SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

PROPOSAL BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE THREAT OF A NEW WAR

DECLARATION

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the great responsibility which rests with the United Nations for the maintenance of peace among the peoples, considers it its duty to draw the attention of all States to the situation which is at present developing in relations between States.

More than ever before, the peoples, which so recently experienced the Second World War with the heavy loss of life and the vast material destruction that war inflicted, are displaying an unflinching will for peace.

As a result of this deep-rooted desire of the peoples for peace, it has already proved possible to bring the bloodshed in Korea and Indo-China to an end and thereby to create more favourable conditions for the settlement of other outstanding international problems.
At the same time, the peoples are displaying a legitimate concern for the fate of peace, especially in view of the situation that is developing in Europe and Asia. This concern has found expression, in particular, in the resolutions adopted at the Conference of Asian and African countries held recently in Bandung, which was of great importance in the struggle for peace, freedom and the independence of peoples.

So far from improving, the situation in some areas of the world is at present deteriorating, and mutual distrust between States is becoming intensified. The absence of the necessary confidence in relations between States is the main reason preventing the settlement of outstanding problems both in Europe and in Asia.

This applies pre-eminentely to relations between the great Powers, which bear the primary responsibility for the maintenance of universal peace and the security of peoples.

Despite the obligations assumed by the great Powers, together with the other States Members of the United Nations, to co-operate in the maintenance of peace and international security, the relations between them do not correspond with these requirements. Mistrust in relations between the Powers led, after the end of the Second World War, to the rise of the threat of a new war still more terrible in its consequences.
As a result of this mistrust, particularly in the relations between the permanent members of the Security Council, the armaments race is assuming ever-increasing proportions, and land, naval and air forces are steadily increasing. The supreme achievements of science and technique are being used to produce the most destructive means for exterminating human beings. The armaments race has assumed particularly large proportions in the production of such dangerous weapons as atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Large numbers of foreign military bases are being established on the territory of other States, a fact which is causing legitimate anxiety to the States in whose vicinity these bases are being established. The creation of such bases also increases the threat to the security of the States on whose territory they are established. The existence of these bases, many of which are being used for the preparations for atomic war that are being carried out by certain Powers, is still further intensifying mistrust in relations between States and increasing international tension.

As a result of all this, the world has for many years been in a state of so-called "cold war", and the military preparations of States are laying a constantly increasing burden on the shoulders of the peoples.

Despite the fact that as long ago as 1947 the General Assembly unanimously adopted a decision condemning all forms of propaganda "either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression", open propaganda for a new war is being carried on in a number of States. Calls to war, far from being brought to a stop, have become increasingly frequent in the press, on the radio and in public statements. Moreover, calls for atomic war have been especially frequent in recent times.

The former traditional economic and trade links between numerous States, developed over many years, have been broken, with all the resulting adverse consequences for international economic co-operation.

The situation that has arisen requires that immediate and effective action should be taken to ease international tension and to strengthen mutual confidence in relations between States. This can only be achieved if an end is put to the "cold war" and if the propaganda for a new war which is being carried on in certain States, with its accompanying incitement of enmity and hatred between peoples and its inflaming of certain peoples against others, is brought to a stop.

Continuance of the propaganda which is being carried on in certain countries with a view to fanning war hysteria, as also incitement to war, can only intensify international tension and mutual distrust between States and thereby increase the threat of a new world war.
On the other hand, the cessation of the "cold war" between States would help to bring about a relaxation of international tension, the creation of the necessary confidence in international relations, the removal of the threat of a new war and the establishment of conditions permitting a peaceful and tranquil life of the peoples. This, in turn, would create the requisite conditions for the execution of a broad disarmament programme, with the establishment of the necessary international control over its implementation.

To these ends, the General Assembly:

1. **Recommends** all States to take the necessary measures to ensure scrupulous compliance with the General Assembly resolution condemning all forms of propaganda for a new war, to put an end to all calls for war and for the kindling of hostility between peoples in the press, on the radio, in the cinema and in public statements. Non-compliance with this recommendation shall be regarded as a violation by a State of its international duty and of its obligations to the United Nations, namely, to abstain in its international relations from the threat or the use of force and not to permit violations of the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.

2. **Notes with satisfaction** the successes achieved in the talks between the interested States on the Korean question -- which led to the termination of the war in Korea -- and also on the question of the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China. Two dangerous hotbeds of war in the Far East were thereby eliminated.
As a result of negotiations between interested States it has also become possible to settle the question of the conclusion of a Treaty of State with Austria, ensuring the restoration of an independent Austria. The settlement of the Austrian question constitutes a new and important contribution to the consolidation of peace in Europe and promotes the creation of conditions for the successful settlement of other outstanding post-war problems.

All this testifies to the fact that the possibilities of settling outstanding international problems by means of negotiations between States in the interests of peace, freedom and the national independence of peoples have by no means been exhausted.

3. **Considers** that the reduction of international tension and the creation of the requisite confidence between States would be promoted if the Four Powers -- the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France -- would immediately withdraw their armies of occupation from the territory of Germany inside their national frontiers, with the exception of strictly limited contingents of forces left temporarily in German territory pending the conclusion of an agreement for their complete withdrawal. These ends would also be served by the formation of strictly limited contingents of local police forces in both parts of Germany and the establishment of joint control by the Four Powers over the execution of the relevant agreement.
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The General Assembly will welcome any other steps which the Four Powers may take with a view to withdrawing their forces from German territory, and also with a view to facilitating the settlement of the German problem in the interest of European security and the national unification of Germany as a single peace-loving and democratic State.

4. **Considers it necessary** that the States which are permanent members of the Security Council should reach agreement on the liquidation of foreign military bases on the territory of other States and inform the Security Council and the General Assembly of the results. Such an agreement would be of great importance for the reduction of international tension and the removal of mistrust in relations between States, and would help to create the necessary conditions for ending the armaments race.

5. **Calls upon** States having experience in the production of atomic materials and atomic energy to render extensive industrial and scientific and technical assistance to other countries in the field of the peaceful use of atomic energy, without making such assistance conditional upon any demands of a political or military nature.

6. **Calls upon** the States concerned to settle outstanding questions in the Far East in accordance with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, since the existing situation of tension in certain areas of the Far East is fraught with the danger of a new war and constitutes a serious threat to the maintenance of universal peace.
7. **Considers it necessary** that States, in their economic relations, should remove every form of discrimination impeding the development of broad economic co-operation between them, first of all in the field of trade. Both private and State interests are prejudiced by a situation in which long-established trade ties between States are severed. The elimination of such discrimination and the broad development of international trade relations based on the principle of mutual benefit will help to consolidate friendly relations between States and will promote the improvement of the well-being of peoples. Without the elimination of these obstacles to the development of international trade no genuine relaxation of tension in international relations can be anticipated.

A further important means for the improvement of mutual understanding and the bringing together of peoples is the extension of international cultural relations, notably through the extensive interchange of delegations, through mutual visits by representatives of industry, agriculture, trade, science, culture and art and by student delegations, and through the development of tourism.

8. **Decides** to place on the agenda of its next session the question of the results achieved through the implementation by States
of the provisions of this Declaration, having regard to the fact that
the implementation of these provisions will correspond to the desire
of the peoples for peace, will promote the creation of the necessary
confidence between States and will thereby facilitate the carrying
into effect of a broad disarmament programme, with the establishment
of effective international control over its execution.

CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND
THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

The General Assembly (Security Council),

Seeking to save mankind from a new and destructive war, to
reduce the tension in relations between States, and to relieve the
peoples of the heavy burden of taxation they bear as a result of the
continuing armaments race,

Desirous of ensuring the possibility of resources thus released
being used to improve the well-being of the peoples and to afford
extensive assistance to the economically under-developed countries,

Instructs the United Nations Disarmament Commission to draw up
and submit for the approval of the Security Council a draft
"international convention (treaty) on the question of the reduction
of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons
of mass destruction".

Such a convention, having as its purpose the strengthening of
peace and international security, shall provide for:
(a) the complete prohibition of the use and production both
of nuclear and of all other weapons of mass destruction, and the
conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful
purposes;
(b) a major reduction in all armed forces and all conventional
armaments;
(c) the establishment of a control organ with rights and
powers and functions adequate to guarantee in the case of all States
alike the effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and
reductions.

Accordingly, the convention (treaty) shall contain the basic
provisions set forth hereunder relating to the execution of measures
for the reduction of the conventional armaments of States, the
prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction
and the procedure for the carrying out of these measures in two stages:

FIRST STAGE - MEASURES TO BE CARRIED OUT IN 1956

The following measures shall be carried out in 1956:

1. The States Parties to the convention (treaty) shall
undertake, as a first step towards the reduction of armaments and
armed forces, not to increase their armed forces and conventional
armaments above the level obtaining on 31 December 1954. They shall
also undertake not to increase their appropriations for armed
forces and armaments, including atomic weapons, above the level of
the expenditures effected for those purposes during the year ended 31 December 1954.

The above-mentioned measures shall be carried out within two months of the entry into force of the corresponding agreement.

The United States, the USSR, China, the United Kingdom and France shall furnish the Disarmament Commission, within one month after the entry into force of the convention (treaty), with full official figures of their armed forces, conventional armaments and expenditures for military requirements.

2. An agreed level shall be established to which armed forces of all States in excess of that level shall be reduced, in order that no State may possess armed forces capable of constituting a serious threat to international peace. A substantial reduction of armed forces shall be effected by the United States, the USSR, China, the United Kingdom and France. To these ends the above-mentioned five Powers shall undertake to reduce the strength of their armed forces so that they do not exceed the following figures:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Figures</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1,000,000 to 1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
<td>1,000,000 to 1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,000,000 to 1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>650,000</td>
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The five Powers shall undertake also to reduce their conventional armaments correspondingly.
The above-mentioned five Powers shall in the course of one year effect a reduction in their armed forces and armaments by 50 per cent of the difference between the level of their armed forces and armaments obtaining on 31 December 1954 and the reduced level of the armed forces and armaments of each of these States established in accordance with the obligations assumed by them as set forth hereinafter.

Appropriations by States for armed forces and conventional armaments shall be reduced correspondingly.

3. There shall be convened, not later than during the first half of 1956, a World Conference on the general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, with the participation of States both Members and non-Members of the United Nations, with a view to determining the size of the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the other States and to prohibiting atomic weapons.

The strength of the armed forces which other States shall be authorized to retain, shall in all cases be considerably lower than the levels established for the five permanent members of the Security Council.

In establishing the size of the reduction in the armaments of States, including those of the permanent members of the Security Council, simple agreed criteria including demographic, geographic, economic and political factors shall be taken into account, with a view to the strengthening of world peace and international security and the diminution of the threat of aggression.
4. As one of the first measures for the execution of the programme for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, States possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons shall undertake to discontinue tests of these weapons.

With a view to supervision of the fulfilment by States of the afore-mentioned obligation, an International Commission shall be set up which shall submit reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

5. Simultaneously with the initiation of measures for the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the five Powers by the first 50 per cent of the agreed reduction to the prescribed levels and before the entry into force of the agreement on the complete prohibition of atomic weapons, States shall assume a solemn obligation not to use nuclear weapons, which they shall regard as prohibited to them. Exceptions to this rule may be permitted for purposes of defence against aggression, when a decision to that effect is taken by the Security Council.

6. States possessing military, naval and air bases in the territories of other States shall undertake to liquidate such bases.

The question of the bases to be liquidated during the first stage shall be additionally agreed upon.

The carrying out of these measures must promote the strengthening of the necessary trust between States and facilitate the execution of the measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons envisaged for the second stage.
SECOND STAGE - MEASURES TO BE CARRIED OUT IN 1957

The following measures shall be carried out in 1957:

1. The production of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall be discontinued immediately, and budgetary appropriations of States for military requirements shall be reduced correspondingly.

2. The United States, the USSR, China, the United Kingdom and France shall, in the course of one year, reduce their armed forces and armaments by the remaining 50 per cent of the difference between the level of the armed forces and armaments of each of these five States obtaining on 31 December 1954 and the reduced level of the armed forces and armaments of each of these States established in accordance with the obligations assumed by them under the convention. These States shall correspondingly reduce their appropriations for armed forces and conventional armaments.

During this stage, measures with a view to the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of other States to the extent established for them at the World Conference shall also be completed.

3. After the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments has been carried out to the extent of 75 per cent of the total reduction laid down in the convention, a complete prohibition on the use of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction shall enter into force. The elimination of these weapons from the armaments of
States and their destruction, and the reduction of armed forces and
conventional armaments by the final 25 per cent of the agreed
reductions shall begin simultaneously; and both these processes shall
be completed within the time-limits in 1957. All atomic materials
shall thereafter be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

States shall undertake to promote extensive international
co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This co-operation
shall include the free exchange of information concerning the use
of atomic energy in industry, agriculture and medicine and in other
fields of economics and science. In this connexion, special attention
shall be given to assistance to economically under-developed countries.
Such assistance shall not be made conditional upon any demands of a
political or military nature.

States shall endeavour to devote a part of the savings resulting
from world-wide disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons
to the extensive use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

4. Measures for the liquidation of all foreign military, naval
and air bases on the territories of other States shall be completed.

On the completion of all the measures enumerated above, it would
be desirable that the Powers should further reduce their armaments
and armed forces to the levels strictly necessary for the maintenance
of internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations of
signatory States under the terms of the United Nations Charter.
The question of the obligations of China, as one of the permanent members of the Security Council, under the convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons of mass destruction shall be examined with the participation of the People's Republic of China.

CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OVER THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the great importance and the necessity of instituting effective international control over the fulfilment by States of their obligations under the convention on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons,

Notes that the necessary conditions for the institution of a control system which would enjoy the trust of all States and would fully meet the requirements of international security do not at present exist.

It is impossible to disregard the fact that there exists at present considerable international tension and mistrust in relations between States. It is this that accounts for the fact that, in the conditions of mistrust among States which have come into being, barriers of every sort are being erected even in regard to the interchange of industrial, agricultural, scientific, cultural and other delegations. Such a situation makes difficult the attainment
of agreement regarding the admission by States to their enterprises, particularly those engaged in military production, of foreign control officials who might carry out the inspection of such enterprises.

In the existing situation, when many States are displaying legitimate anxiety for their security, it is difficult to expect that these States would trustingly provide other States with facilities for access to industrial and other resources of theirs which are vital to their security.

In so far as the necessary trust does not at the present time exist between States, a situation may arise in which the adoption of decisions on international control will in reality be reduced to a mere formality which does not achieve the objective. This is all the more inadmissible because, in present conditions, the greatest apprehensions exist among peace-loving peoples in connexion with the existence of atomic and hydrogen weapons, in regard to which the institution of international control is particularly difficult.

This danger is inherent in the very nature of atomic production. It is well known that the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes can be used for the accumulation of stocks of explosive atomic materials, and moreover, in ever greater quantities. This means that States having establishments for the production of atomic energy can accumulate, in violation of the relevant agreements, large quantities of explosive materials for the production of atomic weapons. The danger of this state of affairs becomes still more
understandable if account is taken of the fact that where the corresponding quantities of explosive atomic materials exist production of actual atomic and hydrogen bombs is technically fully feasible and can be effected on a large scale.

Thus, there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation, the security of the States signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving States.

Until an atmosphere of trust has been created in relations between States, any agreement on the institution of international control can only serve to lull the vigilance of the peoples. It will create a false sense of security, while in reality there will be a danger of the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons and, hence the threat of surprise attack and the unleashing of an atomic war with all its appalling consequences for the peoples.

It must also be borne in mind that preparations for a new war, the danger of which has been greatly increased by the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons, inevitably necessitate the concentration of large military formations at certain points together with large
quantities of conventional armaments -- aircraft, artillery, tanks, warships and so forth. Such concentration and the movement of large formations of land, sea and air forces cannot be effected except through important communication centres, ports and airfields. Under conditions of modern military technique, the importance of such points in the preparation of an aggressive war has not diminished, but is on the contrary increasing.

In addition to atomic and hydrogen weapons, for all their destructive capacity, armies of many millions and vast quantities of conventional armaments, which are of decisive importance to the outcome of any major war, would inevitably be involved in military operations in the event of the outbreak of war.

All this must be taken into account in resolving the problem of instituting international control over the fulfilment by States of their obligations under the convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The problem of instituting International Control and of the rights and powers of the international control organ must therefore be considered in close connexion with the execution of the above-mentioned measures for the lessening of international tension, the strengthening of trust between States and the carrying out of other measures relating to the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.
In view of the foregoing,

the General Assembly institutes an International Control Organ having the following rights and powers:

1. **DURING THE FIRST STAGE** of execution of the measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons

   (a) In order to prevent a surprise attack by one State upon another, the International Control Organ shall establish on the territory of all the States concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodromes. The task of these posts shall be to see to it that there is no dangerous concentration of military land forces or of air or naval forces.

   (b) The International Control Organ shall have the right to require from States any necessary information on the execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

   (c) The Control Organ shall have unimpeded access to records relating to the budgetary appropriations of States for military needs, including all decisions of their legislative and executive organs on the subject. States shall periodically, within specified time-limits, furnish the control organ with information on the execution of the measures provided for in the convention (treaty).
2. **DURING THE SECOND STAGE of execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons**

   The carrying out of the measures provided for in the Declaration set forth above and of the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons envisaged for the first stage will create the necessary atmosphere of trust between States, thereby ensuring the appropriate conditions for the extension of the functions of the International Control Organ.

   In these conditions, the International Control Organ shall have the following rights and powers:

   (a) To exercise control, including inspection on a continuing basis, to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the above-mentioned convention by all States. The international control organ shall exercise these functions, while also enjoying the right to require from States the necessary information on the execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

   Staff recruited to carry out the work of inspection shall be selected on an international basis.

   (b) To have permanently in all States signatories to the convention its own staff of inspectors having, within the bounds of the control functions they exercise, unimpeded access at all times to all objects of control.
In order to prevent a surprise attack by one State upon another, the International Control Organ shall in particular have on the territory of all the States concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodromes.

(c) The Control Organ shall have unimpeded access to records relating to the budgetary appropriations of States for military needs, including all decisions of their legislative and executive organs on the subject. States shall periodically, within specified time-limits, furnish the control organ with information on the execution of the measures provided for in the convention (treaty).

3. The Control Organ shall make recommendations to the Security Council on measures of prevention and suppression with regard to violators of the convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

4. The functions and powers of the permanent international control organ shall be defined on the basis of the foregoing principles, and appropriate instructions shall be prepared for this purpose.
SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

FRANCE: DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE FINANCIAL SUPERVISION OF DISARMAMENT AND THE ALLOCATION FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES OF THE RESULTING FUNDS

The purpose of the present agreement is to institute a financial supervision of military expenditure, together with a system of penalties, for the purpose of encouraging disarmament. It provides for the allocation of the resulting funds for the improvement of levels of living and the development of under-developed areas.

This financial supervision has an economic purpose. By ensuring the automatic transfer of part of the savings effected on military expenditure to orders for goods for peaceful purposes, the agreement averts the threat of an economic crisis which might be brought about by mass disarmament within a short period of time.

The agreement provides certain advantages for States which, in a manner recognized as accurate and complete by the financial body, submit evidence of the budgetary reductions which they have agreed to make. States will agree to reduce their total military expenditure by a percentage that will increase from year to year, the increase in the percentage from one year to the following year being based on the amount of the original defence budget. However, when the reductions are recognized as accurate and complete, this percentage will for the current budgetary year refer only to the actual amount of expenditure, that is to say, to a lower sum.

The sums thus released will be transferred to an international fund which will ensure that they are used in accordance with the criteria laid down by the agreement.
The computation, administration and distribution of these resources will be assured by an International Fund for Development and Mutual Assistance, hereinafter called the "Fund".

Upon the entry into force of the Convention for the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, the abolition of weapons of mass destruction and the setting up of a control, the percentage reductions in military expenditure envisaged in the agreement will be calculated in such a way as to correspond to the reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces and the abolition of weapons of mass destruction as provided for in each stage of the Disarmament Convention.

ARTICLE I

POWERS OF THE FUND

The Fund shall collect the resources released by each signatory State in conformity with the provisions of the Agreement or the Disarmament Convention. It shall verify their allocation or proceed to allocate them in accordance with the principles set forth below.

The Fund shall comprise the following organs:

(a) an Executive Board, appointed by the States parties to the Convention, on which the contributing and the recipient countries shall be assured of balanced representation;
(b) a Standing Executive Committee;
(c) an international Secretariat under the supervision of a Director.

The Board shall receive and approve the reports of the Standing Executive Committee and of the Director. It shall, on the advice of the Standing Executive Committee, decide upon the disposition of the resources placed at the disposal of the Fund. It shall deal with statutory and general administrative questions.
ARTICLE II

COLLECTION OF RESOURCES

The Standing Executive Committee shall be notified of the programme for the reduction of military expenditure agreed upon jointly by Governments. The programme shall determine the scale of the rates applied to the initial volume of military expenditure on the basis of which the annual amount of the contribution payable by the States shall be determined. This amount shall be assessed each year against the initial military appropriation of each State.

Nevertheless, if the information supplied by the States is recognized as accurate and complete by the Standing Executive Committee, the percentage shall be applied to the actual amount of military expenditure for the relevant financial year and not to the initial appropriation.

The Standing Executive Committee shall, in accordance with these principles, compute the sums to be allocated to the Fund. For this purpose, all documents relating to military expenditure shall be communicated to the Committee.

In particular, it shall ensure that the common definition of military expenditure is interpreted by all States in the same spirit, and to this end it shall request the civil and military budgets that are submitted to the institutions which, under the constitutional procedures of each State, are responsible for voting upon or approving the budget.

It shall lay down criteria and make all practical arrangements for rendering the defence expenditures of the signatory States comparable either among themselves or in relation to the total expenditure of each State. For this purpose, it shall establish a common nomenclature including a list of categories of expenditure of a military nature. It shall then make a comparative study of the documents submitted to it by the signatory States and shall submit a detailed report to the signatory States and, upon the conclusion of a Disarmament Convention, to the Standing Committee provided for therein.
ARTICLE III

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

The Standing Executive Committee shall issue general instructions to the Director. It shall supervise the administration and distribution of the resources of the Fund.

The resources shall be allocated in accordance with the following criteria:

(a) one part of the resources made available shall be left at the disposal of each Government, which will thus be able to make such internal transfers as it considers appropriate;

(b) one part of the resources shall also be retained by each State for the economic and financial development of the States or territories which are constitutionally linked to it, the amount being in proportion to the size of the population of such States or territories;

(c) the remaining sums shall be made available to the Fund to be allocated for the development of under-developed areas, and shall be used in a proportion of 75 per cent for orders given to the countries which provide the funds.

In preparing the Statutes of the Fund, the Executive Board of the Fund shall define the relations of the Fund with the United Nations, in particular the Technical Assistance Administration, and with the specialized agencies, such as the International Bank.
ANNEX I

EXTRACT FROM THE STATEMENT OF MR. EDGAR FAURE AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS ON 18 JULY 1955

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We must view the problem of disarmament in conjunction with the related problem of redistributing the resources which disarmament will liberate.

The transfer of unproductive expenditures to productive channels presents difficulties for any single State, because no State can independently evaluate security. Such a transfer is, however, possible within a system of collective security, which diminishes the cost of security.

Any reduction of military potential releases budgetary funds and means of production such as hours of work, units of power and material assets.

Each State is capable of understanding that a reduction of its defence expenditure will lead to increased means of production and greater welfare. It cannot, however, risk reducing its defence expenditure on its own. As the problem of security is an international problem, we must place on an international footing both the reduction of defence expenditure and the allocation of the resulting resources which would otherwise be doomed to remain sterile.

An international organization would become the beneficiary and creditor of all the financial and material resources yielded by a contractual effort to limit armaments. Those resources would be managed by a special joint administration. I suggest that they should be applied towards the assistance and development of under-developed regions and under-privileged peoples.

We would thus be following the suggestion advanced by President Eisenhower on 16 April 1953.

Such a system would lead to a solution of the problems of control and penalties.

The control would become a world-wide control of a financial and budgetary nature. This is easier than material control, as a budget is a single document.

Secondly, even if such control were imperfect, the penalties would be automatically guaranteed, and that is the essential point.
The resources of the common fund would be derived from the stipulated contributions. Consequently, any participating State which maintained its potential at a higher level would be penalized by an amount equal to the value of the armaments which it had unlawfully concealed.

The penalty would be certain. Even if it were somewhat weak at the beginning, the annual cumulative process, which is a logical feature of the system, would very soon render it more formidable.

This new machinery should in no way impede the studies now in progress, especially within the United Nations, regarding the technical procedure of control. This effort should not be interrupted, as it is perfectly compatible with the new formula which we propose.

The machinery for the international transfer of expenditure also affords a guarantee against the fear of economic recession, which often accompanies a policy of armament reduction, as each participant's contribution to the common fund could be furnished from its domestic production.

Finally, beside its technical advantages, this system has a great moral advantage. It would stimulate the interest of world opinion in the effort at disarmament by appealing to sentiments other than fear and self-preservation and by engendering international rivalry in human generosity.

I am well aware that objections can be advanced. I do not wish to go into details. The most important difficulty revolves round the uses to which the resources of the fund should be put.

Some States may be disappointed to think that their contributions would benefit foreign peoples or distant countries instead of contributing to their own development or to a reduction of taxation. This objection can be answered as follows:

1. Nothing would prevent any State from reducing its military expenditure as much as it wished and from profiting from the savings. Here we are concerned solely with conventional and simultaneous reductions, which would otherwise never take place. It would be a form of special saving. National production would continue as before, but part of it would be devoted to beneficial ends instead of going to waste in sterile channels.
2. Secondly, nothing would preclude the fund from being used to assist some of the participants, either because they were themselves responsible for under-developed peoples or because they became entitled to such assistance under circumstances to be determined. These States which wished to become beneficiaries after being contributors should consequently submit to every desirable form of control as far as both reduction and use were concerned.

If these general ideas receive general support, I suggest that our conference should decide to adopt them and thus proclaim a new doctrine in the field of disarmament. We could then either submit it to the United Nations, under our joint guarantee, for consideration by the Powers which possess a military potential justifying their participation in contractual disarmament, or, preferably, decide ourselves on the principle of creating a common organization and the administrative machinery.
ANNEX II

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED ON 21 JULY 1955 TO THE
CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT GENEVA
BY THE FRENCH DELEGATION

At the opening meeting of the Geneva Conference, the French Prime Minister stated the reasons which led him to believe that a first condition for ensuring a lasting peace was progress toward disarmament. A second condition is assistance to the peoples of under-developed territories in improving their general living conditions.

The French Government believes that these two forms of activity should be carried out side by side and that consideration should be given to establishing an organic link between them. Such a link should make possible at least a partial solution of the problem of supervision and sanctions in regard to disarmament.

The French Government proposes that States should agree to a reduction in the amount of their military expenditure and that the financial resources thus made available should be allocated in whole or in part to international expenditure for development and mutual assistance.

The essentially financial aspect of these proposals must be stressed, for it will make possible a comprehensive view of military problems at a high level and will facilitate on an international level the transfer of military expenditure to productive purposes which exceed the resources of any particular country.

The application of these arrangements entails various problems, such as the collection and distribution of the financial resources and administrative procedure, which are dealt with in this memorandum.

1. In order to establish the basis for the contribution, an annual statement would be made by each of the Governments concerned on its estimated amount of military expenditure during a twelve-month period, which as a rule would be the period covered by their budget.

The first statement would relate to the twelve-month period covered by the budget for the current year.
The statements made by the States would be submitted to an international Secretariat, whose chief task would be to ensure that a common definition of military expenditure was interpreted in the same spirit by all the States. For that purpose the Secretariat would be given the civil and military budgets submitted by the Governments to the legislative bodies which according to their Constitutions are responsible for voting or approving the budget. The Secretariat would also prepare a common nomenclature for all States and a list of the categories of military expenditure, subject to eventual agreements relating to the disarmament programme or to its progressive application and supervision.

The percentage reduction in military expenditure for a particular budget period in relation to the preceding period would be defined for subsequent years by agreement between the Governments concerned. This would make it possible to compute the amounts to be allocated to the International Fund for Development and Mutual Assistance.

The rates of assessment during the years in question should be progressive so as to enhance the attractiveness of disarmament. These rates could be related either to the figure for actual military expenditure or, if the Powers agreed on a normal level of military expenditure in relation to their national income or some other criterion to the excess of expenditure over the normal figure thus defined. This second formula would have the advantage of linking the amount of the assessment to the unduly high level of military expenditure maintained by some States.

2. The use of the resources of the International Fund for Development and Mutual Assistance would be supervised by the international Secretariat in accordance with the following four criteria:

(a) In order that the peoples of the States concerned might be associated with the results of disarmament, the amount of the contribution due from each country would be reduced, according to a formula to be determined, by part of the reduction in military expenditure effected between one budget period and the next. Each country would thus be able to make internal transfers in accordance with its own procedure.
(b) Each State contributing to the Fund would also be able to use a predetermined part of its contribution for the benefit of States or territories constitutionally linked to it. All that would be necessary would be to prove to the international Secretariat that the expenditure was genuine.

(c) A part of the available funds then remaining would have to be allocated to orders of all kinds placed in the countries providing the funds. This provision would prevent the reduction of armament expenditure from reacting unfavourably on the level of economic activity of each country, by guaranteeing a certain volume of orders to take the place of military production.

(d) The remaining balance would be used on an international scale and without special restrictions for the development of under-developed territories. This allocation would be made in close co-operation with, or even through, the international agencies of the United Nations. It should, however, be made clear that any State which increased its military expenditure would itself be excluded from participation in the benefits of the International Fund for Development and Mutual Assistance.

3. The United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom and France would, of course, be associated with the procedure to be laid down. As, however, these four nations are all represented on the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations, of which Canada is also a member, it might be best to entrust to that Sub-Committee the task of formulating the procedure for applying this disarmament and transfer plan.

As a suggestion, however, I should like to make the following points:

(a) The administration of the Fund could be carried out by a managerial organ associated with the international Secretariat already referred to, and those two bodies could come under a common political authority which might, for example, include the competent ministers of the four Powers.

(b) The use of the resources of the Fund would be supervised by the managerial organ, which would not necessarily be composed solely of
representatives of the four Powers and of the nations which agreed
to adhere to the principles set out in this memorandum, but also of
representatives of other countries, selected from among those
benefiting from the resources of the International Fund for Development
and Mutual Assistance.

(c) So far as operations are concerned, recourse might be had to existing
agencies, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and various other United Nations bodies, so as to avoid the establishment
of an international agency which would duplicate those already functioning
to the general satisfaction of all.

(d) The political authority alone would be competent to fix the amount
of the contribution from each State. There might be alternative methods
of procedure, according to whether the State concerned accepted financial
supervision or not. If it refused, the contribution would be arrived at
by applying the progressive rate of the levy to the figure of military
expenditure declared for the first year. If it accepted, the contribution
would be determined from the figure for military expenditure for the
current financial year, as verified by the international Secretariat.
The political authority, in accordance with the voting procedure to be
determined, would be limited to choosing between the figure established
by the international Secretariat and, in case of rejection, the amount
of contribution determined according to the procedure agreed upon.

The proposals set out in this memorandum could be given prompt consideration
by the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations, if
the four Powers represented here gave the necessary instructions to their
respective representatives.
SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Statement on disarmament by the President of the United States. Made on 21 July 1955 at the Geneva meetings of the Heads of Government of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Disarmament is one of the most important subjects on our agenda. It is also extremely difficult. In recent years the scientists have discovered methods of making weapons many, many times more destructive of opposing armed forces - but also of homes, and industries and lives - than ever known or even imagined before. These same scientific discoveries have made much more complex the problems of limitation and control and reduction of armament.

After our victory as Allies in World War II, my country rapidly disarmed. Within a few years our armament was at a very low level. Then events occurred beyond our borders which caused us to realize that we had disarmed too much. For our own security and to safeguard peace we needed greater strength. Therefore we proceeded to rearm and to associate with others in a partnership for peace and for mutual security.

The American people are determined to maintain and if necessary increase this armed strength for as long a period as is necessary to safeguard peace and to maintain our security.

But we know that a mutually dependable system for less armament on the part of all nations would be a better way to safeguard peace and to maintain our security.

It would ease the fears of war in the anxious hearts of people everywhere. It would lighten the burdens upon the backs of the people. It would make it possible for every nation, great and small, developed and less developed, to advance the standards of living of its people, to attain better food, and clothing, and shelter, more of education and larger enjoyment of life.
Therefore, the United States Government is prepared to enter into a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of armament. I have directed that an intensive and thorough study of this subject be made within our own Government. From these studies, which are continuing, a very important principle is emerging to which I referred in my opening statement on Monday.

No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement.

The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate reciprocal inspection increase the dangers of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace.

Thus it is my view that the priority attention of our combined study of disarmament should be upon the subject of inspection and reporting.

Questions suggest themselves.

How effective an inspection system can be designed which would be mutually and reciprocally acceptable within our countries and the other nations of the world? How would such a system operate? What could it accomplish?

Is certainty against surprise aggression attainable by inspection? Could violations be discovered promptly and effectively counteracted?

We have not as yet been able to discover any scientific or other inspection method which would make certain of the elimination of nuclear weapons. So far as we are aware no other nation has made such a discovery. Our study of this problem is continuing. We have not as yet been able to discover any accounting or other inspection method of being certain of the true budgetary facts of total expenditures for armament. Our study of this problem is continuing. We by no means exclude the possibility of finding useful checks in these fields.

As you can see from these statements, it is our impression that many past proposals of disarmament are more sweeping than can be insured by effective inspection.
Gentlemen, since I have been working on this memorandum to present to this conference, I have been searching my heart and mind for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament.

I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears and dangers of surprise attack.

I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves - immediately. These steps would include:

To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other, lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country - we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissence, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension.

Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning.

Now from my statements I believe you will anticipate my suggestion. It is that we instruct our representatives in the Subcommittee on Disarmament in the discharge of their mandate from the United Nations to give priority effort to the study of inspection and reporting. Such a study could well include a step-by-step testing of inspection and reporting methods.

The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspections and reporting, and when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results.
The successful working out of such a system would do much to develop the mutual confidence which will open wide the avenues of progress for all our peoples.

The quest for peace is the statesman's most exacting duty. Security of the nation entrusted to his care is his greatest responsibility. Practical progress to lasting peace is his fondest hope. Yet in pursuit of his hope he must not betray the trust placed in him as guardian of the people's security. A sound peace - with security, justice, well-being, and freedom for the people of the world - can be achieved, but only by patiently and thoughtfully following a hard and sure and tested road.
ANNEX 13

GENERAL
DC/SC.1/29/Rev.1
29 August 1955
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION


DECISION OF THE MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE FOUR POWERS ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

1.

With a view to the reduction of tension in the relations between States, the strengthening of mutual confidence among them and the removal of the threat of a new war, the heads of government of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France consider it necessary to endeavour to secure as soon as possible the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

Following an exchange of views on the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, they have agreed on the following:

1. The levels of the armed forces of the United States of America, the USSR and China shall be fixed at 1 to 1.5 million men for each of these Powers; the levels for the United Kingdom and France shall be 650 thousand men each, and the question of the level to be fixed for China, with other related questions concerning the armed forces of China, shall be examined with the participation of the Government of the People's Republic of China.

The levels of armed forces for all other States shall not exceed 150-200 thousand men, and shall be subject to agreement at the appropriate international conference.
2. The complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall enter into force when conventional armaments and armed forces have been reduced to the extent of 75 per cent of the agreed reductions. The elimination of these weapons from the armaments of States and their destruction shall be completed during the process of the reduction of armaments by the final 25 per cent of the agreed reductions. All atomic materials shall thereafter be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

3. Simultaneously with the initiation of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the four Powers, before the entry into force of the agreement on the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, shall assume a solemn obligation not to use nuclear weapons, which they shall regard as prohibited to them. Exceptions to this rule may be permitted for purposes of defence against aggression, when a decision to that effect is taken by the Security Council.

4. As one of the first measures for the execution of the programme for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, States possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons shall undertake to discontinue tests of these weapons.

5. Effective international control shall be instituted over the execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

6. The heads of government of the four Powers have instructed their Ministers of Foreign Affairs to make every effort to achieve the necessary agreement on any yet unsettled points of the convention referred to above, which shall be subject to examination in the United Nations.

II

At the same time, the heads of government of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, determined to prevent the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which are weapons of mass destruction of human beings, and to liberate the peoples from the threat of devastating atomic war, solemnly declare:
Pending the conclusion of the international convention for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France assume the obligation not to be the first to use atomic or hydrogen weapons against any country, and call on all other States to associate themselves with this declaration.
THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF
ATOMIC WEAPONS

STATEMENT BY MR. N.A. BULganIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
OF THE USSR, AT THE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE FOUR
POWERS HELD ON 21 JULY 1955

Mr. Chairman,

In addition to what I said on the question of the reduction of armaments
and the prohibition of atomic weapons in my statement of 18 July, the Soviet
dlegation considers it necessary to make some observations on this question
and to submit corresponding proposals for the consideration of the Meeting.

On 10 May the Soviet Government submitted a proposal on the reduction of
armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the elimination of the threat
of another war. As I have already observed, the Governments of the
United States, the United Kingdom and France have not yet expressed their
opinions on this proposal. We should like to know their views on the questions
we have raised.

A broad disarmament programme can be carried out only if the "cold war"
is brought to an end and the necessary confidence in relations between States,
which, unfortunately, is now lacking, is established. It is to this very
matter that our joint efforts should be primarily directed. The USSR Government
has included proposals to that end in the draft declaration which it submitted
to the United Nations Disarmament Commission on 10 May.

We speak of putting an end to the "cold war" not because it causes us
greater concern than it does to others. We do so because the situation which
it creates is incompatible with our common desire to achieve good relations
among ourselves.
In our opinion, it would be appropriate to make a joint recommendation that the United Nations should adopt this or a similar declaration designed to put an end to the "cold war", reduce international tension and establish the necessary degree of trust in the relations between States, for unless this is achieved, we cannot seriously hope to settle the unsolved international problems.

The Soviet Government would also consider it appropriate that our Meeting should agree on the need for carrying out certain basic measures in the field of disarmament. The measures in question are those on which the positions of the States represented at this Meeting either fully coincide or have drawn much closer together.

First of all, we should record the agreement reached in the matter of the levels of the armed forces of the five great Powers -- the United States of America, the USSR, China, the United Kingdom and France. It will be recalled that on this question the Soviet Government has accepted the proposals of the Western Powers that the levels of the armed forces of the United States of America, the USSR and China should be fixed at 1 to 1.5 million men for each of these States and that the levels for the United Kingdom and France should be 650 thousand men each. It is of course understood that questions concerning the armed forces of China shall be examined with the participation of the Government of the People's Republic of China. The levels of armed forces for all other States should not exceed 150-200 thousand men, the matter being subject to agreement at the appropriate international conference.

Another important question is that of atomic weapons. The Soviet Government agrees that the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons should be carried out in stages. Our proposals on this question, which take into account the positions of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, are before you in the draft decision of the Meeting on questions relating to disarmament.
We should also agree that before the entry into force of the agreement on the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons our Governments should assume a solemn obligation not to use these weapons. Exceptions to this rule would be permitted only for purposes of defence against aggression, when a decision to that effect has been taken by the Security Council.

We should also record that we all consider that effective international control should be instituted over the execution of measures for the reduction of armed forces and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The adoption at this Meeting of an agreed decision on these questions would greatly facilitate the preparation of an international convention on disarmament in the United Nations.

Moreover, in the opinion of the Soviet Government it would be advisable, without awaiting the conclusion of a general international convention, as that may require some time, to agree at this Meeting that France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union shall assume the obligation not to be the first to use atomic or hydrogen weapons and shall call on all other States to associate themselves with that declaration. We are convinced that such an agreement on the atomic question, pending the complete prohibition of the use and production of atomic weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States, would be an important step towards the easing of international tension, ending the "cold war" and relieving the peoples of the dread of an atomic war.

For these reasons, the Soviet delegation is submitting to the Meeting a draft decision of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers on questions relating to the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.
SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

I

Proposal by the United Kingdom delegation at Geneva

The United Kingdom delegation proposes that, as a means of increasing mutual confidence in Europe, consideration should be given to the establishment of a system of joint inspection of the forces now confronting each other in Europe. In specified areas of agreed extent on either side of the line dividing Eastern and Western Europe joint inspecting teams would operate by mutual consent.

This project would provide opportunity for the practical test on a limited scale of international inspection of forces in being and would provide valuable experience and lessons for use over a wider field in the future.

The willingness of the four Governments to accept such inspection would moreover demonstrate their determination to reduce international tension in Europe.

The system of inspection here proposed is without prejudice to the work of the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee. It is also distinct from the proposals put forward by the United Kingdom delegation for the limitation, control and inspection of forces and armaments in connexion with European security.

II

SPEECH BY SIR ANTHONY EDEN. GENEVA, 21 JULY 1955.

Mr. Chairman, at the conclusion of hostilities in Europe after the late war, my country, like the United States, greatly reduced its forces. In fact we brought home all but a very small number of the troops we had overseas in Europe, and of the Air Forces, and decreased our naval forces also. It was then our
profound hope that we would never have to increase them again. Unfortunately everyone else did not feel able to reduce their forces in any comparable fashion, and the conventional arms maintained in Europe continued to be at a high level. In addition to which events occurred in various parts of the world which did not reduce the tension between the countries. As a result we had to engage very reluctantly in a campaign of rearmament. As part of that rearmament campaign we made the atomic bomb, and as part of it we are now engaged in making the hydrogen bomb.

I merely recite these facts in order to emphasize to my colleagues that there is nothing we should like better than to see a comprehensive scheme of disarmament in which we could all join. We would perhaps none of us then have to spend so large a part of our national wealth on these unproductive necessities, as we have to regard them today.

Marshal Bulganin asked our view on the Soviet proposals on 10 May which were submitted to the Disarmament Sub-Committee. As I think we have already said, we welcome those proposals. They include of course a number of points which we and our French allies - the author is here at the table - had put forward some little time before, and as a result of these Soviet proposals of 10 May we are certainly much closer together. We wish to pursue these proposals and others in the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the United Nations at an early date. We consider that that Committee has worked hard and well.

One point is, however, crucial, and it is recognized in paragraph 5 of the paper which the Soviet Government has just submitted to us - the necessity of establishing an effective international control. On that point I fully support the principle enunciated by President Eisenhower this afternoon, that no disarmament plan can be acceptable which does not contain a system of inspection and reporting which is adequate to support every phase of the plan. I think we are all agreed about that.

As has been well said this afternoon, disarmament is perhaps the most complicated of all international problems, principally I think for two reasons: because on the technical side it is infinitely complex, and because it is bound up with international confidence. No country feels that it can go far with disarmament unless it has confidence in the intentions of its neighbours. That is why international discussions on disarmament are apt to get caught up in a vicious circle.
I therefore think the Soviet Government was right, if I may say so, in its proposals of 10 May, to link disarmament with a reduction of international tension. The two are closely connected. If we are to make any practical progress towards disarmament, we have got to find some way of breaking out of this vicious circle. We cannot wait until confidence between the nations is so strong that a plan of general disarmament can be adopted and brought into operation all in one move. This is essentially one of the international objectives which must be approached by stages, and we must make a start upon them now.

President Eisenhower has this afternoon put forward far-reaching proposals for the exchange of military information between the United States and the Soviet Union. I confess that I was deeply moved, Mr. Chairman, by the true sincerity and warm feeling for peace which characterized President Eisenhower's speech. If his proposal could be adopted, I have no doubt that it would make a striking contribution to building confidence between the nations.

For myself, while endorsing what M. Faure has said about the publicity methods of control, I would only like to offer a much more modest suggestion. It has only the advantage that, like the President's much bolder and more imaginative suggestion, it could be put into operation at once. I suggest that we should consider whether we cannot set up a simple, joint inspection of the forces now confronting one another in Europe. It should not be impossible to decide that over a specified area to be agreed between us, extending perhaps for a fixed depth on either side of the line which now divides East and West Europe, there should be supervision by inspecting teams appointed by the military commands on both sides. This suggestion is not of course connected with the wider proposal for a possible limitation of forces which was connected with our discussions for the unity of Germany. This suggestion could however be a practical experiment in the operative inspection of armaments, an experiment which if it were locally successful might extend outwards from the centre to the periphery. In this way we might hope to establish a sense of security in Europe and begin the process of reducing tensions here. Neither this proposal which I have just made, nor I think the wider proposal made by President Eisenhower
this afternoon, would cut across the work which is being done by the
United Nations Sub-Committee on the general problem of disarmament. For my
part I hope that that work will continue, but these supplementary proposals
might well give a fresh impulse and impetus to that work.

I hope that this modest contribution will be accepted in that light.
SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 21 JULY 1955 PRESIDENTIAL PROPOSAL AT GENEVA REGARDING DISARMAMENT

1. Purpose. The purpose of this outline plan is to translate the proposal made by President Eisenhower on 21 July at Geneva into terms of reference, a concept, and an outline of procedures. The details are subject to negotiation within the principles stated by the President.

2. Terms of Reference.
   a. The term "blueprint of military establishments" is defined as consisting of the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, including organized reserves and para-military; and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations.
   b. Each nation has recognized the need for ground observers and these will be stationed at key locations within the other country for the purpose of allowing them to certify the accuracy of the foregoing information and to give warning of evidence of surprise attack or of mobilization.
   c. Each country shall permit unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance by visual, photographic, and electronic means by the other country.

3. Concept. The United States and the USSR will exchange all data relative to military forces and installations which, coupled with measures for verification and surveillance, are essential to provide against the possibility of surprise attack. This exchange is to be accomplished in progressive steps as mutually agreed upon by the two Governments. Among the elements of information
considered essential to preclude surprise attack and to be sought by an exchange between the Governments and to be verified and maintained under surveillance are:

a. Weapons and delivery systems suitable for surprise attack.
b. Transportation and telecommunications.
c. Armed forces, structure and positioning of armed forces.
d. Additional facilities as mutually agreed upon by the two Governments.

4. Initial Procedure.

a. Exchange of "blueprints" of military establishments.
   (1) The Governments of the United States and the USSR will each prepare lists of major military forces and establishments, showing the deployment of forces and the locations of installations and facilities by geographical co-ordinates.
   (2) Schedules will be drawn for time phasing of exchanges to assure simultaneous delivery of similar types of information by each Government, and completion of verification by each side before progressing to a subsequent phase. Provision for immediate spot-checking will be included.

b. Verification of "blueprints" of military establishments.
   (1) Arrangements will be made for the posting of on-the-spot observers with operating land, sea, and air forces, at their supporting installations, and at key locations as necessary for the verification, continued observation, and reporting of each category of information. The number and location of the observers will be as mutually agreed upon prior to the exchange of information, and provisions will be made for changes in the location should the initial arrangements prove to be inadequate.
   (2) Aerial reconnaissance will be conducted by each inspecting country on an unrestricted, but monitored, basis to augment the efforts of the posted observers. Each inspecting country will utilize its own aircraft and related equipment. Liaison personnel of the country being inspected will be aboard each reconnaissance aircraft during all over-flights.
c. Facilities and services to be provided.
   (1) Each sub-list of military installations will include the designation of one or more airfields or bases at which facilities will be made available for support of the aerial reconnaissance aircraft and crews.

d. Checks and controls.
   Procedures will be established for:
   (1) Designation of ports of entry and egress for incoming and departing observers and reconnaissance aircraft.
   (2) Clearance of incoming and departing observers, aircraft and crews and arrangements for monitored passage to and from home territory.
   (3) Check and identification of observers and reconnaissance aircraft, personnel and equipment engaged in this activity.
   (4) Orientation of observers and reconnaissance personnel.
   (5) Air traffic control of inspecting aircraft by host Government.
SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

FRANCE: WORKING PAPER

Proposals concerning the structure of the International
Disarmament Organization

The convention on the regulation, limitation and reduction of all armed
forces and armaments shall establish an International Disarmament Organization,
the membership, rights and powers of which are defined below. This
Organization shall include the financial control organ provided for in the
special Draft Agreement submitted by the French delegation on 29 August 1955
(DC/SC.1/27).

I. The International Disarmament Organization shall comprise the following
organs:

(a) a General Assembly of all States parties;
(b) a Permanent Committee consisting of fifteen States parties, five
   permanent (the permanent members of the Security Council) and ten
   non-permanent. The non-permanent members shall be appointed by the
   General Assembly for a period of two years;
(c) a Council of Jurists consisting of seven persons, of different
   nationalities, elected by the General Assembly on the basis of their
   qualifications;
(d) a Control Administration, under the orders of a director-general,
   consisting of a governing body and of fixed and mobile inspection units.

II. The General Assembly shall meet for the first time as soon as the convention
enters into force, and then on the following year and subsequently every two
years. It may meet in special session at the request of two-thirds of the States
parties, of a two-thirds majority of the Permanent Committee or of the Security
Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations.
It shall not later than one month after the coming into force of the convention elect by absolute majority the non-permanent States members of the Permanent Committee and the members of the Council of Jurists and shall appoint by a two-thirds majority the director-general; it shall adopt the budget, approve the accounts and deal with statutory matters and general organization.

III. The Permanent Committee shall formulate instructions for the guidance of the director-general and take decisions in the circumstances hereinafter set out concerning proposals contained in the director-general's report and also decisions concerning any matters submitted to it by a State party.

It shall, whenever it deems necessary, arrange for the publication of reports of the Control Administration and of its own decisions.

It shall, whenever it deems necessary, report to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Permanent Committee shall take its decisions by simple majority.

IV. The Council of Jurists shall assist the Permanent Committee. It shall take decisions concerning any legal questions relating to the interpretation or application of the convention submitted to it by the director-general, a State party or the Permanent Committee.

The Council of Jurists shall take its decisions by simple majority.

There shall be no appeal against the decisions of the Council of Jurists to any of the organs of the International Disarmament Organization.

V. The Control Administration shall be composed entirely and exclusively of international officers appointed by the director-general.

Each inspection unit shall consist of at least three persons.

Within the limits laid down in the instructions received from the Permanent Committee or, in the absence of such instructions, on his own initiative, the director-general shall draw up investigation programmes and establish inspection units with due regard to the military, technical, scientific or financial mission assigned. If he considers that prior notice is necessary, he shall fix the time-limit required. He may, so far as inspection is concerned, delegate some of his powers to local organs.
All the inspection units shall take their decisions by simple majority. If an inspection unit rejects, by a majority vote, any proposal to conduct an inquiry, that proposal may, at the request of any member who voted with the minority, be submitted to the Permanent Committee.

The inspection units shall in all cases, upon completion of their inquiries, draw up a report recording their conclusions and containing, where appropriate, proposals regarding such action as they consider desirable. This report, adopted by majority vote, shall be accompanied by the observations of the minority. It shall be addressed to the director-general who shall communicate it to the Permanent Committee and the States parties.

In the course of their inquiries, the inspection units may order the imposition of precautionary measures (mesures conservatoires) with a view to ensuring that the existence or seriousness of a breach of the convention may be verified.

VI.  1. Any State party may appeal to the Permanent Committee:
   (a) against a precautionary measure ordered by an inspection unit, provided that such an appeal shall not stay the execution of any action ordered;
   (b) against any act done by an inspection unit in the discharge of its duties or by one of its members individually.

2. If two or more States parties disagree on the interpretation or application of the convention, any one of them may refer the matter to the Permanent Committee.

VII. In the event of a breach of the convention, the Permanent Committee may prescribe any measures which it deems necessary unless it considers that the irregularity in question is covered by Chapter VII of the Charter, provided that the right of the accused State to refer the matter to the Security Council shall not be prejudiced.

If the Permanent Committee considers that the irregularity is covered by Chapter VII of the Charter, it shall forthwith submit the matter to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations by means of a report communicated to the States parties.
VIII. States parties shall give the control officers all necessary assistance and protection in their territory and the support of their police forces in the discharge by the control officers of their duties.

IX. Article 104 and Article 105, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the United Nations Charter shall apply to the Organization.

The status of the Organization and of its agents shall be defined by regulations approved by the General Assembly of the Organization.

The rights of the Organization and of its agents shall include:

(a) the right of permanent residence in the territory of the States parties;
(b) the right of personal inviolability and inviolability of premises, property and archives;
(c) the right to enter, leave and travel in the territory of States parties without restriction and to exercise powers of investigation in all places under the conditions prescribed by the Organization;
(d) the right to use any means of land, sea and air communication necessary for the fulfilment of their tasks and, in particular, to have aircraft and motor vehicles at their own disposal.

The duties of the agents shall include:

(a) the obligations deriving from Article 100 of the United Nations Charter;
(b) the obligation to use such information as they obtain solely for the purposes of their mission, and to refrain from communicating such information to unauthorized persons.
Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission

France: Working Paper

Proposals concerning the powers of the Control Administration

I. Not later than five months after the date of his appointment, the director-general shall set up the Control Administration in the form in which it is to function during the initial operations provided for by the convention. These operations shall begin as soon as the Control Administration has stated that it is ready to discharge its functions, and in any case not later than the above-mentioned time-limit of five months, that is to say, not later than six months after the entry into force of the convention.

II. So long as the sole task of the Control Administration is to ensure that armed forces and conventional armaments do not exceed the level reached on...... and that the appropriations for armed forces and armaments do not exceed the amount of the expenditure under these heads during the year ending.........

(a) The Control Administration shall establish in the territory of all the States parties a network of control posts in ports, at railway junctions, on motor highways, at aerodromes and in military camps. It shall be the task of these posts, which shall be provided with appropriate liaison facilities, to ensure that no dangerous concentrations of land, air or naval forces occur. They shall also make preparations for the functioning of the control organs to be established for the purpose of carrying out subsequent measures.
(b) The Control Administration shall receive from the States parties, and the States parties shall be bound to supply, full information on the level of their armed forces and conventional armaments.

(c) The Control Administration shall have free access to documents relating to appropriations for military requirements.

On the expiry of the time-limit established by the convention, the Control Administration shall present its conclusions to the Permanent Committee and the States parties in a general report.

III. When the time comes for the Control Administration to ensure that the first half of the reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments has been carried out, it shall possess, in addition to those above-described, the following powers:

(a) the Control Administration shall exercise its powers in respect of conventional armed forces and conventional armaments, whether in active service or in reserve; States shall be obliged to supply the Administration with the necessary information for this purpose;

(b) as the control posts referred to in paragraph II above will already have been established, the Control Administration shall have permanent access, in respect of conventional armaments and armed forces, to all military organs of command and administration and to all armed forces and the military establishments on which they are based;

(c) the Control Administration shall receive from States, and States shall be bound to supply, the documents concerning appropriations in the current year for military requirements, the information to be presented according to a standard form; and it shall have free access to all accounting documents relating to such appropriations;

(d) the Control Administration shall ensure that the resources made available have been transferred in accordance with the provisions of the special agreement proposed by the French delegation on 29 August 1955 (DC/SC.1/27);

(e) irrespective of the reports it makes whenever it thinks fit, the Control Administration shall, on the expiry of the time-limit established for carrying out this first part of the reductions or whenever it considers itself in a position to do so, submit its conclusions to the Permanent Committee and the States parties.
IV. On the expiry of the time-limit established for carrying out the operations referred to in paragraph III above, the Control Administration shall:

(1) report to the Permanent Committee on the carrying-out of these operations;
(2) state whether it is in a position to exercise the powers conferred upon it for carrying out the subsequent disarmament operations.

If, on the basis of this report, the Permanent Committee unanimously declares that:

(1) the first half of the reductions has been carried out;
(2) the Control Administration is in a position to exercise the powers conferred upon it for carrying out the subsequent disarmament operations, the provisions relating to such operations shall come into force.

If the declaration of the Permanent Committee is not unanimous, a period of six months shall elapse before the subsequent operations under the convention come into force.

Not later than the expiration of that period and on the basis of a report by the Control Administration, the Permanent Committee shall make a further declaration.

It may then unanimously either:

declare that the conditions necessary for applying the subsequent provisions of the convention have been met, and these shall then forthwith enter into force, or

fix a second period which shall not exceed three months.

Failing a unanimous decision, the matter shall forthwith be referred to the Security Council.

A similar procedure shall be followed if at the expiration of the second period the Permanent Committee does not unanimously consider that the conditions necessary for applying the provisions relating to the subsequent operations have been fulfilled.

V. Before the operations subsequent to those provided for in paragraph III above are begun, the rights and powers of the Control Administration shall be broadened as follows:
The Control Administration shall have the prerogatives specified in paragraph III above. It may, in addition, at all times and in all places exercise control, carry out investigations and obtain such documents, information and reports as it considers necessary in order to ensure:

that the disarmament programme is actually being carried out in each State so far as concerns armed forces, conventional armaments, equipment and relevant installations and establishments used, or capable of being used, for the storage, maintenance or manufacture of armaments and equipment;

that, so far as weapons of mass destruction are concerned, the relevant provisions of the convention are applied to the same extent and simultaneously in all States parties;

that, as regards nuclear energy, the installations, establishments, equipment and materials are abolished or used in accordance with the terms of the convention.

The list of such installations and establishments and any changes which may be made therein shall be communicated to the Control Administration by the States parties.

Within the scope of its functions, the Control Administration shall organize and carry out on-the-spot investigations and aerial reconnaissance in order to verify this information and to identify all installations and establishments. It shall ensure continuous control over nuclear installations, establishments and stockpiles.

While these measures are being carried out and at the expiration of the prescribed period, the Control Administration shall prepare reports in accordance with the conditions laid down in paragraph IV above.

VI. At the expiration of the period prescribed for the whole of the disarmament operations, the Permanent Committee shall express an opinion on whether the convention as a whole has been complied with. If it does not unanimously agree that the convention has been complied with, it shall forthwith bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council.

VII. After the plan for the reduction of armaments has been carried out, the Control Administration shall retain its prerogatives, rights and powers, including the right of presenting its conclusions in reports.
GENERAL
DC/SC.1/34
13 September 1955

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

UNITED KINGDOM: MEMORANDUM

The control organ: methods, objects and rights of inspection and supervision

In the view of the United Kingdom delegation, the methods, objects and rights of inspection and supervision would have to include the following:

1. General

All States shall, at times to be specified in the convention, supply the control organ with all the information it requires on the following subjects:

(i) Levels of overall armed forces;
(ii) Conventional land, sea and air armaments, including certain categories of civilian aircraft and shipping;
(iii) Military installations, including barracks, ordnance depots, dockyards and airfields;
(iv) Factories manufacturing armaments (including aircraft), explosives and propellents;
(v) Nuclear installations and reactors;
(vi) Plants making chemical and biological weapons;
(vii) Budgetary documents used by States in preparing and presenting annual estimates of military expenditure;

The control organ shall have the right to analyse and check the above information, in accordance with the procedures described below.
2. **The Freeze**

During this phase the control organ shall:

(i) establish regional offices which shall analyse the information provided by States under paragraph 1 above;

(ii) establish observation posts at specific points such as railway junctions, ports, highways and airfields;

(iii) have the right to:
   
   (a) send teams of inspectors to check on the information provided under sub-paragraphs (i) to (iv) of paragraph 1;
   
   (b) travel freely to, from and within all States party to the convention;
   
   (c) use the communication systems of all States party to the convention and possess suitable transport and communications of its own.

The control organ shall make preparations during this phase for supervising the measures prescribed in stage 1, so that it may report that it is ready to supervise the measures provided for therein with the minimum intermission.

3. **Stage 1**

During this phase, the control organ shall, in addition to possessing the organs and rights prescribed in paragraph 2 above:

(i) have the right to make use of:
   
   (a) aerial reconnaissance;
   
   (b) inspection on the ground, under conditions prescribed in sub-paragraphs (iii) and (iv) below;
   
   (c) budgetary control, based on analysis of documents disclosed under sub-paragraph (vii) of paragraph 1 above;

(ii) establish fixed teams at points where armed forces are being demobilized and conventional armaments destroyed;

(iii) establish resident inspection posts at certain of the installations and plants listed in sub-paragraph (iii) and (iv) of paragraph 1 above; namely those installations and plants, where inspection is peculiarly difficult and a margin of error critical;
(iv) have the right to inspect all other installations or plants listed in sub-paragraphs (iii) and (iv) of paragraph 1 above at all times which it considers necessary. Advance notice would be given of routine visits, but the right of inspection without warning would also be essential;

(v) have the right to investigate alleged or suspected breaches of the treaty in any establishment or installation;

(vi) have the right to use all technical equipment and devices which may assist inspection and supervision of the measures prescribed for this stage.

The control organ shall make preparations, during this phase, for supervising the measures prescribed in stage 2 so that it may report it is ready to supervise the measures provided for therein with the minimum intermission.

4. Stage 2

During this phase, the control organ shall, in addition to the organs and rights prescribed in paragraphs 2 and 3 above:

(a) have the right to establish resident inspection posts at, or inspect under the conditions prescribed in sub-paragraph (iv) of paragraph 3 above, those installations and plants listed in sub-paragraphs (v) and (vi) of paragraph 1 above;

(b) have the right to make use of all technical equipment and devices which may assist inspection and supervision of the measures prescribed for this stage.
SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

FRANCE: WORKING PAPER

Proposal concerning the objects which should be subject to control

With reference to its Working Paper DC/SC.1/35, which was submitted on 2 September 1955, the French delegation herewith proposes an alternative version of the provisions contained in section V of that document concerning the objects over which the control organ may exercise its powers at any time.

This alternative version substantially reproduces the statements made on this subject by the representative of France on 31 August 1955 (see DC/SC.1/PV.53, pp. 7 and 8).

"A. All the operations assigned to the earlier stages, which are still in progress, and in addition:

"B. In a first category:

"1. All military forces and formations;

"2. All para-military forces and formations and police forces and formations organized on military lines;

"3. All military installations such as barracks, training camps or bases and fortified zones;

"4. All armaments factories;

"5. All naval shipyards, particularly those engaged in the construction of submarines;

"6. All factories manufacturing aircraft and self-propelled missiles, particularly aircraft body and engine plants, assembly plants and wind tunnels.

"C. In a second category:

"1. All enterprises producing or processing raw materials intended for the manufacture of armaments -- for example, steel mills and other metallurgical industries, chemical industries producing or capable of producing gunpowder,
explosives, poison gases, etc. and enterprises producing or processing materials which render them capable of use as armaments factories;

"2. All sources of liquid and solid fuels capable of use in aircraft engines;

"3. All sources of atomic and nuclear raw materials, and all information regarding their destination and use;

"4. All nuclear and scientific research;

"5. All enterprises suspected by the control organ of engaging in any of the above-mentioned activities."
UNITED NATIONS
DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: MEMORANDUM SUPPLEMENTING OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 21 JULY 1955 PRESIDENTIAL PROPOSAL AT GENEVA REGARDING DISARMAMENT

Importance of Inspection and Control System in a Disarmament Programme

All five of the Governments represented in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission have recognized the crucial importance of effective inspection and control in providing the assurance that commitments to reduce and limit and regulate armaments and armed forces will be honoured. President Eisenhower in his statement on disarmament made at Geneva on 21 July 1955 reaffirmed the desire of the United States "to introduce a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of armaments". The President said "No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement. The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate and reciprocal inspection increase the danger of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace".

The Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Marshal Bulganin, on 4 August 1955 told the Supreme Soviet that "the President of the United States justly remarked that each disarmament plan boils down to the question of control and inspection".

Foreign Minister Pearson of Canada, Foreign Minister Pinay of France, Prime Minister Eden of the United Kingdom, have all within the last few months emphasized the need for the kind of control and inspection which would give a basis for confidence that disarmament agreements would be observed, and have all stressed the primary importance of inspection and control of agreements to reduce and limit armaments.
Difficulties of Assuring by Effective Inspection and Control that all Nuclear Weapons are Eliminated

Together with this recognition of the absolute need for a control system adequate to support every portion of a disarmament agreement, the Governments represented in the Disarmament Sub-Committee have recognized the problems caused by the vast technological developments in an expansion of nuclear energy materials. The Soviet Union, in its proposals of 10 May 1955, noted that "there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation, the security of the States signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed, since the possibilities would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for surprise attack on peace-loving States".

In President Eisenhower's statement on disarmament at Geneva on 21 July this year, he said, "We have not as yet been able to discover any scientific or other inspection method which would make certain of the elimination of the nuclear weapons. So far as we are aware no other nation has made such a discovery. Our study of this problem is continuing". The representative of Canada, Mr. Martin, the representative of France, M. Moch, and the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Nutting, have all many times during the discussions of the Sub-Committee noted the danger of inadequate control of fissionable material, that all our previous concepts have been rendered obsolete by new scientific developments, and that it was necessary to consider facts as they are today and not as they were yesterday or the day before.

Mr. Nutting at the Sub-Committee meeting of 5 October 1955 summed up the views of all the delegations when he referred to the "barrier of science which prevents us at this moment, on the admission of the Soviet Union, the United States and every other delegation represented at this table, from making nuclear disarmament the safe hope for the world that we would wish it to be".
The present impossibility of establishing an effective inspection and control method that would completely account for nuclear weapons material is of exceptional importance. It means that no nation has as yet been able to find any scientific or other inspection method that would account for all nuclear weapons material. It means that the amount of unaccountability is of such magnitude as to be an unacceptable unknown quantity of vast destructive capacity.

What should be done?

In the light of these circumstances, the United States believes that two steps should be taken to meet the issues posed by these facts. The first is to continue the search for the method by which complete accountability of nuclear materials and reliable inspection and control might be attained. The United States is already engaged in this search. The United States has placed a number of its ablest scientists in continuing work on this problem. The United States Government welcomes efforts by any other nation in this regard and invites the scientists and officials of any nation in the world, if they believe they have a method which can completely account for past and present production of fissionable materials and to insure against improper diversion of nuclear weapons, to come forward and advance for consideration such method.

Second, in addition to such continuing study and research there must be a joint effort to reach agreements which can reduce the possibility of war, and in particular, and as a first priority provide against the possibility of a great surprise attack.

President Eisenhower's proposal

It is against this background that President Eisenhower on 21 July proposed at Geneva that steps be taken now, which would have an immediate effect, which would be practical, and which would strike at the very core of the disarmament problem — the suspicion and fear which are the great causes of international tensions. The Eisenhower proposal called for an exchange of blueprints of their military establishments between the Soviet Union and the United States and the provision of facilities for reciprocal aerial reconnaissance from one end to the other of these
two countries. The purpose of this exchange is to provide against the possibility of a great surprise attack, particularly with nuclear weapons, the importance of this having been previously recognized by the Soviet Union as well as by the United States.

In expounding these proposals made by the President, in the Outline Plan presented by the United States in the Disarmament Sub-Committee on 30 August 1955, in order to take into account the views of the Soviet Union expressed in its 10 May 1955 proposals and at Geneva, as well as certain views of the other members of the Disarmament Sub-Committee, the United States noted, "Each nation has recognized the need for ground observers, and these will be stationed at key locations within the other country for the purpose of allowing them to certify the accuracy of the foregoing information and to give warning of evidence of surprise attack or of mobilization."

In introducing this 30 August Outline Plan, the United States also recognized that the danger of great surprise attack is a matter of concern to each of the Governments represented in the Sub-Committee and to all nations of the world. It is further realized that the carrying out of the President’s proposal will involve the co-operation of each of the Governments represented in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, and the question arises whether this exchange of military blueprints and aerial reconnaissance should be confined to the territorial limits of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is the belief of the United States that it is most essential that a beginning should be made on the President’s proposal by agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, but that this agreement between these two countries putting the President’s plan into effect without delay might also provide for the adherence and participation, as agreed, of designated countries on an equitable basis, once the plan is in operation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Furthermore, it should be clear that the President’s proposal is directed toward providing against the possibility of a great surprise attack of any kind with any weapon. So far as the information to be exchanged is concerned, it will consist of the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, including
organized reserves and para-military; and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations. It is not contemplated that the blueprints of military establishments would include every specific detail. Similar information would be simultaneously exchanged by each Government, as mutually agreed upon by the two Governments, within the framework of the United Nations. This exchange of information would be directed toward safeguarding the possibility of a great surprise attack, and the details of information to be exchanged are subject to negotiation.

So far as aerial reconnaissance is concerned, however, the United States would not consider that there are prohibited areas. In the words of President Eisenhower, the United States "would allow these planes, properly inspected, peaceful planes, to fly over any particular area of the country that they wanted to, because in this -- only in this -- way could you convince them there wasn't something over there that maybe was by surprise ready to attack them."

Reduction of the burden of armaments

The United States believes that the taking of this practical step to provide against the possibility of surprise attack, as suggested in the President's proposals, will lessen danger and relax international tensions.

By this very fact, a system guarding against surprise attack as proposed by the United States should make more easily attainable a broader disarmament agreement. The lessons learned through the mutual exchange of military blueprints and through reciprocal aerial reconnaissance will help measurably in the joint efforts of the Disarmament Sub-Committee to find an effective inspection and control system which will fully support agreements to reduce, limit and regulate armaments and armed forces.

It is the firm policy of the United States Government that the relaxation of international tensions through concrete deeds should proceed concurrently with efforts to find a solution to the problem of armaments. As President Eisenhower said at the Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, "The United States Government is prepared to enter into a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of armament."
The United States earnestly seeks an agreement for the reduction of all armaments and armed forces, concurrent with the relief of international tensions and when a reliable system of inspection and control is devised. The problems of disarmament have become increasingly complicated because of the changed technical circumstances which have been previously described. These technical circumstances must be taken into account, not only in devising a system of inspection and control, but also in relation to the scale, timing and ratio of any reductions which might be agreed upon.

While these considerations are being studied, and while our scientists are trying to find methods by which complete accountability for nuclear material and reliable inspection and control might be attained, it is imperative that we find the means to provide against surprise attack and to attain that degree of international trust indispensable to a broad disarmament programme supported by effective inspection and reporting. The United States believes that the Eisenhower plan is the gateway to agreement in these further fields and in itself provides a great assurance against war.

It is the hope of the United States that, upon further consideration of the proposal of the President of the United States at Geneva on 21 July, the Outline Plan in implementation of the Presidential proposal submitted to the Disarmament Sub-Committee on 30 August, and the further explanations made during the course of the Sub-Committee discussions and summed up in this memorandum, that the members of the Sub-Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the United Nations General Assembly may decide that the early execution of this plan would contribute to the reduction of present international tensions, would provide safeguards against major surprise attack, would lessen the fear of war, would assist in the development of a comprehensive international agreement for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, and would advance the cause of peace. It is the further hope of the United States that agreement could be reached to place the proposal of the United States into effect at the earliest opportunity, and that the members of this Sub-Committee would continue their efforts to reach agreement on an effective system of international inspection and control and upon a general programme for reduction and limitation of armament.