NOTE:

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its forty-first session, the General Assembly, by its resolution 41/86 E of 4 December 1986, took note, inter alia, of the report of the Disarmament Commission; 1/ requested the Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ the first special session devoted to disarmament; and requested the Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1987 and to submit a substantive report, containing specific recommendations on the items included in its agenda, to the Assembly at its forty-second session.

2. At the same session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions that have direct relevance to the work of the Disarmament Commission:

(a) Resolution 41/55 B, entitled "Nuclear capability of South Africa";
(b) Resolution 41/57, entitled "Reduction of military budgets";
(c) Resolution 41/59 C, entitled "Conventional disarmament";
(d) Resolution 41/59 G, entitled "Conventional disarmament";
(e) Resolution 41/59 K, entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament";
(f) Resolution 41/59 O, entitled "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament";
(g) Resolution 41/86 E, entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission";
(h) Resolution 41/86 J, entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session";
(i) Resolution 41/86 Q, entitled "Verification in all its aspects".

3. The Disarmament Commission met at United Nations Headquarters on 1 December 1986 for a brief organizational session. During that meeting (110th meeting), the Commission considered questions related to the organization of work for its 1987 substantive session and took up the question of the election of its officers, taking into account the principle of rotation of the chairmanship among the geographic regions. The Commission elected its Chairman and four Vice-Chairmen and a Rapporteur; the election of the other officers was postponed to the 1987 substantive session. The Commission also considered the provisional agenda (see para. 6 below) for the 1987 substantive session, scheduled to open on 4 May 1987.
4. The Disarmament Commission met at United Nations Headquarters from 4 to 27 May 1987. In the course of its session, it held 11 plenary meetings (111th-121st meetings).

5. At its 111th meeting, on 4 May, the Disarmament Commission elected three more Vice-Chairmen of the Commission for 1987. The Bureau of the Commission was constituted as follows:

**Chairman:** Mr. Dimitar Kostov (Bulgaria)

**Vice-Chairmen:** Representatives from the following States:
- Austria
- Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
- Bangladesh
- Uruguay
- Cameroon
- Venezuela
- Denmark

**Rapporteur:** Mr. Maher Nashashibi (Jordan)

6. At the same meeting, the Disarmament Commission adopted its agenda, contained in document A/CN.10/L.20, as follows:

1. Opening of the session.
2. Election of officers.
3. Adoption of the agenda.
4. (a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war;

   (b) Consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of resolution 33/71 H, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.

5. Reduction of military budgets:

   (a) Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

   (b) Examination and identification of effective ways and means of achieving agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, taking into
account the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 34/83 F, 35/142 A, 36/82 A, 37/95 A, 38/184 A, 39/64 A, 40/91 A and 41/57 with a view to concluding its work on the last outstanding paragraph of the "Principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets".

6. Substantive consideration of the question of South Africa's nuclear capability as requested by the General Assembly and the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid (resolutions 37/74 B, 38/181 B, 39/61 B, 40/89 B and 41/55 B and document A/CN.10/4).


8. Naval armaments and disarmament.

9. Substantive consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament, including the recommendations and conclusions contained in the study on conventional disarmament.

10. Consideration of the question of verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification.


12. Other business.

7. At the same meeting, the Disarmament Commission approved elements of its programme of work for the session and decided to establish a Committee of the Whole for the consideration of agenda items 4, 11 and 12. With regard to item 4, concerning various aspects of the arms race and questions relating to both nuclear and conventional disarmament, a Contact Group was established within the framework of the Committee of the Whole, under the chairmanship of Mr. J. S. Teja (India), to consider the item. The Contact Group held eight meetings between 11 and 22 May and submitted its report to the Committee of the Whole at the 2nd meeting of the Committee of the Whole, on 27 May.

8. The Disarmament Commission also decided, at the same meeting, to establish a Consultation Group to deal with agenda item 5, on the question of the reduction of military budgets, and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. The Consultation Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Gheorghe Tinca (Romania) and held seven meetings between 12 and 22 May.

9. At the same meeting, the Disarmament Commission decided to establish Working Group I to deal with agenda item 6, on the question of South Africa's nuclear capability, and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. Working Group I met under the chairmanship of Mr. Juan Enrique Fischer (Uruguay) and held eight meetings between 8 and 22 May.

10. Also at the same meeting, the Disarmament Commission decided to establish Working Group II to deal with agenda item 7, on the review of the role of the
United Nations in the field of disarmament, and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. Working Group II met under the chairmanship of Mr. Paul Bamela Engo (Cameroon) and held four meetings between 12 and 22 May.

11. In addition, at the same meeting, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission decided to follow last year's course of action and to hold, under his responsibility, substantive and open-ended consultations on agenda item 8, regarding the question of naval armaments and disarmament. Subsequently, the Chairman delegated the conduct of the consultations to Mr. Ali Alatas (Indonesia). Seven meetings were held between 11 and 22 May for the purpose of these consultations.

12. At the same meeting, the Disarmament Commission decided to establish Working Group III to deal with agenda item 9, on the question of conventional disarmament, and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. Working Group III met under the chairmanship of Mr. Skjold G. Mellbin (Denmark) and held nine meetings between 11 and 22 May.

13. Also at the same meeting, the Disarmament Commission decided to establish Working Group IV to deal with agenda item 10, on the question of verification in all its aspects, and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. Working Group IV met under the chairmanship of Mr. Douglas Roche (Canada) and held eight meetings between 11 and 22 May.

14. On 4, 5 and 6 May, the Disarmament Commission held a general exchange of views on all agenda items (111th-115th meetings).

15. At its 120th meeting, on 27 May, the Disarmament Commission considered the reports of Working Groups I, II, III and IV on agenda items 6, 7, 9 and 10 respectively; the report of the Consultation Group on agenda item 5; the report of the Chairman of the Commission on agenda item 8; and the report of the Committee of the Whole on agenda item 4. The reports of the subsidiary bodies of the Commission and the recommendations contained therein are included in section IV of the present report.

16. In accordance with past practice of the Disarmament Commission, some non-governmental organizations attended the plenary meetings as well as the meetings of the Committee of the Whole.
A. Reports and other documents submitted by the Secretary-General

17. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 41/86 E, the Secretary-General, by a note dated 15 January 1987, transmitted to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Conference on Disarmament \(3^\) together with all the official records of the forty-first session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters (A/CN.10/85).

18. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 41/59 C, the Secretary-General submitted to the Disarmament Commission a note concerning the views received from Member States regarding the Study on Conventional Disarmament \(4^\) (A/CN.10/86 and Add.1).

19. In accordance with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 41/86 Q, the Secretary-General submitted to the Disarmament Commission a report containing a compilation of the views received from Member States on the question of verification in all its aspects (A/CN.10/87 and Add.1 and 2).

B. Other documents, including documents submitted by Member States

20. In the course of the Commission's work, the documents listed below, dealing with substantive questions, were submitted.

21. A paper entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament: Chairman's paper on agenda item 8" (A/CN.10/102) was submitted.

22. A working paper entitled "Conventional disarmament" was submitted by Denmark (A/CN.10/88).

23. A paper entitled "Verification in all its aspects: principles, provisions and techniques: draft conclusions of Working Group IV" was submitted by the Chairman of Working Group IV (A/CN.10/89).

24. A working paper entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament: naval confidence-building measures" was submitted by Finland (A/CN.10/90).

25. A working paper entitled "Verification in all its aspects: the establishment of a United Nations data base on verification of arms control agreements" was submitted by Finland (A/CN.10/91).

26. A working paper entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament" was submitted by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/92).

27. A working paper entitled "Verification in all its aspects: basic issues of verification of confidence-building measures, arms limitation and disarmament at all stages of moving towards a safe and nuclear-weapon-free world" was submitted by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and Czechoslovakia (A/CN.10/93).

29. A working paper entitled "Conventional disarmament: basic position of the Chinese delegation" was submitted by China (A/CN.10/95).

30. A working paper entitled "Negotiations on nuclear disarmament" was submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/96).

31. A working paper entitled "Verification in all its aspects" was submitted by Cameroon (A/CN.10/97).

32. A working paper entitled "Conventional disarmament" was submitted by Hungary (A/CN.10/98).

33. A working paper entitled "Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: improvement of the work of the First Committee" was submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/99).

34. A working paper entitled "Substantive consideration of issues relating to conventional disarmament including the recommendations and conclusions contained in the Study on Conventional Disarmament" was submitted by India (A/CN.10/100).

35. A working paper entitled "Naval armaments and disarmaments" was submitted by Sweden (A/CN.10/101).

36. A working paper entitled "Conventional disarmament" was submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/103).

37. A working paper entitled "Verification in all its aspects" was submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/104).
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

38. At its 120th meeting, on 27 May, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus the reports of its subsidiary bodies and the recommendations contained therein regarding agenda items 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 and agreed to submit the texts of those reports, recorded below, to the General Assembly. Subsequently, at its 121st meeting, on 27 May, the Commission adopted, as a whole, its report to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

39. The Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly:

(a) Decide to ensure full provision, to the Commission and its subsidiary bodies, of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages;

(b) Assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services to this end.

40. The report of the Committee of the Whole on agenda item 4 reads as follows:

Draft report of the Committee of the Whole on agenda item 4

"1. At its 117th meeting, on 8 May, the Disarmament Commission decided that, as at previous sessions, agenda item 4 should be dealt with in the framework of the Committee of the Whole by a Contact Group open to all delegations. Ambassador J. S. Teja (India) was appointed Chairman of the Contact Group.

"2. At its 1st meeting, on 11 May, the Committee of the Whole had a general exchange of views on agenda item 4.

"3. The Contact Group held eight meetings between 11 and 22 May.

"4. The Contact Group continued the work on agenda item 4 on the basis of the compilation of proposals for recommendations on that item contained in annex I to the report of the Commission on its 1986 session. It also had before it the following documents:

"(a) Working paper entitled 'Negotiations on nuclear disarmament', submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/96);


"5. The state of the deliberations of the Contact Group is reflected in the 'Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4', which is annexed to the present report of the Commission (see annex I). Those recommendations whose formulation appears in the compilation without brackets or alternatives are the following: recommendations Nos. 1 and 2; in section I, recommendations Nos. 3, 5, 8, 9, 16, 17, 23 and 24; in section II, the introductory sentence and recommendations Nos. 1, 5 and 7. Those
recommendations were generally acceptable, without prejudice to the right of delegations to review them as appropriate.

"6. While the Contact Group made progress towards resolving outstanding issues and arrived at agreed formulations for some recommendations, as indicated in the 'Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4', it was unable to reach a consensus on a complete set of recommendations. It is recommended that the Commission should continue its efforts with a view to reaching agreement on a complete set of recommendations relating to agenda item 4."

41. The report of the Consultation Group on agenda item 5 reads as follows:

"Report of the Consultation Group

"1. By its resolution 41/57 of 3 December 1986, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue the consideration of the item entitled 'Reduction of military budgets' and, in that context, to conclude, at its substantive session in 1987, its work on the last outstanding paragraph of the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets, and to submit its report and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

"2. The Disarmament Commission at its 111th meeting on 4 May 1987, decided to establish the Consultation Group to deal with agenda item 5, as requested by General Assembly resolution 41/57.

"3. The Consultation Group met under the Chairmanship of Mr. Gheorghe Tinca (Romania) and held seven meetings between: 12 and 22 May.

"4. The Consultation Group had before it the following five proposals for paragraph 7 of the 'Principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets', a/ which were submitted for consideration during the session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1986:

"Proposal for paragraph 7 by Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

"Before there can be meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets the principles of transparency and comparability must be accepted by all parties to any negotiation. To this end, the elaboration of agreed methods of measuring and comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between countries representing different regions and different budgeting systems is a necessary pre-condition. Thus the use of the standardized international reporting instrument by the participating States, although not sufficient in itself, is an essential first step."
Proposal for paragraph 7 by the German Democratic Republic

"Meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets require the participating States to exchange, during the negotiating process, a reasonable amount of information on their military budgets. In this respect States may use any means and methods acceptable to them."

Proposal for paragraph 7 by Pakistan

"Before there can be meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets among any group of States there should be an understanding among them concerning the need for an exchange of data and comparability of their military budgets. In this regard, the elaboration of agreed methods for measuring and comparing military budgets is essential. To this end, the use of the standardized international reporting instrument could constitute the first step."

Proposal for paragraph 7 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

"Meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets require the participating States to exchange on an agreed basis during the negotiating process a reasonable amount of information on their military budgets which will be needed for the purpose of the agreement. In this respect States may use any means and methods acceptable to them. Unreasonable requests for information unrelated to the objectives of the negotiations or setting forth such requests as a pre-condition for the beginning of negotiations might cause damage to these objectives and should be avoided."

Proposal for paragraph 7 by Sweden

"Meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets would require the exchange of a reasonable amount of relevant data and agreement on concepts concerning the measurement and comparability of the military expenditures. The specific methods for measuring and comparing the military expenditures should be elaborated in the context of negotiations of specific agreements taking into account the scope, nature and purposes of the agreements. Relevant parts of the standardized international reporting system adopted in 1980 by the General Assembly could be useful in this connection."

In addition the Consultation Group had before it the following conference room papers:

"(a) Military expenditures in standardized form reported by States (A/CN.10/1987/Item 5/CRP.1 and Rev.1 and 2);

"(b) Proposal for paragraph 7 (A/CN.10/1987/Item 5/CRP.2);

"(c) Proposal for paragraph 7 (A/CN.10/1987/Item 5/CRP.3)."

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5. While significant progress was made on some outstanding elements of paragraph 7, it was not possible to achieve consensus on the formulation of that paragraph.

6. At the final meeting, on 22 May 1987, the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics jointly, and the delegation of Sweden submitted proposals for paragraph 7 to replace their respective proposals made in 1986 (document A/41/42, p. 10). These proposals were not discussed because of time constraints.

7. The Consultation Group was divided on whether this item should be returned to the Disarmament Commission for consideration at its session in 1988.

8. The Consultation Group, therefore, recommended to the Disarmament Commission that it transmit the following document to the General Assembly in order for it to decide on the future course of action on this item:

"PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN FURTHER ACTIONS OF STATES IN THE FIELD OF FREEZING AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS"

1. Concerted efforts should be made by all States, in particular by those States with the largest military arsenals, and by the appropriate negotiating forums, with the objective of concluding international agreements to freeze and reduce military budgets, including adequate verification measures acceptable to all parties. Such agreements should contribute to genuine reductions of armed forces and armaments of States parties, with the aim of strengthening international peace and security at lower levels of armed forces and armaments. Definite agreements on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures are assuming special importance and should be reached within the shortest period of time in order to contribute to the curbing of the arms race, alleviate international tensions, and increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

2. All efforts in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures should take into account the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2).

3. Pending the conclusion of agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures, all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, should exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures.

4. The reduction of military expenditures on a mutually agreed basis should be implemented gradually and in a balanced manner, either on a

* In the absence of agreement on Principle 7, there is no final agreement on the remaining principles.
percentage or on an absolute basis, so as to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage, and without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security and sovereignty and to undertake the necessary measures of self-defence.

'5. While the freezing and reduction of military budgets is the responsibility of all States to be implemented in stages in accordance with the principle of the greatest responsibility, the process should begin with those nuclear-weapon States with the largest military arsenals and the biggest military expenditures, to be followed immediately by other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States. This should not prevent other States from initiating negotiations and reaching agreements on the balanced reduction of their respective military budgets at any time during this process.

'6. Human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures should be devoted to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

'7. [The text of this paragraph is still under consideration. Alternative formulations for this paragraph are appended to this document.]

'8. Armaments and military activities which would be the subject of physical reductions within the limits provided for in any agreement to reduce military expenditures will be identified by every State party to such agreements.

'9. The agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures should contain adequate and efficient measures of verification, satisfactory to all parties, in order to ensure that their provisions are strictly applied and fulfilled by all States parties. The specific methods of verification or other compliance procedure should be agreed upon in the process of negotiation depending upon the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.

'10. Unilateral measures undertaken by States concerning the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, especially when they are followed by similar measures adopted by other States on the basis of mutual example, could contribute to favourable conditions for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures.

'11. Confidence-building measures could help to create a political climate, conducive to the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. Conversely, the freezing and reduction of military expenditures could contribute to the increase of confidence among States.

'12. The United Nations should play a central role in orienting, stimulating and initiating negotiations on freezing and reducing military expenditures, and all Member States should co-operate with the Organization as among themselves, with a view to solving the problems implied by this process.
'13. The freezing and reduction of military expenditures may be achieved, as appropriate, on a global, regional or subregional level, with the agreement of all States concerned.

'14. The agreements on the freezing and reduction of military budgets should be viewed in a broader perspective, including respect for and implementation of the security system of the United Nations, and be interrelated with other measures of disarmament, within the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The reduction of military budgets should therefore be complementary to agreements on the limitation of armaments and disarmament and should not be considered as a substitute for such agreements.

'15. The adoption of the above principles should be regarded as a means of facilitating meaningful negotiations on concrete agreements on the freezing and reduction of military budgets.

* * *

'Proposal for paragraph 7 by Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

"Before there can be meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets the principles of transparency and comparability must be accepted by all parties to any negotiation. To this end, the elaboration of agreed methods of measuring and comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between countries representing different regions and different budgeting systems is a necessary pre-condition. Thus the use of the standardized international reporting instrument by the participating States, although not sufficient in itself, is an essential first step."

'Proposal for paragraph 7 by Pakistan

"Before there can be meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets among any group of States there should be an understanding among them concerning the need for an exchange of data and comparability of their military budgets. In this regard, the elaboration of agreed methods for measuring and comparing military budgets is essential. To this end, the use of the standardized international reporting instrument could constitute the first step."

'Proposal for paragraph 7 by the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

"Greater openness on military activities, inter alia, through voluntary transmittal of relevant information on these activities, including on the levels of military budgets, could contribute to increased confidence among States and promote negotiations on freezing and reductions of military budgets. In the context of negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets, specific methods and means for an exchange of data should be elaborated taking into account
the scope, nature and purposes of the agreements being worked out as well as the differences between budgeting systems of the participating States. In this connection relevant parts of the standardized international reporting system adopted in 1980 by the General Assembly could be taken into account as one of the possible instruments."

'Proposal for paragraph 7 by Sweden

"Greater openness on military activities, *inter alia*, through the regular transmittal of comparable information on these activities, including on the level and magnitude of military budgets, would increase confidence between States and could promote negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets. Negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets require the exchange of comparable data necessary for the elaboration of an agreement. The specific methods and means for such an exchange, as well as the mutually acceptable format and contents of the data to be exchanged should be elaborated in the context of negotiations of specific agreements taking into account the scope, nature and purposes of the agreements, as well as the differences between budgeting systems of the participating States. Completion of applicable parts of the standardized international reporting system adopted in 1980 by the General Assembly should be viewed as a useful instrument in these contexts."

"Notes


42. The report of Working Group I on agenda item 6 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group I


"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 111th meeting, on 4 May 1987, decided to establish Working Group I to deal with agenda item 6 regarding the question of South Africa's nuclear capability and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 41/55 B.

"3. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Juan Enrique Fischer (Uruguay) and held eight meetings between 8 and 22 May 1987. The Working Group also conducted informal consultations through the Chairman during this period."
"4. At its 1st meeting, on 8 May, the Working Group decided that the working paper contained in Annex III of the report of the Disarmament Commission at its 1985 session (A/CN.10/1984/WG.II/CRP.1) 4 should continue to serve as basic document for consideration of the subject.

"5. In carrying out its work, the Working Group also took into account other relevant documents on the subject, inter alia:

"(a) 'South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field' (A/35/402 and Corr.1);

"(b) 'Report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa'; b/

"(c) 'South Africa's nuclear capability' (A/39/470).

"6. On the basis of progress made in the previous years, the Working Group endeavoured to draft conclusions and recommendations on the subject. During the course of deliberations various amendments were submitted in connection with the basic document (A/CN.10/1984/WG.II/CRP.1), as referred to in paragraph 4 mentioned above, with a view to reaching an agreement on a consensus text.

"7. In the course of intensive exchange of views on the text convergencies of approach were evident on several important areas of concern regarding the question of South Africa's nuclear capability.

"8. The Group at this session registered significant progress in its work on the text of conclusions and recommendations (A/CN.10/1984/WG.II/CRP.1) although no consensus was possible on the text as a whole. Agreement was reached on paragraphs 2, 4, 11 (f) and 11 (g) in the complete text which was before the Group. This text follows:

*Nuclear capability of South Africa

'CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON AGENDA ITEM 6

'(Proposals and amendments)

'1. Against the background of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the sovereign right of all peoples to self-determination and independence, the establishment and perpetuation of a racist minority régime in South Africa and Namibia over the majority of the population represent not only a violation of the relevant principles of international law but also criminal conduct.

Alternative for paragraph 1 (proposed by the United Kingdom)

Redraft paragraph 1 as follows: Against the background of the present deteriorating situation in southern Africa, the Commission reaffirms its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a democratic society in accordance with their

Alternative for paragraph 1 (proposed by some States of the African Group)

Against the background of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the sovereign right of all peoples to self-determination and independence, the establishment and perpetuation of a racist minority régime in South Africa and Namibia over the majority of the population represent a flagrant violation of the principles of international law.

Alternative for paragraph 1 (proposal introduced by the Chairman)

Against the background of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the establishment and perpetuation of a racist minority régime in South Africa and Namibia over the majority of the population represent a flagrant violation of the Charter.

2. South Africa's adoption of apartheid, an institutionalized form of racial discrimination, as an instrument of policy runs counter to the human rights provisions of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the human rights and right of all peoples to self-determination. As a result, South Africa's policy of apartheid has been and remains condemned as inhumane and contrary to basic human principle by the international community and a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind by the Security Council.

3. It has become clear that, in its isolation and desperation, the Pretoria régime has resorted to the pursuit of a military option as an instrument of internal oppression and external aggression. It must be suspected that in the pursuit of its military capability in the direction of increased sophistication and ominous dimensions South Africa has placed emphasis on the development and acquisition of nuclear weaponry, which has been made possible through the active nuclear collaboration with it by certain Western countries and Israel, as well as by transnational corporations.

Alternative for paragraph 3 (proposed by France)

South Africa has also resorted to military force to perpetuate the inhumane policy of apartheid and support a policy of destabilization against its neighbours. In its resolution 418 of 1977, the Security Council determined that the acquisition by South Africa of arms and related matériel constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. Reports that South Africa may be acquiring a nuclear weapons capability are a source of grave concern to the international community. If these reports were accurate, this development would represent a serious threat to the stability of the region and greatly aggravate the situation in the region.
'4. In the event, the issue of South Africa's nuclear capability has been brought to international attention by resolution 34/76 B of 11 December 1979 and included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission since its first substantive session in 1979 at the instance of the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid (A/CN.10/4) following the conclusion of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, held at London in February 1979.

'5. In consideration of the item, the Commission affirms the conviction already established by consensus in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly that

"The massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm. It is, therefore, essential for purposes of disarmament to prevent any further acquisition of arms or arms technology by such régimes, especially through strict adherence by all States to relevant decisions of the Security Council" (resolution E-10/2, para. 12).

Alternative for paragraph 5 (proposal introduced by the Chairman)

In consideration of the item the Commission reaffirms with regard to South Africa the concern already expressed in paragraph 12 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. In this respect the Commission strongly recommends that the General Assembly renew its call upon all States to adhere strictly to the relevant decisions of the Security Council.

'6. The Commission is of the firm view that nuclear weapons in the possession of racist régimes can become an instrument of policy for State terrorism, aggression and blackmail and thus increase the danger to international peace and security. It therefore notes with grave concern the danger and serious threat which the established technical capability of South Africa to produce nuclear weapons and the necessary means of delivery pose to the security of African States as well as to international peace and security. This concern is further increased by the reported development by South Africa of a cruise missile, a neutron bomb and various delivery systems in collaboration with Israel.

Alternative for paragraph 6 (proposed by the United States of America)

The proliferation of nuclear weapons to any country is a matter of serious concern to the world. The introduction of nuclear weapons to the African continent, and particularly in such a volatile region as southern Africa, not only would be a severe blow to world-wide efforts at non-proliferation but also would upset many years' efforts to spare the African continent from the nuclear arms race in keeping with the OAU Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa.
Alternative for paragraph 6 (proposed by some States of the African Group)

The Commission is of the firm view that nuclear weapons in the possession of racist régimes could become an instrument of policy for threatening neighbouring States and thus increase the danger to regional and international peace and security. In this connection, the introduction of nuclear weapons into the African continent constitutes not only a severe blow to world-wide efforts at non-proliferation but also undermines many years' efforts to keep the African continent free from the nuclear arms race in keeping with the objectives of the OAU Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa.

7. The Commission notes that the discovery of a reported nuclear-weapon-test site in the Kalahari Desert in 1977, the 22 September 1979 event in the South Atlantic in particular and other data, including the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field (A/35/402 and Corr.1), have caused legitimate and particular concern to the African States and the international community in general, the more so since this nuclear capability may be put at the service of the abhorrent policy of apartheid.

Alternative for paragraph 7 (proposed by the United States of America)

The Commission notes 1977 reports of the discovery of preparations for a possible nuclear-weapon-test site in the Kalahari Desert and reports about the 22 September 1979 event in the South Atlantic; however, despite thorough studies following these reports no definitive conclusions could be reached. Nevertheless, they gave rise to serious concern in the international community.

Alternative for paragraph 7 (proposed by some States of the African Group)

The Commission notes that the discovery of a reported nuclear-weapon-test site in the Kalahari Desert in 1977, and 22 September 1979 event in the South Atlantic in particular and other data, including the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field (A/35/402 and Corr.1) and UNIDIR report (A/39/470) have caused legitimate and particular concern to the African States and the international community in general.

8. The Commission, in fulfilment of its mandate, considers it its responsibility to alert the General Assembly, and through it the Security Council, to the deleterious consequences of South Africa's capability to produce and/or acquire nuclear weapons, its reported and potential possession of nuclear weapons and the implications of this for the security of African States, international peace and security, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the collective decision of the African States regarding the denuclearization of Africa, which has been endorsed by the General Assembly.
Alternative for paragraph 8 (proposed by the United Kingdom)

The Commission, in fulfilment of its mandate, considers it its responsibility to alert the General Assembly to the serious consequences which the acquisition or production of nuclear weapons by South Africa would have for the security of African States, international peace and security, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the collective decision of the African States regarding the denuclearization of Africa which has been endorsed by the General Assembly.

Alternative for paragraph 8 (proposed by some States of the African Group)

The Commission, in fulfilment of its mandate, considers it its responsibility to alert the General Assembly, of the serious consequences of South Africa's capability to produce and/or acquire nuclear weapons, and the implications of this for the security of African States, international peace and security, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the collective decision of the African States regarding the denuclearization of Africa, which has been endorsed by the General Assembly.

9. The Commission considers it at variance with the declared principles of international law relating to the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States to allow, enable and assist, directly or indirectly, South Africa to continue its policy of aggression and destabilization against the countries of the African continent through the development of a nuclear-weapon capability which has been achieved mainly through collaboration in the military and nuclear fields with certain Western countries, Israel and transnational corporations.

Alternative for paragraph 9 (proposed by France)

The Commission draws attention to resolution 591 of the Security Council which in addition to underlining the necessity for the strict implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa imposed by resolution 418 of the Security Council, requested all States to refrain from any co-operation in the nuclear field with South Africa which would contribute to the manufacture and development by South Africa of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

Alternative for paragraph 9 (proposed by some States of the African Group)

The Commission considers it at variance with the declared principles of international law relating to the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States to allow, enable and assist, directly or indirectly, South Africa to continue its policy of aggression and destabilization against the countries of the African continent especially in the military nuclear field.
10. The Commission holds the view that the current exploitation of Namibian uranium by South Africa and transnational corporations violates the principle of international law which recognizes a people's permanent sovereignty over its natural resources for the benefit of its socio-economic development. It further holds the view that South Africa should not be allowed to continue its illegal exploitation of Namibian uranium - made possible through its illegal occupation of Namibia - which strengthens its nuclear base and hence reinforces its policy of apartheid.

Alternative for paragraph 10 (proposed by the United Kingdom)

The Commission is of the view that the natural resources of Namibia should be available for the benefit of the Namibian people and for Namibia's socio-economic development. It further holds the view that South Africa should cease its exploitation of Namibian uranium, which is made possible through its illegal occupation of Namibia and, in compliance with international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, take steps to end that occupation.

11. Given the very nature of the racist régime of South Africa, the Disarmament Commission believes that it is an urgent necessity that the intolerable policy of apartheid be terminated. In this connection, all States and international organizations have the duty and responsibility to contribute to the strengthening of United Nations efforts for the attainment of this goal. It is therefore the responsibility of the international community to ensure that effective and concrete measures are taken to stop the further development of South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability which poses a threat to international peace and security. To this end, the Disarmament Commission recommends the following:

Alternative for paragraph 11 (proposed by Australia and the United States of America)

Replace the third sentence of para. 11 by the following:

In addition, Member States should fully implement Security Council resolution 418, unanimously adopted by the Security Council in 1977, which, inter alia, calls on Member States to refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons.

11. (a) All States have a particular obligation towards the achievement of the above objectives. Those States collaborating with South Africa should cease forthwith all collaboration with South Africa in the military and nuclear aspects which may contribute directly or indirectly to the further development of South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability. They should also put an end to transfers of all equipment, material, technology and personnel, relevant to South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability in order that South Africa adopt a conduct in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations;
Alternative for paragraph 11 (a) (proposed by the United States of America)

Member States should comply with Security Council resolution 591 unanimously adopted by the Security Council in 1986, which, inter alia, requests all States to refrain from any co-operation in the nuclear field with South Africa which would contribute to the manufacture and development by South Africa of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

11. (b) Considering that no decision has been taken by the Security Council since 1978 to give effect to the provisions contained in paragraph 12 of the Final Document, adopted by consensus (see para. 5 above), the Disarmament Commission recommends to the General Assembly to request the Council, in assuming its full responsibility, to take urgent and appropriate measures in this regard by, inter alia, enforcing and extending its arms embargo against South Africa to cover all aspects which may contribute directly or indirectly to the further development of South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability;

Alternative for paragraph 11 (b) (proposed by the United Kingdom)

In the light of Security Council resolutions 418, 558, and 591, the Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly should remind all States of their obligations concerning the arms embargo against South Africa.

11. (c) In the interest of global peace and security and the security and stability of Africa in particular, the Commission recommends that all States should respect their obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and desist from any nuclear co-operation with South Africa which would strengthen directly or indirectly the already established technical capability of South Africa to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States which collaborate with South Africa in this field must accept joint responsibility with that country for endangering the peace and security of the region and the world;

Alternative for paragraph 11 (c) (proposed by France)

- in the first sentence replace the phrase starting with "Desist" with the following:

  "... should not co-operate with South Africa in a way which would enable it to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

- delete the second sentence

11. (d) The Commission recommends that all States should consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965 which endorsed the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted in 1964 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. To this end,
the Commission recommends that the Assembly should request the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective;

Alternative for paragraph 11 (d) (proposed by the United Kingdom)

- delete the last sentence

Alternative for paragraph 11 (d) (proposed by some States of the African Group)

The Commission recommends that all States should consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965 which endorsed the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted in 1964 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. To this end, the Commission recommends that the Assembly should urge the Security Council to consider appropriate and effective steps to prevent the frustration of this objective.

'11. (e) Notwithstanding the statement by the South African Government on 31 January 1984 (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document INFCIRC/314), the Commission recommends that, given the military and reported nuclear-weapon capability of the abhorrent policy and practice of South Africa's racist régime which endanger regional and international peace and security, those States which have collaborated with that country in establishing its nuclear capability should now prevail upon South Africa to comply without delay with all resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, particularly those regarding acceptance of an internationally binding nuclear non-proliferation commitment and the placement of all its activities under IAEA safeguards. Those States should seek to endorse further specific, practical, time-limited and collective measures that would enhance implementation;

Alternative for paragraph 11 (e) (proposed by the United States of America)

Notwithstanding the statement by the South African Government on 31 January 1984 (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document INFCIRC/314), the Commission recommends that all States should now prevail upon South Africa to comply without delay with all relevant resolutions of the United Nations particularly those regarding acceptance of an internationally binding nuclear non-proliferation commitment and the placement of all its activities under IAEA safeguards. States should seek to endorse further specific, practical, time-limited and collective measures that would enhance implementation.

'11. (f) South Africa should be prevailed upon to practise transparency and openness in its military affairs, in order to allow for an unimpeded and full assessment of its activities in the nuclear field by the international community and, in particular, by its neighbouring States;
'll. (g) The Commission recommends further that the Secretary-General should follow more closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and report regularly to the General Assembly on the progress of these recommendations and on all new developments which would require the attention of the international community.'

"9. At its 8th meeting, on 22 May, the Working Group decided to recommend to the Commission the following recommendation on agenda item 6:

'The Disarmament Commission recommends to the General Assembly that work to be accomplished under General Assembly resolution 41/55 B of 3 December 1986 should be continued by the Commission as a matter of priority at its next substantive session in 1988, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations regarding the question of South Africa's nuclear capability, taking into account, inter alia, the views and suggestions of Member States as contained in document A/CN.10/1987/WG.1/CRP.1/Rev.1.'

"Notes"


43. The report of Working Group II on agenda item 7 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group II"

"1. By its resolution 41/59 0 of 3 December 1986, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue its consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament as a matter of priority at its next substantive session, in 1987, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, taking into account, inter alia, the views and suggestions of Member States as well as the documents on the subject listed in the resolution; and to submit its report on the subject, including findings, recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its lllth meeting on 4 May 1987, decided to establish Working Group II to deal with agenda item 7 regarding the question of the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament as requested by General Assembly resolution 41/59 0.

"3. The Working Group met under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Paul Bamela Ngo (Cameroon) and held one informal and three formal meetings between 12 and 22 May 1987.

"4. In carrying out its work, the Working Group had before it the following documents which, according to its decision, are to be considered on an equal footing:
(a) Replies of Member States to the Secretary-General regarding the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament (A/CN.10/69 and Add.1-8, and A/CN.10/71);

(b) Working paper submitted by the People's Republic of China (A/CN.10/79);

(c) Conference room paper entitled 'Findings, recommendations and proposals (Chairman's draft)' (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.1);

(d) Working paper on topic IV, submitted by Mexico (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.2);

(e) Statement on topic IV, submitted by India (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.3);

(f) Statement on topics I to III, submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.4);

(g) Statement on topic IV, submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.5);

(h) Working paper entitled 'Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament', submitted by Canada (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.6);

(i) Statement on the role of the United Nations in disarmament, submitted by the United States of America (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.7);

(j) Comments on the paper entitled 'Findings, recommendations and proposals', submitted by the United States of America (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.8);


(l) Views and suggestions on topics IV and VI, submitted by Japan (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.10);

(m) Some suggestions submitted by Australia (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.11);

(n) Statement on topic IV.1, submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.12);

(o) Proposal on topics I and II, submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.13);

(p) Proposals submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.14);

(q) Working paper containing proposals for recommendations on topics I to III, submitted by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.15);
"(r) Working paper containing proposals for recommendations on topic IV, submitted by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.16);


"(t) Views and suggestions on topic IV, submitted by Norway (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.18);

"(u) Working paper submitted by India and Yugoslavia (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.19);

"(v) Working paper entitled 'Role of the Secretary-General in the field of disarmament', submitted by Uruguay (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.20);

"(w) Working paper containing a proposal on topic IV.3.a, 'World Disarmament Campaign', submitted by Bulgaria (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.21);

"(x) Working paper submitted by Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (A/CN.10/94);

"(y) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/99);

"(z) Working paper submitted by the United States of America (A/CN.10/1987/WG.II/CRP.1);


"5. At its second formal meeting, on 14 May 1987, the Working Group decided to establish an open-ended Contact Group, co-ordinated by Ambassador Richard Butler (Australia), to consider the proposals submitted to the Commission contained in the documents before the Working Group listed in paragraph 4 above as well as the views put forward in the course of deliberations on the item and to examine the possibility of determining what further steps should be taken.

"6. The Contact Group held four meetings between 19 and 22 May 1987.

"7. At the third formal meeting, on 22 May 1987, Ambassador Butler submitted to the Working Group a working paper considered by the Contact Group.

"8. At the same meeting, the Working Group agreed to incorporate this paper as an Annex to its report in the belief that it could usefully complement papers referred to in paragraph 4 above and, in conjunction and on equal footing with those papers, might assist in the future deliberations and work on agenda item 7.
9. At its third formal meeting, held on 22 May 1987, the Working Group decided to make the following recommendation under agenda item 7:

'The Disarmament Commission recommends to the General Assembly that the Commission should continue, at its next substantive session, in 1988, and accord priority to the work to be done under resolution 41/59 0 of 3 December 1986, with a view to the formulation of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, concerning the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, taking into account, inter alia, the views and suggestions of Member States as well as the aforementioned documents on the subject.'"

44. The report of the Chairman on agenda item 8 reads as follows:

"Report of the Chairman"

'1. At its forty-first session, the General Assembly by resolution 41/59 K of 3 December 1986, entitled 'Naval armaments and disarmament', inter alia, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its forthcoming session in 1987, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

'2. In its consideration of the item, the Commission had before it the following documents:

(a) Report of the Secretary-General containing the study on the naval arms race (A/40/535);

(b) Chairman's paper on agenda item 8 (A/CN.10/83);

(c) Working paper submitted by Finland (A/CN.10/90);

(d) Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/92);


'3. On 4 May 1987, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission decided to follow last year's course of action and to hold, under his responsibility, substantive and open-ended consultations on the subject. Pursuant to that decision, the Chairman delegated the actual conduct of the substantive and open-ended consultations to a 'friend of the Chairman'; in casu, the representative of Indonesia. The Consultation Group held seven meetings on the item.

'4. The meetings resulted in a number of substantive findings and recommendations on the subject. These are contained in a working paper by the Chairman (A/CN.10/102) which met with the approval of all delegations participating in the substantive consultations and which in their view could form the basis of further deliberations on the subject.'"
The report of Working Group III on agenda item 9 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group III"

"1. The General Assembly, at its forty-first session, adopted resolution 41/59 C of 3 December 1986 in which, inter alia, it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider at its forthcoming session in 1987 the question of conventional disarmament, fully taking into account the recommendations and conclusions contained in the Study on Conventional Disarmament, as well as all other relevant present and future proposals, with a view to facilitating the identification of possible measures in the field of conventional arms reductions and disarmament, and to report on its deliberations to the General Assembly at its forty-second session. By resolution 41/59 G, the General Assembly, inter alia, also requested the Disarmament Commission to consider, at its substantive session in 1987, issues related to conventional disarmament.

"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 111th meeting, on 4 May 1987, decided to establish Working Group III to deal with agenda item 9 regarding the substantive consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament, including the recommendations and conclusions contained in the Study on Conventional Disarmament.

"3. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Skjold G. Mellbin (Denmark) and held nine meetings between 11 and 26 May.

"4. In carrying out its work, the Working Group had before it the Study on Conventional Disarmament (A/39/348), the views of Member States on the study (A/40/486 and Add.1, A/41/501, Add.1 and 2, and A/CN.10/86 and Add.1) and certain working papers presented by Member States as follows:

"(a) Working paper submitted by Denmark (A/CN.10/88);

"(b) Working paper submitted by China (A/CN.10/95);

"(c) Working paper submitted by Hungary (A/CN.10/98);

"(d) Working paper submitted by India (A/CN.10/100);


"5. In the course of the discussions the following papers were submitted to the Group:

"(a) Draft list of contents for Working Group III Report (A/CN.10/1987/WG.III/CRP.1);


"(c) Draft Report of Working Group III (A/CN.10/1987/WG.III/CRP.3 and Rev.1 and 2);
"(d) Proposed amendments to paragraph 7 of the Draft Report of Working Group III, submitted by Algeria, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/1987/WG.III/CRP.4);

"(e) Suggested additional paragraph 11 bis, submitted by Argentina (A/CN.10/1987/WG.III/CRP.5);

"(f) Suggestion by Egypt for new paragraph 11 ter (A/CN.10/1987/WG.III/CRP.6);

"(g) Suggestion by India for insertion of a new paragraph (A/CN.10/1987/WG.III/CRP.7);

"(h) Suggestion by Cuba for new paragraph 9 bis (A/CN.10/1987/WG.III/CRP.8);


"(j) Suggestion by Denmark for addition to paragraph 8 (A/CN.10/1987/WG.III/CRP.10);

"(k) Chairman's revised text for paragraph 9 (A/CN.10/1987/WG.III/CRP.11);

"(l) Suggestion by Peru for new paragraph 9 bis (A/CN.10/1987/WG.III/CRP.12);

"(m) Suggestion by India for first sentence of paragraph 4 (A/CN.10/1987/WG.III/CRP.13);

"(n) Suggestion by Australia for addition to paragraph 11 (A/CN.10/1987/WG.III/CRP.14).

"6. An extensive exchange of views on substantive issues took place during the Working Group's deliberations but in the time available the Group was unable to complete its discussions with agreement on the revised draft report before it (A/CN.10/1987/WG.III/CRP.3/Rev.2). With a view to the recommendation contained in paragraph 7 below, the text as it stood at the end of discussion will be issued as CRP.3/Rev.3 which, together with the conference room papers listed in paragraph 5 above, will provide a basis for the deliberations on conventional disarmament in the Disarmament Commission at its next substantive session. In respect to CRP.3/Rev.3 it was the understanding that no part of the text is to be considered definitely adopted before a text as a whole is adopted and that the right of any delegation to submit amendments to any part of the text is thus reserved.

"7. At its 9th meeting on 26 May, the Working Group decided to recommend to the Commission the following recommendation on agenda item 9:
The Disarmament Commission recommends to the General Assembly that the Commission should continue its work on conventional disarmament at its next substantive session in 1988.

46. The report of Working Group IV on agenda item 10 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group IV

"1. The General Assembly, at its forty-first session, adopted resolution 41/86 Q of 4 December 1986 in which, inter alia, it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider, at its substantive session in 1987, the subject of verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification. The Disarmament Commission was further requested to report on its deliberations, conclusions and recommendations concerning this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-second session.

"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 111th meeting or 4 May 1987, decided to establish Working Group IV to deal with agenda item 10 regarding the subject of verification in all its aspects, as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 41/86 Q.

"3. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Douglas Roche (Canada) and held eight meetings between 11 and 22 May. The first three meetings of the Working Group were devoted to a general exchange of views on the subject of verification in all its aspects. At the conclusion of this general exchange of views, the Working Group decided to devote one meeting to each of the following three topics: (1) principles, (2) provisions and techniques, and (3) the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification. The last meeting was concerned with the drafting of the Working Group's report.

"4. In carrying out its work, the Working Group had before it the replies of member States to the Secretary-General regarding the subject of verification in all its aspects, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 40/152 Q of 16 December 1985 and 41/86 Q of 4 December 1986, as contained in documents A/41/42 and Add.1 and 2 and A/CN.10/87 and Add.1, as well as other relevant documents on the subject, including the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2). The Chairman prepared and circulated a submission containing draft conclusions of the Working Group. In addition, other papers were submitted by delegations. All the following papers were considered of equal status among themselves:

"(a) Verification in All Its Aspects: Principles, Provisions and Techniques: Draft conclusions submitted by the Chairman of Working Group IV (A/CN.10/89);

"(b) Verification in All Its Aspects: The Establishment of a United Nations Data Base on Verification of Arms Control Agreements, submitted by Finland (A/CN.10/91);
"(c) Verification in All Its Aspects: Basic Issues of Verification of Confidence-Building Measures, Arms Limitation and Disarmament at all Stages - Moving Towards a Safe and Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, submitted by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and Czechoslovakia (A/CN.10/93);

"(d) Verification in All Its Aspects, submitted by Cameroon (A/CN.10/97);

"(e) Verification in All Its Aspects, submitted by the United Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/1987/WG.IV/WP.1);

"(f) Principles of Verification, submitted by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and Czechoslovakia (A/CN.10/1987/WG.IV/WP.2);

"(g) Verification in All Its Aspects, submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/1987/WG.IV/WP.3);

"(h) Role of the United Nations and its Member States in the Field of Verification, submitted by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and Czechoslovakia (A/CN.10/1987/WG.IV/WP.4);


5. In the course of its deliberations, the Working Group conducted an exchange of views on the subject of verification in all its aspects. There was widespread agreement that verification is a critically important element in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament and that, in view of recent events, the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission on this subject were very timely. Various viewpoints were expressed concerning principles, provisions and techniques and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification as well as concerning the appropriate approach to be adopted by the Working Group. A number of suggestions for possible recommendations were put forward.

6. During the course of its deliberations, the Working Group made progress on certain substantive points. The Working Group reaffirmed the continued relevance of the basic principles on verification enunciated in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, which was adopted by consensus in July 1978. The relevant paragraphs of the Final Document are the following:

Paragraph 31: Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.

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Paragraph 91: In order to facilitate the conclusions and the effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

Paragraph 92: In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

The Working Group agreed that these principles should be elaborated upon and added to in order to gain the benefits of the experience which has accrued since July 1978.

"7. The Working Group was able, during the course of its deliberations concerning principles relating to verification in all its aspects, to agree on certain points that elaborate upon or add to the basic principles of the Final Document. While much work remains to adequately formulate, these and other principles relating to verification, the following is an illustrative, non-exhaustive listing of some of the agreed points:

"(1) Adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

"(2) Verification is not an aim in itself, but an essential element in the process of achieving arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

"(3) Verification should promote the implementation of arms limitation and disarmament measures, build confidence among States and ensure that agreements are being observed by all Parties.

"(4) Adequate and effective verification requires employment of different techniques, such as national technical means, international technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspections.

"(5) Verification in the arms limitation and disarmament process will benefit from greater openness.

"(6) Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party undertakes not to interfere with the agreed methods, procedures and techniques of verification, when these are operating in a manner consistent with the provisions of the agreement and generally recognized principles of international law.

"(7) Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the agreement.
"(8) To assess the continuing adequacy and effectiveness of the verification system, an arms limitation and disarmament agreement should provide for procedures and mechanisms for review and evaluation. Where possible, time-frames for such reviews should be agreed in order to facilitate this assessment.

"(9) Verification arrangements should be addressed at the outset and at every stage of negotiations on specific arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

"(10) All States have equal rights to participate in the process of international verification of agreements to which they are parties.

"8. The Working Group agreed that a compilation of possible methods, procedures and techniques including those which form part of existing arms limitations and disarmament agreements as well as proposed methods, procedures and techniques, could be useful in facilitating a consideration of verification as an integral part of arms limitation and disarmament negotiations. Such a catalogue would be illustrative and would exemplify the range and scope of methods, procedures and techniques applicable to verification of compliance. The development of this descriptive and open-ended catalogue could draw upon papers submitted to and views expressed during the Disarmament Commission's deliberations. The Commission should further examine the format and expense of such a compilation.

"9. The Working Group agreed that the United Nations has an important role to play in the context of verification of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements, which is in accordance with its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament as expressed in paragraph 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session. The Working Group also supports the view expressed by the Secretary-General in his annual report for 1986 that the ability of the Organization to assist in verification and compliance arrangements should be explored.

"10. The Working Group was also in agreement on certain further points regarding the role of the United Nations in verification. The United Nations may draw upon experience and expertise, including, \textit{inter alia}, that derived from specialized agencies, from the International Atomic Energy Agency, from existing agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, from peace-keeping operations and from investigations undertaken by the Secretary-General, to provide assistance, advice and technical expertise to negotiators of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

"11. Given that the distribution of technical verification capabilities is uneven, the Disarmament Commission agreed that the United Nations should examine the possibility of compiling and managing a verification data base. Member States and relevant international organizations would be invited to contribute to this data base a wide range of information pertaining to arms limitation and disarmament including information on confidence-building measures. Such a data base could include a catalogue of verification provisions, procedures, and methods as well as a catalogue of experts upon which members may call for assistance in designing verification systems.
12. At its eighth meeting, on 22 May, the Working Group decided to recommend to the Commission the following recommendation on agenda item 10:

'The Disarmament Commission recommends to the General Assembly that work to be accomplished under General Assembly resolution 41/86 Q of 4 December 1986 should be continued by the Commission at its next substantive session in 1988 as a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament, with a view to elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, regarding verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques to promote the inclusions of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification, taking into account, inter alia, the views and suggestions of Member States as well as the aforementioned documents on the subject.'

* * *

Notes


2/ General Assembly resolution S-10/2.


4/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.1.
Recommendation No. 1

All States Members of the United Nations should reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and should strictly observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular, the principles of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

Recommendation No. 2

All States are urged to contribute effectively to the strengthening of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security.

While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race.

Everything possible should be done to enable the Conference on Disarmament, which is a single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, to fulfil its responsibilities by the negotiation and adoption of concrete measures of disarmament to promote effectively the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Recommendation No. 3

In order to implement the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2), all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should urgently engage in negotiations to fulfil the priority tasks set forth in its Programme of Action.

Negotiations of agreements in conformity with paragraph 50 of the Final Document with a view to halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race and bringing about as soon as possible the achievement of the final objective defined therein,
namely, the ultimate and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, should be intensified or, as appropriate, urgently initiated.

Negotiations, in appropriate fora, to achieve reductions in weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, as well as other measures in the disarmament field, should be pursued and agreements concluded in accordance with paragraphs 29 and 31 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Recommendation No. 4

[The Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly note with satisfaction the agreement reached at Geneva in November 1985 at the summit meeting of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to accelerate the work at the negotiations between them on nuclear and space arms, with a view to accomplishing the tasks set out in the joint communiqué of 8 January 1985 of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, namely, to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability [with the ultimate aim of achieving the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere]. The General Assembly could also express strong support for the call by the leaders of the two States for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground.

In this context, the Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly note with satisfaction the joint statement of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Geneva summit meeting, in particular the agreement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, that any conflict between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America could have catastrophic consequences, that any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional should be prevented and that they will not seek to achieve military superiority.

It is urgently needed to turn these agreements into practical results.

The two negotiating parties should bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake and, accordingly, should keep the General Assembly [and the Conference on Disarmament] duly informed of the progress of their negotiations, without prejudice to the progress of the negotiations.

Given the desire of all Member States for speedy accomplishment of the agreed tasks of the negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, it is of great importance to pursue them in a constructive and accommodating spirit, to uphold the agreement on the scope of the negotiations.

[Bilateral negotiations do not in any way diminish the urgent need to carry out multilateral negotiations on the priority items included in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.]

Recommendation No. 5

All States, in particular the major nuclear-weapon States, are urged to pursue their negotiations on arms limitations and disarmament with vigour and to keep the
United Nations appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multi-teral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

Recommendation No. 6

[The Conference on Disarmament should proceed without delay to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and, in particular, begin the elaboration of practical measures for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and for nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, including a nuclear disarmament programme. Such a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, should provide for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination. It should aim at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world by the year 2000 and could consist of three stages:

(a) A first stage of five to eight years, providing for reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America as well as for the renunciation of the development, testing and deployment of space-strike weapons by them and a moratorium on their nuclear explosions;

(b) A second stage, which would last for five to seven years and during which the other nuclear-weapon States would take part in the nuclear disarmament process;

(c) A last stage, during which the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons will be completed.

Verification of the destruction or limitation of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles would be carried out by national technical means, on-site inspections and other measures.]

Recommendation No. 7

(a) [A treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests should be concluded urgently. To this end the Conference on Disarmament should immediately proceed to corresponding negotiations.]

(b) [Substantive examination of specific issues relating a comprehensive nuclear-test ban should begin immediately with a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject.]

(c) [A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty should be negotiated and concluded within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process.]

(d) [A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty prohibiting all nuclear-test explosions by all States in all environments for all time should be concluded as a matter of urgency.]

(e) [A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty prohibiting all nuclear [-weapon] test explosions by all States in all environments for all time should be concluded as a matter of urgency. To this end, it is necessary to use all]
opportunities, including negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament, bilateral or trilateral negotiations. The agreement could be reached also by the extension of the terms of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water to underground nuclear tests as well. The treaty should provide for strict verification measures, including those suggested by the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania, up to on-site inspections. At all talks the issues of the verification of compliance with the agreement could be considered simultaneously with the consideration of the other substantive issues of the prohibition of nuclear tests.}

Text to be added at the end of recommendation No. 7

[Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions starting from a date to be agreed among all of them. The declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to extend its unilateral moratorium until 6 August 1986 should be welcomed. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would considerably be promoted if the United States of America followed this example.] [Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the two major nuclear Powers which conducted the most of nuclear explosions are called on to stop their nuclear tests immediately in order to facilitate the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and other nuclear disarmament measures.]

Recommendation No. 8

Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and entails international responsibility.

The recommendations Nos. 9-14 have been proposed taking fully into account the general applicability of recommendation No. 8.

Recommendation No. 9

In order to intensify the disarmament process, it should be taken into consideration that mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of destruction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most powerful weapons ever produced. Therefore, disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, should be approached as a matter of highest priority and of vital importance for humanity.

Measures for the prevention of nuclear war and for the promotion of nuclear disarmament must take into account the security interests of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

Recommendation No. 10

There is today wide endorsement of the statement of the two major nuclear-weapon States that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, all States should co-operate for the adoption of practical and appropriate measures to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war and to avoid use of nuclear weapons. Note should be taken of existing
undertakings by two nuclear-weapon States about non-first use of nuclear weapons as well as declarations made by some States about non-use of any weapon, except in response to an armed attack.

[The Conference on Disarmament should undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.]

[The Security Council of the United Nations could also take up the question of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war.]

Recommendation No. 11

[A freeze on nuclear weaponry which could begin with that of the two nuclear-weapon States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals. Such a freeze would be subject to all relevant measures and procedures of verification which have already been agreed upon by the parties in the case of the SALT I and SALT II treaties, as well as those agreed upon in principle by them during the preparatory trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban held at Geneva.]

[A freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons should be immediately imposed, as a first step to the reduction and, eventually, the elimination of nuclear arsenals.]

[It is of paramount importance for the nuclear Powers which possess the largest nuclear arsenals to take the lead in halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race between them and reducing drastically their existing nuclear arsenals so as to create propitious conditions for all the nuclear States to further adopt nuclear disarmament measures, including a freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons.]

[[Negotiations should be conducted and concluded which would lead to substantial reductions in nuclear weapons.] [Agreements should be concluded which would result in substantial reductions in nuclear weapons.] These reductions must be mutual, balanced and effectively verifiable.]

[A mutually agreed, balanced and verifiable freeze on nuclear arsenals should be negotiated between the nuclear-weapon States which should be followed by deep cuts in those arsenals and not be seen as an alternative to disarmament.]

Recommendation No. 12

[The fundamental approach to the prevention of nuclear war involves the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Pending the attainment of this goal, the countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead and stop testing, producing and deploying nuclear weapons and reduce drastically their existing nuclear weapons. After that, corresponding measures should be taken by the other nuclear-weapon States according to a reasonable ratio and procedure.]

Recommendation No. 13

[An agreement giving full legally binding force to a commitment by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use these terrible weapons of mass destruction should be concluded.]
[Pending the adoption of a convention on prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States, declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, collectively or individually, on non-first use of nuclear weapons would be a means of strengthening the climate of confidence and a first step towards lessening the risk of nuclear conflict.]

[In accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter, States should never use any weapon except in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence.]

Recommendation No. 14

[A convention on prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States should be urgently negotiated and adopted, pending effective measures of nuclear disarmament.]

Text proposed as an alternative to recommendations 13 and 14

[Reaffirming the prohibition of the threat or use of force under the Charter of the United Nations, States should commit themselves, collectively or individually, never to be the first to use any weapon, nuclear or conventional, except in exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.]

Recommendation No. 15

[In view of the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space, in particular the impending danger of exacerbating the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security, the Conference on Disarmament should urgently undertake negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.]

In order to contribute to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the Conference on Disarmament should intensify its work in accordance with the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee set up by the Conference.

[It is understood that the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee constitutes only a first step towards multilateral negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.]

Recommendation No. 16

Pending comprehensive measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament, States should continue to co-operate in the development of a comprehensive set of measures for the prevention of nuclear war and of all armed conflict. These could include a wide array of confidence-building measures, including measures relating to nuclear weapons, to be negotiated in appropriate frameworks, for regional or global application.

Recommendation No. 17

Nuclear and conventional weapons as well as military forces should be reduced in a mutual, balanced and verifiable manner, particularly in regions where their concentration has attained the most dangerous levels.
Recommendation No. 18

[No deployment of nuclear weapons should take place in territories where there are no such weapons. In countries where such weapons have already been installed, stockpiles of such weapons should not be increased or replaced with new ones. The nuclear weapons deployed by nuclear-weapon States outside their own territories should be withdrawn.]

Recommendation No. 19

[The nuclear-weapon States should refrain from military manoeuvres in which nuclear energy is used for non-peaceful purposes, especially in situations where nuclear armaments are deployed in close proximity of States not possessing nuclear weapons, thus endangering their security.]

Recommendation No. 20

Bearing in mind that the nuclear-weapon States should guarantee that non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons and that unilateral declarations were made in this context, negotiations should proceed for the conclusion [as appropriate] of effective international arrangements to assure [all] non-nuclear-weapon States [without any discrimination] against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Recommendation No. 21

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements and/or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitute an important disarmament measure [and] nuclear-weapon-free zones which will enhance world-wide security and stability should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of [each region] the region in question should be taken into account. Those agreements or arrangements should be fully complied with and the effective respect for the status of such zones by [all] nuclear-weapon States concerned should be subject to adequate agreed verification procedures, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.

Recommendation No. 22

[The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world on the basis of conditions clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole. In the process of setting up such zones, the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken into account.]

Recommendation No. 23

All States should co-operate to achieve the goal of nuclear non-proliferation which is, on the one hand, to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States and, on the other, progressively to reduce and eventually to eliminate nuclear weapons
altogether. States should fully implement all the provisions of relevant international treaties to which they are parties. Nuclear-weapon States in particular should urgently adopt effective measures for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race.

**Recommendation No. 24**

Since the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects is a matter of universal concern, all States are jointly urged to take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

**Recommendation No. 25**

[For the sake of comprehensive international security military concepts and doctrines must be of a defensive character that presupposes the maintenance of armed forces at the lowest possible level and the reduction of military capabilities to a level indispensable for defence.]

**II**

**Introductory sentence**

While nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, the following recommendations on other priority measures of disarmament should be pursued together with nuclear disarmament negotiations.

**Recommendation No. 1**

Efforts should be made to conclude urgently a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. To this end, the Conference on Disarmament should expedite its work with a view to presenting a draft convention to the General Assembly without further delay.

**Recommendation No. 2**

The qualitative development and the growing accumulation of conventional weapons in many parts of the world add a new dimension to the arms race [i., especially among States possessing the largest military arsenals]. Therefore, conventional disarmament should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament.

The countries with the largest military arsenals, which bear a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions, and the member States of the two major military alliances are urged to continue negotiations on conventional disarmament in earnest, with a view to reaching early agreement on the limitation and gradual and balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons under effective international control in their respective regions.

All States, while taking into account the need to protect security and maintain necessary defensive capabilities are encouraged to intensify their efforts
and take, either on their own or in a regional context, (where) appropriate [,] steps to promote progress in conventional disarmament and enhance peace and security.

Recommendation No. 3

The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in a manner that would ensure the right of each State to undiminished security. However, massive arms supply to States that base their security on false claims in order to obtain advantages over others as well as to enhance colonial domination and foreign occupation leads to the perpetuation of intolerable situations and the exacerbation of conflicts and gravely endangers international peace and security and should therefore be ended.

Recommendation No. 4

[An arms race in outer space should be prevented. In this context, the Disarmament Commission welcomes the recent decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament, namely:

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament Decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc Committee under item 5 of its agenda entitled 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space'.

"The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee, in discharging that responsibility, to continue to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

"The Ad Hoc Committee, in carrying out this work, will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, in 1985, and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1987 session."

Consequently, the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee constitutes only a first step towards the urgent initiation of multilateral negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.]

Recommendation No. 5

In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements. The climate of confidence among nations would be significantly improved with agreements on measures for halting the arms race and effective reductions of armaments leading to their complete elimination. The objective at each stage of this process of disarmament should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments.
Recommendation No. 6

[Disarmament would be facilitated by the readiness of all States to participate in negotiations aimed at the peaceful solution of conflicts to which they are a party. The refusal of a government to initiate negotiations on international disputes to which it is a party fosters the continuation of such controversies thus constituting a possible cause of acceleration of the arms race.]

[Disarmament and comprehensive international security would be facilitated by the readiness of all States to participate in negotiations aimed at the peaceful solution of conflicts to which they may be parties. The refusal to initiate negotiations on international disputes fosters the continuation of such controversies thus constituting a possible cause of acceleration of the arms race.]

[A favourable atmosphere for disarmament would be promoted by avoidance of the use of force in attempting to settle disputes.]

Recommendation No. 7

In the context of the World Disarmament Campaign measures should be adopted in order that the public in all regions of the world has access to a broad range of objective information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament, and the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war, to facilitate informed choices about these vital questions concerning efforts to halt and reverse the arms race. Such a campaign should promote public interest in and support for the goals described above and in particular for the reaching of agreements on measures of arms limitation and disarmament with a view to achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
ANNEX II

Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament*

In conducting its review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the Commission reviewed both political and machinery aspects of that role.

Political aspects

1. The primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security.

2. The importance of full commitment by all States Members of the United Nations to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security was reaffirmed.

3. Genuine and lasting peace can be created only through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

4. Multilateral agreements on measures of disarmament has an important role in the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the right and the duty to be concerned with and to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament, in conformity with the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly and the Concluding Document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly. All States have the right to participate on an equal footing in multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a bearing on their national security.

6. Most of the goals set in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly have not so far been achieved. In order to increase momentum towards those goals, political will is required on all sides, but in particular among the nuclear-weapon Powers and other militarily significant States which have been recognized in the Final Document as bearing the primary responsibility for halting and reversing the arms race and moving towards disarmament.

7. The United Nations, a forum where all nations have the opportunity to contribute to the process of disarmament deliberations and negotiations, has, in accordance with the Charter, a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament.

8. To help the United Nations perform its designated role, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States must acknowledge their special responsibility towards the international community and demonstrate the necessary political will to overcome their differences and move towards concrete disarmament measures.

9. It is important for all States to treat recommendations by the United Nations, especially those adopted by consensus, with respect, and truly act in accordance with their assumed political obligations. This also applies to the important task of giving effect to the Final Document adopted by general consent at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

10. The United Nations should encourage and facilitate all disarmament efforts - unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral - and be kept duly informed, through the General Assembly or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of developments in disarmament efforts outside its aegis, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations. The need for the United Nations to be kept informed of such outside efforts is the greater when the subject-matter of the negotiations concerns the wider interests of other countries and the international community as a whole.

11. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

12. Disarmament is an essential factor for lasting peace and security. It was also recognized that improvement in the international security situation would facilitate sustained progress in the field of disarmament. Consequently, disarmament should be pursued within the overall context of the search for the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war, and the establishment of an effective system of collective security for the maintenance of international peace and security.

13. The permanent members of the Security Council, having regard to their special status and responsibilities under the Charter, should undertake as a matter of extreme urgency to ensure the effectiveness of the central role of the Security Council with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security including disarmament.

**Machinery**

14. It was recognized that while the effectiveness of the United Nations machinery in the field of disarmament clearly depends on the need for States to exercise political will to implement the programme of action contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the multilateral disarmament machinery should be utilized more effectively and also improved in order to help the United Nations fulfil its role in the field of disarmament.

15. Accordingly, the Commission made recommendations with respect to a number of practical measures as follows:
(1) General Assembly and its organs

(a) Special sessions

It was agreed that special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament can play a useful role.

(b) First Committee

It was agreed that the effectiveness of the General Assembly's annual consideration of disarmament issues in its First Committee would be enhanced by the adoption of the following procedural recommendations:

(i) Increasing the use of clustering of items on its agenda;

(ii) Adopting recommendations on procedural matters as decisions;

(iii) Where appropriate, the staggering of some items over two or more years;

(iv) The merging, wherever possible, of draft resolutions on the same subject or under the same agenda item;

(v) Setting the earliest practicable deadline for submission of draft resolutions;

(vi) Combining the general debate with debate on specific items of disarmament concern;

(vii) Allowing more time for informal consultations.

(c) Disarmament Commission

It was agreed that the efficiency of the operations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission needed to be improved and recommended that further consideration be given to this issue in appropriate forums.

(2) Other organs

(a) Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

It was agreed that the United Nations disarmament studies play a useful role as a means of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament and recommended that:

(i) The contribution of United Nations studies to the practical solution of disarmament issues should be enhanced;

(ii) That the Board give timely consideration to study proposals and to the means by which they might best be carried out;

(iii) A co-ordinated approach to make the most effective use of the facilities and resources available to the United Nations Secretariat's Department for Disarmament Affairs and to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research be established.
It was agreed that the Institute's research should be complementary to those studies carried out by experts appointed by the Secretary-General, and recommended that the work of the Institute should be supported.

(3) Role of the Secretary-General

It was agreed that the role of the Secretary-General, as envisaged in the Charter, facilitates the discharge of the responsibility of the United Nations to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security, and recommended that:

(a) The Secretary-General should continue the practice of sending reports and communications on disarmament issues to the General Assembly and other multilateral disarmament forums;

(b) In order to keep itself duly informed, through appropriate United Nations channels, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis, and without prejudice to the progress of negotiations, the United Nations should examine the feasibility of the Secretary-General's submitting to the General Assembly a progress report on the disarmament process as a whole.

16. In addition to the recommendations recorded above, other proposals were submitted to the Commission on the same elements of the disarmament machinery. Proposals were also submitted on the following elements of the machinery: the Security Council; the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference; the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean; the World Disarmament Campaign; the specialized agencies; the Conference on Disarmament; review conferences; the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat; Disarmament Week; and regional arrangements.
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