NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly, by resolution 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, took note of the report of the Disarmament Commission and the recommendations contained therein. 1/ The operative part of the resolution reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

1. Takes note of the report of the Disarmament Commission;

2. Notes that the Disarmament Commission again was not able to conclude its consideration of several items on its agenda;

3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and, to that end, to direct its attention at each substantive session to specific subjects from among those which have been or will be under its consideration, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and to make concrete recommendations on such subjects to the subsequent session of the Assembly;

4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1983 and to submit a substantive report on its work to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Committee on Disarmament, 2/ together with all the official records of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled 'Report of the Disarmament Commission'."

2. At the same session, the General Assembly also adopted resolution 37/78 F of 9 December 1982. Paragraph 7 of the resolution, relating to the Disarmament Commission, reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

7. Calls upon the Disarmament Commission to intensify its work in considering various issues of disarmament on its agenda and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session concrete recommendations with a view to contributing to a solution of outstanding issues."

3. Also at the same session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/74 B of 9 December 1982. The operative part of the resolution, in connection with the Disarmament Commission, reads as follows:
"The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Deplores the massive build-up of South Africa's military machine, including its frenzied acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail;

"2. Reaffirms that the racist régime's acquisition of nuclear capability constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

"3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to consider substantively the question of South Africa's nuclear capability pursuant, inter alia, to the findings of the Group of Experts on South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field 3/ appointed by the Secretary-General;

"4. Requests the Security Council, for the purposes of disarmament, to take enforcement measures, through strict adherence by all States to its relevant decisions, to prevent any racist régimes from acquiring arms or arms technology;

"5. Calls upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime, including the provision to it of such materials as computers, electronic equipment and related technology;

"6. Demands that South Africa respect international concern for peace and stability in Africa by terminating forthwith its development of the capability to produce nuclear weapons and that it submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

"7. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;

"8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled 'Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa'."

4. The General Assembly, at the same session, further adopted resolution 37/95 A of 13 December 1982. The operative part of the resolution, concerning the Disarmament Commission, reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Declares once again its conviction that it is possible to achieve international agreements on reduction of military budgets without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty;
"2. Reaffirms that human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures could be reallocated for economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries;

"3. Reiterates the urgent need to reinforce the endeavours of all States and international action in the reduction of military budgets, with a view to reaching international agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures;

"4. Urges all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries;

"5. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its session to be held in 1983, the consideration of the item entitled 'Reduction of military budgets', including consideration of the background paper 4/ as well as other proposals and ideas on that subject, with a view to identifying and elaborating the principles that should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage;

"6. Also requests the Disarmament Commission to consider, at its next substantive session, other proposals and ideas, as well as recommendations submitted by Member States, for reducing military budgets;

"7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session the item entitled 'Reduction of military budgets'."

5. Also at the same session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/99 B of 13 December 1982. The operative part of the resolution, in connection with the Disarmament Commission, reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues to the Disarmament Commission;

"2. Further requests the Disarmament Commission to consider those recommendations and proposals in the report that relate to disarmament and arms limitation and to suggest, in a report to the General Assembly, how best to ensure an effective follow-up thereto within the United Nations system or otherwise;

"3. Decides to include in the agenda of its thirty-eighth session an item entitled 'Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues: report of the Disarmament Commission'."

6. At the same session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 37/100 D of 13 December 1982. The operative part of the resolution, regarding the Disarmament Commission, reads as follows:
"The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Urges all States to encourage and assist all efforts designed to explore further the ways in which confidence-building measures can strengthen international peace and security;

"2. Invites all States to consider the possible introduction of confidence-building measures in their particular regions and, where possible, to negotiate on them in keeping with the conditions and requirements prevailing in the respective regions;

"3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to consider the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level;

"4. Further requests the Disarmament Commission to submit a progress report on its deliberations on this item to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session;

"5. Further recommends that all States consider the inclusion of a reference to, or an agreement on, confidence-building measures, as appropriate, in any joint statements or declarations of a political nature;

"6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eighth session an item entitled 'Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures'."

7. The Disarmament Commission met at United Nations Headquarters on 13 and 15 December 1982 for a brief organizational session. During that period, the Commission held two meetings (A/CN.10/PV.63 and 64). In the course of its deliberations, the Commission considered various questions regarding the organization of its work for its 1983 session, in particular the question of the election of the officers of the Commission, taking into account the principle of rotation of the chairmanship. In that connection, the Commission elected its Chairman and four Vice-Chairmen; however, it decided to postpone the election of other Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur to the substantive session in 1983 (see A/CN.10/PV.64). The Commission also considered the provisional agenda for its next substantive session, but decided to defer further consideration of the provisional agenda to its substantive session, to be held in May/June 1983.
II. ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF THE 1983 SESSION

8. The Disarmament Commission met at United Nations Headquarters from 9 May to 3 June 1983. During the course of its session, it held 6 plenary meetings (A/CN.10/PV.65-70) and 7 informal meetings.

9. At its 65th meeting, on 9 May, the Commission elected three Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur. The bureau of the Commission was constituted as follows:

   **Chairman:** Mr. Celso Antônio de Souza e Silva (Brazil)

   **Vice-Chairmen:** Representatives from the following States:

   Bangladesh          Sierra Leone
   Czechoslovakia      Sweden
   Germany, Federal Republic of    Tunisia
   Romania

   **Rapporteur:** Mr. Abdul Mou'men Al-Atassi (Syrian Arab Republic)

10. At its 65th meeting, on 9 May, the Commission adopted its agenda (A/CN.10/L.12), as follows:

   1. Opening of the session.

   2. Election of officers.

   3. Adoption of the agenda.

   4. (a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war;

   (b) Consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of resolution 33/71 H, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with the priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.

   5. Reduction of military budgets:

   (a) Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

   (b) Examination and identification of effective ways and means of achieving agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, taking into
account the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 34/83 F, 35/142 A, 36/82 A and 37/95 A, with a view to identifying and elaborating the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

6. Substantive consideration of the question of South Africa's nuclear capability as requested by the General Assembly and the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid (resolution 37/74 B and A/CN.10/4).

7. Consideration of recommendations and proposals contained in the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues entitled "Common Security" that relate to disarmament and arms limitation and to suggest, in a report to the General Assembly, how best to ensure an effective follow-up thereto within the United Nations system or otherwise.

8. Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level.


10. Other business.

11. At its 65th meeting, on 9 May, the Commission adopted its programme of work and also decided to establish the Committee of the Whole, with the following tasks: consideration of agenda items 4 (a) and (b), submission of the report of the Commission (agenda item 9), and the consideration of other business (agenda item 10). The Committee of the Whole met under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the Commission and held 7 meetings between 11 May and 2 June. At its 3rd meeting, on 20 May, the Committee of the Whole decided to establish a contact group with the task of dealing with item 4 (a) and (b), under the chairmanship of Mr. Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil). The Contact Group held 10 meetings between 24 May and 1 June, and submitted its report to the Committee of the Whole at the 6th meeting of the Committee on 1 June.

12. In accordance with its programme of work, the Commission also decided, at its 65th meeting, to establish:

   (a) An informal, open-ended working group (Working Group I) to deal with agenda item 5 regarding the question of reduction of military budgets and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Ion Diaconu (Romania) and held 14 meetings between 12 and 31 May;

   (b) An informal, open-ended working group (Working Group II) to deal with agenda item 6 concerning the question of South Africa's nuclear capability and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Davidson L. Hepburn (Bahamas) and held 15 meetings between 13 May and 1 June.
(c) An informal, open-ended working group (Working Group III) to deal with agenda item 7 concerning the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues entitled "Common Security" (A/CN.10/38) and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Curt Lidgard (Sweden) and held 11 meetings between 12 May and 1 June;

(d) An informal, open-ended working group (Working Group IV) to deal with agenda item 8 regarding the question of confidence-building measures and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Henning Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany) and held 11 meetings between 13 and 27 May.

13. On 10 and 11 May, the Disarmament Commission held a general exchange of views on all agenda items (A/CN.10/PV.66-67).

14. At its 68th meeting, on 24 May, the Chairman of the Commission made a statement regarding the question of the organization of work of the Disarmament Commission. He expressed concern and dissatisfaction over the inadequacy of conference services provided by the Secretariat. He pointed out that, during the preceding two weeks, five of the Commission's subsidiary bodies had been confined to two rooms and assisted by a single team of interpreters and that it was paradoxical that administrative difficulties should occur at a time when the General Assembly had enhanced the responsibilities and resources of the former Centre for Disarmament and in view of the priority accorded by the General Assembly to disarmament questions.

15. At its 69th meeting, on 2 June, the Commission considered the reports of the Working Groups as well as the results of deliberations in the Committee of the Whole on agenda items 4 (a) and (b), 5, 6, 7 and 8. The reports of the subsidiary bodies of the Commission and recommendations contained therein are included in chapter IV, entitled "Conclusions and recommendations", of the present report.

16. In accordance with the previous practice of the Commission, some non-governmental organizations attended the plenary meetings as well as the meetings of the Committee of the Whole and also addressed communications to the Commission (A/CN.10/INF.10 and Corr.1).
III. DOCUMENTATION

A. Reports and other documents submitted by the Secretary-General

17. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 37/78 H, the Secretary-General, by a note dated 28 January 1983, transmitted to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Committee on Disarmament, 2/ the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session (A/S-12/32), together with all the official records of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters (A/CN.10/37).


19. In connection with document A/CN.10/38, a note by the Secretariat (A/CN.10/51), was transmitted to the Disarmament Commission.

B. Documents submitted by Member States

20. In the course of the Commission's work, the following documents dealing with substantive questions were submitted:

   (a) Letter dated 9 May 1983 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Permanent Mission of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary of the Disarmament Commission, submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/39);

   (b) Letter dated 11 May 1983 from the head of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations Disarmament Commission addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/40);

   (c) Working paper entitled "Consideration of agenda item 4 in the Committee of the Whole", submitted by the Chairman of the Commission (A/CN.10/41);

   (d) Working paper entitled "Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level", submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/42);

   (e) Working paper entitled "Nuclear capability of South Africa", submitted by Mauritius on behalf of the African States members of the Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/43 and Rev.1);

   (f) Working paper entitled "Doctrines of nuclear warfare", submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/44);

   (g) Working paper entitled "Agenda item 4 of the current session of the Commission", submitted by the non-aligned countries (A/CN.10/45);
(h) Working paper entitled "Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level", submitted by India (A/CN.10/46); 

(i) Working paper entitled "Consideration of recommendations and proposals contained in the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, entitled 'Common Security' that relate to disarmament and arms limitation and to suggest, in a report to the General Assembly, how best to ensure an effective follow-up thereto within the United Nations system or otherwise", submitted by Mexico (A/CN.10/47); 

(j) Working paper entitled "Item 4 of the agenda of the Commission's current session", submitted by Mexico (A/CN.10/48); 

(k) Letter dated 24 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting the text of the answers given by Y. V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to the questions put by representatives of a number of Finnish public organizations, which were published in the newspaper Pravda on 11 May 1983 (A/CN.10/49); 

(l) Working paper entitled "Confidence-building measures and their application: guidelines for effective implementation", submitted by the Bahamas (A/CN.10/50); 

(m) Working paper entitled "Item 4 of the agenda of the present session of the Commission", submitted by Belgium (A/CN.10/52); 

(n) Working paper entitled "Possible elements for concrete recommendations concerning agenda item 6 on the question of South Africa's nuclear capability", submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/53); 

(o) Working paper entitled "Agenda item 4 of the current session of the Commission", submitted by the United Kingdom (A/CN.10/54/Rev.1); 

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

21. At its 69th meeting, on 2 June, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus the reports of its subsidiary bodies and the recommendations contained therein regarding items 4 (a) and (b), 5, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda, and agreed to submit the texts of those reports recorded below to the General Assembly.

22. The report of the Contact Group on item 4 (a) and (b) reads as follows:

"REPORT OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON AGENDA ITEM 4 (a) AND (b)

"1. Following a decision of the Committee of the Whole at its 3rd meeting, on 20 May 1983, a contact group open to all delegations was established under the Chairmanship of Mr. S. de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil) on behalf of the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole. The Committee of the Whole had requested the contact group to examine all working documents tabled before the Commission under agenda item 4 and to draft specific recommendations on that item for adoption by the Commission.

"2. The contact group held 10 meetings between 24 May and 1 June 1983. It had before it the following documents, which are annexed to the report of the Commission:

"(a) Letter dated 9 May 1983 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Permanent Mission of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary of the Disarmament Commission, submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/39); a/


"(c) Working paper entitled 'Consideration of agenda item 4 in the Committee of the Whole', submitted by the Chairman of the Commission (A/CN.10/41); c/

"(d) Working paper entitled 'Doctrines of nuclear warfare', submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/44); d/

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a/ See annex I.
b/ See annex II.
c/ See annex III.
d/ See annex IV.
"(e) Working paper entitled 'Agenda item 4 of the current session of the Commission', submitted by the non-aligned countries (A/CN.10/45); e/

"(f) Working paper entitled 'Item 4 of the agenda of the Commission's current session', submitted by Mexico (A/CN.10/48); f/


"The Contact Group decided that all documents would be considered on an equal footing, and further decided to utilize document A/CN.10/45 as the basis for its drafting work, without prejudice to the positions of individual delegations as regards the substance of the matter.

"3. The Contact Group was unable to achieve consensus on a set of recommendations for submission to the Committee of the Whole. It recommends, therefore, that item 4 of the Commission's agenda continue to be considered at the 1984 substantive session with a view to the formulation of concrete recommendations on that item.

"4. The Contact Group furthermore suggests that the Committee of the Whole annex to its report to the Commission the 'Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4', which reflects the state of the consideration of the matter in the Disarmament Commission." h/

23. The report of the Working Group I on item 5 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group I

"1. The General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session adopted resolution 37/95 A of 13 December 1982 in which it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its session to be held in 1983, the consideration of the item entitled 'Reduction of military budgets', including the consideration of the background paper as well as other proposals and ideas on that subject, with a view to identifying and elaborating the principles that should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

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e/ See annex V.
f/ See annex VI.
g/ See annex VII.
h/ See annex VIII.
"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 65th meeting, on 9 May 1983, decided to establish Working Group I to deal with agenda item 5 (a) and (b) as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 37/95 A.

"3. The Working Group had before it the background paper on some of the proposed principles and ideas which should govern actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures (annex II to the report of the Disarmament Commission). 1/ During the session, the Working Group had before it the following new documents: a working paper submitted by the delegations of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/1983/WG.I/WP.1) j/ and a working paper submitted by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland (A/CN.10/1983/WG.I/WP.3). j/ The interested delegations also recalled the documents submitted to the Commission previously, namely, the working paper submitted by the delegations of Romania and Sweden (A/CN.10/26 of 14 May 1981) k/ and the working paper submitted by the delegation of India (A/CN.10/35 of 20 May 1982). l/

"4. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Ion Diaconu (Romania) and held 14 meetings during the period from 12 to 31 May 1983. Furthermore, the Chairman of the Working Group conducted informal consultations on different proposals and ideas.

"5. The Working Group commenced the substantive work of identifying and elaborating the principles on the basis of the background paper and other proposals and ideas submitted by delegations. As a result, it appeared that many of the proposed principles and ideas were generally accepted, subject to drafting improvement and to an agreement on the whole. At the same time, there were still important divergences and oppositions concerning other proposed principles and ideas. Proposals and suggestions were made with a view to the rapprochement of positions.

"6. The exchange of views revealed serious concern among Member States about the continuing arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and growing military expenditures which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and have extremely harmful consequences with regard to international peace and security. It was also reaffirmed that it was possible to achieve continued and systematic reductions in military expenditures without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty.

i/ See annex IX.

j/ See annex X.

k/ See annex XI.

l/ See annex XII.
7. Some delegations stressed the primary responsibility vested with the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States to be the first to reduce their military budgets. The view was held that those nuclear-weapon States which had the highest military budgets should take the lead in reducing their military expenditures and thereafter the other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States should join them in reducing their respective military budgets.

8. Some delegations stressed that an agreed and balanced reduction of military expenditures would only be possible if it was based on the principles of transparency and comparability which could be best achieved through the regular availability of meaningful and reliable data. The same delegations held the view that an important first step to that end was the systematic use by an increasing number of States of the standardized international reporting instrument established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B.

9. Other delegations stressed that conceptions of transparency and comparability should not be used as a pretext for delaying the commencement of concrete negotiations on the halting of the increase and subsequent reduction of military expenditures. Still other delegations stated that there were no principles of transparency and comparability and recalled that they were not in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2). Some delegations stressed the view that transparency was an ambiguous concept and should not therefore be the object of a concrete commitment of States.

10. Some delegations stressed that agreed methods for measuring and comparing military expenditures constitute an essential requirement for meaningful negotiations on balanced reductions of military budgets. To that end, they attached particular importance to the standardized reporting instrument, presenting national expenditure data in a format suitable for international comparison. In that regard, they stressed the need for the reporting instrument to be used by an increasing number of States from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems.

11. In the view of other delegations, the insistence on the availability of data and comparability of military budgets as a pre-condition would only create obstacles to the initiation of such negotiations. Other delegations also emphasized the view that availability of additional data and comparability were not necessary for the freezing and reduction of military budgets. Some other delegations stated that the question of data and comparability could only be resolved satisfactorily in the course of negotiations, which should start as soon as possible.

12. It was also stated by some delegations that a greater openness in military matters, for instance, through a wider use of the reporting instrument, would help to increase confidence between States. Although the transparency and comparability of military expenditures may constitute an essential requirement for agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, it was emphasized by some delegations that they should not constitute a pre-condition for States to start negotiations on such agreements.
"13. A view was expressed that whether the military data of the third world countries and other medium and small countries without adequate defence capabilities and subject to aggression should be open or not was to be decided by those countries themselves in the light of the need for their national security and self-defence.

"14. Some delegations stressed the need for agreements to reduce military expenditures to contain effective and adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties. Some other delegations did not see the necessity of verification of such agreements. Other delegations stated that adequate measures of verification should be part of the respective agreements and should be determined during the negotiations.

"15. Some delegations referred to the need for the exercise of political will on the part of Governments, which should result in the initiation of business-like negotiations on the reduction of military budgets, particularly on the part of the permanent members of the Security Council, either in percentage terms or in absolute figures of the same magnitude. Therefore, those delegations expressed the view that it was timely and most urgent to enter, without delay, into concrete negotiations on halting the increase of military expenditures and on their subsequent reductions. In the view of those delegations, further consideration of questions relating to transparency and comparability of military budgets would only divert attention from effective disarmament measures.

"16. Some delegations objected to the concept of freezing of military budgets on the ground that a freeze would not be verifiable, would consolidate possible existing imbalances in military budgets and would suppress an incentive to reduce military budgets. Other delegations maintained that the freeze of military budgets would be an extremely useful and feasible measure that did not require verification.

"17. Some delegations stated that the principles and provisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly were a sufficient basis for adopting, without delay, practical and concrete measures for the freezing and reduction of military budgets. Other delegations made reference in that respect to resolution 37/95 A, which, inter alia, expressed the conviction that the identification and elaboration of a set of principles which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets could contribute to harmonizing the view of States and create confidence among them conducive to achieving international agreements on the reduction of military budgets. Still other delegations were of the view that principles alone cannot build confidence and underlined the need to follow a pragmatic course in working towards the adoption of concrete, balanced and verifiable measures.

"18. Some delegations stressed that the reduction of military budgets should be implemented in connection with other disarmament measures.
"19. Following the discussion, the Chairman of the Working Group submitted a set of suggestions of formulations for several of the proposals and ideas discussed (A/CN.10/1983/WG.1/WP.2), m/ which could be a basis for further reflection and for the continuation of the activity on this subject, together with other working papers, proposals, ideas and suggestions submitted to the Working Group. The working papers referred to in paragraph 3 above and the working paper including the Chairman's suggestions are annexed to the present report.

"20. In the light of its consideration of agenda item 5 (a) and (b), the Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly should request the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its next substantive session, the consideration of this agenda item, including consideration of the Chairman's suggestions as well as other proposals and ideas on the subject matter, with the view to further identifying and elaborating the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

"21. The Disarmament Commission also recommends that at its next substantive session, further consideration should be given to other proposals and ideas, as well as recommendations, including those contained in document A/CN.10/35.

"Notes

"l/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-12/3)."

24. The report of Working Group II on item 6 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group II

"1. In accordance with a decision taken by the Commission at its 65th meeting, on 9 May 1983, Working Group II was established with the task of dealing with agenda item 6 regarding the question of Nuclear Capability of South Africa, as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 37/74 B.

"2. In connection with its work, the Working Group had before it the following working papers:

m/ See annex XIII.
"(a) 'Nuclear capability of South Africa', submitted by Mauritius on behalf of the African States members of the Disarmament Commission (A/CONF.10/43 n/ and Rev.1 o/).

"(b) 'Possible elements for concrete recommendations concerning agenda item 6 on the question of South Africa's nuclear capability', submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CONF.10/53). p/

3. In carrying out its work, the Working Group also took into account other relevant documents on the subject, inter alia, 'South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field' (A/35/402 and Corr.1); and 'Report of the United Nations Seminar on nuclear cooperation with South Africa' (S/13157).

4. The Working Group met under the Chairmanship of Mr. Davidson L. Hepburn (Bahamas) and held 15 meetings between 13 May and 1 June 1983. The Working Group also conducted informal consultations through the Chairman during this period.

5. In the absence of an agreed text or recommendations, the Working Group, at its 14th meeting, on 31 May, requested the Chairman to submit the following progress report on its deliberations under agenda item 6 at the current session of the Disarmament Commission:

'In order to facilitate the deliberations and bridge the gap on different positions held by various delegations, the Chairman undertook initial, informal and intensive consultations with delegations directly concerned as well as with all regional groups. During the course of informal consultations, the Chairman urged delegates to put forward their views and proposals.

'As a result of these consultations, the Chairman felt optimistic that there was a basis for agreement on a consensus text.

'When the Working Group met formally, the only proposal submitted was that of the African group introduced on 16 May 1983 by the representative of Mauritius in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of African States for the month of May (A/CONF.10/43).

'After preliminary discussions, there was no objection to accepting the text presented by the African States as a basis for discussion. The debate revealed that, while a majority of delegations accepted provisions contained in the working paper, it was felt that the text none the less could be improved from the point of view of precise data and less controversial language. On the other hand, some delegations disagreed fundamentally with some concepts and elements emphasized in certain paragraphs of the text.

\n
n/ See annex XIV.

o/ See annex XV.

p/ See annex XVI.
'Conscious that the initial predisposition for compromise was weakening, the Chairman intensified informal consultations with delegations. It became clear that, in the Chairman's view, positions had hardened because delegations could not agree on generally acceptable reformulations of controversial paragraphs and had reverted to previous divergent positions regarding, inter alia:

'(a) The legal and political interpretation to be placed on South Africa's actions and policy, in particular apartheid policy;

'(b) The verification of South Africa's nuclear capability;

'(c) The eligibility of South Africa to access of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

'Despite these divergent views, delegations were still willing and prepared to continue formal discussions with a view to reaching consensus. Consequently, the Chairman was asked to prepare a working paper but, having regard to progress made on the preambular sections of the paper (A/CN.10/43), the Chairman decided, instead of preparing a totally new text, to reformulate the operative sections of the paper, taking into account written proposals which the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany had prepared in a search for compromise.

'As the Chairman's reformulation did not meet with consensus, the African group, in a spirit of compromise, presented a revised version of A/CN.10/43, taking into consideration discussions in the group, including agreed paragraphs and written proposals by the Federal Republic of Germany. Subsequently, the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany presented these proposals as a working paper (A/CN.10/53).

'It was agreed that both working papers should be annexed to the report of the Working Group and be taken as bases for discussion at the next session of the Disarmament Commission.'

"At its 15th meeting, on 1 June, the Working Group adopted this report."

25. The report of Working Group III on item 7 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group III

1. In accordance with the decision taken by the Commission at its 65th meeting, on 9 May 1983, Working Group III was established with the task of dealing with agenda item 7 and making recommendations thereon to the Commission, as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 37/99 B.

2. In connection with its work, the Working Group had before it the following documents:

"(b) Letter dated 9 May 1983 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Permanent Mission of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary of the Disarmament Commission, submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/39);

"(c) Letter dated 11 May 1983 from the head of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations Disarmament Commission addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/40);


"3. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Curt Lidgard (Sweden) and held 11 meetings between 12 May and 1 June 1983. The Working Group also conducted informal consultations through the Chairman during this period.

"4. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (ICDSI) consisting of prominent personalities from different countries was set up at Vienna, Austria, in September 1980 under the chairmanship of the present Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Olof Palme.

"5. The report of ICDSI was published on 1 June 1982 and presented by its Chairman to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. It contains six chapters entitled: (1) 'Common survival', (2) 'The threat of war', (3) 'The consequences of war', (4) 'The economic and social consequences of military spending', (5) 'A positive approach to security' and (6) 'Recommendations and proposals'.

"6. In the first chapter, entitled 'Common survival', ICDSI states that all nations would be united in destruction if nuclear war were to occur. Recognition of this interdependence means that nations must begin to organize their security policies in co-operation with one another. ICDSI notes that there is always the danger that the fragile stability of an international system based on armaments will suddenly crumble and that nuclear confrontation will take its place. A more effective way to ensure security is, in the view of the Independent Commission, to create positive processes that can lead to peace and disarmament. It is essential to create an irreversible process, with a momentum such that all nations co-operate for their common survival (pp. 6-7). All countries should, in the view of ICDSI, adopt the following principles of common security as the basis for their security policies: (a) all nations have a legitimate right to security; (b) military force is not a legitimate instrument for resolving disputes between nations; (c) restraint is necessary in expressions of national policy; (d) security cannot be attained through military superiority; (e) reductions and qualitative limitations of armaments are necessary for common security; and (f) 'linkages' between arms negotiations and political events should be avoided (pp. 8-10).
7. The recommendations and proposals of ICDSI are summarized in chapter 6 of the report. A number of principles for action are proposed based upon the concept of common security. ICDSI notes in this context that in the absence of a world authority with the right and power to police international relations, States have to protect themselves. Unless they show mutual restraint and proper appreciation of the realities of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of security can cause intensified competition and more tense political relations and, at the end of the day, a reduction in security for all concerned. Nuclear weapons have changed not only the scale of warfare but the very concept of war itself. In the nuclear age, war cannot be an instrument of policy, only an engine for unprecedented destruction. States can no longer seek security at each other's expense; it can be attained only through co-operative undertakings. Security in the nuclear age means common security (pp. 138-139).

8. In the view of ICDSI, its recommendations, taken together, constitute a broad programme for substantial progress towards arms limitation and disarmament. The recommendations fall into six categories: (a) the nuclear challenge and East-West relations; (b) curbing the qualitative arms competition; (c) assuring confidence among States; (d) strengthening the United Nations security system; (e) regional approaches to security; and (f) economic security (p. 140 ff).

9. The Disarmament Commission carried out a broad discussion of the concept of common security. The Disarmament Commission considered this concept a valuable approach in the search for lasting peace and security.

10. The Disarmament Commission examined the proposals and recommendations of the report of ICDSI in the light of various security perceptions. Differing views were expressed as regards the principles, proposals and recommendations contained in the report. One delegation proposed that the Disarmament Commission should endorse the proposal outlined by ICDSI for the establishment of a tactical or battlefield nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe and stated its firm belief that the provisions on geographic delimitation, verification machinery and other relevant points for the treaty or convention which would have to be concluded to that effect should be negotiated without delay between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization alliances (A/CN.10/47). This proposal was supported by a number of delegations, whereas other delegations raised objections to it on various grounds. The objecting delegations voiced their regret that only one recommendation of the ICDSI report - and, at that, a recommendation that was controversial among the States of the region - had been singled out for consideration by the Working Group. They stated that the proposal which they had already formally rejected was unacceptable since, in view of the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Europe, such a zone would actually increase the risk of confrontation. They argued that the determinant for a territory to be under nuclear threat is not whether nuclear weapons are stationed there, but whether nuclear weapons are aimed at it. The delegations supporting the proposal stressed that all the objections which had been raised in the debate of the Working Group had been taken into account by ICDSI in the thorough process of the preparation of its report. They added that ICDSI had felt, however, obliged to disregard such objections as groundless; it considered the establishment of the proposed zone an important confidence-building measure which would raise the nuclear threshold and reduce some of the pressures for early use of nuclear weapons.
Some delegations stated in supporting the proposal that, in their view, there is no conventional superiority on any side in Europe. It was also stressed that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in any region should be on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and that, in the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account.

"11. The Disarmament Commission found the report of ICDSI noteworthy in the sense that prominent personalities of different political convictions from various regions of the world were able to reach agreement on a concrete programme aimed at halting the arms race and creating a downward spiral in armaments.

"12. The Disarmament Commission welcomed the report of ICDSI as a timely and constructive contribution to international efforts to achieve disarmament and to maintain and strengthen international peace and security.

"13. The Disarmament Commission noted that in many cases the proposals of ICDSI dealt with ongoing efforts, inter alia, in the Commission itself, whereas in other cases new measures were proposed. The Commission recommended that the report of ICDSI be duly taken into account in ongoing and future disarmament efforts."

26. The report of Working Group IV on item 8 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group IV

"1. The General Assembly, at its thirty-seventh session, adopted resolution 37/100 D on 13 December 1982 by which it, inter alia, requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level, and further requested the Commission to submit a progress report on its deliberations on the item to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 65th meeting, on 9 May 1983, decided to establish an informal, open-ended working group to deal with agenda item 8 regarding the question of confidence-building measures and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 37/100 D.

"3. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Henning Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany) and held 11 meetings between 13 and 27 May 1983. The Working Group also conducted informal consultations through the Chairman during the period.

"4. In connection with its work, the Working Group had before it the following documents, which are annexed to the report of the Commission:
"(a) 'Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level', working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/42); g/

"(b) Working paper submitted by the Netherlands (A/CN.10/1983/WG.IV/WP.3); f/

"(c) 'Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level', working paper submitted by India (A/CN.10/46); s/

"(d) 'Confidence-building measures and their application: guidelines for effective implementation', working paper submitted by the Bahamas (A/CN.10/50). t/

"In addition to the Charter of the United Nations and the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution 5-10/2), the Working Group also had before it for its consideration the following documents:

"(a) Relevant resolutions of the General Assembly adopted by consensus (34/87 B, 35/156 B, 36/97 F and 37/100 D) (see A/CN.10/1983/WG.IV/WP.2);

"(b) Replies by Member States to the Secretary-General regarding confidence-building measures pursuant to General Assembly resolution 33/91 B of 16 December 1978 (A/34/416 and Add.1-3 and A/35/397);

"(c) Comprehensive study on confidence-building measures (A/36/474 and Corr.1); l/

"(d) Proposals relating to confidence-building measures made at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see A/S-12/AC.1/59).

"5. At its 2nd meeting, on 16 May, the Working Group adopted its programme of work, contained in document A/CN.10/1983/WG.IV/WP.1. In the course of the Group's deliberations, the Chairman submitted for the Group's consideration the following two informal conference room papers: (a) the Chairman's paper on definitions of confidence-building measures (A/CN.10/1983/WG.IV/CRP.1) and (b) the Chairman's paper on issues in general debate (A/CN.10/1983/WG.IV/CRP.2) dealing with issues that, from the Chairman's personal perspective, had evolved in the course of the general debate on the agenda item in question.

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g/ See annex XVII.

f/ See annex XVIII.

s/ See annex XIX.

l/ See annex XX.
"6. From the beginning of the Working Group's discussions, it was understood that the task assigned to the Disarmament Commission by the General Assembly in its resolution 37/100 D under this item envisaged a two-year exercise. It was therefore agreed that the Commission should, during its 1983 substantive session, concentrate on a general discussion on the concept as well as the question of guidelines for confidence-building measures. Pursuant to that agreed approach, the Commission carried out intensive discussions and consultations on the item, including a first reading of the papers presented to the Working Group, during which time detailed comments on those papers were made.

"7. All delegations agreed on the fundamental importance of the Charter of the United Nations, the general principles of international law and the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) for the work of the Group. Most delegations also considered the comprehensive study on confidence-building measures as an important basis and point of reference for further work, while some delegations were of the opinion that the study should be taken into account along with the other relevant documents.

"8. All delegations agreed on the growing importance of the confidence-building process in a world which is characterized by political tensions and an increasing recourse to the use or threat of force on one hand, and by what many delegations referred to as the escalation of the arms race on the other. They stressed that strict adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, the validity of which had been unanimously and categorically reaffirmed by all Member States at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, were of overriding importance for the preservation of peace and the realization of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and that this should be appropriately reflected in the wording of the future guidelines. In emphasizing the necessity for the strict observance of the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations in order to enhance confidence among States, they referred in particular to the following principles: (a) refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State; (b) non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States; (c) peaceful settlement of disputes; and (d) sovereign equality of States and self-determination of peoples. In that context, some delegations stressed that certain paragraphs from the Final Document should be incorporated into the guidelines; paragraphs 3, 8, 24, 26 and 93 were indicated as being particularly relevant. Other delegations thought that individual quotations from the Final Document would necessarily have to be selective and that therefore a summary reference to the Final Document might be preferable.

"9. All delegations agreed that confidence-building measures must neither be a substitute nor a precondition for disarmament or for negotiations on disarmament, nor divert attention from requisite measures of disarmament. Yet, in the view of many delegations, their positive potential in terms of creating favourable conditions for agreement on arms limitation or disarmament measures, enhancing the implementation of measures already agreed upon and promoting the dynamic development of détente, encompassing all fields of international relations in all regions of the world with the participation of all countries, should be fully utilized. In particular, the capability to
strengthen international peace and security through confidence-building measures was pointed out. Several delegations highlighted the value of such measures as an instrument to prevent the settlement of political conflicts by military means and to avoid the risk of surprise attack, and the outbreak of war by mistake or accident. It was also pointed out that for confidence-building measures to generate their full potential they should be binding and militarily significant.

"10. All delegations further agreed that disarmament and arms limitation measures, which directly limit or reduce military potential, had a particularly high confidence-building value. Some delegations emphasized that this particular confidence-building value would only materialize if the measures were adequately verifiable. The view was more specifically expressed that, in the disarmament field, nothing is more conducive to confidence-building than measures to halt the nuclear arms race and move towards nuclear disarmament. Most delegations distinguished between disarmament measures, on the one hand, and confidence-building measures which leave the military potential untouched, on the other. It was widely felt that, despite the inherent limitations of a concept not immediately leading to disarmament proper, confidence-building measures would make a valuable specific contribution towards the enhancement of peace and security and the attainment of disarmament measures. It was pointed out by some delegations that the implementation of verification measures has a confidence-building effect of its own, and that this effect could be further enhanced by utilizing the positive potential of confidence-building measures. One delegation felt that the mandate given in the Final Document relating to confidence-building measures very clearly stated that they were in the nature of collateral measures which were parallel or contributory to disarmament measures. Those measures, therefore, could not be a goal or end by themselves, nor could they be pursued autonomously and in isolation of the process of arms limitation and disarmament. Confidence-building measures could not be seen in a narrow, restrictive or regulatory context either; nor could they be binding or enforceable.

"11. While some delegations expressed concern that confidence-building measures had come to the fore at a time when, generally, the disarmament process had met with difficulties in many parts of the world, others pointed out that it was precisely one of the tasks of confidence-building measures to create and improve conditions conducive to measures of disarmament and, as such, they played a particularly significant role in time of slow progress or even stagnation in the disarmament process. One delegation, reflecting the views shared by some other delegations, stated that, at a time when the disarmament process had come to a halt and the nuclear-arms race was continuing at an accelerated pace, priority attention must be given to those measures which would help in halting the nuclear-arms race and moving towards nuclear disarmament. In the view of this delegation, major Powers had a special responsibility for improving the climate of trust and confidence among States. Among the measures they should adopt to accomplish this are: (a) dismantling of all foreign military bases, (b) dissolution of military alliances, and (c) removal of their military presence from foreign regions of the world. The same delegation held that, as matters relating to disarmament and international security were of concern to all States, international confidence would improve if multilateral negotiations on all disarmament issues became the accepted norm. Furthermore, the United Nations should be
permitted to play a central role and assume primary responsibility in the
field of disarmament. A number of other delegations emphasized the particular
significance of confidence-building measures in the nuclear field in that they
facilitated nuclear disarmament.

"12. All delegations shared the view that confidence-building measures could
only be agreed upon with the participation of all States concerned.

"13. Delegations agreed that confidence, comprising the belief in the
co-operative disposition of other States, was one significant element for the
conduct of States. It relates to a wide spectrum of activities, political,
military, economic, cultural, social and other. Confidence was described by
some delegations as one step in a continuum between certainty and uncertainty,
falling short of knowledge but going beyond hope.

"14. Delegations agreed further that building confidence was necessary in all
areas which could contribute to diminishing mistrust and enhancing trust among
States by reducing and eventually eliminating potential causes for
misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscalculation. They also held that
it was necessary to establish confidence in all relevant areas of
international, regional and bilateral relations and to improve and broaden
confidence where it already existed. In order to achieve that goal, several
delegations referred to the measures listed in paragraph I36 of the
comprehensive study on confidence-building measures as measures to be included
in a process of further development and promotion. In that respect, some
delegations emphasized the importance of confidence-building measures in
promoting international economic co-operation. One delegation stressed that
confidence-building was a positive concept and an approach to it must be a
comprehensive one involving the adoption and implementation of measures in the
political, economic and social fields. These should include removal of
political tensions, progress towards disarmament, restructuring of the world
economic system in order to establish the new international economic order and
the elimination of racial discrimination and foreign occupation. Some
delegations expressed the view that a lessening of the danger of war was not
possible without the creation of an atmosphere of confidence in relations
among States. That, they stressed, necessitated, along with the development
of political dialogue and the adoption of corresponding measures in the
economic and military spheres, the dissemination of true information and the
renunciation of great-Power aspirations, the propagation of racism, chauvinism
and nationalist exclusiveness, efforts to instruct other nations how to lead
their life, the preaching of violence, the fomentation of war psychosis and
the propaganda of nuclear war.

"15. The Working Group had an in-depth exchange of views on the question of
whether confidence-building measures, as the subject of the future guidelines,
should comprise all measures which are capable of enhancing confidence in
inter-State relations, or whether the concept, in accordance with the mandate
of the Disarmament Commission, would have to be narrowed down so as to focus
mainly on measures in the military and security field. Some delegations
stressed that, taking into account the various reasons for political tensions,
confidence-building measures would have to comprise all measures designed to
solve or capable of solving international problems and thus contributing to
the building of confidence. On the other hand, it was widely held that, while
confidence-building measures had constantly to be seen in the context of the
wide range of possible measures which could increase confidence, for the purpose of elaborating guidelines for confidence-building measures and for their implementation in the Disarmament Commission, the focus should be on measures relating to the military and security field. Many delegations affirmed that in recent years confidence-building measures had increasingly come to be perceived as a specific category of State behaviour worthy of further development and enhancement.

"16. Most delegations agreed that it was not necessary to include an explicit definition of confidence-building measures into the guidelines but that, by way of a functional approach, the focus of the exercise should become clear from the objectives and characteristics of confidence-building measures to be spelt out in the future guidelines. One delegation, however, suggested that a precise definition of confidence-building measures would be desirable and useful.

"17. While some delegations stressed the necessity to focus on a regional approach towards confidence-building, others highlighted the global significance of the confidence-building process. A number of delegations expressed the view that a regional approach to confidence-building measures could not be pursued in isolation from the global approach. Several delegations stated that the regional and global approaches were not contradictory but rather complementary. Views were also expressed that confidence-building measures could be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. In that context, it was underlined that in certain regions unilateral confidence-building measures were of considerable importance. Most delegations maintained that, in considering the possible introduction of confidence-building measures in particular regions, the specific political, military and other conditions prevailing in the region concerned should be fully taken into account.

"18. A view was expressed that statements of intent and unilateral commitments would have a positive effect on inter-State relations and should be regarded as important confidence-building measures, contributing to the strengthening of international security. The declaration of non-first use of nuclear weapons was referred to as a good example in that context. At the same time, militaristic declarations as well as nuclear warfare doctrines would undermine confidence among States. The fact that stated intentions were - not always fulfilled would not detract from the value of declarations of intent. In that context, it was pointed out that collective declarations of intent through international bodies could also enhance confidence, although the effectiveness in terms of confidence-building of any expression of intent would have to be measured in terms of subsequent action. Another view was expressed that such declarations, not leading to concrete action capable of being examined and assessed, could not remove perceptions of threat or suspicion and that genuine potential for confidence-building would only reside in sustained verifiable action by States. Some delegations, however, did not believe that all confidence-building measures need be verifiable or, in the view of one delegation, could be verifiable.
ANNEX I


The delegation of the German Democratic Republic to the Disarmament Commission has the honour to forward herewith the texts of two letters by the Government of the German Democratic Republic related to the Swedish proposal on the establishment in Central Europe of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons and to request that the documents be circulated as official documents of the Disarmament Commission referring to items 4 (a) and 7 of the agenda.

(Signed) Harry OTT
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

APPENDIX I

Letter dated 27 January 1983 from the Government of the German Democratic Republic addressed to the Government of Sweden

The Government of the German Democratic Republic shares the concern of the Swedish Government over the high concentration of nuclear weapons on this continent. It concurs with its view that every possible effort must be made to reduce and, indeed, completely eliminate nuclear weapons in Europe. The Swedish proposal affords an opportunity to move closer to this goal and to scale down military confrontation in Europe substantially. At the same time, it conforms to the belief of the German Democratic Republic and the other signatory States of the Warsaw Treaty that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of Europe may lessen the danger of nuclear war and give fresh impetus to détente and mutually beneficial co-operation.

The German Democratic Republic attaches special importance to creating such a zone on both sides of the dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty organization because in its immediate proximity is to be found the State with the densest concentration of nuclear weapons and because plans exist to deploy further nuclear weapons. However, if one takes into account the principal military parameters (range, speed, etc.) of the nuclear weapons already existing, the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones of 150 kilometres on each side of this line would appear to be not wide enough. A wider zone would be required in order to obtain a real increase in security for the participating States and for Europe as a whole. As far as the German Democratic Republic is concerned, it is prepared to make available its entire territory for such a zone provided the principle of equality and equal security is observed.

The Government of the German Democratic Republic is interested in continuing to discuss with representatives of the Swedish Government all questions connected with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. It would welcome it if the Swedish Government would provide information on the reactions of other European Governments and would elaborate the ideas put forward to date.
Letter dated 4 February 1983 from the Government of the German Democratic Republic addressed to the Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Permit me to inform you that the Swedish Government has requested the Government of the German Democratic Republic to set forth its views on the proposal to create a "zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons extending from Central Europe to the outermost northern and southern flanks of the two alliances". The Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Council of State and the Council of Ministers of the German Democratic Republic, having closely studied this Swedish proposal, have arrived at the conviction that the creation of such a zone could be a useful move to strengthen peace in Europe and to advance détente.

Accordingly, it was resolved to support the Swedish initiative. Meanwhile, the Swedish Government has been officially informed that the German Democratic Republic, going beyond the Swedish proposal, is ready to make available its entire territory for such a zone if the principle of equality and equal security is observed.

Considering the importance of the Swedish initiative as well as the responsibility of both German States for peace and the concomitant obligation to assist actively in preventing a nuclear catastrophe, it would be of great significance if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, too, supported this initiative.

I should be very much obliged to you, Chancellor, if you would notify me of the decision of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Enclosed please find the note of the Swedish Government and the reply of the Government of the German Democratic Republic. a/

Notes

a/ These communications are not reproduced in the present document.
ANNEX II


I should like to refer to document A/CN.10/39 of 9 May 1983 containing two letters by the Government of the German Democratic Republic related to a proposal by the Government of Sweden for the establishment on a subregional level in Europe of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons.

In order to inform delegations more fully on the various views pertaining to that proposal and to enable them to form a considered opinion, I have the honour to enclose the note in reply of the Federal German Government of 16 February 1983 to the note by the Government of Sweden dated 9 December 1982, as well as the reply of Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl of 18 February 1983 to the letter addressed to him by General Secretary Erich Honecker of 4 February 1983, as reproduced in document A/CN.10/39.

I would request that these documents be circulated as official documents of the Disarmament Commission.

(Signed) Henning WEGENER
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

APPENDIX I

Note verbale dated 16 February 1983 from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed to the Government of Sweden

The Federal Government has carefully examined the proposal to create a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons reaching from Central Europe to the southern and northern flanks of the two alliances.

The main criterion applied in this examination was the effectiveness of any such measure towards the prevention of any war, including a conflict with conventional weapons in Europe. In the opinion of the Federal Government, the proposal to create a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons raises a number of problems in this respect. In view of the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact in Europe, such a zone could actually increase the risk of a military conflict.

The Atlantic Defence Alliance maintains its nuclear weapons arsenal, including battlefield nuclear weapons, exclusively for the purpose of deterrence in order to ensure that war, in whatever form, will no more be considered as an instrument of policy. Every potential aggressor must be faced with an incalculable risk of nuclear escalation. The establishment of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons might render the risk of an aggressor more calculable and lead to the mistaken conclusion that a surprise attack based on superiority in conventional
armaments might be successful, at least within such a zone. The attempt to raise, by this measure, the nuclear threshold harbours the risk of contributing to the lowering of the threshold of aggression.

This possibility alone—quite apart from the purely military problems which the proposal raises—would have politically destabilizing effects. Furthermore, such a zone with a special security status would, on the Western side, essentially be limited to the Federal Republic of Germany. This would be incompatible with the concept of indivisible security for all States members of the Atlantic Alliance, which guarantees stability and peace in Europe even beyond its membership.

Quite apart from the misgivings this proposal raises when viewed in the context of a policy aimed at preventing war, it does not appear conclusive in terms of its own arms control policy conception. The compliance with agreed reductions and the prohibition of stationing could not be verified in a reliable way.

Even assuming that verification would be feasible in normal times, battlefield nuclear weapons, especially warheads, could be redeployed in a very short time during a crisis or after a conflict with conventional weapons had started. The agreement on such a zone would therefore only create an illusion of security.

The determinant for a territory to be under nuclear threat is not where nuclear weapons are stationed but above all which targets they can reach. The proposal for the creation of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe does not take into account the fact that the majority of Soviet nuclear weapons—though to date stationed outside the proposed zone—are aimed at targets within the zone.

The Federal Government holds the opinion that an effective reduction of the nuclear threat can only be achieved by the reduction and limitation of existing potentials through concrete and verifiable agreements aiming at a stable balance at the lowest possible level of armaments and taking into account the strategic context. The efforts of the Atlantic Alliance in the field of arms control are focused on this object.

In this context, the endeavours currently undertaken in the framework of the intermediate nuclear force negotiations at Geneva for a complete renunciation of land-based intermediate-range missiles by the United States and the Soviet Union are of a priority character.

In the opinion of the Federal Government, negotiations on arms control aiming only at nuclear disengagement in a small zone de facto limited to Central Europe could distract from the priority of these negotiations and make speedy results more difficult.

For the above-mentioned reasons, the Federal Government is not in a position to support the initiative of the Swedish Government for the creation of a zone free of battlefield nuclear weapons.
APPENDIX II

Letter dated 18 February 1983 from the Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic

Thank you for your letter of 4 February 1983.

I know we share the view that the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic bear a grave responsibility for the preservation of peace in Europe and in the world. We should therefore earnestly try to provide positive impulses for the situation in Europe. It is my firm conviction that dialogue and co-operation, the implementation of existing treaties and increased contacts between people constitute an important contribution towards peace.

Mr. General Secretary, all efforts at arms control by the Federal Republic and the entire Atlantic Alliance - in Geneva, in Vienna, in Madrid and in the United Nations - are aimed at the goal of preserving the peace. We want to safeguard the peace with fewer and fewer weapons. We desire a stable military balance between East and West at the lowest possible level of armaments.

At present, our expectations are focused especially on the negotiations in Geneva on nuclear intermediate-range weapons. The United States, in concurrence with its allies, has proposed that the United States and the USSR renounce their land-based intermediate-range missiles. Such a result would demonstrate that it is possible for East and West to agree on genuine disarmament measures, and would be a decisive contribution towards eliminating the nuclear threat to Europe.

The determinant for a territory to be under nuclear threat is not whether nuclear weapons are stationed there but whether nuclear weapons are aimed at it. Negotiations that merely result in moving the nuclear arsenals in Europe farther apart would therefore not enhance stability but would only create an illusion of greater security. They would detract from the ongoing negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons, thereby making it more difficult to reach prompt results.

Our main criterion for all arms control policy proposals is what contribution they make towards the prevention of any war, including a conflict with conventional weapons in Europe. The initiative for creating a zone in Central Europe that is free of battlefield nuclear weapons does not meet this requirement. We therefore do not find ourselves in a position to support it. In view of the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact in Europe, such a zone would actually increase the risk of a confrontation. We cannot overlook the fact that in the area alone that is covered by the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced reduction of troops, the Warsaw Pact has at its disposal more than twice as many divisions, tanks and cannons as NATO.

I consider it necessary that we should concentrate all efforts on those endeavours in the field of disarmament and arms control that are apt to bring about concrete, balanced and verifiable results. For this reason, we attach the greatest importance to progress in the ongoing negotiations.
Representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic are participating in a number of negotiations of this kind. I consider it useful to conduct a direct and objective exchange of views about basic questions concerning these negotiations. I therefore propose that our disarmament representatives meet for the purpose of continuing the discussion of those topics that have already been the subject of a mutual exchange of ideas. In our view, such a meeting could take place in April or May in Bonn.

(Signed) Helmut KOHL
ANNEX III

Consideration of agenda item 4 in the Committee of the Whole
(A/CN.10/41)

Working paper by the Chairman

The Commission decided on 9 May 1983 to adopt the Chairman's suggestion that
item 4 be entrusted to the Committee of the Whole. As the Chairman explained, the
reasons for proposing this procedure were twofold. First, there is no specific
General Assembly resolution dealing with this item, as there are for the four other
substantive items on the Commission's agenda; secondly, at the beginning of the
present session, there were no concrete documents on which the Commission might
base its work on item 4. Later on, a document of the German Democratic Republic
was distributed on 9 May 1983 (A/CN.10/39). The Chairman was informed,
furthermore, that some non-aligned delegations were working on a text to be
submitted in due course. Other delegations might wish to do likewise.

Many delegations have expressed, in past sessions of the Commission, as well
as in other forums, the great importance that they attached to this item. It
should be recalled, in this connection, that in the Final Document of the Tenth
Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) highest priority was
assigned to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear
disarmament, which constitute the subject matter of item 4 (a) and (b). The
Chairman therefore expected that delegations would avail themselves of the early
meetings of the Committee of the Whole to take the floor on the substance of these
questions.

As the Chairman emphasized in his opening statement to the Commission on
9 May 1983, the work this year should follow the guidelines contained in resolution
37/78 H. The Chairman also noted that the 1983 session of the Commission should be
considered as a transitional period in which the Commission should adapt its
working philosophy to the new approach introduced by that resolution. It should be
recalled that in resolution 37/78 H the General Assembly requested the Commission
"to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118
of the Final Document", "to direct its attention at each substantive session to
specific subjects from among those which have been and will be under its
consideration", and "to make concrete recommendations on such subjects".

Given the importance and priority that all delegations attach to the main
subject matter of item 4, that is, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the
prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear disarmament, the Chairman expected that the
Committee of the Whole would, at this session, direct its attention to the specific
subjects dealt with in the context of this item, with a view to making concrete
recommendations on them to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session. The
comments that delegations wish to make as the Commission starts its debate in the
Committee of the Whole will guide the Chair in suggesting the subsequent treatment
of this matter, including the establishment of a subsidiary body to examine texts
that may be submitted.
Based on the guidelines given to the Commission by the General Assembly, and as stressed in his opening remarks to the Commission on 9 May 1983, the Chairman would therefore suggest at this point that the Commission envisage a report on item 4 containing concrete recommendations on specific subjects, rather than remaining on the level of generality which characterizes the previous reports of the Commission to the General Assembly on this item. The final shape of the report will depend, of course, on the suggestions and texts submitted by delegations and on the outcome of the debate on them. It is the Chairman's understanding, however, that such a report should be action-oriented and contain recommendations that the Commission would be able to agree upon at the close of its work. The Chairman believes that, in this way, the Commission will be fulfilling the express wish of its parent body, the General Assembly, as contained in paragraph 3 of resolution 37/78 H.
ANNEX IV

Doctrines of Nuclear Warfare
(A/CN.10/44)

Agenda item 4 of the current session of the Commission

Working paper: German Democratic Republic

1. In order to contribute to removing the obstacles which impede the solution of the tasks that have the highest priority for nuclear disarmament, appropriate attention should be given to the doctrines of nuclear warfare.

2. The United Nations has commented repeatedly on such doctrines:

   (a) The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) stated in paragraph 13:

   "Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority";

   (b) Resolution 35/152 B, which was subsequently reaffirmed by resolutions 36/92 E and 37/78 C stated, inter alia:

   "Noting with alarm the increased risk of a nuclear catastrophe associated both with the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and with the adoption of the new doctrine of limited or partial use of nuclear weapons giving rise to illusions of the admissibility and acceptability of a nuclear conflict ...";

   (c) Resolution 36/100 stated:

   "Any doctrines allowing the first use of nuclear weapons and any actions pushing the world towards a catastrophe are incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the United Nations";

   (d) Referring to what was stated in the above documents, resolution 37/78 C underlined:

   "Noting with alarm that to the doctrine of a limited war was later added the concept of a protracted war,

   "Noting also with alarm that these dangerous doctrines lead to a new twist in the spiral of the arms race, which may seriously hamper the reaching of agreement on nuclear disarmament ...".

In addition, the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons (A/35/392) dealt with the doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons. The resolutions quoted point out that nuclear warfare doctrines are particularly dangerous since their orientation is on strategic superiority and first strike.

3. These specifically threatening characteristics of nuclear warfare doctrines have become increasingly manifest in the second half of the 1970s in connection
with long-term arms programmes and other decisions on the development, production, introduction and stationing of qualitatively new nuclear weapon systems. The escalating nuclear-arms race at the beginning of the 1980s is reflected in the escalation of new concepts to fight and win a nuclear war, which have been elaborated above all by the main Western Power.

4. These doctrines include the following major concepts:

(a) The concept of limited nuclear war, according to which nuclear weapons, limited in scale and geographically, could be used or the use be threatened in order to achieve political and military goals. This concept, which provides for the first use of nuclear weapons, is directed against not only the socialist States of Europe but also countries in all other parts of the world. It bears the risk of a nearly unavoidable escalation of such a "limited" war into a full exchange of nuclear strikes;

(b) The concept of protracted nuclear war with a duration of up to six months, in which not only tactical but also strategic nuclear weapons would be employed. Preparatory measures for such a conflict include, inter alia, the creation of invulnerable command systems;

(c) The concept of a strategic first strike. Planning provides for the "decapitation" of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other socialist States, above all by means of those new medium-range missiles to be deployed in Western Europe from the end of 1983. At the same time, a massive strategic first strike is envisaged against the strategic counter-strike weapons of the USSR, its industrial basis and population centres;

(d) The concept of a defence system based in outer space to neutralize intercontinental ballistic missiles has the purpose to achieve a first-strike capability while the other side is deprived of its capability to respond with a counter-strike. In disregard of the indivisible interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive weapons, the realization of this concept would lead to an arms race in the field of all kinds of strategic weapons which could not be stopped.

The purpose of all those plans is to win a nuclear war. Arguments, without any justification whatsoever, are disseminated claiming that it is possible to wage and to survive such a war. This will only serve to counteract the rejection of the idea of nuclear war by world public opinion.

5. The adverse effects of nuclear doctrines have increasingly become felt in the negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. The implementation of arms build-up programmes linked with these doctrines accelerates the arms race. Through discontinuing and protracting disarmament negotiations, refusal to ratify concluded agreements and calling existing treaties into question, the intention is to remove obstacles to the achievement of strategic superiority on which these doctrines are being based.

6. In contrast to this, the Political Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, adopted at the session of the Political Consultative Committee held at Prague on 4 and 5 January 1983, stated:
"The States represented at the session wish to stress as forcefully as possible that any expectation of winning a nuclear war after unleashing it is senseless. If a nuclear war is started, there can be no winner. Such a war would inevitably lead to the destruction of whole nations, to enormous devastation and catastrophic consequences for civilization and life itself on earth."

These States have no doctrines which contain the threat or first use of nuclear weapons. The USSR explicitly renounced each form of the first use of nuclear weapons, and the Warsaw Treaty member States proposed to the member States of NATO the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the first use of nuclear and conventional weapons.

7. The vast majority of the other States Members of the United Nations reject nuclear warfare doctrines. The Political Declaration of the Seventh Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries stated:

"The renewed escalation in the nuclear arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations."

In the endeavour to prevent a nuclear war, the majority of Member States attach great importance to those measures which most directly oppose the main danger arising from preparations for nuclear war and related doctrines. These include:

(a) Prevention of nuclear catastrophe (resolution 36/100);
(b) Commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons (resolution 37/78 J);
(c) Non-use of nuclear weapons (resolutions 36/92 I and 37/100 C);
(d) Freeze on nuclear weapons (resolutions 37/100 A and 37/100 B);
(e) Prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests (resolutions 37/85, 37/72 and 37/73);
(f) Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon (resolutions 36/92 K and 37/78 E);
(g) Non-stationing of nuclear weapons (resolutions 33/91 F, 35/156 C, 36/97 E, and 37/99 A);

as well as other measures to halt the qualitative arms race.

8. The United Nations is called upon to exploit all possibilities at its disposal to prevent the implementation of plans that envisage a nuclear first strike with the possible consequence of a nuclear catastrophe that would endanger the very survival of mankind. It is necessary, therefore, that the Disarmament Commission engage in even more thorough studies of the implications and consequences of theoretical and psychological war preparations as a concomitant of physical war preparations. Appropriate measures of the United Nations could considerably contribute to efforts to check the influence of such perilous doctrines on the political decisions of some States.

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9. A recommendation of the Disarmament Commission should therefore be included in its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session that the Commission be requested to attach due importance, during its next session, to doctrines of nuclear warfare, which is under item 4 of its present agenda.
ANNEX V

Agenda item 4 of the current session of the Commission
(A/CN.10/45)

Working paper: Non-aligned countries

1. The Disarmament Commission notes with deep concern that the recommendations and decisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) have not been implemented and that, in the five years since then, no real progress in the field of disarmament has been achieved. Furthermore, it is a matter of deep regret and concern that the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was not able to achieve its main objectives. Multilateral negotiations on priority items of disarmament as established by consensus in the Final Document have yet to start while bilateral negotiations have produced no discernible results. At the same time, the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, continues and even intensifies in both quantitative and qualitative terms. The growing accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear ones, far from contributing to international security, on the contrary, weakens it. Open threats, pressures and military interventions against independent States and violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations are taking place, posing the most serious threat to international peace and security. The conflicts in various parts of the world are intensifying; international tensions are on the rise; the differences between opposing military alliances are exacerbated. The sense of insecurity among all States is widespread. The arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, threatens also to stall the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of development, to become an obstacle on the road of achieving the new international economic order and to hinder the solution of other vital problems facing mankind.

2. The Disarmament Commission considers that the most urgent task is to halt and reverse the arms race and to undertake concrete measures of disarmament, particularly in its nuclear aspect. It reaffirms that disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, is a question of human survival. It reiterates that the renewed intensification of the nuclear arms race and the reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence have increased the risk of a nuclear war.

3. Guided by these considerations, the Disarmament Commission emphasizes the importance of the negotiation and adoption of effective measures for prevention of nuclear war as a matter of the highest priority and, in that context, adopts the following recommendations:

(a) All States are urged to contribute effectively to the strengthening of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In this context, the Committee on Disarmament, as a single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, should be enabled to fulfil its mandate to negotiate and adopt concrete measures of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament;

(b) In order to implement the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document, all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should urgently engage in multilateral negotiations to fulfil the priority tasks set forth in its Programme of Action;
(c) A comprehensive treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons should be speedily negotiated and concluded, since there are no more technical obstacles for its conclusion;

(d) Measures for the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament must take into account the security interests of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike;

(e) A convention on prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States should be urgently negotiated and adopted, pending effective measures of nuclear disarmament;

(f) Pending the adoption of such a convention, declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, collectively or individually, on non-first-use of nuclear weapons would be a means of strengthening the climate of confidence and a first step towards lessening the risk of nuclear conflict;

(g) A freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons should be immediately imposed;

(h) The nuclear weapons deployed by nuclear-weapon States outside their own territories should be withdrawn. In regions where the concentration of nuclear weapons has attained the most dangerous levels, as an interim measure, all tactical nuclear weapons in such regions should be urgently removed. No future deployments of any nuclear weapons should be carried out;

(i) The nuclear-weapon States should refrain from military manoeuvres in which nuclear energy is used for non-peaceful purposes, especially in situations where nuclear armaments are deployed in close proximity of States not possessing nuclear weapons, thus endangering their security;

(j) As an interim measure, the nuclear-weapon States should guarantee that non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. Negotiations should proceed without delay for the conclusion of an agreed international instrument of effective international arrangements to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States, without any discrimination, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(k) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements and/or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. Those agreements or arrangements should be fully complied with and nuclear-weapon States should effectively respect the status of such zones, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons;

(l) In order to prevent effectively the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States should abide by the commitments undertaken in relevant international treaties and adopt urgent measures for halting and reversing the nuclear arms race;

(m) Since the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects is a matter of universal concern, all States are jointly urged to take further steps to develop
an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory
basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

(a) The major nuclear-weapons States are urged to pursue their negotiations on
arms limitation and disarmament with greater vigour, and to keep the United Nations
informed of the progress achieved in those negotiations.

4. While nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, the following
recommendations on other important measures of disarmament should also be pursued:

(a) Efforts should be made to conclude without further delay a treaty on the
prohibition of chemical weapons. To this end, the Committee on Disarmament should
expedite its work and submit the draft treaty to the General Assembly at its
thirty-eighth session;

(b) The qualitative development of conventional weapons adds a new dimension
to the arms race, especially among States possessing the largest military
 arsenals. Therefore, conventional disarmament must be pursued within the framework
of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

(c) The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in a manner that
would ensure the right of each State to undiminished security. However, the policy
of massive arms supply based on false security claims of certain States in order to
obtain advantages over others as well as to enhance colonial domination and foreign
occupation leads to the perpetuation of intolerable situations and the exacerbation
of conflicts. Such a policy gravely endangers international peace and security and
should therefore be ended;

(d) The extension of the arms race into outer space should be prevented so
that outer space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes;

(e) The climate of confidence among nations would be significantly improved
in proceeding with effective reductions of armaments leading to their complete
elimination. The objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible
level of armaments;

(f) In the context of the World Disarmament Campaign measures should be
adopted in order that the public opinion would be aware of the unacceptability of a
world system based on the continued development, possession and deployment of
nuclear weapons.
ANNEX VI

Agenda Item 4 of the current session of the Commission
(A/CN.10/48)

Working paper: Mexico

1. The United Nations General Assembly, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), approved by consensus in 1978, defined a series of objectives, principles, priorities, measures and mechanisms which, taken together, constitute what could be called an excellent philosophy of disarmament.

2. However, even though the General Assembly itself emphasized the urgency of putting the provisions of the Final Document into practice and continuing along the path of obligatory and effective international agreements in matters of disarmament, it is an undeniable fact that almost all of those provisions have remained a dead letter up to the present time and that, during the five years that have elapsed since then, it has not been possible to conclude a single new treaty or convention on nuclear disarmament.

3. This is why it is necessary to resort to procedures that could make more effective those traditionally used in international negotiations. Perhaps one such procedure which might well be explored carefully in the light of some experiences that have already been fruitful is that of unilateral measures.

4. As will be recalled, the probable immediate precursor of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, signed in 1972, was the unilateral declaration made a short time earlier by the Government of the United States, announcing its intention to destroy all its stocks of such weapons.

5. Another significant example of unilateral measures is the one known as "voluntary suspension of nuclear-weapon tests", which was observed for almost three years, from the autumn of 1958 to the autumn of 1961.

6. For the necessary development of measures of this kind, it would undoubtedly be essential that the States concerned should be fully confident that the measures would not be harmful to their security. However, that does not seem difficult to achieve if there is reciprocal good will. Thus, for example, a State or group of States could initiate the process by announcing the unilateral adoption of a very modest disarmament measure, declaring in addition that, if there was no reciprocity within a reasonable period - say, six months - on the part of the corresponding State or States, they would annul the measure. They would make it known at the same time that, if reciprocity were shown, they would be prepared to expand the scope of the measures in question progressively and to a very considerable extent.

7. What has been said here constitutes merely a glimpse of the unsuspected advantages that may be found in this idea if it is properly explored.

8. For that reason, the delegation of Mexico believes it would be highly desirable that the report of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session should include, in connection with item 4 of the agenda of the Commission's current session, a paragraph reading as follows:
"The Disarmament Commission recommends to the General Assembly that it should request the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts and applying the methods customary in such cases, a report, to be submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, on the procedures that seem advisable for stimulating the adoption of unilateral disarmament measures which, without prejudice to the security of States, would come to promote and complement bilateral and multilateral negotiations in this sphere."
ANNEX VII


I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the answers given by Y. V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to the questions put by representatives of a number of Finnish public organizations, which were published in the newspaper Pravda on 11 May 1983.

The answers outline the position of the USSR concerning a number of questions discussed in the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

I request you, Sir, to have the text of these answers circulated as an official document of the Disarmament Commission.

(Signed) O. TROYANOFSKY

APPENDIX

Answers given by Y. V. Andropov to questions by representatives of a number of Finnish public organizations

1. Question: What are your proposals concerning nuclear disarmament and the removal of the dangerous situation in Europe and concerning the creation of a nuclear-free Europe?

2. Answer: The removal of the nuclear danger is the most important line of policy of the Soviet State. From the moment the first atomic bombs appeared, we have steadfastly striven for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. As early as 1946, we proposed the conclusion of an international convention under which nuclear weapons would be prohibited and nuclear energy would be used solely for peaceful purposes. It was not possible to achieve this at the time, through the fault of those who wished to retain an atomic monopoly for themselves.

3. In the years that followed, the Soviet Union persistently put forward, and it continues to put forward, proposals aimed at halting the growth of nuclear arsenals, reducing the risk of a nuclear conflict and ultimately making such a conflict totally impossible. Let me recall just a few of these proposals.

4. We propose halting the production of nuclear weapons and then gradually eliminating the stockpiles of such weapons. In order to start matters moving on a practical basis, we have advocated the preparation of a programme of stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament and have presented an appropriate document on the subject in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament.

5. Endeavouring to facilitate the reaching of agreements on the limitation of nuclear weapons and to take the first step to reduce such weapons, the USSR has
declared its readiness to agree to a mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals by all nuclear-weapon States or, as a start, by the Soviet Union and the United States alone. We also propose that for such time as the Soviet-United States negotiations are in progress, the medium-range nuclear weapons and the strategic weapons of the two sides should be frozen.

6. In the negotiations with the United States on strategic weapons, our side has proposed a substantial reduction, by more than one fourth, in the total number of strategic delivery vehicles, which would lead to the removal of more than 1,000 such vehicles from the arsenals of the two sides. The number of nuclear warheads would also be reduced to equal levels, which would be lower than the levels of today.

7. We propose that all test explosions of nuclear weapons should be immediately prohibited everywhere; this would make it more difficult to produce new kinds and types of such weapons. Pending the conclusion of an agreement on this point, we are prepared to declare, together with all nuclear-weapon States, a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, including peaceful explosions.

8. Lastly, the Soviet Union has unilaterally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and has called upon the other nuclear-weapon Powers to follow that example.

9. Now, concerning Europe. The best solution of the problem of nuclear armaments here would be the complete liberation of the European continent from both medium-term and tactical nuclear weapons. This is the real path to a nuclear-free Europe. This path must, of course, be followed by all States which have nuclear weapons in this area. Up to now, unfortunately, those to whom our proposal was addressed are acting as if it did not exist at all.

10. At the negotiations with the United States at Geneva, we also proposed the following variant: agreement on a radical reduction by both sides of their medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe - reducing the number on each side by about 1,000, to a level of 300 units. The Soviet Union is prepared for reductions which will leave it with only 162 missiles, that is to say, exactly the same number as are possessed today on the NATO side by the United Kingdom and France. The number of carrier aircraft would be fixed at equal low levels of 138 units each.

11. They say to us that this would leave the Soviet Union with more nuclear warheads on its missiles. Well, we are prepared to agree to equality of the nuclear potential of the two sides in Europe both in delivery vehicles and in warheads, taking into account, of course, the relevant weapons of the United Kingdom and France.

12. In other words, we propose that the USSR should have neither more missiles nor more warheads on the missiles than the NATO side has during each period to be determined by agreement. If the number of warheads on the United Kingdom and French missiles is reduced, an equal reduction will be made in the number of warheads on our medium-range missiles. The same approach would apply to airborne weapons of this class deployed in Europe. This would result in the maintenance of rough parity between the USSR and NATO both in medium-range nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles, that is to say, in missiles and aircraft, and in the number of warheads on them, and this parity would be at a much lower level than today.
13. I wish to emphasize especially that, if this new proposal were implemented, the result would be that in the European part of the Soviet Union there would be considerably fewer medium-range missiles and considerably fewer warheads on those missiles than up to 1976, when we did not have the SS-20 missiles.

14. The implementation of this proposal we have made would bring Europe much closer to complete liberation from both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons. Such a proposal can be rejected only by those who want to deploy new United States missiles in Western Europe at any cost and thereby to destroy the existing balance of forces both in Europe and at the global level. If this happened, the threat of war would come even closer to Europe's doorstep. We cannot permit this, and we shall take the necessary steps to ensure that parity is maintained.

15. **Question:** Do you support the creation of a nuclear-free zone, for example, in Northern Europe, and are you prepared to give security guarantees for such zones?

16. **Answer:** Yes, we support the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Northern Europe and in other parts of the European continent, since we regard them as an important means for strengthening the security of the European peoples.

17. We have unequivocally supported the proposal of Finland to make Northern Europe a nuclear-free zone. It is important, of course, that this zone should be truly free from nuclear weapons and that any loopholes that might permit their appearance there should be closed.

18. The Soviet Union, for its part, is prepared to undertake not to use nuclear weapons against Northern European States that will become participants in the zone. This can be arranged through the conclusion either of a multilateral agreement or of bilateral agreements with each of the States participating in the zone. Naturally, the security of these countries would be more reliably ensured if corresponding guarantees were also given by the nuclear States of NATO. But we shall not make this a condition for our undertaking.

19. Taking account of the wishes expressed in a number of Scandanavian countries, the USSR would also be prepared to consider the question of some measures — and they would be substantial measures — that would relate to its own territory adjacent to such a zone and would help to strengthen the nuclear-free status of Northern Europe.

20. In supporting the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the northern part of Europe, the Soviet Union has also declared its attitude favouring in principle the idea, proposed by the Government of Sweden, of creating in Central Europe a zone free from battlefield nuclear weapons.

21. I am convinced that the implementation of the aforementioned proposals for nuclear-free zones would promote the future liberation of all of Europe from nuclear weapons.

22. **Question:** If the nuclear Powers made declarations that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, what significance would those declarations have for the reduction of the danger of nuclear war?
23. **Answer:** We are firmly convinced that such declarations would make it easier to avert nuclear war by creating an atmosphere of profound trust in relations between States. And this is especially important in the present international situation.

24. The Soviet Union, as I have already said, has undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. If the USSR's example were followed by the other nuclear Powers, this would be tantamount in practice to a total renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. After all, if nobody uses them first, then there will be no second or third nuclear strike. Such an obligation would not require lengthy negotiations and agreements. The only thing necessary is good will and a sincere desire for peace. However, the United States and its NATO allies, continuing to rely on being the first to use nuclear weapons, are not inclined to follow the Soviet Union's example.

25. **Question:** Is the widespread and authentic movement for peace strengthening the security of peoples, and does it provide support for the disarmament negotiations being carried on between the USSR and the United States?

26. **Answer:** I am convinced that this is so. The massive anti-war movement is an important factor for peace. Statesmen and Governments cannot afford to ignore it if they value the opinion of their peoples and, in this sense, the peace movement is unquestionably exerting an influence on the arms-limitation negotiations.
ANNEX VIII

Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4

I. Recommendation No. 1

All States are urged to contribute effectively to the strengthening of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In this context, all States members of the Committee on Disarmament should do everything possible to ensure that the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, [is able to] fulfil its mandate to negotiate and adopt concrete measures of disarmament ...

Proposals concerning the last line:

(a) "... of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament and other priority matters."

(b) "... of disarmament, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament."

Recommendation No. 2

In order to implement the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should urgently engage in [multilateral] negotiations to fulfil the priority tasks set forth in its Programme of Action.

Proposals concerning the above text:

(a) The fourth line should read "... engage in bilateral and multilateral ..."

(b) Last line should be amended to read "... Programme of Action, especially those measures relating to nuclear disarmament contained therein."

Recommendation No. 3

Proposed texts:

(a) [A comprehensive treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons] [A comprehensive treaty on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States] [A comprehensive treaty on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process] [A comprehensive nuclear-test ban] should be speedily negotiated and concluded, [since it is generally agreed that there are no more technical obstacles for its conclusion] [overcoming any technical obstacles there may be for its conclusion]

(b) [A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty should be negotiated and concluded within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process]

(c) [A treaty on a nuclear-test ban should be speedily negotiated and concluded]
(d) Text to be added at the end of recommendation No. 3:

[Declarations should be collectively or individually made by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions for the time until a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is concluded.] [Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the two major nuclear Powers which conducted the most of nuclear explosions are called on to stop immediately their nuclear tests in order to facilitate the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and other nuclear disarmament measures]

Recommendation No. 4

Measures for the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament must take into account the security interests of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike;

Recommendation No. 5

[A convention on prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States should be urgently negotiated and adopted, pending effective measures of nuclear disarmament;]

Recommendation No. 6

[Pending the adoption of such a convention, declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, collectively or individually, on non-first-use of nuclear weapons would be a means of strengthening the climate of confidence and a first step towards lessening the risk of nuclear conflict;]

Text proposed as an alternative to recommendations 5 and 6

[Reaffirming the prohibition of the threat or use of force under the Charter of the United Nations, States should commit themselves, collectively or individually, never to be the first to use any weapon, nuclear or conventional, except in exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.]

Additional recommendations a/

[Pending more effective measures of nuclear disarmament, States should co-operate in the development of a comprehensive set of measures for the prevention of nuclear war and of all armed conflict. These should include a wide array of confidence-building measures, including measures relating to nuclear weapons, to be negotiated in appropriate frameworks, for regional or global application.]

Recommendation No. 7

(a) [A freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons should be immediately imposed, as a first step to the reduction and, eventually the elimination of nuclear arsenals]

(b) [It is of paramount importance for the nuclear Powers which possess the largest nuclear arsenals to take the lead in halting and reversing the nuclear arms race between them and reducing drastically their existing nuclear arsenals so as to create propitious conditions for all the nuclear States to further adopt nuclear]
disarmament measures, including a freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons;]

(c) [Negotiations should be conducted and concluded which would lead to substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. These reductions must be mutual, balanced and verifiable.]

Recommendation No. 8

(a) [The nuclear weapons deployed by nuclear-weapon States outside their own territories should be withdrawn. In regions where the concentration of nuclear weapons has attained the most dangerous levels, as an interim measure, all tactical nuclear weapons in such regions should be urgently removed. No future deployments of any nuclear weapons should be carried out;]

(b) [In regions where an accumulation of military forces exist, these should be reduced in a mutual, balanced and verifiable manner.]

Recommendation No. 9

[The nuclear-weapon States should refrain from military manoeuvres in which nuclear energy is used for non-peaceful purposes, especially in situations where nuclear armaments are deployed in close proximity of States not possessing nuclear weapons, thus endangering their security]

Recommendation No. 10

Text proposed by the Chairman

Bearing in mind that the nuclear-weapon States should guarantee that non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons and unilateral declarations made in this context, negotiations should proceed without delay for the conclusion of an agreed international instrument of effective international arrangements to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States, without any discrimination, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

Proposals concerning the above text:

(a) In line 4, delete "all"

(b) In lines 4 and 5, delete "without any discrimination"

Recommendation No. 11

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements and/or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. Those agreements or arrangements should be fully complied with and the effective respect for the status of such zones by nuclear-weapon States should be subject to adequate verification procedures thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.
Recommendation No. 12

All States should co-operate to prevent effectively the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. States should fully implement all the provisions of relevant international treaties to which they are parties. Nuclear-weapon States in particular should urgently adopt effective measures for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race.

Recommendation No. 13

Since the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects is a matter of universal concern, all States are jointly urged to take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

Recommendation No. 14

(a) [The major nuclear-weapon States are urged to pursue their negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament with greater vigour, and to keep the United Nations informed of the progress achieved in these negotiations;]

(b) [All States, in particular the major nuclear-weapon States are urged to pursue their negotiations on arms limitations and disarmament with vigour, and to keep the United Nations appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations;]

Recommendation No. 15

[The Commission taking into account that doctrines [of nuclear warfare] [on the possession and use of nuclear weapons] represent an essential part of preparation for nuclear war and seriously hamper negotiations on nuclear disarmament recommends the General Assembly to request the Disarmament Commission, during its next session, to attach due importance to the dangers of doctrines [of nuclear warfare] [on the possession and use of nuclear weapons].]

II. Introductory sentence

While nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, the following recommendations on other priority measures of disarmament [should] [could] be pursued [concurrently]:

Recommendation No. 1

Efforts should be made to conclude urgently a treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons. To this end, the Committee on Disarmament should expedite its work with a view to presenting a draft treaty to the United Nations General Assembly without further delay.

Recommendation No. 2

The qualitative development and the growing accumulation of conventional weapons [in many parts of the world] add a new dimension to the arms race, especially among States possessing the largest military arsenals. Therefore,
conventional disarmament should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament.

**Recommendation No. 3**

The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in a manner that would ensure the right of each State to undiminished security. However, massive arms supply to States that base their security on false claims in order to obtain advantages over others as well as to enhance colonial domination and foreign occupation leads to the perpetuation of intolerable situations and the exacerbation of conflicts and gravely endangers international peace and security and should therefore be ended.

**Recommendation No. 4**

The extension of [the] [an] arms race into outer space should be prevented through further measures and appropriate international negotiations and the use of outer space [exclusively] for peaceful purposes should be [promoted] [ensured].

**Recommendation No. 5**

[In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, refrain from actions [and programmes aimed at arms build-up] which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements. The climate of confidence among nations would be significantly improved with agreements on measures for halting the arms race and effective reductions of armaments leading to their complete elimination. The objective at each stage of this process of disarmament should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments.]

**Recommendation No. 6**

**Proposed texts:**

(a) [In the context of the World Disarmament Campaign measures should be adopted in order that the public in all regions of the world have access to a broad range of information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament, and the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war [to facilitate informed choices about these vital questions] [concerning efforts to halt and reverse the arms race]. Such a campaign should promote public interest in and support for the goals set out in the paragraphs referred to above and in particular for the reaching of agreements on measures of arms limitation and disarmament with a view to achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.]

(b) [In the context of the World Disarmament Campaign measures should be adopted in order that public opinion would be aware of the unacceptability of a world system based on the continued development, possession and deployment of nuclear weapons. Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to]
concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.]

Recommendation No. 7

Proposed texts:

(a) [The Disarmament Commission recommends to the General Assembly that it should request the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts and applying the methods customary in such cases, a report, to be submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, on the procedures that seem advisable for stimulating the adoption of unilateral disarmament measures which, without prejudice to the security of States, would come to promote and complement bilateral and multilateral negotiations in this sphere.]

(b) [The Disarmament Commission requests the Secretary-General to refer to the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies the possibility of preparing, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts and applying the methods customary in such cases, a report, to be submitted to the Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, on the procedures that seem advisable for stimulating the adoption of unilateral disarmament measures which, without prejudice to the security of States, would come to promote and complement bilateral and multilateral negotiations in this sphere, and to report on the feasibility of this proposal and the priority to be accorded to it and to report to the Secretary-General in time for the matter to be considered by the Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.]

Notes

a/ The placement of this recommendation is yet to be determined.
ANNEX IX

Working paper: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
(A/CN.10/1983/WG.1/WP.1)

1. An agreed and balanced reduction of military expenditures will only be possible if it is based on the principles of transparency and comparability.

2. Transparency and comparability can best be achieved through the regular availability of significant and reliable data on military expenditures in a standardized reporting format suitable for international comparison.

3. To this end, a systematic use by an increasing number of States of the standardized international reporting instrument established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B of 12 December 1980 is an important first step.

4. The elaboration of agreed methods for measuring and comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between countries representing different regions and different budgeting systems is a necessary condition for meaningful negotiations on balanced reductions of military budgets.

5. The gradual reduction of military expenditures should be subject to strict and effective verification. The agreements to reduce military expenditures should, therefore, contain adequate measures of verification, satisfactory to all parties, in order to ensure that the provisions are strictly applied and fulfilled by all States parties. For such agreements the use of the reporting instrument constitutes a necessary precondition, although not sufficient in itself.
1. Given the speedy rise in military expenditures, urgent measures are necessary to stop the increase of such appropriations and to reduce them subsequently. Therefore, negotiations on this subject should be commenced without delay.

2. As proposed in the Political Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, adopted on 5 January 1983 (A/38/67), they have called on NATO countries to seek practical agreement on a non-increase of military expenditures and on their subsequent cut in percentage or absolute terms, and suggested the immediate opening of direct negotiations between the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO member States. Earlier proposals for a non-increase and a substantial cut in military expenditures remain valid.

3. Any agreement on this issue must, of course, apply to all States with major military potentials.

4. The means released as a result of such reduction would be used to promote economic and social development, including assistance to the developing countries in this respect.

5. Negotiations on the non-increase and reduction of military expenditures must be commenced without any pre-conditions.

6. Those negotiations are to be conducted in good faith by the parties concerned.

7. Conceptions of openness and transparency of military expenditure data developed in a certain group of States are aimed at detracting attention from effective disarmament measures.

8. To hold a data discussion as such within the United Nations framework, however, would lead us into futile and lengthy disputes without bringing about any progress in the vital field of disarmament. It is almost impossible to solve the practical and theoretical problems involved.

(a) Data on armaments belonging to different social systems are not exactly comparable. Scientists would, presumably, have to work for decades to achieve tangible results. The existing global figures on military forces and armaments are completely sufficient for the conclusion of effective agreements on that subject;

(b) The sovereignty of States and national specifics are to be respected. The vast majority of States publish global data. On the other hand, no country, not even those States which at the first glance seem to publish some details more than it is international custom, officially informs about such consequences as the economic burden caused by armaments, the decrease of economic growth, increase of inflation, unemployment, etc.;

(c) Even the figures being published by a small number of States advocating openness and comparability do not coincide with their actual expenditures on armaments. It has repeatedly been proved that officially registered appropriations
for armaments sometimes deviate from the real expenditures, including those indirectly allocated to armaments, by up to 20 per cent.

(d) Armaments-producing corporations in countries of the so-called free market economy are not only financed by the State but also by private loans and credits. Thus, constantly a higher amount is made available for financing armaments. Sometimes those amounts are of considerable size. If some countries suggest discussion of a far-reaching transparency and openness of military data, those invisible financial sources have to be disclosed since they are typical of so-called free market economies.

9. The suggested reporting system at best can bring about a certain comparability of the budgets of States with equal social systems. It is impossible to compare expenditures on armaments when monopoly prices are typical of one country and the prices of a socialist planned economy of the other. Efforts to compare these prices are practically destined to fail.

CONCLUSIONS

The halting of the increase of military expenditures and their subsequent reduction cannot be achieved by entering into endless abstract data discussions on military budgets. Instead, it is timely to concentrate on practical steps towards initiating sincere negotiations. The only prerequisite to do so is the presence of the political good will of all States concerned.
ANNEX XI

Working paper on principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures: Romania and Sweden (A/CN.10/26)

1. In its resolution 35/142 A of 12 December 1980, the General Assembly requested the Disarmament Commission to identify and elaborate on the principles which should govern the further action of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

2. The adoption of these principles could represent a practical contribution of the United Nations to the efforts to create the necessary conditions for negotiations of agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures.

3. The principles should reflect the common understanding of States as to their objectives in the field of freezing and reducing military expenditures. They should also define concrete ways and means to reach these objectives, taking into account political and security concerns of States. The elaboration of such principles could contribute to the efforts to narrow down the different approaches in this field and to create confidence among States and thereby to promote their political will to start negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. The principles should be negotiated with the participation of all States and adopted by consensus.

4. The nature of the document to be negotiated should be established at an appropriate moment with the agreement of all States. In the view of Romania and Sweden the document could have the form of a United Nations declaration.

5. The basic ideas provided for in this document are taken from the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), adopted by consensus, as well as from other United Nations documents.

6. It is recalled that the elaboration of a set of general principles to govern the conduct of States in this field should be regarded as complementary to ongoing United Nations efforts to settle unresolved problems relating to a system for reporting and comparing military expenditures, including adequate verification measures acceptable to all parties, with the objective of facilitating progress towards freezing and reducing military expenditures. The reaching of an agreement on these problems at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would constitute an important United Nations achievement.

7. Desiring to contribute to the process of identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern the activities of States in the field of freezing and reducing military expenditures, the delegations of Romania and Sweden hereby submit the following draft to the Disarmament Commission:

"The General Assembly,

"Convinced that the accumulation of armaments, in particular nuclear weapons, constitutes a continuous threat to peace and international security
and thereby also the independence of States, stimulates the use of force and
the threat thereof in international relations and endangers the very survival
of mankind,

"Profoundly concerned about the constant acceleration of the arms race
and military expenditures which, besides their potential threat to
international peace and security, absorb enormous human and material
resources, constituting thus a heavy burden on the economies of all States,

"Reaffirming the provisions of the Final Document of the First Special
Session devoted to disarmament, which states that the gradual reduction of
military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures
or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and
other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute
to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of
reallocating of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and
social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

"Convinced that agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued
on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening
peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction
of armed forces and armaments, taking into account the need of States to
protect their security and the need to ensure balance at each stage and
undiminished security of all States,

"Recalling its resolutions 34/83 F and 35/142 A on the necessity to give
new impetus to the efforts to reach agreements to freeze and reduce military
expenditures, as well as its resolutions 33/67 and 35/142 B on the
continuation of the process of examining certain technical aspects concerning
the comparability of the military expenditures and measures to verify future
agreements in this field,

"Desiring to contribute to creating the necessary conditions for
substantive progress towards genuine negotiations with a view to reaching
agreement on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures,

"Solemnly declares the following:

"1. Concerted efforts should be made with the objective of concluding
international agreements to freeze and reduce military budgets, including
adequate verification measures acceptable to all parties. Such agreements
should result in genuine reductions of armaments and armed forces of States
parties with the aim of strengthening international peace and security at the
lowest possible level of military forces and armaments;

"2. Pending the conclusion of agreements to freeze and reduce military
expenditures all States should exercise self-restraint in such expenditures;

"3. The freezing and reduction of military expenditures should be
implemented in a balanced and equitable manner in order to ensure the right of
all States to undiminished security;
5. Together with the process of freezing and reducing military expenditures, measures should be undertaken to ensure that the resources released as a result shall be reallocated, in a planned and systematic manner, to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries. The Disarmament Commission should make concrete recommendations in this regard, taking into account the report of the recent United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development as well as any specific proposals and views that may be submitted by Member States.

6. At its current session the Commission can make a valuable contribution to the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament by carrying out a further elaboration of the main areas identified in this working paper, namely, concrete measures for the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, in stages, based on the principles and guidelines already established by consensus; and a programme for the reallocation of the resources released as a result to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries. A debate on the principles which would govern the actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures would only serve to reopen issues that have already been settled and delay the adoption of practical and concrete steps in this field, particularly by those States who have the primary responsibility for disarmament.
ANNEX XIII

Working paper: Chairman's suggestions concerning principles and ideas which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures (A/CN.10/1983/WG.1/WP.2)

1. Concerted efforts should be made by all States, in particular by those States with the largest military arsenals, and by the appropriate negotiating forums, with the objective of concluding international agreements to freeze and reduce military budgets, including adequate verification measures acceptable to all parties. Such agreements should contribute to genuine reductions of armed forces and armaments of States parties, with the aim of strengthening international peace and security at lower levels of armed forces and armaments.

2. All efforts in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures should take into account the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2).

3. Pending the conclusion of agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures, all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, should exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures.

4. The reduction of military expenditures should be implemented gradually and in a balanced manner, either on a percentage or on an absolute basis mutually agreed, as to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage, and without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, to sovereignty and to undertake the necessary measures of self-defence.

5. The freezing and reduction of military budgets should be achieved in accordance with the principle of the greatest responsibility. Therefore, the freezing and reduction of the military budgets should be implemented in stages, beginning with nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States.

6. Human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures should be devoted to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

7. Negotiations on freezing and reduction of military budgets would be facilitated by the elaboration of agreed methods of comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between different countries, as well as by using an agreed instrument for reporting in a standardized manner the actual military budgets.

8. In the process of negotiations on freezing and reduction of military budgets, a reasonable amount of data on the military budgets should be made available by the participating States. In this respect, the participating States may use the standardized international reporting instrument established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B or any other methods agreed among them.
9. Each State party to an agreement of reduction of military expenditures will identify armaments and military activities which will be subject to physical reductions within the limits provided for in the agreement.

10. Agreements on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures should be subject to strict and efficient verification. The agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures should contain adequate measures of verification, satisfactory to all parties, in order to ensure that their provisions are strictly applied and fulfilled by all States parties.

11. Unilateral measures undertaken by States concerning the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, especially when they are followed by similar measures adopted by other States on the basis of mutual example, could contribute to favourable conditions for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures.

12. Confidence-building measures could help to create a political climate conducive to freezing and reduction of military expenditures.

13. The United Nations should play a central role in orienting, stimulating and initiating negotiations on freezing and reducing military expenditures, and all Member States should co-operate with the Organization as among themselves, with a view to solving the problems implied by this process.

14. The freezing and reduction of military expenditures may be achieved, as appropriate, on a global, regional or subregional level, with the agreement of all States concerned.

15. The agreements on freezing and reduction of military budgets should be interrelated with measures of disarmament, within the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The reduction of military budgets should therefore be complementary to agreements of the limitation of armaments and disarmament and should not be considered as a substitute for such agreements.

16. This declaration should be regarded as a firm political commitment to start negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures as soon as possible.
ANNEX XIV

Nuclear capability of South Africa
(A/CN.10/43)

Working paper presented by Mauritius on behalf of the African States members of the Disarmament Commission

Conclusions and recommendations on agenda item 6

1. Against the background of the sovereign right of all peoples to self-determination and independence enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the establishment and perpetuation of a racist minority régime in South Africa over the majority of the population represent not only an illegal act but also criminal and immoral conduct.

2. South Africa's adoption of apartheid, an institutionalized form of racial discrimination, as an instrument of public policy runs counter to the human rights provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its objective of universality of membership through decolonization. As a result, South Africa's policy of apartheid has been and remains universally condemned as a crime against humanity and a challenge to international conscience.

3. It has become clear that, in its isolation and desperation as an international pariah, the Pretoria régime has resorted to a frenzied pursuit of a military option as an instrument of internal oppression and external aggression. The pursuit of its military capability in the direction of increased sophistication and ominous dimensions placed emphasis on the development and acquisition of nuclear weaponry, which has been made possible through the active nuclear collaboration with it by certain member countries.

4. In the event, the issue of South Africa's nuclear capability has been brought to international attention and included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission since its first substantive session in 1979 at the instance of the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid (A/CN.10/4) following the conclusion of the United Nations seminar on nuclear collaboration with South Africa held in London in February 1979 (S/13157).

5. In consideration of the item, the Commission affirms the conviction already established by consensus in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) that the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as possible acquisition by them of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm. It is therefore essential for purposes of disarmament to prevent any further acquisition of arms or arms technology by such régimes, especially through strict adherence by all States to the relevant decisions of the Security Council. In this connection, the Security Council should assume its full responsibility.

6. The Commission is of the firm view that nuclear weapons in the possession of racist régimes can become instruments of public policy, state terrorism and blackmail and thus portend danger to international peace and security. It
therefore notes with grave concern the danger and serious threat which the established capability of South Africa to produce nuclear weapons and its reported development of a cruise missile and various delivery systems in collaboration with Israel pose to the security of African States as well as to international peace and security.

7. The Commission notes that the overt evidence concerning the two nuclear events of July 1977 in the Kalahari Desert and 22 September 1979 in the South Atlantic in particular and other data, including the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field (A/35/402 and Corr.1) have caused legitimate and particular concern to the African States and the international community in general, the more so since this nuclear capability has been put at the service of the abhorrent policy of apartheid.

8. The Commission, in fulfilment of its mandate, considers it its responsibility to alert the General Assembly, and through it the Security Council, to the deleterious consequences of South Africa's capability to produce nuclear weapons and its actual possession of nuclear weapons and their implications on the security perception of African States, international peace and security, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the collective decision of the African States regarding the denuclearization of Africa.

9. The Commission considers it at variance with the declared principles of international law relating to the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States to allow, enable and encourage South Africa to continue its policy of aggression and destabilization against the countries of the African continent through the development of a nuclear-weapon capability which has been achieved through collaboration in the military and nuclear fields with certain Western countries and Israel in particular.

10. The Commission holds the view that the current exploitation of Namibian uranium by South Africa violates the accepted principle of international law which recognizes a people's sovereignty over its natural resources for the benefit of its socio-economic development. It further holds the view that South Africa should not be allowed to continue its illegal exploitation of Namibian uranium, which strengthens its nuclear base and hence reinforces its policy of apartheid.

11. The Commission recommends to the General Assembly to call on Israel to terminate forthwith its nuclear collaboration with South Africa and urges the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, among others, to desist, in the interest of peace and stability in Africa and in the world, from further collaboration in the nuclear field with South Africa.

12. The Commission recommends to the General Assembly to take suitable decisions to ensure that South Africa's nuclear power plant is dismantled and that its nuclear programme, designed to further its nuclear-weapon capability, is discontinued.

13. The Commission recommends to the General Assembly to request the Security Council to take mandatory action by extending and enforcing its arms embargo against South Africa to include a ban on any nuclear collaboration with South Africa, such as supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology, computers, and so on, and termination of existing and future nuclear contracts, loans, technical assistance, foreign aid and investments in South Africa which help to sustain its intransigence and enhance its nuclear capability.
ANNEX XV

Nuclear capability of South Africa
(A/CN.10/43/Rev.1)

Working paper presented by Mauritius on behalf of the African
States members of the Disarmament Commission

Conclusions and recommendations on agenda item 6

1. Against the background of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter
of the United Nations, in particular the sovereign right of all peoples to
self-determination and independence, the establishment and perpetuation of a racist
minority régime in South Africa over the majority of the population represent not
only a violation of the relevant principles of international law but also criminal
conduct.

2. South Africa's adoption of apartheid, an institutionalized form of racial
discrimination, as an instrument of policy runs counter to the human rights
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its objective of universality
of membership through decolonization. As a result, South Africa's policy of
apartheid has been and remains condemned as a crime against humanity by the
overwhelming majority of States and a challenge to international conscience by the
Security Council itself.

3. It has become clear that, in its isolation and desperation as an international
pariah, the Pretoria régime has resorted to a frenzied pursuit of a military option
as an instrument of internal oppression and external aggression. The pursuit of
its military capability in the direction of increased sophistication and ominous
dimensions placed emphasis on the development and acquisition of nuclear weaponry,
which has been made possible through the active nuclear collaboration with it by
certain Western countries, Israel as well as transnational corporations.

4. In the event, the issue of South Africa's nuclear capability has been brought
to international attention by resolution 34/76 B and included in the agenda of the
Disarmament Commission since its first substantive session in 1979 at the instance
of the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid (A/CN.10/4) following
the conclusion of the United Nations seminar on nuclear collaboration with
South Africa held in London in February 1979 (S/13157).

5. In consideration of the item, the Commission affirms the conviction already
established by consensus in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the
General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) that the massive accumulation of armaments and
the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as possible
acquisition by them of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly
dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm. It
is therefore essential for purposes of disarmament to prevent any further
acquisition of arms or arms technology by such régimes, especially through strict
adherence by all States to the relevant decisions of the Security Council.

6. The Commission is of the firm view that nuclear weapons in the possession of
racist régimes can become an instrument of policy for State terrorism, aggression
and blackmail and thus increase the danger to international peace and security. It therefore notes with grave concern the danger and serious threat which the established technical capability of South Africa to produce nuclear weapons and the necessary means of delivery pose to the security of African States as well as to international peace and security. This concern is further increased by the reported development by South Africa of a cruise missile, a neutron bomb and various delivery systems in collaboration with Israel.

7. The Commission notes that the discovery of a reported nuclear-weapon-test site in the Kalahari Desert in 1977, the 22 September 1979 event in the South Atlantic in particular and other data, including the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field (A/35/402 and Corr.1), have caused legitimate and particular concern to the African States and the international community in general, the more so since this nuclear capability has been put at the service of the abhorrent policy of apartheid.

8. The Commission, in fulfilment of its mandate, considers it its responsibility to alert the General Assembly, and through it the Security Council, to the deleterious consequences of South Africa's capability to produce nuclear weapons and its possession of nuclear weapons and their implications on the security perception of African States, international peace and security, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the collective decision of the African States regarding the denuclearization of Africa.

9. The Commission considers it at variance with the declared principles of international law relating to the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States to allow, enable and assist, directly or indirectly, South Africa to continue its policy of aggression and destabilization against the countries of the African continent through the development of a nuclear-weapon capability which has been achieved mainly through collaboration in the military and nuclear fields with certain Western countries, Israel and transnational corporations.

10. The Commission holds the view that the current exploitation of Namibian uranium by South Africa and transnational corporations violates the principle of international law which recognizes a people's permanent sovereignty over its natural resources for the benefit of its socio-economic development. It further holds the view that South Africa should not be allowed to continue its illegal exploitation of Namibian uranium - made possible through its illegal occupation of Namibia - which strengthens its nuclear base and hence reinforces its policy of apartheid.

11. Given the very nature of the racist régime of South Africa, the Disarmament Commission believes that it is the responsibility of the international community to ensure that effective and concrete measures are taken to stop the development of South Africa's nuclear-weapon programme. To this end, the Commission recommends the following:

(a) It is an urgent necessity that the intolerable policy of apartheid be terminated. In this connection, all States have the duty and responsibility to contribute to the strengthening of United Nations efforts for the attainment of this goal. States which still have relations with South Africa have a particular obligation towards the achievement of this objective by availing themselves of all the means at their disposal to prevail upon South Africa to adopt a conduct in
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations;

(b) Considering that no decision has been taken by the Security Council since 1978 to give effect to the provisions contained in paragraph 12 of the Final Document, adopted by consensus (see para. 5 above), the Disarmament Commission recommends to the General Assembly to request the Council, in assuming its full responsibility, to take urgent and appropriate measures in this regard by, inter alia, enforcing and extending its arms embargo against South Africa to cover the nuclear aspects;

(c) In the interest of global peace and security and the security and stability of Africa in particular, the Commission recommends that all States should respect their obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and desist from any co-operation with South Africa which would strengthen the already established technical capability of South Africa to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States which collaborate with South Africa in the nuclear and military fields must accept joint responsibility with that country for endangering the peace and security of the region and the world;

(d) The Commission recommends that all States should consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965 which endorsed the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted in 1964 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. To this end, the Commission recommends that the Assembly should request the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective;

(e) Given the military and nuclear aspects of the criminal policy and the aggressive practices of the South African racist régime, which endanger regional and international peace and security and stability, the Disarmament Commission recommends that Israel and those Western industrialized States which have assisted and/or are assisting South Africa in establishing its nuclear capability should now prevail upon it to comply with the relevant resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, particularly those regarding acceptance of a binding nuclear non-proliferation commitment and the placement of all its nuclear facilities and installations under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Those States should seek to adopt and/or endorse specific, practical, time-limited, individual and collective measures that would enhance implementation;

(f) The Commission recommends further that the Secretary-General should follow closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and report regularly to the General Assembly on the progress of these recommendations and on all new developments which would require the attention of the international community.
ANNEX XVI

Possible elements for concrete recommendations concerning agenda item 6 on the question of South Africa's nuclear capability (A/CN.10/53)

Working paper: Federal Republic of Germany

1. The following elements for concrete recommendations are put forward at the request of the Chairman, who has expressed the wish to see additional draft texts of a possible consensus nature at this time. These elements do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Republic of Germany in full. The elements also seek to reflect a number of suggestions resulting from informal contacts with other delegations. The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany reserves the possibility to amplify its proposals at a later date.

2. The Disarmament Commission might recommend that the General Assembly request:

(a) South Africa to terminate forthwith its apartheid policy, an institutionalized system of racial discrimination, by setting in motion a process of peaceful change in favour of the oppressed majority and for the benefit of all sections of the population;

(b) All States to contribute to the attainment of this goal to the best of their ability;

(c) South Africa to refrain from any acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, not to acquire control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly, not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to conduct the explosion of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in Africa or elsewhere;

(d) South Africa to adhere without delay to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to place all its nuclear facilities under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(e) South Africa to practice transparency and openness in its military affairs, in order to allow for an unimpeded and full assessment of its activities in the nuclear field by the international community and, in particular, by its neighbouring States;

(f) All States to refrain, in line with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, from any co-operation with South Africa involving sensitive nuclear technology or special nuclear material which would lead to the creation or strengthening of a capability on the part of that country to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(g) All States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

(h) The Secretary-General to follow closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report to the General Assembly whenever new developments require the attention of the international community.
ANNEX XVII

Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level
(A/CN.10/42)

Working paper: Federal Republic of Germany

Draft conclusions of the Working Group of the Disarmament Commission at its 1983 session on the subject of the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global and regional level, to be included in its report to be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session

1. In resolution 37/100 D of 13 December 1982, adopted by consensus at its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly requested the Disarmament Commission "to consider the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level". The Disarmament Commission was further requested "to submit a progress report on its deliberations on this item to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session".

2. The Disarmament Commission was agreed that the comprehensive study of the Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence-building Measures, a/ the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), the reaffirmation of the latter by the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session (A/S-12/32), the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the proposals made to the General Assembly by individual countries b/ afford a suitable basis for its deliberations. The following points were considered to be of particular relevance:

(a) The fact that the concept of confidence-building measures is enshrined in paragraphs 24 and 93 of the Final Document, the latter paragraph stating that "in order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States";

(b) The General Assembly's repeated affirmations since the first special session devoted to disarmament of its support for the world-wide implementation of confidence-building measures and its recommendations to consider the possible introduction of such measures in individual regions with a view to enhancing security between States and facilitating progress in arms control and disarmament;

(c) The large degree of agreement on the concept of confidence-building measures achieved within the Group of Governmental Experts, whose members came from all parts of the world, as well as the illustrative list of concrete measures unanimously proposed by that Group.

3. The Working Group was agreed that in its deliberations it must seek to give the greatest possible substance to the concept of confidence-building in order to
promote the implementation of concrete measures in various regions, in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly, and to render those measures more effective. It pointed out that the different regions of the world have different kinds of problems specific to each region, and that the initiation of any confidence-building measures must be preceded by an adequate and careful consideration of the political, military and other conditions prevailing in the respective regions. With regard to the substance of the guidelines to be elaborated, it was agreed that the study of the Group of Governmental Experts afforded a highly suitable basis since it was most detailed and precise.

4. In view of the limited time available for the consideration of this item, the Commission decided to concentrate during its substantive session in 1983 on a general approach to the question of guidelines for confidence-building measures. However, it is intended to elaborate, as a next step, specific guidelines for a number of measures deemed to be especially suitable and of undeniable importance to international security. It was agreed that the following principles and guidelines were of fundamental importance to the building of confidence among States:

(a) **Objectives and purposes of confidence-building measures**

(i) The ultimate objective of confidence-building measures is to strengthen international peace and security and to contribute to the development of confidence, better understanding and more stable relations between nations, thus improving the conditions for the prevention or the settlement of political crises and armed conflicts and for progress in arms control and disarmament;

(ii) The immediate goal of confidence-building measures is to reduce or eliminate the causes of insecurity, mistrust, fear, tensions and hostilities, which are major contributory factors of the international arms build-up and political instability in general;

(iii) One of the major causes of insecurity, mistrust, fear, tensions and hostilities is a lack of reliable information on the military activities of other States and other matters related to mutual security. The destabilization caused by insufficient knowledge about opposing military forces is often aggravated by subjective misconceptions and a resulting lack of trust concerning the intentions of States. Consequently, one of the main purposes of confidence-building measures is to facilitate the exchange of information on military activities and other matters pertaining to mutual security, thereby augmenting openness, transparency and mutual calculability in security matters;

(iv) All means of enhancing communication and information are thus of particular importance. The publication and exchange of information on military strength, structures and activities, as well as regular personal contacts and the establishment of appropriate channels of communication at all levels of political and military decision-making, should be encouraged with a view to achieving a more accurate and reliable reciprocal assessment of security matters and a better understanding of mutual concerns;

(v) Confidence-building measures can thus help to create a political and psychological climate in which the tendency towards a competitive arms
build-up will be reduced and the importance of the military element will gradually diminish. This can greatly facilitate genuine progress in arms control and disarmament negotiations ultimately aimed at general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

(vi) Another purpose of confidence-building measures is to facilitate the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. While the implementation of verification measures does, of course, have a confidence-building effect of its own, confidence-building measures cannot, however, replace verification measures, which are an inseparable and indispensable part of genuine arms control and disarmament;

(vii) Apart from improving information and communication, confidence-building measures can go a step further and, under appropriate circumstances, place certain constraints on military options without impairing the overall military potential, thus ensuring that existing potentials cannot be used for aggressive purposes. Such mutual constraints could, for example, take the form of limitations of military activities, including measures of verification;

(viii) In this way confidence-building measures can inhibit political decisions to use military force contrary to the rules of international law;

(ix) While confidence-building measures can help to bring about progress in arms control and disarmament, they cannot, however, replace measures which would directly limit and reduce military potentials;

(b) Principles and characteristics

(i) States must decide freely and in the exercise of their sovereignty whether a confidence-building process is to be initiated and, if so, which measures are to be taken and how the process is to be pursued;

(ii) Strict observance of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, such as the renunciation of the use or threat of use of force, and other relevant instruments of international law is both a prerequisite and a fundamental source of confidence-building;

(iii) In order to maintain and strengthen the security of States and build confidence it is essential to observe the principles of equality and undiminished security between those participating in the confidence-building process;

(iv) Confidence-building is a process based on certainty and experience with regard to the conduct of States in specific situations. It is therefore only on concrete actions which can be examined, assessed and verified that confidence can be founded. This implies that neither declarations of intent nor a reiteration of generally recognized principles nor mere pledges of future conduct satisfy the exigencies of removing perceptions of threat and suspicion;

(v) A specific measure will become all the more effective, the better it is attuned to the perception of a particular threat or the confidence requirements of a given situation;
The seriousness, credibility and reliability of a State's commitment to confidence-building can only be demonstrated by the continuous, regular and full implementation of confidence-building measures;

In the progressive building of confidence it should be a general rule to proceed from less to more restraining measures until there is a comprehensive network of confidence-building measures that provides the sound basis on which more extensive agreements in the field of international security can be reached;

As many, if not most, problems of security and the perceptions thereof derive from regional factors and elements, a regional approach to confidence-building is both desirable and feasible;

An arrangement between two or more neighbouring States can serve as the nucleus of a regional arrangement, in that it is gradually extended by the accession of other States;

Stressing the importance of the regional approach does not signify, however, that efforts towards a wider global approach should be neglected;

Once the confidence-building process in a particular region has been consolidated, consideration should be given to enhancing the gain in regional security thus achieved by broadening the geographical scope of suitable confidence-building measures to form interregional arrangements;

Development and perspectives

One possible method of developing confidence-building measures is to enhance the quantity and quality of military information exchanged. A case in point may be the establishment of rules for the treatment of observers at manoeuvres enabling the observers to make a proper assessment of the manoeuvres. Attempts should also be made to refine progressively the indicators of routine military activities with a view to improving their value for warning purposes;

Another possible method is to expand, in an appropriate manner, the scope and area of application of existing confidence-building measures, thus greatly enhancing their value. For instance, commitments to notify major military movements in a restricted area could be broadened so as to include all militarily relevant movements within a larger area. Similarly, commitments to notify only major manoeuvres and other military movements can be widened by including notification of manoeuvres and other military movements of a smaller scope;

A very important qualitative step in enhancing the credibility and reliability of the confidence-building process may consist in strengthening the degree of commitment with which the various confidence-building measures are to be implemented. Voluntary or unilateral measures should, as soon as possible, be reciprocated and developed into mutual and balanced politically binding provisions, and the latter then - if appropriate - into legally binding obligations;
(iv) Statements of intent and declarations, which in themselves do not contain a commitment to the application of concrete and verifiable measures and are therefore only a preparatory step on the path towards confidence-building measures, must be followed up and rendered more concrete by negotiations on clearly defined, applicable measures;

(v) The continuous and regular application of politically binding measures may create a practice which ultimately establishes the conviction of the participating States that only conduct in keeping with this practice can be regarded as lawful. A politically binding confidence-building measure, implemented consistently and uniformly over a substantial period of time, may develop into an obligation under customary international law;

(vi) After a sufficient consolidation of the confidence-building process, an international convention establishing a number of basic and universally applicable obligations for the implementation of confidence-building measures may eventually be considered;

(d) Opportunities

(i) One important opportunity for the introduction of confidence-building measures exists in conjunction with joint efforts to prevent and contain international conflicts. Confidence-building measures can considerably improve the capacity for effective international crisis management. A primary requirement is, however, that communication and contacts between the parties to a conflict are not broken off at any time, but are improved instead;

(ii) Appropriate confidence-building measures such as adequate communication channels, including "hot lines", should be provided especially during crises, since they can have an important stabilizing effect and supplement existing instruments of international crisis management;

(iii) As the nuclear Powers bear a special responsibility for world peace, they should consider all possible means to avoid political conflicts escalating into crises and to prevent political crises from developing into armed conflicts. Besides "hot lines", it is conceivable that, where circumstances permit, the establishment of jointly staffed "crisis management centres" might have a stabilizing effect. Such centres could be either permanent or established ad hoc according to rules agreed upon in advance;

(iv) A particular opportunity might arise upon the introduction of peace-keeping forces into a region. Thus it might be useful to supplement a peace-keeping agreement by confidence-building measures;

(v) A statement of political intent envisaging the pursuit of confidence-building measures once the peace-keeping forces have taken up their tasks may greatly help to consolidate the situation. Under such circumstances, the parties should at the earliest possible time envisage the establishment of an adequate mandated mechanism;

(vi) Another opportunity for agreements on specific confidence-building measures may arise on the cessation of hostilities between States;
(vii) In the context of arms limitation negotiations, certain confidence-
building measures may form part of the envisaged agreement itself (for
example, associated measures in the framework of mutual and balanced
force reductions);

(viii) Other confidence-building measures may supplement the arms control
agreement concerned. Both types can have a positive effect on the
parties' ability to achieve the purposes and goals of the respective
negotiations and agreements by creating a climate of co-operation and
understanding, by facilitating measures of verification and by fostering
reliable and credible implementation;

(ix) Conferences for the review of existing arms limitation agreements could
provide an opportunity to strengthen such agreements by the development
and incorporation of confidence-building measures. Such
confidence-building measures as may be agreed upon could be included in
the concluding documents of those conferences, without the need for a
formal amendment of the agreements;

(x) Still further opportunities may arise in conjunction with agreements
among States for co-operation in other fields of international
relations. Confidence-building measures, or at least a statement of
intent to develop them in future, could be included in any form of
political declaration on goals shared by two or more States;

(xi) Opportunities for building confidence may also arise in connection with
joint development projects, especially in frontier areas;

(e) The role of United Nations organs

(i) All organs of the United Nations should participate in promoting the
process of confidence-building. In particular, the Security Council and
the General Assembly can further this process by adopting recommendations
containing suggestions and requests to States to agree on and apply
confidence-building measures;

(ii) Depending on the nature of the measure in question, such decisions and
recommendations can be directed at all States or only at certain States
in a particular region or - in the event of an imminent crisis - at those
States directly affected;

(iii) The Security Council would primarily be responsible for measures having a
direct bearing on the maintenance of international peace and security.
This would, among other activities, include the promotion of
confidence-building measures in the context of peace-keeping initiatives
and of arrangements for the cessation of armed conflicts. A large number
of measures adopted in connection with peace-keeping operations of the
United Nations and the introduction of peace-keeping forces, observers
and mediators are practical and well-established examples of measures
that increase confidence;

(iv) The General Assembly would include in its activities those measures which
might be applied in the political, legal, economic and social fields.
This, however, would in no way limit the General Assembly's right to
recommend any confidence-building measures which fall within the scope of the Charter of the United Nations. To fulfil this task, it is essential that the General Assembly and, through it, all relevant United Nations organs be kept duly informed of negotiations and agreements on confidence-building measures;

(v) Both the Security Council and the General Assembly could, inter alia, recommend the evaluation of certain confidence-building measures which have been applied for a period of time and, on the basis of such evaluations, propose their continuation, modification or - in the case of regional measures - their extension to other regions;

(vi) The Committee on Disarmament, which is the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of arms control and disarmament, should identify and negotiate such confidence-building measures as are related to or included in agreements on disarmament and arms control that are being negotiated in the Committee. Of these measures, the ones designed to enhance the verification of existing agreements or to facilitate the conclusion of new agreements would be of primary importance;

(vii) The Secretary-General might support, when acting in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter in bringing to the attention of the Security Council a matter which may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, such confidence-building measures as may seem appropriate to ease existing tensions and to stop the emergence of new ones, thereby preventing the development or aggravation of a crisis;

(viii) The specialized agencies of the United Nations could, in their respective fields of activity, contribute significantly to the process of confidence-building. In particular, the United Nations could, in programmes of aid to developing countries, help to alleviate through its specialized agencies political, economic and social inequalities, thereby reducing existing tensions and distrust and laying the basis for better understanding and co-operation in these areas. One way of achieving this would be to support regional co-operation.

5. The Disarmament Commission proposes that the General Assembly should lend its support to the guidelines set out in this report by incorporating them in a resolution for adoption at its thirty-eighth session. The Disarmament Commission also calls upon all States to make further tangible contributions towards building confidence world-wide.

Notes

a/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3.

b/ Including the working paper on confidence-building measures within the United Nations system, prepared by the Federal Republic of Germany for the second special session devoted to disarmament (A/52-12/AC.1/38) and the memorandum on measures to improve the reliability and objectivity of information in the military area, prepared by Austria for the second special session devoted to disarmament (A/52-12/AC.1/59).
ANNEX XVIII

Working paper submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands (A/CN.10/1983/NG.IV/WP.2)

1. Confidence is a prerequisite for the adequate interaction of human beings as well as for that of States. Decisions and actions, even normal functioning of States could, in certain circumstances, be impossible without confidence. The more confidence exists among States, the easier co-operative inter-State relations can be developed. As co-operation aims at a wide spectrum of activities, confidence concerns a wide range of topics. In order to enhance inter-State relations and to promote the well-being of States it is necessary to establish confidence in all relevant areas of international, regional and bilateral relations and improve and broaden confidence where it already exists.

2. As was pointed out in the comprehensive study of the Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence-building Measures, a/ confidence is a result of many factors, both military and non-military, b/ and measures to overcome distrust must take into account particular situations and concerns. c/ These include measures related to political, economic and social matters. They could comprise, inter alia, the respect for the purposes, principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as well as for the provisions contained in other relevant documents of international law, terminating policies of aggression, military intervention, occupation, annexation and intervention in the internal affairs of States and the denial of the inalienable right to self-determination of peoples under colonial or foreign domination, respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with existing international instruments, respecting the sovereignty of States over their natural resources, establishing a new international economic order, including international co-operation for economic and social development, undertaking joint economic development projects, especially in border areas, elaborating bilateral or regional agreements on projects for co-operation and integration, using qualified personnel and resources in joint co-operation projects in the field of development and of a humanitarian nature, help in case of national disasters and making use of the United Nations and other appropriate forums for the continuing consideration and promotion of confidence-building measures. d/

3. The Commission could, in accordance with its mandate as contained in paragraph 118 (a) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), while elaborating guidelines for confidence-building measures and for their implementation, focus on measures relevant to the military and security field. However, it should stress that these measures have constantly to be seen in the context of the wide range of possible measures which can increase confidence. The Commission expresses the view that measures designed to increase confidence in the non-military and non-security-related areas should be further studied and developed in other appropriate United Nations bodies.
Notes

a/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3.
b/ Ibid., para. 22.
c/ Ibid., para. 110.
d/ Ibid., para. 136.
ANNEX XIX

Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level
(A/CN.10/46)

Working paper: India

1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 37/100 D, of 13 December 1982 adopted at its thirty-seventh session, requested the Disarmament Commission "to consider the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level". The Disarmament Commission was further requested "to submit a progress report on its deliberations on this item to the General Assembly at thirty-eighth session".

2. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, (resolution 8-10/2), provides the basis for the elaboration of the objectives, concepts and approaches to confidence-building measures as well as for the consideration of appropriate types of such measures and for their implementation on a global or regional level. The Final Document, in paragraph 24, recommends that "collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension". The disarmament measures mentioned in this paragraph and to the adoption and implementation of which confidence-building measures can make significant contribution are additional to those mentioned in paragraph 22 of the Final Document. These disarmament measures are required to be adopted on a priority basis and are themselves indispensable for the building of confidence.

3. Paragraph 93 of the Final Document states that:

"In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue the policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament."

Paragraph 93 then goes on to list certain measures of confidence-building.

4. A study on confidence-building measures has also been carried out by a group of governmental experts whose recommendations, though confined merely to the narrow military field, may also be taken into account along with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the proposals made to the General Assembly by individual countries.

5. In resolution 37/100 D, the General Assembly states that "confidence-building measures cannot serve as a substitute for concrete disarmament measures". They can, however, "play a very significant role in achieving disarmament". They are, therefore, in the nature of collateral measures, that is, parallel or contributory to disarmament measures.
6. Confidence-building measures cannot be a goal or end in themselves. Nor can they be pursued autonomously or in isolation from the process of arms limitation and disarmament.

7. At a time when there is no disarmament taking place and when the nuclear-arms race is continuing at an accelerated pace, priority attention must be given to those measures which will help in halting the nuclear-arms race and moving towards nuclear disarmament. It is hardly the time to shift attention to confidence-building measures of marginal significance.

8. Confidence-building is not a narrow, restrictive and regulatory concept. Regulatory measures are provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. In this sense, it is by scrupulously observing the Charter of the United Nations that States can best promote confidence among themselves.

9. Confidence-building is a positive concept involving a commitment by States, as undertaken in paragraph 3 of the Final Document, to "the dynamic development of détente, encompassing all spheres of international relations in all regions of the world, with the participation of all countries".

10. Any approach to confidence-building in the wider sense of the term must be a comprehensive one involving the adoption and implementation of measures in the political, economic and social fields. These should include removal of political tensions, progress towards disarmament, restructuring of the world economic system in order to establish the new international economic order and elimination of racial discrimination and foreign occupation.

11. In the disarmament field, nothing is more conducive to confidence-building than measures to halt the nuclear-arms race and to move towards nuclear disarmament. Pre-eminent among such measures are those designed for preventing nuclear war, prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, an immediate freeze on the production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.

12. Decisions further to escalate the nuclear-arms race and the introduction of new dangerous doctrines such as winnable nuclear war cannot but have a shattering effect on confidence. Renunciation of such doctrines will go a long way towards restoring and inspiring confidence.

13. The major Powers have a special responsibility in improving the climate of trust and confidence among States. Among the measures they should adopt to accomplish this are:

(a) Dismantling of all foreign military bases;

(b) Dissolution of military alliances;

(c) Removal of their military presence from various regions of the world.

14. As matters relating to disarmament and international security are of concern to all States, international confidence will improve if multilateral negotiations on all disarmament issues become the accepted norm. The United Nations should be permitted to play a central role and assume primary responsibility in the field of disarmament.
15. A multilateral approach to international security and disarmament will enhance international confidence. Confining disarmament negotiations on matters of vital concern to all nations to major Powers cannot but result in lack of confidence and erosion of trust. The association of the countries of the non-aligned movement in all disarmament negotiations which have a bearing on the very survival of mankind and removal of international tension and preservation of peace will go a long way towards restoring confidence.

16. Confidence-building is a form of co-operation voluntarily embarked upon in a spirit of trust and good will. It can, therefore, be both unilateral as well as bilateral and multilateral. It can also very well assume the form of a declaration of intent which need not be followed by specific and concrete commitment.

17. A collateral measure like a confidence-building measure cannot have a legal identity separate from the legal basis or framework of the disarmament measures the adoption and implementation of which it is supposed to contribute to. For that very reason, there cannot be politically binding or legally enforceable confidence-building measures. Politically binding or legally enforceable confidence-building measures are a contradiction in terms. If a measure is politically binding or reinforceable, it can never inspire confidence.

18. It is none of the functions of confidence-building measures to facilitate verification of arms limitation and disarmament measures. On the contrary, the verification procedures provided for in disarmament agreements will themselves build and inspire confidence. Paragraph 31 of the Final Document states:

"Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties."

Paragraph 91 states:

"In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements."

19. There is also no direct link between confidence-building measures and security. Security, including the principle of undiminished security, applies to measures of disarmament and cannot be extended to collateral measures for confidence-building.

20. While it is true that the promotion of confidence-building measures in different regions must be based on the specific situation prevailing in those regions, a regional approach to confidence-building measures cannot be pursued in isolation from the global approach, nor can regional confidence-building measures be seen as a starting point for global measures. In an age of nuclear weapons and in an international political environment characterized by global rivalry and confrontation among the major Powers and the alliance systems built by them, one cannot really speak of a regional threat to security. Today, the greatest threat to our security, that is, the nuclear threat, emanates not only from our neighbourhood or region but mainly from beyond the oceans. This implies that there can be no confidence in a region unless and until the overwhelming and all-
encompassing threat of nuclear war is eliminated and the major Powers undertake to
give up their policy of global rivalry and spheres of influence and remove their
military presence, including military bases and facilities, from the region.

21. Confidence-building measures in a regional context should be adopted on the
initiative and with the agreement of the States of the region concerned. In
resolution 37/100 D, the General Assembly speaks of "confidence-building measures
freely arrived at by the States concerned".

22. Exchange of information and data relating to military strength by itself can
be only of a limited and marginal value in building confidence. Questions relating
to exchange of information and data can be best solved in the course of
negotiations on concrete measures of disarmament and must be related to the scope
of the intended measures. They cannot be considered in the abstract or in
isolation, nor made a precondition for the adoption of disarmament measures.

23. The United Nations can contribute most effectively to increasing confidence
among States by playing the central role and discharging its primary responsibility
in the field of disarmament assigned to it by the international community. It will
be a distortion of priority and a waste of resources if the Security Council or the
General Assembly starts dealing specifically with confidence-building measures.
This applies with equal, if not greater, force to the consideration of this subject
by the Committee on Disarmament.
ANNEX XX

Confidence-building measures and their application:
guidelines for effective implementation
(A/CONF.10/50 and Corr.1)

Working paper: Bahamas

INTRODUCTION

1. The mandate of Working Group IV has its source in paragraphs 3 of General Assembly resolutions 37/100 D of 13 December 1982 and 37/78 H of 9 December 1982 respectively. The elements or directives contained in the mandate are as follows:

   (a) "To consider the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures" (resolution 37/100 D, para. 3);

   (b) Determination of what constitutes "appropriate types";

   (c) "Guidelines ... for implementation of such measures";

   (d) Determination of their application or "implementation" "on a global" level, on a "regional level", or at both global and regional levels;

   (e) Directives under the previous four directives are to be complied with via "concrete recommendations" (resolution 37/78 H, para. 3).

The General Assembly's request for concreteness therefore makes indispensable a clear and precise definition of confidence-building measures and their characteristics before guidelines can be determined or their implementing procedures and mechanisms isolated.

2. Resolution 37/100 D, a consensus resolution, noting "the findings of the comprehensive study on confidence-building measures" a/ and "the important role that confidence-building measures can play with regard to regional and world-wide stability as well as to progress in disarmament", urged "all States to encourage and assist all efforts designed to explore further the ways in which confidence-building measures can strengthen international peace and security" (37/100 D, para. 1). In the same resolution, the Assembly, in encouraging States to embark upon this endeavour, invited "all States to consider the possible introduction of confidence-building measures in their particular regions and, where possible, to negotiate on them in keeping with the conditions and requirements prevailing in the respective regions", as well as to include "a reference to, or an agreement on, confidence-building measures, as appropriate, in any joint statements or declarations of a political nature" (ibid., paras. 2 and 5).

3. Taking into consideration the debate so far in the Working Group and the elements for the nature, scope and development of confidence-building measures found in the study, the Working Group therefore recommends to the General Assembly through the Commission the adoption of the following framework of guidelines for effective implementation of concrete confidence-building measures in order to promote the implementation of resolution 37/100 D.
GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

A. Prerequisites

1. Cognizance of an agreement on the objective circumstances of the current international situation in which confidence-building measures are being implemented or intended.

2. The parameters for confidence are, initially, restrictive yet open-ended depending on the perceptions and requirements of potential participants and their scope: modest, step-by-step, progressively more positive within the framework of the definitional guidelines of appropriate policies and international commitments, based on the primary sources of the Commission, namely, the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

B. Principal definitional characteristics (elements)

1. Contribution to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures (resolution S-10/2, para. 24).

2. Furtherance of relaxation of international tension (ibid.).

3. Facilitating of the process of disarmament (resolution S-10/2, para. 93 resolution 36/97 F, para. 7).

4. Significant contribution to preparing for further progress in disarmament (ibid.; resolution 37/100 D, preambular para. 3).

5. Elimination of the sources of tension by peaceful means and the resulting contribution to the strengthening of peace and security in the world (resolution 33/9 B, preambular para. 3; resolution 34/87 B, preambular para. 2; and resolution 37/100 D, preambular para. 3).

6. Not a substitute for disarmament but significant in achieving disarmament (resolution 37/100 D, preambular para. 5).

7. Diminishing of the danger of armed conflicts resulting from misunderstanding or misinterpretations of military activities (resolution 33/91 B, preambular para. 6; resolution 34/87 B, preambular para. 4; and A/36/474 and Corr.1, para. 29).

8. Reduction and eventual elimination of potential causes for mistrust, misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscalculation (resolution 36/97 F, para. 6).

10. Translation of universally recognized principles in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (resolution S-10/2, para. 26; and A/36/474 and Corr.1, para. 40 of which subsumes all references to the purposes and principles of the Charter as well as to other existing international obligations, treaty and customary, and the considerations detailed in paras. 90 and 136 of the study).

C. Guidelines for effective implementation of confidence-building measures

1. Clarity (A/36/474 and Corr.1, paras. 42 and 43). In this context, the observation of the Government of Peru that "factors which favourably or adversely affect confidence must also be identified" (A/35/397, para. 26), is pertinent.


3. Objectivity (ibid., para. 44).

4. Informed by past experience and specificity of the objective circumstances of potential participants (ibid., paras. 20, 40 and 166).

5. Security-enhancing (ibid., para. 43).

6. Consistent, uniform and full application by all (ibid., para. 41).

7. Capable of being measured, assessed or verified (ibid., paras. 40 and 161).

8. Criteria (non-exhaustive) for measurement, assessment and verification:
   (a) Volume and quality of concrete results achieved in the light of goals set;
   (b) Use and/or introduction of monitoring and evaluation machinery or mechanisms at all levels of state and inter-State relations where confidence-building measures are being attempted;
   (c) Use of time-limited goals.

Notes

a/ A/36/474 and Corr.1. The study was subsequently issued with the title Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3).
1. The Disarmament Commission notes with deep concern that developments in the field of disarmament since 1978 have not lived up to hopes engendered by the first special session devoted to disarmament. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) stated that disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security were directly related to each other. Progress in any of the spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others. The past five years have witnessed increasing recourse to the use or threat of use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. Open threats, pressures and military interventions against independent States and violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter are taking place, posing the most serious threat to international peace and security. The consequent tensions and confrontations have retarded progress in disarmament and have in turn been aggravated by the failure to make significant progress towards disarmament.

2. The Disarmament Commission stresses that, in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter, States should never use any weapon except in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence.

3. The Disarmament Commission stresses the need to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, to implement the security system provided for in the Charter and to enhance the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body.

4. Guided by these considerations, the Disarmament Commission emphasizes the importance of the negotiation and adoption of effective measures of disarmament, and for the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war. In that context, the Disarmament Commission adopts the following recommendations:

   (a) All States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should pursue as a matter of urgency negotiations to fulfil the priority tasks set forth in the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session. These negotiations must take into account the legitimate security interests of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Agreements should provide for effective measures of verification and compliance;

     (b) Negotiations should be pursued and concluded, in appropriate forums, which would lead to substantial equitable and verifiable reductions in weapons, in particular nuclear weapons;

     (c) A nuclear-test ban should be negotiated and concluded within the framework of an effective disarmament process.
(d) Pending more effective measures of nuclear disarmament, all States, in particular the major nuclear-weapon States, should co-operate in the development of a comprehensive set of measures for the prevention of nuclear war and of all armed conflict. In particular, where the necessary conditions exist, confidence-building measures should be negotiated in appropriate frameworks for regional or global application, in order to increase trust and confidence and to decrease the risk of misunderstanding among nations;

(e) Bearing in mind assurances already given, negotiations should continue on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(f) Since the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects is a matter of universal concern, all States are urged to contribute effectively to the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States should fully implement all provisions of relevant international treaties to which they are parties;

(g) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements and/or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. Those agreements or arrangements should be fully complied with and nuclear-weapon States should respect the status of such zones, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons;

(h) All States, in particular the major nuclear-weapon States, are urged to pursue their negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament with vigour, and to keep the United Nations appropriately informed of all steps in this field, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations;

(i) Efforts should be made to conclude urgently a treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons, including adequate verification provisions. To this end, the Committee on Disarmament should expedite its work with a view to presenting a draft treaty to the General Assembly without further delay;

(j) The limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued concurrently with nuclear disarmament, especially in regions where there is a concentration of armed forces and armaments. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in this field;

(k) The extension of an arms race into outer space should be prevented;

(l) In the context of the World Disarmament Campaign, measures should be adopted in order that the public in all regions of the world have access to a broad range of information and opinions on questions of arms limitations and disarmament, to facilitate informed choices about these vital questions.

Notes

\(^a\) The representative of the United Kingdom mentioned at the 7th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, held on 2 June, that the working paper was also submitted on behalf of a number of States of the Group of Western European and other States.