that this type of disarmament should precede conventional disarmament, Belgium recognizes the difficulty of envisaging disarmament measures on an international scale if the lead is not taken by the nuclear States, particularly in the field where those States have acquired a decisive monopoly and a privilege, endorsed for some of them by means of an international treaty.

(3) Belgium is aware of the merits of the negotiations initiated or proceeding between certain nuclear States, such as those concerning the discontinuance of nuclear tests and the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons. However, the non-nuclear States, and especially those which have acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, are entitled not only to have doubts, but also to be worried about the limited extent (as regards participation as well as substance) of the efforts made so far to achieve nuclear disarmament, most of which have resulted only in non-armament or purely collateral measures. In his recent address to the General Assembly, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated: "All States which have rightly chosen not to acquire a nuclear-weapon capability are entitled to ask all the nuclear Powers to discharge their special responsibilities and take concrete measures to stop the arms race."

(4) Doctrinal differences among the nuclear Powers are heightened by the institutional situation which has been developing over the past 15 years in international disarmament talks. It is important, in the interests of the international community, that these institutional difficulties should be overcome as soon as possible and that a dialogue be initiated between the main military States.

(5) The history of disarmament negotiations over the past 20 years has shown that the elaboration of international instruments (treaties or agreements) is conceivable without the necessity for States parties to abandon tenets which are sometimes
diametrically opposed, and without prejudice to the security of those States. Nevertheless, the development of this international legislation in the field of disarmament is conceivable only if all the military Powers participate and if they are all more ready to accept, for their own part, the body of provisions laid down in the treaties (particularly with respect to control and verification). Such a development can now only come about through international instruments which include no discriminatory provisions.

(6) With a view to future work or negotiations, it would be in the interests of the international community to broaden the concept of "disarmament measures" to include not only disarmament measures proper, and limitation or non-armament measures, but also any measure taken in the military sphere which may contribute to increased stability or confidence among States.

(7) From the outset, Belgium has shown interest in the initiative which led to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee. It voted in favour of resolution 3484 B (XXX), in the firm belief that the time had come for a general review of international proceedings on the subject of disarmament.

(8) The efficacy of this review will obviously depend on the presence at the meetings of the Committee of the main military States, and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States.

At the meeting held on 27 January, the Belgian representative in the Ad Hoc Committee expressed the wish that all nuclear-weapon States might attend the meetings and take an active part in the discussions.

II. "POSSIBLE NEW APPROACHES FOR ACHIEVING MORE EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES" (resolution 3484 B (XXX), para. 3)

(1) Belgium still believes that plenary deliberative meetings (such as the World Disarmament Conference, a special session of the General Assembly or the United Nations Disarmament Commission) could make a positive contribution to disarmament efforts only if preceded by preliminary consultations and careful preparations.

These consultations and preparations should serve to show that all the main military States, including the nuclear-weapon States, are ready to participate in the proposed international meeting.

They should also lead to the conviction that a dialectical and doctrinal confrontation would not be the only feature of the meeting, and that positive developments could be expected. Nothing could be more unfortunate for the climate of international relations than conflict-ridden and abortive world gatherings.

(2) The General Assembly, and its First Committee, is still the most appropriate means of reviewing and providing a general impetus where disarmament issues are concerned.

/...
Perhaps consideration of the methods of work of the First Committee might result in some suggestions that would help to increase the efficacy and impact of the deliberations.

An increasing number of resolutions adopted at each session is not necessarily a sign of productive work.

Each session of the Assembly might select one or more main topics as the focal point for concern and decision, especially in the general debate during the session.

While it might not be necessary to consider changing the voting procedures, greater efforts at conciliation should perhaps be made with a view to the adoption of as many texts as possible by consensus, while, at the same time, ensuring that the texts retain as much substance and meaning as possible.

While one would not wish to deny a majority of countries the right to express themselves, it must be admitted that a resolution adopted unanimously has greater impact.

(3) The machinery of negotiation affords the best guarantees of concrete results in these matters.

International legislation, from the Antarctic Treaty to the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons and including other multilateral, regional or bilateral instruments, is a contribution to international security.

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) has demonstrated, on several occasions, its ability to bring negotiations to a successful conclusion.

The problem of an international negotiating body is crucial to the future of disarmament deliberations. The principle of having such a body should be upheld at all costs. Belgium considers that every effort should be made to induce all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in such a negotiating body, although it has no preconceived notions about the means of achieving that object.

(4) The General Assembly’s deliberations, and negotiating efforts, should be further supported by in-depth studies. In this connexion, recourse to groups of government experts established by Assembly decisions could be helpful, provided that:

- The terms of reference of the experts relate to a well-defined topic (such as, bacteriological and chemical weapons, nuclear-free zones, or specific budgetary questions);

- Decisions to establish a group are taken on an ad hoc basis. Recourse to experts should not become systematic;

- The experts are qualified;

- The group, while being representative, is kept as small as possible.

/...
(5) Relations between the General Assembly and international conferences and organizations dealing with disarmament-related questions should also be given consideration, with due respect for the competence and prerogatives of each institution.

The Assembly should continue to be the main centre for study and encouragement, although the debates in New York should not seek to take the place of deliberations held on clearly defined subjects in other forums.

The most striking example is IAEA, whose statute calls for the promotion and supervision of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Relations between the General Assembly and CCD could be the subject of a new exchange of views.

(6) The possibilities for negotiations on disarmament and arms control, at the regional level, may not have been given sufficient attention in the discussions held in the General Assembly during the past 30 years.

Few examples of regional negotiations are to be found during this period.

Essential security requirements are often more easily perceived among States of the same region.

The grounds for negotiation will be more quickly defined, whether they have to do with stabilization or reduction of forces, nuclear-free zones, the sale of weapons or other measures aimed at increasing confidence among the States of the region. The United Nations should, by such means as in-depth studies, promote consideration of issues that lend themselves to a regional approach in negotiations (example: the global study of nuclear-free zones concluded in 1975 by an ad hoc group of government experts).

The Assembly should concentrate its activity here on the global study of topics and the provision of information to Member States, although (and this is essential) it should not be able to take the place of the States of the region in determining the advisability of talks and the procedures for such talks.

III. UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION FACILITIES (resolution 3484 B (XXX), para. 3 (b))

Belgium does not feel that the lack of substantial achievements in the field of disarmament can be attributed to deficiencies in the international information facilities provided to States. The difficulties derive from the complexity of the negotiations, the often divergent doctrines developed by States and the extreme susceptibility of States about matters affecting their security or measures that could be applied in their territory. Belgium is prepared to participate in a debate on information questions, particularly in the light of the report to be submitted by the Secretary-General. If specific improvements designed to increase the efficiency of the United Nations information facilities prove feasible, Belgium is
prepared to consider proposals to that end. But, at first glance, it does not consider any drastic reforms to be really necessary.

IV. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT (resolution 34/84 B (XXX), para. 3 (c))

As in the case of information (see the preceding section), the Belgian authorities do not feel that the United Nations Secretariat can incur any blame whatsoever for the stagnation of disarmament proceedings at the international level.

It is the political commitment and will of Governments that are at issue here. Whenever Governments, in particular situations, have requested the assistance of the Secretariat, that assistance has always been provided.

The Belgian authorities acknowledge, however, that an exchange of views could usefully be held on the role of assistance by the United Nations Secretariat in international meetings or negotiations dealing with disarmament.

The role of assistance, at the request of Governments, may be performed at various stages:

- Studies;
  (in particular, assistance to ad hoc groups of experts)

- Debates;
  (example: role of the Secretariat in the proceedings of the First Committee)

- Negotiations;
  (assistance in the international negotiating body or in connexion with particular negotiations)

- Implementation of agreements concluded:
  Belgium considers that the United Nations might, in specific cases, be called upon to lend assistance in the case of international systems for supervision of the fulfilment of commitments entered into under disarmament treaties or agreements.

The most striking example to date is the contractual role of IAEA in the supervisory procedure of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

United Nations participation could take different forms. The examples proposed by the Swedish delegation (technical functions, inspection teams, harmonization of the verification procedures, compilation of reports) at the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee held on 26 January (A/AC.181/SR.1), merit consideration. Belgium is interested in these procedures for international verification provided that they are non-discriminatory.

/...
The same applies to the role of the United Nations Secretariat in connexion with the review conferences provided for in some treaties. The fact that a treaty was not drawn up under United Nations auspices should not prevent the United Nations Secretariat from co-operating as fully as possible at the review conferences.

Moreover, any review of the organization of the Secretariat services could only come as a corollary to the examination of structures in general and the tasks of the Secretariat in particular. The examination will lead to an assessment of the means which the Secretariat should have at its disposal in order to meet the expectations of the international community.

Belgium declares its readiness to co-operate in all efforts likely to facilitate progress in deliberations and negotiations at the international level in the field of disarmament and arms control.

It considers that the Ad Hoc Committee offers prospects for debates and reflection which the international community cannot disregard. It will participate in these proceedings with great open-mindedness, without doctrinaire prejudice, in the belief that hopes for positive developments will be justified only by an attitude of tolerance, pragmatism, understanding and mutual respect on the part of all participating States.
Canada continues to regard the United Nations as the principal forum in which to focus world attention on the need to limit and reduce the levels of military forces and armaments and for the exchange of views among Member States on disarmament issues. Canada also recognizes the important catalytic role that the United Nations can play in encouraging the examination of disarmament-related questions in other international fora. Accordingly, Canada will participate actively in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee established by resolution 34/84 B (XXX) to review the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

In Canada's view, the failure of the international community to make more rapid and concrete progress in the disarmament field is primarily attributable to the absence of adequate political will and to continued differences of view among States about the most appropriate and effective means of meeting their security concerns. More vigorous and concerted efforts must be made by all States, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other States of military significance, to overcome these obstacles. It is difficult to see how this can be achieved by major changes in the general mandates, structure, methods of work or interrelationships of the fora that already exist for the exchange of views on disarmament questions and for the negotiation of arms control agreements or the creation of new United Nations disarmament institutions. Nonetheless, Canada fully supports efforts to find ways in which the United Nations can more effectively carry out its role in the disarmament field within its present mandate and organizational framework.

As foreseen in resolution 34/84 B (XXX), the Ad Hoc Committee should give careful consideration to ways in which the United Nations can improve its ability to compile information on disarmament questions and disseminate it to Governments, other interested organizations and the public. While Canada has doubts about the need for a major reorganization within the Secretariat to accomplish this task, consideration might be given to additional measures in this area within already existing over-all United Nations resources.

Particular attention might be given by the Ad Hoc Committee to ways of improving the methods of work of the First Committee of the General Assembly. It would seem desirable, for example, to consider whether the work of the First Committee would be more productive if some disarmament issues were the subject of separate resolutions less frequently than every year and if requests for reports on specific subjects to other forums or to ad hoc committees established by the General Assembly allowed those bodies more time to study in greater depth the issues and proposals which they are asked to investigate. It is not intended that such a step restrict in any way the freedom of individual Member States to address themselves to any arms control or disarmament issue during the deliberations of the First Committee.
Canada continues to regard the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) as the most appropriate forum for the negotiation of arms control agreements intended to have universal application. The role of the CCD in the negotiation of such treaties has been consistently recognized in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. Canada deeply regrets that no major arms control agreement has emerged from the CCD in recent years, but does not believe that this is due in any appreciable way to the structure, mandate or methods of work of the CCD itself. The value of the CCD would be greatly enhanced by the inclusion of those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet participated in its work. Were it to be indicated that changes in the structure of the CCD would lead to the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, Canada would wish close consideration to be given in the CCD to appropriate changes. At this juncture, however, the CCD remains well suited to the negotiation of international arms control agreements whenever fundamental political and other obstacles to such negotiations can be surmounted.

There may be instances when parties to arms control negotiations or treaties would wish to seek the assistance of the United Nations in their negotiations or in the implementation of agreements. The United Nations may be particularly well-placed to provide assistance, upon request, to countries seeking to conclude or to implement arms control agreements of a regional character. The Ad Hoc Committee might explore ways of enhancing the ability of the United Nations to respond, within its existing resources, to such requests while recognizing that any assistance it did provide would have to be confined to the scope of a request and be fully consistent with the United Nations Charter. The Ad Hoc Committee could also consider ways of improving the ability of the Secretariat to assist, on a cost-recovery basis, in the periodic review of arms control and disarmament agreements when requested to do so by the parties to such agreements.

Canada would also favour consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee of the desirability of having the Secretary-General of the United Nations perform the depositary function with respect to future arms control and disarmament agreements designed for international application. Allowing for exceptional circumstances, it would seem that reasons for assigning the depositary function to specific Governments no longer have the validity they have had in the past.
The Finnish Government has given its support to resolution 3484 B (XXX) instituting the review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and intends to participate actively in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with the task of carrying out this review.

In the view of the Finnish Government, arms control and disarmament is a prerequisite for and an integral part in the efforts of the international community to maintain international peace and security, which, according to the Charter, is the main task of the United Nations. The role of the United Nations in disarmament is therefore central and self-evident. In terms of effort, disarmament has from the outset represented the most continuous activity of the United Nations.

On the specific objectives on which the review should focus according to the terms of paragraph 3 of resolution 3484 B (XXX), the Finnish Government should like to offer the following preliminary comments.

(a) Possible new approaches for achieving more effective procedures and organization of work in the field of disarmament, thereby enabling the United Nations to exercise its full role in multilateral disarmament efforts.

It is the view of the Finnish Government that the relatively slow progress in disarmament negotiations is mainly due to the inherent complexity of the problem rather than to a lack of adequate machinery and procedures either within the framework of the United Nations or outside it.

So far the question of procedures and organization of the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament has been solved by a pragmatic and flexible approach. They provide for manifold organs for discussion and negotiation: the annual review of the whole disarmament field in the First Committee of the General Assembly; the indispensable main organ for multilateral disarmament negotiations - the CCD - with its links to the United Nations; the many special committees and study groups set up for specific disarmament tasks and a possible future over-all role of a World Disarmament Conference. These organs and procedures are proof of great flexibility and pragmatism geared to existing concrete needs for negotiation and compromise rather than to rigid organizational formulas.

It is the understanding of the Finnish Government that the intention of the review to be undertaken by the Ad Hoc Committee is not to interfere with the work of existing disarmament bodies or to impose on them any solutions on how they should organize their work. The degree of autonomy, originally envisaged by the General Assembly when setting up these organs, should be respected. If reforms are needed, the initiative to suggest them should come from the organs themselves.
In this connexion, the Finnish Government notes that the CCD has already undertaken a comprehensive review of its procedures, and that at least initial results of this review can be expected to be included in the annual report of the CCD to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

Of particular relevance to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee under paragraph 3 (a) of resolution 3484 B (XXX) is the question of improving the working methods of the First Committee of the General Assembly when dealing with disarmament matters. In recent years, this problem has become more acute with the continuous increase of disarmament items inscribed on the agenda of the First Committee and the concomitant increase in the number of draft resolutions the Committee is expected to consider. On the other hand, the annual consideration of all disarmament questions in the First Committee is practically the only possibility for the great majority of the Members of the United Nations to express their views on these questions which are of vital concern to them all. Any reform in the work of the First Committee should therefore not be effected in a way that would curtail this possibility.

A possible alleviation in the workload of the First Committee with respect to disarmament matters might be effected through the reactivation of the United Nations Disarmament Commission which, like the First Committee, comprises the whole membership of the Organization.

As a practical proposition to improve the working methods of the First Committee, the draft resolutions intended for the consideration of the Committee should be presented at an early stage. Initial consultations preceding their presentation could take place even before the actual consideration of disarmament items by the Committee begins.

In recent years, an exceedingly high number of draft resolutions has been presented for approval by the First Committee on various disarmament items. Some of the resolutions are of a similar aim and content and could be amalgamated through an intensification of consultations between interested delegations. Another possible simplification of the procedures of the First Committee could be effected through a grouping or a regrouping of items. There is, however, no practical alternative to the present practice of conducting a single, general debate on all disarmament items together.

The work of the First Committee on disarmament items could be further assisted by a reform of the format and the content of the report of the CCD which is presently under consideration in that body. It is to be hoped that the changes envisaged would lead to a report which, from the point of view of the delegations not represented at the CCD, would give an account of the actual state of negotiations in the CCD in a more accessible and concise manner than has been the case hitherto.
(b) Ways and means of improving existing United Nations facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues, in order to keep all Governments, as well as world public opinion, properly informed on progress achieved in the field of disarmament.

There is room for considerable improvement as far as the present facilities of the United Nations for collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament are concerned. With the general intensification of disarmament negotiations, the increase in the number of various bodies dealing with disarmament questions and the increase in the number of topics discussed by them, there has been a rapid augmentation of the amount of information available. On the other hand, there has also been a sensible heightening of the interest of public opinion in disarmament issues. This is clearly demonstrated by the activities of various non-governmental organizations which are making a valuable contribution to the over-all objectives of disarmament. The role of various national and international research institutes which specialize in disarmament affairs is another welcome development in the same direction.

Concerning practical alternatives for the improvement of United Nations facilities in this field, the Finnish Governments looks forward to proposals that the Secretary-General might wish to make in response to the invitation by the Ad Hoc Committee.

Without wishing to prejudge the proposals that the Secretary-General may make, the Finnish Government would see considerable merit in the possibility of transforming the present publication The United Nations and Disarmament to an annually issued publication. While such a "yearbook on disarmament" could in the main preserve its present format and content and concentrate mainly on United Nations activities in this field, it could usefully be expanded to contain at least an index of the books, studies, reports, substantive articles, etc. published on disarmament elsewhere. Another possibility in the same direction would be the publication of a "United Nations disarmament periodical". This could come out at least twice a year and could simultaneously serve as material for the preparation of the yearbook.

(c) Ways and means to enable the Secretariat to assist, on request, States parties to multilateral disarmament agreements in their duty to ensure the effective functioning of such agreements, including appropriate periodical reviews.

One of the main functions of the Disarmament Affairs Division of the United Nations Secretariat consists at present in providing conference services and other support to various disarmament organs: the First Committee of the General Assembly, the CCD, various special committees, review conferences, etc. This involves not only technical facilities (conference services) but also increasingly more substantive support (basic studies, drafting of background papers, etc.). The workload placed on the Secretariat in this respect has been in continuous and rapid augmentation - a trend that is likely to continue.

/...
The resources put at the disposal of the Secretariat for a satisfactory fulfilment of these tasks have not kept pace with the increase of the services required from it. This is particularly true of the personnel situation of the Disarmament Affairs Division.

Both the present situation as well as the added tasks that the Ad Hoc Committee may wish to recommend under the headings (b) and (c) of its mandate therefore presuppose a considerable strengthening of the personnel capacities of the Disarmament Affairs Division of the Secretariat over and above the measure already taken under General Assembly resolution 3484 D (XXX).
1. It would be of advantage if the United Nations were to provide a constructive political impetus to arms control and disarmament.

2. The debate on disarmament in the United Nations would gain in substance if the First Committee were to proceed from a precise agenda, and if the number of draft resolutions could be limited and submitted to the First Committee, if possible before it enters into its deliberations.

3. With a view to achieving greater effectiveness and rationalization, Governments could look into the possibility of abandoning the practice of referring all agenda items of one session to the session of the following year. It would help to relieve the pressure on the agenda if some topics did not come up for discussion annually but at intervals of several years. Governments should undertake a critical review every year of resolutions from the preceding year so as to identify topics to be discussed again during the next session, as distinct from others which could be postponed in the interest of new and more urgent matters.

4. It seems appropriate that related subjects be combined for joint consideration.

5. Ad hoc committees should, as a rule, complete their work within one year or two years at the latest.

6. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany would further propose for consideration that the United Nations Secretariat submit to the First Committee an analytical report on disarmament issues raised during the general debate and that working groups be established which could seek to reconcile conflicting views.

7. In the field of information and documentation the United Nations Secretariat could provide valuable services to Governments and the public.

8. Regarding verification of bilateral and multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements, it is primarily for the parties or members to such agreements to take the relevant measures to ensure their effective functioning. It would not be in the interest of disarmament endeavours if the United Nations were to assume tasks which are performed more appropriately and effectively by other institutions or organizations.
HOLY SEE

Original: French

30 April 1976

1. TO DISARM

I. THE ARMAMENTS RACE

It is to be condemned unreservedly.

Even when motivated by a concern for legitimate defence, it is in fact, by virtue of the nature of modern weapons and the situation prevailing on our planet (paralysis of the nuclear Powers: any major conflict being excluded from their mutual relations, while limited ones proliferate outside the area of nuclear stability).

(1) A danger, in terms of the possible total or partial use of these weapons or the threat thereof, with deterrence, carried to the point of blackmail, accepted as the norm in relations with other nations. (Note No. 1)

(2) An injustice. For it constitutes:

(a) A violation of law by asserting the primacy of force: the accumulation of weapons becomes the pretext for the race for power (cf. infra.). (Note No. 2)

(b) A form of theft. The massive budgets allocated to the manufacture and stockpiling of weapons is tantamount to misappropriation of funds by the "managers" of the large nations or favoured blocs. (Note No. 3)

The obvious contradiction between the waste involved in the overproduction of military devices and the extent of unsatisfied vital needs (developing countries and the marginal and poor elements in rich societies) is in itself an act of aggression against those who are the victims of it. It is an act of aggression which amounts to a crime, for even when they are not used, by their cost alone armaments kill the poor by causing them to starve. (Notes Nos. 4 and 4 bis)

The condemnation by the Council, reiterated by the 1974 Synod, is understandable: "The armaments race is an extremely grave affliction for mankind and does intolerable harm to the poor" (G.S. 81, 5). "It is a scandal" (Pop. Progr. No. 53).

(3) A mistake. One of the chief arguments ordinarily invoked in favour of the armaments race is the economic crisis and unemployment which would result from the closure of military factories and arsenals. That would be true if there were to be an abrupt change. But normally, industrial societies have prospered in spite of constant redepolyments. The conversion of military manufacturing plants and military markets for civilian purposes is equally possible, if trouble is taken to

N.B. The "D.C." quotations in the text are taken from the magazine La Documentation Catholique. (5 rue Bayard-Paris).

/...
plan ahead. It is all the more feasible in that it would create jobs by making it possible to undertake the large-scale projects which prove necessary for the protection of the environment, etc. ...

(4) A wrong (cf. infra). Refusal to undertake this conversion "is completely incompatible with the spirit of humanity and still more with the spirit of Christianity" because "it is unthinkable that no other work can be found for hundreds of thousands of workers than the production of instruments of death". (Paul VI, speech to the Diplomatic Corps, 10 February 1972; cf. infra).

(5) Folly: This system of international relations based on fear, danger and injustice is a kind of collective hysteria, a folly that will be judged by history. It is meaningless because it is a means which does not achieve its end. The armaments race does not ensure security.

- In the case of nuclear weapons, it does not afford any additional security because there is already a surplus of such instruments (overkill); it creates additional risks by introducing elements of instability which could upset the "balance of terror". (Note No. 5)

- As to traditional weapons, their proliferation, especially in the third-world countries (trade in arms) creates regional imbalances and can thus generate conflicts or fuel those in progress.

In any case, whether it is a matter of nuclear weapons or traditional weapons, of great or small Powers, the armaments race has become a cumulative process, which has its own dynamics, independent of any aggressive feelings, and which escapes the control of States. It is a machine gone mad. (Note No. 6)

It is often said of disarmament that it is a "worn-out" or "tired cause", (because of its many failures: it is said, for example, that there has been too much talk about it, for too long a time, without any visible results).

But is it not rather the cause of armament that is worn out? Is it not the premise underlying the armaments race that gives every day further proof that it is antiquated and anachronistic? If one gauges the success or effectiveness of armaments by the peace they achieve, would it not be more appropriate to speak of failure?

The Church condemn the armaments race.

The Council is categorical. It absolutely condemns the use of weapons of mass destruction. It is, in fact, the only "excommunication" to be found in it.

"Endorsing the condemnations of total war already expressed by recent Popes, this Holy Synod declares: Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities ... and their inhabitants, is a crime against God and against man himself, which must be condemned firmly and without hesitation".

As to deterrence, "If it has served, paradoxically, to deter possible adversaries" (G.S. 81, 1) this can be seen at the very most as "a delay granted us from on high" (G.S. 81, 4), in short, a respite which we must "use to advantage" (id.) and very quickly, because time is not on our side. "By accumulating weapons,
far from eliminating the causes of war we are in danger of gradually increasing them. ... Instead of actually defusing conflicts between nations, we are spreading the contagion to other parts of the world" (G.S. 81, 2).

This armed competition can therefore only be viewed as a means of transition from "the ancient servitude of war" (G.S. 81, 4) to a new system, a new solution, new "methods which will enable us to settle our differences in a manner worthier of man" (Ibid.).

Otherwise this mad armaments race will maintain a false peace, a false security. It will become an end rather than the means it had the illusion of being. It will perpetuate the established disorder. It will be a perversion of peace. (Note No. 7)

Whether or not the time seems right, Christians, following the Vicar of Christ, must denounce mankind's scientific preparations for its own demise. They must also alert public opinion to the growing perils resulting from nuclear excesses (explosions) and from the transport, stockpiling and proliferation of atomic weapons. "Mankind, already in great peril, runs the risk, despite its admirable scientific knowledge, of reaching the fatal point at which it will no longer be able to experience any peace but the formidable peace of death." (G.S. 82, 4).

The severity of the diagnosis is thus clear. In the eyes of the Church, the present situation of would-be security is to be condemned:

(1) In the name of peace, which it does not ensure. Particularly on account of atomic weapons: "Let these shameful weapons be banned" and "let this terrible art, which consists in manufacturing, multiplying and storing bombs to terrorize the people ... be outlawed ... Let us pray that this murderous device does not kill peace while seeking it." (Paul VI, Message on the twentieth anniversary of Hiroshima, 8 August 1965, D.C. 1965, col. 1452) (Note No. 8)

(2) In the name of natural morality and the ideal of the Gospels: The armaments race (A.B.C. weapons, but also conventional modern weapons because of their capacity for scientific destruction), is against man and against God. This mad race must therefore be outlawed from the standpoint of ethics, for two main reasons:

- when the damage caused is disproportionate to the values we are seeking to safeguard, "it is better to suffer injustice than to defend ourselves" (Pius XII).

Or rather, than to defend ourselves by such means. Because we still have the right and the duty of active, albeit non-violent, resistance to unjust oppression, in the name of human rights and human dignity. (Note No. 9)

It is no longer merely a matter of cold war, but of an offensive action, of an inadmissible aggression and oppression: "The power of arms does not legitimize any use of this force for political and military ends". (G.S. 79, 4).

/...
- It constitutes a *provocation which explains* - psychologically, economically, socially, and politically - the emergence and growth of another kind of competition: the small arms race. Terrorism, in fact, often appears to be the last means of defence against this abuse of power by the large nations and a violent protest against the injustice created or perpetuated by the use or threat thereof on the part of better-armed States.

This use of big weapons by the industrialized States has also had the effect of involving the developing countries in a similar arms race. An increasing portion of the military budgets of certain less-favoured countries further retards their economic growth. The rise of authoritarian political régimes in the third world is both the cause and the effect of increased purchases (and, hence, sales) of weapons by the industrial Powers.

- This use of financial resources for military purposes means, on the other hand, a slowing down or reduction of aid. It renders more difficult the transfer of resources so often desired and requested by Paul VI in his Message from Bombay (4.12.64 - D.C. 1965, col. 15), by Populorum Progressio (N. 53) and by Gaudium et Spes (81, 2-3): *disarm in order to develop.*

This would not be the case if the nations which had the greatest resources in the field of armaments finally agreed to slow down and then stop pursuing the armaments race as a means of achieving hegemony, and not simply as a means of protecting the property and lives of their nationals.

Paul VI's solemn entreaty to the representatives of all the world's peoples, in his address to the United Nations on 4 October 1965, is more timely and valid than ever: "Let the weapons fall from your hands."

Thus the duty is just as clear as the diagnosis.

- The armaments race must be stopped.

- The reduction of armaments must be achieved.

II. THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

It will not be enough to keep stockpiles and armed forces at their present levels. A gradual process of disarmament, supervised at every stage, must be initiated in order to guarantee security.

1. Why a reduction of armaments?

It will initiate a *reversal* of the armaments race: it will be both a sign and a means of diminishing fear and a return to confidence.
It will lend greater credibility to the prohibition of force in international relations. It will make it easier to ensure respect for international law and a peace based on justice, both between nations and within nations.

It will make it possible to ensure security more economically and to allocate the new sums thus saved to peaceful purposes.

2. How to disarm?

The documents of the Magisterium suggest a number of criteria for ensuring that disarmament is both just and effective.

Disarmament must be so designed that the resulting security is at least equal to that afforded by the present situation.

Disarmament must be gradual, and the transition from one stage to another must be subject to verification of fulfilment of the obligations undertaken. (Notes Nos. 10 and 10 bis)

It must be controlled: by means of international verification systems designed to ensure respect for undertakings entered into.

If it is "to become a reality, it must not be carried out unilaterally, but co-ordinated, through agreements, and accompanied by genuine and effective guarantees" (G.S. 82, 1).

(a) The history of these adjectives and others (mutual, simultaneous, institutionally guaranteed disarmament) is linked to a specific context characterized by the concept of State sovereignty. It originated in a climate of mutual distrust which, ipso facto, justified the possession of weapons and a certain amount of caution.

This vigilance is still understandable today. "So long as man remains the weak, changeable and even wicked being that he often shows himself to be, defensive arms will, alas! be necessary" (Paul VI's address to the United Nations, 4 October 1965).

"What thoughtlessness sometimes lies at the very heart of certain demonstrations which claim to be pacifist! And what lies or power plays underlie certain pretensions to peace". This appeal of Paul VI for realism (Discourse to ex-servicemen of European countries, 20 November 1971, D.C. - 1972, pp. 64-65) is consistent with the statement made at Vatican II: "As long as the danger of war remains and there is no competent international authority with sufficient forces at its disposal it will not be possible to deny Governments ... the right of legitimate defence. Heads of State ... therefore have the duty to ensure the safety of the people for whom they are responsible ..." (G.S. 79, 4).
But if the elimination of armaments involves insecurity, their possession in excessive quantity involves another, equally serious, kind of insecurity. It is therefore not a matter of elimination, but of reduction.

(b) Should one, then, abide literally by the traditional criteria of disarmament, whatever their merits may be in other respects? Does not the failure of disarmament, derive from the mere repetition of yesterday's legal and political criteria? From a kind of immutable legal entity which the Powers concerned hold in reserve, in order to defer this delicate question?

Can the Church, for its part, go no further in its recommendations and teaching?

Can no other solutions be found to break out of this vicious circle and cast off the spell of mistrust?

In the quarter century following the last world war, have not a certain number of reconciliations called in question the premise that security rests solely on military strength? Have not historians and politicians been surprised to see that the reasons behind these catastrophic historic clashes amounted to very little, and to see how little was also needed to turn hostility into collaboration? If war is the meeting-point of two fears, is not peace the outcome of two confidences restored, or to be restored as soon as possible, before setting in motion the process of military escalation?

Are not the times we are living in conducive to this kind of outlook?

Will not the peoples engaged in the insane quantitative and qualitative armaments race eventually stop from exhaustion like athletes in a running race? Has not the time come to make use of opposites and to transform the excess of war or threats into the conquest and preservation of peace?

Disarmament is not a separate reality, a separate "thing in itself". It is part of a whole. It must, of course, be envisaged for its own sake and with its own methods, out of concern for scientific, legal, political and spiritual clarity. It calls for and requires appropriate techniques, disciplines and men. It must, however, at all times, be viewed and achieved in close connexion with the two other great realities of the day: the development and organization of international society. Disarm, develop, institutionalize: one and the same problem, one and the same solution.

2. TO REPLACE WAR

I. Peace through law

Disarmament therefore means stopping and reducing. But it also, and primarily, means transferring. You do not destroy something without replacing it. It means replacing, at least for the most part, national security and its military
instruments, which thus far have been dependent on the will of each Government, by international security. (Note No. 11)

This is to be achieved by confident recourse to the law, as is done in the case of matters affecting the internal life of each civilized State.

A. A World Structure: the United Nations and Disarmament (Note No. 12)

The encyclical Pacem in Terris strongly stresses the compelling need for a "public authority with world-wide jurisdiction" (133). The constitution Gaudium et Spes echoes the same idea word for word: "A universal public authority recognized by all, endowed with real powers enabling it to ensure everyone security, respect for justice and the protection of rights". (81, 1).

The Council considers that this essential institution should have a function supported by enlightened public opinion, namely, the function of "preparing for ... the time when, with the general consent of nations, war could be completely prohibited". (id.)

The Synod of October 1971 was even more specific on this point. It mentioned the existing organization and stated what it expected of it: "The United Nations - which, by virtue of its very purpose, must promote the participation of all nations - and the international organizations should be supported as a first step towards a system capable of curbing the armament race, ending the arms trade, achieving disarmament and resolving conflict by such peaceful means as legal action, arbitration and international policing. Disputes between nations must on no account be settled by war; other means must be found which are in keeping with human nature; ..."

Paul VI is equally explicit: "We have faith in the United Nations; We have confidence in its potential for extending the realm of peace and the rule of law in our troubled world. We are prepared to give it Our full moral support. The cause of peace and of law is sacred. The obstacles in its way must not discourage those who are dedicated to it; whether they derive from adverse circumstances or human ill will, they can and must be overcome". (Discourse to Mr. Waldheim, 5 February 1972; D.C. 1972, p. 208).

And many other texts could be cited in the same context.

B. Bilateral or multilateral conventions and agreements (Notes Nos. 13, and 13 bis and ter)

We should not, however, wait for the establishment of this "public authority with world-wide jurisdiction" before taking action in the area of law. Much has been written and said on this subject by the last three Popes.

On 30 June 1964, a letter from the Secretary of State, Cardinal Cicognani, to Mr. Houari Souiah, the Algerian delegate to the Conference on the Denuclearization
of the Mediterranean (D.C. 1964, col. 1960-1970) states: "The Holy See has encouraged (inter alia) disarmament initiatives, and especially those designed to avert the atomic peril, and hopes that mankind will eventually guard (against it) by means of a sincere and general agreement, which is the only means of ensuring the success of its efforts." ... "It trusts that this appeal will be heeded by all who are responsible for the destiny of nations ..." (D.C. 1964, col. 970)

Three years later, on 27 August 1967, he explained that he endorsed the Geneva Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons "without any political implications" because it "marked a first step ... and opened a new phase of international harmony and co-operation, without which there can be no hope of peace and security in the world". (D.C. 1967, col. 1647)

On 24 June 1968, the Holy Father returned to the subject. He welcomed the "adoption by the United Nations of the text of an international agreement putting an end to the proliferation of atomic weapons and the nuclear arms race". While not yet a perfect result, it was a "first step" in the direction of a "total ban on nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament". (Address to the Sacred College, 24 June 1968; D.C. 1968, col. 1270).

C. Finally, these agreements and conventions should lead to the establishment of new institutions specifically concerned with disarmament. They would constitute the foundations of the eagerly awaited world arbitral and international policing body (regional organisations).

II. Political will (Notes Nos. 14 and 14 bis)

Laws and conventions will remain a dead letter unless they are animated from within by political will coupled with a strategy for peace.

A. It is a matter of "using not military weapons, even when justified by the defence of law and civilization, but political weapons ... to promote the unity of peoples". (Paul VI, address to the NATO College, 30 January 1971; D.C. 1971, p. 204).

One year later, the Holy Father reverted to the same theme before the same audience: "Is it not the general wish of mankind and in its vital interests that military relations should be progressively transformed into civilian relations?" (To the NATO College, 3 February 1972; D.C. 1972, p. 261).

This is clearly a priority task for Governments. John XXIII urges them to "spare no effort" to this end (Pacem in Terris, No. 117). The Council endorses his appeal. "The Bishops of the whole world, assembled as one, appeal to Heads of State and military authorities to ponder at all times such an immense responsibility" (G.S., 80, 5).

* The Holy See signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 25 February 1971.

/...
But, there again, "Heads of State ... are all dependent on the opinions and feelings of the masses ... hence the urgent need for a reshaping of mental attitudes and a change of tone in public opinion" (G.S., 82, 3). The technical nature of the problems relating to national security and the exercise of authority as a result of the "socialization" of existence (cf. Semaine Sociale de France, Grenoble, 1959) means that there is a risk of power isolating from the people. Governments could easily find themselves trapped in their own determinations and driven, almost in spite of themselves, to the point where they no longer wanted or were able to achieve disarmament, if pressure from their respective peoples did not force them to reconsider inherited assumptions about armed or over-armed defence.

Only the pressure and common sense of public opinion can avert the emergence of two parallel and often contradictory histories: the history of civilizations and the history of dehumanizing military or civilian technologies.

The role of political groups (parties in power or in opposition, press representing political opinion, etc.) should be decisive in guiding the foreign policy of their Governments in a peaceful direction.

In this "general assent of nations whereby all war can be completely prohibited" (G.S., 82, 1), scientists have a very special role to play. Paul VI makes an urgent appeal to them: (Note No. 15) "Mankind must collect itself, and try to find within itself, in its leaders and in its teachers, the strength and wisdom to reject the malevolent uses of destructive science ... Rather, it should ask science the secret of doing good to itself." (Address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, 27 April 1968, D.C. 1968, col. 868)

Disarmament is not simply a matter of good will. It cannot be improvised. It will be costly, as in the case of tearing down an old building in order to replace it by a new one. The conversion of the armaments industries, and the armaments trade in particular, is a matter for technologists. It requires "extensive and bold study" (G.S. 82, 3).

Industrial and economic techniques, but also political techniques.

"Let the highest and most qualified assemblies study in depth the problem of international balance ... based on mutual trust ..., sincerity in diplomacy, and fidelity in the observance of treaties" ... (Pacem in Terris, No. 118).

B. Those responsible for the common good, at all levels, must therefore formulate a strategy for disarmament and peace, which is scientifically based on objective and exhaustive analyses, which alone can ensure its credibility.

At the present time, in order to give credibility to any statement or message on disarmament and to bring it into line with the "signs of the times", it would seem to be necessary:

- first, to recognize the growing difficulty of certain formulas or programmes, such as "disarmament for development":
... owing to the intensification of military aid which gives reason to foresee a growth in authoritarian political systems in the third world;

... owing to the increase in police resources and internal security devices justified by the struggle against terrorism, which could now become institutionalized in a masked civil war, etc. ...

- secondly, to put forward some suggestions consistent with present-day aspirations for a disarmament policy, for example:

  . strengthening of the international policing role of the United Nations;

  . the institutionalization, on an international scale, of police measures against terrorism, by reducing or avoiding the creation of a duality of armed forces during this decade;

  . access by the developing countries to negotiations on disarmament, as "partners" in any de-escalation moves.

  . further suggestions, to discourage the tendency to pursue the arms race would be:

    - prohibiting access to "drawing rights" for the developing nations which increase their military budgets;

    - on the other hand, priority access to international financing for countries which reduce their military expenditure for social purposes;

    - diversion to peaceful uses of income from arms patents for the purpose of establishing development funds, etc.

C. A "disarmament strategy" cannot be confined to criteria of efficiency or profitability. It must be based on ethical, cultural and spiritual considerations. It will call, in future years, for profound reflection on the part of philosophers and theologians, particularly concerning the concepts of "self-defence", "nation" and of national sovereignty, which is all too often viewed in terms of absolute autarky, etc.

It will also need "prophets" - provided they are genuine - people who speak out, "heralds", catalysts and "mystics", in both the broad and the narrow sense of the word, to enlist and mobilize energies and their potential for unity, dialogue and co-operation.

In short, the basis and motive force for disarmament is "mutual confidence". Recourse to war can be replaced only by a "dynamics of peace".

Disarmament requires, as a first condition, not the suppression but the sublimation of the warlike instincts of man (as hunter, plunderer, dominator) by engaging him in the service "of the civil construction of peace" (G.S. 82, 2).

/...
We must find substitutes for war, by providing alternative wars to be won. Disarmament is inseparable from the other goals of unity, justice, harmony and development of the whole "human family".

The victory of disarmament is none other than the victory of peace. Its only chance lies in being incorporated into the Grand Design, the "new history" of mankind (Paul VI, address to the United Nations, 4 October 1965).
NOTES

"Gaudium et Spes"
(Note No. 1) - A.A.S. Vol. LVIII (1966) p. 1103

... "If one were fully to utilize the resources already stockpiled in the arsenals of the great Powers, the result would be nothing less than the almost total and completely reciprocal extermination of each adversary by the other, not to mention the dire effects deriving from the use of these weapons. ..."

Address to the Peace Committee of the CPJP (Pontifical Committee on Justice and Peace) - 22/3/75
(Note No. 2) - A.A.S. Vol. LXVII (1975) p. 201

... "The production and sale of weapons is continuing to grow, to fuel conflicts and to increase the risks of war ..."

Letter to U Thant - 1966
(Note No. 3) - A.A.S. Vol. LVIII (1966) p. 136

... "But it cannot be denied: each passing day shows us more clearly that no stable peace can be established between men until action has been taken to ensure an effective general and controlled reduction of armaments. Each passing day also makes more tragic and dramatic the contrast between the immensity of the sums poured into the manufacture of weapons and the widespread and growing material distress of more than half of mankind, which is still waiting to see its most elementary needs satisfied ..."

Christmas broadcast - 22/12/64
(Note No. 4) - A.A.S. Vol. LVII (1965), p. 180

"We venture to hope that Governments will manage to follow the path of disarmament with caution and magnanimity and will generously contemplate for the future the - at least partial and gradual - application of military budgets to humanitarian needs, not only for the benefit of their own States but also for the benefit of the developing and the needy countries. Hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance are continually crying out for help ..."

Appeal for disarmament: Letter to U Thant
(Note No. 4 bis) - A.A.S. Vol. LVIII (1966) p. 135

"In speaking out in support of the great cause of disarmament, We know that We are following faithfully in the footsteps of Our predecessors ..."

Address to the Diplomatic Corps - 11/1/75
(Note No. 5) - A.A.S. Vol. LXVII (1975) p. 98-99

"This 'terror', for which laborious attempts are being made to ensure some kind of balance, has even been, and is still considered to be the main, if
not the only safeguard against risks which would seem too perilous even to
those who, in theory, feel sufficiently strong to hope to be able to
overcome them by surviving their adversaries."

Christmas message - 1959

"The destructive power of modern man is incalculable and the fatal probability
that this power will be used to devastate human towns derives from tragically
random causes, which neither science nor technology alone will be able to
master. Then, hope will give way to anguish.

Address delivered during the Mass on 4 October 1966
(Note No. 7) - A.A.S. Vol. LVIII (1966), p. 900

"... We can see an increasing growth in the inward conviction that true and
lasting peace cannot be based on the power of destructive weapons or on the
static tension of conflicting ideologies ..."

(Note No. 8) - A.A.S. Vol. LXVII (1975), p. 670

"... If the awareness of universal brotherhood truly succeeds in penetrating the
hearts of men, will they still need to arm to the point of becoming
blind and fanatical murderers of their own brothers, who are innocent
in themselves, and perpetrating, for the sake of peace, massacres of incredible
violence, as happened at Hiroshima on 6 August 1945?"

(Note No. 9) - Message on "Peace Day" 1976

"... Either disarmament should be undertaken by all, or it is a crime of
inadequate defence: throughout the historical and concrete human community,
has not the sword its justification, for justice and for peace?"

Address to the European Association of Paediatric Cardiologists - 22/5/67

"... A possibility or first step towards this solution ... would be the
progressive, simultaneous and universal reduction of military armaments. By
putting an end to this exhausting arms race, which has now become, as We
have stated elsewhere, an 'intolerable scandal' ..."

Message for Peace Day - 1/1/76
(Note No. 10 bis) - A.A.S. Vol. LXVII (1975), p. 669 (No. 1)

"Military disarmament should be joint and general if it is not to prove an
unforgiveable mistake resulting from impossible optimism and blind naivety,
and a temptation to violence on the part of others. Either disarmament must
be undertaken by all, or it is a crime of inadequate defence."
Discourse to President Ford - 3/6/76
(Note No. 11) - Osservatore Romano, Italian ed. - 5 June 1975 - p. 1

"We are not shutting our eyes to the realities of the power relations which are being established between nations and their blocs and which are continually posing problems of balance and imbalance. But we must speak out and remind the people that a peaceful and humane international order cannot be based on strength but must be based on a criterion of justice, on respect and understanding of the rights and needs of others ..."

Message for the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations
(Note No. 12) - A.A.S. LXII (1970), p. 685

"May your indefatigable perseverance, placed at the service of all initiatives for reciprocal and controlled disarmament, ensure in our industrial age that the words of the prophets in ancient agrarian times, come true, and that the resources thus made available for scientific progress may be used to exploit the immense resources of the land and the oceans, and for the subsistence of all members of the human family which is perpetually growing: that the labours of the living may never be used against life but may instead serve to nurture it and make it truly human!"

Appeal for disarmament: Letter to U Thant - 1966

"As the 'Committee of Eighteen on Disarmament' is about to resume its deliberations in Geneva, We would like to address an urgent appeal inspired by the wish to see the activities of this Committee end in positive and concrete results and thus constitute a new step towards the achievement of the disarmament so unanimously desired and awaited.

We feel encouraged to take this step by the recent position adopted by more than 2,000 Catholic bishops meeting in Rome at the Oecumenical council. We also feel encouraged to do this by the response evoked, in the Disarmament Commission, by Our appeal from Bombay, and by the favourable reception accorded by world public opinion to Our address to the United Nations."

Message to the Helsinki Conference - 30/7/75
(Note No. 13 bis) - A.A.S. Vol. LXVII (1975), p. 478-479

"Having learnt from the tragic experience of two terrible wars, which broke out in Europe in the space of 30 years and consumed, as in a furnace, so many millions of victims, devastating vast and prosperous regions and involving many other non-European peoples in the fratricidal strife, these representatives wish to establish an understanding based on clear and firm principles of international law and to shield Europe and the world from the threat of further destructive and death-dealing experiences infinitely more terrifying. At the same time they wish to outline a plan for co-operation, consolidating peace which will serve to increase and intensify the exchanges of values which constitute the spiritual force of Europe.

/...
The Papacy, although entrusted with a religious mission that is open to the universal, nevertheless has its seat in Europe ... /and a/ recognition of the interdependence of security among States, reflected in solemn commitments to renounce the use and the threat of force, and for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the sincere fulfilment of international obligations."

To the NATO Defence College
(Note No. 13 ter) - A.A.S. LXIII (1971), p. 143

"... "Your institution is known as a Defence College. May its very existence serve purely for the defence of peace. May the training it provides prepare people to use not military weapons - even where justified for the defence of law and civilization - but political weapons, not to foster divisions among peoples but to promote their unity ..."

Angelus, Sunday 27 August 1967
(Note No. 14) - Insegnamenti di Paolo VI Vol. V (1967) p. 891-892

"At this spiritual moment We shall recall the positive development of the submission of the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This event seems to Us a very positive one because it shows that leaders are aware of the fearful and incalculable danger of nuclear weapons, and because it marks a first step - not decisive to be sure, but a beginning - towards averting this danger which hangs over all mankind."

(Note No. 14 bis) - Message on "Peace Day" 1976

"We note, with satisfaction and hope, the progress made by the idea of peace. It is growing in importance and scope in the minds of men; and with it the necessary structures for the organization of peace are developing: solemn occasions involving commitments, and solemn occasions of a more academic nature to promote it, are increasing in number; ... peace is gaining ground. The Helsinki Conference, held in July-August 1975, is an event which gives reason for hope in this area."

Address to the Papal Academy of Sciences. 27/4/68
(Note No. 15) - A.A.S. LX (1968), p. 275

"May all measures be taken, all commitments undertaken, with a view to preventing and eliminating the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons, and bacteriological attacks ..."
In examining the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic starts from the following two statements of principle.

1. The Hungarian People's Republic, in common with other members of the community of Socialist countries, attaches primary importance to the strengthening of international peace and security, to the creation of pre-conditions for universal human progress, accordingly, the Hungarian people and its Government consider of particular significance any initiative and measure likely to promote the lessening of international tension, the elimination of the danger of war, and the realization of general and complete disarmament. They lend full support, by all means and at all forums, to any proposal and practical measure that contribute to the curbing and ending of the arms race and to the working out of effective arrangements conducive to general end complete disarmament.

2. The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic - both prior to its admission to the United Nations and even in the period when the Organization was regarded and used by certain Powers as a means of furthering their own aspirations for world domination and as a forum for their cold-war attacks - has always sought to help the United Nations become what it is called upon to be in accordance with the aims and purposes of its Charter, a useful and effective leverages of maintaining and strengthening international peace and security.

It is only natural against this double set of considerations that, whenever a proposal aimed at advancing the cause of disarmament figured on the agenda of any United Nations forum, the Hungarian Government has promptly declared its readiness to support it and given evidence thereof by actively promoting any reasonable and realistic initiative.

The value of the United Nations as a forum of disarmament resides primarily in the fact that it meets in session at regular intervals, thus providing systematically recurring opportunities for the majority of the countries of the world to express their views on disarmament, to make proposals and take initiatives to promote the development of useful and realistic initiatives enjoying majority support into international agreements and, finally, to help make such agreements universal and binding.

The value of the United Nations as a forum of disarmament is, at the same time, impaired on the one hand by the fact that due to its dimensions it is not able to carry on an effective practical activity on a continuing basis, and - on the other hand - that, despite the large number of its Member States, it still has not reached full universality.
For this very reason, the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, together with the majority of States Members of the United Nations, feels it indispensable for two different organizational frameworks to be available in order to ensure effective disarmament activities or to raise the existing degree of efficiency:

(a) It is necessary to have a negotiating body with a reasonably limited number of participants proportionately representing the various geographical regions of the world, as well as the States militarily allied with the two leading Powers and the countries outside the two great systems of alliance. This requirement has so far been basically satisfied by the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which, during the past 14 years has, on innumerable occasions, proved to be an effective means of elaborating international agreements on disarmament and thus has accumulated a wealth of practical experience in this field, which cannot be substituted for by anything else. The CCD has all the time given evidence of sufficient flexibility and has adequately reacted to changes in the international balance of forces, while being able to ensure throughout the negotiations that the fundamental requirement of equal security prevails and the agreements reached do not result in prejudice to the security of any State.

(b) Parallel to this, it would likewise be absolutely necessary to provide a forum for all States of the world, including States not members of the United Nations, to state their views and present their proposals on the institutionalization of the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems, on the tasks of extending the process of détente to the military field, and on all questions connected with the reduction and cessation of the arms race as well as with measures conducive to general and complete disarmament. The Hungarian Government believes that the best forum for achieving this goal would be the convening of a world disarmament conference as proposed in 1971 by the Government of the Soviet Union and supported by an ever-growing majority of Member States. Such a conference would serve for participating States to gain a better knowledge of each other's views, to define basic criteria for the searching of ways towards this global objective, and to give the initial impulse to the practical elaboration of measures of the greatest urgency. A world disarmament conference could also contribute to consolidating and making universal the results already achieved in the field of disarmament.

The correctness and necessity of this realistic approach are recognized and shared by the majority of States Members of the United Nations. However, motivated by certain considerations and purposes, there have recently emerged frequent demands for a review of the existing disarmament forums and of the role of the United Nations in disarmament, while, on the other hand, certain Powers are seeking to slow down and hinder the activity of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.

The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic holds that reviews of this sort cannot but provide scope for disturbing and disrupting the established balance procedures for disarmament negotiations, thereby bringing into question the

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conduct of efficient and successful work. The cause of disarmament would inevitably suffer a setback, if a break of continuity in the activities of the existing forums occurred. Consequently, it would be difficult or perhaps even impossible to conduct disarmament negotiations of substance, for instance, if the work of such time-tested and well-proven a forum as the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament became impossible.

It is the conviction of the Hungarian Government that the responsibility for the lack of more progress in disarmament negotiations lies not in the existing organizational frameworks but in certain political considerations. Neither the United Nations nor any other organization or body is capable of performing more than the participating States are willing to do individually and collectively. Further progress and more efficient work depend not on the organizational aspects of disarmament forums but on the political will of States. The role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament can similarly increase in significance only if the Organization gives more consequent and resolute support to the relevant efforts of Member States.

The tasks involved in disarmament cannot be tackled either by sterile debates on organizational matters or by a new forum established for this purpose, which could only serve to divide and divert attention from questions of substance to different problems of a secondary nature. Neither the extension of information activity nor the increase in the tasks of the Secretariat, nor even the enlarged role of non-governmental organizations can replace the political commitment and firm determination of Member States to promote disarmament negotiations on substance.

The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic wishes to state emphatically that the United Nations as an organizational unit and the individual Member States can genuinely serve the interest of disarmament only if, instead of engaging in time and energy-consuming discussions, they focus their attention, both in the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and during the session of the General Assembly, on the convening of the World Disarmament Conference as soon as possible. The Hungarian Government is convinced that the time is ripe and the conditions are given for starting to take practical steps preparatory for the World Disarmament Conference, which is supported by the majority of Member States.
2. The primary purpose of the United Nations, according to Article I of its Charter, is "to maintain international peace and security". It has been accepted by the international community that lasting international peace and security can only be based on disarmament, for which the United Nations has the ultimate responsibility.

3. The United Nations has been fully alive to its role in the disarmament field. The very first resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly pertained to the question of disarmament. In its historic resolution 1378 (XIV), adopted unanimously on 20 November 1959, the United Nations declared that the goal of the international community in this nuclear age should be general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The General Assembly has also repeatedly affirmed in its various resolutions adopted over the years that the highest priority in the field of disarmament should be accorded to nuclear disarmament and to the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

4. Although the world has never had disarmament in its history, and the existence of deep-seated suspicions and rivalries among States has complicated the task of achieving disarmament, never was the need for disarmament more imperative than during the present times, when mankind is witnessing a suicidal arms race with the diversion of enormous material and human resources to all kinds of ever newer and deadlier means of destruction, particularly nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The increasing number and range of resolutions on this subject which are being adopted every year by the United Nations is a clear evidence of the preoccupation and deep yearnings of the international community for general and complete disarmament.

5. The question of strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the disarmament field should be considered against this general background and basic approach.

6. The United Nations has provided deliberative forums like the First Committee and Disarmament Commission, where all Member States can express their views and suggestions on how disarmament can be achieved. As a result of the very valuable exchanges of views in these forums, the United Nations has, in its various resolutions, laid down general principles and guidelines for conducting detailed negotiations on the various aspects of the question of disarmament. This essential role of the United Nations of providing deliberative forums has to be continued and further strengthened. The proposal to convene a world disarmament conference under United Nations auspices is an important step in this direction, and it is hoped that such a conference, the idea of which has been endorsed in several United Nations resolutions, would be convened at an early date with the
participation of all States. Suggestions have also been made for a special session of the General Assembly exclusively devoted to disarmament. All such proposals deserve serious consideration and strong support by all States, so that they can be implemented.

7. It is clear, however, that the actual negotiations concerning specific measures in the field of disarmament can only be undertaken in a small body. It has been a remarkable achievement in the long and difficult history of disarmament efforts that a negotiating body has, for the first time, functioned actively for 14 years. The Committee on Disarmament, which was established in 1962, has done valuable work through its painstaking efforts by discussing in depth various issues in the field of disarmament and by negotiating agreements on some of those issues. The United Nations has regularly provided general guidelines, specific instructions and logistic support to the Committee on Disarmament. The participation of militarily significant States like France and China in disarmament negotiations can provide a new vigour and a fresh impetus to disarmament efforts. The United Nations can greatly help in securing such participation.

8. The cause of disarmament would receive a setback if the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament were disrupted. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to hold meaningful disarmament discussions if a proven forum were to be destroyed or premature changes made in it on the basis of wishful anticipation.

9. While procedural or organizational improvements in the structure of the various disarmament forums may be required to meet a changing situation and could always be considered by the United Nations, it is useful to bear in mind that any such improvements would be facilitated if there is an earnest common desire to move forward in substantive matters. Any undue concern with procedural and organizational matters can distract attention from substantive issues. Disarmament can be achieved only if political wills and attitudes undergo a radical change in the desired direction.

10. While the United Nations should vigorously pursue the cause of global disarmament and undertake efforts to create necessary international political climate for it, it would not be appropriate for the United Nations to get involved in the actual implementation of bilateral, regional or multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

11. The role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament could be greatly strengthened if this could coincide with collective efforts of its Member States to promote development. A substantial part of the resources released by disarmament should be devoted to meeting development needs, particularly of the developing countries.

12. The United Nations Secretariat has done valuable work in servicing meetings of the Committee on Disarmament, First Committee and various international
conferences organized under United Nations auspices to discuss disarmament questions. It will be useful to strengthen this role of the Secretariat in every possible manner. In the ultimate analysis, it is the States themselves who have to develop the necessary political will to move towards disarmament. Any in-depth studies of various disarmament issues that may be considered necessary can best be undertaken, as heretofore, by experts drawn from different countries and assisted by the United Nations Secretariat.
KUWAIT

[Original: English]
9 April 1976

1. Disarmament negotiations have so far been conducted in the form of a dialogue between the two super-Powers. It is this fact which has undermined the United Nations role in disarmament.

2. A mechanism should be formed to enable the United Nations to take active part in disarmament negotiations. All Members of the United Nations should be allowed to submit concrete disarmament proposals to the Secretary-General which he, in turn, would communicate to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should submit annual reports on its reaction to these proposals and the reasons for not implementing them.

3. The Secretary-General should draw his conclusions from the disarmament negotiations and submit a detailed analysis to the General Assembly so as to bring moral pressure to bear on the super-Powers.

4. Draft disarmament conventions submitted by the super-Powers should not be treated as sacrosanct but must be open to substantial amendments by all Member States.

5. The Secretary-General should use his good offices to make it possible to convene the World Disarmament Conference as early as possible.

6. The machinery of the United Nations should be improved to give more active support to bodies concerned with zones of peace, denuclearization, and disarmament in general.

POLAND

[Original: English]
25 April 1976

1. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3484 B (XXX) of 12 December 1975 and in response to its invitation addressed to all States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the Government of the Polish People's Republic wishes, in the first place, to restate its consistent support for the fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially those bearing directly on international peace and security.

   In the age of nuclear and other weapons of mass annihilation, disarmament efforts cannot but have special immediacy and an enhanced place in that field.

2. Apart from important bilateral and regional disarmament efforts, the
United Nations has over the years played a consistently central role in that vital area, indeed, was instrumental in encouraging the political willingness of States, particularly the nuclear-weapon Powers, to seek meaningful progress in the realm of arms limitation and disarmament. Thus, owing to such effective United Nations bodies as the General Assembly and its political Committee as well as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament — it has been possible to elaborate and to conclude such important international instruments as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the sea-bed Treaty and the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

3. The Polish People's Republic, which played a constructive and active role in their elaboration, attaches major importance to those agreements. It also stands ready to continue contributing to the pursuit of further partial measures of disarmament. It is prepared to help identify both the areas where progress is imperative and possible and the mechanisms which are most likely to succeed in securing such progress.

In that spirit, the Government of the Polish People's Republic applauded and welcomed the timely and momentous Soviet initiatives, submitted to the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, for the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and for the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, to mention only the latest ones.

4. Earlier, desiring to facilitate progress in the field of disarmament negotiations, Poland gave from the very inception her full and unreserved support to the concept of a world disarmament conference. Such a forum, open to all States and not detracting from the existing and proven disarmament negotiating bodies, would — in our view — add significant momentum to the process of multilateral disarmament negotiations. It could do so, in the first place, by making a comprehensive review of the state of disarmament negotiations and by elaborating, on that basis, constructive recommendations as to the military, political, economic and social aspects of such negotiations, both on a global and regional scale, in the nuclear and conventional fields.

In the opinion of the Polish Government, therefore, the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference is an important United Nations body whose potential must be put to full use with the co-operation of all States, including nuclear-weapon Powers. Given their political will, the idea of a world disarmament conference would offer the international community a practical and realistic forum where to deal effectively with the substantive problems of disarmament and international security. Indeed, a World Disarmament Conference would add a global dimension to the process of political détente while, at the same time, launching a process of military détente.

5. Against that background, the Government of the Polish People's Republic finds it difficult to accept a theory that meaningful progress in disarmament and in arms limitation can be secured by addressing secondary, procedural matters rather than the political will of States.
Poland, therefore, entertained serious doubts as to the course of action
proposed at the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and,
in consequence, felt constrained to abstain in the vote on resolution 3484 B (XXX).

It was our considered view that the inadequate progress in the field of
disarmament lies not in the negotiating machinery but in the lack of political
willingness on the part of certain Powers. We continue to believe that focusing
on procedural and organizational issues is entirely inappropriate, for it tends
to divert the attention of the international community from the problems of
substance and thus undermines rather than facilitates the ongoing efforts in the
existing bodies.

Attaching excessive and undue importance to formal and procedural issues
can be particularly unfortunate at a time when the Conference of the Committee
on Disarmament enters a delicate stage of negotiations with a view to completing
this year - in accordance with the wish of the General Assembly - a draft
convention on the prohibition of the use of environmental modification techniques
for military or other hostile purposes.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic strongly believes that
nothing should be done at present to hamper or slow down the difficult and
important work in the CCD. On the contrary, full support and encouragement must
be extended to the business-like efforts of that and other bodies in their efforts
to make the earth a safer place to live on.

In that spirit Poland is ready to join other States in contributing to join
endeavours to bring closer the ultimate goal - general and complete disarmament.
The Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania consistently advocated the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in all areas of international life, including disarmament, a position fully expressed in the following documents presented during the thirty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly:

"Romania's position on the improvement and democratization of the activities of the United Nations and the strengthening of its role in achieving co-operation among all States without distinction as to social system, in building a more just and a better world, and in securing a durable peace" (A/C.6/437);

"The position of Romania on the problems of disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, and the establishment of world peace" (A/C.1/1066).

On the basis of the position set forth in document A/C.1/1066, according to which ... "it is imperative to give the United Nations an enhanced role in the field of disarmament, in which it should exercise direct authority in the negotiation and conclusion of disarmament measures and in supervising their implementation", the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania wishes at this time to submit to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament the following considerations on the subject of disarmament negotiations and the need to enhance the United Nation's role in this connexion.

1. By virtue of its very Charter, the United Nations has the right and the obligation to study the general principles of co-operation for the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and on the basis of these principles it can make recommendations to Member States and to the Security Council.

The United Nations is accordingly destined to occupy a special position with regard to disarmament. There is no question, therefore, of whether the United Nations has a role to play in this field; the question is rather to find ways and means, appropriate in present-day conditions, of enabling it fully to accomplish its mission and perform its role in this respect.

At the present time, however, the United Nations is being relegated to the background in the matter of negotiations on disarmament as such, and to a great extent it has been transformed into a forum where the information that other organizations pass on to it is noted. Its lengthy discussions and the numerous resolutions it adopts and transmits to negotiating forums are usually not taken into consideration or else are not acted upon. Efforts in this regard are dissipated, which deprives the negotiations of the necessary perspective. Likewise, it may be observed that vital topics are gradually abandoned and peripheral subjects are taken up without any relation to the task of putting an end to the arms race.

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A thorough re-examination of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament has become necessary, as was emphasized in the introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization for 1975. 1/

2. Any serious study of the problems of disarmament as a whole should be based on the following premises: the participation of all States of the world in such negotiations on a footing of complete equality; development of the negotiations in accordance with a coherent general plan approved by the entire international community; the creation of structures permitting the democratic development of the negotiations and the adoption of effective measures with regard to the fundamental problems of disarmament; and the concentration of all efforts under the aegis of the United Nations.

3. A primary consideration in enabling the United Nations to make an effective contribution in the field of disarmament is the full and efficient utilization of existing structures - the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission - and association with the United Nations of organizations that carry on their activities outside the United Nations framework.

First, the General Assembly, must be able, with regard either to specific topics or to the subject as a whole, periodically to evaluate the status of disarmament negotiations and the means by which the resolutions it has adopted have been implemented.

All disarmament forums, bilateral or multilateral, should report to the United Nations General Assembly on the status and results of negotiations. In turn, the General Assembly should have the opportunity to formulate observations, proposals and recommendations on disarmament negotiations, whatever the forum in which they are taking place. Liaison between the United Nations and disarmament negotiation forums could also be strengthened by the presence of a representative of the Secretary-General at all such forums.

4. With regard to the concentration of discussion on disarmament under the aegis of the United Nations, a particularly important place should be given to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, to which all Member States belong.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission should hold regular sessions scheduled according to need. It should discuss all disarmament negotiations and the development of efforts made in this field, and transmit its point of view to the General Assembly.

The Commission's principal and specific task should be to prepare an international treaty on general disarmament and in particular on nuclear disarmament.

The Commission could establish sub-commissions of the whole which would be subordinate to it and would have the task of negotiating specific disarmament measures or measures relating to different parts of the world and of presenting periodic reports to the Commission on the results obtained.

Negotiating forums existing in the world today would become sub-commissions of the Disarmament Commission with special assignments.

This structure would make it possible to approach several aspects of disarmament simultaneously, to negotiate the treaty for general and complete disarmament, and in short, to concentrate all efforts under the same aegis - the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission should be provided with the necessary structures to enable it to keep informed as to the implementation of agreements concluded, and the control systems prepared individually for each agreement should be placed under this Commission's supervision.

5. The Geneva Committee on Disarmament should be appropriately reorganized so as to make it a subsidiary body of the Disarmament Commission. This would imply distributing specific tasks to that body, democratizing the direction of its work, guaranteeing open negotiations which could be watched by international public opinion and participation in its work by all States on an equal footing.

6. It is also necessary to step up the activities of the United Nations Secretariat in the field of disarmament, especially the compilation of statistics on the arms race and military expenditures, the definition of trends emerging in this field and the subsequent provision of information to Governments and public opinion on these matters. The United Nations should publish an annual bulletin (report) on both the arms race and the status of negotiations on disarmament.

Means must be found to enable the United Nations to communicate with non-governmental organizations and international research organizations. These organizations and institutions could be granted consultative status with the Disarmament Commission.

The Disarmament Affairs Division of the United Nations Secretariat could become a unit directly subordinate to the Secretary-General.

7. The Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania feels it is imperative to convene a special session of the United Nations General Assembly to consider the arms race and disarmament negotiations multilaterally. The principal aims of the session should be to draw up a code of principles that could be applied to all disarmament negotiations, to establish a strategy and a draft programme for disarmament negotiations, and to redefine existing structures and create new structures for disarmament negotiations, all under the aegis of the United Nations.

8. It must also be borne in mind that, because of its complex nature, the problem of the arms race and its consequences make multilevel analysis and combined action imperative in the political, legal, economic, social and scientific...
fields. Hence the armaments problem and its implications for various fields should be studied in all appropriate organizations and specialized agencies, according to their specialty. Their conclusions and decisions should be made known to the United Nations, which in the future should pool all such information with a view to undertaking, with all the means at its disposal, specific action to put an end to the arms race and bring about disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament.
The Government of Spain considers that the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament is a subject which involves three types of problems:

(a) Structural deficiencies in the existing system;

(b) Difficulties relating to the functioning of the bodies concerned with disarmament; and

(c) The formulation and general acceptance of a concrete objective in the field of disarmament that is attainable in the near future.

The efforts made in recent years reveal an increasing tendency on the part of Governments to focus attention on problems relating to the structure and functioning of the specialized bodies concerned and an accompanying abandonment of the basic problem of defining a concrete objective. At the time the Disarmament Decade was proclaimed, it was not expected that the efforts during those 10 years would be devoted primarily to improving the structures and their operation; rather, it was hoped that concrete results would be attained - results to which, now that more than half that period has passed, States appear to be devoting dwindling attention and political will.

The most recent initiatives, although still deserving of consideration, confirm this phenomenon of a reversal of objectives, which would have efforts focus on instrumental ways and means in the hope that their smoother functioning would at some uncertain time in the future perhaps generate some progress in the field of disarmament. In the view of the Spanish Government, this attitude in practice amounts to an abandonment of hope and of the will to bring about general disarmament in the foreseeable future.

The Government of Spain considers that the first priority should be to place the problems back in their proper perspective, i.e., to strive first and foremost to formulate an objective which must be concrete, attainable in the near future and generally accepted.

It is obvious that the formulation of an objective having these characteristics is no easy task. But it is equally obvious that, in recognizing this fact, constructive suggestions simultaneously should be offered to overcome the difficulty. One of these suggestions, as has been pointed out on a number of occasions in various forums, might be to correct the focus of disarmament by considering it in conjunction with the problem of international security. The experience of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe demonstrates the necessity of integrating matters relating to security with those of a predominantly military nature within as broad a geographical framework as possible.
Furthermore, and in order not to dissipate entirely the impetus behind the proclamation of the Disarmament Decade, consideration might be given to the possible convening of a world conference on international security and arms control and reduction by the end of the decade, if possible, before 1980. This objective could bring the desired characteristics together, thus serving as a basis for a reordering of priorities. If this objective is accepted during the debates in 1976 in the various bodies concerned with disarmament, due attention should at the same time be devoted to the structural and operational aspects referred to in the working paper contained in document A/AC.181/L.2 submitted on 27 January to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament.

SWEDEN

[Original: English]
[25 March 1976]

In operative paragraph 3 of its resolution 3484 B (XXX) the General Assembly has provided the conceptual framework for the basic review of the role of the United Nations in the disarmament field to be carried out by the Ad Hoc Committee established for that purpose. Before turning to the three main objectives indicated in that paragraph, the Swedish Government would like to make certain general comments on the overall approach to the basic review.

The experience from 30 years of disarmament endeavours in the United Nations and a realistic evaluation of present potentials for major break-throughs in these negotiations have been important factors for the Swedish Government when proposing a level of ambition for the basic review. A primary objective of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee should be to present proposals to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session which could lay the basis for a more efficient role of the United Nations in international disarmament efforts, the task of the Ad Hoc Committee should thus be to explore in which fields of disarmament the United Nations can make a more concrete and effective contribution and to propose measures to this effect. This should not, at the present stage, involve the establishment of new permanent intergovernmental United Nations bodies in the field. It should also be recalled that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee does not call for a consideration of the substance of disarmament matters.

In view of the considerable tasks entrusted by the Ad Hoc Committee, which are to be carried out in a short time, careful attention must be given to the further organization of its work. In the opinion of the Swedish Government, the Committee should at the end of its second session establish intersessional working groups as appropriate. The working groups should report their findings to the Committee at its third session and if possible present draft for the final report of the Committee.

The following proposals, which are grouped under the main headings of operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 3484 B (XXX), are intended to indicate areas where it should be possible to reach agreement on action this year.
The Swedish Government expresses its sincere wish that the process thus initiated will, in a longer perspective, yield such decisive results in the field of disarmament as urgently called for by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the introduction of his report on the work of the organization in 1975.

I. POSSIBLE NEW APPROACHES FOR ACHIEVING MORE EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES AND ORGANIZATION OF WORK IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT, THEREBY ENABLING THE UNITED NATIONS TO EXERCISE ITS FULL ROLE IN MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT EFFORTS

A. Improved methods of work of the First Committee of the General Assembly in disarmament matters

It seems clear that the First Committee has now reached the upper limits of what could, with the present organization of its work, reasonably be dealt with in one session. Smaller delegations find it increasingly difficult to take part in both the informal negotiations on the many resolutions to be adopted and the simultaneous plenary debate of the Committee. The fact that the many resolutions adopted (25 in 1975) in real terms contribute little to the cause of disarmament, involves serious risks for the status and prestige of the United Nations, which is detrimental to the interest of all States.

Accordingly, it is proposed that:

A precise agenda be established for the consideration of the various disarmament items by the First Committee at the beginning of each session;

Delegations should strive to arrange for informal circulation of draft resolutions already at the start of the disarmament debate in the Committee;

An attempt be made to concentrate the attention of the Committee on a limited number of specific issues during each session;

A serious attempt be made to limit considerably the number of agenda items and the number of resolutions presented. One step in this direction would be to consider certain items every second year instead of every year. Also, it does not seem necessary always to adopt resolutions every year on subjects where no significant developments have taken place in the previous year. Instead a reference could be made in the report of the First Committee to earlier resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the matter in question;

Matters which are closely related to each other should further be considered at the same time (e.g. nuclear disarmament, SALT, comprehensive test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions could be dealt with in one group and items concerning nuclear weapon free zones in another).

It is proposed that consultations take place in the Ad Hoc Committee on specific proposals to be put forward to the General Assembly.

/...
B. The relationship between the General Assembly and other United Nations bodies in the field of disarmament

It is proposed that relevant sections of the annual report of the International Atomic Energy Agency be considered by the First Committee before the report is dealt with by the General Assembly in plenary. This would seem to be a logical step in view of the Agency's large responsibilities for the prevention of nuclear weapons.

C. Role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission

The possibility of convening sessions of the United Nations Disarmament Commission should be kept open as an option also in the future, e.g. to consider draft conventions agreed upon by a limited group of States such as the CCD. If efforts fail to improve the methods of work of the First Committee the role of the Disarmament Commission should be generally reconsidered.

D. Role of the United Nations in providing assistance, on request in multilateral and regional disarmament negotiations

It is proposed that:

The Ad Hoc Committee endorse a recommendation that serious consideration always be given by States participating in multilateral and regional disarmament negotiations to the possibility of requesting conference servicing and other technical assistance from the United Nations. The regular involvement of the United Nations in such negotiations would contribute to the negotiation process;

The United Nations should attempt to establish contacts with various negotiating bodies in the arms control and disarmament field and, whenever appropriate, circulate reports from such bodies;

The United Nations Secretariat be enabled to analyse, at an early stage, disarmament and arms control proposals as to their compatibility with other proposals and existing disarmament treaties.

E. The relationship between the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)

It is proposed that:

The General Assembly make suggestions to the CCD for the improvement of the CCD report to the General Assembly. It is highly desirable that the report presents the extensive material emanating from each session together with agreed conclusions, in a more analytical manner than at present. The report should in a main short chapter give an account of the discussions /...
and negotiations during each CCD session, geared to the specific needs of the General Assembly. The report should also, whenever possible, attempt to draw relevant conclusions. The report should be supplemented by an annex containing both an account of the most important opinions expressed by delegations on specific items and the texts of relevant working documents. An effort should be made to limit the length on the report. If the report should become the type of indispensable document of the General Assembly which is to be expected, it is also imperative that it be available to delegations not later than 15 September each year;

The General Assembly show great restraint in entrusting new tasks to the CCD in the absence of concrete results with regard to present agenda items of that body;

Full opportunities be given during the second session of the Ad Hoc Committee for drawing appropriate conclusions of the present consideration by the CCD of its organization of work.

F. Studies

There is a clear need to strengthen considerably the capacity of the United Nations for in-depth studies of relevant disarmament matters. The present system of ad hoc studies on the basis of General Assembly resolutions specifically adopted for the purpose is not entirely satisfactory. The establishment of a more permanent structure within the United Nations for studies in this field is highly desirable. Such a unit should solicit assistance whenever possible and necessary from other sources inside and outside the United Nations system, such as UNITAR, SIPRI and recognized non-governmental organizations, who take a special interest in disarmament affairs. Special attention must be given to the important matter of maintaining a close liaison with Member States.

A possibility, which should be seriously considered, would be for the United Nations to work out a report on important aspects of arms and disarmament, military strategies, national, regional and international security problems, economic and social consequences of the arms race, etc. Such a report, which would be a valuable contribution also to the information activities of the United Nations Secretariat, could be published annually or every second year.

It is proposed that:

Consultations take place during the second session of the Ad Hoc Committee on the desirable scope and organization of an increased United Nations effort in this area;

The Secretary-General be invited to assist an intersessional working group of the Ad Hoc Committee, to be established at the end of the second session of the Committee, in defining organizational, technical and financial requirements for such an effort;

/...
Consultations take place in the Ad Hoc Committee on the appropriate method of establishing a satisfactory liaison between Member States and a possible future United Nations study organization.

II. WAYS AND MEANS OF IMPROVING EXISTING UNITED NATIONS FACILITIES FOR COLLECTION, COMPILATION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES, IN ORDER TO KEEP ALL GOVERNMENTS, AS WELL AS WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, PROPERLY INFORMED ON PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

The existing United Nations facilities for information on disarmament issues are clearly inadequate. Action is long overdue to make this important function correspond to what is considered natural in other fields of United Nations activity. It seems essential that the United Nations be provided with adequate resources to be able to publish in a highly readable form at regular intervals factual basic data on relevant disarmament matters.

It is proposed that:

The Secretary-General be invited to assist an intersessional working group of the Ad Hoc Committee, to be established at the end of the second session of the Committee, in defining organizational, technical and financial requirements for the preparation of a disarmament periodical of the United Nations. Such a periodical should be distributed in the official languages of the Organization approximately three times a year and would present basic data covering the entire field of disarmament;

Consultations take place in the Ad Hoc Committee on the best ways to bring about a desirable close interaction between the United Nations and recognized non-governmental organizations in the field of disarmament.

III. WAYS AND MEANS TO ENABLE THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT TO ASSIST, ON REQUEST, STATES PARTIES TO MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS IN THEIR DUTY TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF SUCH AGREEMENTS, INCLUDING APPROPRIATE REVIEWS

The IAEA has been entrusted with important follow-up functions with regard to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Swedish Government strongly believes that the United Nations, on request by Governments, can play a useful role in the follow-up of other agreements in the field of disarmament. It should be emphasized that the conclusion of a particular disarmament agreement often represents the beginning, rather than the end, of a process towards disarmament.

Effective implementation of an agreement must be ensured. At the same time enough flexibility must be maintained to make it possible to adapt particular
provisions to changing circumstances. An increased role of the United Nations in this area would also contribute to increasing confidence between States.

When considering a strengthened United Nations role in the field of disarmament it is thus obvious that the follow-up function is of cardinal importance.

It is proposed that:

Consultations take place in the Ad Hoc Committee on how to strengthen this function. During such consultations the following possibilities should be explored:

(a) Preparation of United Nations Annual Reports on the status of disarmament agreements;

(b) Involvement of the United Nations, as appropriate, in the co-ordination of ratification procedures;

(c) Increased multilateral emphasis on review conferences and an expanded United Nations role in this connexion;

(d) Increased United Nations involvement in the implementation of disarmament agreements generally: The following United Nations functions could be contemplated in the area of verification of compliance with disarmament agreements:

(i) A general fact-finding function entrusted to the Secretary-General with the assistance of experts from States parties to treaties, this function could be combined with the utilization of the good offices of the Secretary-General in the settlement of disputes;

(ii) Compilation and dissemination of data in order to facilitate exchange of information between States on matters relevant to the implementation of specific disarmament agreements;

(iii) Technical support function (e.g., United Nations seismological stations monitoring a comprehensive test ban agreement);

(iv) United Nations inspection teams;

United Nations role in harmonizing verification arrangements between different disarmament agreements.

The realization of the proposals made above or part of them presupposes a considerable strengthening of the resources of the United Nations Secretariat. Already in the present situation the burden placed on the disarmament affairs division is excessive. The recent increase of professional staff of the division from 11 to 15 officers merely preserves a status quo of the United Nations role in the face of increasing conference servicing requirements.
In the opinion of the Swedish Government a strengthening of the United Nations Secretariat role with respect to studies, information and the follow-up of multilateral disarmament agreements requires thorough organizational changes. The disarmament affairs division should be replaced by a secretariat unit responsible directly to the Secretary-General. The head of the unit should have the rank of at least Assistant Secretary-General. Such a unit, which could be given the working name United Nations Disarmament Centre (UNDC), should combine the functions for committee and conference services, retrieval and dissemination of information, disarmament studies and the follow-up of disarmament resolutions and agreements.
TURKEY

[Original: English]
[30 April 1976]

The Turkish Government avails itself of this opportunity to express its satisfaction on the establishment of an ad hoc committee for the purpose of exploring ways and means of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, in a period when there is an obvious and ever-increasing need for intensifying the efforts deployed to this effect.

The Turkish Government believes that the following views and suggestions which are elaborated in the light of the main objectives listed in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 3484 B (XXX) might, at this stage, help the United Nations to make concrete and effective contributions to endeavours in the disarmament field:

1. World public opinion, by getting better informed on developments in the field of disarmament, may have an increased degree of interest on national Governments' activities to seek out viable and concrete solutions to disarmament issues. Therefore, the Turkish Government suggests that:

   (a) A United Nations periodical covering major aspects of disarmament issues, as well as factual basic data concerning developments in this field, be prepared and published at regular intervals, in the official languages of the Organization;

   (b) Governments of Member States assume the task of translating (if necessary) this periodical and ensure the widest dissemination of its contents through all appropriate means of mass communication.

2. Certain alternations in the procedures adopted by the relevant bodies of the United Nations might contribute to the cause of disarmament. Therefore, the Turkish Government suggests that:

   (a) Subjects which are closely interrelated, such as the nuclear test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions, be dealt with at the same time. This might not only be a time-saving method, but also could pave the way to more comprehensive and systematic discussions on such issues;

   (b) The First Committee focus its attention on a rather limited number of specific disarmament items during each session and, thereby, have enough time to discuss these in great detail;

   (c) Subjects on which no progress is registered be considered every other year;

   (d) The Ad Hoc Committee review the existing procedures concerning the relationship between the General Assembly and other competent bodies in the field of disarmament so as to make this collaboration more efficient.

/...
3. There is an absolute necessity to ensure effective implementation of multilateral disarmament agreements, and that the United Nations should be entrusted with an active role in the follow-up of such agreements.

The Turkish Government suggests, therefore, that consultation should take place in the Ad Hoc Committee on ways and means of increasing the United Nations role of supervising the implementation of disarmament agreements in general.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]
[28 April 1976]

The Soviet Union wages a constant struggle to halt the arms race and to promote disarmament. This principle, which guides the foreign policy of the Soviet State, was again reaffirmed at the 25th Congress of the CPSU. The Soviet Union considers that its primary task is to halt the accelerating arms race which threatens the world, to begin reducing the stockpile of weapons and to move towards disarmament.

Accordingly, the USSR is firmly in favour of expanding the active role of the United Nations in solving this urgent problem. In recent years, the General Assembly of the United Nations, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, has adopted a number of important resolutions on the question of containing the arms race and the question of disarmament. It is vital to take energetic measures to ensure the implementation of those decisions. The proposed convocation of a World Disarmament Conference, which is supported by the majority of the States Members of the United Nations, is also of particular significance. It is especially important to take all measures to ensure that the Conference be held as quickly as possible and to concentrate the resources of the United Nations on the completion of the preparatory work. The work carried out in recent years by the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference has provided a good basis for this. The Conference could not only study various aspects of the problem of disarmament from all sides but could, through a concerted effort, determine the most effective ways and means of solving the problem; it could also, of course, determine what role the United Nations could play in this matter.

Consequently, there are many unutilized possibilities for the United Nations to mobilize the efforts of Member States with a view to solving the problems of halting the arms race and of achieving disarmament.

Thus, at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Soviet delegation expressed serious doubts about the usefulness of establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament, and it stated its views on this matter.

The Soviet Union remains convinced that the real reasons for the lack of progress in the field of disarmament lie not in the mechanics or procedures of
the discussions but in the reluctance of some of the larger States to halt the arms race. Under these conditions, any action whereby the attention of the United Nations is concentrated on the procedural and organizational aspects of disarmament could only divert Member States from the real substance of the problem of disarmament; it would also disrupt proven procedures for discussions on disarmament and would allow the opponents of disarmament to continue to avoid participating in talks and to shirk their responsibilities in this field. That would adversely affect the concrete efforts which States are making, both within the framework of the United Nations and elsewhere, to end the arms race and to achieve disarmament.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the introduction to the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (A/10001/Add.1) the Secretary-General appealed to all nations "to exercise unilateral restraint and at the same time to broaden the scope and intensify the pace of their efforts to negotiate truly effective arms control and disarmament agreements". It is right to concentrate on this important task but we should not underestimate the value of what has already been achieved. The years since the United Nations came into existence have not been unproductive. The United Nations itself has produced treaties on outer space and the Antarctic. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) has negotiated several agreements, notably the non-proliferation and sea-bed treaties and the bacteriological (biological) weapons Convention. Latin American States have established a nuclear-weapon-free zone by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The United States and Soviet Union have concluded an agreement limiting anti-ballistic missile systems, a first agreement on strategic arms limitation, and a threshold agreement which should soon come formally into force now that the associated negotiations on peaceful nuclear explosions seem to have reached a successful conclusion. At present, negotiations are taking place at the regional level (for example on mutual force reductions in Europe); at the bilateral level (for example strategic arms limitation talks); and multilaterally in the CCD and under the auspices of the Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts.

The disarmament machinery at present used by the international community provides adequate opportunity for discussing new ideas or for pursuing new possibilities for negotiation, and the United Kingdom Government do not believe that the creation of new bodies to deal with disarmament would necessarily facilitate progress. For this reason they abstained from voting on General Assembly resolution 3484 B (XXX). At the same time, because the United Kingdom Government recognized that some Governments believe that defects in international machinery for discussing and negotiating disarmament are partly responsible for slow progress, they participated in the first organizational meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee to discuss this matter. The United Kingdom Government are prepared to play a full part in the Committee's activities and will support any proposals which will genuinely increase the effectiveness of the United Nations role in connexion with international disarmament negotiations.

More effective procedures and organization of work (para. 3 (a) of General Assembly resolution 3484 B (XXX)

The United Kingdom Government believe that the First Committee of the General Assembly provides sufficient scope for all United Nations Members to exchange views on the full range of disarmament problems. However, in their view, the following...
possibilities could be usefully explored, with a view to making the First Committee's discussions more effective and valuable:

(a) The Committee to deal with each disarmament topic separately and in turn, on the basis of a more precise agenda;

(b) The number of agenda items to be limited, by avoiding resolutions every year on subjects where there have been no significant developments;

(c) Draft resolutions to be circulated to all delegations as early as possible in the First Committee's disarmament debates.

The United Kingdom Government also consider that the United Nations could usefully direct greater attention to exploring the possibilities for regional arms control arrangements by identifying and examining those problems particularly suited to regional solutions. Specific regional initiatives will remain a matter for States of the regions concerned.

A world disarmament conference or a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament might facilitate progress in disarmament. As the United Kingdom delegate said in his speech in the First Committee on 17 November 1978:

"My Government have consistently said that such a conference might give fresh impetus to the negotiation of disarmament. But we believe that the attendance of all significant military States, and certainly all nuclear powers, would be essential. Otherwise, it would not be a true 'world' conference and its results might well be a great disappointment. An alternative which has been suggested is a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Here again my Government would need to be convinced that a special session would be likely to make a useful contribution going beyond that of the First Committee's annual debates."

The United Kingdom Government believe that the CCD remains the most effective multilateral disarmament negotiating body. It is at present conducting a thorough review of its own procedures, and the United Kingdom Government consider that the CCD's role and operating procedures should continue to remain outside the scope of the Ad Hoc Committee.

United Nations information on disarmament issues (para. 3 (b) of resolution 3484 B (XXX))

The United Kingdom Government do not themselves find that the existing sources of information on disarmament are inadequate but recognize that other Governments may. They are accordingly ready to consider proposals for the provision of more extensive information on disarmament matters by the United Nations Secretariat. Since progress in bilateral and multilateral negotiations often depends on some degree of confidentiality, there will obviously be limits as to what the United Nations Secretariat is able to achieve in this field.

/...
United Nations Secretariat (para. 3 (c))
of resolution 3484 B (XXX)

The United Kingdom Government are ready to consider ways in which the United Nations Secretariat might be able, on request, to assist parties to disarmament agreements to ensure the effective functioning of those agreements. The Secretariat might, for example, in certain circumstances usefully play a part in organizing services for any investigatory or monitoring committees established under disarmament treaties.

The Ad Hoc Committee might also consider the possibility that the United Nations Secretariat should assume the depositary role for disarmament conventions and treaties.

In the view of the United Kingdom Government, any additional functions for the Secretariat need not, and should not, lead to any substantial increase in the size of the Disarmament Division.