DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

OFFICIAL RECORDS

SUPPLEMENT FOR 1967 and 1968

UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1969
NOTE

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Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.
# DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

Supplement for 1967 and 1968

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**DISARMAMENT COMMISSION DOCUMENTS**

issued during the period 1 January 1967 to 31 December 1968

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Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
(18 January-14 March 1968)

[Original text: English, French, Spanish and Russian]
[19 March 1968]

1. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament submits to the General Assembly and to the Disarmament Commission a full report on the negotiations regarding a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, together with the pertinent documents and records.

2. Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.


4. In view of the urgency of concluding a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2346 (XXII), the Committee has continued to give its primary attention to the negotiation of this treaty. Initially, the discussions and negotiations were conducted on the basis of texts of the treaty submitted for the consideration of the Committee by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on 24 August 1967 [see annex IV, sections 8 and 6 below]. On 18 January 1968 the two delegations submitted revised texts incorporating a number of views and proposals presented by various members of the Committee [ibid., sections 9 and 7]. The text reproduced as annex I includes changes incorporated on 11 March 1968 by the delegations of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the light of the Committee's subsequent discussion.

5. During the Committee's discussions specific proposals were made by various delegations to amend the texts of the draft treaty presented by the delegations of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The proposals and working papers submitted by all delegations and by Governments not represented in the Committee are found in annex IV, covering the two sessions held in 1967 and the session held in 1968. The views of individual delegations on the text of the treaty, to the extent they support or remain at variance with the text presented in annex I, are recorded in the relevant verbatim records. For the convenience of Members of the General Assembly, there is attached as annex III a listing which cites pertinent documents and verbatim records in which the views of various delegations are recorded.

6. Regarding the question of assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America submitted on 7 March 1968 to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a draft resolution for appropriate consideration by the Security Council. The text of the draft resolution appears as annex II. These delegations also informed the Committee of statements of their Governments intended to make at the time the draft resolution was considered by the Security Council.

7. The Committee agreed to reconvene during the summer of 1968, following the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly, the actual date to be established by the Co-Chairmen of the Conference in consultation with all members.

8. This report is transmitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) A. A. Roshchin
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
William C. Foster
United States of America

Annexes

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I. Text of draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
II. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America: draft resolution on security assurances, for consideration by the Security Council
III. List of documents and verbatim records setting forth views of various delegations
IV. Documents attached to the report, covering the periods 21 February-14 December 1967 and 18 January-14 March 1968

ANNEX I

Text of draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty", considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

* As revised by changes incorporated on 11 March 1968 by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America

* Document DC/230/Add.1, dated 19 March 1968, constitutes annex IV to the present report.
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convincing that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the partial-test-ban treaty of 1963 in its preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the attainment of the objectives set forth in the non-proliferation regime, including the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Have agreed as follows:

**Article I**

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapon or other nuclear explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

**Article II**

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any other nuclear weapon State of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

**Article III**

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is otherwise any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

**Article IV**

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty shall participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technical information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

**Article V**

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate to insure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.

**Article VI**

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of
States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the
total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to
this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be
submitted to the Depository Governments which shall circulate
it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do
so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the
Depository Governments shall convene a conference, to which
they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider
such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a
majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including
the votes of all nuclear-weapon States. A Party to this Treaty
and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is
circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall
enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of
ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of instruments
of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the
instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party
to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the
amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Gov-
ernors of the International Atomic Energy Agency There-
after, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the
deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a
conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva,
Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty
with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble
and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At in-
tervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to
the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect
to the Depository Governments, the convening of further
conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation
of the Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature.
Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry
into force shall, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article,
may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory
States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession
shall be deposited with the Governments of ..., which are
hereby designated the Depository Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification
by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and
40 other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of
their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this
Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured
and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
device prior to 1 January, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession
are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty,
it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their
instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all
signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature,
the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of
accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and
the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference
or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Govern-
ments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty
have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties
to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council
three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement
of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized
its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty,
a Conference shall be convened to decide whether the
Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended
for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall
be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and
Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited
in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified
copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository
Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding
States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized
have signed this Treaty.

DONE AT This Date of...

ANNEX II

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States
of America: draft resolution on security assurances, for
consideration by the Security Council

[ENDC/222, of 7 March 1968]
[Original text: English and Russian]

The Security Council,

Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of
States to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, and thereby to undertake not to receive
the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nucl ear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other
explosive devices,

Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these
States that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate
measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the
use of nuclear weapons would endanger the peace and security
of all States,

1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the
threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State
would create a situation in which the Security Council, and
above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would
have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations
under the United Nations Charter;

2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that
they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance
with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression
in which nuclear weapons are used;

3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized
under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

\*\*\*Adopted by the Security Council on 19 June 1968, see
Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1968, resolu-
tion 255 (1968).
### ANNEX III

List of documents and verbatim records set forth views of various delegations

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**Mexico**

**Nigeria**

ENDC/PV 327  | 31 August 1967 |              |
ENDC/PV 344  | 2 November 1967 |            |
ENDC/PV 351  | 28 November 1967 |            |
ENDC/PV 371  | 28 February 1968 |            |

**Poland**

ENDC/PV 326  | 29 August 1967 |              |
ENDC/PV 359  | 25 January 1968 |            |
ENDC/PV 369  | 22 February 1968 |            |

**Romania**

ENDC/PV 199  | 19 October 1967 | Ibid., sect. 14 |
ENDC/PV 223/Rev.1  | 8 March 1968 | Ibid., sect 40 |
ENDC/PV 290  | 8 August 1967   |              |
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ENDC/PV 340  | 19 October 1967 |              |
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ENDC/PV 376  | 11 March 1968   |              |

**Sweden**

ENDC/PV 216  | 13 February 1968 | Ibid., sect. 32 |
ENDC/PV 297  | 8 February 1968  |              |
ENDC/PV 364  | 13 February 1968 |              |
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**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**

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**United Arab Republic**

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**United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**

ENDC/PV 207  | 5 December 1967 | Ibid., sect. 24 |
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ENDC/PV 226  | 20 August 1967  |              |
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*The documents and records of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament are mimeographed, except as indicated in the last column of the list.*

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ENDC/PV 298  | 23 May 1967  |              |
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ENDC/PV 370  | 27 February 1968 |            |
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**Italy**

ENDC/PV 318  | 1 August 1967 |              |
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ENDC/PV 341  | 24 October 1967 |            |
ENDC/PV 350  | 23 November 1967 |            |
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ENDC/PV 200/Rev.1  | 26 October 1967 | Ibid., sect. 15 |
ENDC/218  | 20 February 1968 | Ibid., sect. 34 |
ENDC/221  | 6 March 1968 | Ibid., sect. 38 |

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ENDC/200/Rev.1  | 26 October 1967 | Ibid., sect. 15 |
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### ANNEX IV

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Letter dated 18 January 1967 from the Secretary-General to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, transmitting resolutions 2149 (XXI), 2153 A (XXI), 2162 (XXI), 2163 (XXI), 2164 (XXI) and 2165 (XXI) of the General Assembly

I have the honour to transmit the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament:

Resolution 2153 A (XXI), entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 149th plenary meeting on 17 November 1966;

Resolution 2162 C (XXI), entitled "Question of general and complete disarmament", adopted at the 148th plenary meeting on 5 December 1966;

Resolution 2163 (XXI), entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests", adopted at the 148th plenary meeting on 5 December 1966;

Resolution 2165 (XXI), entitled "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America", adopted at the 148th plenary meeting on 5 December 1966.

I would draw attention particularly to the following direct references to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament:

In resolution 2153 A (XXI), paragraphs 4, 6 and 8 requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to consider urgently the proposal that the nuclear-weapon Powers should give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories, and any other proposals that have been or may be made for the solution of this problem; calling upon the Committee to give high priority to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with resolution 2028 (XX); and requesting the Committee to report to the General Assembly at an early date on the result of its work on the question non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;

In resolution 2162 C (XXI), paragraphs 1 and 3 requesting the Committee to pursue new efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures, and to report to the General Assembly, as appropriate, on the progress achieved;

In resolution 2163 (XXI), paragraph 4 requesting the Committee to elaborate without any further delay a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests;
In resolution 2165 (XXI), requesting the Committee to give further consideration to the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and to report to the General Assembly.

In connection with resolution 2153 A (XXI), paragraph 7, the relevant documents and records are the following: A/6350, A/6359, A/6430, A/6509, A/6510, A/6511, A/C/1/393, A/C/1/L/371 and Corr.1 and Add-1, A/C/1/L/373, A/C/1/L/371, Rev./1, and the verbatim records of the 1414th to 1450th meetings of the First Committee (A/C/1/PV.1441-1450); the summary records of the corresponding meetings (A/C/1/SR.1441-1450); and the verbatim record of the 145th plenary meeting (A/PV.1469).

In connection with resolution 2162 C (XXI), paragraph 2, the relevant documents and records are the following: A/6350, A/6359, A/6430, A/6529 and Add.1, A/6597, A/C/1/393, A/C/1/L/370, A/C/1/L/370, Rev./1, Rev./1/Add.1, A/C/1/L/379, Rev./1, Rev./1/Add.2, A/C/1/L/379, Rev./1, Rev./1/Add.1, A/C/1/L/378, A/C/1/L/381 and Rev./1, A/C/1/L/382, Rev./1 and Rev./1/Add.1, A/C/1/L/377, A/C/1/L/378, A/C/1/L/377, Add.2, A/C/1/L/379, Rev./1, A/C/1/L/381 and Rev./1, A/C/1/L/382, Rev./1, and the verbatim records of the 1436th to 1450th, the 1469th to 1462nd meetings of the First Committee (A/C/1/PV.1441-1457 and 1460-1462); the summary records of the corresponding meetings (A/C/1/SR.1441-1457 and 1460-1462); and the verbatim records of the 1448th and 1449th plenary meetings (A/PV.1484 and A/PV.1485).

In connection with resolution 2165 (XXI), the relevant documents and records are the following: A/6399, A/6438, A/6440, A/6541, A/6541, A/6541, A/6541, A/C/1/393, A/C/1/L/369, A/C/1/L/385, A/C/1/L/386, A/C/1/L/387, the verbatim records of the 1463rd to 1471st meetings of the First Committee (A/C/1/PV.1463-1471); the summary records of the corresponding meetings (A/C/1/SR.1463-1471); and the verbatim record of the 146th plenary meeting (A/PV.1484).

The documents and records listed above have already been circulated to the Members of the United Nations, including all members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I also have the honour to transmit herewith, for the information of the members of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the following resolutions, adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, which deal with matters relating to the work of the Conference:

Resolution 2149 (XXI), entitled "Renunciation by States of actions hampering the conclusion of an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 145th plenary meeting on 4 November 1966;

Resolution 2153 B (XXI), entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 145th plenary meeting on 17 November 1966;

[See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 8.]

Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, preface, fascicle No. 1, agenda.

Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 26.

Mimographed.


Ibid., para. 4.

Same text as resolution 2153 A (XXI).


Ibid., document A/6529, para. 4.

Same text as resolution 2162 A (XXI).

See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 27, document A/6529, paras. 5, 13, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 11, 14, 15, respectively.

Ibid., Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 98.

Ibid., agenda item 8.

Ibid., agenda item 98, document A/6541, paras. 5, 6 and 7, respectively.

Same text as resolution 2165 (XXI).

Resolutions 2162 A (XXI) and 2162 B (XXI), entitled "Question of general and complete disarmament", adopted at the 1484th plenary meeting on 5 December 1966;

Resolution 2164 (XXI), entitled "Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons", adopted at the 1484th plenary meeting on 5 December 1966.

(Signed) U TRANTY
Secretary-General

[For the text of the resolutions, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16]

2

Final act of the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Demilitarization of Latin America, held at Mexico City on 30 August 1966 and 31 January 1967

[ENDC/186, of 21 February 1967]

[Original text: English]

The Preparatory Commission for the Demilitarization of Latin America held its fourth session in two parts. The first part consisted of a single meeting on 30 August 1966; at this meeting the Commission decided to postpone the discussions at its fourth session until 31 January 1967 in order to facilitate more thorough consultation and exchanges of views among the member States and thus enable them to reach an understanding on the outstanding points in the draft Treaty on the Demilitarization of Latin America. The second part of the session covered the period 31 January to 14 February 1967.

At the meeting of 30 August 1966, at which the resolution to postpone discussion (resolution 19 (IV)) was adopted, the member States were represented by officials of their diplomatic missions accredited to the Government of Mexico. At the second part of the session, the member States accredited the following delegations:

ARGENTINA

Representative
Mr. Luis Santiago Sanz

Alternate representatives
Mr. Fidel González Paz
Mr. Vicente Ernesto Berasategui
Mr. Octaviano Adolfo Saracho

Advisers
Commander Roberto Orinstein
Major Rodolfo Reynoso
Mr. Mario Eduardo Báñcora

BOLIVIA

Representative
Mr. Reinaldo del Carpio Jáuregui

Alternate representative
Mr. Hugo Esteinsohl Baldomar

BRAZIL

Representative
Mr. Sérgio Corrêa da Costa

Alternate representatives
Mr. Geraldo de Carvalho Silva
Colonel Fernando Guimarães de Carneiro Lima
Mr. Paulo Ribeiro de Arruda
Mr. Ovídio Andrade Meio

Advisers
Mr. Carlos Antônio de Betiencourt Bueno
Mr. Aderbal Costa
CHILE
Representative
Mr. Armando Uribe Arce
Alternate representatives
Mr. Enrique Cobos del Campo
Mr. Oscar Ruiz Bourgeois

COLOMBIA
Representative
Mr. Álvaro Herrán Medina
Alternate representative
Mr. César Augusto Pantoja

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Representative
Mr. René Fiallo

ECUADOR
Representative
Mr. Leopoldo Bentive Vinueza
Alternate representative
Mr. Gonzalo Almeida Urrutia

EL SALVADOR
Representative
Mr. Rafael Eguizábal Tobías
Alternate representative
Mr. Guillermo Rubio Melindo

GUATEMALA
Representative
Mr. Carlos Léonidas Acevedo
Alternate representatives
Mr. Carlos Hall Lloreda
Mr. Juan Carlos Delprée Crespo

HAITI
Representative
Mr. Julio Jean Pierre-Audain

HONDURAS
Representative
Colonel Armando Velázquez Cerrato
Alternate representative
Mr. Hernán López Callejas
Advisor
Mr. Roberto Alonzo Cleaves

JAMAICA
Representative
Mr. Frederick E. Degazon
Alternate representative
Mr. Oswald G. Harding

MEXICO
Representative
Mr. Alfonso García Robles
Alternate representative
Mr. Jorge Castañeda

Nicaragua
Representative
Mr. Alejandro Aguirre Montiel
Alternate representatives
Mr. Edgar Escobar Fornos
Mr. Silvio Morales Ocón

Panama
Representative
Mr. José B. Cárdenas
Alternate representatives
Mr. Simón Quiñós Guardia
Mr. José B. Calvo

Paraguay
Representative
Mr. Bacón Duarte Prado

Peru
Representative
Mr. Eduardo Valdez Pérez del Castillo

Trinidad and Tobago
Representative
Sir Ellis Clarke

Uruguay
Representative
Mr. Manuel Sánchez Morales
Alternate representatives
Mr. Aníbal Abadie-Aciardi
Mr. Alfredo Giró Pintos

Venezuela
Representative
Mr. Rolando Salcedo Delima
Alternate representatives
Commander Augusto Brito Ascario
Mr. José A. Velasquez
Adviser

Mr. Alberto Domínguez R.

The Preparatory Commission again received the valuable help of Mr. William Epstein, Chief of the Disarmament Affairs Division, United Nations Secretariat, as Technical Consultant. Mr. Gorden W. Wattles, an official of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, served as Technical Adviser to the Drafting Committee.

The countries listed below demonstrated their interest by sending the following observers to attend the proceedings:

**Austria**
Mr. Hans Thalberg
Alternate: Mr. Christoph Georg Parisini

**Belgium**
Mr. Max Wéry
Alternate: Mr. Marcel Lejeune

**Canada**
Mr. Dwight Wilder Fulford

**China**
Mr. Chen Chih-Feng
Alternate: Mr. Wei Yu Sun

**Denmark**
Mr. Hans von Haffen
Alternate: Mr. Erno Carl Marinus Olsen

**Federal Republic of Germany**
Mr. Swidbert Schnippenkötter
Alternate: Mr. Bernhard Wolf

**Finland**
Mr. Kai Somerto

**France**
Mr. Jacques VImont
Alternate: Mr. Henri de Coignac

**Ghana**
General Nathan A. Aferi

**India**
Mr. Naranjan Singh Gill
Alternate: Mr. Pramod Kumar

**Israel**
Mr. Shimshon Abad
Alternate: Mr. Simai Rome

**Italy**
Mr. Enrico Guastone Belcheri
Alternate: Mr. Pio Pignatti Morano di Custoza

**Japan**
Mr. Masami Nakana
Alternate: Mr. Yoji Sugiyama

**Netherlands**
Mr. Luis A. M. Lichtveld
Alternate: Mr. Mathias J. M. Janssen

**Norway**
Mr. Eigil Nygaard
Alternate: Mr. Nils O. Dietz

**Poland**
Mr. Ryszard Majcherzak
Alternate: Mr. Roman Czyzyki

**Romania**
Mr. Gheorghe Diaconescu

**Sweden**
Mr. Tord Göransson
Alternate: Mr. Arne Hellervik

**United Arab Republic**
Mr. Hassan Salah el Din Gohar
Alternate: Mr. Abdel Rahman Hassan

**United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**
Sir Nicolas J. A. Cheetham
Alternate:
Mr. Ian M. Sinclair
Mr. Thomas C. Barker

**United States of America**
Mr. Fulton Freeman
Alternate:
Mr. Duncan A. D. Mackay
Mr. Robert W. Smith

**Yugoslavia**
Mr. Dalibor Solatačić
Alternate: Mr. Borivoje Stojadinović

**International Atomic Agency**
Mr. Reinhard Rainer

Among the observers referred to above, special mention should be made of those from Belgium, China, Finland, Ghana, Israel and Romania, who for the first time, to the Preparatory Commission's pleasure, joined the other observers who had followed the Commission's work at earlier sessions.

It should also be mentioned that, shortly before the opening of the second part of the fourth session, one of the extra-continental States having international responsibility for territories in America—namely, the Kingdom of the Netherlands—requested permission to participate in the session on a footing of equality with the member States. When the Preparatory Commission had made considerable progress in its work without reaching any decision whether or not to accept this friendly overture, the observer from the Netherlands stated that his Government would not press the point. The basic reason why a Netherlands delegation did not participate in the discussions at this session was that it had finally been decided that extra-continental States in the same situation would not be Contracting Parties to the Treaty in preparation and consequently the participation of a Netherlands delegation was not essential, notwithstanding the friendly attitude in which the Preparatory Commission received the approach made by the Government of the Netherlands.

As background material for its fourth session the Preparatory Commission had before it, in addition to the aforementioned resolution 19 (IV), the recommendations which the Co-ordinating Committee had made to the Governments of the member States in December 1966, at the end of the meetings it had held in New York in connection with the twenty-first regular session of the United Nations General Assembly, to spare no time or effort in arriving as soon as possible at the conclusion of a contractual instrument for the establishment of a Latin American demilitarized zone.

On the basis of the Co-ordinating Committee's suggestions further to the proposals adopted by the Preparatory Commission at its third session, and the observations submitted by the Governments of Mexico, Uruguay, Chile and Venezuela (COPREDAL/OAT/1-4), the Commission adopted the following agenda:

1. Report of the Co-ordinating Committee (COPREDAL/CC/23);

2. Preparation of the draft Treaty on Demilitarization of Latin America (COPREDAL/38, 46-49, 51-53, 55, 56 and 59; COPREDAL/L.14 Rev; COPREDAL/OAT/1-4, COPREDAL/CN/2);
3. Consideration of the draft Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, with a view to its possible adoption as a treaty and its being opened for signature.

On this occasion the following served as officers of the Commission:

Chairman:
Mr. Alfonso García Robles, representative of Mexico

Vice-Chairman:
Mr. Rafael Eguiñizal Torres, representative of El Salvador, and Mr. Sérgio Corrêa da Costa, representative of Brazil.

At the fourth session, the representative of Brazil served in the office held at earlier sessions by Mr. José Sette Camara, also representative of Brazil on the Preparatory Commission.

Mr. Carlos Peñalver del Valle served as General Secretary of the Preparatory Commission. He was assisted by Mr. Antonio González de León, as Deputy Secretary of the Commission, and by Mr. Sergio González Gálvez, Mr. Alvaro Carranco, Mr. Joaquín Mercado and Mr. Mario Valverde Núñez as Assistant Secretaries. Mr. Donaciano González Gómez served as Coordinator.

The Preparatory Commission was gratified to receive, both at the opening and at the closing of the fourth session, messages of encouragement and congratulations from U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, and also had the great honour of receiving Mr. Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, President of the United Mexican States.

The President of Mexico was good enough to attend the closing meeting of the fourth session, at which the Commission's term of office expired upon the opening for signature of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

In order to carry out faithfully, the task assigned to it, the Preparatory Commission divided its work between two working groups that examined the provisions on which no identity of views had been achieved. Working Group 1 was instructed to study questions relating to the control system and other predominantly technical problems, while Working Group 2 dealt mainly with legal and political questions.

Working Group 1 had as its Chairman Mr. Armando Uribe Arce, representative of Chile, and as its Rapporteur Commandant Roberto Orstein of the Argentine Republic. Working Group 2 had as its Chairman Mr. Sérgio Corrêa da Costa, representative of Brazil, and as its Rapporteur Mr. Vicente Ernesto Basategui of the Argentine Republic.

In addition to those Working Groups, the Commission decided to set up a Drafting Committee to prepare the final text. This Committee was presided over by Mr. Alvaro Herrán Medina, representative of Colombia.

Lastly, a Credentials Committee was set up under the chairmanship of Mr. Carlos Leónidas Acevedo, representative of Guatemala.

At its fortieth plenary meeting on 7 February 1967, the Preparatory Commission decided to place on record the correct interpretation of the omission, from article 1, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the Treaty, of the term "transport", which had appeared in one of the alternative texts included in the "Proposals for the preparation of the Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America" (COPREDAL/36). The Commission accordingly decided to include the following statement in the Final Act:

"The Commission deemed it unnecessary to include the term 'transport' in article 1, concerning 'Obligations', for the following reasons:

1. If the carrier is one of the Contracting Parties, transport is covered by the prohibitions expressly laid down in the remaining provisions of article 1 and there is no need to mention it expressly, since the article prohibits 'any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.'

2. If the carrier is a State not a Party to the Treaty, transport is identical with 'transit' which, in the absence of any provision in the Treaty, must be understood to be governed by the principles and rules of international law; according to those principles and rules it is for the territorial State, in the free exercise of its sovereignty, to grant or deny permission for such transit in each individual case, upon application by the State interested in effecting the transit, unless some other arrangement has been reached in a Treaty between such States."

At the same time, the delegation of Argentina expressed the wish that the following statement should be recorded in the Final Act:

"The delegation of Argentina declares that, in its opinion, the prohibition of transport (including transit) of nuclear weapons within the territorial jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties should be specified in such a way as to permit such transport would in its opinion violate the spirit of the Treaty, which—as expressly stated in the preamble to the Treaty—is that Latin America should be wholly free from nuclear weapons."

The delegation of Nicaragua expressly requested at the 47th plenary meeting on 12 February 1967 that the following statement should be included in this Final Act:

"The delegation of Nicaragua understands that the prohibitions laid down in this Treaty refer solely to the use of nuclear energy for warlike purposes. Consequently Nicaragua, in signing this Treaty, reserves its sovereign right to use nuclear energy as it sees fit for peaceful purposes, such as the large-scale removal of earth for the construction of inter-oceanic or other canals, irrigation works and electric power stations, and to permit transit of atomic materials through its territory."

The Preparatory Commission adopted, at its only meeting in the first part of the fourth session, the following resolution:

RESOLUTION 19 (IV). POSTPONEMENT OF DISCUSSIONS AT THE FOURTH SESSION

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Considering that several member States have taken the view that the discussions at the fourth session should be postponed until January 1967 in order to facilitate the successful culmination of the Commission's work,

Wishing to help in fostering the most favourable conditions for the completion of the draft Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Noting, furthermore, the urgent need to conclude the task entrusted to it for the benefit of the peoples of Latin America and of all mankind,

Decides
1. To postpone the discussions at the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America;
2. To set Tuesday, 31 January 1967, as the date for the resumption of the fourth session at the headquarters of the Commission;
3. Earnestly to urge the Governments of member States to give priority, during this interval, to the study of those points in the draft Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America which are still unresolved;
4. That the date set in this resolution may be changed only by the Commission through the affirmative vote of two-thirds of its members.

Lastly, the second part of the fourth session resulted in the adoption of the following resolutions:

RESOLUTION 20 (IV). TERRITORIES SUBJECT TO DISPUTES OR CLAIMS

The Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America,

Considering that the maintenance of the territorial integrity of a State takes on particular importance by virtue of the aims
pursued by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

Recalling that in the Act of Washington of the First Special Inter-American Conference it was decided that the Council of the Organization of American States should take no decision, on any application for admission submitted by a political entity whose territory was, in whole or in part prior to the date of that resolution, the subject of a dispute or claim between a country outside the continent and one or more States members of that Organization, until the dispute had been settled by peaceful means;

Recalling also that the Preparatory Commission itself agreed to include the guiding principle of that resolution in article 20, paragraph 3, by providing that the General Conference of the Agency established by article 8 of the Treaty shall not take any decision regarding the admission of a political entity whose territory is in whole or in part prior to the date of the signature of the Treaty, the subject of a dispute or claim between a country outside the continent and one or more Latin American States until the dispute has been settled by peaceful means,

Decides that, for the purposes of representing territories that are, in whole or in part prior to the date of signature of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the subject of a dispute or claim between a country outside the continent and one or more Latin American States, the Preparatory Commission for the Deminimization of Latin America recognizes the law of the Latin American States.

RESOLUTION 21 (IV). TREYRI FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA

The Preparatory Commission for the Deminimization of Latin America,

Recalling resolution 191 (XVIII), in which the United Nations General Assembly noted with satisfaction on 27 November 1963, the initiative for the deminimization of Latin America taken in the joint declaration of 29 April 1963;

Noting that in the same resolution the General Assembly expresses the hope that the States of Latin America will initiate studies concerning the measures that should be agreed upon with a view to achieving the aims of the said declaration;

Considering that the Preparatory Commission, in fulfillment of the task entrusted to it by the Governments of the member States in resolution II of the Preliminary Meeting on the Deminimization of Latin America adopted at Mexico City on 27 November 1964, has completed the preparation of a draft Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,

Decides
1. To adopt the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, as set forth in the annex to this resolution;
2. To open the said instrument for an indefinite period for signature by the States referred to in article 25 of the Treaty, at Mexico City, with effect from Tuesday, 14 February 1967.

ANNEX
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

[For the text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 91, document A/1/C/1946]

RESOLUTION 22 (IV). TWENTY-SECOND SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[For the text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 91, document A/6676 and Add 1-4, para 6]

1 Declaration on the deminimization of Latin America, issued by the Presidents of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico; for the text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 74, document A/5415/Rev 1, annex.`
Resolution 26 (IV). Vote of Gratitude

The Preparatory Commission for the Demunuclearization of Latin America,

Having completed the task entrusted to it by the Preliminary Meeting on the Demunuclearization of Latin America,

Conscious that the peaceful and Americanist policy of the Government of Mexico has been of value morally, practically and in every way in the successful discharge of its responsibilities, and that the said Government has made a valuable contribution by providing all the facilities and services needed to enable the Commission secretariat to work efficiently,

Having received with all due respect and warmth the demonstrations of support in its task which have been made to it by the Mexican authorities,

Sure that it faithfully interprets the wishes of the Governments and peoples who laid on the Commission the responsibility of preparing for a Latin America free from the consequences of the use of nuclear energy in war,

Decides

1. To convey to the Government of Mexico its gratitude for the moral and material contribution it has made to the Commission throughout its existence;

2. To submit to His Excellency Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, the President of the United Mexican States, and to His Excellency Antonio Carrillo Flores, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, a clear and expressive statement of its deep appreciation for the support they have given the Preparatory Commission in the performance of its functions and for the facilities they have provided for its work.

Resolution 27 (IV). Vote of Thanks

The Preparatory Commission for the Demunuclearization of Latin America,

Seeking to make the results of its efforts as good and as lasting as possible, keenly aware, for this high purpose, of the contributions it has received from the holders of offices of particular prominence in the Commission's proceedings,

Conscious of the merit which has distinguished the services of those officers of the Commission who have been called upon to play a particularly representative part in the Preparatory Commission,

Recalling with satisfaction the agreements reached by this Commission and by the Preliminary Meeting on the Demunuclearization of Latin America concerning the appointment of the Commission's officers and the organization of the work of this Latin American body,

Decides

1. To express in this resolution the deep appreciation which is due to His Excellency Ambassador Alfonso García Robles for having brought the task entrusted to the Preparatory Commission to a successful conclusion through his distinguished services as its Chairman;

2. To extend its congratulations to their Excellencies Ambassador José Sette Camara, Ambassador Rafael Egüezabal Torres and Ambassador Sergio Corrêa da Costa on their efficient work as Vice-Chairmen of the Commission;

3. To record its gratitude to His Excellency Carlos Peón del Valle, General Secretary, His Excellency Antonio González de León, Deputy Secretary, Mr. Donaciano González, Mr. Sergio González Gálvez, Mr. Alvaro Carranco Avila, Mr. Joaquín Mercado and other officials of the secretariat for the zeal and diligence with which they have contributed to the success of the Preparatory Commission's task.

Resolution 28 (IV). Vote of Appreciation

The Preparatory Commission for the Demunuclearization of Latin America,

Deeply grateful for the co-operation it has received, in its own work and in the specific activities of its various organs, from the United Nations Secretariat,

Particularly thankful for the generous spirit of co-operation shown by the United Nations Secretariat whenever recourse has been had to operative paragraph 4 of United Nations General Assembly resolution 1911 (XVIII) in order that the Secretary-General of the United Nations might extend to the States of Latin America, at their request, such technical facilities as they might require for the purposes of ensuring the demunuclearization of Latin America,

Esteeming likewise the technical co-operation with which the International Atomic Energy Agency has contributed to its work,

Decides

1. To address a vote of thanks to His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the valuable services which the international organization under his charge has rendered to the Preparatory Commission for the Demunuclearization of Latin America by appointing Mr. William Epstein, the Technical Consultant, whose ability and efficiency the Commission takes pleasure in acknowledging once again;

2. To extend this vote of thanks to Dr. Sigvard Eklund, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for having accredited to the Commission Mr. Reinhard H. Rainer as Observer and, in that capacity, as a distinguished participant in the Preparatory Commission's work.

Resolution 29 (IV). Vote of Appreciation

The Preparatory Commission for the Demunuclearization of Latin America,

Considering it a matter of justice to express the gratitude of its members and of the countries they represent to Mr. Adolfo López Mateos, the former President of Mexico who, sincerely anxious to preserve our peoples from the terrible dangers of nuclear wars, took the initial steps towards the conclusion of a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons on our continent,

Decides to record a vote of appreciation to Mr. Adolfo López Mateos, the former President of Mexico, for his magnanimous initiative and decisive contribution to the cause of peace.

This Final Act was adopted unanimously by the Preparatory Commission at the 45th plenary meeting, held on 14 February 1967.

3

United States of America: message dated 21 February 1967 from the President of the United States, Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

[ENDC/187, of 21 February 1967]

[Original text: English]

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee reconvenes today in a time of renewed hope. Conclusion of a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in outer space, and a treaty for a Latin American nuclear free zone, give new impetus to the effort to bring the arms race under control.

The Disarmament Committee now faces a great opportunity—a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons I earnestly hope that it will soon be possible to recommend draft provisions of a non-proliferation treaty for the consideration of the Committee.

As I pointed out to the Congress of the United States in my State of the Union Message, the world is “in the midst of a great transition, a transition from narrow nationalism to international partnership; from the harsh spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and threatened planet”.

Our deepest obligation to ourselves and to our children is to bring nuclear weapons under control. We have already made considerable progress. The next step is to prevent the further spread of these weapons. If we fail to act now, nation after nation will be driven to use valuable resources to
acquire them. Even local conflicts will involve the danger of nuclear war. Nuclear arms will spread to potentially unstable areas where open warfare has taken place during the last decade. Indeed, all the progress of the past few years toward a less dangerous world may well be undone.

A non-proliferation treaty must be equitable as between the nuclear and the non-nuclear-weapon powers. I am confident that we can achieve such equity and that the security of all nations will be enhanced.

Such a treaty will help free the non-nuclear nations from the agonizing decision of whether to pursue a search for security through nuclear arms. Freed from the fear that non-nuclear neighbors may develop such weapons, nations can devote their efforts in the field of atomic energy to developing strong, peaceful programs.

I have instructed our negotiators to exercise the greatest care that the treaty not hinder the non-nuclear powers in their development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We believe in sharing the benefits of scientific progress and we will continue to act accordingly Through the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the European Atomic Energy Community, and through other international channels, we have shared—and will continue to share—the knowledge we have gained about nuclear energy. There will be no barrier to effective co-operation among the signatory nations.

I am sure we all agree that a non-proliferation treaty should not contain any provisions that would defeat its major purpose. The treaty must, therefore, cover nuclear explosive devices for peaceful as well as military purposes. The technology is the same. A peaceful nuclear explosive device would, in effect, also be a highly sophisticated weapon.

However, this will not impose any technological penalty on the participating nations. The United States is prepared to make available nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international safeguards. We are prepared to join other nuclear States in a commitment to do this.

More generally, we recommend that the treaty clearly state the intention of its signatories to make available the full benefits of peaceful nuclear technology—including any benefits that are the by-product of weapons research.

We believe that the peaceful atom remains peaceful, we must work toward a broad international system of safeguards satisfactory to all concerned. The treaty provides a unique opportunity for progress to this end.

Agreement on a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will be an historic turning point in the long effort to bring the atom to heel. It will, I am confident, permit further co-operative steps to reduce nuclear armaments. Plain sanity calls for a halt to the competition in nuclear arms.

There is nothing to choose here between the interests of the nuclear and the non-nuclear nations: there is a terrible and inescapable equity in our common danger. I wish you Godspeed in your work.

4 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: message from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Right Honourable Harold Wilson, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

[ENDC/188, of 21 February 1967] [Original text: English]

The 1967 session of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will be of critical importance. I believe that we have now reached the point at which, given the political will, a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons can be negotiated soon. This is the most urgent of the Committee's tasks.

Such an agreement, however, cannot stand on its own. If, as I hope, the Committee's negotiations result in a non-proliferation treaty, this must spur it on to new endeavours. I believe that progress is possible in two most important areas. The first is that of a complete test ban; the second, real progress to more general disarmament, particularly in nuclear weapons. Dangerous tendencies now exist which could lead the world into a new arms race. It must be the Committee's objective to halt these tendencies and to begin the pressing task of reducing nuclear stocks and conventional forces, so that the world can devote a higher proportion of its resources to the problems of hunger and inequality.

In seeking these objectives the Committee will have the full support of the United Kingdom. I send it my best wishes for a fruitful session.

5 Sweden: memorandum on the control of an underground test ban treaty

[ENDC/291, of 10 July 1967] [Original text: English]

1. Purpose

The purpose of this document is to provide a more detailed explanation of the scientific background to some of the statements on the problems of underground test ban control made by the Swedish representative at the 39th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 29 June 1967 (ENDC/PV 309). To make it more generally accessible, descriptive language has been used. To be fully understandable some of the points would, however, require an explanation in mathematical terms.

As stated in the speech, the Swedish investigations have been concentrated on the question of how to use seismological methods of identification to distinguish underground explosions among earthquakes for the purpose of verifying an underground test ban treaty.

2. Analytical method used

The statistical method of evaluation employed constitutes an application of decision theory and is a further development of the method described in a report from the National Defence Research Institute in Stockholm. It has been used to evaluate both the case of control with inspection and the case of such control without inspection.

The basic assumption made was that a convincing control system would have to satisfy two political requirements:

1. It should provide sufficient deterrence against violations by making the probability for discovery sufficiently high;

2. It should contain adequate assurance against the risk that "freaks of nature", in the form of earthquakes similar in appearance to explosions, should induce unwarranted political accusations.

These political requirements were put into mathematical form together with the statistical properties of the identification method investigated. The quantities obtained were then used in a mathematical model of control procedures which takes into account the always present risks of mistaking explosions for earthquakes and vice versa. (The appearance now and then of explosions looking like earthquakes is covered in this way.) This model then provides a procedure by which to determine the level of earthquake similarity below which an event is regarded as an explosion. This level is selected in such a way as to provide the required deterrence against violations and at the same time providing sufficient assurance against mistakes concerning earthquakes. An essential feature of the method employed is that it also permits the determination of the most efficient level of earthquake-similarity, efficient in the sense that the required deterrent is maintained at the same time as—in the non-inspection case—the risk for mistakes concerning earthquakes is made as small as possible. Likewise, in the inspection case, the number of inspections required is minimized.

8 Research Institute for National Defence of Sweden, Approaches to some test ban control problems, report C 4286-20(23) 1967.
In conclusion, the method employed provides a procedure to determine whether a particular identification method, exploited in the most efficient way, meets a particular political control requirement or not.

3. Specific assumptions

The method involves eight basic quantities. These are described more fully in the following. In order to be able to make the calculations, specific numerical values have been assigned to some of them. This is also explained below.

For three of the eight quantities the numerical values are determined by nature and by the observational techniques available.

For the purpose of calculation, the number of earthquakes per year in the area to be monitored was taken as 200. According to an official statement in the United States* this corresponds to the yearly number of shallow earthquakes in the Soviet Union, of magnitudes larger than 4. This number has also been said to be not far from the corresponding number of earthquakes in the United States. The particular magnitude level of 4 was selected as being close to the level of routine detection by the powerful seismological LASA (large aperture seismic array) station in Montana. Events of magnitudes just above this detection level will, because of the sophisticated post detection processing possible with data from this station, have a signal-to-noise ratio which is helpful to identification analysis also of these weak events. The magnitude corresponds to various explosions in hard rock of nuclear devices with yields of approximately 1 kiloton.

Two statistical quantities were employed to describe the particular identification methods considered. One of them is determined by the physical properties of earthquakes and the other by the corresponding properties of explosions. Both are influenced by the particular method of measurement employed. In all, five identification methods are considered. The statistical properties of these methods were obtained from published reports or from articles in scientific journals. Three of those articles make use of local or regional data, measured within approximately 1,000 km from the event. (For the purpose of test ban control such regional data could be obtained through a proper international data exchange.) The two other identification methods considered employ teleseismic data, obtained at distances between 1,000 and 10,000 km from the event. These can thus be used over intercontinental distances.

The remaining five quantities involved in our analysis express the political requirements of the control procedure. Their numerical determination is largely a matter of political and technical judgement and should be considered as a major step in the definition of a control system.

The sufficient deterrence against violations is defined by two quantities: the number of explosions per year in violation of a treaty and a sufficiently high probability of disclosure of such violations. In our calculations the number of these explosions was chosen to be one per year. The disclosure probability level was put at 10 per cent. meaning that a prospective violator would have to face one chance in ten of being disclosed. This level was estimated to be high enough to deter from violations in view of the high political costs involved in a disclosure. As a matter of fact, this figure seems to have been used in similar calculations in the United States. It should not be confused with the higher levels of disclosure desirable in intelligence activities, where one, of course, wants to find out as much as possible.

The second political requirement of the control system, as outlined in the statement of the Swedish representative, concerns the adequate assurance against the risk that earthquakes, similar in appearance to explosions, could lead to unwarranted political accusations.

In the case of control with inspection the process of verification contains two steps. In the first of these, mistakes concerning earthquakes on the basis of seismological and collateral evidence are of limited importance, as the final political decision will be made only after the second step, that of inspection, has given conclusive evidence of a violation. The case of control with on-site inspection therefore has to take into account the number of such inspections required or permitted. At the outset of our calculations this number was left open as a quantity to be determined by the calculation. In the inspection case the efficiency of inspections also has to be taken into account. This will depend on the inspection procedure provided in the treaty (in past test ban discussions referred to as inspection modalities) and on available techniques for event localization and on-site inspection. This inspection efficiency was taken into account in terms of the probability that inspections of violations will be successful. This probability was put at 50 per cent, being an estimate of what event location capabilities and modalities could provide, taken together.

In the case of control without on-site inspections, the guarantee given by the inspections against mistaking in the final assessment earthquakes for explosions does not exist and has to be replaced by an extremely low probability for making such mistakes. This probability is measured by the expected number of years between such mistakes. In our calculations this number was left open as a quantity to be determined.

In assessing the results, we assumed that control systems, where such mistakes are expected to occur only once in a hundred years, are acceptable and that systems with one mistake in ten years are worth being discussed.

4 Results

Using the assumptions described above, the calculations showed that some of the identification methods that have been published are of rather limited efficiency. However, data on the British teleseismic or long distance method of identification by complexity, as presented by Kelly in the report referred to in an earlier footnote and obtained with the LASA station in Montanas, indicate the possibility of control with no mistake on inspection in two years. A similar number of on-site inspections would be sufficient if regional data, proper to the identification method developed in the United States by Booker and Mitrofanovs and also referred to above, could be obtained, for instance, through an international data exchange. If combined, these two methods should result in a further decrease in the number of on-site inspections required, and thus constitute considerable progress if compared with the requirement of several inspections per year stated in the past.

The efficiency of the published identification methods has indeed improved so much during the last years that it has become meaningful to discuss the possibilities for control without inspection. The data on identification by complexity, already referred to, indicate the possibility of an inspection-free control system within the required ten per cent deterrent level and limiting mistakes concerning earthquakes to once in 15 years. This might constitute an acceptable system in itself.
It would be further improved if regional data for the Booker and Mironovas identification method were made available through an international data exchange.

The most promising of the published identification methods is, however, one which makes use of certain simultaneous measurements, from long distances, of long period and short period waves. The value of this method was recognized at an early stage by British scientists and the data on this method, published by Marshall et al., in the British report referred to earlier, indicate the possibility of an inspection-free system operating at a deterrence level of more than 10 per cent and limiting mistakes concerning earthquakes to one in a hundred years. This would be a very impressive system but in this case our estimates rest on rather few observations and one should be cautious in using our conclusions until more data have been made available. To include in its practical application sufficiently low magnitudes this short-period/long-period method of identification requires that the sensitive short-period array stations are combined with arrays of very sensitive long-period instruments and powerful computers.

6 United States of America: draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons [ENDC/192, of 24 August 1967] [Original text: English]

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, mutual and decisive,

Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Have agreed as follows:

**Article I**

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

**Article II**

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

**Article III**

(International Control)

**Article IV**

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

**Article V**

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.
ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time thereafter.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of __________________, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any request for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty, the Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in __________________ at this __________________ of __________________

United States of America: revised draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENMC/192/Rev.1, of 18 January 1968]
[Original text: English]

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation, of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; nor to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless
the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

**Article IV**

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

**Article V**

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.

**Article VI**

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

**Article VII**

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

**Article VIII**

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

**Article IX**

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the States which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and 40 other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

**Article X**

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

**Article XI**

This Treaty, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited.
in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in... at... this... of...

8

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/193, of 24 August 1967]
[Original text: Russian]

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty", considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

(International Control)

ARTICLE IV

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE V

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of... which are hereby designated as Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and... other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.
4 For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5 The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6 This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

**ARTICLE VII**

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

**ARTICLE VIII**

This Treaty, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duty certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in... at... this... of...

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**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: revised draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons**

[ENDC/J93/Rev.1, of 18 January 1968]

[Original text: Russian]

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty”,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the developments of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Have agreed as follows:

**ARTICLE I**

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

**ARTICLE II**

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; nor to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

**ARTICLE III**

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material, whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

**Article IV**

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty.

**Article V**

Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty so desiring may, pursuant to a special agreement or agreements, obtain any such benefits on a bilateral basis or through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.

**Article VI**

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

**Article VII**

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

**Article VIII**

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

**Article IX**

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of . . ., which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and 40 other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

**Article X**

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

**Article XI**

This Treaty, the Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in . . . at . . . this . . . of . . .

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United States of America: statement, dated 24 August 1967, by the President of the United States, Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson

[ENDC/194, of 24 August 1967]
[Original text: English]

Today at Geneva the United States and the Soviet Union as Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee are submitting to the Committee a draft treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. For more than twenty years the world has watched with growing fear as nuclear weapons have spread. Since 1945, five nations have come into possession of these dreadful weapons. We believe now—as we did then—that even one such nation is too many. But the issue now is not whether some have nuclear weapons while others do not. The issue is whether the nations will agree to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse.

Today, for the first time, we have within our reach an instrument which permits us to make a choice.

The submission of a draft treaty brings us to the final and most critical stage of this effort. The draft will be available for consideration by all Governments, and for negotiation by the Conference.

The treaty must reconcile the interests of nations with our interest as a community of human beings on a small planet. The treaty must be responsive to the needs and problems of all the nations of the world—great and small, aligned and non-aligned, nuclear and non-nuclear.

It must add to the security of all.

It must encourage the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

It must provide adequate protection against the corruption of the peaceful atom to its use for weapons of war.

I am convinced that we are today offering an instrument that will meet these requirements.

If we go forward to completion of a worldwide agreement, we will pass on a great gift to those who follow us.

We shall demonstrate that—despite all his problems, quarrels, and distractions—a man still retains a capacity to design his fate, rather than being engulfed by it.

Failure to complete our work will be interpreted by our children and grandchildren as a betrayal of conscience, in a world that needs all of its resources and talents to serve life, not death.

I have given instructions to the United States representative, Mr. William C. Foster, which reflect our determination to ensure that a fair and effective treaty is concluded.

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament now has before it the opportunity to make a cardinal contribution to man’s safety and peace.

Sweden: text of an article on international control for insertion in the draft Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/195, of 30 August 1967]  
[Original text: English]

ARTICLE III

For the purpose of providing assurance that source or special fissionable material, covered by this article, shall not be diverted to nuclear weapons:

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes:

(a) Not to allow source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to be transferred to any other State unless such material and equipment are subject to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency;

(b) To apply the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all such material and equipment, transferred to its territory or territory under its jurisdiction after the entry into force of the Treaty.

2. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes, in addition, to accept the full application of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all nuclear energy activities within its territory or territory under its jurisdiction.

3. Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes, in addition, to co-operate in facilitating the gradual application of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the peaceful nuclear energy activities within its territory or territory under its jurisdiction.

4. For such transfers referred to in paragraph 1 of this article, or such nuclear energy activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this article, as are regulated by bilateral or multilateral arrangements entered into before the date of the original entry into force of this Treaty, the obligations stipulated in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be implemented as soon as practicable, but not later than three years from the date of the original entry into force of the Treaty.

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Mexico: working paper containing a summary of amendments suggested by the delegation of Mexico, in the course of its statement at the 331st meeting of the Committee on 19 September 1967, to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/196, of 19 September 1967]  
[Original text: English and Spanish]

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to this Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those Parties that are in a position to do so, have the duty to contribute, according to their ability, either in cooperation with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the production, industries, and other applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States.

ARTICLE IV-A

1. Nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty shall provide adequate means and facilities to make available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

2. Such assistance shall be requested and channeled through appropriate international bodies with adequate representation of non-nuclear weapon States, subject to procedures to be established in a special agreement; it shall be provided on a non-discriminatory basis and shall not be withheld because of extraneous considerations. The charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used shall be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

ARTICLE IV-B

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE IV-C

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith, with all speed and perseverance, to arrive at further agreements regarding the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, as well as to reach agreement on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
United Arab Republic: working paper containing certain amendments to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/197, of 26 September 1967] [Original text: French]

Article I

Amend the article as follows:
1. Between the words "any recipient whatsoever" and the words "nuclear weapons", insert the words "in any form whatsoever";
2. At the end of the article add the following new paragraph:
"Each nuclear-weapon State undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that no person, company, enterprise or private, public or semi-public body that is subject to its jurisdiction and is engaged in nuclear activities participates in any act which is prohibited by this article."

Article II

Amend the article by adding the following text at the end of the last sentence:
"... and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices"

Article IV-A

Each nuclear-weapon State undertakes not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty which has no nuclear weapons on its territory

Romania: working paper containing amendments to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/199, of 19 October 1967] [Original text: French]

Preamble
1. After the third paragraph, introduce a new paragraph:
"Recognizing that the danger of a nuclear war can be eliminated only by the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and the destruction of all existing stockpiles of such weapons and of the means of their delivery."
2. At the end of the fourth paragraph, add the following provisions:
"based on the following principles:
"(a) The Treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;
"(b) The Treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers;
"(c) The Treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament;
"(d) There should be acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the Treaty;
"(e) Nothing in the Treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories."
3. Replace the present fifth preambular paragraph by the following text:
"Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities in accordance with the bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded by them"
not have given, six months before the date of expiry of the Treaty, notice of its intention to cease to be Party to the Treaty."

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Brasil: amendments to the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/204, of 31 October 1967]  
[Original text: English]

1. Article I shall be amended to read as follows:

"Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or the control over such weapons directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over such weapons. Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes the obligation to channel, through a special United Nations fund, for the benefit of the economic development of developing countries, in particular for their scientific and technological progress, a substantial part of the resources freed by the measures of nuclear disarmament."  

2. Article II shall be amended to read as follows:

"Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or the control over such weapons directly or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture, acquisition or control of nuclear weapons."

3. A new article, provisionally numbered II-A, shall be included and formulated as follows:

"Each nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes the obligation to negotiate at the earliest possible date a Treaty for the cessation of nuclear arms race and for the eventual reduction and elimination of their nuclear arsenals and the means of delivery of their nuclear weapons."

4. Article IV shall be amended to read as follows:

"Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop, alone or in co-operation with other States, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including nuclear explosive devices for civil uses, without discrimination, as well as the right of the Parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

5. Article V, paragraph 2, shall be amended to read as follows:

"2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty, and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency."

6. Article V, paragraph 3, shall be amended to read as follows:

"3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty, with a view to ensuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized, in particular the provisions of articles I and II-A."

7. Article VI, paragraph 3, shall be amended to read as follows:

"3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and ... other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of the instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is the one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to January 1, 1967."

8. In article VI, a new paragraph provisionally numbered paragraph 7, shall be included and formulated as follows:

"7. Nothing in this Treaty affects nor shall be interpreted as affecting, in any way, the rights or obligations of signatory States under regional treaties on the proscription of nuclear weapons or the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties, consistent with the objectives of this Treaty."

9. Article VII shall be amended to read as follows:

"This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that there have arisen or may arise circumstances related with the subject matter of this Treaty which may affect the supreme interest of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary Governments, three months in advance."

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Brasil: amendments to the revised draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/201 Rev. 2, of 13 February 1968]  
[Original text: English]

1. Article I shall be amended to read as follows:

"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or the control over such weapons directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or control over such weapons."

2. Article II shall be amended to read as follows:

"Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or the control over such weapons directly or indirectly, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture, acquisition or control of nuclear weapons."

3. Article IV shall be amended to read as follows:

"1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop, alone or in co-operation with other States, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including nuclear explosive devices for civil uses, without discrimination."

"2. All the parties to the Treaty have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or International Organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty."

4. Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:

"1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

"2. Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes the obligation to negotiate at the earliest possible date a Treaty for the cessation of nuclear arms race and for the eventual reduction and elimination of the nuclear arsenals and the means of delivery of the nuclear weapons."

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"3 Each nuclear-weapon State party to this Treaty undertakes the obligation to channel, through a special United Nations fund for the benefit of the economic development of developing countries, in particular for their scientific and technological progress, a substantial part of the resources freed by the measures of nuclear disarmament."

5. Article VII shall be amended to read as follows:

"Nothing in this treaty affects or shall be interpreted as affecting, in any way, the rights or obligations of signatory States under regional Treaties on the proscription of nuclear weapons or the rights of any group of States to conclude regional Treaties, consistent with the objectives of this Treaty."

6. Article IX, paragraph 3, shall be amended to read as follows:

"3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and ... other States signatory to the Treaty, and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty a nuclear-weapon State is the one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon prior to 1 January 1967."

7. Article X, paragraph 1, shall be amended to read as follows:

"1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that there have arisen or may arise circumstances related with the subject matter of this Treaty which may affect the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary Governments, three months in advance.

\[ENDC/202, of 2 November 1967\]

**Article II-A**

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes, if requested, to come to the aid of any non-nuclear-weapon State which is threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons.

**Article IV-A**

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to co-operate directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency, in good faith and according to its technological and/or material resources, with any other State or group of States Party to this Treaty in the development and advancement of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and in the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty shall make available, through the International Atomic Energy Agency, to all non-nuclear-weapon Parties, full scientific and technological information on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy accruing from research on nuclear explosive devices.

The nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty shall also provide facilities for scientists from non-nuclear-weapon countries to work on the Treaty to collaborate with their scientists working on nuclear explosive devices, in order to narrow the intellectual gap which will be created in that field as a result of restrictions imposed by this Treaty on non-nuclear-weapon States.

**Article IV-B**

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to communicate annually to the International Atomic Energy Agency, full information on the nature, extent and results of its co-operation with any other Party or group of Parties, in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The reports so received by the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be circulated by the Agency to all the Parties to the Treaty.

**Article IV-C**

Each Party to this Treaty shall take necessary legal and administrative steps to ensure that all organizations working on the development of nuclear energy in territory under its jurisdiction do so in conformity with the aims and provisions of the Treaty.

**Article VII**

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides:

(a) That the aims of the Treaty are being frustrated;

(b) That the failure by a State or group of States to adhere to the Treaty jeopardizes the existing or potential balance of power in its area, thereby threatening its security;

(c) That any other extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of reasons for withdrawal.

\[ENDC/203, of 22 November 1967\]

**Article V**

"3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuming that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized."

\[ENDC/203/Rev.1, of 22 February 1968\]

**Article VII**

"3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuming that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized."

\[ENDC/204, of 24 November 1967\]

**Aide-mémoire submitted on 17 November 1967 by the Government of Switzerland to the Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament**

Switzerland is paying the greatest attention to the work of the Conference on the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is convinced that the interest of the community of nations requires that the spread and proliferation of nuclear weapons should be checked. Hence it hopes very much that a satisfactory non-proliferation treaty will be concluded.

The present draft Treaty [sections 6 and 8 above] cannot yet give rise to the adoption of a definitive position by the Swiss Government, since the text is subject to amendment and one of its main articles is missing. Nevertheless, the draft calls for some comments which it is to be hoped that the negotiations will be able to take into account..."
1. Articles I and II of the draft Treaty contain some ideas which should be defined more accurately in order to clarify the commitments which they entail.

(a) The two articles prohibit the direct or indirect transfer of any nuclear explosive device. The Swiss authorities consider that the term "indirect" concerns the supply of arms, explosives or technical assistance for military purposes through the agency of a third State whether a Party to the Treaty or not.

(b) The phrase "to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" does not cover, according to the interpretation of the Swiss authorities, exploitation of uranium deposits, enrichment of uranium, extraction of plutonium from nuclear fuels, or manufacture of fuel elements or heavy water, when these processes are carried out for civil purposes.

The Swiss authorities would like these interpretations to be confirmed formally.

2. The future Article III on control should express in particular the following principles:

(a) Control should be limited to the flow of source and special fissionable materials, as indeed the fifth paragraph of the preamble provides. It should not go beyond its objective, which is to prevent these products from being used for the manufacture of weapons. Consequently, there should be an accurate description of what can be controlled in accordance with the rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency of 3 December 1953.

(b) There should not be any double control.

(c) The costs of control should be borne by the control organ in order to avoid commercial discrimination against peaceful exports of nuclear material from non-nuclear-weapon States for the benefit of nuclear-weapon States not subject to control or of signatory non-nuclear-weapon States.

(d) Each State should be entitled to object to particular inspectors, and to have inspectors accompanied during control by its own officials.

(e) To maintain equality in the conditions of competition between States, it would be desirable that control should extend also to the civil nuclear installations of nuclear-weapon States.

3. Article IV, on freedom to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, should be supplemented:

(a) The sixth paragraph of the preamble expresses the intention of the nuclear-weapon States to make available to all Parties to the Treaty the knowledge and benefits of applications of nuclear technology derived from the development of nuclear explosive devices and capable of civil use. This intention should be transformed into a juridical commitment in the body of the Treaty, without however implying that the communication of such information would be free of charge.

(b) In regard to atomic explosions for peaceful purposes, the Swiss authorities consider that the intentions expressed in the eighth paragraph of the preamble should also constitute an article of the Treaty; this article could provide for the establishment of a special body, in which the non-nuclear-weapon States would be represented, to determine the conditions in which nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could take place.

4. For the Treaty to fulfil its aim, it should come near to universality. It would be desirable that Article VI, paragraph 3, should stipulate that the entry into force of the Treaty shall be subject to ratification by as large a number of States as possible, including all the signatory nuclear-weapon States. Switzerland could only be a party to the Treaty if most of the Powers that possess nuclear weapons acceded to it. So long as that condition is not fulfilled, the Treaty will contain a gap endangering the security of the small States on which it would be binding. Moreover, the non-accession of important industrial Powers might be economically prejudicial to the competitive capacity of the atomic industry of the signatory States.

5. Article VII stipulates that the Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. To subscribe to such a commitment seems hardly conceivable in a field where development is as rapid and unpredictable as that of nuclear science and its technical, economic, political and military implications. Consequently it would be preferable that the Treaty be concluded for a definite period, at the end of which a review conference would decide about its renewal. During that interval, the nuclear-weapon States could adopt specific measures aimed at a limitation of armaments. The non-nuclear-weapon States certainly cannot take the responsibility of tying their hands indefinitely if the nuclear-weapon States fail to arrive at positive results in that direction.

6. The Treaty will establish a lasting juridical discrimination between States according to whether they possess nuclear weapons or not. To consent to this would represent for the non-nuclear-weapon States a heavy sacrifice which is inconceivable unless something is given in return. Since their security is what the arms race chiefly endangers, some progress should be made in limiting this.

The provisions on that subject in the preamble are not sufficient, because they do not constitute a commitment but a mere declaration of intent. They should not only be given a place in the body of the Treaty but should also comprise more precise obligations, such as the stabilization of atomic armaments at their present level. Furthermore, the nuclear-weapon States should solemnly and formally undertake never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. Parties to the Treaty.

Such provisions would to some extent meet the security requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

7. It would be desirable that the Treaty should provide a mandatory arbitration procedure for all disputes over its interpretation and application.

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Italy: working paper containing a proposal concerning the transfer of fissile material

[ENDC/205, of 30 November 1967]

[Original text: French]

(The following text is similar to a statement made at the 318th plenary meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, on 1 August 1967, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Amintore Fanfani.)

Because of the importance we attribute to a well-balanced and effective Treaty, no effort should be spared to make progress with other collateral disarmament measures, especially if they are likely to encourage adherence to the draft Treaty.

I therefore wonder whether it would not be possible to imagine some proposal which, while linked up with measures examined in the past, might respond to certain imperatives important for all of us and more particularly for the non-nuclear Powers that have undertaken the negotiation of the treaty.

This proposal could be independent of the Treaty, linked with or even incorporated in it according to circumstances; it could consist of an agreement under which the nuclear Powers would transmit periodically to the non-nuclear States signatories to the Treaty an agreed quantity of the fissile material they produce. Such an agreement might be based on the proposal put forward by the United States in 1964 for a "cut-off"—that is, a discontinuance of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons—a proposal which was not followed up because of the difficulties encountered in connexion with the question of control. It represented, however, an expression of the will to achieve disarmament, an expression of will to which it might perhaps be opportune to revert today.

An agreement of this kind would indirectly subject the production of nuclear weapons by the military-nuclear States to a brake consisting in the necessity of allocating part of their fissile material to non-nuclear countries for peaceful uses.

* See Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1964, document DC/209, annex 1, sect B.
Within the same context, the non-nuclear countries to which the fissile material transferred by the nuclear Powers would be assigned should pay a reduced price compared to the market value; while part of this price would go to the nuclear producing Powers, the other part could be paid into the United Nations funds for the progress of the developing countries.

The agreement thus proposed could also lay down the principles of the distribution of fissile material among the beneficiary countries. As for control, one could refer to the provisions to be proposed for a non-proliferation treaty.

I wish to stress the link that exists in this proposal between the brake on nuclear armament, the encouragement of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the aid given to the social and economic progress of the developing countries.

This initiative, of which I have sketched the broad outline, would also be a gesture of good will by the nuclear Powers in respect of disarmament to prove their willingness to give up part of their fissile material and to put a brake, even a modest one, on the continuous growth of their military nuclear potential. This initiative would provide them with the means of countering renunciation on the part of the non-nuclear countries by allocating to them fissile material for peaceful uses at a favourable price, which would not fail to encourage concrete measures to fill the technological gap, such as those that were envisaged in an Italian proposal put forward in 1966. The initiative which we suggest would enable the nuclear countries which would give up part of the value, and the non-nuclear countries which would pay the agreed price, to establish an ideal link between disarmament measures and the progress of a region or country, in conformity with the appeal of His Holiness Pope Paul VI and the Italian proposal made in 1965.

Lastly, if the transfer of fissile material would benefit only the non-nuclear countries signatories to the non-proliferation Treaty, the idea which I have just explained to you would favour the accession to this treaty of the greatest possible number of non-nuclear countries by providing an appreciable material and moral compensation for their renunciation of nuclear weapons.

If the Committee agrees that this idea is interesting, the Italian delegation could easily develop it for the purposes of the Conference in a document which might prove useful either in the expectation of a draft treaty and even in its preparation or in supplementing and strengthening it.\cite{ibid, Supplement 1966, document DC/228, annex I, sect C}

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United States of America: statement made on 2 December 1967 by the President of the United States, Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson

[ENDC/206, of 5 December 1967] [Original text: English]

I believe history will record that on this day 25 years ago, mankind reached the turning-point of his destiny.

The Book of Genesis tells us that, in the beginning, God directed man to:

"Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it."

But only in our lifetime have we acquired the ultimate power to fulfill all of that command. Throughout history, man has struggled to find enough power—and to find enough energy—to do his work in the world. He domesticated animals, he sold his brother into slavery, and enslaved himself to the machine—all in a desperate search for energy.

Desperation ended in the experiment conducted in Chicago, 25 years ago, by Enrico Fermi and by his fellow scientists. In a single stroke, they increased man's available energy more than a thousand-fold.

They placed in our hands the power of the universe itself.

Nothing could have been more appropriate than the words that were used by Dr. Arthur Compton to describe what happened on that day: "The Italian navigator has just landed in the new world."

This modern "Italian navigator" was a great man of science. But he was also something more. He was one of millions who, in the long history of the world, have been compelled to leave a beloved native land to escape the forces of tyranny. Like millions before him, Enrico Fermi found here a new home, among free men, in a new world. His life and career have a special meaning to all who love freedom.

There are today millions of young Americans with an Italian heritage who feel a deep personal pride in Enrico Fermi. America was born out of the voyages of a great Italian navigator. In a time of greatest danger, another—equally willing to pursue his dream beyond existing charts—took us into a new epoch.

Today we commemorate our debt to him. And in doing so, we also honor the historic bond between the old world and the new.

In a short time, we will be dedicating, in Illinois, a new national accelerator laboratory. This laboratory, with its 200,000 million electron-volt accelerator, will maintain our country's position in the forefront of nuclear research.

And I suggest that we dedicate this great new laboratory to the memory of the modern-day "Italian navigator."

In so honoring Enrico Fermi, we will also honor the immeasurable contributions made, over the centuries, by the people of Italy to the people of the United States.

Much has already happened in that new world which began 25 years ago.

Giant nuclear reactors, direct descendants of Fermi's first atomic pile, are producing millions of kilowatts of power for peaceful purposes. Other reactors are powering nuclear submarines under the seas of the earth—our first line of defense against tyranny, whatever its contemporary doctrine or disguise, which Enrico Fermi dedicated himself to resist.

But it is really the peaceful uses of atomic energy about which Enrico Fermi would have wished us to speak—and they are many.

When I became President, nuclear energy was generating about 1,000,000 kilowatts of electric power in the United States.

Today, the atom is giving us more than 2,000,000 kilowatts—almost three times as much. More than 70 additional nuclear power plants are already planned or under construction.

This will equal about 20 per cent of the whole electric generating capacity in the United States today. It is enough to meet the total requirements of 45 million people. All this from what was, 25 years ago—before the success of Fermi's experiment—only a scientist's dream.

The dream has been realized. By learning the secret of the atom, we have given mankind—for the first time in history—all the energy mankind can possibly use.

It took the genius of countless generations of dedicated scientists to find the secret, and it remains to us to use it wisely.

What began as the most terrible instrument of war that man has ever seen, can become the key to a golden age of mankind. But this will not happen unless we make it happen.

We cannot forget that another, darker future also opened on this day, 25 years ago.

The power to achieve the promise of Genesis is also power to fulfill the prophecy of Armageddon. We can either remake life on earth or we can end it forever.

Let me be specific.

If Enrico Fermi's reactor had operated ten thousand years, it would not have produced enough plutonium for one atomic bomb.

Today, a single reactor can, while generating electricity, produce enough plutonium to make dozens of bombs every year. And scores of these reactors are now being built all over the world.
Their purpose is peaceful. Yet the fact remains that the secret diversion of even a small part of the plutonium they create could soon give every nation power to destroy civilization—if not life on this earth.

We cannot permit this to happen.

Nor can mankind be denied the unlimited benefits of the peaceful atom.

We must find a way to remove the threat while preserving the promise.

The American people made their own desires crystal clear when their representatives in the United States Senate voted unanimously to support an effective non-proliferation treaty for nuclear weapons.

We are now engaged in a major effort to achieve such a treaty, in a form acceptable to all nations.

We are trying to assure that the peaceful benefits of the atom will be shared by all mankind—without increasing the threat of nuclear destruction.

We do not believe that the safeguards we propose in that treaty will interfere with the peaceful activities of any country.

And I want to make it clear to the world that we in the United States are not asking any country to accept safeguards that we are unwilling to accept ourselves.

So I am, today, announcing that when such safeguards are applied under the treaty, the United States will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States—excluding only those with direct national security significance.

Under this offer the Agency will be able to inspect a broad range of United States nuclear activities, both governmental and private, including the fuel in nuclear reactors owned by utilities for generating electricity, and the fabrication and chemical reprocessing of such fuel.

This pledge maintains the consistent policy of the United States since the beginning of the nuclear age.

Just 14 years ago, a President of the United States appeared before the General Assembly of the United Nations to urge the peaceful use of the atom President Eisenhower said on that occasion:

"...the United States pledges . . . before the world, its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to finding the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."

We renew that pledge today. We reaffirm our determination to dedicate the miraculous power of the atom, not to death, but to life.

We invite the world's nations to join with us.

Let us use this historic anniversary to deepen and reaffirm the search for peace.

Let us so conduct ourselves that future generations will look back upon 2 December 1942—not as the origin of sorrow and despair—but as the beginning of the brightest, most inspiring chapter in the long history of man.

In order to assist these negotiations, Her Majesty's Government have decided that, at such time as International safeguards are put into effect in the non-nuclear weapon states in implementation of the provisions of a treaty, they will be prepared to offer an opportunity for the application of similar safeguards in the United Kingdom, subject to exclusions for national security reasons only.

Her Majesty's Government welcome the similar decision announced by President Johnson on behalf of the United States.

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Interim report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Committee

[ENDC/208, of 7 December 1967]
[Original text: English and Russian]

[For the text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 28, document A/6931-DC/229.]

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Statement by the President of the Republic of Chile submitted on 29 November 1967 to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

[ENDC/209/Rev.1, of 15 December 1967]
[Original text: Spanish]

In view of various publications regarding the situation of Latin American armament, the Government of Chile wishes to express its opinion as follows:

Chile neither supports nor sponsors disarmament of the Latin American countries.

Our armed forces are essential to the life of our countries: they safeguard our internal and external security, public order and national sovereignty, and must therefore maintain the level of efficiency necessary for the fulfillment of their important task.

To be drawn into an arms race is, however, quite a different matter.

Our present Government, like its predecessor, maintains that the acquisition of armaments must be restricted, for otherwise we might throw ourselves into a competition which would have the most serious political, economic and social consequences, since no country could refuse to compete without risking its own security.

It is inconceivable that we should make our chief aim the integration of our nations, and at the same time should initiate a policy of unlimited acquisition of armaments.

The situation would be even more unreasonable, for the weapons so acquired would have no other use than to defend each country against attack by the very neighbours who are seeking integration. However much the weapons cost, they could not be of the latest technological standards, nor of any use in a world war, over which moreover in these days our countries would have absolutely no control.

On the other hand, an arms race imports an economic and social decision. It would be absolutely incompatible for our peoples to redouble their efforts at economic and social development in order to extirpate misery, raise education to a high level, build housing, improve health conditions, develop agriculture and industry and create employment, and simultaneously to pay the costs of an uncontrolled competition in armaments.

Furthermore, all the American Presidents assembled in Punta del Este unanimously and solemnly supported that attitude towards the acquisition of armaments. We think it necessary to reproduce their declaration:

[Meeting of American Chiefs of State, held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, 12-14 April 1967]
Paragraphs and sections are not visible in the image. A text fragment is available:

"The Presidents of the Latin-American Republics,

Conscious of the importance of armed forces to the maintenance of security, recognize at the same time that the demands of economic development and social progress make it necessary to devote to those purposes the maximum resources available in Latin America.

Therefore, they express their intention to limit military expenditures in proportion to the actual demands of national security in accordance with each country's constitutional provisions, avoiding those expenditures that are not indispensable for the performance of the specific duties of the armed forces and, where pertinent, of international commitments that obligate their respective governments. With regard to the Treaty on the Banning of Nuclear Arms in Latin America, they express the hope that it may enter into force as soon as possible, once the requirements established by the Treaty are fulfilled.

This declaration was based precisely on the philosophy inspiring the Alliance for Progress To act otherwise would destroy its fundamental meaning.

The Government of Chile, in making this statement, does not claim to judge nor to refer to resolutions adopted by any of the States in the exercise of their sovereignty. It makes no complaint or reproach against any nation of the hemisphere. Chile respects these nations and seeks and needs their friendship, for it is convinced that only integration and co-operation between our countries can open before us a wide road of progress, justice and social peace.

We are guided only by an earnest desire, subject to the actual situation and the need to maintain armed forces, to seek agreements which will enable us to put the Declaration of Punta del Este into practice and devote the bulk of our resources to the economic and social development which our people so urgently require.

We do not ourselves claim to convene a meeting to consider this problem. We merely wish to point out to all fraternal peoples and governments in Latin America that our Government is completely ready and willing to participate in any high-level meeting that may be convened or may be proposed by any country, for this purpose.

Failure to act immediately would court obvious dangers. It would mean a deep contradiction between the facts and the declarations, and would compel us to admit that none of the machinery intended to unite us and ensure peace had the least value.

Letter dated 11 January 1968 from the Secretary-General to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament transmitting resolutions 2286 (XXII), 2289 (XXII), 2342 (XXII), 2343 (XXII), 2344 (XXII), and 2346 (XXII) of the General Assembly:

[ENDC/210, of 18 January 1968]

I have the honour to transmit the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament:

Resolution 2289 (XXII), entitled "Conclusions of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 1623rd plenary meeting on 8 December 1967;

Resolutions 2342 A (XXII) and 2342 B (XXII), entitled "Question of general and complete disarmament", adopted at the 1640th plenary meeting on 19 December 1967;

Resolution 2343 (XXII), entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests", adopted at the 1640th plenary meeting on 19 December 1967;

Resolution 2344 (XXII), entitled "Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America", adopted at the 1640th plenary meeting on 19 December 1967;

Resolution 2346 A (XXII), entitled "Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", adopted at the 1640th plenary meeting on 19 December 1967.

I would draw attention particularly to the following direct references to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament contained in the above-mentioned resolutions:

In resolution 2289 (XXII), paragraph 2 referring to the possibility of negotiations by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the conclusion of an appropriate convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons;

In resolution 2342 (XXII), paragraph 4 recommending that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in its efforts towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, should take into account the report (A/6858) by the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons and the conclusions thereof;

In resolution 2342 B (XXII), paragraphs 1 and 3 requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at the earliest possible date consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament in accordance with resolution 2162 C (XXI) and to report on the progress achieved to the General Assembly at its twentieth session;

In resolution 2343 (XXII), paragraph 4 requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report on that matter to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

In resolution 2344 (XXII), paragraphs 1 and 2 requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume consideration of the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in accordance with resolution 2165 (XXI), and to report on the progress achieved to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session;

In resolution 2346 A (XXII), paragraphs 2 and 3 calling upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to continue negotiations regarding a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving all due consideration to all proposals submitted to the Committee and to the views expressed by Member States during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, and requesting the Committee to submit to the General Assembly on or before 15 March 1968 a full report on the negotiations, together with the pertinent documents and records.

In connexion with resolution 2289 (XXII), paragraph 3, the relevant documents and records are the following: A/6834, A/6840/Add.1, A/6840/Rev.2, A/6851/Rev.2, A/6945/Add.1, A/C.1/L.409, the verbatim records of the 153rd, 153rd to 155th and 153rd to 154th meetings of the First Committee (A/C.1/PV.1532, 1534-1552 and 1539-1541); and the verbatim records of the 1623rd plenary meeting (A/PV.1623).

In connexion with resolution 2342 B (XXII), paragraph 2, the relevant documents and records are the following: A/6860/Rev.1, A/6860, A/6880/Rev.2, A/6885/Rev.2, A/6885/Rev.2, A/7017, A/C.1/L.411 and Rev.1, A/C.1/L.412 and Add.1-2, A/C.1/...
the world, the two nations which carry the heaviest responsibility for averting the catastrophe of nuclear war can, with sufficient patience and determination, move forward. They can move forward toward the goal which all men of good will seek—a reversal of the arms race and a more secure peace based on our many common interests on this one small planet.

I believe history will look on this treaty as a landmark in the effort of mankind to avoid nuclear disaster while ensuring that all will benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

This treaty will be a testament of man's faith in the future in that spirit I commend it to all.

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United States of America: statement dated 25 January 1968 on "Project Gasbuggy" by the Atomic Energy Commission of the United States

[ENDC/213, of 25 January 1968]
[Original text: English]

The United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and other project participants released today the preliminary technical data obtained from "Project Gasbuggy." Project Gasbuggy is the first joint government-industry experiment in the AEC's "Plowshare Program" to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.

The detonation occurred on 10 December 1967 near Farmington, New Mexico. The limited seismic data analyzed to date indicate that the explosion released approximately 26 kilotons of energy.

The specific objective of Project Gasbuggy is to obtain data to help determine whether nuclear explosives can be used to stimulate production and recovery of natural gas from formations where gas is not presently economically recoverable by conventional means. The experiment is being conducted jointly by the El Paso Natural Gas Company, the Department of the Interior, and the AEC. The technical programme is under the direction of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, California, operated for the AEC by the University of California. The final results of Project Gasbuggy are not expected to be known for about a year.

Re-entry drilling was completed on 10 January 1968 and indicates that a chimney of broken rock formed as expected. The top of this chimney is 3,007 feet below the surface of the ground, which gives a chimney height of 333 feet. Pre-shot calculations had indicated that a layer of coal, located 334 feet above the explosion point would stop the formation of the chimney at that height. The agreement between calculations and the actual chimney height is considered remarkably good. The fact that the chimney height was so close to that expected gives increased confidence that other pre-shot calculations such as the 78-foot chimney radius may also be approximately correct. Other measurements indicate that the chimney was formed by collapse within a minute after the explosion.

At the time of the explosion the instrumentation designed to measure the extent of fracturing in rock around the chimney indicated that such fractures were formed and extended out to about 440 feet. The pre-shot prediction of the extent of such fracturing was about 390 feet.

The chimney formation and the extent of the fracturing are important since the rate at which natural gas flows into the well is determined by the permeability of the rock and the pressure of the gas within the rock. Thus, the size of the chimney of broken rock and the extent of the fractures extending outward from it, determine the increase in the recoverable gas.

The measurements of gas pressure in the Gasbuggy reservoir prior to detonation revealed a gas pressure of about 1,050 pounds per square inch. The gas pressure, measured after the explosion currently is 833 pounds per square inch at the surface which indicates the pressure in the chimney now to be about 950 pounds per square inch. The lower pressure results from the fact that the explosion created about two

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United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: message from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Right Honourable Harold Wilson, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

[ENDC/211, of 18 January 1968]
[Original text: English]

With the resumption of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the negotiations for the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to which the Committee has devoted so much effort move to their crucial stage. I am glad that agreement has been reached on a complete text to be tabled at the opening of this session and hope that the treaty will soon be opened for signature.

The early conclusion of this treaty will not only constitute a major arms control achievement; it should also open the way to further progress in the field of disarmament.

I send the Disarmament Committee my best wishes for a constructive session.

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United States of America: statement dated 18 January 1968, by the President of the United States, Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson

[ENDC/222, of 19 January 1968]
[Original text: English]

I am most heartened to learn the Soviet Union will join the United States, as Co-Chairs of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to submit a complete text of a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and that this draft treaty will be submitted today to the Committee in Geneva. This revised text includes an agreed safeguards article and other revisions that will make the treaty widely acceptable.

We have worked long and hard in an effort to draft a text that reflects the views of other nations. I believe the draft presented today represents a major accomplishment in meeting these legitimate interests.

The text submitted today must now be considered further by all Governments. Following its review by the Conference in Geneva, it will be considered by the General Assembly in the spring. It is my fervent hope that I will be able to submit it to the Senate of the United States for its advice and consent this year.

The draft treaty text submitted today clearly demonstrates an important fact. In the face of the differences that exist in

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Ibid., document A/7017, paras. 4 (a), 4 (c), 4 (d), 4 (b) and 4 (c), respectively.

II Same text as resolution 2342 B (XXII).
million cubic feet of void space between the broken rock in the chimney into which gas can flow. As gas enters the chimney, pressure within the chimney starts to increase and is expected to approach original levels within a few months.

One of the objectives of the Gasbuggy experiment is to determine the rate at which gas re-enters the chimney, and this can be measured, in part, by the rate of the pressure increase. This data will be refined further by removing the gas collected in the chimney and again measuring the rate at which gas re-enters the chimney. Such determinations will be part of the continuing post-shot programme.

The predictions made before the Gasbuggy explosion indicated that several radionuclides would be present in the gas after the explosion—including krypton-85, iodine-131, and tritium. Measurements to determine the amount of tritium are important in assessing the public-health and safety aspects of this experiment. However, the samples of gas collected and measured to date at the Gasbuggy site have shown only that xenon-133 is present. The presence of xenon is not unexpected, and its short radio-active half-life of about five days means that it would not be of significance in future applications.

On-site instruments used for these radioactivity measurements are designed primarily to assure the health and safety of the workers at the site. They are not designed to perform detailed analyses to identify very small quantities of krypton or tritium. Samples of natural gas have been flown to Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore, California, for detailed analyses to investigate the presence of these and other nuclides. The results of these analyses are not expected to be known for several months.

Scientists working on this project point out that the most important information to be obtained from the Gasbuggy experiment—on radioactivity, gas-flow increases related to fracturing, gas pressure, and gas-production testing—will be gathered and analyzed during the coming year, after which it will be possible to draw firm conclusions about the results of the experiment.

In the figure below, the larger drawing at the right shows schematically the chimney, or column of crushed rock, and attendant fracturing, resulting from the use of a nuclear explosive used for the stimulation of gas production. The smaller drawing at the left shows in idealized form how nuclear explosives might be used for actual gas production in a gas-bearing field.

APPENDIX
[See page 31]

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Sweden: working paper containing amendments, suggested by the delegation of Sweden at the 36th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 8 February 1968, to the revised draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/215, of 8 February 1968]
[Original text: English]

Preamble
After the tenth paragraph insert a new paragraph worded as follows:

"Recalling the determination expressed by the parties to the partial test ban treaty of 1963 in its preamble to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end."

Article VI
After the words "arms race" insert the words "at an early date"; between the words "complete" and "disarmament" insert the word "nuclear."

The article would then read as follows:

"Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, and nuclear disarmament, and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament under strict and effective international control."

Article VIII
Add to the present wording of paragraph 3 the following sentence:

"At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convoking of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty."

32

Sweden: working paper containing further amendments, suggested by the delegation of Sweden at the 36th meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 13 February 1968, to the revised draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/216, of 13 February 1968]
[Original text: English]

Preamble
In the seventh preambular paragraph delete the words "by nuclear-weapon States."

Article V
In the first sentence, replace the words "non-nuclear-weapon" with the word "other". In the third sentence, after the words "understood that", delete the words "non-nuclear-weapon"; in the same sentence, delete the words "so desiring", "or agreements" and "on a bilateral basis."

The article would then read as follows:

"Each Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in order to assure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available through appropriate international procedures to other States Party to this Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. It is understood that States Party to this Treaty may, pursuant to a special agreement, obtain any such benefits through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States."

33

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: aide-mémoire dated 10 February 1968 from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the United States of America

[ENDC/217, of 13 February 1968]
[Original text: Russian]

On 21 January 1968 a B-52 bomber of the United States Strategic Air Command carrying four hydrogen bombs crashed in the area of North Star Bay, off the western coast of Greenland, while trying to land at the United States Air Force base at Thule.

As a result of the disaster the bombs fragmented and radioactive substances leaked out of them. The search party of the United States Air Force that arrived at the place of the accident has stated that radioactivity consisting of alpha particles emitted by plutonium has been discovered in the vicinity of Thule According to a dispatch of Associated Press, the leader of the search party, Maj. Gen. Richard O. Hunziker, has stated that apparently, it will take months before the United States Air Force succeeds in recovering the lost bombs, and that the search party has not even determined the scale of the problem facing it.

Competent scientists in various countries consider that the risk of radioactive contamination off the shores of Greenland is a very serious one. The extensive fisheries areas of the Atlantic Ocean will suffer from radioactive contamination for many months and possibly years. This hazard will be even further increased when radioactive particles are caught up by currents and carried throughout the waters of the Atlantic, The Gulf Stream, which washes the shores of many States, is directly in the area of radioactivity.
Appendix

GAS RESERVOIR STIMULATION

100ft NUCLEAR PRODUCTION WELLS
GAS COLLECTION LINE
GAS BEARING SANDSTONE
NUCLEAR CHIMNEYS

EMPLACEMENT HOLE PRODUCTION WELL
GAS COLLECTION LINE
ALUVIUM
SHALE
NATURAL FRACtURES
GAS FLOW
BEDDING PLANES
GAS BEARING SANDSTONE
PERMEABLE FRACtURES
RUBBLE CHIMNEY

W.P. = LOCATION OF EXPLOSIVE
Rc = CAVITY RADIUS
Fr = FRACTURE RADIUS
Rd = RADIUS OF DRAINAGE
H = HEIGHT OF CHIMNEY
h = DEPTH OF BURIAL
The operations of the United States Air Force, which have led, not for the first time, to radioactive contamination of wide areas of the sea, are a violation of the generally recognized principles and standards of international law They are contrary to the purpose of the Treaty banning nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water;\(^{11}\) signed in Moscow 1963 This purpose is to "put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances" These operations also infringe the 1958 Convention on the High Seas,\(^{12}\) to which the United States is a party This Convention obliges each State to take measures to prevent "pollution of the seas or air space above, resulting from any activities with radioactive materials or other harmful agents"\(^{13}\)

In attempting to minimize the seriousness of the disaster, the United States Department of Defense has stated that the hydrogen bombs, which occurred in the present case, as device Of course, and by explanation in no way alters the fact of the dangerous leakage of radioactive substances from the hydrogen bombs, which occurred in the present case, as many previous similar cases Attempts to represent as normal a situation in which United States nuclear bombs fall to the ground year after year, even though they have a safety device, cannot be taken seriously.

Is there any guarantee that the next accident to a United States bomber armed with nuclear bombs will not lead to the explosion of the bombs, with all the ensuing consequences? According to a statement in the Western press, there has already been an incident in which, at the time of an accident to a United States B-52 bomber in January 1961, four of the 5 switches were brought into operation, and everything depended solely on the last switch, which, had it been actuated, would have caused the hydrogen bomb to explode.

According to an Associated Press dispatch from Thule, each of the four hydrogen bombs carried by the B-52 bomber was of 11 megatons The explosion of one of these bombs would be 50 times greater than the power of the explosion that wiped Hiroshima off the face of the earth Such a catastrophe is possible not only over Greenland, but also over densely populated areas of the earth, since the United States Air Force, as is known, makes flights over many countries of the world. Who can guarantee that in the present, tense enough situation, such a nuclear explosion would not entail a whole chain of irreversible events, hazardous for the whole of mankind?

It is therefore quite understandable that many Governments, including Governments of the military allies of the United States, are protesting against flights by American aircraft carrying nuclear weapons in their air space. Two years ago, when United States nuclear bombs fell on Spanish soil in the Palomares area, a number of Governments protested against such flights and demanded their cessation. Justifiable anxiety is now being expressed by the Government of Denmark, which has stated that flights over Greenland by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons are a violation of existing agreements.

The Soviet Government, for its part, has more than once warned the Government of the United States of the serious risk that is represented by flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons outside national boundaries. Attention was drawn to this in the aide-mémoire from the Soviet Government to the Government of the United States of 16 February 1966 in connection with the incidents on the Spanish coast, when a considerable area of land and water was contaminated by radioactive activity following a similar air disaster. Nevertheless, as is evidenced, in particular, by the new disaster to a United States B-52 bomber off the shores of Greenland, the United States Government has not drawn the appropriate conclusions.

The Soviet Government once again draws the attention of the United States Government to a dangerous and even aggressive nature of flights by United States bombers carrying nuclear weapons, especially in the neighbourhood of the boundaries of the Soviet Union. From a purely military standpoint these flights by United States bombers are pointless under the circumstances of the existence of nuclear missile weapons. They can have only one purpose: to increase international tension, without regard to the consequences for the security of the peoples and the fate of mankind.

It is obvious that the responsibility for such a way of acting rests wholly and entirely on the Government of the United States.

34

Italy: working paper containing amendments to articles IV, VIIIX and X of the revised draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/218, of 20 February 1968]
[Original text: French]

Article IV

Insert the following new paragraph after paragraph 1:

"2 Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the supply of source and special fissionable materials or equipment for the use of source and special fissionable materials for peaceful purposes."

Article VIII

Amend paragraph 3 to read as follows:

"3. Every five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized." Article X

Amend paragraph 2 to read as follows:

"2. The Treaty shall have a duration of 25 years. It shall be renewed automatically for periods equal to its initial duration for all governments which shall not have given six months before the successive dates of its expiry, notice of their intention to withdraw.

35

Memorandum by the Government of Spain submitted on 8 February 1968 to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

[ENDC/219, of 27 February 1968]
[Original text: Spanish]

Nuclear energy is one of the aspects of technical progress that can contribute most decisively to the welfare of all countries; but if its use is not controlled it is capable of destroying man and his work on earth. Hence the imperative need to prevent its use for ends not wholly peaceful. Likewise, until such time as nuclear disarmament and the destruction of atom-bomb arsenals are achieved, an objective which cannot be overlooked in the context of general and complete disarmament, a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would bring the international community nearer to that end.

The mature stage reached by the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on the preparation of a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the opportunities that its rules of procedure offer to non-member countries to set forth their ideas, have led the Spanish Government to address to the Co-Chairmen some remarks on the texts submitted on 18 January 1968 [sections 7 and 9 above] setting forth its views on some aspects of the draft which Spain regards as most important.

For many years the Spanish Government has been interested in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in prospecting for its sources. As a result Spain is now mining large uranium deposits with highly favourable prospects of extension. It also has three atomic power stations under construction with an over-all...
rating of more than 1,000 MW, and four others in an advanced stage of design which will certainly double that rating in the very near future.

The measures in the new draft concerning the right to participate as fully as possible in scientific and technical information for the peaceful uses of atomic energy are sound, and can have important effects on the development of non-nuclear countries. Nevertheless, the Spanish Government takes the view that this information should refer specifically to the entire technology of reactors and fuels.

In regard to the measures proposed in article X, paragraph 2, of the draft, the Spanish Government considers too long the period of 25 years which is specified before a conference would decide whether the treaty is thereafter to continue in force indefinitely or to be extended for a limited period. Likewise, the 20 years between the conference mentioned in article VIII, paragraph 3, and that mentioned in article X is too long a time for the treaty to be adaptable solely through the procedure laid down for introducing amendments, to any fresh circumstances that may arise in the international situation. Thus it seems advisable that conferences like that provided for in article VIII should be held every 5 years, and that one mentioned in article X should be held 20 years after the treaty comes into force.

In the Spanish Government's view the vitality of the treaty will be directly proportional to the support it receives from the members of the international community. Thus the important question is not merely the number of ratifying countries, for the purposes both of putting it into force and of introducing amendments, but the nuclear characteristics of the countries whose signature and ratification will help to put it into force. Hence this Government takes the view that the non-nuclear Powers which ratify the treaty and its amendments ought to include the largest possible number of countries having some development in this field. It would therefore be advisable to require that the ratifying countries should include at least 12 which possess power reactors or under construction, or else possess within their territories uranium deposits which have been proved economically exploitable. Lastly, the number of 40 for the countries ratifying the treaty seems too small, and should be raised to 60 at least.

In regard to the ratification of amendments, it would seem logical that the procedure for putting them into force should be similar to that proposed for ratifying the treaty, naturally subject to the provision of article VIII, paragraph 2, that amendments shall be binding solely on the parties that ratify them.

The Spanish Government attaches the greatest importance to the content of article VI of the draft. It is indeed essential that non-proliferation shall never be regarded as an end in itself. Actually it is only a stage—one of vital importance to mankind, certainly—but only a stage in the consummation we all seek to achieve: general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Hence this Government considers that the obligations set out in article VI should be strengthened to the maximum by specially including in them the destruction of nuclear weapons and their vehicles, since disarmament will not have any effective reality except under a general scheme which covers nuclear armament. Though the undertaking to pursue negotiations is of the greatest importance, it seems advisable to specify more concretely the obligations which signatories of the Treaty undertake through this clause.

The Spanish Government attaches the greatest importance to the statements made by the President of the United States of America and by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the effect that both these countries are ready to accept the application of the system of safeguards to all their peaceful activities, following the principle set forth in resolution 2088 (XX), paragraph 2 (b), of the United Nations General Assembly, which is fundamental in all matters connected with the proliferation of atomic weapons. The Spanish Government thinks it necessary that an obligation of this kind should also be included in the text of the treaty, binding all the nuclear Powers, so as to reduce as far as possible the existing discrimination between them and those who do not possess atomic weapons.

Lastly, a feature which the Spanish Government misses in the text submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on 18 January 1968 is any measure relating to the guarantees which must be given to non-nuclear countries by signatories possessing nuclear weapons: first that they shall not be attacked or threatened with attack by nuclear weapons, and secondly that, if a nuclear Power not party to the treaty attacks or threatens to attack a non-nuclear signatory, the nuclear parties to the treaty shall react appropriately. The Government of Spain hopes that a formula will be found for a positive solution of this problem, the importance of which has been stressed by most countries and which is fundamental for this Government.

Nigeria: working paper containing amendments to the revised draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/220, of 28 February 1968]
[Original text: English]

Article IV

In paragraph 2, replace the words "have the right to participate in" with the words "undertake to facilitate". In the same sentence, between the words "technological information" and "the peaceful uses", replace the word "for" with the word "on".

Article V

Insert the following as paragraph 2:

"2. Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to communicate annually to the International Atomic Energy Agency, full information on the nature, extent and results of its co-operation with any other Party or group of Parties, in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The reports so received by the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be circulated by the Agency to all the Parties to the Treaty."

Article VIII

After the amendments of the United Kingdom and Sweden (ENDC/203/Rev.1 and EDC/215, respectively), insert the following as paragraph 4.

"4. The findings of the review conferences shall be adopted by a majority of signatory States present."

Nigeria: working paper containing amendments to the revised draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/320/Rev.1, of 14 March 1968]
[Original text: English]

Article II

Insert as paragraph 2, the following:

"2. Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes, if requested, to come to the aid of any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which is threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons."

Article IV

In paragraph 2, replace the words "have the right to participate in" with the words "undertake to facilitate". In the same sentence, between the words "technological information" and "the peaceful uses", replace the word "for" with "on".

Article VIII

In paragraph 3, insert the following sentence at the end of the paragraph: "The findings of the review conferences shall be adopted by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty who are present."

See sections 20 and 31 above
Article X

In paragraph 1, after the words "extraordinary events", insert the words "or important international developments"; after the words "have jeopardized", insert the words "or are likely to jeopardize"; and replace the words "supreme interests" with the words "national interests", so that the paragraph will read as follows:

"Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, or important international developments, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized, or are likely to jeopardize, the national interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests."

Italy: working paper concerning the work of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

[ENDC/221, of 6 March 1968]

[Original text: French]

Resolution 2346 (XXII), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 19 December 1967, called upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, among other things, to continue its work, giving all due consideration to all proposals submitted to the Committee concerning non-proliferation and to the views expressed by Member States during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly.

In view of the short time separating us from 15 March 1968, the date on which a full report on the state of our work is to be submitted to the General Assembly, the Italian delegation desires to make an initial contribution to the preparation of this report, at the same time facilitating the task of its drafters.

For this purpose, it has endeavoured to group, by chapter headings relating to the specific points raised, the various documents which reflect the opinions and proposals advanced from all quarters concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The Italian delegation expresses the opinion that these documents should be referred to in the report to the General Assembly.

The list of these documents, which is reproduced below, far from claiming to be complete, is, on the contrary, open to any additions and amendments which other delegations may wish to make to it:

A. Link between the non-proliferation treaty and other disarmament measures: the treaty as a first step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament

1. Mexico: ENDC/196 [sect. 12]
3. Japan: A/PV.1563
5. Romania: A/PV.1584.
7. Sweden: ENDC/215 [sect. 31].
8. Brazil: ENDC/201/Rev.2 [sect. 17].

B. Balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear Powers

1. Romania: ENDC/199 [sect. 14].
2. Italy: ENDC/PV.318 (1 August 1967).

**The records of the General Assembly meetings mentioned are contained in Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Plenary Meetings, respectively Ibd., Twenty-second Session, First Committee; the records of the Conference are mimeographed. The indications in brackets after the various documents of the Conference listed refer to other sections in the present annex, in which those documents are printed.**

3. Italy: ENDC/PV.326 (29 August 1967).
4. Switzerland: ENDC/204 [sect. 21].
5. Brazil: A/PV.1562.

C. Development of research and utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

1. Italy: ENDC/PV.289 (28 February 1967).
2. Italy: ENDC/PV.326 (29 August 1967).
5. Romania: ENDC/199 [sect. 14].
6. Brazil: ENDC/201 [sect. 16].
7. Nigeria: ENDC/202 [sect. 18].
8. Switzerland: ENDC/204 [sect. 21].
15. India: A/PV.1582.
19. Sweden: ENDC/216 [sect. 32].
20. Brazil: ENDC/201/Rev.2 [sect. 17].
21. Italy: ENDC/218 [sect. 34].
22. Nigeria: ENDC/220 [sect. 36].

D. Problem of security guarantee against nuclear attack and against the threat of such attack

1. Italy: ENDC/PV.326 (29 August 1967).
2. United Arab Republic: ENDC/197 [sect. 13].
3. Romania: ENDC/199 [sect. 14].
5. United States of America: A/PV.1562.

E. Problem of the Universality of the non-proliferation treaty

5. Brazil: A/C.1/PV.1551.
F. Problem of control
1. Italy: ENDC/PV 289 (28 February 1967).
2. Italy: ENDC/PV 326 (29 August 1967).
5. Romania: ENDC/199 [sect. 14].
6. Switzerland: ENDC/204 [sect. 21].
7. United States of America: ENDC/205 [sect. 23].
8. United Kingdom: ENDC/207 [sect. 24].

G. Vertical proliferation in its various aspects
1. United Arab Republic: ENDC/197 [sect. 13].
2. Switzerland: ENDC/204 [sect. 21].

H. Regional demilitarization agreements
1. Mexico: ENDC/196 [sect. 12].
2. Brazil: ENDC/201/Rev 2 [sect. 17].

I. Duration of the non-proliferation treaty and problems of amendments
1. Italy: ENDC/PV 236 (29 August 1967).
2. Romania: ENDC/199 [sect. 14].
4. Brazil: ENDC/201 [sect. 16].
5. Italy: ENDC/PV 350 (23 November 1967).
7. Italy: ENDC/218 [sect. 34].

J. Periodic revision conferences
2. Sweden: ENDC/215 [sect. 31].
3. Italy: ENDC/218 [sect. 34].

K. Right of withdrawal
1. Nigeria: ENDC/202 [sect. 18].

L. Entry into force of the non-proliferation treaty
1. Switzerland: ENDC/204 [sect. 21].

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Romania: amendments to the revised draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/223, of 8 March 1968]
[Original text: French]

Article III

1. Introduce a new paragraph—paragraph 1—worded as follows:

"1. The control established by this Article shall have the exclusive purpose of preventing the use of special fissionable materials for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty. Control shall be applied to such peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty as, by their nature and the quantities of source and special fissionable materials which they produce, process or use, may lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.""

2. Amend paragraph 1 of the present text, which becomes paragraph 2 in the proposed formulation, in the following way:

(a) Replace the words "assumed under this Treaty" by the words "assumed under Articles I and II of this Treaty".

(b) Replace the expression "required by this Article" by the expression "stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency".

(c) Replace the last sentence beginning "The safeguards required by this Article", by the following sentence: "The safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material which exceeds the qualitative and quantitative limits beyond which its use in peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere may lead to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

3. Amend paragraph 2 of the present text, which becomes paragraph 3 in the proposed formulation, by replacing the words "safeguards required by this Article" by the words "safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency".

4. Amend paragraph 3 of the present text, which becomes paragraph 4 of the proposed formulation, in the following way:

(a) Replace the words "The safeguards required by this Article" by the words "The safeguards stipulated by the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency".

(b) Replace the words "in accordance with the provisions of this Article" by the words "in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Agency's safeguards system".

5. Paragraph 4 of the present text becomes, as a result of the foregoing amendments, paragraph 5.

6. Insert at the end of the present text a new paragraph worded as follows:

"6. The States Party to the Treaty agree to establish through the Security Council an appropriate control to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on whose territory there are foreign military bases shall not acquire in any form whatsoever access to nuclear weapons indirectly through such bases."

As a result of the proposed amendments Article III will have the following wording:

"1. The control established by this Article shall have the exclusive purpose of preventing the use of special fissionable materials for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty. Control shall be applied to such peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, by their nature and the quantities of source and special fissionable materials which they produce, process or use, may lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

2. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under Articles I and II of this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material which exceeds the qualitative and quantitative limits beyond which its use in peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere may lead to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

3. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the
processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

“4. The safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with the provisions of Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Agency's safeguards system and the principal of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

“5. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

“6. The States Party to the Treaty agree to establish through the Security Council an appropriate control to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on whose territory there are foreign military bases shall not acquire in any form whatsoever access to nuclear weapons indirectly through such bases.”

Article VI

Replace the present text by the following formulation:

“1. Nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty undertake to adopt specific measures to bring about as soon as possible the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

“2. If, five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, such measures shall not have been taken, the Parties shall examine the situation thus created and decide on the measures to be taken.”

Article VI-A

Insert a new article worded as follows:

“Nuclear-weapon States solemnly undertake never in any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.”

Article VIII

After paragraph 3, add a new paragraph:

“Such conferences shall be convened thereafter periodically every five years, to review the manner in which the obligations assumed by all Parties to this Treaty are carried out.”

Article X

Delete the last sentence of paragraph 1 of this Article which reads: “Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.”

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Romania: revised amendments to the revised draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[ENDC/223/Rev.1, of 1 March 1968]

[Original text: French]

Article III

1. Introduce a new paragraph—paragraph 1—worded as follows:

“1. The control established by this Article shall have the exclusive purpose of preventing the use of special fissionable materials for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty. Control shall be applied to such peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty as, by their nature and the quantities of source and special fissionable materials which they produce, process or use, may lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”

Amend paragraph 1 of the present text, which becomes paragraph 2 in the proposed formulation, in the following way:

(a) Replace the words “assumed under this Treaty” by the words “assumed under Articles I and II of this Treaty”.

(b) Replace the expression “required by this Article” by the expression “stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

(c) Replace the last sentence, beginning “The safeguards required by this Article”, by the following sentence: “The safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material which exceeds the qualitative and quantitative limits beyond which its use in peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere may lead to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

3. Amend paragraph 2 of the present text, which becomes paragraph 3 in the proposed formulation, by replacing the words “safeguards required by this Article” by the words “safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

4. Amend paragraph 3 of the present text, which becomes paragraph 4 of the proposed formulation, in the following way:

(a) Replace the words “The safeguards required by this Article” by the words “The safeguards stipulated by the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

(b) Replace the words “in accordance with the provisions of this Article” by the words “in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Agency’s safeguards system”.

5. Paragraph 4 of the present text becomes, as a result of the foregoing amendments, paragraph 5.

6. Insert at the end of the present text a new paragraph worded as follows:

“6. The States Party to the Treaty agree to establish through the Security Council an appropriate control to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on whose territory there are foreign military bases shall not acquire in any form whatsoever access to nuclear weapons indirectly through such bases.”

As a result of the proposed amendments Article III will have the following wording:

“1. The control established by this Article shall have the exclusive purpose of preventing the use of special fissionable materials for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty. Control shall be applied to such peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty as, by their nature and the quantities of source and special fissionable materials which they produce, process or use, may lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

2. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under Articles I and II of this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be followed with respect
to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material which exceeds the qualitative and quantitative limits beyond which its use in peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdic-

tion, or carried out under its control anywhere may lead to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

“3. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to pro-
vide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equip-
ment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

“4. The safeguards stipulated in the aforesaid agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with the provisions of Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Agency’s safeguard system and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble.

“5. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of deposit of such agreement. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

“6. The States Party to the Treaty agree to establish through the Security Council an appropriate control to ensure that non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on whose territory there are foreign military bases shall not acquire in any form whatever access to nuclear weapons indirectly through such bases.”

Article VI

Replace the present text by the following formulation:

“1. Nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty undertake to adopt specific measures to bring about as soon as possible the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

“2. If, five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, such measures shall not have been taken, the Parties shall examine the situation thus created and decide on the measures to be taken.”

Article VI-A

Insert a new article worded as follows:

“1. Nuclear-weapon States solemnly undertake never in any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.

“2. The States Party to the Treaty agree to establish through the Security Council an appropriate procedure to ensure that the undertaking set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be fulfilled.”

Article VII

After paragraph 3, add the following new paragraph:

“4. Such conferences shall be convened thereafter periodically every five years, to review the manner in which the obligations assumed by all Parties to this Treaty are carried out.”

Article X

Delete the last sentence of paragraph 1 of this Article which reads: “Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.”

DOCUMENT DC/231

Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
(16 July-28 August 1968)

[Original text: English and Russian]
[4 September 1968]

4. Fourteen formal plenary meetings took place between 16 July and 28 August 1968. On 8 August, the Committee held an informal plenary meeting.

I. RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY REFERRED TO THE COMMITTEE

5. The Committee had before it resolution 2289 (XXII), entitled “Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons”; resolutions 2342 A (XXII) and 2342 B (XXII), entitled “Question of general and complete disarmament”; resolution 2343 (XXII), entitled “Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests”; resolution 2344 (XXII), entitled “Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America”; and resolution 2373 (XXII), entitled “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”
6. The Committee considered these resolutions. Noting the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), the Committee devoted most of its attention to the request of the General Assembly that the Committee urgently pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

II. Messages, working papers and other documents submitted to the Conference

7. On 11 January and 20 June 1968 the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Co-Chairmen letters containing the above resolutions of the General Assembly [ENDC/210, ENDC/226].

8. On 16 July the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted a memorandum of the Government of the USSR concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament [ENDC/227].

9. On 16 July the representative of the United States of America submitted a message to the Conference from President Lyndon B Johnson [ENDC/228].

10. On 16 July the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland submitted a message to the Conference from Prime Minister Harold Wilson [ENDC/229].

11. On 29 July the representative of Sweden submitted a letter which enclosed a summary report of the meetings of a group of experts on seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions convened by the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm [ENDC/230].

12. On 6 August the representative of the United Kingdom submitted a working paper on microbiological warfare [ENDC/231].

13. On 20 August the representative of the United Kingdom submitted a working paper on the comprehensive test ban treaty [ENDC/232].

14. On 23 August the representative of Italy submitted a working paper on underground nuclear explosions [ENDC/234].

15. On 26 August the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic submitted a joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty [ENDC/235].

16. Annex I contains the text of the documents attached to the present report. Annex II contains a list of all documents submitted to the Committee and of the verbatim records of the plenary meetings during the period covered by the report.

III. Agenda

17. In recognition of the views expressed by the members of the Committee, in response to the recommendations of the General Assembly, taking into account the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and also the agreement, announced on 1 July 1968, for bilateral discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles, which was welcomed by members of the Committee, the Co-Chairmen recommended the following provisional agenda which was adopted by the Committee on 15 August 1968:

1. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament

"Under this heading, members may wish to discuss measures dealing with the cessation of testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons, and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles, nuclear free zones, etc.

2. Non-nuclear measures.

"Under this heading, members may wish to discuss chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitations, etc.

3. Other collateral measures.

"Under this heading, members may wish to discuss prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, etc.

4. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

18. The Committee also noted the recognized right of any delegation to raise and discuss any disarmament subject at any time.

19. Because of the comparative shortness of this session, the Committee reports that it has not been able to give comprehensive consideration to the matters before it. However, the Committee had a useful discussion of items on the agenda. All delegations participated in the work of the Committee and many interesting suggestions were made.

20. The Committee believes that the adoption of this agenda is a step forward which will facilitate progress in its work. In addition, the submission and discussion of concrete proposals, the exchange of views, and the exploration of possible questions which may become ripe for agreement, all help to lay the foundation for fruitful negotiations in the future.

IV. Questions considered by the Committee

A. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament

21. The Committee agreed that first priority in its work should be given to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. In this session, and pursuant to the recommendations of the General Assembly contained in resolution 2373 (XXII), the Committee pursued negotiations on such measures. Several delegations made useful contributions.

22. In accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly in resolution 2343 (XXII), the Committee gave consideration to the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. The Committee held a useful and valuable discussion regarding this important matter.

23. Pursuant to resolution 2289 (XXII), the Committee received from the Secretary-General the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the records of the meetings of the First Committee concerning such a convention Mem-

1 General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee had an extensive discussion of this matter.

24. The Committee considered the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles. Members of the Committee also took up the subject of nuclear-free zones.

25. The Committee intends to devote attention to this category of measures commensurate with the priority attached to it by the agenda. The hope was expressed that one or more of the measures within this category would become ripe for agreement at an early date.

B. **Non-nuclear measures**

26. Taking into account resolution 2162 B (XXI) of the General Assembly, the Committee considered the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The United Kingdom proposed a study by the Secretary-General on the nature and possible effects of chemical weapons and on the implications of their use. Poland proposed a study by the Secretary-General on the effects of the use of both chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Committee agreed to recommend to the General Assembly that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. Because of the importance of this matter, the hope was expressed that this study would be referred at an early date to the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Committee. A number of other proposals were also made concerning chemical and bacteriological weapons.

27. Members of the Committee expressed the view that the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons should be given further attention at its next session.

28. Views were also expressed on the problem of regional arms limitations.

C. **Other collateral measures**

29. Several suggestions were made concerning the problem of prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. The Committee concluded that this new subject would be a fruitful area for its future work.

30. Taking into account resolution 2344 (XXII) of the General Assembly, delegations made statements on the question of the elimination of foreign military bases.

D. **General and complete disarmament**

31. In accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2342 (XXII) and 2373 (XXII), and taking into account the report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, members of the Committee exchanged views on the question of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and emphasized the importance of resuming the consideration of this question.

V. **Meetings of the Co-Chairmen**

32. During the period covered by this report, the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, held meetings to discuss the schedule of and procedure for the work of the Committee and also certain substantive questions before the Committee.

33. The Committee agreed to reconvene on a date to be established by the Co-Chairmen in consultation with all members of the Committee.

34. This report is transmitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) A. **ROSENCHIN**

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

GEORGE BUNN
United States of America

ANNEX I

**Documents attached to the report**

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3 United Nations publication (Sales No.: E.68.IX.1).
Letter dated 11 January 1968 from the Secretary-General to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, transmitting resolutions 2286 (XXII), 2289 (XXII), 2342 (XXII), 2343 (XXII), 2344 (XXII), and 2346 (XXII) of the General Assembly

[ENDC/210, of 18 January 1968]
[Original text: English]

[For the text of the Secretary-General’s letter, see document DC/230 and Add.1, annex IV, sect. 27 above; for the text of the resolutions cited, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16.]

Letter dated 20 June 1968 from the Secretary-General to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, transmitting resolution 2373 (XXII) of the General Assembly and resolution 255 (1968) of the Security Council

[ENDC/226, of 16 July 1968]
[Original text: English]

I have the honour to transmit herewith resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, adopted by the General Assembly on agenda item 28 (a) of the twenty-second session entitled, “Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament”. Annexed to the resolution is the text of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

I wish to draw attention, in particular, to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution, requesting the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the nuclear-weapon States urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and requesting furthermore the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress of its work to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

All the relevant documents and records relating to the discussion of item 28 (a) in the First Committee and in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly have been circulated to the Members of the United Nations, including all members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I also have the honour to transmit herewith resolution 255 (1968), adopted by the Security Council at its 1433rd meeting on 19 June 1968, dealing with the question of appropriate measures to be undertaken to safeguard the security of States in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(Signed) U Thant
Secretary-General

[For the texts of the two resolutions, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 16A and Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1968, respectively.]

Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament

[ENDC/227, of 16 July 1968]
[Original text: Russian]

[For the text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Annexes, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96, document A/7134.]

* Reissued for technical reasons to replace an earlier text, dated 20 June 1968.

United States of America: message from the President of the United States, Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

[ENDC/228, of 16 July 1968]
[Original text: English]

The Conference has achieved singular success in negotiating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty is a major step toward a goal which the United States has been seeking since the dawn of the nuclear age. It is a triumph of sanity in international affairs and a testament to man’s will to survive.

The world looks today for a beginning of the negotiations called for by the Treaty—"negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament . . . ." This is the most pressing task which the Treaty lays on its parties, and the nations meeting in Geneva today share a major responsibility in performing it. The United States takes this responsibility with the utmost seriousness.

High on the disarmament agenda of mankind is the need to halt the strategic arms race. Agreement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into bilateral discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. It is expected that the two sides will shortly reach a decision on the time and place for talks.

In the absence of agreement, the nuclear arms race could escalate to new levels. This would only result in higher and higher destructive power on each side and vast diversion of resources from peaceful pursuits—with no increase in security for anyone.

If we can make progress on limiting strategic delivery systems, the United States would be prepared to consider reductions of existing systems. By reducing these systems, we would cut back effectively—and for the first time—on the vast potentials for destruction which each side possesses.

The United States and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility to head off a strategic arms race. The fate of mankind could well depend on the manner in which our two nations discharge that responsibility.

Progress on limiting strategic delivery systems will also facilitate the achievement of various related measures of nuclear arms control and disarmament. A number of such measures has been suggested by the United States. Additional measures have been proposed by other nations and recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The United States hopes that your conference will soon be able to make significant progress on measures which have been the subject of past discussions. But these are not the only subjects of interest to the conference.

We must soon take up the question of arms limitations on the sea-bed in the light of the consideration being given by the General Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction to a number of proposals for arms limitations on the sea-bed. Your conference should begin to define those factors vital to a workable, verifiable and effective international agreement which would prevent the use of this new environment for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction.

Meaning must soon be given to the language of the Non-Proliferation Treaty dealing with sharing potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. In the view of the United States, the International Atomic Energy Agency is the "appropriate international body" through which the non-nuclear-weapon Parties to the Treaty may obtain these benefits under article V of the Treaty if they choose to do so.

We also believe that the Agency is the appropriate forum for development of procedures and agreements relating to the

* General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.
furnishing of the peaceful nuclear explosive services obtained through the Agency.

Finally, we must be alert to opportunities for achieving regional limitations on armaments. We have seen that cooperation at the regional level to limit armaments is not only possible but is in fact a promising path to progress. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a worthy example of what can be achieved when neighbors collaborate in safeguarding their national security interests and in promoting their common welfare. In signing Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States had demonstrated its intention to respect the demilitarized status of Latin America which will be established by that Treaty. We hope that all nuclear powers will respect this great achievement of Latin American diplomacy.

We have also seen the consequences of the failure of nations to effect regional arrangements to inhibit the growth of arsenals of conventional weapons. Resources continue to be diverted from critical human needs to the acquisition of armaments and the maintenance of military establishments that in themselves feed fears and create insecurity among nations.

The United States attaches particular importance to halting non-nuclear arms races. We must achieve regional limitations on conventional armaments.

Representatives of the United States are under standing instructions to search out any initiatives for regional restraints coming from the areas concerned. If arrangements acceptable to the nations involved can be concluded, they will be respected by the United States. We stand ready to support any reasonable measure affecting the activities of the major weapons-producers that would make a regional agreement more effective including a requirement that suppliers publicize or register their arms shipments to a particular region.

5

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: message from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Right Honourable Harold Wilson, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

[ENDC/229, of 16 July 1968] [Original text: English]

The long and patient labours that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had devoted to the Non-Proliferation Treaty were finally, at its last session, crowned with success and with the opening of the Treaty for signature the Committee will be free to turn its attention to other measures of arms control and disarmament. This is a tremendous opportunity which must be exploited to the full. I am sure the Disarmament Committee will be equal to its responsibilities and trust that in its present session it will initiate work that will enable further steps to be taken on the long road that leads to general and complete disarmament.

6

Sweden: letter dated 29 July 1968 from the representative of Sweden addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

[ENDC/230, of 29 July 1968] [Original text: English]

Enclosed with this letter you will find a copy of a press release issued by the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm on 29 June 1968, regarding two meetings of seismological experts which took place in Sweden in April and June of this year. Attached to the press release is a summary report, adopted on 28 June by this group of experts on seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions.

The International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm is a non-governmental international institution, which was set up two years ago through a decision of the Swedish Parliament which also allocates the main funds for its activities. The governing bodies and the personnel of the Institute are, however, international. The Swedish Government is thus not involved in or responsible for the actions or publications of the Institute.

As this documentation would seem to be of interest to other delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I hereby request you to circulate this letter with the enclosed press release and summary report as a document of the Committee.

(Signed) Alva Myrdal
Chairman of the delegation of Sweden

APPENDIX

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, STOCKHOLM: PRESS RELEASE, DATED 29 JUNE 1968

The group of seismologists from 10 countries including four nuclear powers which met at Taleberg in the province of Dalarna, on 24 June 1968 adjourned on 28 June, after having unanimously adopted a joint report assessing today's state of the art of seismic test-ban verification. The meeting was the second of two by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

The plan is to publish the experts' report as soon as possible, preferably before the resumption of the Geneva disarmament conference on 16 July, in order to provide a technical background for those who have to make political judgements in different countries.

The main feature of the report is the recognition that it is now possible to distinguish large and medium-sized underground explosions from interfering earthquakes. This provides a new situation in test-ban control. The report includes no political judgement of the sufficiency of available capabilities.

An assessment of the state of the art of seismic test-ban control cannot alone indicate whether sufficient security can be achieved or not. But it is a necessary ingredient for political decision-making. Other ingredients are assessments of the security risks of cheating by the other parties if it is not disclosed, the need for additional measures as on-site-inspections, the military significance of difficult-to-disclose small tests, and the general feasibility of stopping all testing and by that restricting weapons development. This last point is closely related to the procurement of anti-ballistic missile systems.

SEISMIC METHODS FOR MONITORING UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS AND OUTLOOK

Summary of report of the SIPRI seismic study group, April and June 1968

Considerable progress in the field of detection and identification of underground explosions and earthquakes has been made since 1960, when technical talks were held on this subject in Geneva. At that time the prospect of identification of explosions as such was considered remote. On the initiative of SIPRI an expert study group was convened to review and assess the present possibilities of detection and identification by seismological means alone of underground explosions and earthquakes. The work of the group, seismologists from the following ten countries took part: Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Japan, Rumania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

The study group considered these developments in order to assess the state of the art in different countries, to find areas of consensus, to probe nuclear or controversial areas and to point out promising areas for further research and development. One of the main tasks of the group was to examine the usefulness of networks for the detection and identification by seismological means only of underground explosions. The members of the study group presented the most recent results and arrived at the conclusions summarized below.

\[\text{[Footnote]}\]

\[\text{Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America; see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 96, document A/C.1/946.}\]
(1) Since 1960 improvements in the fields of instrumentation, seismological theory and interpretation of observations have been achieved, and networks of standardized instruments (reporting to data centres, for example the International Seismological Centre, at Edinburgh and the Bureau international de sismologie, at Strasbourg) have been deployed. Research and development of this type had been recommended by the Geneva Conference of Experts. This and other encouragement to research the WWSSN has led to the establishment of several seismological networks and stations. Two of them are particularly large and homogenous, one consisting of about 100 widespread single stations. One of these systems is the national system deployed on the territory of the USSR. The other, the so-called WWSSN (World Wide Standard Seismological Network) system, is on the territories of the United States of America and many other countries of the world. The former system is within the territory of the USSR, whereas the latter is external to the USSR and is world-wide. This distribution results in the better capability of the latter system to detect and identify underground explosions of interest. In addition, ten arrays have been established for research purposes, some of which contribute data to international data centres.

(2) It was reported that the problems of detection using body waves by such networks as WWSSN and contributing arrays are less severe than those involved in identification. American and British participants reported that identification by the WWSSN network is possible for explosions in the northern hemisphere down to the level of 20 to 60 kilotons exploded in hard rock, like granite. This progress has depended on the traditional seismological data exchange between countries.

(3) Both major systems mentioned in paragraph (1) above are able to locate within 10 to 40 kilometres the site of explosions in the range of yields mentioned above.

(4) It was however recognized that for explosions in less dense materials, like Nevada tuff (a porous volcanic rock) and alluvium, the yield corresponding to the identification limit mentioned above would be increased two (if) to ten times (alluvium), depending on the latter case on the water content. The maximum possible yield in alluvium would be limited by the thickness of the alluvium layer, and by the possible requirement to prevent cratering. For example, if the layer is 450 metres thick, the maximum fully contained yield would be of the order of 20 kilotons.

(5) Another case of reduced signal strength is that of an explosion in a specially prepared underground cavity. Small-scale experiments in the United States and the United Kingdom have been made during the last few years, the largest of which was reported to be a nuclear explosion of 0.35 kilotons. All confirmed the theoretically predicted reduction of signal strength by a factor of about 10. It was recognized that this may be considerable practical limitations to do this with yields above 10 kilotons. Some participants expressed the opinion that large decoupled explosions might be detected by radioactive leakage, subsidence craters and by other means.

(6) Although the emergence of a method for positive identification of explosions has made the annual number of corresponding earthquakes less important than in the past, earthquake statistics are still pertinent to the problems associated with an underground test ban. The world-wide number of earthquakes corresponding to a 20-kiloton explosion in tuff, has been observed to be about 2,000. The number corresponding to 2 ± 1 kilotons exploding in granite, was estimated to be somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000. These observations and estimates are based on four years of observations, obtained from the data centre of the WWSSN. The Soviet data indicate that these numbers of earthquakes should be reduced by a factor of 2. The large numbers of earthquakes at the lower yield equivalence would be expected to cause some problems of interference.

(7) The criterion providing the method of positively identifying explosions by seismological means alone employs the difference in the relative excitation of body and surface seismic waves between explosions and earthquakes. This technique requires that seismic waves from explosions are not masked by signals from other events.

(8) At the yields referred to above (20 to 60 kilotons in granite), the measurements of these seismic waves recorded research by the WWSSN network give a clear separation of explosions and earthquakes. The existing experimental evidence on the usefulness of the surface wave method for identification of explosions with lower yields is as yet inconclusive. The long-period instruments in the WWSSN are not sensitive enough to record the surface waves from low-yield explosions at great distances. United Kingdom, Canadian, United States and USSR research indicates that separation of explosions and earthquakes down to 10 kilotons in hard rock. Studies at shorter distances are inconclusive as to the validity of this discriminant for yields below 10 kilotons in hard rock.

(9) The majority of the participants believe that other criteria, such as the depth at which the event takes place, the direction of the first ground motion at recording stations, the frequency content of seismic waves, excitation of shear waves and the complexity of the seismic record, are not at present provide adequate identification. However, ideas were presented on how such criteria could be combined, by standard statistical procedures, for more effective utilization of the data.

(10) Improvements in identification can be expected in the foreseeable future from application of current research results. Immediate improvement of existing networks could be obtained, for example, by moving stations from disturbed to quiet locations or establishing satellite stations in certain cases. A similar example of a more costly improvement would be the installation of about 30 highly sensitive long-period seismographs, of a kind only recently developed, at certain stations of the WWSSN network. It would lower the detection threshold for surface waves by a factor of about 10, but the discriminant is at present unproved below 10 kilotons in hard rock.

In addition, the implementation of more arrays would make it possible to conduct research into the question whether the identification of explosions in the 2 to 10 kiloton range is possible, and would enable the design of suitable monitoring systems, if the results so warrant.

(11) Implicit in the projections above are recommendations for network developments based on present research results.

(12) The group also saw that the following fields for research could be profitable:

(a) Methods of improving surface wave detection;
(b) More detailed work on the relative excitation of body and surface waves by earthquakes and explosions;
(c) Pattern recognition of seismic records;
(d) Statistical treatment of identification criteria for decision applications.

(13) The effectiveness of this programme of research, as well as progress in the efforts to lower the thresholds of detection and identification, would be greatly increased if existing networks could merge into one worldwide data exchange system.

(Signed)

I. Constantinescu
U. Ericson
E. Herluf
V. Kärnik
P. Mechi
S. Miyamura

(Signed)

I. Pasechnik
F. Press
H. Thirlaway
K. Whitman
T. Varghese

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*Conference of experts to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement in the suspension of nuclear tests, held at Geneva from 1 July to 21 August 1958.

*An array is a complex of seismometers spread over a wide area and connected to a central point.

A surface wave is a wave of long period running along the surface of the Earth; a body wave is a short-period wave running through the deep interior of the Earth.*
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: working paper on microbiological warfare

[ENDC/23], of 6 August 1968
[Original text: English]

1. The United Kingdom delegation considers that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is not an entirely satisfactory instrument for dealing with the question of chemical and microbiological warfare. The following points may be noted:

(i) Many States are not Parties to the Protocol and of those that are Parties many, including the United Kingdom, have reserved the right to use chemical and bacteriological weapons against non-parties, violators of the Protocol and their allies.

(ii) Jurists are not agreed whether the Protocol represents customary international law or whether it is of a purely contractual nature.

(iii) Even if all States were to accede to the Protocol, there would still be a risk of large-scale use of the proscribed weapons as long as States have the right to manufacture such weapons and to use them against violators and their allies.

(iv) There is no consensus on the meaning of the term "gases" in the phrase "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices". The French version of the Protocol renders "or other" as "ou similaires" and the discrepancy between "other" and "similaires" has led to disagreement on whether non-lethal gases are covered by the Protocol.

(v) The term "bacteriological" as used in the Protocol is not sufficiently comprehensive to include the whole range of microbiological agents that might be used in hostilities.

(vi) The prohibition in the Protocol applies to use "in war". There may therefore be doubt about its applicability in the case of hostilities which do not amount to war in its technical sense.

2. It is not to be expected that all these difficulties can be easily or speedily resolved. The United Kingdom delegation suggests, however, that the problem might be made less intractable by considering chemical and microbiological methods of warfare separately. The Geneva Protocol puts them on an identical basis, but:

(i) As indicated in paragraph 1 (iv) above, there is disagreement on whether the ban covers all agents or only lethal ones. It would be extremely difficult to negotiate on a new instrument banning the use of all agents of chemical warfare, particularly as some of those agents have legitimate peaceful uses for such purposes as riot control.

(ii) Chemical weapons have been used on a large scale in war in the past and are regarded by some States as a weapon they must be prepared to use if necessary in any future war, particularly as they fear they may be used against them. In any event, at the moment, they would be reluctant to give up the manufacture of chemical agents and the right to conduct research, etc., in this field.

3. The United Kingdom delegation recognizes that verification, in the sense in which the term is normally used in disarmament negotiations, is not possible in either the chemical or the microbiological field. The difficulty, as far as the microbiological field is concerned, is that the organisms which would be used are required for medical and veterinary uses and could be produced quickly and without special facilities either in established laboratories or in makeshift facilities. As far as chemical agents are concerned it seems unlikely that States will be prepared to forgo the right to produce and stockpile such agents for possible use in war unless adequate verification procedures can be devised and applied and problems of definition etc. are resolved. However, the use of microbiological methods of warfare has never been established, and these are generally regarded with even greater abhorrence than chemical methods. The United Kingdom delegation therefore considers that in this field the choice lies between going ahead with the formulation of new obligations and doing nothing at all—in which case the risks and the fears of eventual use of microbiological methods of warfare will continue and intensify indefinitely.

4. The United Kingdom delegation therefore proposes the early conclusion of a new convention for the prohibition of microbiological methods of warfare, which would supplement but not supersede the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This convention would proscribe the use for hostile purposes of microbiological agents causing death or disease by infection in man, other animals, or crops. Under it States would:

(i) Declare their belief that the use of microbiological methods of warfare of any kind and in any circumstances should be treated as contrary to international law and a crime against humanity;

(ii) Undertake never to engage in such methods of warfare themselves in any circumstances.

5. The convention should also include a ban on the production of microbiological agents which was so worded as to take account of the fact that most of the microbiological agents that could be used in hostilities are for peaceful purposes. Thus the ban might be on the production of microbiological agents on a scale which had no independent peaceful justification. Alternatively, the convention might ban the production of microbiological agents for hostile purposes, or it might ban their production in quantities that would be incompatible with the obligation never to engage in microbiological methods of warfare in any circumstances.

6. Whatever the formulation might be, the ban would also need to cover ancillary equipment specifically designed to facilitate the use of microbiological agents in hostilities. In addition, the convention would of course need to include an undertaking to destroy, within a short period after the convention comes into force, any stocks of such microbiological agents or ancillary equipment which are already in the possession of the parties.

7. The convention would also need to deal with research work. It should impose a ban on research work aimed at the production of the kind prohibited above, as regards both microbiological agents and ancillary equipment, and it would also provide for the appropriate civil medical or health authorities to have access to all research work which might give rise to allegations that the obligations imposed by the convention were not being fulfilled. Such research work should be open to international investigation if so required and should also be open to public scrutiny to the maximum extent compatible with national security and the protection of industrial and commercial processes.

8. In the knowledge that strict processes of verification are not possible, it is suggested that consideration might be given inter alia to the possibility that a competent body of experts, established under the auspices of the United Nations, might investigate allegations made by a party to the convention which appeared to establish a prima facie case that another party had acted in breach of the obligations established in the convention. The convention would contain a provision by which parties would undertake to co-operate fully in any investigation and any failure to comply with this or any of the other obligations imposed by the convention would be reported to the Security Council.

9. As regards entry into force of the convention, the appropriate international body might be invited to draw up a list of States (say 10 to 12) that it considers most advanced in microbiological research work. The convention might come into force when ratified by all those states and a suitably large number of other states.

10. Consideration should be given to the possibility of including in the convention an article under which the parties would undertake to support appropriate action in accordance with the decision.
with the United Nations Charter to counter the use, or threatened use, of microbiological methods of warfare. If such an article were included it might be endorsed by the Security Council in rather the same way as the Council welcomed and endorsed the declarations made by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in connexion with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

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United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: working paper on the comprehensive test ban treaty

[ENDC/232, of 20 August 1968]
[Original text: English]

1. The United Kingdom delegation considers that priority in the field of nuclear-arms control and disarmament should be given to a ban on underground tests of nuclear weapons; in their view the real danger of vertical proliferation lies in the development of more sophisticated weapons systems which a comprehensive test ban treaty would prevent. The United Kingdom delegation favours the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty at the earliest possible moment and as soon as terms that are generally acceptable can be agreed.

2. The principal avowed obstacle in the way of a comprehensive test ban treaty is the problem of on-site inspection. It may be noted, however, that since the early days of the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, the means of identifying incidents as earthquakes or explosions have been greatly improved and there is substantial agreement at the technical level on what can or cannot be identified. This is evidenced in the unanimously adopted summary of the report [see above] of the recent meetings of scientists and other experts to discuss the technical aspects of the control of an underground test ban under the auspices of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm.

3. The United Kingdom delegation understands fears that on-site inspection might present difficulties but recognizes that below the identification threshold there can be no certainty whether a given event is an explosion or an earthquake. In these circumstances it is reasonable for parties to a comprehensive test ban treaty to insist on verification to be provided as is possible, practicable and necessary to ensure that other parties are honouring their obligations. In order to dispel the fears of those who maintain that on-site inspection would present difficulties and to meet the needs of those who maintain that the possibility of on-site inspection is vital for the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban treaty, the United Kingdom delegation suggests that consideration should be given to the establishment under such a treaty of a committee whose function it would be to consider evidence of possible infringement of the treaty. Such a committee would have the right to carry out on-site inspection but only if strong evidence were produced of an infringement of the treaty.

4. The United Kingdom delegation's views on the composition of the committee are flexible. It seeks first to gain acceptance of the principle of its establishment. But it suggests that the committee might be composed of representatives of the three nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty, representatives of three non-aligned countries, and a nominee of the Secretary-General of the United Nations or the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is suggested that, apart from the United Nations or the International Atomic Energy Agency nominee, the members of the committee might be government representatives, assisted by scientific advisers, rather than themselves scientists. The right of on-site inspection would only be exercised if the committee agreed by a majority of 5 to 2 that a prima facie case had been made out. While the committee would have the ultimate right of on-site inspection, the procedure proposed is specifically designed to circumscribe this right in such a way as to ensure that it was not exercised irresponsibly or improperly.

5. As scientific knowledge and the means of detection and identification develop, the need for and the probability of on-site inspection would diminish. No country adhering to the treaty would be submitting to any certain or automatic on-site inspection. But the possibility that inspection might take place would play a very large part in establishing confidence in the effectiveness of the treaty.

6. While the United Kingdom delegation is in favour of the conclusion of an effective test ban treaty at the earliest possible moment it has also been considering the possibility that the implementation of the comprehensive test ban might be made a phased operation by starting with an agreed annual quota of underground test explosions. This proposal is based on recognition of the fact that it may not be possible to get agreement now to stop all nuclear weapons testing over night in isolation from other measures of disarmament. The object of the quota proposal is to put an increasingly powerful brake on the development of new nuclear weapon systems with a view to bringing this dangerous process to a complete halt within a fixed time period. The treaty might provide for quotas on a descending scale over a period of four or five years ending with a nil quota after which further tests would be banned absolutely. Alternatively, the quotas might not be written into the treaty but fixed annually, possibly by a committee of the kind which has been suggested above. Supervision of the quota arrangements would be exercised by the same mechanism as proposed above for the treaty itself.

It will and be necessary under a comprehensive test ban treaty to provide for the carrying out of operational or experimental nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The United Kingdom delegation considers that such a requirement could be accommodated within the system proposed. There may well be a need for international supervision of peaceful nuclear explosions, in order to satisfy States party to the treaty and the international committee that no explosion in question was needed for its stated purpose. Peaceful nuclear explosions could also be accommodated within a quota system, either by treating them as part of the quota or as permitted exclusions from the treaty provided they conformed to internationally agreed arrangements for their conduct.

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Italy: working paper on underground nuclear explosions

[ENDC/234, of 23 August 1968]
[Original text: French]

1. The Italian Government has long advocated the possibility of extending the 1963 Treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests to underground nuclear explosions. The recent conclusion of negotiation on a Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the undertakings stipulated in article V1 of that Treaty, as well as in the preamble, make it possible to hope that definite progress will be made very quickly in this field, which is so important for world peace and security. From the development of the discussions during the present session of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament it appears that an over-all and complete solution of this problem still presents difficulties which have not been eliminated. Consequently, the Italian Government considers possible that a partial solution should be made to achieve at least some partial progress, while waiting until events have matured and enable all the remaining obstacles to be overcome.

2. With this in view, and with the object of obtaining some partial results, the Italian delegation suggests that the regulation of underground explosions for peaceful purposes should for the time being be separated from that of underground nuclear explosions for military purposes. This separation would have the advantage of making it possible to leave military explosions aside provisionally and to endeavour to reach agreement on an acceptable form of control where nuclear explosions of a peaceful nature are concerned. The Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

a General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.
problem would thus be simplified because by tackling it in this way a temporary solution would be possible, until scientific and technical progress succeeded in providing appropriate ways and means for guaranteeing an over-all prohibition of tests, beyond all possibility of dispute.

3 Within the framework of an international system for the regulation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the following preliminary initiatives could be envisaged:

(a) Governments responsible for underground nuclear explosions should act in a different manner according to whether underground nuclear explosions for peaceful or for military purposes are concerned. The former, before being carried out, should be announced to the United Nations, with all necessary details (approximate date of the test, locality, depth, purpose, power of explosive). All explosions which had not been announced to the United Nations in this way would be regarded as being of a military nature.

(b) These same Governments should invite foreign experts (scientists and technicians) chosen and approved by them from non-nuclear States to observe the explosions. In this way, the experts of the non-nuclear States would be able to familiarize themselves with the techniques of nuclear explosions, and especially with their practical results. A start would thus be made to apply the provisions of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(c) Non-nuclear Governments, in their turn, should submit a list of experts to the Governments of the States where the nuclear explosions are to take place; the observers invited to participate in the nuclear tests would be selected from among the names given in this list.

4. The proposal submitted by the Italian delegation, if accepted, would make it possible to obtain the following results:

(a) The scope of the field not yet covered by the regulations of the 1963 Treaty would be reduced.

(b) A start could be made to apply the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in particular articles V and VI, as well as the eleventh preambular paragraph.

(c) The result would be achieved that a certain number of scientists and technicians from non-nuclear States would acquire knowledge or deepen their existing knowledge of the benefits that can be derived from nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

(d) There would be created a more favourable situation for tackling, in due course, the problem of underground nuclear explosions for military purposes with reasonable prospects of success.

5 Lastly, the Italian Government is of the opinion that, in the light of recent developments in the international field, it would be desirable to consider, at the same time as the measures set forth above, the advisability of deciding upon and proclaiming the prohibition of all explosions under the sea-bed of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices for military purposes. Nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under the sea-bed could at present be the subject of a general moratorium until they are regulated on an international basis requiring detailed studies to guarantee the necessary safety measures for the protection of the interests of nations in the sea-bed and ocean floor environments.

6 The Italian delegation wishes to make it clear that the proposals which it has submitted are aimed essentially at the adoption of provisional measures which would represent a limited advance while waiting for the possibility of reaching an over-all agreement for the cessation of all experiments for military purposes.

view with deep concern that it has not so far been possible to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. They had expressed their apprehensions and anxieties in this regard in their earlier joint memoranda [ENDC/159 and ENDC/171].

Ever since 1959, when the General Assembly became seized of this question, it has adopted resolutions each year on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

In its latest resolution on the subject, resolution 2343 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, the General Assembly urged all States which have not so far adhered to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water to do so without further delay, called upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments, and expressed the hope that States would contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data. Finally, the resolution requested the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on this matter at its twenty-third session.

In the preamble of the partial test ban Treaty of 1963 the three nuclear-weapon powers parties to the Treaty expressed their determination to seek "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and determined to continue negotiations to this end"

It is a matter of utmost regret that despite General Assembly resolution 1762 (XVII), which had condemned all nuclear weapon tests, and the partial test ban Treaty, nuclear weapon tests have not been suspended but are continuing both in atmosphere and underground.

The eight delegations are gravely concerned by the fact that all countries have not yet adhered to the partial test ban Treaty. Tests in the atmosphere are, in fact, taking place at an increasing rate and the yields of such tests have reached the megaton range, resulting once again in widespread radioactive contamination, which had started diminishing since the conclusion of the partial test ban Treaty.

Nuclear weapon testing underground is also continuing at a high frequency and with increasing yields, thus substantiating the fears expressed in the June memorandum of the eight delegations of 17 August 1966, that continued testing would impart "a renewed impetus to the arms race, bringing about unforeseeable consequences in regard to imbalance and mistrust in the relationship between States and causing immense and increasing diversion of human and material resources for purposes of war".

There have also been reports that large underground tests had led to leakages of radioactivity outside the territorial limits of testing States, thus causing infringements of the partial test ban Treaty. Even if these incidents have not been deliberate, they may eventually lead to a weakening of the partial test ban Treaty and even endanger its very existence.

The heavy costs involved in nuclear weapon testing and the continued drain on highly specialized personnel being used for the further development and sophistication of nuclear weapons are a matter of serious concern for the international community. Considerable economic and technical resources and personnel could be redirected to peaceful scientific efforts and co-operation in the peaceful nuclear field if a comprehensive test ban treaty were concluded.

The eight delegations reaffirm their strong view that a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests would be an important step in the field of disarmament and would constitute an earnest of the intention of the nuclear-weapon Powers to carry out their obligations in accordance with the partial test ban Treaty.

The eight delegations are aware that the differences among the nuclear-weapon Powers on the question of verification and the type of system needed for monitoring a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests need to be overcome, and the procedure envisaged in the partial test ban Treaty must be adapted to these circumstances.

Brazil, Burm, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic: joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty [ENDC/235, of 26 August 1968]

Original text: English

The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic continue to


2 Ibid., Supplement for 1966, document DC/228, annex I, sect. O.
underground tests have not yet been resolved in spite of the fact that there has been considerable progress in regard to methods of control of an underground test ban.

The eight delegations note that various proposals have been put forward in the Committee by several delegations. They view with deep apprehension the fact that no serious negotiations have taken place on these proposals. These proposals should be studied further without delay.

Further international discussion could be held to promote an organized international exchange of seismic data from national seismological stations. Such an exchange would help to provide a better scientific basis for national evaluation of underground events.

An encouraging development has been that experts from various countries including four nuclear-weapon States have recently had an unofficial meeting in order to exchange views and hold discussions in regard to the adequacy of such methods. It is the view of the eight delegations that such discussions are useful and should continue.

In the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in connexion with discussions on it the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes has been given considerable prominence. This question is, however, also closely linked with a comprehensive test ban. This aspect of the matter underlines the urgency of a universal and comprehensive solution of the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in the context of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The eight delegations strongly urge that renewed and urgent efforts be made to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the eight delegations reaffirm their strong and consistent view that the nuclear-weapon States should take immediate steps for the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests.

ANNEX II
Check list of documents issued by the Conference (16 July-28 August 1968)

Verbatim records of the Conference
ENDC/PV 381-394 (16 July-28 August 1968):
Verbatim records of the 381st to 394th meetings

Documents of the Conference
*ENDC/226 (16 July 1968):
Letter dated 20 June 1968 from the Secretary-General to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, transmitting resolution 2373 (XXII) of the General Assembly and resolution 255 (1968) of the Security Council.

*ENDC/227 (16 July 1968):
Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament.

*ENDC/228 (16 July 1968):
United States of America: message from the President of the United States, Mr Lyndon B. Johnson, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

*ENDC/229 (16 July 1968):
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: message from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Right Honourable Harold Wilson, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

*ENDC/230 (29 July 1968):
Sweden: letter dated 29 July 1968 from the representative of Sweden addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

*ENDC/231 (6 August 1968):
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: working paper on microbiological warfare.

*ENDC/232 (20 August 1968):
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: working paper on the comprehensive test ban treaty.

ENDC/233 (20 August 1968):
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: letter dated 20 August 1968 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

*ENDC/234 (23 August 1968):
Italy: working paper on underground nuclear explosions.

*ENDC/235 (26 August 1968):
Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic: joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Documents containing information of an administrative nature
Basic information for delegations on conference arrangements and documentation.

ENDC/INF.2/Rev.36 and Add.1 (28 July and 8 August 1968):
List of members of delegations to the Conference.
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