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DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

OFFICIAL RECORDS

SUPPLEMENT FOR JANUARY TO DECEMBER 1965

UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1966
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## DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

**Supplement for January to December 1965**

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### DISARMAMENT COMMISSION DOCUMENTS

Issued during the period 1 January to 31 December 1965

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Letter dated 31 March 1965 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General requesting a meeting of the Disarmament Commission

[Original text : Russian]
[31 March 1965]

On the instructions of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics I hereby request you to convene the Disarmament Commission.

As is stated in the report transmitted by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session,\(^1\) protracted discussion on disarmament questions in the Committee did not lead to the attainment of any specific agreement either on questions of general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension. On adjourning its proceedings in September 1964, the Eighteen-Nation Committee decided to resume its meetings "as soon as possible after the termination of the consideration of disarmament at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, on a date to be decided by the two Co-Chairmen after consultation with the members of the Committee". For known reasons, however, it proved impossible for the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the state of the disarmament negotiations as a whole to be discussed at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly. Nevertheless, the course of international events requires the adoption of effective measures in the matter of disarmament and limitation of the arms race.

The problem of disarmament affects the vital interests of all States. The peoples are entitled to expect the United Nations to make a thorough examination of the disquieting state of disarmament negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and to help in charting specific courses along which progress can be made in those negotiations. Since no such discussion took place at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Government considers it necessary that the Disarmament Commission, on which all States Members of the United Nations are represented, should be convened.

The Soviet Government considers it desirable that the Disarmament Commission should begin work as soon as possible, in the first half of April 1965.

Please circulate this letter as an official document of the Disarmament Commission.

(Signed) N. FEDORENKO
Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations

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DOCUMENT DC/211

"Note verbale" dated 1 April 1965 from the Secretary-General to the members of the Disarmament Commission

[Original text : English]
[5 April 1965]

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to ... and has the honour to refer to resolution 1403 (XIV), adopted by the General Assembly at its fourteenth session, by which the Assembly noted with approval the report of the Disarmament Commission that contained the resolution adopted on 10 September 1959 \(^2\) in which the Commission, *inter alia*, recommended to the General Assembly "that the Disarmament Commission as set up by General Assembly resolution 1252 D (XIII) of 4 November 1958 should continue in being and be convened whenever deemed necessary".


The Secretary-General has just received a letter dated 31 March 1965 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations [DC/210] in which it has been stated that the Soviet Government considers it necessary that the Disarmament Commission, on which all States Members of the United Nations are represented, should be convened. The Secretary-General would be grateful to receive the views of the Government of ... regarding this matter. The Government of the USSR has further indicated that it considers it desirable that the Disarmament Commission should begin work as soon as possible, in the first half of April 1965. The Secretary-General wishes to inform the members that he could make arrangements to convene
a meeting of the Commission on 13 April 1965. However, in his final decision regarding the date of the meeting, the Secretary-General will be guided by the reactions of the members of the Commission and would appreciate receiving the views of the Government of ... in the matter.

DOCUMENT DC/212

"Note verbale" dated 12 April 1965 from the Secretary-General to the members of the Disarmament Commission

[Original text : English]  
[13 April 1965]

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to ... and has the honour to refer to his note dated 1 April 1965 [DC/211] in connexion with the convening of the Disarmament Commission.

The Secretary-General wishes to state that on the basis of the consultations undertaken by him on the subject, he has decided to convene a meeting of the Disarmament Commission on Wednesday, 21 April 1965, at 3 p.m. The Secretary-General wishes to add that the first meeting, on 21 April 1965, will be devoted to the opening of the proceedings and the organizational question of elections, and that the substantive work of the Commission will commence on 26 April 1965.

DOCUMENTS DC/213 AND ADD. 1 AND 2

Letter dated 28 April 1965 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission

[Original text : Russian]  
[28 April 1965]

DOCUMENT DC/213

I would request you to have circulated as official documents of the Disarmament Commission the attached Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control [DC/213/Add.1] and the memorandum by the Soviet Government of 7 December 1964 on measures for the further reduction of international tension and limitation of the arms race [DC/213/Add.2].

(Signed) N. FEDORENKO  
Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations

DOCUMENT DC/213/ADD. 1

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:  
draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control

[Original text : Russian]  
[28 April 1965]

"Draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control"

Preamble

The States of the world,

Acting in accordance with the aspirations and will of the peoples,

Convinced that war cannot and must not serve as a method for settling international disputes, especially in

3 Revised text of the draft treaty originally submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 15 March 1962, incorporating additions and amendments issued since that date.

the present circumstances of the precipitate development of means of mass annihilation such as nuclear weapons and rocket devices for their delivery, but must forever be banished from the life of human society,

Fulfilling the historic mission of saving all the nations from the horrors of war,

Basing themselves on the fact that general and complete disarmament under strict international control is a sure and practical way to fulfil mankind’s age-old dream of ensuring perpetual and inviolable peace on earth,
Desirous of putting an end to the senseless waste of human labour on the creation of the means of annihilating human beings and of destroying material values,

Seeking to direct all resources towards ensuring a further increase in prosperity and socio-economic progress in all countries in the world,

Conscious of the need to build relations among States on the basis of the principles of peace, good-neighbourliness, equality of States and peoples, non-interference and respect for the independence and sovereignty of all countries,

Reaffirming their dedication to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty and to implement forthwith general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

PART 1. GENERAL

Article 1. Disarmament obligations

The States parties to the present Treaty solemnly undertake:

1. To carry out, over a period of five years, general and complete disarmament entailing:
   The disbanding of all armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever;
   The prohibition and destruction of all stockpiles and the cessation of the production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons;
   The destruction and cessation of the production of all means of delivering weapons of mass destruction to their targets;
   The dismantling of all kinds of foreign military bases and the withdrawal and disbanding of all foreign troops stationed in the territory of any State;
   The abolition of any kind of military conscription for citizens;
   The cessation of military training of the population and the closing of all military training institutions;
   The abolition of war ministries, general staffs and their local agencies, and all other military and paramilitary establishments and organizations,
   The elimination of all types of conventional armaments and military equipment and the cessation of their production except for the production of strictly limited quantities of agreed types of light firearms for the equipment of the police (militia) contingents to be retained by States after the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament;
   The discontinuance of the appropriation of funds for military purposes, whether from State budgets or by organizations or private individuals.

2. To retain at their disposal, upon completion of general and complete disarmament, only strictly limited contingents of police (militia) equipped with light firearms and intended for the maintenance of internal order and for the discharge of their obligations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter and under the provisions of article 37 of the present Treaty.

3. To carry out general and complete disarmament simultaneously in three consecutive stages, as set forth in parts 2, 3 and 4 of the present Treaty. Transition to a subsequent stage of disarmament shall take place after adoption by the International Disarmament Organization of a decision confirming that all disarmament measures of the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and that any additional verification measures recognized to be necessary for the next stage have been prepared and can be put into operation when appropriate.

4. To carry out all measures of general and complete disarmament in such a way that at no stage of disarmament any State or group of States gains any military advantage and that the security of all States parties to the Treaty is equally safeguarded.

Article 2. Control obligations

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly undertake to carry out all disarmament measures, from beginning to end, under strict international control and to ensure the implementation in their territories of all control measures set forth in parts 2, 3 and 4 of the present Treaty.

2. Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure.

3. To implement control over disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization composed of all States parties to the Treaty shall be established within the framework of the United Nations. It shall begin operating as soon as disarmament measures are initiated. The structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organization and its bodies are laid down in part 5 of the present Treaty.

4. In all States parties to the Treaty the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation of all three groups of States existing in the world.

This staff shall exercise control on a temporary or permanent basis, depending on the nature of the measure being carried out, over the compliance by States with their obligations to reduce or eliminate armaments and the production of armaments and to reduce or disband their armed forces.

5. The States parties to the Treaty shall submit to the International Disarmament Organization in good time such information on their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as is necessary for the purpose of carrying out the measures of the stage concerned.

6. Upon completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall be kept in being and shall exercise supervision over the fulfilment by States of the obligations they have assumed so as to prevent the re-
establishment of the military potential of States in any form whatsoever.

**Article 3. Obligations to maintain international peace and security**

1. The States parties to the Treaty solemnly confirm their resolve in the course of and after general and complete disarmament:

(a) To base relations with each other on the principles of peaceful and friendly coexistence and co-operation;

(b) Not to resort to the threat or use of force to settle any international disputes that may arise, but to use for this purpose the procedures provided for in the United Nations Charter;

(c) To strengthen the United Nations as the principal institution for the maintenance of peace and for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

2. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to refrain from using the contingents of police (militia) remaining at their disposal upon completion of general and complete disarmament for any purpose other than the safeguarding of their internal security or the discharge of their obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

PART 2. FIRST STAGE OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

**Article 4. First-stage tasks**

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the first stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases in alien territories, to withdraw all foreign troops from these territories and to reduce their armed forces, their conventional armaments and the production of such armaments, and their military expenditure.

**CHAPTER I. ELIMINATION OF THE MEANS OF DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN ALIEN TERRITORIES, AND WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM THOSE TERRITORIES; CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES**

**A. MEANS OF DELIVERY**

**Article 5. Elimination of rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons**

1. All rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons of any calibre and range, whether strategic, operational, tactical or tactical, and pilotless aircraft of all types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed, except for an agreed and strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category, to be retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, exclusively in their own territory, until the end of the third stage. A strictly limited number of rockets to be converted to peaceful uses under the provisions of article 15 of the present Treaty shall also be retained.

All launching pads, silos and platforms for the launching of rockets and pilotless aircraft, other than those required for the missiles to be retained under the provisions of this article, shall be completely demolished. All instruments for the equipment, launching and guidance of rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be destroyed. All underground depots for such rockets, pilotless aircraft and auxiliary facilities shall be demolished.

2. The production of all kinds of rockets and pilotless aircraft and of the materials and instruments for their equipment, launching and guidance referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. All undertakings, or workshops thereof, engaged in their production shall be dismantled; machine tools and equipment specially and exclusively designed for the production of such items shall be destroyed; the premises of such undertakings as well as general-purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All proving grounds for tests of such rockets and pilotless aircraft shall be demolished.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

4. The production and testing of appropriate rockets for the peaceful exploration of space shall be allowed, provided that the plants producing such rockets, as well as the rockets themselves, will be subject to supervision by the inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

**Article 6. Elimination of military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons**

1. All military aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Military airfields serving as bases for such aircraft and repair and maintenance facilities and storage premises at such airfields shall be rendered inoperative or converted to peaceful uses. Training establishments for crews of such aircraft shall be closed.

2. The production of all military aircraft referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Undertakings or workshops thereof designed for the production of such military aircraft shall be either dismantled or converted to the production of civil aircraft or other civilian goods.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

**Article 7. Elimination of all surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons, and submarines**

1. All surface warships capable of being used as vehicles for nuclear weapons and submarines of all classes and types shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Naval bases and other installations for the maintenance of the above warships and submarines shall be demolished or dismantled and handed over to the merchant marine for peaceful uses.
2. The building of the warships and submarines referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. Shipyards and plants wholly or partly designed for the building of such warships and submarines shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful production.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

Article 8. Elimination of all artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons

1. All artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivering nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. All auxiliary equipment and technical facilities designed for controlling the fire of such artillery systems shall be destroyed. Surface storage premises and transport facilities for such systems shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. The entire stock of non-nuclear munitions for such artillery systems, whether at the gun site or in depots, shall be completely destroyed. Underground depots for such artillery systems and for the non-nuclear munitions thereof shall be destroyed.

2. The production of the artillery systems referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be completely discontinued. To this end, all plants, or workshops thereof, engaged in the production of such systems shall be closed and dismantled. All specialized equipment and machine tools at these plants and workshops shall be destroyed, the remainder being converted to peaceful uses. The production of non-nuclear munitions for these artillery systems shall be discontinued. Plants and workshops engaged in the production of such munitions shall be completely dismantled and their specialized equipment destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

B. FOREIGN MILITARY BASES AND TROOPS IN ALIEN TERRITORIES

Article 9. Dismantling of foreign military bases

1. Simultaneously with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under articles 5 to 8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have army, air force or naval bases in foreign territories shall dismantle all such bases, whether principal or reserve bases, as well as all depot bases of any type. All personnel of such bases shall be evacuated to their national territory. All installations and armaments existing at such bases and coming under articles 5 to 8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State which owned the base. All installations of a military nature at such bases shall be destroyed. The living quarters and auxiliary installations of foreign bases shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory they are located.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be fully applicable to military bases which are used by foreign troops but which may legally belong to the State in whose territory they are located. The said measures shall also be implemented with respect to army, air force and naval bases that have been set up under military treaties and agreements for use by other States or groups of States, regardless of whether any foreign troops are present at those bases at the time of the conclusion of the present Treaty.

All previous treaty obligations, decisions of the organs of military blocs and any rights or privileges pertaining to the establishment or use of military bases in foreign territories shall lapse and may not be renewed. It shall henceforth be prohibited to grant military bases for use by foreign troops and to conclude any bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements to this end.

3. The legislatures and Governments of the States parties to the present Treaty shall enact legislation and issue regulations to ensure that no military bases to be used by foreign troops are established in their territory. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.

Article 10. Withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories

1. Simultaneously with the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons under articles 5 to 8 of the present Treaty, the States parties to the Treaty which have troops or military personnel of any nature in foreign territories shall withdraw all such troops and personnel from such territories. All armaments and all installations of a military nature which are located at points where foreign troops are stationed and which come under articles 5 to 8 of the present Treaty shall be destroyed on the spot. Other armaments shall either be destroyed on the spot in accordance with article 11 of the present Treaty or evacuated to the territory of the State withdrawing its troops. The living quarters and auxiliary installations previously occupied by such troops or personnel shall be transferred for civilian use to the States in whose territory such troops were stationed.

2. The measures set forth in paragraph 1 of this article shall be fully applicable to foreign civilians employed in the armed forces or engaged in the production of armaments or any other activities serving military purposes in foreign territory.

Such persons shall be recalled to the territory of the State of which they are citizens, and all previous treaty obligations, decisions by organs of military blocs, and any rights or privileges pertaining to their activities, shall lapse and may not be renewed. It shall henceforth be prohibited to dispatch foreign troops, military personnel or the above-mentioned civilians to foreign territories.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the withdrawal of troops, the destruc-
tion of installations and the transfer of the premises referred to in paragraph 1 of this article. The International Disarmament Organization shall also have the right to exercise control over the recall of the civilians referred to in paragraph 2 of this article. The laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 3 of article 9 of the present Treaty shall include provisions prohibiting citizens of States parties to the Treaty from serving in the armed forces or from engaging in any other activities serving military purposes in foreign States.

CHAPTER II. REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES, CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE; CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES

Article 11. Reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments

1. In the first stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be reduced to the following levels: United States of America — 1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — 1,900,000 enlisted men, officers and civilian employees. [Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article.]

2. The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out in the first place through the demobilization of personnel released as a result of the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories, as provided for in articles 5 to 10 of the present Treaty, but chiefly through the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

3. Conventional armaments, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 30 per cent for each type of all categories of these armaments. The reduced armaments, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds belonging to such units, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

4. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are being disbanded and where released conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

Article 12. Reduction of conventional armaments production

1. The production of conventional armaments and munitions not coming under articles 5 to 8 of the present Treaty shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 11 of the present Treaty. Such reduction shall be carried out primarily through the elimination of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general-purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 13. Reduction of military expenditure

1. The States parties to the present Treaty shall reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons and the discontinuance of their production, to the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from alien territories as well as to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and to the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 5 to 12 of the present Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the first-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article through its financial inspectors, to whom the States parties to the Treaty undertake to grant unimpeded access to the records of central financial institutions concerning the reduction in their budgetary appropriations resulting from the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, and to the relevant decisions of their legislative and executive bodies.

CHAPTER III. MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY OF STATES

Article 14. Restrictions on the movement of means of delivering nuclear weapons

1. From the beginning of the first stage until the final destruction of all means of delivering nuclear weapons in accordance with articles 5 to 8 of the present Treaty, it shall be prohibited for any special devices capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to be placed in orbit or stationed in outer space and for warships or military aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction to leave their territorial waters or to fly beyond the limits of their national territory.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article. The States parties to the Treaty shall provide the
International Disarmament Organization with advance information on all launching of rockets for peaceful purposes provided for in article 15 of the present Treaty, as well as on all movements of military aircraft within their national frontiers and of warships within their territorial waters.

Article 15. Control over launchings of rockets for peaceful purposes

1. The launching of rockets and space devices shall be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes.

2. The International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article through the establishment, at the sites for peaceful rocket launchings, of inspection teams which shall be present at the launchings and shall thoroughly examine every rocket or satellite before its launching.

Article 16. Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons

The States parties to the Treaty which possess nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from transferring control over nuclear weapons and from transmitting information necessary for their production to States not possessing such weapons.

The States parties to the Treaty not possessing nuclear weapons undertake to refrain from producing or otherwise obtaining nuclear weapons and shall refuse to admit the nuclear weapons of any other State into their territories.

Article 17. Prohibition of nuclear weapon tests

The conducting of nuclear weapon tests of any kind shall be prohibited (if such a prohibition has not come into effect under other international agreements by the time this Treaty is signed).

Article 17a. Measures to reduce the danger of outbreak of war

1. From the commencement of the first stage, large-scale joint military movements or manoeuvres by armed forces of two or more States shall be prohibited.

The States parties to the Treaty agree to give advance notification of large-scale military movements or manoeuvres by their national armed forces within their national frontiers.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall exchange military missions between States or groups of States for the purpose of improving relations and mutual understanding between them.

3. The States parties to the Treaty agree to establish swift and reliable communication between their Heads of Government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

4. The measures set forth in this article shall remain in effect after the first stage until the completion of general and complete disarmament.

Article 18. Measures to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security

1. With a view to ensuring that the United Nations is capable of effectively protecting States against threats to or breaches of the peace, all States parties to the Treaty shall, between the signing of the Treaty and its entry into force, conclude agreements with the Security Council by which they undertake to make available to the latter armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, as provided in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

2. The armed forces specified in the said agreements shall form part of the national armed forces of the States concerned and shall be stationed within their territories. They shall be kept up to full strength and shall be fully equipped and prepared for combat. When used under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, these forces, serving under the command of the military authorities of the States concerned, shall be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

Chapter IV. Time-limits for first-stage measures; transition from the first to the second stage

Article 19. Time-limits for first-stage measures

1. The first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be initiated six months after the Treaty comes into force (in accordance with article 46), within which period the International Disarmament Organization shall be set up.

2. The duration of the first stage of general and complete disarmament shall be eighteen months.

Article 20. Transition from the first to the second stage

In the course of the last three months of the first stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of the first-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Part 3. Second stage of general and complete disarmament

Article 21. Second-stage tasks

The States parties to the Treaty shall undertake, in the course of the second stage of general and complete disarmament, to effect the complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to make a further reduction in their armed forces, their conventional armaments and the production of such armaments, and their military expenditure.
CHAPTER V. ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL,
BILOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS; CONTROL
OVER SUCH MEASURES

Article 22. Elimination of nuclear weapons

1. (a) Nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities, with the exception of the warheads pertaining to missiles temporarily retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America under article 5, paragraph 1, of this Treaty shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Fissionable materials extracted from weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots, shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct reconstitution into weapons and shall form a special stock for peaceful uses, belonging to the State which previously owned the nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear components of such weapons shall be completely destroyed.

All depots and special storage spaces for nuclear weapons shall be demolished.

(b) All stockpiles of nuclear materials intended for the production of nuclear weapons shall be appropriately processed to render them unfit for direct use in nuclear weapons and shall be transferred to the above-mentioned special stocks.

(c) Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures to eliminate nuclear weapons referred to above in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

2. (a) The production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components shall be eliminated or converted to production for peaceful purposes. All workshops, installations and laboratories for the production of the components of nuclear weapons at plants that are partially engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

(b) The measures for the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to inspect all undertakings which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy.

The States parties to the Treaty shall make available to the International Disarmament Organization documents pertaining to the extraction and processing of nuclear raw materials and to their utilization for military or peaceful purposes.

3. Each State party to the Treaty shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedures enact legislation completely prohibiting nuclear weapons and making any attempt by individuals or organizations to reconstitute such weapons a criminal offence.

Article 23. Elimination of chemical, biological and radiological weapons

1. All types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots and storage places, shall be eliminated from the arsenals of States and destroyed (neutralized). All instruments and facilities for the combat use of such weapons, all special facilities for their transportation, and all special devices and facilities for their storage and conservation shall simultaneously be destroyed.

2. The production of all types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and of all means and devices for their combat use, transportation and storage shall be completely discontinued. All plants, installations and laboratories that are wholly or partly engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

3. The measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be implemented under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

CHAPTER VI. FURTHER REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES,
CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES;
CONTROL OVER SUCH MEASURES

Article 24. Further reduction of armed forces and conventional arms

1. In the second stage of general and complete disarmament the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty shall be further reduced to the following levels: United States of America — one million enlisted men, officers and civilian employees; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — one million enlisted men, officers and civilian employees.

[Agreed force levels for other States parties to the Treaty shall be included in this article.]

The reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out in the first place through the demobilization of personnel previously manning the nuclear or other weapons subject to elimination under articles 22 and 23 of the present Treaty, but chiefly through the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized.

2. Conventional arms, military equipment, munitions, means of transportation and auxiliary equipment in units and depots shall be reduced by 35 per cent from the original levels for each type of all categories of these arms. The reduced arms, military equipment and munitions shall be destroyed, and the means of transportation and auxiliary equipment shall be either destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

All living quarters, depots and special premises previously occupied by units being disbanded, as well as the territories of all proving grounds, firing ranges and drill grounds belonging to such units, shall be transferred for peaceful uses to the civilian authorities.

3. As in the implementation of such measures in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control at places where troops are being
disbanded and where released conventional armaments and military equipment are being destroyed, and shall also verify the conversion to peaceful uses of means of transportation and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

Article 25. Further reduction of conventional armaments production

1. The production of conventional armaments and munitions shall be reduced proportionately to the reduction of armed forces provided for in article 24 of the present Treaty. Such reduction shall, as in the first stage of general and complete disarmament, be carried out primarily through the elimination of undertakings engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions. These undertakings shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and their premises and general-purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses.

2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

Article 26. Further reduction of military expenditure

1. The States parties to the Treaty shall further reduce their military budgets and appropriations for military purposes proportionately to the destruction of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons and the discontinuance of the production of such weapons as well as to the further reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and the reduction of the production of such armaments, as provided for in articles 22 to 25 of the present Treaty.

The funds released through the implementation of the second-stage measures shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. Control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the present Treaty. Financial inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall also be granted unimpeded access to records concerning the reduction in the budgetary appropriations of States resulting from the elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

Chapter VII. Measures to safeguard the security of States

Article 27. Continued strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security

The States parties to the Treaty shall continue to implement the measures referred to in article 18 of the present Treaty regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council for use under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter.

Chapter VIII. Time-limits for second-stage measures; transition from the second to the third stage

Article 28. Time-limits for second-stage measures

The duration of the second stage of general and complete disarmament shall be twenty-four months.

Article 29. Transition from the second to the third stage

In the course of the last three months of the second stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of this stage.

Measures for the transition from the second to the third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be similar to the corresponding measures for the first stage, as laid down in article 20 of the present Treaty.

Part 4. Third stage of general and complete disarmament

Article 30. Third-stage tasks

The States parties to the Treaty undertake, in the course of the third stage of general and complete disarmament, fully to disband all their armed forces and thereby to complete the elimination of the military machinery of States.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America undertake to complete the total elimination of all the missiles, and the nuclear warheads pertaining thereto, which remained at their disposal under article 5, paragraph 1, of this Treaty.

Chapter IX. Completion of the elimination of the military machinery of States; control over such measures

Article 31. Completion of the elimination of armed forces and conventional armaments

1. With a view to completing the process of the elimination of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall disband the entire personnel of the armed forces which remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of disarmament. The system of military reserves of each State party to the Treaty shall be completely abolished.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall destroy all types of armaments, military equipment and munitions, whether held by the troops or in depots, that remained at their disposal after the accomplishment of the first two stages of the Treaty. All military equipment which cannot be converted to peaceful uses shall be destroyed.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the disbanding of troops and over the destruction of armaments and military equipment, and shall control the conversion to peaceful uses of transport and other non-combat equipment, premises, proving grounds, etc.

The International Disarmament Organization shall have access to documents pertaining to the disbanding of all
personnel of the armed forces of the States parties to the Treaty.

**Article 32. Complete cessation of military production**

1. Military production at factories and plants shall be discontinued, with the exception of the production of agreed types and quantities of light firearms for the purposes referred to in article 36, paragraph 2, of the present Treaty. The factories and plants subject to elimination shall be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and equipment shall be destroyed, and the premises, general-purpose machine tools and equipment shall be converted to peaceful uses. All scientific research in the military field at all scientific and research institutions and at designing offices shall be discontinued. All blueprints and other documents necessary for the production of the weapons and military equipment subject to elimination shall be destroyed.

All orders placed by military departments with national or foreign government undertakings and private firms for the production of armaments, military equipment, munitions and material shall be cancelled.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article.

**Article 33. Abolition of military establishments**

1. War ministries, general staffs and all other military and paramilitary organizations and institutions for the purpose of organizing the military effort of States parties to the Treaty shall be abolished. The States parties to the Treaty shall:

   (a) Demobilize all personnel of these institutions and organizations;

   (b) Abrogate all laws, rules and regulations governing the organization of the military effort and the status, structure and activities of such institutions and organizations;

   (c) Destroy all documents pertaining to the planning of the mobilization and operational deployment of the armed forces in time of war.

2. The entire process of the abolition of military and paramilitary institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

**Article 34. Abolition of military conscription and military training**

In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, the States parties to the Treaty shall enact legislation prohibiting all military training, abolishing military conscription and all other forms of recruiting the armed forces, and discontinuing all military courses for reservists. All establishments and organizations dealing with military training shall simultaneously be disbanded in accordance with article 33 of the present Treaty. The disbanding of all military training institutions and organizations shall be carried out under the control of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization.

**Article 35. Prohibition of the appropriation of funds for military purposes**

1. The appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether by government bodies, private individuals or social organizations, shall be discontinued.

The funds released through the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall be used for peaceful purposes, including the reduction or complete abolition of taxes on the population and the subsidizing of the national economy. A certain portion of the funds thus released shall also be used for the provision of economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries. The size of this portion shall be subject to agreement between the parties to the Treaty.

2. For the purpose of organizing control over the implementation of the provisions of this article, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access to the legislative and budgetary documents of the States parties to the present Treaty.

**Article 35a. Elimination of missiles, and of nuclear warheads pertaining thereto, retained until the end of the third stage**

1. At the end of the third stage there shall be carried out the elimination of all intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in accordance with the provisions of article 5, paragraph 1, of this Treaty, together with the nuclear warheads, launching devices and guiding systems.

2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the measures referred to above in paragraph 1.

**Chapter X. Measures to safeguard the security of States and to maintain international peace**

**Article 36. Contingents of police (militia)**

1. After the complete abolition of armed forces, the States parties to the Treaty shall be entitled to have strictly limited contingents of police (militia), equipped with light firearms, to maintain internal order, including the safeguarding of frontiers and the personal security of citizens, and to provide for compliance with their obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

The strength of these contingents of police (militia) for each State party to the Treaty shall be as follows:

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall be allowed to manufacture strictly limited quantities of light firearms intended for such contingents of police (militia). The list of plants producing such arms and the quotas and types of such arms for each party to the Treaty shall be specified in a special agreement.

3. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over compliance by the States parties to the Treaty with their obligations with regard to the restricted production of the said light firearms.
Article 37. Police (militia) units to be made available to the Security Council

1. The States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council, at its request, units from the contingents of police (militia) retained by them, as well as to provide assistance and facilities, including rights of passage. The placing of such units at the disposal of the Security Council shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter. In order to ensure that urgent military measures may be undertaken, the States parties to the Treaty shall maintain in a state of immediate readiness those units of their police (militia) contingents which are intended for joint international enforcement action. The size of the units which the States parties to the Treaty undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council as well as the areas where such units are to be stationed shall be specified in agreements to be concluded by those States with the Security Council.

2. The command of the units referred to in paragraph 1 shall be composed of representatives of the three principal groups of States existing in the world on the basis of equal representation. It shall decide all questions by agreement among its members representing all three groups of States.

Article 38. Control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces

1. The police (militia) contingents retained by the States parties to the Treaty after the completion of general and complete disarmament shall be under the control of the International Disarmament Organization, which shall verify the reports by States concerning the areas where such contingents are stationed, concerning the strength and armaments of the contingents in each such area, and concerning all movements of substantial contingents of police (militia).

2. For the purpose of ensuring that armed forces and armaments abolished as a result of general and complete disarmament are not re-established, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty.

3. The International Disarmament Organization shall have the right to institute a system of aerial inspection and aerial photography over the territories of the States parties to the Treaty.

Chapter XI. Time-limits for third-stage measures

Article 39

The third stage of general and complete disarmament shall be completed over a period of one year. During the last three months of this stage the International Disarmament Organization shall review the implementation of the third-stage measures of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty as well as to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Part 5. Structure and functions of the International Disarmament Organization

Article 40. Functions and main bodies

The International Disarmament Organization to be set up under article 2, paragraph 3, of the present Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Organization", shall consist of a Conference of all States parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Conference", and a Control Council, hereinafter referred to as the "Council".

The Organization shall deal with questions pertaining to the supervision of compliance by States with their obligations under the present Treaty. All questions connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security which may arise in the course of the implementation of the present Treaty, including preventive and enforcement measures, shall be decided by the Security Council in conformity with its powers under the United Nations Charter.

Article 41. The Conference

1. The Conference shall comprise all States parties to the Treaty. It shall hold regular sessions at least once a year and special sessions, which may be convened by decision of the Council or at the request of a majority of the States parties to the Treaty, with a view to considering matters connected with the implementation of effective control over disarmament. The sessions shall be held at the headquarters of the Organization, unless otherwise decided by the Conference.

2. Each State party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on questions of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority and on all other matters by a two-thirds majority. In accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, the Conference shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

3. The Conference may discuss any matters pertaining to measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament and may make recommendations to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Council on any such matter or measure.

4. The Conference shall:
   (a) Elect non-permanent members of the Council;
   (b) Consider the annual, and any special, reports of the Council;
   (c) Approve the budget recommended by the Council;
   (d) Approve reports to be submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
   (e) Approve amendments to the present Treaty in accordance with article 47 of the present Treaty;
   (f) Take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Council;
   (g) Propose matters for consideration by the Council and request from the Council reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Council.
Article 42. The Control Council

1. The Council shall consist of:
   
   (a) The five States which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council;
   
   (b) ... [number] other States parties to the Treaty, elected by the Conference for a period of two years.

   The composition of the Council must ensure proper representation of the three principal groups of States existing in the world.

2. The Council shall:
   
   (a) Provide practical guidance for the measures of control over the implementation of general and complete disarmament; set up such bodies at the headquarters of the Organization as it deems necessary for the discharge of its functions; establish procedures for their operation, and devise the necessary rules and regulations in accordance with the present Treaty;
   
   (b) Submit to the Conference annual reports and such special reports as it deems necessary to prepare;
   
   (c) Maintain constant contact with the United Nations Security Council as the organ bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, periodically inform it of the progress achieved in the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and promptly notify it of any infringements by the States parties to the Treaty of their disarmament obligations under the present Treaty;
   
   (d) Review the implementation of the measures included in each stage of general and complete disarmament with a view to submitting a report on the matter to the States parties to the Treaty and to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations;
   
   (e) Recruit the staff of the Organization on an international basis so as to ensure that the three principal groups of States existing in the world are adequately represented. The personnel of the Organization shall be recruited from among persons who are recommended by Governments and who may or may not be citizens of the country of the recommending Government;
   
   (f) Prepare and submit to the Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Organization;
   
   (g) Draw up instructions by which the various control bodies are to be guided in their work;
   
   (h) Make a prompt study of incoming reports;
   
   (i) Request from States such information on their armed forces and armaments as may be necessary for control over the implementation of the disarmament measures provided for by the present Treaty;
   
   (j) Perform such other functions as are envisaged in the present Treaty.

3. Each member of the Council shall have one vote. Decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be taken by a simple majority, and on other matters by a two-thirds majority.

4. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. The Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure and shall be authorized to establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 43. Privileges and immunities

The Organization, its personnel and representatives of the States parties to the Treaty shall enjoy in the territory of each State party to the Treaty such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of independent and unrestricted control over the implementation of the present Treaty.

Article 44. Finances

1. All the expenses of the Organization shall be financed from the funds allocated by the States parties to the Treaty. The budget of the Organization shall be drawn up by the Council and approved by the Conference in accordance with article 41, paragraph 4 (c), and article 42, paragraph 2 (f), of the present Treaty.

2. The States parties to the Treaty shall contribute funds to cover the expenditure of the Organization according to the following scale: .................. [The agreed scale of contributions shall be included in the present article.]

Article 45. Preparatory Commission

Immediately after the signing of the present Treaty, the States participating in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament shall set up a Preparatory Commission for the purpose of taking practical steps to establish the International Disarmament Organization.

PART 6. FINAL CLAUSES

Article 46. Ratification and entry into force

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States in accordance with their constitutional procedures within a period of six months from the date of its signature, and shall come into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification with the United Nations Secretariat by all the States which are permanent members of the Security Council, as well as by those States that are their allies in bilateral and multilateral military alliances, and by ... [number] non-aligned States.

Article 47. Amendments

Any proposal to amend the text of the present Treaty shall come into force after it has been adopted by a two-thirds majority at a Conference of all States parties to the Treaty and has been ratified by the States referred to in article 46 of the present Treaty in accordance with their constitutional procedures.

Article 48. Authentic texts

The present Treaty, done in the Russian, English, French, Chinese and Spanish languages, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the United Nations Secretariat, which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the signatory States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed the present Treaty.

DONE at ........................................
Memorandum by the Soviet Government on measures for the further reduction of international tension and the limitation of the arms race

[For the text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 9, document A/5827 of 7 December 1964.]

DOCUMENTS DC/214 AND ADD. 1

Letter dated 29 April 1965 from the representative of the United States of America to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission

[Original text : English]
[29 April 1965]

DOCUMENT DC/214

I have the honour to request that the attached “Memorandum of the United States of America on measures to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, halt and turn down the arms race, and reduce international tension” [DC/214/Add.1] be circulated as a document of the Disarmament Commission.

(Signed) William C. Foster
Vice-Chairman,
United States delegation to the Disarmament Commission

DOCUMENT DC/214/Add. 1

Memorandum of the United States of America on measures to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, halt and turn down the arms race, and reduce international tension

[Original text : English]
[29 April 1965]

This memorandum sets forth the positions the United States took at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament during 1964. These positions were derived largely from proposals contained in a message submitted to the Conference by President Johnson on 21 January 1964. Pertinent portions of this message, followed by excerpts from statements by United States representatives elaborating upon the proposals contained therein, are set forth in section I below; the complete text of President Johnson’s message is given in section II. The text of the United States “Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world”, as amended, appears in section III.

I

Measures to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, halt and turn down the arms race, and reduce international tension

A. MEASURES TO STOP THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

President Johnson’s proposal of 21 January 1964

To stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them, let us agree:

(a) That nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of States which do not now control them, and that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards;

(b) That the major nuclear powers accept in an increasing number of their peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection they recommend for other States; and

(c) On the banning of all nuclear weapons tests under effective verification and control.

Elaboration of proposal (a) by William C. Foster, Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in a statement made on 6 February 1964 at the 164th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

My Government voted in favour of the Irish draft resolution unanimously adopted by the sixteenth session of the General Assembly [resolution 1665 (XVI)]. You will recall that that resolution calls upon all States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement under which nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons to States not possessing such weapons. The agreement called for by the Irish resolution would also contain provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons. The United States has long sought an agreement which would implement the terms of the Irish resolution.

We wish to make it clear that the creation of multinational defence forces within the framework of existing collective security arrangements would not result in additional States obtaining national control of nuclear weapons. The creation of such forces would be fully consistent with the Irish resolution and would, in fact, reinforce common policies to prevent wider dissemination of national nuclear weapons capabilities.

As an immediate step and to facilitate progress in these discussions, the United States, for its part, does not intend to take any actions inconsistent with the terms of the Irish resolution. That is the declared policy of the United States.
Elaboration of proposals (a) and (b) by Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in a statement made on 5 March 1964 at the 172nd meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee

At present only a few countries can produce nuclear weapons. It is in the interest of all the world that their number not be increased.

An increasingly large number of countries have peaceful nuclear programmes. It is in the interest of all that their number continue to increase.

However, without effective safeguards, the materials and technology which are acquired for peaceful uses of nuclear energy may be diverted to produce nuclear weapons.

... The United States has ... given its strong support to the development of an effective system of international safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States bilateral system is fully consistent with that IAEA system.

... It is the policy of the United States to transfer the administration of safeguards under its existing bilateral agreements to the IAEA as rapidly as possible. ...

Some two years ago, the IAEA was also invited by the United States to apply Agency safeguards to several of its own smaller research and power reactors ...

The United States does not believe that the opening of these reactors to international inspection is a derogation of its national sovereignty. Nor is the safeguard system onerous. It involves record-keeping, reporting and inspection — the same kind of controls as prudent management would naturally set up internally.

... I should now like to develop further the United States proposals regarding international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities.

First, the United States proposes that all future transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards. We believe that this proposal could be implemented by appropriate agreements, which would grow out of this conference, covering all such future transfers. Fissionable materials, or raw materials or equipment essential to the production of fissionable materials, would be covered. Suppliers would agree to transfer materials and equipment only under IAEA safeguards or similar arrangements. Recipients would agree to receive materials or equipment only under such safeguarded arrangements. Provisions relating to open technology and authorized visits by scientists for study and observation might also be included.

We believe that the agreement regarding transfers should, in addition, provide for the extension of IAEA or similar safeguards to an increasing number of the peaceful-use facilities of all States receiving assistance.

Second, the United States proposes that the major nuclear Powers accept in an increasing number of their own peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection as recommended for other States.

As a first step in that direction, the United States has already accepted IAEA safeguards on certain of its peaceful-use facilities, as I have described previously.

As a second step, the United States will invite the IAEA to apply safeguards to a large power reactor in the United States. The Yankee power reactor at Rowe, Massachusetts, has been selected for this purpose. This privately-owned reactor, which is rated at a power level of 600,000 thermal kilowatts, is one of the largest nuclear power reactors in operation in the United States. In 1963 it produced over 1,000 million electrical kilowatt hours.

We are offering the Yankee reactor for IAEA inspection for two reasons. First, it will assist the IAEA further in developing and demonstrating the effectiveness of its inspection techniques for large reactor facilities. Second, we intend it as an example to other nuclear Powers. We hope that other States will join us in this step and invite the application of IAEA safeguards on some of their large civil reactors; indeed, we urge them, and in particular we urge the Soviet Union, to do so.

... Elaboration of proposal (c) by William C. Foster in a statement made on 3 September 1964 at the 213th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee

One way in which we can realistically hope to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war is by continuing our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to nations which do not have them. If we are concerned now about the danger of a nuclear holocaust when there are only four nuclear Powers, what will our concern be when there are five, ten or twenty?

A comprehensive test ban is one important way of dealing with this problem. A comprehensive ban would of course prevent all testing by signatories. It would thereby severely inhibit efforts by them to acquire the knowledge and the ability to make nuclear weapons. For that reason my Government believes that a verified agreement banning all nuclear weapon tests is an urgent necessity. The Committee will remember that President Johnson has twice this year proposed such a ban. Concerning that proposal I have three points to make.

First, since the limited nuclear test ban treaty was signed, our scientists have continued to press forward with research into the problems of nuclear test detection and identification. My Government's Vela research programme costs more than $50 million a year, and much of this is devoted to the detection and identification of underground nuclear tests. However, no technical advances have been reported by our scientists which would justify modification of the United States position that on-site inspections are essential. Therefore, the requirement for on-site inspection to verify compliance with a ban on underground nuclear tests still exists.

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4 On 18 January 1964 (see Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1964, document DC/205, annex I, sect. C) and on 21 January 1964 (see section II below)
Second, the Soviet Union has withdrawn the offer of two or three on-site inspections, made by Premier Khrushchev in a letter to President Kennedy on 19 December 1962. On 20 August 1964 [209th meeting] the representative of the Soviet Union stated again that his Government was prepared to agree to a comprehensive test ban "without the establishment of international control but with the use of national means of detection for the verification of compliance with the agreement banning nuclear tests underground". We do not believe that this step backward by the Soviet Union can be justified on scientific or technical grounds. Indeed, the Soviet Government has not seen fit to share with other nations any new technical or seismological data which might conceivably support its present position.

B. A VERIFIED CUT-OFF OF PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FOR USE IN WEAPONS, AND A TRANSFER OF SUCH MATERIALS TO PEACEFUL USES

President Johnson’s proposal of 21 January 1964

The United States believes that a verified agreement to halt all production of fissionable materials for weapons use would be a major contribution to world peace. Moreover, while we seek agreement on this measure, the United States is willing to achieve prompt reductions through both sides closing comparable production facilities on a plant-by-plant basis, with mutual inspection. We have started in this direction — we hope the Soviet Union will do the same — and we are prepared to accept appropriate international verification of the reactor shutdown already scheduled in our country.

Elaboration of that proposal by William C. Foster on 13 February 1964 at the 166th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee

Regarding the cut-off, the United States is willing to agree to either a complete halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons or a reciprocal plant-by-plant shut-down. This approach seems to embrace the entire range of possible methods of bringing a cut-off into effect. We are prepared to halt production all at once or over a period of time. We would welcome an indication from the Soviet delegation of the sort of approach which they would find acceptable.

Regarding the transfer, the United States position is similarly flexible. The proposal originally put forward by the United States called for the transfer to non-weapon uses of the same quantity of weapons-grade U-235 by both sides. We have, however, indicated our willingness to consider other ratios whereby the United States would transfer a larger amount than the Soviet Union.

This might be for the United States to transfer an amount such as 60,000 kilogrammes if the Soviet Union would agree to transfer 40,000 kilogrammes. We are still flexible on the question of amounts of weapons-grade U-235 to be removed from availability for nuclear weapons. We would welcome and give serious consideration to any reasonable Soviet counter-proposal.

This proposal is not merely a gesture. Some figures illustrate its scope. As examples, the approximate monetary value of 60,000 kilogrammes of weapons-grade U-235 is $720 million. If completely fissoned in explosions, 60,000 kilogrammes would release about 1,000 megatons, or one-third of a ton of TNT equivalent for every man, woman and child on earth. On the other hand, if the 60,000 kilogrammes were completely converted to electrical energy in nuclear power reactors, it would produce 370,000 million kilowatt-hours, or somewhat more than one-third as much as the entire United States production of electrical energy in 1963. These figures give some idea of the dimensions of the United States proposal.

Now I should like to consider some of the possible methods of verifying the cut-off. One of the reasons why the United States delegation believes that this proposal is promising is because the inspection required can be limited in scope.

For example, inspection of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons would not be necessary.

The extent of inspection initially required would depend on whether the Soviet Union preferred a complete halt in the production of fissionable materials for weapons or a reciprocal plant-by-plant shut-down.

If a complete production cut-off were agreed upon, the International Atomic Energy Agency might monitor declared facilities for the production of fissionable material.

Those facilities declared to have been shut down would be inspected to make sure that no production of fissionable materials was taking place. Other declared facilities might continue to produce fissionable materials for peaceful purposes. These facilities and the produced materials would be monitored to ensure that no such product was diverted to the fabrication of nuclear weapons.

Each side would also need to have assurance that the other was not engaging in clandestine production at undeclared facilities. We believe that inspection to guard against this possibility could be carried out on a reciprocal basis. We also believe that a reciprocal system could be devised that would not be onerous.

If, on the other hand, production were halted on a plant-by-plant basis by the United States and the Soviet Union, inspection would be even more limited at the outset. Only the plant or plants actually shut down would be inspected. The possibilities of International Atomic Energy Agency inspection of a plant-by-plant shut-down appear promising to us also, and we believe they should be carefully explored.


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Statement concerning action taken by President Johnson to cut back production of fissionable materials for weapons use, made by Adrian S. Fisher on 21 April 1964 at the 185th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee

President Johnson, in the third point of his message to this conference when it reconvened on 21 January of this year, mentioned not only a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons use but also a cut-back in the production of such materials, as a possible major contribution towards world peace. These subjects — both a cut-off and a cut-back — have been put before the conference and have been discussed both at private meetings and in plenary session. Therefore, on behalf of the United States, I am happy to be able to point to concrete steps being taken to turn down the arms race in this area.

Yesterday President Johnson announced:

"I am taking two actions today which reflect both our desire to reduce tensions and our unwillingness to risk weakness. I have ordered a further substantial reduction in our production of enriched uranium, to be carried out over a four-year period. When added to previous reductions, this will mean an over-all decrease in the production of plutonium by 20 per cent, and of enriched uranium by 40 per cent. By bringing production in line with need ... we think we will reduce tensions while we maintain all the necessary power.

"... In reaching these decisions, I have been in close consultation with Prime Minister Douglas-Home. Simultaneously with my announcement, Chairman Khrushchev is releasing a statement in Moscow, at 2 o'clock our time, in which he makes definite commitments to steps toward a more peaceful world. He agrees to discontinue the construction of two big new atomic reactors for the production of plutonium over the next several years, to reduce substantially the production of U-235 for nuclear weapons and to allocate more fissionable material for peaceful uses.

"This is not disarmament. This is not a declaration of peace. But it is a hopeful sign and it is a step forward which we welcome and which we can take in hope that the world may yet, one day, live without the fear of war. At the same time, I have reaffirmed all the safeguards against weakening our nuclear strength which we adopted at the time of the test ban treaty."

C. A VERIFIED FREEZE OF THE NUMBER AND CHARACTERISTICS OF STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES FOR CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

President Johnson's proposal of 21 January 1964

While we continue our efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, we must first endeavour to halt further increases in strategic armaments now. The United States, the Soviet Union and their respective allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. For our part, we are convinced that the security of all nations can be safeguarded within the scope of such an agreement and that this initial measure preventing the further expansion of the deadly and costly arms race will open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels.

Elaboration of that proposal by William C. Foster in a statement made on 31 January 1964 at the 162nd meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee

This proposal is patterned after measures which have already been successfully negotiated, measures having a common general philosophy. This philosophy is that a logical first step is to freeze things where they are and thereby remove future obstacles to disarmament. This philosophy lay behind the Antarctic Treaty, which was easier to achieve because Antarctica was still free of armaments. It lay behind the resolution against nuclear weapons in orbit [General Assembly resolution 1884 (XVIII)], which was easier to achieve because space was still free of weapons of mass destruction.

... President Johnson's [freeze] would halt the race for more and better strategic nuclear vehicles and open the path to reductions from present levels in all types of forces. Where the test ban treaty limited warhead size, and the United States proposal for a fissionable materials cut-off would limit the amount of explosive materials available for warheads, the present proposal would limit numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear vehicles.

... We suggest that the specifics of the freeze be explored by allies on both sides before detailed negotiations are undertaken. For our part, of course, we would give weight to the general reaction which delegations may wish to express here in the near future. To assist in their consideration, we suggest that the following be explored:

First, the freeze should, we believe, include strategic missiles and aircraft ........

Secondly, the United States believes the freeze should also include antiballistic missile systems ........

Thirdly, the immediate objective of the freeze on numbers should be to maintain the quantities of strategic nuclear vehicles held by the East and the West at constant levels ........

Fourthly, the objective of the freeze on characteristics should be, the United States believes, to prevent the development and deployment of strategic vehicles of a significantly new type ........

Fifthly, as I have already indicated, we have singled out strategic vehicles partly because we believe that the verification requirements would be less onerous than for a production freeze on the entire range of major armaments included within our general and complete disarmament plan ........

The freeze we wish to explore would have important advantages for all States. It would curb a key area of the arms race; it would inhibit development of costly, new, and more destructive weapon systems; it would be an accomplishment far beyond any "confidence building" measure in significance, yet one that could be achieved in
a reasonable period of time; it would lay a firm basis for the achievement of the balanced reductions contemplated in the joint statement of agreed principles; it would tend to reduce any fears which may exist that either side could achieve a decisive first-strike capability; it would permit significant reduction of military expenditures; it would help to reduce tensions and accelerate the forward movement toward general disarmament.

D. A verified “bomber bonfire” of United States B-47 and Soviet TU-16 aircraft

United States proposal made and elaborated by Adrian S. Fisher on 19 March 1964 at the 176th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee

Today I should like to present to the Committee a proposal for the physical destruction of armaments. The arms we propose to destroy are of real significance. They are bomber aircraft which can carry weapons of immense destructive capability. Agreement on and implementation of this measure would present a graphic example of armament reduction to the entire world.

The United States proposes destruction by the United States and the Soviet Union of an equal number of B-47 and TU-16 bombers. We propose that this destruction be carried out at the rate of twenty per month on each side, the bombers to be taken from the operational inventory. We are prepared to continue destruction of these bombers at this rate for a period of two years. In addition, we are prepared to increase the total number destroyed by adding to the monthly quota an additional agreed number to be taken from bombers stored and preserved for emergency mobilization.

We are prepared to negotiate the manner in which this destruction will be verified. The verification should be relatively simple. It should include no more than the observation of the destruction of the monthly quota of agreed bombers from each country at designated depots.

The B-47 bomber which we are prepared to destroy is our part of this agreement is a truly formidable weapon. The B-47 is a six-engine jet bomber which can fly over 4,000 miles without refuelling. With in-flight refuelling, it is an intercontinental bomber. It can carry a multi-megaton bomb load. We can gather some measure of the danger of our times by noting that the explosive yield from the bomb load of one B-47 is greater than that from all bombs dropped by all bombers in the Second World War.

As long as such bombers remain in existence in the hands of the nuclear Powers — whether actually flying or stored so that they can easily be rendered flyable — they remain a substantial factor of military power. In the hands of non-nuclear Powers — and used without nuclear weapons — these planes are no less a factor of military power. The B-47 is superior in many respects to any other bomber outside the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, summed it up last Thursday [74th meeting] when he said that bomber aircraft “still remain one of the powerful means of carrying on a war of aggression . . .”

The United States and the Soviet Union are the possessors of the world’s greatest military arsenals. That is particularly true with regard to nuclear delivery vehicles.

The B-47 and TU-16 bombers are logical armaments with which to start the process of physical destruction of arms. The United States and the Soviet Union possess roughly comparable numbers of those aircraft. The two types of aircraft have been assigned generally similar strategic roles. Thus the balance in the over-all force structure of the two sides would be maintained at the reduced levels resulting from their destruction. This, of course, is in keeping with the fifth principle in the joint statement of agreed principles: that measures of this kind should be balanced so that no State or group of States should gain a military advantage and that security should be ensured equally for all.

E. Measures to reduce the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack

President Johnson’s proposal of 21 January 1964

We must further reduce the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack. In consultation with our allies, we shall be prepared to discuss proposals for creating a system of observation posts as a move in this direction.

Elaboration of that proposal by Adrian S. Fisher in a statement made on 26 March 1964 at the 178th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee

The United States believes that a properly designed system of observation posts would be a measure which in itself would advance the cause of peace. It would be of value in enhancing military security for both sides, in strengthening international confidence, and in facilitating progress toward future arms control and disarmament measures.

The nature of such a system should be such that it is capable of providing prompt and reliable information on unusual military movements and events. By providing early warning of any indication of possible preparations for hostile actions, it would increase the time available for diplomatic or other action to avert any threat of hostilities. It should be capable of providing timely and reliable information during an international crisis, and

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8 Further details with respect to the types of missiles and bombers covered, the limitations on production and testing, and the verification system were provided in later statements. These were by Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, on 16 April 1964, at the 184th meeting of the Committee, and by the acting United States representative, Clare H. Timberlake, on 27 August 1964, at the 211th meeting.

9 The details of this simplified verification procedure were set forth in a statement by Clare H. Timberlake, acting United States representative, on 16 July 1964, at the 195th meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

10 A working paper on this subject was introduced by the United Kingdom (see Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for January to December 1964, document DC/209, annex I, sect. G).
thus help to reduce the risk of war through misunderstanding of the posture of the other side. It would be an instrument available to each side through which concrete evidence of peaceful intent would be provided and through which unusual events which otherwise might be subject to misleading interpretations could be clarified.

The scope of such a system should include posts established by mutual agreement in North America, the United Kingdom, Europe and the Soviet Union.

II
Message from Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, sent to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 21 January 1964

There is only one item on the agenda of this Conference — it is the leading item on the agenda of mankind — and that one item is peace.

Already this Conference has led to more concrete and effective results than any disarmament conference in modern history. Your efforts and deliberations laid the groundwork for the nuclear test ban treaty, for the communications link between Washington and Moscow and for the General Assembly action against nuclear weapons in outer space.

Today your search begins anew in a climate of hope. Last year’s genuine gains have given us new momentum. Recent Soviet and American announcements of reductions in military spending, even though modest, have brightened the atmosphere further. Let us pray that the tide has turned — that further and more far-reaching agreements lie ahead — and that future generations will mark 1964 as the year the world turned for all time away from the horrors of war and constructed new bulwarks of peace.

Specifically, this nation now proposes five major types of potential agreement:

First, as Chairman Khrushchev and I have observed, the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes is not in the interest of any people or country. In consultation with our allies, we shall be prepared to discuss means of prohibiting the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly — whether by aggression, subversion, or the clandestine supply of arms — to change boundaries or demarcation lines; to interfere with access to territory; or to extend control or administration over territory by displacing established authorities.

Second, while we continue our efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, we must first endeavour to halt further increases in strategic armaments now. The United States, the Soviet Union and their respective allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. For our part, we are convinced that the security of all nations can be safeguarded within the scope of such an agreement and that this initial measure preventing the further expansion of the deadly and costly arms race will open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels.

Third, in this same spirit of early action, the United States believes that a verified agreement to halt all production of fissionable materials for weapons use would be a major contribution to world peace. Moreover, while we seek agreement on this measure, the United States is willing to achieve prompt reductions through both sides closing comparable production facilities on a plant-by-plant basis, with mutual inspection. We have started in this direction — we hope the Soviet Union will do the same — and we are prepared to accept appropriate international verification of the reactor shut-down already scheduled in our country.

Fourth, we must further reduce the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack. In consultation with our allies, we shall be prepared to discuss proposals for creating a system of observation posts as a move in this direction.

Fifth, and finally, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them, let us agree:

(a) That nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of States which do not now control them, and that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards;

(b) That the major nuclear Powers accept in an increasing number of their peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection they recommend for other States; and

(c) On the banning of all nuclear weapons tests under effective verification and control.

Each one of these proposed steps is important to peace. No one of them is impossible of agreement. The best way to begin disarming is to begin — and the United States is ready to conclude firm agreements in these areas and to consider any other reasonable proposal. We shall at all times pursue a just and lasting peace — and with God’s help, we shall achieve it.

III
Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world 11

In order to assist in the preparation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States submits the following outline of basic provisions of such a treaty. The preamble of such a treaty has already been the subject of negotiations and is therefore not submitted as part of this treaty outline.

A. Objectives

1. To ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) general and complete disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and by effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

11 Revised text of the “Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world” originally submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 18 April 1962, incorporating additions and amendments issued since that date.
2. Taking into account paragraphs 3 and 4 below, to provide, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) Abolition of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military efforts of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.

3. To ensure that, at the completion of the programme for general and complete disarmament, States would have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

4. To ensure that during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament, States also would support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments necessary to ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms.

5. To establish and provide for the effective operation of an international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations for the purpose of ensuring that all obligations under the disarmament programme would be honoured and observed during and after implementation of general and complete disarmament; and to this end to ensure that the international disarmament organization and its inspectors would have unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

B. Principles

The guiding principles during the achievement of these objectives are:

1. Disarmament would be implemented until it is completed by stages to be carried out within specified time-limits.

2. Disarmament would be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage, and so that security would be ensured equally for all.

3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations would be effectively verified during and after their entry into force. Verification arrangements would be instituted progressively as necessary to ensure throughout the disarmament process that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded.

4. As national armaments are reduced, the United Nations would be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to ensure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international co-operation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

5. Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next would take place upon decision that all measures in the preceding stage had been implemented and verified and that any additional arrangements required for measures in the next stage were ready to operate.

INTRODUCTION

The treaty would contain three stages designed to achieve a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. The treaty would enter into force upon the signature and ratification of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and such other States as might be agreed. Stage II would begin when all military significant States had become parties to the treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Stage III would begin when all States possessing armed forces and armaments had become parties to the treaty and other transition requirements had been satisfied. Disarmament, verification, and measures for keeping the peace would proceed progressively and proportionately, beginning with the entry into force of the Treaty.

STAGE I

Stage I would begin upon the entry into force of the Treaty and would be completed within three years from that date.

During stage I the parties to the treaty would undertake:

1. To reduce their armaments and armed forces and to carry out other agreed measures in the manner outlined below;

2. To establish the international disarmament organization upon the entry into force of the treaty in order to ensure the verification in the agreed manner of the obligations undertaken;

3. To strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace through the measures outlined below.

A. Armaments

1. Reduction of armaments

(a) Specified parties to the treaty, as a first stage toward general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, would reduce by 30 per cent the armaments in each category listed in sub-paragraph (b) below. Each type of armament in the categories listed in sub-paragraph (b) would be reduced by 30 per cent of the inventory existing at an agreed date.

(b) All types of armaments within agreed categories would be subject to reduction in stage I (the following list of categories, and of types within categories, is illustrative):

(i) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilogrammes or greater; missiles having a range of
5,000 kilometres or greater, together with their related fixed launching pads; and submarine-launched missiles and air-to-surface missiles having a range of 300 kilometres or greater. (Within this category, the United States, for example, would declare as types of armaments: the B-52 aircraft; Atlas missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Titan missiles together with their related fixed launching pads; Polaris missiles; Hound-dog missiles; and each new type of armament, such as Minuteman missiles, which came within the category description, together with, where applicable, their related fixed launching pads. The declared inventory of types within the category by other parties to the treaty would be similarly detailed)

(ii) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 15,000 kilogrammes and 40,000 kilogrammes and those missiles not included in category (i) having a range between 300 and 5,000 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(iii) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of between 2,500 and 15,000 kilogrammes. (The parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(iv) Surface-to-surface (including submarine-launched missiles) and air-to-surface aerodynamic and ballistic missiles and free rockets having a range of between 10 and 300 kilometres, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(v) Anti-missile missile systems, together with related fixed launching pads. (The parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(vi) Surface-to-air missiles other than anti-missile missile systems, together with any related fixed launching pads. (The parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(vii) Tanks. (The parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(viii) Armoured cars and armoured personnel carriers. (The parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(ix) All artillery, and mortars and rocket launchers having a calibre of 100 mm. or greater. (The parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

(x) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater of the following classes: aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyer types and submarines. (The parties would declare their armaments by types within the category.)

2. Method of reduction

(a) Those parties to the treaty which were subject to the reduction of armaments would submit to the international disarmament organization an appropriate declaration respecting inventories of their armaments existing at the agreed date.

(b) The reduction would be accomplished in three steps, each consisting of one year. One-third of the reduction to be made during stage I would be carried out during each step.

(c) During the first part of each step, one-third of the armaments to be eliminated during stage I would be placed in depots under supervision of the international disarmament organization. During the second part of each step, the deposited armaments would be destroyed or, where appropriate, converted to peaceful uses. The number and location of such depots and arrangements respecting their establishment and operation would be set forth in an annex to the treaty.

(d) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in a treaty annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing reduction and would provide assurance that retained armaments did not exceed agreed levels.

3. Limitation on production of armaments and on related activities

(a) Production of all armaments listed in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 above would be limited to agreed allowances during stage I and, by the beginning of stage II, would be halted except for production, within agreed limits, of parts for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

(b) The allowances would permit limited production of each type of armament listed in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 above. In all instances during the process of eliminating production of armaments, any armament produced within a type would be compensated for by an additional armament destroyed within that type to the end that the 10 per cent reduction in numbers in each type in each step, and the resulting 30 per cent reduction in stage I, would be achieved.

(c) The testing and production of new types of armaments would be prohibited.

(d) The expansion of facilities for the production of existing types of armaments and the construction or equipping of facilities for the production of new types of armaments would be prohibited.

(e) The flight testing of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

(f) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

4. Additional measures

The parties to the treaty would agree to examine unresolved questions relating to means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. In the light of this examination, the parties to the treaty would agree to arrangements concerning chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

B. Armed forces

1. Reduction of armed forces

Force levels for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to 2.1 million each and for other specified parties to the
treaty to agreed levels not exceeding 2.1 million each. All other parties to the treaty would, with agreed exceptions, reduce their force levels to 100,000 or 1 per cent of their population, whichever were higher, provided that in no case would the force levels of such other parties to the treaty exceed levels in existence upon the entry into force of the treaty.

2. Armed forces subject to reduction

Agreed force levels would include all full-time, uniformed personnel maintained by national Governments in the following categories:

(a) Career personnel of active armed forces and other personnel serving in the active armed forces on fixed engagements or contracts;

(b) Conscripts performing their required period of full-time active duty as fixed by national law;

(c) Personnel of military organized security forces and of other forces or organizations equipped and organized to perform a military mission.

3. Method of reduction

The reduction of force levels would be carried out in the following manner:

(a) Those parties to the treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would submit to the international disarmament organization a declaration stating their force levels at the agreed date.

(b) Force level reductions would be accomplished in three steps, each having a duration of one year. During each step, force levels would be reduced by one-third of the difference between force levels existing at the agreed date and the levels to be reached at the end of stage I.

(c) In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would verify the reduction of force levels and provide assurance that retained forces did not exceed agreed levels.

4. Additional measures

The parties to the treaty which were subject to the foregoing reductions would agree upon appropriate arrangements, including procedures for consultation, in order to ensure that civilian employment by military establishments would be in accordance with the objectives of the obligations respecting force levels.

C. Nuclear weapons

1. Production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons

(a) The parties to the treaty would halt the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.

(b) This measure would be carried out in the following manner:

(i) The parties to the treaty would submit to the international disarmament organization a declaration listing by name, location and production capacity every facility under their jurisdiction capable of producing and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date.

(ii) Production of fissionable materials for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons would be limited to agreed levels. The parties to the treaty would submit to the international disarmament organization periodic declarations stating the amounts and types of fissionable materials which were still being produced at each facility.

(iii) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared facilities and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared facilities.

2. Transfer of fissionable material to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons

(a) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would each transfer to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons agreed quantities of weapons-grade U-235 from past production. The United States of America would transfer ________ kilogrammes and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would transfer ________ kilogrammes of such weapons-grade U-235. For this purpose, "weapons-grade U-235" means the U-235 contained in metal of which at least 90 per cent of the weight is U-235.

(b) To ensure that the transferred materials were not used in nuclear weapons, such materials would be placed under safeguards and inspection by the international disarmament organization either in stockpiles or at the facilities in which they would be utilized for purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. Arrangements for such safeguards and inspection would be set forth in the annex on verification.

3. Transfer of fissionable materials between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy

(a) Any transfer of fissionable materials between States would be for purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons and would be subject to a system of safeguards to ensure that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

(b) The system of safeguards to be applied for this purpose would be developed in agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and would be set forth in an annex to the treaty.

4. Non-transfer of nuclear weapons

The parties to the treaty would agree to seek to prevent the creation of further national nuclear forces. To this end the parties would agree that:

(a) Any party to the treaty which had manufactured, or which at any time manufactures, a nuclear weapon would:

(i) Not transfer control over any nuclear weapons to a State which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before an agreed date;

(ii) Not assist any such State in manufacturing any nuclear weapons.

(b) Any party to the treaty which had not manufactured a nuclear weapon before the agreed date would:

(i) Not acquire, or attempt to acquire, control over any nuclear weapons;
(ii) Not manufacture, or attempt to manufacture, any nuclear weapons.

5. Nuclear weapons test explosions

(a) If an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon test explosions and providing for effective international control had come into force prior to the entry into force of the treaty, such agreement would become an annex to the treaty, and all the parties to the treaty would be bound by the obligations specified in the agreement.

(b) If, however, no such agreement had come into force prior to the entry into force of the treaty, all nuclear weapon test explosions would be prohibited, and the procedures for effective international control would be set forth in an annex to the treaty.

6. Additional measures

The parties to the treaty would agree to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles. In the light of this examination, the parties to the treaty would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapon stockpiles.

D. Outer space

1. Prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in orbit

The parties to the treaty would agree not to place in orbit weapons capable of producing mass destruction.

2. Peaceful co-operation in space

The parties to the treaty would agree to support increased international co-operation in peaceful uses of outer space in the United Nations or through other appropriate arrangements.

3. Notification and pre-launch inspection

With respect to the launching of space vehicles and missiles:

(a) Those parties to the treaty which conducted launchings of space vehicles or missiles would provide advance notification of such launchings to other parties to the treaty and to the international disarmament organization together with the track of the space vehicle or missile. Such advance notification would be provided on a timely basis to permit pre-launch inspection of the space vehicle or missile to be launched.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would conduct pre-launch inspection of space vehicles and missiles and would establish and operate any arrangements necessary for detecting unreported launchings.

4. Limitations on production and on related activities

The production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space vehicles would be subject to agreed limitations. Such activities would be monitored by the international disarmament organization in accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

E. Military expenditures

1. Report on expenditures

The parties to the treaty would submit to the international disarmament organization at the end of each step of each stage a report on their military expenditures. Such reports would include an itemization of military expenditures.

2. Verifiable reduction of expenditures

The parties to the treaty would agree to examine questions related to the verifiable reduction of military expenditures. In the light of this examination, the parties to the treaty would consider appropriate arrangements respecting military expenditures.

F. Reduction of the risk of war

In order to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war, the parties to the treaty would agree to the following measures:

1. Advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres

Specified parties to the treaty would give advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres to other parties to the treaty and to the international disarmament organization. Specific arrangements relating to this commitment, including the scale of movements and manoeuvres to be reported and the information to be transmitted, would be agreed.

2. Observation posts

Specified parties to the treaty would permit observation posts to be established at agreed locations, including major ports, railway centres, motor highways, river crossings and air bases, to report on concentrations and movements of military forces. The number of such posts could be progressively expanded in each successive step of stage I. Specific arrangements relating to such observation posts, including the location and staffing of posts, the method of receiving and reporting information, and the schedule for installation of posts would be agreed.

3. Additional observation arrangements

The parties to the treaty would establish such additional observation arrangements as might be agreed. Such arrangements could be extended in an agreed manner during each step of stage I.

4. Exchange of military missions

Specified parties to the treaty would undertake the exchange of military missions between States or groups of States in order to improve communications and understanding between them. Specific arrangements respecting such exchanges would be agreed.

5. Communications between Heads of Government

Specified parties of the treaty would agree to the establishment of rapid and reliable communications among their Heads of Government and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Specific arrangements
in this regard would be subject to agreement among the parties concerned and between such parties and the Secretary-General.

6. International commission on reduction of the risk of war

The parties to the treaty would establish an international commission on reduction of the risk of war as a subsidiary body of the international disarmament organization to examine and make recommendations regarding further measures that might be undertaken during stage I or subsequent stages of disarmament to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack. Specific arrangements for such measures as might be agreed to by all or some of the parties to the treaty would be subject to agreement among the parties concerned.

G. The international disarmament organization

1. Establishment of the international disarmament organization

The international disarmament organization would be established upon the entry into force of the treaty and would function within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the treaty.

2. Co-operation of the parties to the treaty

The parties to the treaty would agree to co-operate promptly and fully with the international disarmament organization and to assist the international disarmament organization in the performance of its functions and in the execution of the decisions made by it in accordance with the provisions of the treaty.

3. Verification functions of the international disarmament organization

The international disarmament organization would verify disarmament measures in accordance with the following principles which would be implemented through specific arrangements set forth in the annex on verification:

(a) Measures providing for reduction of armaments would be verified by the international disarmament organization at agreed depots and would include verification of the destruction of armaments and, where appropriate, verification of the conversion of armaments to peaceful uses. Measures providing for reduction of armed forces would be verified by the international disarmament organization either at the agreed depots or at other agreed locations.

(b) Measures halting or limiting production, testing, and other specified activities would be verified by the international disarmament organization. Parties to the treaty would declare the nature and location of all production and testing facilities and other specified activities. The international disarmament organization would have access to relevant facilities and activities wherever located in the territory of such parties.

(c) Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities limited or prohibited by the treaty were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided by the international disarmament organization through agreed arrangements which would have the effect of providing that the extent of inspection during any step or stage would be related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the parties to the treaty of possible violations. This might be accomplished, for example, by an arrangement embodying such features as the following:

(i) All parts of the territory of those parties to the treaty to which this form of verification was applicable would be subject to selection for inspection from the beginning of stage I as provided below.

(ii) Parties to the treaty would divide their territory into an agreed number of appropriate zones and at the beginning of each step of disarmament would submit to the international disarmament organization a declaration stating the total level of armaments, forces, and specified types of activities subject to verification within each zone. The exact location of armaments and forces within a zone would not be revealed prior to its selection for inspection.

(iii) An agreed number of these zones would be progressively inspected by the international disarmament organization during stage I according to an agreed time schedule. The zones to be inspected would be selected by procedures which would ensure their selection by parties to the treaty other than the party whose territory was to be inspected or any party associated with it. Upon selection of each zone, the party to the treaty whose territory was to be inspected would declare the exact location of armaments, forces and other agreed activities within the selected zone. During the verification process, arrangements would be made to provide assurance against undeclared movements of the objects of verification to or from the zone or zones being inspected. Both aerial and mobile ground inspection would be employed within the zone being inspected. In so far as agreed measures being verified were concerned, access within the zone would be free and unimpeded, and verification would be carried out with the full co-operation of the State being inspected.

(iv) Once a zone had been inspected it would remain open for further inspection while verification was being extended to additional zones.

(v) By the end of stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of parties to the treaty.

4. Composition of the international disarmament organization

(a) The international disarmament organization would have:

(i) A general conference of all the parties to the treaty;

(ii) A control council consisting of representatives of all the major signatory Powers as permanent members and certain other parties to the treaty on a rotating basis; and

(iii) An administrator who would administer the international disarmament organization under the direction of the control council and who would have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to ensure effective and
impartial implementation of the functions of the international disarmament organization.

(b) The general conference and the control council would have power to establish such subsidiary bodies, including expert study groups, as either of them might deem necessary.

5. Functions of the general conference

The general conference would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

(a) Electing non-permanent members to the control council;

(b) Approving certain accessions to the treaty;

(c) Appointing the administrator upon recommendation of the control council;

(d) Approving agreements between the international disarmament organization and the United Nations and other international organizations;

(e) Approving the budget of the international disarmament organization;

(f) Requesting and receiving reports from the control council and deciding upon matters referred to it by the control council;

(g) Approving reports to be submitted to bodies of the United Nations;

(h) Proposing matters for consideration by the control council;

(i) Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

(j) Approving amendments to the treaty for possible ratification by the parties to the treaty;

(k) Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the treaty or disarmament in general.

6. Functions of the control council

The control council would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

(a) Recommending appointment of the administrator;

(b) Adopting rules for implementing the terms of the treaty;

(c) Establishing procedures and standards for the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and maintaining supervision over such arrangements and the administrator;

(d) Establishing procedures for making available to the parties to the treaty data produced by verification arrangements;

(e) Considering reports of the administrator on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements;

(f) Recommending to the conference approval of the budget of the international disarmament organization;

(g) Requesting the International Court of Justice to give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty, subject to a general authorization of this power by the General Assembly of the United Nations;

(h) Recommending to the conference approval of certain accessions to the treaty;

(i) Considering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the treaty or to disarmament in general.

7. Functions of the administrator

The administrator would have the following functions, among others which might be agreed:

(a) Administering the installation and operation of the verification arrangements, and serving as chief executive officer of the international disarmament organization;

(b) Making available to the parties to the treaty data produced by the verification arrangements;

(c) Preparing the budget of the international disarmament organization;

(d) Making reports to the control council on the progress of disarmament measures and of their verification, and on the installation and operation of the verification arrangements.

8. Privileges and immunities

The privileges and immunities which the parties to the treaty would grant to the international disarmament organization and its staff and to the representatives of the parties to the international disarmament organization, and the legal capacity which the international disarmament organization should enjoy in the territory of each of the parties to the treaty would be specified in an annex to the treaty.

9. Relations with the United Nations and other international organizations

(a) The international disarmament organization, being established within the framework of the United Nations, would conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It would maintain close working arrangements with the United Nations, and the administrator of the international disarmament organization would consult with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on matters of mutual interest.

(b) The control council of the international disarmament organization would transmit to the United Nations annual and other reports on the activities of the international disarmament organization.

(c) Principal organs of the United Nations could make recommendations to the international disarmament organization, which would consider them and report to the United Nations on action taken.

Note: The above outline does not cover all the possible details or aspects of relationships between the international disarmament organization and the United Nations.
H. Measures to strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace

1. Obligations concerning threat or use of force

The parties to the treaty would undertake obligations to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type — including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of warfare — contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. Rules of international conduct

(a) The parties to the treaty would agree to support a study by a subsidiary body of the international disarmament organization of the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament.

(b) The parties to the treaty would refrain from indirect aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body provided for in sub-paragraph (a) would also study methods of assuring States against indirect aggression or subversion.

3. Peaceful settlement of disputes

(a) The parties to the treaty would utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between them and any other State, whether or not a party to the treaty, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations, or other peaceful means of their choice.

(b) The parties to the treaty would agree that disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty which were not settled by negotiation or by the international disarmament organization would be subject to referral by any party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on another mode of settlement.

(c) The parties to the treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective; and to institute new procedures and arrangements where needed.

4. Maintenance of international peace and security

The parties to the treaty would agree to support measures strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security.

5. United Nations peace force

The parties to the treaty would undertake to develop arrangements during stage I for the establishment in stage II of a United Nations peace force. To this end, the parties to the treaty would agree on the following measures within the United Nations:

(a) Examination of the experience of the United Nations leading to a further strengthening of United Nations forces for keeping the peace;

(b) Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter;

(c) Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations peace force in stage II, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments.

6. United Nations peace observation corps

The parties to the treaty would agree to support the establishment within the United Nations of a peace observation corps, staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be dispatched promptly to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or a breach of the peace. Elements of the peace observation corps could also be stationed as appropriate in selected areas throughout the world.

I. Transition

1. During the last three months of stage I, the control council would review the situation respecting the following listed circumstances with a view to determining, in the light of specified criteria, whether these circumstances existed at the end of stage I:

(a) All undertakings to be carried out in stage I had been carried out;

(b) All preparations required for stage II had been made; and

(c) All militarily significant States had become parties to the treaty.

2. Transition from stage I to stage II would take place at the end of stage I or at the end of any periods of extension of stage I, upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the control council, including at least the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the foregoing circumstances existed.

3. If, at the end of stage I, one or more permanent members of the control council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of stage I would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the Control Council would again consider whether the foregoing circumstance did in fact exist and would vote upon transition in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

Stage II

Stage II would begin upon the transition from stage I and would be completed within three years from that date.

During stage II, the parties to the treaty would undertake:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during stage I;
2. To reduce further the armaments and armed forces reduced during stage I and to carry out additional measures of disarmament in the manner outlined below:

3. To ensure that the international disarmament organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during stage II;

4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace through the establishment of a United Nations peace force and through the additional measures outlined below.

A. Armaments

1. Reduction of armaments

(a) Those parties to the treaty which had during stage I reduced their armaments in agreed categories by 30 per cent would during stage II further reduce each type of armaments in the categories listed in stage I, section A, sub-paragraph (b), by 50 per cent of the inventory existing at the end of stage I.

(b) Those parties to the treaty which had not been subject to measures for the reduction of armaments during stage I would submit to the international disarmament organization an appropriate declaration respecting the inventories by types, within the categories listed in stage I, of their armaments existing at the beginning of stage II. Such parties to the treaty would during stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by 65 per cent in order that such parties would accomplish the same total percentage of reduction by the end of stage II as would be accomplished by those parties to the treaty which had reduced their armaments by 30 per cent in stage I.

2. Additional armaments subject to reduction

(a) The parties to the treaty would submit to the international disarmament organization a declaration respecting their inventories existing at the beginning of stage II of the additional types of armaments in the categories listed in sub-paragraph (b) below, and would during stage II reduce the inventory of each type of such armaments by 50 per cent.

(b) All types of armaments within further agreed categories would be subject to reduction in stage II (the following list of categories is illustrative):

(i) Armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of up to 2,500 kilograms (declarations by types)

(ii) Specified types of unarmed military aircraft (declarations by types).

(iii) Missiles and free rockets having a range of less than 10 kilometres (declarations by types).

(iv) Mortars and rocket launchers having a calibre of less than 100 mm (declarations by types).

(v) Specified types of unarmoured personnel carriers and transport vehicles (declarations by types).

(vi) Combatant ships with standard displacement of 400 tons or greater which had not been included among the armaments listed in stage I, and combatant ships with standard displacement of less than 400 tons (declarations by types).

(vii) Specified types of non-combatant naval vessels (declarations by types).

(viii) Specified types of small arms (declarations by types).

(c) Specified categories of ammunition for armaments listed in stage I, section A, sub-paragraph (b), and in sub-paragraph (b) above would be reduced to levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of stage II.

3. Method of reduction

The foregoing measures would be carried out and would be verified by the international disarmament organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in stage I, section A, paragraph 2.

4. Limitation on production of armaments and on related activities

(a) The parties to the treaty would halt the production of armaments in the specified categories except for production, within agreed limits, of parts required for maintenance of the agreed retained armaments.

(b) The production of ammunition in specified categories would be reduced to agreed levels consistent with the levels of armaments agreed for the end of stage II.

(c) The parties to the treaty would halt development and testing of new types of armaments. The flight testing of existing types of missiles would be limited to agreed annual quotas.

(d) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing measures were not conducted at undeclared locations.

5. Additional measures

(a) In the light of their examination during stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of production and stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, the parties to the treaty would undertake the following measures respecting such weapons:

(i) The cessation of all production and field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction;

(ii) The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels 50 per cent below those existing at the beginning of stage II;

(iii) The dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities engaged in the production or field testing of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

(b) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the treaty.

(c) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that retained levels of chemical and biological weapons did not exceed
agreed levels and that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

B. Armed forces

1. Reduction of armed forces

   (a) Those parties to the treaty which had been subject to measures providing for reduction of force levels during stage I would further reduce their force levels on the following basis:

      (i) Force levels of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would be reduced to levels 50 per cent below the levels agreed for the end of stage I.

      (ii) Force levels of other parties to the treaty which had been subject to measures providing for the reduction of force levels during stage I would be further reduced, on the basis of an agreed percentage, below the levels agreed for the end of stage I to levels which would not in any case exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of stage II.

   (b) Those parties to the treaty which had not been subject to measures providing for the reduction of armed forces during stage I would reduce their force levels to agreed levels consistent with those to be reached by other parties which had reduced their force levels during stage I as well as stage II. In no case would such agreed levels exceed the agreed level for the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of stage II.

   (c) Agreed levels of armed forces would include all personnel in the categories set forth in stage I, section B, paragraph 2.

2. Method of reduction

   The further reduction of force levels would be carried out and would be verified by the international disarmament organization in a manner corresponding to that provided for in stage I, section B, paragraph 3.

3. Additional measures

   Agreed limitations consistent with retained force levels would be placed on compulsory military training, and on refresher training for reserve forces of the parties to the treaty.

C. Nuclear weapons

1. Reduction of nuclear weapons

   In the light of their examination during stage I of the means of accomplishing the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles, the parties to the treaty would undertake to reduce in the following manner remaining nuclear weapons and fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons:

   (a) The parties to the treaty would submit to the international disarmament organization a declaration stating the amounts, types and nature of utilization of all their fissionable materials.

   (b) The parties to the treaty would reduce the amounts and types of fissionable materials declared for use in nuclear weapons to minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentages. The foregoing reduction would be accomplished through the transfer of such materials to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons. The purposes for which such materials would be used would be determined by the State to which the materials belonged, provided that such materials were not used in nuclear weapons.

   (c) The parties to the treaty would destroy the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons from which fissionable materials had been removed to effect the foregoing reduction of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons.

   (d) Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissionable materials would be subject to agreed limitations.

   (e) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the treaty.

   (f) In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the verification annex to the treaty, the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared locations and would provide assurance that activities subject to the foregoing limitations were not conducted at undeclared locations.

2. Registration of nuclear weapons for verification purposes

   To facilitate verification during stage III that no nuclear weapons remained at the disposal of the parties to the treaty, those parties to the treaty which possessed nuclear weapons would, during the last six months of stage II, register and serialize their remaining nuclear weapons and would register remaining fissionable materials for use in such weapons. Such registration and serialization would be carried out with the international disarmament organization in accordance with procedures which would be set forth in the annex on verification.

D. Military bases and facilities

1. Reduction of military bases and facilities

   The parties to the treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed military bases and facilities, wherever they might be located.

2. Method of reduction

   (a) The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measures and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling them or converting them to peaceful uses would be set forth in an annex to the treaty.

   (b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing measures.

E. Reduction of the risk of war

   In the light of the examination by the international commission on reduction of the risk of war during stage I the parties to the treaty would undertake such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The parties to the treaty would also consider extending and improving the measures undertaken in stage I for this purpose. The
commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be undertaken during and after stage II.

F. The international disarmament organization

The international disarmament organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity to verify the measures undertaken in stage II through an extension of the arrangements based upon the principles set forth in stage I, section G, paragraph 3.

G. Measures to strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace

1. Peaceful settlement of disputes

(a) In the light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted during stage I, the parties to the treaty would agree to such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

(b) The parties to the treaty would undertake to accept without reservation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph (1), of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide international legal disputes.

2. Rules of international conduct

(a) The parties to the treaty would continue their support of the study by the subsidiary body of the international disarmament organization initiated in stage I to study the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. The parties to the treaty would agree to the establishment of procedures whereby rules recommended by the subsidiary body and approved by the control council would be circulated to all parties to the treaty and would become effective three months thereafter unless a majority of the parties to the treaty signified their disapproval, and whereby the parties to the treaty would be bound by rules which had become effective in this way unless, within a period of one year from the effective date, they formally notified the international disarmament organization that they did not consider themselves bound. Using such procedures, the parties to the treaty would adopt such rules of international conduct related to disarmament as might be necessary to begin stage III.

(b) In the light of the study of indirect aggression and subversion conducted in stage I, the parties to the treaty would agree to arrangements necessary to assure States against indirect aggression and subversion.

3. United Nations peace force

The United Nations peace force to be established as the result of the agreement reached during stage I would come into being within the first year of stage II and would be progressively strengthened during stage II.

4. United Nations peace observation corps

The parties to the treaty would conclude arrangement for the expansion of the activities of the United Nations peace observation corps.

5. National legislation

Those parties to the treaty which had not already done so would, in accordance with their constitutional processes, enact national legislation in support of the treaty, imposing legal obligations on individuals and organizations under their jurisdiction and providing appropriate penalties for non-compliance.

H. Transition

1. During the last three months of stage II, the control council would review the situation respecting the following listed circumstances with a view to determining, in the light of specified criteria, whether these circumstances existed at the end of stage II:

(a) All undertakings to be carried out in stage II had been carried out;

(b) All preparations required for stage III had been made; and

(c) All States possessing armed forces and armaments had become parties to the treaty.

2. Transition from stage II to stage III would take place at the end of stage II or at the end of any periodic extension of stage II, upon a determination, in the light of specified criteria, by affirmative vote of two thirds of the members of the control council, including at least the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that the foregoing circumstances existed.

3. If, at the end of stage II, one or more permanent members of the control council should declare that the foregoing circumstances did not exist, the agreed period of stage II would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended by a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of bringing about the foregoing circumstances.

4. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the control council would again consider whether the foregoing circumstances did in fact exist and would vote upon transition in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

STAGE III

Stage III would begin upon the transition from stage II and would be completed within an agreed period of time as promptly as possible.

During stage III, the parties to the treaty would undertake:

1. To continue all obligations undertaken during stages I and II;

2. To complete the process of general and complete disarmament in the manner outlined below;

3. To ensure that the international disarmament organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed manner the obligations undertaken during stage III and of continuing verification subsequent to the completion of stage III;

4. To strengthen further the arrangements for keeping the peace during and following the achievement of general and complete disarmament through the additional measures outlined below.
A. Armaments

1. Reduction of armaments

Subject to agreed requirements for non-nuclear armaments of agreed types for national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens, the parties to the treaty would eliminate all armaments remaining at their disposal at the end of stage II.

2. Method of reduction

(a) The foregoing measure would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements that would be set forth in an annex to the treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements that would be set forth in the annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that the only forces and organizational arrangements retained or subsequently established were those necessary for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of citizens and those for providing agreed manpower for the United Nations peace force.

3. Other limitations

The parties to the treaty would halt all military conscription and would undertake to annul legislation concerning national military establishments or military service inconsistent with the foregoing measures.

C. Nuclear weapons

1. Reduction of nuclear weapons

In the light of the steps taken in stages I and II to halt the production of fissurable material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapon stockpiles, the parties to the treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than use in such weapons.

2. Method of reduction

(a) The foregoing measures would be carried out in an agreed sequence and through arrangements which would be set forth in an annex to the treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing measures and would provide assurance that no nuclear weapons or materials for use in such weapons remained at the disposal of the parties to the treaty and that no such weapons or materials were produced at undeclared facilities.

D. Military bases and facilities

1. Reduction of military bases and facilities

The parties to the treaty would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses the military bases and facilities remaining at their disposal, wherever they might be located, in an agreed sequence except for such agreed bases or facilities within the territory of the parties to the treaty for agreed forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

2. Method of reduction

(a) The list of military bases and facilities subject to the foregoing measure and the sequence and arrangements for dismantling them or converting them to peaceful uses during stage III would be set forth in an annex to the treaty.

(b) In accordance with arrangements which would be set forth in the annex on verification, the international disarmament organization would verify the foregoing measure at declared locations and provide assurance that there were no undeclared military bases and facilities.
E. Research and development of military significance

1. Reporting requirement

The parties to the treaty would undertake the following measures respecting research and development of military significance subsequent to stage III:

(a) The parties to the treaty would report to the international disarmament organization any basic scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance.

(b) The control council would establish such expert study groups as might be required to examine the potential military significance of such discoveries and inventions and, if necessary, to recommend appropriate measures for their control. In the light of such expert study, the parties to the treaty would, where necessary, establish agreed arrangements providing for verification by the international disarmament organization that such discoveries and inventions were not utilized for military purposes. Such arrangements would become an annex to the treaty.

(c) The parties to the treaty would agree to appropriate arrangements for protection of the ownership rights of all discoveries and inventions reported to the international disarmament organization in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) above.

2. International co-operation

The parties to the treaty would agree to support full international co-operation in all fields of scientific research and development, and to engage in free exchange of scientific and technical information and free interchange of views among scientific and technical personnel.

F. Reduction of the risk of war

1. Improved measures

In the light of the stage II examination by the international commission on reduction of the risk of war, the parties to the treaty would undertake such extensions and improvements of existing arrangements and such additional arrangements as appeared desirable to promote confidence and reduce the risk of war. The commission would remain in existence to examine extensions, improvements or additional measures which might be taken during and after stage III.

2. Application of measures to continuing forces

The parties to the treaty would apply to national forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens those applicable measures concerning the reduction of the risk of war that had been applied to national armed forces in stages I and II.

G. The international disarmament organization

The international disarmament organization would be strengthened in the manner necessary to ensure its capacity: (1) to verify the measures undertaken in stage III through an extension of arrangements based upon the principles set forth in stage I, section G, paragraph 3, so that by the end of stage III, when all disarmament measures had been completed, inspection would have been extended to all parts of the territory of parties to the treaty; and (2) to provide continuing verification of disarmament after the completion of stage III.

H. Measures to strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace

1. Peaceful change and settlement of disputes

The parties to the treaty would undertake such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to provide a basis for peaceful change in a disarmed world and to continue the just and peaceful settlement of all international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

2. Rules of international conduct

The parties to the treaty would continue the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament in the manner provided in stage II and by any other agreed procedure.

3. United Nations peace force

The parties to the treaty would progressively strengthen the United Nations peace force established in stage II until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no State could challenge it.

I. Completion of stage III

1. At the end of the time period agreed for stage III, the control council would review the situation with a view to determining whether all undertakings to be carried out in stage III had been carried out.

2. This determination would be made by affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the control council, including at least the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If an affirmative determination were made, stage III would be deemed completed.

3. In the event that one or more of the permanent members of the control council should declare that such undertakings had not been carried out, the agreed period of stage III would, upon the request of such permanent member or members, be extended for a period or periods totalling no more than three months for the purpose of completing any uncompleted undertakings. Upon the expiration of such period or periods, the control council would again consider whether such undertakings had been carried out and would vote upon the question in the manner specified in paragraph 2 above.

4. After the completion of stage III, the obligations undertaken in stages I, II and III would continue.

GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL STAGES

1. Subsequent modifications or amendments of the treaty

The parties to the treaty would agree to specific procedures for considering amendments or modifications of the treaty which were believed desirable by any party to the treaty in the light of experience in the early period of implementation of the treaty. Such procedures would include provision for a conference on revision of the treaty after a specified period of time.
2. *Interim agreement*

The parties to the treaty would undertake such specific arrangements, including the establishment of a preparatory commission, as were necessary between the signing and entry into force of the treaty to ensure the initiation of stage I immediately upon the entry into force of the treaty, and to provide an interim forum for the exchange of views and information on topics relating to the treaty and to the achievement of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

3. *Parties to the treaty, ratification, accession and entry into force of the treaty*

(a) The treaty would be open to signature and ratification or accession by all States Members of the United Nations or members of its specialized agencies.

(b) Any other State which desired to become a party to the treaty could accede to the treaty with the approval of the conference on recommendation of the control council.

(c) The treaty would come into force when it had been ratified by States, including the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and an agreed number of the following States: ________.

(d) In order to ensure the achievement of the fundamental purpose of a permanent state of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the treaty would specify that the accession of certain militarily significant States would be essential for the continued effectiveness of the treaty or for the coming into force of particular measures or stages.

(e) The parties to the treaty would undertake to exert every effort to induce other States or authorities to accede to the treaty.

(f) The treaty would be subject to ratification or acceptance in accordance with constitutional processes.

(g) A depositary government would be agreed upon which would have all of the duties normally incumbent upon a depositary. Alternatively, the United Nations would be the depositary.

4. *Finance*

(a) In order to meet the financial obligations of the international disarmament organization, the parties to the treaty would bear the international disarmament organization’s expenses as provided in the budget approved by the general conference and in accordance with a scale of apportionment approved by the general conference.

(b) The general conference would exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the international disarmament organization.

5. *Authentic texts*

The text of the treaty would consist of equally authentic versions in English, French, Russian, Chinese and Spanish.

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**DOCUMENT DC/215**

Letter dated 29 April 1965 from the representative of Portugal to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission

[Original text: English]
[30 April 1965]

With reference to the allegations made at the 72nd meeting of the Disarmament Commission, on 26 April 1965, by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that “in 1964 West Germany supplied Portugal with 10,000 sub-machine-guns” and that “500 West German officers and men are in Portugal as military experts”, I have the honour to inform you, under instructions of my Government, that there is no truth whatsoever in these allegations, which are hereby categorically denied.

For many years now, Portugal has had her own arms industry which manufactures all the automatic weapons necessary to meet national requirements and the demands of her export trade. The Portuguese Government has thus for many years neither purchased nor imported nor obtained in any other way automatic weapons of foreign manufacture. On the other hand, it is commonly known that weapons of all origins as well as of all models and types can always be found everywhere in the world.

Likewise there are no military instructors, monitors, experts or consultants of German or of any other nationality in any Portuguese territory.

I would appreciate it very much if this letter was circulated to all the members of the Commission.

(Signed) António Patricio

Chargé d'Affaires a.i.,

Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations

33
Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request that the enclosed memorandum of the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on necessary immediate measures in the field of disarmament be circulated as a document of the Disarmament Commission.

(Signed) Danilo Lekić
Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the United Nations

MEMORANDUM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA ON NECESSARY IMMEDIATE MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT

1. The developments in international relations confirm to an increasing extent that the broadest interests of the international community and of every country in securing peace and establishing new international relations call for an urgent and successful settlement of the disarmament problem.

2. However, efforts exerted on the part of the international community to bring about general and complete disarmament, or at least some substantial measures in the field of disarmament, have proved, thus far, to be inadequate. Many talks and discussions in the course of the last nineteen years, and numerous statements and warnings that a wider military conflict is unacceptable in the present circumstances, have been contrasted by a stepped-up arms race and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and rockets that has reached proportions beyond our comprehension.

3. Certain progress made in the course of 1963 and 1964, manifested in the conclusion of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and in the expressed intention not to station any nuclear weapons in outer space, to start reducing the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and to effect certain reductions in military budgets on the part of some Powers, has been welcomed throughout the world as a first step which could and should lead to the undertaking of more substantial measures, and to general and complete disarmament. So far, however, these expectations have not been fulfilled.

4. Today, it is becoming increasingly evident that in the past some Powers did not show a sufficient measure of effective readiness to reach disarmament. Consequently, the world was often faced with many artificially created difficulties and false dilemmas: the utmost use was made of the difficulties arising in connexion with the problem of control, which was often given pre-eminence; many years have been spent in trying to solve the problem of the negotiating body; difficulties appeared in connexion with conventional armament, the dangers of which were over- emphasised and often placed on the same level as the dangers of nuclear weapons; voices were even heard to the effect that the armies of small and newly formed States could allegedly also present a serious threat to world peace and an obstacle to disarmament. Obviously, all this, in general, diverted the attention from the key problems of disarmament to those of lesser importance or even to peripheral problems.

5. Around the real problem of balance and security a whole system of "scientific theories" was evolved with the purpose of providing at any moment "proofs" that every measure, every step in the sphere of disarmament could upset the balance and threaten the security of one side.

6. At the same time there were expounded various theories on local and limited wars and on security under the existing conditions. In fact, all these theories were an attempt to create somehow a feeling of security and to justify the continued arms race, presenting it even as a logical and acceptable way out of the situation in which mankind found itself.

7. The need to make negotiations and plans on disarmament more concrete — which is fully justified — has also been misused. The atomization of certain formulae, the lengthy and abortive debates on minor technical questions, for which many acceptable solutions, no doubt, could be found, have brought about a situation in which, despite continued negotiations, no real progress has been achieved.

8. For these reasons, the outcome of efforts exerted in the course of the last nineteen years in the solution of the problem of disarmament is giving rise to concern. Instead of tangible progress in the field of disarmament we are faced with the following indicators: (a) Annual military expenditures in the world exceed the figure of US$120,000 million; (b) The striking force of major military Powers is estimated to be over 300,000 megatons; (c) Nuclear bombs of 30 and 199 megatons are produced; (d) The number of nuclear Powers has increased to five, with the potential danger of further increase; (e) Further spread of nuclear weapons, within the armies of nuclear Powers, is being carried out to an increasing extent; (f) Military force and foreign armed intervention are being more and more often used as an instrument for the attainment of specific aims in spite of the danger of unforeseeable consequences that this may have for mankind as a whole; (g) The development of more extensive economic relations among States than hitherto and a more rapid progress of economically less developed and newly formed States continue to be extremely difficult or practically arrested.

9. In the face of such a state of affairs it is understandable why mankind cannot be satisfied only with an occasional rapprochement of views. Great disparity continues to persist between the proclaimed intentions in the field of disarmament and the results achieved. In
fact, it should have become obvious a long time ago that disarmament constitutes a problem which cannot remain at a standstill: unless we go forward we go backward by the very logic of the arms and armaments race.

10. In view of the existing situation in the sphere of disarmament, and being mindful of the common interests of all peace-loving countries in overcoming the present stalemate in disarmament and in initiating the process of disarmament as soon as possible, the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers it indispensable that urgent and concrete actions be undertaken both on the national and on the international plane.

11. On the national plane, Governments should undertake indispensable measures which would make it possible to divert military-industrial complexes from the present road — where they are permanently generating preparations for war and the arms race — to new peaceful roads which could probably be achieved if Governments lent stability and permanence to these new roads.

12. On the international plane, the existing international conditions and the increasing danger created by the present developments demand an urgent initiation of negotiations on disarmament in a more appropriate manner than has been the case hitherto. These new efforts should be made on the broadest basis and should take into account the experience gained in the negotiations which have taken place so far. The problem of disarmament calls for universal responsibility and efforts of all nations. No country should be exempted from this. Naturally, the greatest responsibility for the solution of this problem falls on the nuclear Powers.

13. General and complete disarmament is today, more than ever before, the main objective of all efforts — a goal which must be reached if we wish to ensure lasting and just peace and security for all countries.

14. Past experience and the complexity of the disarmament problem show that it is necessary to secure continuity in the adoption of disarmament measures and that those measures have a logical and natural although not too rigid order. The consideration of and attempt to adopt some at times atomized measures does not represent the optimal course, as it hinders continuity and usually leads to a waste of time and efforts.

15. In order to create more favourable international conditions for the realization of general and complete disarmament, while at the same time taking into consideration the objections voiced in the past with respect to various proposals on specific partial measures, the Yugoslav Government is of the opinion that it would be necessary to adopt at least a minimum number of measures, which would considerably neutralize the shortcomings of each of these individual measures taken separately, and which in themselves would constitute substantial progress in the field of disarmament and open up favourable prospects for further progress, i.e., transition to general and complete disarmament.

16. Such a minimum of logically and naturally linked measures, which under the existing conditions could, objectively, be acceptable to all countries, would be as follows: (a) the obligation not to use nuclear weapons; (b) the banning of all nuclear weapon tests without exception; (c) the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons in any form whatever, with an agreement to begin solving the problem of denuclearization of the nuclear Powers themselves.

17. An agreement on the aforementioned minimum number of measures could be reached in the immediate future in view of the fact that each of these measures has for years been the subject of discussion in various international forums. These measures, taken as a whole, would provide, in general, an appropriate approach towards nuclear and non-nuclear countries, since they call for the discontinuation of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and the undertaking of specific and substantial measures in the field of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear Powers themselves. The adoption of these measures would in no way upset the global balance of power in the world. On the contrary, the balance of power would gradually shift to the descending line of the arms race spiral. It is only on the descending line that it could constitute a certain factor of security, facilitating, by its very logic, the reaching of an agreement. The problems of control, as far as these measures are concerned, should not constitute an insurmountable difficulty.

18. In proposing the adoption of this minimum of naturally and logically linked measures, the Yugoslav Government is of the opinion that this minimum could serve as a basis for the initiation of action in the field of nuclear disarmament. The acceptance of such a programme, in the view of the Yugoslav Government, would not stand in the way of adopting supplementary measures as well as some other partial measures.

19. In the opinion of the Yugoslav Government, the most appropriate way for the attainment of such agreement or of a similar agreement in the field of disarmament — though this does not mean that the agreement is conditioned thereby — is the convening of a world conference on disarmament in the near future, to which all countries should be invited.

20. The Yugoslav Government considers that it is also necessary to convene a general world conference on disarmament in order to reappraise the efforts exerted thus far and to determine firmer and clearer guidelines for future actions to be undertaken with a view to bringing about the settlement of the disarmament problem. The Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo in 1964, declared itself in favour of such a conference.

21. In submitting this memorandum the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia wishes to stress once again the universal interest and responsibility of all countries to exert new, more adequate efforts than hitherto, in order to have the process of disarmament initiated while maintaining indispensable security for all countries.

Belgrade, April 1965.
DOCUMENT DC/217

Letter dated 20 May 1965 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission

[Original text: Russian]
[21 May 1965]

In connexion with the letter dated 29 April 1965 from the representative of Portugal [DC/215], in which an attempt is made to deny the military co-operation between the Portuguese colonialists and the militarists of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations considers it necessary to state the following:

The representative of Portugal tries to make it appear that the facts cited in the Soviet delegation’s statement in the Disarmament Commission, regarding Portugal’s receipt of a consignment of weapons from the Federal Republic of Germany in 1964 and the assistance being provided to the Portuguese military clique by military experts of the Federal Republic of Germany, are not in accordance with the truth. Such unsubstantiated assertions will not, however, succeed in confusing world public opinion and concealing the collusion between Portugal and the Bonn revanchists to suppress the national liberation movement of the African peoples.

The details cited in the aforementioned statement of the Soviet delegation are based on information published by the Mozambique National Liberation Front in its bulletin Mozambican Revolution in December 1964.

The facts relating to the military assistance being provided by the Federal Republic of Germany to the Portuguese colonialists have been published many times in various African countries. In October 1964, for example, the periodical Vigilance (Tanganyika) published an article drawing attention to the fact, inter alia, that military specialists of the Federal Republic of Germany are helping to train military specialists and to plan military operations against the partisans (the operations referred to are those against the partisans in Angola).

Thus, the facts concerning the military assistance provided to the Portuguese colonialists by NATO countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, are a matter of common knowledge.

With regard to the Portuguese representative’s statement that Portugal itself “manufactures all the automatic weapons necessary to meet national requirements”, it can only be said that the Members of the United Nations are well aware of the purposes for which these weapons are used. The Portuguese colonialists are trying to suppress by armed force the just struggle of those African peoples which are still suffering under the yoke of shameful colonial slavery.

I should be grateful if you would take the necessary steps to have this letter circulated as an official document of the Disarmament Commission.

(Signed) P. MOROZOV
Deputy Permanent Representative of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations

DOCUMENT DC/220

United States of America: draft resolution

[Original text: English]
[1 June 1965]

The Disarmament Commission.

Deeply concerned that the continuing arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, poses a threat to the security of mankind while consuming resources that could otherwise be employed to enhance the welfare of peoples everywhere,

Convinced that any further delay in concluding agreements to halt nuclear proliferation and to stop and turn back the nuclear arms race cannot be justified,

Believing that there must be no interruption in constructive discussions and negotiations designed to achieve, in accordance with the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, agreements on limitation and reduction of armaments which would increase international security and contribute to the lessening of tension,

Noting the widespread support for the measures listed below,

Convinced that those measures would contribute significantly to halting and turning back the nuclear arms race, thus lessening the danger of nuclear war,

Urge the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to reconvene as soon as possible and to:

(a) Resume negotiations as a matter of priority on a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests;

(b) Undertake without further delay the drafting of an international agreement on non-proliferation as called for in General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI);

(c) Conclude as soon as possible an agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for weapons use and to transfer to non-weapons use sizable, agreed quantities of such material;

(d) Explore with a sense of urgency a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles which would open the path to early reductions in such vehicles.
The Disarmament Commission,

Deeply concerned that the continuing arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, poses a threat to the security of mankind while consuming resources that could otherwise be employed to enhance the welfare of peoples everywhere,

Convinced that any further delay in concluding agreements to halt nuclear proliferation and to stop and turn back the nuclear arms race cannot be justified,

Believing that there must be no interruption in constructive discussions and negotiations designed to achieve, in accordance with the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, the goal of general and complete disarmament and agreements on limitation and reduction of armaments which would increase international security, contribute to the lessening of tensions, and facilitate the attainment of that goal,

Noting the widespread support for the measures listed below,

Convinced that those measures would contribute significantly to halting and turning back the nuclear arms race, thus lessening the danger of nuclear war,

Urges the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to reconvene as soon as possible and, inter alia, to:

(a) Resume negotiations as a matter of priority on a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests;

(b) Undertake without further delay the drafting of an international agreement on non-proliferation as called for in General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI) and bearing in mind the suggestions made on that issue during the present meetings of the Disarmament Commission;

(c) Conclude as soon as possible an agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for weapons use and to transfer to non-weapons use sizable, agreed quantities of such material;

(d) Explore with a sense of urgency a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles which would open the path to early reductions in such vehicles.

DOCUMENT DC/221 AND ADD. 1

Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Congo (Brazzaville), Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zambia: draft resolution

[Original text : English]
[3 June 1965]

The Disarmament Commission,

Recognizing the paramount importance of disarmament as one of the basic problems of the contemporary world and that its solution should be sought in a world-wide framework,

Convinced that a world disarmament conference would provide powerful support for the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process by formulating proposals and guidelines in the spirit of the Declaration adopted at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, with a view to speeding up general and complete disarmament under effective international control and thus contributing to the relaxation of international tension;

1. Affirms the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in October 1964 for the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited;

2. Recommends that the General Assembly give urgent consideration to the above-mentioned proposal at its twentieth session.
DOCUMENT DC/223
Malta : amendments to document DC/221 and Add. 1
[Original text : English]
[4 June 1965]

1. In the second preambular paragraph, after the words “a world disarmament conference” replace the existing text by the following:
“might provide a valuable forum in which to seek agreement on steps to facilitate the adoption of specific measures of disarmament in accordance with the agreed principles for multilateral negotiations on disarmament issued jointly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States on 20 September 1961.”

2. In operative paragraph 1, replace the word “Affirms” by the word “Welcomes”.

3. At the end of operative paragraph 2, add the words “in the light of the discussions at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament”.

DOCUMENT DC/224
Resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 98th meeting, on 11 June 1965
[Original text : English]
[15 June 1965]

The Disarmament Commission,

Recognizing the paramount importance of disarmament as one of the basic problems of the contemporary world and that its solution should be sought in a world-wide framework,

Convinced that a world disarmament conference as proposed by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries would provide powerful support for the efforts which are being made to set in motion the process of disarmament and for securing the further and steady development of this process, with a view to speeding up general and complete disarmament under effective international control and thus contributing to the relaxation of international tension,

1. Welcomes the proposal adopted at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in October 1964 for the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries would be invited;

2. Recommends that the General Assembly give urgent consideration to the above-mentioned proposal at its twentieth session.

DOCUMENT DC/225
Resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 102nd meeting, on 15 June 1965
[Original text : English]
[15 June 1965]

The Disarmament Commission,

Having considered the report dated 17 September 1964 of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament submitted to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session, \(^{12}\)


Reaffirming the ultimate and continuing responsibility of the United Nations for disarmament,

Noting with regret that during 1964, despite the efforts made by the Eighteen-Nation Committee, no specific agreements were reached either on general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at lessening international tension or halting and reversing the arms race,

Deploring that, notwithstanding General Assembly resolutions 1762 (XVII) of 6 November 1962 and 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, nuclear weapon tests
have taken place and also that no agreement has been reached on the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, which is one of the stated objectives of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water,

Considering that the memorandum of 14 September 1964 submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic\(^{13}\) represents a fair and sound basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the remaining differences for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty,

Convinced that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious consequences,

Deeply conscious of the urgency of making early progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and of reaching agreement on measures which would facilitate the attainment of that goal,

Bearing in mind the proposals made at its present series of meetings for measures to reduce international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, and also at the first session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity and at the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries,

Recalling the principle that a substantial part of the resources that will be released through disarmament should be devoted to the economic and social development of the developing countries, thus contributing to the evolution of a safer and better world,

1. Reaffirms the call of the General Assembly upon all States to become parties to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and to abide by its spirit and provisions;
2. Recommends that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should:
   (a) Reconvene as early as possible to resume as a matter of urgency its efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to consider all proposals for measures to relax international tension and halt and reverse the arms race, including those submitted to the Disarmament Commission at its present series of meetings;
   (b) Consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the partial test ban treaty to cover underground tests;
   (c) Also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures;
   (d) Keep in mind the principle of converting to programmes of economic and social development of the developing countries a substantial part of the resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditures;
3. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee to report to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly during its twentieth session on the progress made in respect of the above recommendations.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., annex I, sect. O.

DOCUMENT DC/226

Letter dated 16 June 1965 from the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission to the Co-Chairman of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

[Original text : English]
[16 June 1965]

I have the honour to transmit herewith document DC/224, containing the text of the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 98th meeting, on 11 June 1965.

I also have the honour to transmit document DC/225, containing the text of the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 102nd meeting, on 15 June 1965, and to draw your attention to paragraph 2 of that resolution, which makes specific recommendations to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and to paragraph 3, in which the Committee is requested to report to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly during its twentieth session.

(Signed) Mohamed El-Kony
1. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament transmits to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly a report on its deliberations on all questions before it for the period 27 July 1965 to 16 September 1965.

2. Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

I. PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS


5. The Conference at its 234th plenary meeting, on 16 September 1965, having in view the convening of the twentieth session of the General Assembly on 21 September 1965, decided to adjourn and to resume its meetings in Geneva as soon as possible after the termination of the consideration of disarmament at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, on a date to be decided by the two Co-Chairmen after consultation with the members of the Committee.

II. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT AND MEASURES AIMED AT LESSENING INTERNATIONAL TENSION, CONSOLIDATING CONFIDENCE AMONG STATES, AND FACILITATING GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

6. The Committee has continued its discussion of general and complete disarmament. The Committee considers it to be a primary goal of its future work to continue efforts to develop a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. However, in view of present international developments, a number of members concentrated their attention on collateral measures at this series of meetings.

7. In its efforts to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date, the Committee continued consideration in its plenary meetings of such measures as could be agreed on prior to, and as would facilitate the achievement of, general and complete disarmament.

8. On 26 July 1965, the Co-Chairmen received a letter [ENDC/149] \(^{14}\) from the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission transmitting the text of the resolution adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965 [DC/224], which, *inter alia*, made certain specific recommendations to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

9. On 27 July 1965, at the 218th meeting a message from the President of the United States of America, Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson, to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [ENDC/150] was submitted by the United States.

10. On 29 July 1965, at the 219th meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland read a message to the Conference from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Harold Wilson.

11. On 5 August 1965, at the 221st meeting, on the occasion of the second anniversary of the signing of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the Conference issued a statement to the effect that it considered more urgent than ever further progress on disarmament measures.

12. On 10 August 1965 a letter addressed by the Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations [ENDC/151] was submitted by the USSR.

13. On 17 August 1965, at the 224th meeting, the United States, supported by the delegations of Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom, submitted a draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons [ENDC/152] and a statement by President Lyndon B. Johnson on this draft treaty [ENDC/153].

14. On 2 September 1965, at the 229th meeting, Sweden submitted a memorandum on international co-operation for the detection of underground nuclear explosions [ENDC/154].

15. On 9 September 1965, at the 231st meeting, the United Kingdom submitted notes on United Kingdom research on techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions [ENDC/155].

16. On 14 September 1965, at the 232nd meeting, Italy submitted a draft unilateral declaration of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons [ENDC/157].

17. On 15 September 1965, at the 233rd meeting, a joint memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons [ENDC/158] was submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic.

18. Also at the 233rd meeting, on 15 September 1965, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic submitted a joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty [ENDC/159].

19. As in the past, the questions before the Committee were in general discussed in a thorough manner. All the

\(^{14}\) Also issued under the symbol DC/226.
participants took an active part in the discussion and a number of interesting suggestions were put forward. The Soviet Union stated its readiness to meet the position taken by the United Arab Republic and to agree to its proposal that the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water should be extended to cover underground nuclear weapon tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75, and that as an additional measure the nuclear Powers should agree to a moratorium on all other forms of underground nuclear weapon tests until such time as agreement had been reached on an over-all ban on nuclear weapon tests. The United States reiterated its readiness to conclude an adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty and in this regard emphasized the desirability of an exchange of scientific information among nuclear Powers, as suggested by the eight non-aligned States in their memorandum of 14 September 1964.  

20. The Committee did not reach any specific agreement at this series of meetings either on questions of general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension. However, the members of the Committee believe that the extensive discussions on major problems relating to certain collateral measures were particularly valuable in clarifying the respective points of views of member Governments. The Committee believes that these discussions and exchanges of views may facilitate agreement in its further work.

III. Meetings of the Co-Chairmen

21. During the period covered by this report, the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, held meetings to discuss the schedule of and procedure for the work of the Conference and certain substantive questions before the Conference.

IV. Conference Documents

22. A list of all Conference documents and of the verbatim records of the plenary meetings for the period under review is given in annex 2 to the present report.

23. This report is submitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed) S. K. TSARAFKIN  
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

(Signed) William C. FOSTER  
(United States of America)

ANNEX 1

LIST OF DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO THE REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Document No.</th>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>United States of America: draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons</td>
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United States of America: draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons *

[Original text: English]

The Parties to this Treaty,

Desiring to promote international peace and security,

Desiring in particular to refrain from taking steps which will extend and intensify the arms race,

Believing that the further spread of nuclear weapons will jeopardize these ends,

Recalling that resolution 1665 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations urges all States to co-operate for these purposes,

Desiring to achieve effective agreements to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce armaments, including particularly nuclear arsenals,

Reaffirming their determination to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Have agreed as follows:

**Article I**

1. Each of the nuclear States party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer any nuclear weapons into the national control of any non-nuclear State, either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance, and each undertakes not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.

2. Each of the nuclear States party to this Treaty undertakes not to assist any non-nuclear State in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

**Article II**

1. Each of the non-nuclear States party to this Treaty undertakes not to manufacture nuclear weapons; each undertakes not to seek or to receive the transfer of such weapons into its national control, either directly, or indirectly through a military alliance; and each undertakes not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons.

2. Each of the non-nuclear States party to this Treaty undertakes not to seek or to receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or itself to grant such assistance.

Article III
Each of the States party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities.

Article IV
In this Treaty:
(a) "nuclear State" means a State possessing independent power to use nuclear weapons as of (date);
(b) "non-nuclear State" means any State which is not a nuclear State.

Article V
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by (a certain number of) Governments, including those of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, and the date of its entry into force.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VI
1. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the right of any Party to the Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other signatory and acceding States and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. ________years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties may be held at a date and place to be fixed by agreement of two-thirds of the Parties in order to review the operation of the Treaty.

Article VII
This Treaty, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate at the city of ________, the ________day of ________, one thousand nine hundred and ________.

Sweden: memorandum on international co-operation for the detection of underground nuclear explosions*

[Original text: English]

1. In view of the efforts being made to extend the partial test ban to cover also underground nuclear weapon tests, the question of improving existing facilities for monitoring seismic events has received increased attention. The scientific advisors attached to the Swedish delegation at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament presented a few months ago a discussion paper on extended international co-operation in seismology for detection purposes ("detection club"). The Swedish delegation has the honour to present to the Conference for information its views on this subject.

2. Underground nuclear explosions do not, as a rule, generate global distributions of easily detected radio-active debris. So far the seismic method seems to be the only technical way to detect them. Since the conclusion of the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, considerable progress has been made in the field of seismic detection. Problems, however, still remain in the fields of identification and inspection. These problems are not discussed in this paper, which is confined to the problem of detection, i.e. questions related to the national systems of seismological detection.

3. The seismological stations are not yet optimally developed in all countries. It is surmised that if the means of detection were sufficiently developed, the problem of identification, i.e. of distinguishing between natural earthquakes and man-made explosions, would be greatly facilitated.

4. Well equipped and well located stations can now detect events corresponding to yields of the order of one kiloton from distances up to 10,000 kilometres, covering half the globe. Hence no State has territories large enough to contain such seismic signals within its borders. The methods of recording these signals seem now to be good enough to permit an adequate " national means only " solution of the detection part of the verification problem. If, however, the data emanating from the national systems were kept insulated within the national framework of each country, few of these, if any, would be large enough to monitor signals from the whole globe. To make it possible for all nations interested in compliance with a treaty banning nuclear weapon test explosions to follow and also seek to evaluate events presupposes the availability of data from several stations in widely distributed and suitably selected locations. Such co-operation by exchange of seismological data is already internationally instituted for the purpose of monitoring and studying earthquakes.

5. Since new and technologically much more advanced seismological stations are now being established, and data flowing from them are beginning to reach the community of scientists in this field, the time has come to consider what forms further collaboration should take. We think that States interested on the one hand in furthering seismological observations and research and on the other hand in the detection of underground explosions will find it useful to co-operate in an exchange of pertinent seismological observations. Such a "detection club" would essentially be an international data service, giving access to first-class data for independent analysis.

6. If such co-operation is started before an underground test ban enters into force, research on the remaining test ban verification problems will be facilitated.

7. The last-mentioned aspect has led the Swedish Government to plan certain steps to establish in Sweden appropriate resources for seismological observation and analysis. The observation data will be made available to all interested parties, and Sweden expects to get corresponding information in return.

8. The "detection club" data should preferably come from good instruments on good sites, globally distributed in advantageous positions. Although a broad participation would be desirable, such a global network could be based on seismological observations from selected stations in a rather small number of countries.

9. In order to broaden the uncertainty range of the absolute detection threshold facing a prospective test ban politician and thus increase the deterrence capability of seismological verification systems, it is foreseen that some stations might remain outside the network of co-operating stations.

10. The data exchanged should comprise short messages — of the bulletin type currently used by seismologists — continuously circulated on a time scale appropriate to detection efforts. It would also be of great value if the results of calculations on bulletin data were included. The data co-operation should, furthermore, comprise the exchange, upon request, of copies of records.

11. Another essential element of the proposed co-operation would be the facilitation of the data exchange by the adoption of appropriate standards for instrumentation and data formats.

12. The fact that the existing and projected advanced seismological stations will extract a very large amount of information from the earth will also have to be considered. To cope with this immense quantity of data it may prove necessary to establish some international co-ordinating body.

13. International data exchange has been for a long time a well established practice in the geophysical sciences. The paramount importance of such co-operation for seismology has generated several national, regionally international and global schemes for the collection, analysis and exchange of data. Examples of regionally international schemes are the arrangements maintained in France, Japan, the USSR and the United States.

14. Indeed, much of the desiderata for the extended data exchange proposed in this paper is already met by the existing arrangements for scientific purposes. Thus, the specific needs of a "detection club" would in many cases require only adjustments of present national and international efforts.

15. The development of the science of geophysics and of the technique of test ban verification are closely connected. It would therefore be advantageous for all concerned to make the "detection club" data available to all scientists, to use such standards as might be sponsored by the International Council of Scientific Unions, to seek ways to achieve rapid circulation of bulletin data on some global telecommunication network accessible to scientists (for example, the one used by the World Meteorological Organization for weather data and tapped in all countries) and to achieve co-ordination as far as possible, with existing global seismological co-operative efforts, such as the International Seismological Centre at Edinburgh.

16. The considerations in this paper have been formulated so as to help achieve more effective seismological detection as well as to allow science to benefit from resources allocated for detection purposes and vice versa, while avoiding placing an unwanted political burden upon scientists.

C

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: notes on United Kingdom research on techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions

[Original text : English]

1. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is familiar with the history of the Conference of Experts here in Geneva in 1958 and its recommendations for monitoring possible violations of a nuclear test ban treaty in all environments. Then, as now, discussions about how to distinguish between earthquakes and man-made underground explosions proved most difficult of all. This continuing difficulty is reflected in the fact that while it is still not possible to obtain agreement on this problem, a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all other environments has been concluded.

2. When it became clear that for various reasons the control system recommended at Geneva in 1958 was unlikely to be implemented, scientists in the United Kingdom took a new look at the possibilities of detecting underground events at much greater distances than the 1,000-kilometre range required for the Geneva recommendations of 1958. The thought was that seismic waves generated at such distances would enable them to travel through the earth's homogeneous deep mantle should be much freer from the complexities introduced at shorter ranges by heterogeneities along shallower propagation paths through the earth's crust. With this concept in mind, United Kingdom scientists embarked on a seismic research programme to examine the possibilities of developing a detection system very different from that already recommended at Geneva.

3. The problem was seen as calling not only for research in all the usual seismic conditions but also as one where the seismic problem itself should be examined as one of exact measurement. The latter aspect immediately led to all recordings being made in such a way as would enable them to be processed electronically. By increasing the number of seismometers per station and deploying them in beam-forming arrays, by placing them in deep boreholes and by seeking lower noise sites than previously used, the possibility of great improvements in the signal-to-noise ratio soon became apparent with an essentially increased ability to see the first motions of the compressional or P waves arriving from a seismic source.

4. It was found that arrays of this particular type offered the greatest promise of advancement. As well as offering a signal-to-noise improvement in proportion to the square root of the number of seismometers used, they allowed the possibility of turning the array to more than one signal component velocity, thus improving the reception of later signal components, they offered an approximate determination of the direction of the source and they provided a body of data which enabled a method for determining depth of focus to be applied with considerable success. With such early encouragement, scientists in the United Kingdom intensified their work with these arrays and established an experimental facility in the United Kingdom to develop array techniques and prove instrumentation. At the same time, in close collaboration with their colleagues in the United States, they established a similar experimental facility in the United States. From this work it became apparent that a completely new concept of methods could be used to detect and identify earthquakes.

5. The main facts then emerging may be summarised as follows:

(a) Application of data processing techniques to magnetic tape recordings increased the capability of determining first motion of the first wave;

(b) Estimation of the focal depth of events could be improved;

(c) Array-type stations could be operated effectively beyond 3,000 kilometres, as compared with the 1,000-kilometre range for the previous (Geneva) system;

(d) Comparative differences in the characteristics of seismic waves from earthquakes and explosions were enhanced.

6. These advances suggested that the seismic detection and identification required to monitor a ban on underground tests could be carried out by a relatively small number of array stations at seismic distances. The reduced number of station sites in turn increased the possibility of confining stations to the quietest seismic sites available and this in itself led to a significant improvement in attaining the signal-to-noise ratio necessary to detect the smallest events of interest.

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7. The next stage in this research work obviously called for a specific study of explosions and earthquakes at teleseismic distances using large arrays. In the case of the United Kingdom, these have varied from about 10 to 25 kilometres in length, are of a crossed linear geometry rather than triangular or radial and are carefully sited for noise, interference and topographical characteristics. This phase of the work is a continuing part of the research programme still being pursued by United Kingdom scientists.

8. In the development and application of these array systems, there are many variants to be examined. These include array geometry, site noise level, and the number and characteristics of seismometers to be deployed. The results to be reported from the very large array experiment now being carried out in the United States will be of great interest. It is hoped that the approach taken by United Kingdom scientists will also contribute to resolving this difficult problem of distinguishing between natural seismic events and man-made underground explosions. A corresponding statement from any other delegation which has a contribution to report would be welcome. But behind all this, many detailed technical problems arise calling for detailed technical discussion. It would therefore be greatly preferable to have the scientists working on these problems brought together to discuss their work and assess the possibilities of creating an effective monitoring system for the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions. It may well be that an effective monitoring system will call not for one particular type of array but for various types depending on local seismic and topographical characteristics, as well as costs.

9. In the meantime the United Kingdom has continually sought to exploit these new technical advances as they have come along. They made possible a new approach to an underground test ban in 1962, and the West has continued to modify its position as scientific evidence has accumulated. Some of this work has already been published and all the work carried out by United Kingdom scientists is now being prepared for publication. That work was the subject of a symposium sponsored by the Royal Society in January 1965 to which representatives from many countries, including the Soviet Union, were invited.

10. Nevertheless, with all these technical advances there still remains a residual number of seismic events at or above seismic magnitude 4.0 that would be unidentifiable by remote seismological observations alone and which could be suspected as possible violations of a test ban unless they could be eliminated by some supplementary means such as on-site inspection being applied in some measure. This is the problem that still confronts us and that prevents an extension of the test ban treaty to cover the underground environment. It remains to be seen whether further research can provide any significant improvement on the position now reached, but if there is such a possibility the United Kingdom believes that it could only be hastened in a detailed joint examination of the advanced now achieved in the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

D

Italy: draft unilateral declaration of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons

[Original text: English]

The Government of ..., not having national control of nuclear weapons,

Desiring to promote international peace and security and to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI),

Reaffirming the necessity of an international agreement to stop the spread of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that a unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear States may facilitate and encourage international agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce nuclear arsenals, leading to general and complete disarmament,

Hoping that such agreements will be achieved very soon,

Declares that, from the date of the entry into force of the present declaration and for a period of ... years:

(1) It will not manufacture or otherwise acquire national control of nuclear weapons;

(2) It will not seek or receive assistance from other States in the manufacture of any such weapons;

(3) It will accept the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards to its nuclear activities;

Declares further that:

(1) The present undertakings are conditioned upon similar declarations, issued by at least ... States within six months from the signature of the present declaration;

(2) Three months before the expiration of the above said period of ... years, it will consult the signatories of similar declarations, in order to prolong the said undertakings, considering the progress which has been made toward international agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons or to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce nuclear arsenals;

(3) It reserves all freedom of action if a non-nuclear State in any way acquires within the above-mentioned period of ... years national control of nuclear weapons.

Invites all States not having national control of nuclear weapons, and particularly those which are already approaching nuclear capability, to engage, as a matter of urgency, in the undertakings set forth in the present declaration;

Calls upon all States to respect and to observe the principles of this declaration and to encourage their observance by other States.

E

Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and United Arab Republic: joint memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

[Original text: English]

1. The Disarmament Commission adopted a resolution on 15 June 1965 (DC/225) by an overwhelming majority, in which, inter alia, "convinced that failure to conclude a universal treaty or agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to the most serious consequences", it recommended that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should "also accord special priority to the consideration of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, giving close attention to the various suggestions that agreement could be facilitated by adopting a programme of certain related measures".

2. The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic have been deeply concerned with this problem. They have noted with satisfaction that the other members of the Committee also expressed their anxiety in regard to this problem. The United States, supported by the delegations of the other NATO countries represented in the Committee, has submitted a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The non-aligned delegations regret, however, that it has not yet been possible to reconcile the various approaches for an appropriate or adequate treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.


† Document ENDC/158 of 15 September 1965.
3. In these circumstances, the delegations of Brazil, Burra, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic believe that it would be of advantage if they placed on record their basic approach to the question of non-proliferation. A treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself but only a means to an end. That end is the achievement of general and complete disarmament, and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament. The eight delegations are convinced that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

4. The delegations of Brazil, Burra, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic express the hope that their basic approach concerning a non-proliferation treaty as put forward in the foregoing paragraphs will receive general acceptance so that a draft treaty on prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons receives the support of the entire international community.

Brazil, Burra, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and United Arab Republic: joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty

[Original text: English]

1. The international community has for many years urged upon all States, particularly the major Powers, the imperative need to reach agreement on the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. The United Nations General Assembly has adopted several resolutions on the subject, particularly resolution 1762 (XVII) which condemned all tests.

2. The Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, entered into force on 5 August 1963, was a significant first step in this direction. The preamble to that treaty expressed the determination of the nuclear Powers to continue negotiations for achieving the disarmament of all nuclear weapon tests. Unfortunately, no progress has yet been made towards this end, and test explosions continue to take place despite repeated calls by the United Nations for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. In particular, the General Assembly, in its resolution 1910 (XVIII), called upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue with a sense of urgency its negotiations to that end.

3. The delegations of Brazil, Burra, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic noted that the Disarmament Commission, at its meetings in April, May and June 1965, took special interest in the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and made a special mention of the initiative taken by the eight delegations as contained in the joint memorandum they submitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 14 September 1964. In its resolution of 15 June 1965 [DC/223], the Disarmament Commission especially recommended that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the partial test ban treaty to cover underground tests.

4. In response to world public opinion and to the will of the United Nations as embodied in the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, as well as in implementation of the Disarmament Commission’s resolution of 15 June 1965, the delegations of the eight non-aligned States have continued to pursue with urgency and determination, at the present meetings of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. They have also elaborated various proposals and suggestions made by them in this respect.

5. The delegations of the eight non-aligned States are convinced that the discontinuance of the underground tests and the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty will not only consolidate the partial test ban treaty but also in itself constitute a measure towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It will strengthen the efforts being made to reach agreement on an appropriate treaty on non-proliferation, and will generally improve the international climate.

6. The delegations of Brazil, Burra, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic have noted with satisfaction the declarations made during the current meetings of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that there has been considerable improvement in the techniques of detection and identification of underground tests. They therefore urge the nuclear Powers to take immediate steps to reach an agreement to ban all nuclear weapon tests. They still believe that agreement on a treaty banning underground tests could be facilitated by the exchange of scientific and other information between the nuclear Powers or by the improvement of detection and identification techniques, if necessary. Meanwhile, they reiterate their appeal to the Powers concerned to suspend forthcoming nuclear weapon tests in all environments. In order to assist the nuclear Powers in observing suspension of underground tests, the non-aligned delegations stress the advantages that would accrue from international co-operation in the work of seismic detection.

7. The eight delegations reaffirm their stand that all nuclear weapon tests should cease immediately.

ANNEX 2

CHECK LIST OF DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY THE CONFERENCE
(26 July – 16 September 1965)

Verbatim records of the Conference
ENDC/PV 218 – 234 (27 July – 16 September 1965): Verbatim records of the 218th to 234th meetings

Documents of the Conference
ENDC/149 (26 July 1965):
Letter dated 16 June 1965 from the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission to the Co-Chairman of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, transmitting resolutions DC/224 and DC/225 of the Disarmament Commission

ENDC/150 (2 August 1965):
United States of America: message of President Lyndon B. Johnson of 27 July 1965 to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

ENDC/151 (10 August 1965):
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: letter dated 10 August 1965 from the Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

ENDC/152 (17 August 1965):
United States of America: draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons

ENDC/153 (18 August 1965):
United States of America: statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson of 17 August 1965 on the draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons

ENDC/154 (2 September 1965):
Sweden: memorandum on international co-operation for the detection of underground nuclear explosions

* Document ENDC/159 of 15 September 1965.

* Printed in annex 1 to this report.
* ENDC/135 (9 September 1965):
  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: notes on United Kingdom research on techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions

* ENDC/156 (14 September 1965):
  Draft report to the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly (recommended by the Co-Chairmen)

* ENDC/157 (14 September 1965):
  Italy: draft unilateral declaration of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons

* ENDC/158 (15 September 1965):
  Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and United Arab Republic: joint memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

* ENDC/159 (15 September 1965):
  Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and

* Printed in annex 1 to this report.

United Arab Republic: joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty

Documents containing information of an administrative nature

ENDC/INF.1/Rev.5 (27 July 1965):
  Basic information for delegations on conference arrangements and documentation

ENDC/INF.2/Rev.21 (27 July 1965) and Corr. 1 (29 July 1965);
ENDC/INF.2/Rev.22 (3 August 1965) and Corr. 1 (2 September 1965):
  List of members of delegations to the Conference

ENDC/INF.4/Add.35 (16 September 1965):
  Check list of documents issued between 26 July and 16 September 1965

Non-governmental communications

ENDC/NGC/20 (16 September 1965):
  List of communications received by the secretariat of the Conference from 26 July to 16 September 1965
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