Fifteenth special session

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
AT ITS THIRD SPECIAL SESSION DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

* The present document is a mimeographed version of the special report of
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its forty-second session, the General Assembly, by resolution 42/42 G of 30 November 1987, took note of the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission 1/ and requested the Commission, inter alia, to submit a substantive special report, containing specific recommendations on the items included in its agenda, to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament.

2. Pursuant to that request, the Disarmament Commission submits its substantive special report to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Its annual reports for 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 and 1987 as well as its special report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament 2/ may be referred to for further information concerning the work of the Commission during those periods.

3. The General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, held from 23 May to 30 June 1978, established the United Nations Disarmament Commission, defined its mandate and determined its functions. Paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S 10/2) reads as follows:

"118. The General Assembly establishes, as successor to the Commission originally established by resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, a Disarmament Commission, composed of all States Members of the United Nations, and decides that:

(a) The Disarmament Commission shall be a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the function of which shall be to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session devoted to disarmament. The Disarmament Commission should, inter alia, consider the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament;

(b) The Disarmament Commission shall function under the rules of procedure relating to the committees of the General Assembly with such modifications as the Commission may deem necessary and shall make every effort to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on substantive issues be adopted by consensus;

(c) The Disarmament Commission shall report annually to the General Assembly and will submit for consideration by the Assembly at its thirty-third session a report on organizational matters; in 1979, the Disarmament Commission will meet for a period not exceeding four weeks, the dates to be decided at the thirty-third session of the Assembly;

(d) The Secretary-General shall furnish such experts, staff and services as are necessary for the effective accomplishment of the Commission's functions."
II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE COMMISSION SINCE 1982

A. Organizational sessions

4. Following the practice in previous years, the Disarmament Commission held its various organizational sessions on 13 and 15 December 1982, 1 and 8 December 1983, 3 and 5 December 1984, 2 December 1985, 1 December 1986 and on 1 December 1987. During those periods, the Commission considered all relevant questions to the organization of its work, in particular the questions of the election of officers and the provisional agenda for its next substantive session.

B. Election of officers

5. In accordance with the established principle of rotation for its chairmanship, the Commission elected Mr. Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva (Brazil) as its Chairman for the year 1983. The Commission also elected Mr. Andul Mou'Men Al-Atassi (Syrian Arab Republic) as its Rapporteur and representatives from the following Member States as its Vice-Chairmen: Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Federal Republic of, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sweden and Tunisia.

6. The Disarmament Commission elected, for the year 1984, Mr. James Victor Gbeho (Ghana) as its Chairman, Mr. Sergei Martynov (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) as its Rapporteur and the representatives from the following Member States as its Vice-Chairmen: Argentina, Bahamas, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Nepal, Pakistan and Sudan.

7. The Disarmament Commission elected, for the year 1985, Mr. Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan) as its Chairman, Mr. Arturo Laclastra (Spain) as its Rapporteur and the representatives from the following Member States as its Vice-Chairmen: Bahamas, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, German Democratic Republic, Greece, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Mexico and Morocco.

8. The Disarmament Commission elected, for the year 1986, Mr. Henning Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany) as its Chairman, Mr. Idule-Amoko (Uganda) as its Rapporteur and the representatives from the following Member States as its Vice-Chairmen: Australia, Burma, Cameroon, Ecuador, Hungary, Peru and Poland.

9. The Disarmament Commission elected, for the year 1987, Mr. Dimitar Kostov (Bulgaria) as its Chairman, Mr. Maher Nashashibi (Jordan) as its Rapporteur and the representatives from the following Member States as its Vice-Chairmen: Austria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Denmark, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela.

10. The Disarmament Commission elected, for the year 1988, Mr. Davidson L. Hepburn (Bahamas) as its Chairman, Mr. Istvan Sipos (Hungary) as its Rapporteur and the representatives from the following Member States as its Vice-Chairmen: Austria, Australia, Cameroon, Czechoslovakia, Jordan, Togo and Uruguay.
C. Rules of procedure

11. Paragraph 118 (b) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (see para. 3 above) laid down the basis of the rules of procedure for the Disarmament Commission. It should be noted that the Commission has particularly observed the principle of consensus in making its decisions during the entire period of its substantive sessions from 1982 to 1988.

12. During the 1988 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission, at its 125th meeting, on 3 May 1988, decided to retain the services of verbatim records for the Commission by a vote of 43 in favour to 5 against (see A/CN.10/PV.125). The Chairman stated: "A precedent is not being set, but we have certain rules and procedures within our jurisdiction and we try to use them whenever possible (see A/CN.10/PV.126).

D. Secretariat and services for the Commission

13. Paragraph 118 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (see para. 3 above) requests the Secretary-General to furnish such experts, staff and services as are necessary for the effective accomplishment of the Commission's functions. Pursuant to that provision, the Secretary-General appointed as Secretary of the Disarmament Commission, Mr. Fehmi Alem, Principal Officer (1983-1986) and Mr. Lin Kuo-Chung, Senior Political Affairs Officer (from 1986), both of the Department for Disarmament Affairs. Other staff members of the Department were also assigned to serve as secretaries of various subsidiary bodies of the Commission as the number of agenda items and subsidiary bodies increased substantially during the period from 1983 to 1988.

14. At its 1983 session, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission expressed his concern and dissatisfaction over the inadequacy of conference services provided by the Secretariat, following the increase in the number of agenda items and subsidiary bodies of the Commission during that session (see A/38/42, para. 14). At the subsequent session in 1984, adequate conference services were provided.

15. Owing to the economy measures undertaken by the General Assembly during 1986 and 1987 in the light of the financial crisis of the United Nations, the duration of sessions and the conference services for the Disarmament Commission were substantially curtailed. In this connection, at its 1987 session, the Disarmament Commission recommended to the General Assembly that full services be provided to the Commission and its subsidiary bodies in order to fulfil its mandate effectively, as entrusted to it in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session (see A/42/42, para. 39). During the 1988 session, conference services were restored (see A/CN.10/PV.123). In future it would be desirable to ensure that translation and interpretation services made available to the Commission should be fully utilized.

E. Documentation

16. In accordance with the decisions taken at the tenth special session of the General Assembly and the recommendations thereafter, verbatim records were provided for the records of meetings of the Disarmament Commission during the period 1978-1985. However, owing to the economy measures taken in view of the financial
crisis of the United Nations, the service of verbatim records was interrupted during 1986 and 1987. In 1988, the services have been resumed by the General Assembly.

17. During the period of the Disarmament Commission's 1978-1988 sessions, a considerable amount of documentation was prepared by the Secretariat or submitted by Member States in connection with the agenda items of the Commission. A list of the substantive documents of the Commission (A/CN.10/1-113, A/CN.10/L.1-22) is annexed to the present report (annex I). 3/

18. Furthermore, at its 1985 session, the Disarmament Commission recommended to the General Assembly at its fortieth session that the publication entitled The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1970 be updated to cover the period 1945-1985 (A/40/42, annex VI). Consequently, the Department for Disarmament Affairs undertook the task and the book entitled The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1985 was published in 1985.

F. Participation of non-governmental organizations

19. During the substantive sessions of the Disarmament Commission, from 1982 to 1988, some non-governmental organizations attended the plenary meetings as well as the meetings of the Committee of the Whole of the Commission and also addressed communications to the Commission (A/CN.10/INF.10 and Corr.1 and 12).
III. WORK OF THE COMMISSION AT ITS SUBSTANTIVE SESSIONS
FROM 1983 TO 1988

A. Agenda of the Commission at its substantive sessions

20. At its substantive sessions from 1983 to 1988, the Disarmament Commission included the following substantive items in its agenda (A/CN.10/L.12, 14, 16, 18, 20 and 22) for consideration: 5/

(1) (a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war;

(b) Consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of resolution 33/71 H, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with the priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.

(2) Reduction of military budgets:

(a) Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

(b) Examination and identification of effective ways and means of achieving agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, taking into account the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 34/83 F, 35/142 A, 36/82 A, 37/95 A, 38/184 A, 39/64 A, 40/91 A, 41/57 and 42/36, with a view to concluding its work on the last outstanding paragraph of the "Principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets". 7/

(3) Substantive consideration of the question of South Africa's nuclear capability as requested by the General Assembly and the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid (resolutions 37/74 B, 38/181 B, 39/61 B, 40/89 B, 41/55 B and 42/34 B and document A/CN.10/4).

(4) Consideration of recommendations and proposals contained in the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues entitled "Common Security" that relate to disarmament and arms limitation and to suggest, in a report to the General Assembly, how best to ensure an effective follow-up thereto within the United Nations system or otherwise.

(5) Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level/Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures. 8/
(6) Consideration of proposals concerning the relationship between disarmament and development.

(7) Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

(8) Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of naval armaments and extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans.

(9) Review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade: preliminary assessment and suggestions to ensure progress.

(10) Substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament/Naval armaments and disarmament.

(11) Substantive consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament, including the recommendations and conclusions contained in the study on conventional disarmament.

(12) Consideration of the question of verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification.

(13) Special report of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament.

21. In view of the limited time available to the Commission to consider its agenda items, it has been the general view of Member States that the agenda should be kept as short as possible so that the Commission could dispose of it in an appropriate manner.

B. Consideration of the substantive items 10/

1. Various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, as well as a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.

(a) Consideration of the subject from 1983 to 1987

22. In accordance with recommendations contained in the Disarmament Commission's annual reports, this item has been continuously included for consideration in the agenda of the Commission since its 1983 session.

23. During the 1983 session of the Commission, this item was considered at its initial stage in the Committee of the Whole and thereafter by a Contact Group. The Group concentrated its effort on the elaboration of a set of recommendations on the subject. However, it was not possible for the Group to achieve consensus on a set of recommendations and thus the Group recommended that this item be considered at the 1984 session of the Commission. In this connection, a working paper entitled "Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4" was annexed to the report of the Commission for further consideration (see A/38/42, para. 22).
24. From the 1984 to 1987 sessions of the Commission, the subject was continuously considered by a Contact Group under the Committee of the Whole on the basis of the compilation of proposals for recommendations, above-mentioned, with a view to reaching consensus on a set of recommendations to be submitted to the General Assembly. However, consensus on such a text was not achieved during that period (see A/39/42, para. 23; A/40/42, para. 27; A/41/42, para. 27; and A/42/42, para. 40).

(b) Present state of deliberations and recommendations at the 1988 session

25. During its 1988 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission again considered this subject in a Contact Group under the Committee of the Whole. At its 129th meeting, on 19 May, the Commission adopted by consensus the report of the Committee of the Whole and the recommendation contained therein regarding agenda item 4, which reads as follows:

"Report of the Committee of the Whole on work on agenda item 4"

"1. At its 123rd meeting, on 2 May, the Disarmament Commission decided that, as at previous sessions, agenda item 4 should be dealt with in the framework of the Committee of the Whole by a contact group open to all delegations. Mr. Sergei Martynov (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) was appointed Chairman of the Contact Group.

"2. The Contact Group held nine meetings between 4 and 17 May.

"3. The Contact Group continued the work on agenda item 4 on the basis of the compilation of proposals for recommendations on that item contained in annex I to the report of the Commission on its 1987 session (A/42/42). It also had before it a working paper entitled 'Negotiations on nuclear disarmament', submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/110).

"4. The state of the deliberations of the Contact Group is reflected in the 'Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4', which is annexed to the present report of the Commission (see annex II). Those recommendations whose formulation appears in the compilation without brackets or alternatives are the following: recommendations Nos. 1 and 2; in section I, recommendations Nos. 3, 5, 8, 9, 17, 18, 24 and 25; in section II, the introductory sentence and recommendations Nos. 1, 5 and 7. Those recommendations were generally acceptable, without prejudice to the right of delegations to review them as appropriate.

"5. In the course of the work at the 1988 session, the Contact Group updated some of the texts under consideration and made some progress towards narrowing areas of disagreements. Nevertheless, as indicated in the 'Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4', it was unable to reach a consensus on a complete set of recommendations. It is recommended that the Commission should continue its efforts with a view to reaching agreement on a complete set of recommendations relating to agenda item 4."
2. Reduction of military budgets

(a) Consideration of the subject from 1983 to 1987


27. During its 1983 session, the Disarmament Commission established a working group to consider the subject of reduction of military budgets. The Working Group commenced its substantive work of identifying and elaborating the principles on the basis of a background paper on some of the proposed principles and ideas which should govern actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures (see A/S-12/3, annex II) and other proposals and ideas submitted by delegations. As a result, while some progress was made in reaching a consensus text, divergent positions among delegations continued to exist. Consequently, the Group recommended to the Commission that this subject be considered at its next session.

28. From the 1984 to 1986 sessions, the item on reduction of military budgets was consecutively considered by a working group established by the Commission. The group continued its efforts to identify and elaborate the principles that should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage. In the course of deliberations, many principles and ideas were generally accepted, on a provisional basis and subject to reaching agreement on the text of principles as a whole, while on some of the proposed principles and ideas significant divergencies persisted (see A/39/42, para. 24 and A/40/42, para. 28). By the end of the 1986 session, the Group was able to achieve consensus on the text embodying an entire set of principles concerning the reduction of military budgets entitled "Principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets", except for paragraph 7. That paragraph dealt with the principles of transparency, comparability, and availability of meaningful and reliable data, in particular, through the use of the standardized international reporting instrument established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B. Various proposals in this regard were put forward with a view to reaching consensus on a compromise text. However, the Working Group was unable to achieve such an agreement, and thus recommended that the agenda item be again considered at the 1987 session of the Commission (see A/41/42, para. 28).

29. During the 1987 session, the item of reduction of military budgets was considered in a consultation group established by the Commission with a view to finalizing the last outstanding paragraph in the set of principles on the subject. In the course of negotiation to reach agreement on paragraph 7, additional proposals were put forward. Despite all efforts made through intensive consultations among the concerned delegations, the Consultation Group was still not able to conclude its consideration of the item. It therefore recommended to the Disarmament Commission that it transmit the entire text on principles, including the outstanding paragraph, to the General Assembly in order for it to decide on the future course of action on this item (see A/42/42, para. 41).
Present state of deliberations and recommendations at the 1988 session

30. During its 1988 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission further considered this item in a consultation group. At its 129th meeting, on 19 May, the Commission adopted by consensus the report of the Consultation Group and the recommendation contained therein regarding agenda item 5, which reads as follows:

"Report of the Consultation Group on item 5

1. By its resolution 42/36 of 30 November 1987, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue the consideration of the item entitled 'Reduction of military budgets' and, in this context, to conclude, at its 1988 substantive session, its work on the last outstanding paragraph of the principles that should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets, and to submit its report and recommendations to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-third session.

2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 123rd meeting, on 2 May 1988, decided to establish the Consultation Group to deal with agenda item 5, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 42/36.

3. The Consultation Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Teodor Melescanu (Romania) and held seven meetings and a number of informal consultations between 4 and 18 May. Mrs. Hannelore Hoppe of the Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the Consultation Group.

4. The Consultation Group continued the consideration of paragraph 7 of the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets on the basis of a formulation proposed by the Chairman. That proposal was subsequently amended in the course of the deliberations, resulting in four conference room papers (A/CN.10/1988/Item 5/CRP.1 to 4) which were before the Consultation Group. In addition, the Consultation Group took into account other proposals for paragraph 7, which had been submitted for consideration during the 1986 and 1987 sessions of the Disarmament Commission and which are contained in paragraph 41 of document A/42/42.

5. While a general agreement was reached on most of the elements of paragraph 7, it was not possible to achieve a consensus formulation for that paragraph. Nevertheless, the Consultation Group agreed that the text for paragraph 7 as discussed at its 6th meeting, on 16 May 1988, with the bracketed wording in the last sentence, should be incorporated into the document entitled 'Principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military budgets' (see para. 6 below). It was generally felt that further consideration of paragraph 7 should focus, inter alia, on the last sentence, taking into account the content of that paragraph as a whole. In this connection the Consultation Group noted that in the absence of agreement on principle 7, there is no final agreement on all principles.

6. At its 7th meeting, on 18 May 1988, the Consultation Group recommended to the Disarmament Commission that the following document be transmitted to the
fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament, for its consideration:

'PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN FURTHER ACTIONS OF STATES IN THE FIELD OF FREEZING AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS

1. Concerted efforts should be made by all States, in particular by those States with the largest military arsenals, and by the appropriate negotiating forums, with the objective of concluding international agreements to freeze and reduce military budgets, including adequate verification measures acceptable to all parties. Such agreements should contribute to genuine reductions of armed forces and armaments of States parties, with the aim of strengthening international peace and security at lower levels of armed forces and armaments. Definite agreements on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures are assuming special importance and should be reached within the shortest period of time in order to contribute to the curbing of the arms race, alleviate international tensions, and increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

2. All efforts in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures should take into account the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2).

3. Pending the conclusion of agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures, all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, should exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures.

4. The reduction of military expenditures on a mutually agreed basis should be implemented gradually and in a balanced manner, either on a percentage or on an absolute basis, so as to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage, and without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security and sovereignty and to undertake the necessary measures of self-defence.

5. While the freezing and reduction of military budgets is the responsibility of all States to be implemented in stages in accordance with the principle of the greatest responsibility, the process should begin with those nuclear-weapon States with the largest military arsenals and the biggest military expenditures, to be followed immediately by other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States. This should not prevent other States from initiating negotiations and reaching agreements on the balanced reduction of their respective military budgets at any time during this process.

6. Human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures should be devoted to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.
'7. Meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets would require that all parties to such negotiations have accepted and implemented transparency and comparability. The elaboration of agreed methods of measuring and comparing military expenditures between specified periods of time and between countries with different budgeting systems would be required. To this end it [is essential]/[should be encouraged] that [the participating] States utilize the reporting system adopted by the General Assembly in 1980.

'8. Armaments and military activities which would be the subject of physical reductions within the limits provided for in any agreement to reduce military expenditures will be identified by every State party to such agreements.

'9. The agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures should contain adequate and efficient measures of verification, satisfactory to all parties, in order to ensure that their provisions are strictly applied and fulfilled by all States parties. The specific methods of verification or other compliance procedure should be agreed upon in the process of negotiation depending upon the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.

'10. Unilateral measures undertaken by States concerning the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, especially when they are followed by similar measures adopted by other States on the basis of mutual example, could contribute to favourable conditions for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures.

'11. Confidence-building measures could help to create a political climate, conducive to the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. Conversely, the freezing and reduction of military expenditures could contribute to the increase of confidence among States.

'12. The United Nations should play a central role in orienting, stimulating and initiating negotiations on freezing and reducing military expenditures, and all Member States should co-operate with the Organization as among themselves, with a view to solving the problems implied by this process.

'13. The freezing and reduction of military expenditures may be achieved, as appropriate, on a global, regional or subregional level, with the agreement of all States concerned.

'14. The agreements on the freezing and reduction of military budgets should be viewed in a broader perspective, including respect for and implementation of the security system of the United Nations, and be interrelated with other measures of disarmament, within the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The reduction of military budgets should therefore be complementary to agreements on the limitation of armaments and disarmament and should not be considered as a substitute for such agreements.
'15. The adoption of the above principles should be regarded as a means
of facilitating meaningful negotiations on concrete agreements on the
freezing and reduction of military budgets.'

3. Nuclear capability of South Africa

(a) Consideration of the subject from 1983 to 1987

31. Pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 37/74 B of 13 December 1982, 38/181 B
of 20 December 1983, 39/61 B of 12 December 1984, 40/89 B of 12 December 1985,
41/55 B of 3 December 1986 and 42/34 B of 30 November 1987, this item was
continuously included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission at its sessions

32. From the 1983 to 1987 sessions, the item on South Africa's nuclear capability
was considered in a working group established by the Commission. During that
period, the working group devoted its efforts mainly to elaborating a set of
recommendations on the basis of working papers and proposals submitted by various
delегations, particularly the paper by the African States (A/CN.10/43 and Rev.1).
In the course of deliberations, differences of view among delegations centred on
some fundamental concepts and elements emphasized in that text, particularly South
Africa's nuclear weapons capability and its verifiability. While some paragraphs
of the text were adopted, the Working Group could not achieve consensus on the
entire set of recommendations on the subject during its five years of
deliberations. At the 1987 session, the Working Group recommended that the
Commission continue the consideration of the subject at its 1988 session (see
A/38/42, para. 24; A/39/42, para. 25; A/40/42, para. 29; A/41/42, para. 29; and
A/42/42, para. 42).

(b) Present state of deliberations and recommendations at the 1988 session

33. During its 1988 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission again
considered this subject in its Working Group I. At its 129th meeting, on 19 May,
the Commission adopted by consensus the report of Working Group I and the
recommendation contained therein on agenda item 6, which reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group I on item 6

"1. At its forty-second session, the General Assembly adopted resolution
42/34 B of 30 November 1987 by which it, inter alia, requested the Disarmament
Commission to consider once again as a matter of priority during its
substantive session in 1988 South Africa's nuclear capability, taking into
account, inter alia, the findings of the report of the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research on South Africa's nuclear capability.

"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 123rd meeting, on 2 May 1988, decided
to establish Working Group I to deal with agenda item 6 regarding the question
of South Africa's nuclear capability and to make recommendations thereon to
the Commission, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 42/34 B.

"3. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Ambassador Daya Perera
(Sri Lanka) and held nine meetings between 4 and 17 May 1988."
Ms. Agnès Marcaillou of the Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the Working Group. The Working Group also conducted informal consultations through the Chairman during this period.

"4. In connection with its work, the Working Group had before it the following documents: (a) A/CN.10/1988/WG.I/WP.1; (b) A/CN.10/1988/WG.I/CRP.1; and (c) A/CN.10/1988/WG.I/CRP.2. In addition, the Working Group also took into account other relevant documents on the subject, inter alia: (a) 'South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field' (A/35/402 and Corr.1); (b) 'Report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa'; a/ (c) 'South Africa's nuclear capability' (A/39/470).

"5. At its 1st meeting, on 4 May, the Working Group decided that the text of conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Disarmament Commission at its 1987 session B/ should constitute the basic document for consideration of the subject (A/CN.10/1988/WG.I/WP.1).

"6. On the basis of progress made in previous years, the Working Group endeavoured to draft conclusions and recommendations on the subject. During the course of deliberations various amendments were submitted in connection with the basic document (A/CN.10/1988/WG.I/WP.1), as referred to in paragraph 5 above with a view to reaching an agreement on a consensus text.

"7. In the course of an intensive exchange of views on the text, convergencies of approach were evident on several important areas of concern regarding the question of South Africa's nuclear capability.

"8. The group at this session registered significant progress in its work on the text of conclusions and recommendations (A/CN.10/1988/WG.I/WP.1) although no consensus was possible on the text as a whole. Besides paragraphs 2, 4, 11 (f) and 11 (g) on which an agreement was reached by the Working Group at its 1987 session, at its 9th meeting, on 17 May, the Working Group reached agreement on paragraphs 1, 5, 7 and 11 (e) in the complete text which was before it. This text follows:

'Nuclear capability of South Africa

'CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON AGENDA ITEM 6

(proposals and amendments)

'1. Against the background of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the Commission condemns the perpetuation of a racist minority régime in South Africa and the continued illegal occupation of Namibia. It reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South Africa and Namibia for their self-determination and the elimination of apartheid and supports the struggle for the independence of Namibia.

'2. South Africa's adoption of apartheid, an institutionalized form of racial discrimination, as an instrument of policy runs counter to the human rights provisions of the Charter of the United Nations concerning
the human rights and right of all peoples to self-determination. As a result, South Africa's policy of apartheid has been and remains condemned as inhumane and contrary to basic human principle by the international community and a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind by the Security Council.

3. It has become clear that, in its isolation and desperation, the Pretoria régime has resorted to the pursuit of a military option as an instrument of internal oppression and external aggression. It must be suspected that, in the pursuit of its military capability in the direction of increased sophistication and ominous dimensions, South Africa has placed emphasis on the development and acquisition of nuclear weaponry, which has been made possible through the active nuclear collaboration with it by certain Western countries and Israel, as well as by transnational corporations.

*Alternative for paragraph 3 (proposed by France)*

South Africa has also resorted to military force to perpetuate the inhumane policy of apartheid and support a policy of destabilization against its neighbours. In its resolution 418 (1977), the Security Council determined that the acquisition by South Africa of arms and related material constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. Reports that South Africa may be acquiring a nuclear weapons capability are a source of grave concern to the international community. If these reports were accurate, this development would represent a serious threat to the stability of the region and greatly aggravate the situation in the region.

4. In the event, the issue of South Africa's nuclear capability has been brought to international attention by General Assembly resolution 34/76 B of 11 December 1979 and included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission since its first substantive session in 1979 at the instance of the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid (A/CN.10/4) following the conclusion of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, held at London in February 1979.

5. In consideration of the item the Commission reaffirms with regard to South Africa the concern already expressed in paragraph 12 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2). In this respect the Commission strongly recommends that the General Assembly renew its call upon all States to adhere strictly to the relevant decisions of the Security Council.

6. The Commission is of the firm view that nuclear weapons in the possession of racist régimes can become an instrument of policy for State terrorism, aggression and blackmail and thus increase the danger to international peace and security. It therefore notes with grave concern the danger and serious threat which the established technical capability of South Africa to produce nuclear weapons and the necessary means of delivery pose to the security of African States as well as to international peace and security. This concern is further increased by the reported development by South Africa of a cruise missile, a neutron bomb and various delivery systems in collaboration with Israel.

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The proliferation of nuclear weapons to any country is a matter of serious concern to the world. The introduction of nuclear weapons to the African continent, and particularly in such a volatile region as southern Africa, not only would be a severe blow to world-wide efforts at non-proliferation but also would upset many years' efforts to spare the African continent from the nuclear-arms race in keeping with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

The Commission is of the firm view that nuclear weapons in the possession of racist régimes could become an instrument of policy for threatening neighbouring States and thus increase the danger to regional and international peace and security. In this connection, the introduction of nuclear weapons into the African continent constitutes not only a severe blow to world-wide efforts at non-proliferation but also undermines many years' efforts to keep the African continent free from the nuclear-arms race in keeping with the objectives of the OAU Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

7. The Commission notes the 1977 reports of the discovery of preparations for a nuclear-weapon-test site in the Kalahari desert and reports about the 22 September 1979 event in the South Atlantic. These reports and the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field (A/35/402 and Corr.1) and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research report (A/39/470) have caused legitimate and particular concern to the African States and the international community, in general.

8. The Commission, in fulfilment of its mandate, considers it its responsibility to alert the General Assembly, and through it the Security Council, to the deleterious consequences of South Africa’s capability to produce and/or acquire nuclear weapons, its reported and potential possession of nuclear weapons and the implications of this for the security of African States, international peace and security, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the collective decision of the African States regarding the denuclearization of Africa, which has been endorsed by the General Assembly.

The Commission, in fulfilment of its mandate, considers it its responsibility to alert the General Assembly to the serious consequences which the acquisition or production of nuclear weapons by South Africa would have for the security of African States, international peace and security, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the collective decision of the African States regarding the denuclearization of Africa which has been endorsed by the General Assembly.
'Alternative for paragraph 8 (proposed by the African Group of States)

The Commission, in fulfilment of its mandate, considers it its responsibility to alert the General Assembly of the serious consequences of South Africa's capability to produce and/or acquire nuclear weapons, and the implications of this for the security of African States, international peace and security, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the collective decision of the African States regarding the denuclearization of Africa, which has been endorsed by the General Assembly.

'9. The Commission considers it at variance with the declared principles of international law relating to the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States to allow, enable and assist, directly or indirectly, South Africa to continue its policy of aggression and destabilization against the countries of the African continent through the development of a nuclear-weapon capability which has been achieved mainly through collaboration in the military and nuclear fields with certain Western countries, Israel and transnational corporations.

'Alternative for paragraph 9 (proposed by France)

The Commission draws attention to Security Council resolution 591 (1986) which, in addition to underlining the necessity for the strict implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa imposed by Security Council resolution 418 (1977), requested all States to refrain from any co-operation in the nuclear field with South Africa which would contribute to the manufacture and development by South Africa of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.

'Alternative for paragraph 9 (proposed by the African Group of States)

The Commission considers it at variance with the declared principles of international law relating to the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States to allow, enable and assist, directly or indirectly, South Africa to continue its policy of aggression and destabilization against the countries of the African continent especially in the military nuclear field.

'10. The Commission holds the view that the current exploitation of Namibian uranium by South Africa and transnational corporations violates the principle of international law which recognizes a people's permanent sovereignty over its natural resources for the benefit of its socio-economic development. It further holds the view that South Africa should not be allowed to continue its illegal exploitation of Namibian uranium - made possible through its illegal occupation of Namibia - which strengthens its nuclear base and hence reinforces its policy of apartheid.
The Commission is of the view that the natural resources of Namibia should be available for the benefit of the Namibian people and for Namibia's socio-economic development. It further holds the view that South Africa should cease its exploitation of Namibian uranium, which is made possible through its illegal occupation of Namibia and, in compliance with international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, take steps to end that occupation.

Given the very nature of the racist régime of South Africa, the Disarmament Commission believes that it is an urgent necessity that the intolerable policy of apartheid be terminated. In this connection, all States and international organizations have the duty and responsibility to contribute to the strengthening of United Nations efforts for the attainment of this goal. It is therefore the responsibility of the international community to ensure that effective and concrete measures are taken to stop the further development of South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability which poses a threat to international peace and security. To this end, the Disarmament Commission recommends the following:

Replace the third sentence of paragraph 11 by the following:

In addition, Member States should fully implement Security Council resolution 418 (1977), unanimously adopted by the Security Council, which, inter alia, calls on Member States to refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons.

All States have a particular obligation towards the achievement of the above objectives. Those States collaborating with South Africa should cease forthwith all such collaboration in the military and nuclear fields which may contribute directly or indirectly to the further development of South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability. They should also put an end to transfers of all equipment, material, technology and personnel, relevant to South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability in order that South Africa adopt a conduct in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations;

Member States should comply with Security Council resolution 591 (1986) unanimously adopted by the Security Council, which, inter alia, requests all States to refrain from any co-operation in the nuclear field with South Africa which would contribute to the manufacture and development by South Africa of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
11 (b). Considering that no decision has been taken by the Security Council since 1978 to give effect to the provisions contained in paragraph 12 of the Final Document, adopted by consensus (see para. 5 above), the Disarmament Commission recommends to the General Assembly to request the Council, in assuming its full responsibility, to take urgent and appropriate measures in this regard by, inter alia, enforcing and extending its arms embargo against South Africa to cover all aspects which may contribute directly or indirectly to the further development of South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability;

'Alternative for paragraph 11 (b) (proposed by the United Kingdom)

In the light of Security Council resolutions 418 (1977), 558 (1984), and 591 (1986), the Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly should remind all States of their obligations concerning the arms embargo against South Africa.

'Alternative for paragraph 11 (b) (proposed by the African Group of States)

In the light of Security Council resolutions 418 (1977), 558 (1984), and 591 (1986), the Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly should call upon all States to observe scrupulously, and as a matter of urgency, their obligations concerning the arms embargo against South Africa. The General Assembly should also recommend to the Security Council to enforce and extend the arms embargo against South Africa to cover all aspects which may contribute directly or indirectly to the further development of South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability.

11 (c). In the interest of global peace and security and the security and stability of Africa in particular, the Commission recommends that all States should respect their obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and desist from any nuclear co-operation with South Africa which would strengthen directly or indirectly the already established technical capability of South Africa to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States which collaborate with South Africa in this field must accept joint responsibility with that country for endangering the peace and security of the region and the world;

'Alternative for paragraph 11 (c) (proposed by France)

- in the first sentence replace the phrase starting with "Desist" with the following:

"... should not co-operate with South Africa in a way which would enable it to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

- delete the second sentence
'Alternative for paragraph 11 (c) (proposed by the African Group of States)

Delete the second sentence from the original paragraph.

'11 (d). The Commission recommends that all States should consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965 which endorsed the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted in 1964 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. To this end, the Commission recommends that the Assembly should request the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective;

'Alternative for paragraph 11 (d) (proposed by the United Kingdom)

- delete the last sentence

'Alternative for paragraph 11 (d) (proposed by the African Group of States)

The Commission recommends that all States should consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965 which endorsed the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted in 1964 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. To this end, the Commission recommends that the Assembly should urge the Security Council to consider appropriate and effective steps to prevent the frustration of this objective.

'11 (e). Notwithstanding the statement by the South African Government on 31 January 1984 (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document INFCIRC/314), the Commission recommends that all States, particularly the five permanent members of the Security Council, should now prevail upon the racist régime of South Africa to comply without delay with all relevant resolutions of the United Nations, particularly those regarding acceptance of an internationally binding nuclear non-proliferation commitment and the placement of all its activities under IAEA safeguards. All States should seek to endorse further specific, practical, time-limited and collective measures that would enhance implementation.

'11 (f). South Africa should be prevailed upon to practise transparency and openness in its military affairs, in order to allow for an unimpeded and full assessment of its activities in the nuclear field by the international community, and in particular, by its neighbouring States.

'11 (g). The Commission recommends further that the Secretary-General should follow more closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and report regularly to the General Assembly on the progress of these recommendations and on all new developments which would require the attention of the international community.'
At its 9th meeting, on 17 May 1988, the Working Group decided to recommend to the Commission the following recommendation on agenda item 8:

'The Disarmament Commission recommends to the General Assembly that work to be accomplished under General Assembly resolution 42/34 B of 30 November 1987 should be continued by the Commission as a matter of priority at its next substantive session in 1989, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations regarding the question of South Africa's nuclear capability, taking into account, inter alia, the views and suggestions of Member States as contained in document A/CN.10/1988/WG.I/CRP.2.'

"Notes"


34. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 37/99 B of 13 December 1982, this item was included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission at its 1983 session.

35. At its 1983 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission considered this item in a working group on the basis of the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (ICDSI) entitled "Common Security - a programme for disarmament" (A/CN.10/38) as well as other documents submitted by delegations (A/CN.10/39, 40 and 47). After extensive deliberations in the Working Group, the Disarmament Commission adopted the report of the Group by consensus (see A/38/42, para. 25).

36. During its deliberations on this item, the Commission carried out a broad discussion of the concept of common security. It considered this concept offered a valuable approach in the search for lasting peace and security. However, in the course of consideration of the proposals and recommendations of the ICDSI report in the light of various security perceptions, divergent views were expressed as regards the principles, proposals and recommendations contained in it.

37. Nevertheless, the Disarmament Commission welcomed the report of ICDSI as a timely and constructive contribution to international efforts to achieve disarmament and to maintain and strengthen international peace and security. In concluding this agenda item, the Commission recommended that the report of ICDSI be duly taken into account in ongoing and future disarmament efforts (see A/38/42, para. 25 (paras. 12 and 13)).

5. **Guidelines for confidence-building measures**

(a) **Consideration of the subject from 1983 to 1987**


39. At its 1983 and 1984 sessions, the Disarmament Commission considered this item in a working group. At the 1983 session, the Working Group conducted an extensive general exchange of views on the subject, particularly the clarification of the concept of confidence-building in all its aspects. During the 1984 session, the Working Group concentrated its efforts on the elaboration of a body of guidelines for confidence-building measures on the basis of a composite draft of guidelines presented by the Chairman of the Group (see A/39/42, annex XV). Despite the intensive deliberations on the subject and great efforts made with a view to bringing the item to a conclusion, the Group was unable to achieve an agreed text. In this connection, the Working Group made specific recommendations to the General Assembly regarding certain actions it might undertake relevant to this item (see A/39/42, para. 26 (para. 10)).
40. At its 1986 session, the Disarmament Commission took up the subject again in a consultation group. After intensive work, the group was able to agree upon all paragraphs of a text of draft guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level, except for three paragraphs, namely, paragraphs 2.3.3, 2.3.4 and 2.3.6 (see A/41/42, annex II).

(b) Present state of deliberations and recommendations at the 1988 session

41. At its 1988 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission again considered this subject in a consultation group. At its 129th meeting, on 19 May, the Commission adopted by consensus the report of the consultation group and the recommendation contained therein regarding agenda item 11, which reads as follows:

"Report of the Consultation Group on item 11"

"1. The General Assembly, at its forty-second session, adopted resolution 42/39 F of 30 November 1988 by which it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider, at its 1988 session, the 'Draft guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level', with a view to finalizing them in the most expeditious manner to be determined by that body.

"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 123rd meeting, on 2 May 1988, decided to establish a consultation group to deal with agenda item 11 regarding guidelines for confidence-building measures, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 42/39 F.

"3. In connection with its work, the Consultation Group had before it the following documents:

"(a) Annex II of the report of the Disarmament Commission on its 1986 session (A/41/42);

"(b) Alternatives to the relevant paragraphs contained in annex II to document A/41/42 (A/CN.10/1988/1tem 11/CRP.1);


"4. The Consultation Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Davidson L. Hepburn and held six meetings between 5 and 18 May 1988. Mr. Lin Kuo-Chung of the Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the Consultation Group. The Group also conducted informal consultations through the Chairman during this period.

"5. In the course of its deliberations, the Consultation Group concentrated its efforts on the three outstanding paragraphs contained in annex II to the report of the Disarmament Commission at its 1986 session (A/41/42), namely, paragraphs 2.3.3, 2.3.4 and 2.3.6, with a view to searching for a compromise text on them. In this regard, a number of proposals were put forward, particularly as contained in documents A/CN.10/1988/Item 11/CRP.1 and 2 and..."
other informal working papers during the discussions. All delegations participating in the deliberations conducted their work in a businesslike manner and co-operative spirit.

"6. At its 6th meeting, on 18 May, the Consultation Group adopted by consensus the compromise texts in connection with paragraphs 2.3.3, 2.3.4 and 2.3.6 contained in annex II to document A/41/42. Consequently, the Consultation Group concluded its consideration of agenda item 11 regarding guidelines for confidence-building measures and recommends to the Disarmament Commission that the following text, which was adopted by consensus, be recommended to the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament, for its consideration:

'Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level

'The Commission has elaborated the subsequent guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures for the consideration of the General Assembly at its forty-first session, in keeping with resolution 39/63 E.

'The text of the guidelines is agreed on all counts.

'The Commission wishes to draw particular attention to paragraph 1.2.5 of the guidelines where it is emphasized that the accumulation of relevant experience with confidence-building measures may necessitate the further development of the text at a later time, should the General Assembly so decide.

'In elaborating the guidelines, all delegations were aware, notwithstanding the high significance and role of confidence-building measures, of the primary importance of disarmament measures and the singular contribution only disarmament can make to the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war. Some delegations would have wished to see the criteria and characteristics of a regional approach to confidence-building measures spelt out in greater detail.

'1. General considerations

'1.1 Frame of reference

'1.1.1 The present guidelines for confidence-building measures have been drafted by the Disarmament Commission in pursuance of resolution 37/100 D adopted by consensus by the General Assembly, in which the Disarmament Commission was requested "to consider the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level", and of resolutions 38/73 A and 39/63 E in which it was asked to continue and conclude its work, and was further requested to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-first session a report containing such guidelines.
'1.1.2 In elaborating the guidelines the Disarmament Commission took into account, inter alia, the following United Nations documents: the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2), the relevant resolutions adopted by consensus by the General Assembly (resolutions 34/87 B, 35/156 B, 36/51 F, 37/100 D and 38/73), the replies received from Governments informing the Secretary-General of their views and experiences regarding confidence-building measures, a/ the Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures b/ by a Group of Governmental Experts, the proposals made by individual countries at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, g/ the second special session devoted to disarmament, as well as the views of delegations as expressed during the annual sessions of the Disarmament Commission in 1983, 1984 and 1986 and reflected in the relevant documents of those sessions.

'1.2 General political context

'1.2.1 These guidelines have been elaborated at a time when it is universally felt that efforts to heighten confidence among States are particularly pertinent and necessary. There is a common concern about the deterioration of the international situation, the continuous recourse to the threat or use of force and the further escalation of the international arms build-up, with the concomitant rise in instabilities, political tensions and in mistrust, and the heightened perception of the danger of war, both conventional and nuclear. At the same time, there is a growing awareness of the unacceptability of war in our time, and of the interdependence of the security of all States.

'1.2.2 This situation calls for every effort by the international community to take urgent action for the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war - in the language of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, a threat whose removal is the most acute and urgent task of the present day - and for concrete measures of disarmament - to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, to limit, reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability - but also for efforts to reduce political confrontation and to establish stable and co-operative relationships in all fields of international relations.

'1.2.3 In this context, a confidence-building process embracing all these fields has become increasingly important. Confidence-building measures, especially when applied in a comprehensive manner, have a potential to contribute significantly to the enhancement of peace and security and to promote and facilitate the attainment of disarmament measures.
1.2.4 This potential is at present already being explored in some regions and subregions of the world, where the States concerned - while remaining mindful of the need for global action and for disarmament measures - are joining forces to contribute, by the elaboration and implementation of confidence-building measures, to more stable relations and greater security, as well as the elimination of outside intervention and enhanced co-operation in their areas.

The present guidelines have been drafted with these significant experiences in mind, but they also purport to provide further support to these and other endeavours on the regional and global level. They do not, of course, exclude the simultaneous application of other security-enhancing measures.

1.2.5 These guidelines are part of a dynamic process over time. While they are designed to contribute to a greater usefulness and wider application of confidence-building measures, the accumulation of relevant experience may, in turn, necessitate the further development of the guidelines at a later time, should the General Assembly so decide.

1.3 Delimitation of the subject

1.3.1 Confidence-building measures and disarmament

1.3.1.1 Confidence-building measures must be neither a substitute nor a pre-condition for disarmament measures nor divert attention from them. Yet their potential for creating favourable conditions for progress in this field should be fully utilized in all regions of the world, in so far as they may facilitate and do not impair in any way the adoption of disarmament measures.

1.3.1.2 Effective disarmament and arms limitation measures which directly limit or reduce military potential have particularly high confidence-building value and, among these measures, those relating to nuclear disarmament as especially conducive to confidence-building.

1.3.1.3 The provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session relating to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, also have a high confidence-building value.

1.3.1.4 Confidence-building measures may be worked out and implemented independently in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures, or, no less important, as collateral measures in connection with specific measures of arms limitation and disarmament.
1.3.2 Scope of confidence-building measures: military and non-military measures

1.3.2.1 Confidence reflects a set of interrelated factors of a military as well as of a non-military character, and a plurality of approaches is needed to overcome fear, apprehension and mistrust between States and to replace them by confidence.

1.3.2.2 Since confidence relates to a wide spectrum of activities in the interaction among States, a comprehensive approach is indispensable and confidence-building is necessary in the political, military, economic, social, humanitarian and cultural fields. These should include removal of political tensions, progress towards disarmament, reshaping of the world economic system and the elimination of racial discrimination, of any form of hegemony and domination and of foreign occupation. It is important that in all these areas the confidence-building process should contribute to diminishing mistrust and enhancing trust among States by reducing and eventually eliminating potential causes for misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscalculation.

1.3.2.3 Notwithstanding the need for such a broad confidence-building process, and in accordance with the mandate of the Disarmament Commission, the main focus of the present guidelines for confidence-building measures relates to the military and security field, and the guidelines derive their specificity from these aspects.

1.3.2.4 In many regions of the world economic and other phenomena touch upon the security of a country with such immediacy that they cannot be disassociated from defence and military matters. Concrete measures of a non-military nature that are directly relevant to the national security and survival of States are therefore fully within the focus of the guidelines. In such cases military and non-military measures are complementary and reinforce each other's confidence-building value.

1.3.2.5 The appropriate mixture of different types of concrete measures should be determined for each region, depending on the perception of security and of the nature and levels of existing threats, by the countries of the regions themselves.
2. Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for their implementation

2.1 Principles

2.1.1 Strict adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and fulfilment of the commitments contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), the validity of which had been unanimously and categorically reaffirmed by all Member States at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, make a contribution of overriding importance for the preservation of peace and for ensuring the survival of mankind and the realization of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

2.1.2 In particular, and as a prerequisite for enhancing confidence among States, the following principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations must be strictly observed:

(a) Refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State;

(b) Non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States;

(c) Peaceful settlement of disputes;

(d) Sovereign equality of States and self-determination of peoples.

2.1.3 The strict observance of the principles and priorities of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session is of particular importance for enhancing confidence among States.

2.2 Objectives

2.2.1 The ultimate goal of confidence-building measures is to strengthen international peace and security and to contribute to the prevention of all wars, in particular nuclear war.

2.2.2 Confidence-building measures are to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the peaceful settlement of existing international problems and disputes and for the improvement and promotion of international relations based on justice, co-operation and solidarity; and to facilitate the solution of any situation which might lead to international friction.
'2.2.3 A major goal of confidence-building measures is the realization of universally recognized principles, particularly those contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

'2.2.4 By helping to create a climate in which the momentum towards a competitive arms build-up can be reduced and in which the importance of the military element is gradually diminished, confidence-building measures should in particular facilitate and promote the process of arms limitation and disarmament.

'2.2.5 A major objective is to reduce or even eliminate the causes of mistrust, fear, misunderstanding and miscalculation with regard to relevant military activities and intentions of other States, factors which may generate the perception of an impaired security and provide justification for the continuation of the global and regional arms build-up.

'2.2.6 A centrally important task of confidence-building measures is to reduce the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities, to help to prevent military confrontation as well as covert preparations for the commencement of a war, to reduce the risk of surprise attacks and of the outbreak of war by accident; and thereby, finally, to give effect and concrete expression to the solemn pledge of all nations to refrain from the threat or use of force in all its forms and to enhance security and stability.

'2.2.7 Given the enhanced awareness of the importance of compliance, confidence-building measures may serve the additional objective of facilitating verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

In addition, strict compliance with obligations and commitments in the field of disarmament and co-operation in the elaboration and implementation of adequate measures to ensure the verification of such compliance - satisfactory to all parties concerned and determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the relevant agreement - have a considerable confidence-building effect of their own.

Confidence-building measures cannot, however, supersede verification measures, which are an important element in arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

'2.3 Characteristics

'2.3.1 Confidence in international relations is based on the belief in the co-operative disposition of other States. Confidence will increase to the extent that the conduct of States, over time, indicates their willingness to practise non-aggressive and co-operative behaviour.
'2.3.2 Confidence-building requires a consensus of the States participating in the process. States must therefore decide freely and in the exercise of their sovereignty whether a confidence-building process is to be initiated and, if so, which measures are to be taken and how the process is to be pursued.

'2.3.3 Confidence-building is a step-by-step process of taking all concrete and effective measures which express political commitments and are of military significance and which are designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security to lessen tension and assist in arms limitation and disarmament. At each stage of this process States must be able to measure and assess the results achieved. Verification of compliance with agreed provisions should be a continuing process.

'2.3.4 Political commitments taken together with concrete measures giving expression and effect to those commitments are important instruments for confidence-building.

'2.3.5 Exchange or provision of relevant information on armed forces and armaments as well as on pertinent military activities plays an important role in the process of arms limitation and disarmament and of confidence-building. Such an exchange or provision could promote trust among States and reduce the occurrence of dangerous misconceptions about the intentions of States. Exchange or provision of information in the field of arms limitation, disarmament and confidence-building should be appropriately verifiable as provided for in respective arrangements, agreements or treaties.

'2.3.6 A detailed universal model being obviously impractical, confidence-building measures must be tailored to specific situations. The effectiveness of a concrete measure will increase the more it is adjusted to the specific perceptions of threat or the confidence requirements of a given situation or a particular region.

'2.3.7 If the circumstances of a particular situation and the principle of undiminished security allow, confidence-building measures could, within a step-by-step process, where desirable and appropriate, go further and (though not by themselves capable of diminishing military potentials) limit available military options.

'2.4 Implementation

'2.4.1 In order to optimize the implementation of confidence-building measures, States taking, or agreeing to, such measures should carefully analyse, and identify with the highest possible degree of clarity, the factors which favourably or adversely affect confidence in a specific situation.
2.4.2 Since States must be able to examine and assess the implementation of, and to ensure compliance with, a confidence-building arrangement, it is indispensable that the details of the established confidence-building measures should be defined precisely and clearly.

2.4.3 Misconceptions and prejudices, which may have developed over an extended period of time, cannot be overcome by a single application of confidence-building measures. The seriousness, credibility and reliability of a State's commitment to confidence-building, without which the confidence-building process cannot be successful, can be demonstrated only by consistent implementation over time.

2.4.4 The implementation of confidence-building measures should take place in such a manner as to ensure the right of each State to undiminished security, guaranteeing that no individual State or group of States obtains advantages over others at any stage of the confidence-building process.

2.4.5 The building of confidence is a dynamic process: experience and trust gained from the implementation of early largely voluntary and militarily less significant measures can facilitate agreement on further and more far-reaching measures.

The pace of the implementation process both in terms of timing and scope of desirable measures depends on prevailing circumstances. Confidence-building measures should be as substantial as possible and effected as rapidly as possible. Whilst in a specific situation the implementation of far-reaching arrangements at an early stage might be attainable, it would normally appear that a gradual step-by-step process is necessary.

2.4.6 Obligations undertaken in agreements on confidence-building measures must be fulfilled in good faith.

2.4.7 Confidence-building measures should be implemented on the global as well as on regional levels. Regional and global approaches are not contradictory but rather complementary and interrelated. In view of the interaction between global and regional events, progress on one level contributes to advancement on the other level; however, one is not a pre-condition for the other.

In considering the introduction of confidence-building measures in particular regions, the specific political, military and other conditions prevailing in the region should be fully taken into account. Confidence-building measures in a regional context should be adopted on the initiative and with the agreement of the States of the region concerned.
2.4.8 Confidence-building measures can be adopted in various forms. They can be agreed upon with the intention of creating legally binding obligations, in which case they represent international treaty law among parties. They can, however, also be agreed upon through politically binding commitments. Evolution of politically binding confidence-building measures into obligations under international law can also be envisaged.

2.4.9 For the assessment of progress in the implementing action of confidence-building measures, States should, to the extent possible and where appropriate, provide for procedures and mechanisms for review and evaluation. Where possible, time-frames could be agreed to facilitate this assessment in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

2.5 Development, prospects and opportunities

2.5.1 A very important qualitative step in enhancing the credibility and reliability of the confidence-building process may consist in strengthening the degree of commitment with which the various confidence-building measures are to be implemented; this, it should be recalled, is also applicable to the implementation of commitments undertaken in the field of disarmament. Voluntary and unilateral measures should, as early as appropriate, be developed into mutual, balanced and politically binding provisions and, if appropriate, into legally binding obligations.

2.5.2 The nature of a confidence-building measure may gradually be enhanced to the extent that its general acceptance as the correct pattern of behaviour grows. As a result, the consistent and uniform implementation of a politically binding confidence-building measure over a substantial period of time, together with the requisite opinio iuris, may lead to the development of an obligation under customary international law. In this way, the process of confidence-building may gradually contribute to the formation of new norms of international law.

2.5.3 Statements of intent and declarations, which in themselves contain no obligation to take specific measures but have the potential to contribute favourably to an atmosphere of greater mutual trust, should be developed further by more concrete agreements on specific measures.

2.5.4 Opportunities for the introduction of confidence-building measures are manifold. The following compilation of some of the main possibilities may be of assistance to States wishing to define what might present a suitable opportunity for action.
2.5.4.1 A particular need for confidence-building measures exists at times of political tension and crises, where appropriate measures can have a very important stabilizing effect.

2.5.4.2 Negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament can offer a particularly important opportunity to agree on confidence-building measures. As integral parts of an agreement itself or by way of supplementary agreements, they can have a beneficial effect on the parties' ability to achieve the purposes and goals of their particular negotiations and agreements by creating a climate of co-operation and understanding, by facilitating adequate provisions for verification acceptable to all the States concerned and corresponding to the nature, scope and purpose of the agreement, and by fostering reliable and credible implementation.

2.5.4.3 A particular opportunity might arise upon the introduction of peace-keeping forces, in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations Charter, into a region or on the cessation of hostilities between States.

2.5.4.4 Review conferences of arms limitation agreements might also provide an opportunity to consider confidence-building measures, provided these measures are in no way detrimental to the purposes of the agreements; the criteria of such action to be agreed upon by the parties to the agreements.

2.5.4.5 Many opportunities exist in conjunction with agreements among States in other areas of their relations, such as the political, economic, social and cultural fields, for example in the case of joint development projects, especially in frontier areas.

2.5.4.6 Confidence-building measures, or at least a statement of intent to develop them in the future, could also be included in any other form of political declaration on goals shared by two or more States.

2.5.4.7 Since it is especially the multilateral approach to international security and disarmament issues which enhances international confidence, the United Nations can contribute to increasing confidence by playing its central role in the field of international peace, security and disarmament. Organs of the United Nations and other international organizations could participate in encouraging the process of confidence-building as appropriate. In particular, the General Assembly and the Security Council - their tasks in the field of disarmament proper notwithstanding - can further this process, by adopting decisions and recommendations containing suggestions and requests to States to agree on and
implement confidence-building measures. The Secretary-General, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, could also contribute significantly to the process of confidence-building by suggesting specific confidence-building measures or by providing his good offices, particularly at times of crises, in promoting the establishment of certain confidence-building procedures.

2.5.4.8 In accordance with item IX of its established agenda - the so-called decalogue - and without prejudice to its negotiating role in all areas of its agenda, the Conference on Disarmament could identify and develop confidence-building measures in relation to agreements on disarmament and arms limitation under negotiation in the Conference.

'Notes

'a/ A/34/416 and Add.1-3, A/35/397.

'b/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3.

'c/ See A/S-12/AC.1/59.'
6. **Relationship between disarmament and development**

42. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 38/71 B of 15 December 1983, this item was included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission at its 1984 session.

43. At its 1984 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission considered the subject in a working group. The Working Group held extensive deliberations on the question of the relationship between disarmament and development on the basis of views and proposals submitted by a large number of delegations (A/CN.10/57 and Add.1-12), including a working paper by France (A/CN.10/1984/WG.IV/WP.1). Among all the various proposals submitted, the Group particularly considered the recommendation of convening an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development under the auspices of the United Nations. Following its deliberations on the item, the Group formulated some conclusions (see A/39/42, para. 27).

44. Because of the lack of consensus on the various proposals, particularly the convening of an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development, the Disarmament Commission recommended that efforts be continued to enable the General Assembly to reach, at its thirty-ninth session, a broad measure of agreement on the subject, taking into account the various views expressed in the Commission. In this connection, it should be noted that the General Assembly took up the proposal contained in the Commission's recommendation and decided to convene the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which was held from 24 August to 11 September 1987 in New York (see General Assembly resolutions 39/160, 40/155 and decisions 40/473 and 41/422).

7. **Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament**

(a) **Consideration of the subject from 1985 to 1987**


46. During its sessions from 1985 to 1988, the Commission considered this item in a working group. In the course of its deliberations, the Working Group conducted an extensive exchange of views on a broad range of issues relating to the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In this connection, various views were expressed and a number of suggestions for possible recommendations were put forward (see A/41/42, para. 30). In 1987, following the general exchange of views on the subject, a contact group was set up to conduct consultations for the elaboration of a set of recommendations. As a result, the Working Group decided to incorporate an unagreed paper as an annex to its report (see A/42/42, annex II). At the 1987 session, the Working Group recommended that the Commission continue to consider this subject at its 1988 session.

(b) **Present state of deliberations and recommendations at the 1988 session**

47. During its 1988 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission again considered this subject in its Working Group II, which re-established the Contact
Group for that purpose. At its 130th meeting, on 20 May, the Commission adopted by consensus the report of Working Group II and the recommendation contained therein regarding agenda item 7, which reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group II on item 7"

"1. By its resolution 42/38 O of 30 November 1987, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue its consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament as a matter of priority at its next substantive session, in 1988, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, taking into account, *inter alia*, the views and suggestions of Member States as well as the documents on the subject listed in the resolution; and to submit its report on the subject, including findings, recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, to the General Assembly at its forty-third session.

"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 123rd meeting, on 2 May 1988, decided to establish Working Group II to deal with agenda item 7 regarding the question of the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament as requested by General Assembly resolution 42/38 O.

"3. The Working Group met under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Paul Bamela Engo (Cameroon) and held five meetings between 4 and 19 May 1988. The Working Group through the Chairman also conducted informal consultations during that period. Ms. Silvana F. da Silva of the Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the Group.

"4. In carrying out its work, the Working Group had before it the following documents which, according to its decision, were to be considered on an equal footing:

"(a) Replies of Member States to the Secretary-General regarding the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament (A/CN.10/69 and Add.1-8, and A/CN.10/71);

"(b) Working paper submitted by the People's Republic of China (A/CN.10/79);

"(c) Conference room paper entitled 'Findings, recommendations and proposals (Chairman's draft)' (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.1);

"(d) Working paper on topic IV, submitted by Mexico (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.2);

"(e) Statement on topic IV, submitted by India (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.3);

"(f) Statement on topics I to III, submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.4);

"(g) Statement on topic IV, submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.5);"
(h) Working paper entitled 'Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament', submitted by Canada (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.6);

(i) Statement on the role of the United Nations in disarmament, submitted by the United States of America (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.7);

(j) Comments on the paper entitled 'Findings, recommendations and proposals', submitted by the United States of America (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.8);


(l) Views and suggestions on topics IV and VI, submitted by Japan (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.10);

(m) Some suggestions submitted by Australia (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.11);

(n) Statement on topic IV.1, submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.12);

(o) Proposal on topics I and II, submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.13);

(p) Proposals submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.14);

(q) Working paper containing proposals for recommendations on topics I to III, submitted by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.15);

(r) Working paper containing proposals for recommendations on topic IV, submitted by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.16);


(t) Views and suggestions on topic IV, submitted by Norway (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.18);

(u) Working paper submitted by India and Yugoslavia (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.19);

(v) Working paper entitled 'Role of the Secretary-General in the field of disarmament', submitted by Uruguay (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.20);

(w) Working paper containing a proposal on topic IV.3.a, 'World Disarmament Campaign', submitted by Bulgaria (A/CN.10/1986/WG.II/CRP.21);

(x) Working paper submitted by Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (A/CN.10/94);
5. At its first meeting, on 4 May 1988, the Working Group decided to establish an open-ended contact group to assist the Chairman in informal consultations. The Contact Group was co-ordinated by Ambassador Richard Butler (Australia) and considered the proposals submitted to the Commission. Those are contained in the documents before the Working Group listed in paragraph 4 above as well as in the views expressed and the proposals put forward in the course of deliberations on the item.

6. In carrying out its work, the Contact Group agreed to use annex II to the 1987 report of the Disarmament Commission as the basis for its discussions, with the understanding that all other documents listed in paragraph 4 above, as well as the views expressed and the proposals put forward in the course of deliberations, would be considered on an equal footing. With a view to facilitating its work, the Contact Group further agreed to commence its deliberations by addressing first the section devoted to machinery in annex II (paras. 14 to 16), and thereafter proceed to the section on political aspects (paras. 1 to 13), on the understanding that agreement on any one section would be contingent on agreement on the other. The Contact Group held seven meetings between 4 and 16 May 1988 and also conducted informal consultations through its Co-ordinator. Due to time constraints, the Contact Group was unable to consider the section on political aspects.

7. At the third meeting of the Working Group, on 17 May 1988, Ambassador Butler submitted to the Working Group a working paper which had formed the basis for discussions in the Contact Group. He gave an account of the discussions on Machinery and outlined areas in which some progress had been made and those on which substantial divergencies remained. The Working Group discussed these outstanding issues and the Chairman thereafter undertook further informal consultations.
8. At the fourth meeting of the Working Group, on 18 May 1988, the Chairman submitted proposals resulting from his consultations. Due to lack of time, the Group was unable to address such proposals and it was decided that the Chairman would continue with informal consultations.

9. At the fifth meeting of the Working Group, on 19 May 1988, the Working Group agreed to incorporate paragraphs 1 to 14 of Annex II of the 1987 Report of the Disarmament Commission as well as the working paper referred to in paragraph 7 above as an Annex to its Report in the belief that it could usefully complement papers referred to in paragraph 4 above and, in conjunction and on equal footing with those papers, might assist in the future deliberations and work on the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

10. At the same meeting, the Working Group decided to make the following recommendation to the Disarmament Commission under agenda item 7:

'The Disarmament Commission transmits the text contained in annex III of its report to the General Assembly for its consideration, bearing in mind that it was not agreed, with a view to the formulation of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, taking into account, inter alia, the views and suggestions of Member States as well as the aforementioned documents on the subject, and the results of the consideration of the relevant agenda item at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament.'

8. Curbina the naval arms race

48. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 39/151 I of 17 December 1984, this item was included in the agenda of the Commission at its 1985 session.

49. During its 1985 session, the Disarmament Commission considered this item in plenary meetings, during which a number of views were expressed and proposals were made by delegations (see A/CN.10/PV.93 and 94). At the end of the plenary meetings, the Chairman of the Commission undertook to prepare a report in consultation with "his friends" and other interested delegations. It was not possible, however, to reach consensus on a set of proposals for recommendations. The Commission accordingly decided to refer the question to the General Assembly at its fortieth session (see A/40/42, para. 31). The Commission thus concluded its consideration of the item.

9. Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade

50. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 39/148 Q of 17 December 1984, this item was included in the agenda of the Commission at its 1985 session.

51. During its 1985 session, the Disarmament Commission considered this item in plenary meetings and thereafter the Chairman of the Commission undertook the task of elaborating a report on the item in consultation with "his friends" and other interested delegations in a contact group. In the course of discussion on the subject at the plenary meetings, a number of views were expressed and suggestions
made by delegations (see A/CN.10/PV.95 and 96). Following the deliberations, agreement was reached on a consensus text on the stage reached in the deliberations on the item (see A/40/42, annex VII). In concluding its consideration of this item, the Disarmament Commission recommended to the General Assembly that it call upon all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States:

(a) To reaffirm their commitment to the Declaration of the Second Disarmament Decade;

(b) To reaffirm their commitment to the attainment of the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

(c) To adopt concrete and practical measures for preventing the outbreak of war, in particular nuclear war;

(d) To take appropriate steps to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race with a view to improving the international climate as well as enhancing the efficacy of disarmament negotiations;

(e) To exert greater effort in the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign.

10. Naval armaments and disarmament

(a) Consideration of the subject in 1986 and 1987


53. During the 1986 and 1987 sessions, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission held, under his responsibility, substantive and open-ended consultations on agenda item 8, regarding the question of naval armaments and disarmament, with the actual conduct of the consultations by a "friend of the Chairman". The consultations during the 1986 and 1987 sessions of the Commission resulted in a number of substantive findings and recommendations on the subject. These are contained in the working papers drafted by the Chairman of the Commission (A/CN.10/83 and 102), which met with the approval of all delegations participating in the substantive consultations and which, in their view, could form the basis of further deliberations on the subject (A/41/42, para. 31, and A/42/42, para. 44).

(b) Present state of deliberations and recommendations at the 1988 session

54. During its substantive session, the Disarmament Commission again considered this subject in a consultation group under the responsibility of the Chairman of the Commission. At its 129th meeting, on 19 May, the Commission adopted the report of the Chairman regarding agenda item 8, which reads as follows:
"Report of the Chairman on item 8

1. At its forty-second session, the General Assembly by resolution 42/38 K of 30 November 1987, entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament", inter alia, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its forthcoming session in 1988, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly not later than at its forty-third session.

2. In its consideration of the item, the Commission had before it the following documents:

(a) Report of the Secretary-General containing the study on the naval arms race (A/40/535);

(b) Study on the Naval Arms Race - replies received from Governments (Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Indonesia, Lesotho, Mexico and Sweden - A/CN.10/77; Australia and Norway - Add.1; Gabon - Add.2; Denmark, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - Add.3);

(c) Working paper submitted by China (A/CN.10/78);

(d) Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/80);

(e) Chairman's paper on agenda item 8 (A/CN.10/83);

(f) Working paper submitted by Finland (A/CN.10/90/Rev.1);

(g) Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/92);

(h) Working paper submitted by Sweden (A/CN.10/101/Rev.1);

(i) Chairman's paper on agenda item 8 (A/CN.10/102);


3. On 2 May 1988, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission decided to follow last year's course of action and to hold, under his responsibility, substantive and open-ended consultations on the subject. Pursuant to that decision, the Chairman delegated the actual conduct of the substantive and open-ended consultations to a 'friend of the Chairman'; in casu, the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Rolf Ekeus. The Consultation Group held eight meetings on the item. Mr. Derek G. Boothby of the Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the Consultation Group and Mr. Jack Gerardi-Siebert from the same Department acted as Deputy Secretary.

4. The meetings resulted in a number of substantive findings and recommendations on the subject. These are contained in a working paper by the Chairman (A/CN.10/113) which met with the approval of all delegations participating in the substantive consultations and which in their view could form the basis of further deliberations on the subject (see A/CN.10/113, para. 16)."
11. **Conventional disarmament**

(a) **Consideration of the subject in 1987**

55. Pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 41/59 C and 41/59 G of 3 December 1986, this item was included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission at its 1987 session.

56. During its 1987 session, the Disarmament Commission considered the item on conventional disarmament in a working group. In its initial stage of deliberations, the Working Group conducted an extensive exchange of views on substantive issues on the subject on the basis of a number of working papers submitted by the delegations as well as the study on conventional disarmament (A/39/348) that had been carried out by a group of governmental experts under the auspices of the United Nations. In the course of deliberations, many proposals on the question of conventional disarmament were put forward and a comprehensive draft report was presented by the Chairman with a view to reaching consensus on a set of recommendations on the subject. However, by the end of the session no agreement could be reached on such a text and the Working Group recommended that the Disarmament Commission continue to consider this item at its next session (see A/42/42, para. 45).

(b) **Present state of deliberations and recommendations at the 1988 session**

57. During its 1988 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission again considered the item regarding conventional disarmament in its Working Group III. At its 129th meeting, on 19 May, the Commission adopted by consensus the report of Working Group III and the recommendation contained therein regarding agenda item 9, which reads as follows:

"**Report of Working Group III on item 9**

"1. The General Assembly, at its forty-second session, adopted resolution 42/38 E of 30 November 1987 in which, inter alia, it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue at its 1988 session the consideration of the question of conventional disarmament, with a view to facilitating the identification of possible measures in the fields of conventional arms reduction and disarmament, and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session. By resolution 42/38 G, the General Assembly, inter alia, also requested the Disarmament Commission to consider further, at its 1988 substantive session, issues related to conventional disarmament.

"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 123rd meeting, on 4 May 1987, decided to establish Working Group III to deal with agenda item 9 regarding the substantive consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament, including the recommendations and conclusions contained in the *Study on Conventional Disarmament* (A/39/348), a/ pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 42/38 E and 42/38 G.

"3. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Skjold G. Mellbin (Denmark) and held 7 meetings and a number of informal consultations between 4 and 17 May. Mr. Derek G. Boothby of the Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the Working Group and Mr. Jack Gerardi-Siebert from the same Department acted as Deputy Secretary."
"4. In carrying out its work, the Working Group had before it the Study on Conventional Disarmament, the views of Member States on the study (A/40/486 and Add.1, A/41/501 and Add.1 and 2, and A/CN.10/86 and Add.1) and working papers presented by Member States as follows:

"(a) Working paper submitted by Denmark (A/CN.10/88);

"(b) Working paper submitted by China (A/CN.10/95);

"(c) Working paper submitted by Hungary (A/CN.10/98);

"(d) Working paper submitted by India (A/CN.10/100);


"5. The following papers were submitted to the Group:

"(a) Draft report of Working Group III (A/CN.10/1988/WG.III/CRP.1 and Rev.1);

"(b) Suggested additional paragraph 11 bis, submitted by Argentina (A/CN.10/1988/WG.III/CRP.2);

"(c) Suggestion by India for insertion of a new paragraph (A/CN.10/1988/WG.III/CRP.3);

"(d) Suggested additional paragraph 6 bis, submitted by Panama (A/CN.10/1988/WG.III/CRP.4);

"(e) Suggestion by Peru for new paragraph 9 bis (A/CN.10/1988/WG.III/CRP.5 - subsequently replaced by CRP.9);

"(f) Suggestion by China for new sentences to be added to paragraph 10 (A/CN.10/1988/WG.III/CRP.6);

"(g) Suggestion by Colombia for new paragraph 11 bis (A/CN.10/1988/WG.III/CRP.7);

"(h) Proposal by Hungary for new paragraph 9 bis (A/CN.10/1988/WG.III/CRP.8 and Rev.1);

"(i) Proposal by Peru for new paragraph 9 ter (A/CN.10/1988/WG.III/CRP.9);


"6. During the deliberations, an extensive discussion took place on the basis of the draft text contained in documents A/CN.10/1988/WG.III/CRP.1 and Rev.1 and of proposals made by delegations orally and as indicated in the conference room papers listed in paragraph 5 above. It proved not possible to find agreement on the substantive content of the draft report.
"7. At its 7th meeting, on 17 May, the Working Group decided to make the following recommendation to the Commission on agenda item 9:

'The Disarmament Commission recommends to the General Assembly that the Commission should continue its work on conventional disarmament at its next substantive session in 1989.'

"Notes"
"a/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.1."
12. Verification in all its aspects

(a) Consideration of the subject in 1987

58. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 41/86 Q of 4 December 1986, this item was included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission at its 1987 session.

59. During its 1987 session, the Disarmament Commission considered the item regarding verification in all its aspects in a working group. In its initial stage of deliberations on the subject, the Working Group conducted a general exchange of views on the basis of various working papers submitted by delegations as well as by the Chairman of the Working Group. Thereafter, the Group concentrated its efforts on the three major parts of the subject, namely, principles of verification, provisions and techniques of verification, and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification. In the course of discussions, there was widespread agreement that verification was a critically important element in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament and that, in view of recent events, the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission on this subject were very timely. In this regard, a number of suggestions for possible recommendations were put forward. As a result, the Working Group was able to achieve agreement on a set of recommendations on the three major parts of the subject (see A/42/42, para. 46 (paras. 7-11)). The Working Group recommended that the Disarmament Commission continue to consider the subject at its 1988 session (see A/42/42, para. 46).

(b) Present state of deliberations and recommendations at the 1988 session

60. During its 1988 substantive session, the Disarmament Commission again considered the item regarding verification in all its aspects in its Working Group IV. At its 129th meeting, on 19 May, the Commission adopted by consensus the report of Working Group IV and the recommendation contained therein regarding agenda item 10, which reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group IV on item 10"

"1. On 3 November 1987, the General Assembly adopted resolution 42/42 F, entitled 'Verification in all its aspects', paragraph 4 of which reads as follows:

'4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to conclude its consideration of verification in all its aspects at its 1988 substantive session, in the context of pursuing general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, regarding verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification, and to report on its deliberations, conclusions and recommendations to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament and to its forty-third session;'

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2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 123rd meeting, on 2 May 1988, decided to establish Working Group IV to deal with agenda item 10 regarding the subject of verification in all its aspects, and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 42/42 F.

3. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Douglas Roche (Canada) and held eight meetings between 5 and 18 May 1988. Mr. Lin Kuo-Chung of the Department for Disarmament Affairs served as Secretary of the Working Group and Mr. Tsutomu Ishiguri from the same Department acted as Deputy Secretary. The Working Group also conducted informal consultations through the Chairman during this period.

4. In carrying out its work, the Working Group had before it the replies of Member States to the Secretary-General regarding the subject of verification in all its aspects, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 40/152 of 16 December 1985, 41/86 Q of 4 December 1986 and 42/42 F of 30 November 1987, as contained in documents A/41/422 and Add.1 and 2, A/CN.10/87 and Add.1, and A/CN.10/106 and Add.1 and 2, as well as other relevant documents on the subject previously issued, including the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2). In addition, the Working Group had before it the following papers submitted at the 1988 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission:

   "(a) Verification in all its aspects: additional principles - paper submitted by the Chairman of Working Group IV (A/CN.10/107);

   "(b) Suggestions for additional principles respecting verification - working paper submitted by Canada (A/CN.10/111).

5. In the course of its deliberations, the Working Group conducted an exchange of views on the subject of verification in all its aspects with a view to concluding its consideration of the agenda item. In this connection, a number of suggestions for possible recommendations were put forward regarding the three major parts of the subject, namely, principles, provisions and techniques and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification.

6. At its 8th meeting, on 18 May, the Working Group concluded its consideration of agenda item 10 as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 42/42 F. The Group was able to agree on the three major parts of the subject, namely, principles of verification, provisions and techniques of verification and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification. The Working Group recommends to the Disarmament Commission that the following text, which was adopted by consensus, be recommended to the General Assembly at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, for its consideration:
I. PRINCIPLES OF VERIFICATION

In the context of pursuing general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements, the Disarmament Commission affirms the continued relevance of the principles concerning verification as enunciated in the following paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly:

'Paragraph 31: Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.

'Paragraph 91: In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

'Paragraph 92: In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

'The Disarmament Commission considers that the following general principles elaborate upon or add to those stated in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. While further work can be done to formulate adequately these and other principles relating to verification, the following is a non-exhaustive listing of such principles:

'(1) Adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

'(2) Verification is not an aim in itself, but an essential element in the process of achieving arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

'(3) Verification should promote the implementation of arms limitation and disarmament measures, build confidence among States and ensure that agreements are being observed by all parties.
(4) Adequate and effective verification requires employment of different techniques, such as national technical means, international technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspections.

(5) Verification in the arms limitation and disarmament process will benefit from greater openness.

(6) Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party undertakes not to interfere with the agreed methods, procedures and techniques of verification, when these are operating in a manner consistent with the provisions of the agreement and generally recognized principles of international law.

(7) Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the agreement.

(8) To assess the continuing adequacy and effectiveness of the verification system, an arms limitation and disarmament agreement should provide for procedures and mechanisms for review and evaluation. Where possible, time-frames for such reviews should be agreed in order to facilitate this assessment.

(9) Verification arrangements should be addressed at the outset and at every stage of negotiations on specific arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

(10) All States have equal rights to participate in the process of international verification of agreements to which they are parties.

(11) Adequate and effective verification arrangements must be capable of providing, in a timely fashion, clear and convincing evidence of compliance or non-compliance. Continued confirmation of compliance is an essential ingredient to building and maintaining confidence among the parties.

(12) Determinations about the adequacy, effectiveness and acceptability of specific methods and arrangements intended to verify compliance with the provisions of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement can only be made within the context of that agreement.

(13) Verification of compliance with the obligations imposed by an arms limitation and disarmament agreement is an activity conducted by the parties to an arms limitation and disarmament agreement or by an organisation at the request and with the explicit consent of the parties, and is an expression of the sovereign right of States to enter into such arrangements.
'(14) Requests for inspections or information in accordance with the provisions of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement, should be considered as a normal component of the verification process. Such requests should be used only for the purposes of the determination of compliance, care being taken to avoid abuses.

'(15) Verification arrangements should be implemented without discrimination, and, in accomplishing their purpose, avoid unduly interfering with the internal affairs of State parties or other States, or jeopardizing their economic, technological and social development.

'(16) To be adequate and effective, a verification régime for an agreement must cover all relevant weapons, facilities, locations, installations and activities.

'II. PROVISIONS AND TECHNIQUES OF VERIFICATION

'1. The Disarmament Commission recognizes that there is a variety of methods, procedures and techniques available for the verification of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements. No verification arrangements can be absolutely foolproof. Adequate and effective verification will involve the use of a combination of various verification methods, procedures and techniques which will operate in such a manner that they reinforce one another. Some methods, procedures and techniques are uniquely applicable in specific arms limitation and disarmament contexts, while others have wider applicability. The determination of the appropriate details and combination of methods, procedures and techniques will vary with the scope and nature of the arms limitation and disarmament agreement and will be a critical component of the specific treaty negotiations.

'2. The Disarmament Commission also emphasises that the inclusion of provisions respecting procedures for consultation and co-operation can greatly assist in resolving problems emerging in the course of the implementation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements, such as concerns about compliance. Such provisions for consultation and co-operation could involve the use of some or all of the following: bilateral consultations, the United Nations, and/or the use of organizations set up under the specific agreement in question.

'3. The Disarmament Commission also recognizes that under general international law, parties to treaties are obligated to take the measures necessary for implementation of the treaty at the national level. Such national measures should be undertaken in a fashion to facilitate adequate and effective verification.

'4. The Disarmament Commission recognizes the utility of continuing the examination of verification methods, procedures and techniques. One possible example of the work that could be done is the preparation of a compilation of possible verification methods, procedures and techniques, including those which form part of existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements as well as those which have been proposed. Such a
catalogue, which could form part of a verification database, would be
illustrative and would exemplify the range and scope of methods,
procedures and techniques applicable to the verification of compliance. It
could be useful in facilitating a consideration of verification as an
integral part of arms limitation and disarmament negotiations. The
survey of methods, procedures and techniques that would be necessary to
prepare such a compilation could also provide the initial steps towards
producing a directory of sources of verification expertise. It could
also serve to identify current research activities relating to
verification and indicate areas where more research would be beneficial.
The format and expense of such a catalogue should be subject to further
examination.

5. The Disarmament Commission takes note that many countries have
provided to the international community the results of their research
concerning verification matters, whether it be in the use of existing
technology or in the consideration of how technology might evolve in
order to facilitate the verification of future agreements. The
Disarmament Commission commends to experts and researchers the worthy
endeavour of deepening the international community's understanding of
verification provisions and techniques.

'III. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS MEMBER STATES
IN THE FIELD OF VERIFICATION

1. The Disarmament Commission welcomes the view expressed by the
Secretary-General in his 1987 report on the work of the Organization that
the United Nations can make a significant contribution in the field of
verification. a/ Such a contribution can be viewed as in accordance with
the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations as
stated in paragraph 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special
Session of the General Assembly.

2. The Disarmament Commission takes note of various views expressed and
concrete proposals made, within the framework of its discussions, by a
number of countries with respect to the nature and scope of the role that
the United Nations could possibly play in the context of verification of
compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements. These
proposals, which were discussed but on which no consensus was possible,
include, inter alia: (a) the establishment of a verification database
within the United Nations; (b) the development of a United Nations
capacity to provide advice to negotiators respecting verification
matters; (c) research into the process, structures, procedures and
techniques of verification as well as the role of the United Nations,
beginning with a request to the Secretary-General to look into these and
other matters with the assistance of qualified experts; (d) on a
responsive basis, and with the consent of the parties to an arms
limitation and disarmament negotiation or agreement, potential
involvement by the United Nations in the formulation and implementation
of verification provisions of specific agreements; (e) the establishment
of an integrated multilateral verification system within the United
Nations; and (f) the setting up, under the aegis of the United Nations,
of a mechanism for extensive international verification of compliance with agreements on reducing international tension and limiting armaments and on the military situation in conflict areas.

'Notes

13. Special report of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament

61. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 42/42 G of 30 November 1987, this item was included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission at its 1988 substantive session.

62. In the course of consideration of this item, the Disarmament Commission agreed to submit all those recommendations made by it in connection with its agenda items during the sessions from 1983 to 1988, including those contained in the reports of the subsidiary bodies, to the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament, for its consideration.

Notes


3/ Documents issued by the subsidiary bodies of the Commission are not included in the list.

4/ United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.1.


6/ The agenda items considered by various sessions are listed in chronological order.

7/ The language of sub-item 2 (b) has varied from year to year depending upon the state of deliberations in the Commission.

8/ The title of this item in the 1988 session was shortened.

9/ The title of this item was shortened in the 1987 and 1988 sessions. In connection with the adoption of the agenda at the 1986, 1987 and 1988 sessions, the United States of America expressed its reservation on the inclusion of this item in the agenda (see A/CN.10/PV.102).

10/ The short titles used in this section refer to the subject-matter of the agenda items and are here used for the sake of convenience. The full titles of the agenda items are contained in para. 20 above.

11/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.1.
### ANNEX I

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A/CN.10/13

Approaches to conventional disarmament within the framework of the United Nations: working paper submitted by Denmark

A/CN.10/14

Freezing and reduction of military expenditures: working paper jointly submitted by Romania and Sweden

A/CN.10/15

Elements of a draft resolution entitled "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade": working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of a number of countries

A/CN.10/16

Elements of a draft resolution entitled "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade": working paper submitted by Cuba on behalf of the non-aligned countries

A/CN.10/17

Elements for inclusion in a draft resolution on the declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade: working paper submitted by Poland on behalf of Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian SSR and the USSR

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Working paper on principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures, jointly submitted by Romania and Sweden

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Conventional disarmament: working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Verification in all its aspects: working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Provisional agenda dated 30 April 1987

Provisional agenda dated 19 November 1987

Note by the Secretary-General

Verification in all its aspects

Verification in all its aspects: additional principles: paper submitted by the Chairman of Working Group IV

Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: working paper submitted by Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

Naval armaments and disarmament: confidence-building measures at sea: working paper submitted by Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Negotiations on nuclear disarmament: working paper submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Suggestions for additional principles respecting verification: working paper submitted by Canada

Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community

Naval armaments and disarmament: Chairman's paper on agenda item 8

Naval armaments and disarmament: naval confidence-building measures: working paper submitted by Finland

Naval armaments and disarmament: working paper submitted by Sweden
Documents issued by the subsidiary bodies are not included in the list.

Document A/CN.10/84 was withdrawn.
Recommendation No. 1

All States Members of the United Nations should reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and should strictly observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular, the principles of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

Recommendation No. 2

All States are urged to contribute effectively to the strengthening of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security.

While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race.

Everything possible should be done to enable the Conference on Disarmament, which is a single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, to fulfil its responsibilities by the negotiation and adoption of concrete measures of disarmament to promote effectively the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Recommendation No. 3

In order to implement the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2), all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should urgently engage in negotiations to fulfil the priority tasks set forth in its Programme of Action.

Negotiations of agreements in conformity with paragraph 50 of the Final Document with a view to halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race and bringing about as soon as possible the achievement of the final objective defined therein, namely, the ultimate and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, should be intensified or, as appropriate, urgently initiated.
Negotiations, in appropriate forums, to achieve reductions in weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, as well as other measures in the disarmament field, should be pursued and agreements concluded in accordance with paragraphs 29 and 31 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Recommendation No. 4

[The Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly note with satisfaction the agreement reached at Geneva in November 1985 at the summit meeting of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to accelerate the work at the negotiations between them on nuclear and space arms, with a view to accomplishing the tasks set out in the joint communiqué of 8 January 1985 of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, namely, to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability [with the ultimate aim of achieving the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere]. The General Assembly could also express strong support for the call by the leaders of the two States for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground.

In this context, the Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly note with satisfaction the joint statement of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Geneva summit meeting, in particular the agreement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, that any conflict between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America could have catastrophic consequences, that any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional should be prevented and that they will not seek to achieve military superiority.

It is urgently needed to turn these agreements into practical results.

The two negotiating parties should bear constantly in mind that not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples of the world are at stake and, accordingly, should keep the General Assembly [and the Conference on Disarmament] duly informed of the progress of their negotiations, without prejudice to the progress of the negotiations.

Given the desire of all Member States for speedy accomplishment of the agreed tasks of the negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, it is of great importance to pursue them in a constructive and accommodating spirit, to uphold the agreement on the scope of the negotiations.

[Bilateral negotiations do not in any way diminish the urgent need to carry out multilateral negotiations on the priority items included in the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.]

[Bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other.]

Recommendation No. 5

All States, in particular the major nuclear-weapon States, are urged to pursue their negotiations on arms limitations and disarmament with vigour and to keep the
United Nations appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

**Recommendation No. 6**

[The Conference on Disarmament should proceed without delay to negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and, in particular, begin the elaboration of practical measures for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and for nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, including a nuclear disarmament programme. Such a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, should provide for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination. It should aim at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world by the year 2000 and could consist of three stages:

(a) A first stage of five to eight years, providing for reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America as well as for the renunciation of the development, testing and deployment of space-strike weapons by them and a moratorium on their nuclear explosions;

(b) A second stage, which would last for five to seven years and during which the other nuclear-weapon States would take part in the nuclear disarmament process;

(c) A last stage, during which the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons will be completed.

Verification of the destruction or limitation of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles would be carried out by national technical means, on-site inspections and other measures.]

**Recommendation No. 7**

[A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty prohibiting all nuclear-test explosions by all States in all environments for all time should be concluded as a matter of urgency. To this end the Conference on Disarmament should immediately proceed to the negotiations required for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The issues of the verification of compliance with the agreement to be negotiated could be considered simultaneously with the other substantive issues relating to a prohibition of nuclear tests.]

[The Disarmament Commission [further] recommends that the General Assembly acknowledge the importance of the opening, on 9 November 1987, of full-scale step-by-step negotiations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which, in accordance with their joint statement of 17 September 1987, will be conducted in a single forum and in which the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an]
effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as
the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately,
their elimination.]

[Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States are called
upon to declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions starting from a date to be
agreed among all of them. The two major nuclear Powers which have conducted the
most of nuclear explosions are called on to stop their nuclear tests immediately.]

Recommendation No. 8

Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations. Such a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international
law and the Charter of the United Nations and entails international responsibility.

The recommendations Nos. 9-14 have been proposed taking fully into account the
general applicability of recommendation No. 8.

Recommendation No. 9

In order to intensify the disarmament process, it should be taken into
consideration that mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of
destruction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most
powerful weapons ever produced. Therefore, disarmament, in particular nuclear
disarmament, should be approached as a matter of highest priority and of vital
importance for humanity.

Measures for the prevention of nuclear war and for the promotion of nuclear
disarmament must take into account the security interests of nuclear-weapon and
non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

Recommendation No. 10

There is today wide endorsement of the statement of the two major
nuclear-weapon States that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, all States should co-operate for
the adoption of practical and appropriate measures to prevent the outbreak of a
nuclear war and to avoid use of nuclear weapons. Note should be taken of existing
undertakings by two nuclear-weapon States about non-first use of nuclear weapons as
well as declarations made by some States about non-use of any weapon, except in
response to an armed attack.

The Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly welcome the
agreement on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres in Washington and
Moscow which the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of
outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation,
miscalculation, or accident, concluded on 15 September 1987.

[The Conference on Disarmament should undertake, as a matter of the highest
priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and
practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war.]
The Security Council of the United Nations could also take up the question of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war.

Recommendation No. 11

A freeze on nuclear weaponry which could begin with that of the two nuclear-weapon States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals. Such a freeze would be subject to all relevant measures and procedures of verification which have already been agreed upon by the parties in the case of the SALT I and SALT II treaties, as well as those agreed upon in principle by them during the preparatory trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban held at Geneva.

A freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons should be immediately imposed, as a first step to the reduction and, eventually, the elimination of nuclear arsenals.

It is of paramount importance for the nuclear Powers which possess the largest nuclear arsenals to take the lead in halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race between them and reducing drastically their existing nuclear arsenals so as to create propitious conditions for all the nuclear States further to adopt nuclear disarmament measures, including a freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons.

Negotiations should be conducted and concluded which would lead to substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. Agreements should be concluded which would result in substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. These reductions must be mutual, balanced and effectively verifiable.

A mutually agreed, balanced and verifiable freeze on nuclear arsenals should be negotiated between the nuclear-weapon States which should be followed by deep cuts in those arsenals and not be seen as an alternative to disarmament.

Recommendation No. 12

Agreements should be concluded which would result in substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. These reductions must be mutual, balanced and effectively verifiable. The Disarmament Commission welcomes the signing, on 8 December 1987, of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which is historic both for its objective - the complete elimination of an entire class of United States and Soviet nuclear arms - and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions.

Recommendation No. 13

The fundamental approach to the prevention of nuclear war involves the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Pending the attainment of this goal, the countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead and stop testing, producing and deploying nuclear weapons and reduce drastically their existing nuclear weapons. After that, corresponding measures should be taken by the other nuclear-weapon States according to a reasonable ratio and procedure.
Recommendation No. 14

[An agreement giving full legally binding force to a commitment by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use these terrible weapons of mass destruction should be concluded.]

[Pending the adoption of a convention on prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States, declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, collectively or individually, on non-first use of nuclear weapons would be a means of strengthening the climate of confidence and a first step towards lessening the risk of nuclear conflict.]

[In accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter, States should never use any weapon except in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence.]

Recommendation No. 15

[A convention on prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States should be urgently negotiated and adopted, pending effective measures of nuclear disarmament.]

Text proposed as an alternative to recommendations Nos. 13 and 14

[Reaffirming the prohibition of the threat or use of force under the Charter of the United Nations, States should commit themselves, collectively or individually, never to be the first to use any weapon, nuclear or conventional, except in exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.]

Recommendation No. 16

[In view of the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space, in particular the impending danger of exacerbating the current state of insecurity by developments that could further undermine international peace and security, the Conference on Disarmament should urgently undertake negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.]

In order to contribute to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the Conference on Disarmament should intensify its work in accordance with the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee set up by the Conference.

[It is understood that the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee constitutes only a first step towards multilateral negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.]

Recommendation No. 17

Pending comprehensive measures of nuclear and conventional disarmament, States should continue to co-operate in the development of a comprehensive set of measures for the prevention of nuclear war and of all armed conflict. These could include a wide array of confidence-building measures, including measures relating to nuclear weapons, to be negotiated in appropriate frameworks, for regional or global application.
Recommendation No. 18

Nuclear and conventional weapons as well as military forces should be reduced in a mutual, balanced and verifiable manner, particularly in regions where their concentration has attained the most dangerous levels.

Recommendation No. 19

[No deployment of nuclear weapons should take place in territories where there are no such weapons. In countries where such weapons have already been installed, stockpiles of such weapons should not be increased or replaced with new ones. The nuclear weapons deployed by nuclear-weapon States outside their own territories should be withdrawn.]

Recommendation No. 20

[The nuclear-weapon States should refrain from military manoeuvres in which nuclear energy is used for non-peaceful purposes, especially in situations where nuclear armaments are deployed in close proximity of States not possessing nuclear weapons, thus endangering their security.]

Recommendation No. 21

Bearing in mind that the nuclear-weapon States should guarantee that non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons and that declarations were made in this context, negotiations should proceed for the conclusion [, as appropriate,] of effective international arrangements to assure [all] non-nuclear-weapon States [, without any discrimination,] against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Recommendation No. 22

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements and/or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitute an important disarmament measure [and] [. Nuclear-weapon-free zones which will enhance world-wide security and stability] should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of [each region] [the region in question] should be taken into account. [Those agreements or arrangements should be fully complied with and the effective respect for the status of such zones by [all] [nuclear-weapon] States [concerned] should be subject to adequate [agreed] verification procedures, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.]

Recommendation No. 23

[The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world on the basis of conditions clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole. In the process of setting up such zones, the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations should be taken into account.]
Recommendation No. 24

All States should co-operate to achieve the goal of nuclear non-proliferation which is, on the one hand, to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States and, on the other, progressively to reduce and eventually to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. States should fully implement all the provisions of relevant international treaties to which they are parties. Nuclear-weapon States in particular should urgently adopt effective measures for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race.

Recommendation No. 25

Since the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects is a matter of universal concern, all States are jointly urged to take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Recommendation No. 26

[For the sake of comprehensive international security military concepts and doctrines must be of a defensive character that presupposes the maintenance of armed forces at the lowest possible level and the reduction of military capabilities to a level indispensable for defence.]

II

Introductory sentence

While nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, the following recommendations on other priority measures of disarmament should be pursued together with nuclear disarmament negotiations.

Recommendation No. 1

All efforts should be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. To this end, the Conference on Disarmament should, as a matter of high priority, intensify the negotiations on such a convention with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date.

Recommendation No. 2

The qualitative development and the growing accumulation of conventional weapons in many parts of the world add a new dimension to the arms race [especially among States possessing the largest military arsenals]. Therefore, conventional disarmament should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament.

The countries with the largest military arsenals, which bear a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions, and the member States of the two major military alliances are urged to continue negotiations through various forums on conventional disarmament in earnest, with a
view to reaching early agreement on the limitation and gradual and balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons under effective international control in their respective regions, particularly in Europe, which has the largest concentration of arms and forces in the world.

All States, while taking into account the need to protect security and maintain necessary defensive capabilities, are encouraged to intensify their efforts and take, either on their own or in a regional context, appropriate steps to promote progress in conventional disarmament and enhance peace and security.

Regional disarmament measures should be taken at the initiative and with the participation of all the States concerned and must take into account the specific conditions characteristic of each region. Disarmament efforts in a region cannot be isolated either from the disarmament efforts in other regions or from global disarmament efforts both in the nuclear and conventional field.

Recommendation No. 3

[The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in a manner that would ensure the right of each State to undiminished security. However, massive arms supply to States that base their security on false claims in order to obtain advantages over others as well as to enhance colonial domination and foreign occupation leads to the perpetuation of intolerable situations and the exacerbation of conflicts and gravely endangers international peace and security and should therefore be ended.]

Recommendation No. 4

[An arms race in outer space should be prevented. In this context, the Disarmament Commission welcomes the recent decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament, namely:

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Conference on Disarmament decides to re-establish an Ad Hoc committee under item 5 of its agenda entitled 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space'.

"The Conference requests the Ad Hoc Committee, in discharging that responsibility, to continue to examine, and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

"The Ad Hoc Committee, in carrying out this work, will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives as well as developments which have taken place since the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee, in 1985, and report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament before the end of its 1987 session."

[Consequently, the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee constitutes only a first step towards the urgent initiation of multilateral negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in all its aspects in outer space.]]

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Recommendation No. 5

In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements. The climate of confidence among nations would be significantly improved with agreements on measures for halting the arms race and effective reductions of armaments leading to their complete elimination. The objective at each stage of this process of disarmament should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments.

Recommendation No. 6

[Disarmament would be facilitated by the readiness of all States to participate in negotiations aimed at the peaceful solution of conflicts to which they are a party. The refusal of a Government to initiate negotiations on international disputes to which it is a party fosters the continuation of such controversies thus constituting a possible cause of acceleration of the arms race.]

[Disarmament and comprehensive international security would be facilitated by the readiness of all States to participate in negotiations aimed at the peaceful solution of conflicts to which they may be parties. The refusal to initiate negotiations on international disputes fosters the continuation of such controversies thus constituting a possible cause of acceleration of the arms race.]

[A favourable atmosphere for disarmament would be promoted by avoidance of the use of force in attempting to settle disputes.]

Recommendation No. 7

In the context of the World Disarmament Campaign measures should be adopted in order that the public in all regions of the world has access to a broad range of objective information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament, and the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war, to facilitate informed choices about these vital questions concerning efforts to halt and reverse the arms race. Such a campaign should promote public interest in and support for the goals described above and in particular for the reaching of agreements on measures of arms limitation and disarmament with a view to achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
Annex III

Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament

In conducting its review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, the Commission reviewed both political and machinery aspects of that role.

Political aspects

1. The primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security.

2. The importance of full commitment by all States Members of the United Nations to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security was reaffirmed.

3. Genuine and lasting peace can be created only through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

4. Multilateral agreement on measures of disarmament has an important role in the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the right and the duty to be concerned with and to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament, in conformity with the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly and the Concluding Document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly. All States have the right to participate on an equal footing in multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a bearing on their national security.

6. Most of the goals set in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly have not so far been achieved. In order to increase momentum towards those goals, political will is required on all sides, but in particular among the nuclear-weapon Powers and other militarily significant States which have been recognized in the Final Document as bearing the primary responsibility for halting and reversing the arms race and moving towards disarmament.

7. The United Nations, a forum where all nations have the opportunity to contribute to the process of disarmament deliberations and negotiations, has, in accordance with the Charter, a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament.

8. To help the United Nations perform its designated role, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States must acknowledge their special
responsibility towards the international community and demonstrate the necessary political will to overcome their differences and move towards concrete disarmament measures.

9. It is important for all States to treat recommendations by the United Nations, especially those adopted by consensus, with respect, and truly act in accordance with their assumed political obligations. This also applies to the important task of giving effect to the Final Document adopted by general consent at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

10. The United Nations should encourage and facilitate all disarmament efforts — unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral — and be kept duly informed, through the General Assembly or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of developments in disarmament efforts outside its aegis, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations. The need for the United Nations to be kept informed of such outside efforts is the greater when the subject-matter of the negotiations concerns the wider interests of other countries and the international community as a whole.

11. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

12. Disarmament is an essential factor for lasting peace and security. It was also recognized that improvement in the international security situation would facilitate sustained progress in the field of disarmament. Consequently, disarmament should be pursued within the overall context of the search for the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war, and the establishment of an effective system of collective security for the maintenance of international peace and security.

13. The permanent members of the Security Council, having regard to their special status and responsibilities under the Charter, should undertake as a matter of extreme urgency to ensure the effectiveness of the central role of the Security Council with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security including disarmament.

Machinery

14. It was recognized that while the effectiveness of the United Nations machinery in the field of disarmament clearly depends on the need for States to exercise political will to implement the programme of action contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the multilateral disarmament machinery should be utilized more effectively and also improved in order to help the United Nations fulfil its role in the field of disarmament.

15. Accordingly, the Commission made recommendations with respect to a number of practical measures as follows:
(1) General Assembly and its organs

The General Assembly constitutes the principal forum for deliberation on disarmament issues.

(a) Special sessions

Special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be convened with a view to facilitating international co-operation on issues related to disarmament. Special sessions should provide the opportunity for consideration at a significant level of relevant issues such as: the appraisal of developments in the field of disarmament; the encouragement and support of the process of negotiations at all levels; the possibility of promoting and strengthening the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament; the assessment of the implementation of agreed programmes and measures in this field; and the adoption of concrete programmes and measures for the future.

(b) First Committee

The First Committee of the General Assembly should continue to serve as its Main Committee dealing with disarmament and related international security questions. Efforts to improve the effectiveness of the work of the First Committee, and to expand the area of consensus, should continue to be made. In order to enhance the effectiveness of the General Assembly's annual consideration of disarmament issues in its First Committee, inter alia, the implementation of the following procedural recommendations adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-second session should be expedited:

(i) The agenda of the First Committee should be rationalized by grouping or merging related items to the extent possible in order to provide greater organizational clarity and without prejudging their substance;

(ii) Recommendations on procedural matters should be adopted as decisions, not as resolutions;

(iii) In the interest of maximum effectiveness and efficiency, draft resolutions on the same subject or under the same agenda items should be merged, whenever possible;

(iv) A period of time for discussion and for organized informal consultations among delegations should be allocated in the programme of work of the First Committee;

(v) The First Committee should have a single general debate on all disarmament questions during which delegations may speak on specific issues, in order to ensure the best use of time and resources available;

(vi) The deadline for the submission of draft resolutions on disarmament items should be advanced further to the extent feasible with a view to allowing sufficient time for consultations before proceeding to take action upon them.
(c) **Disarmament Commission**

The efficiency of the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission needs to be improved. Further consideration should be given to this issue in appropriate forums, including at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Such consideration should seek to ensure that the Commission is provided with an appropriate agenda, bearing in mind the time available to it at its annual session, and is enabled to continue to play a constructive role within the United Nations disarmament machinery.

(2) **Security Council**

In any further review of the disarmament machinery of the United Nations, consideration might also be given to the role of the Security Council, consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter.

(3) **The Secretary-General**

The role of the Secretary-General, as envisaged in the Charter, facilitates the discharge of the responsibilities of the United Nations to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. All States should give the Secretary-General maximum support to enable him to discharge, as effectively as possible, his responsibilities under the Charter.

In the exercise of his role, the Secretary-General should be assisted by an adequately staffed and funded Department for Disarmament Affairs. The present resource allocation to the Department is inadequate and, accordingly, it is recommended, should be reviewed by relevant bodies taking into account the existing resources of the United Nations.

The role of the Department for Disarmament Affairs in assisting the Secretary-General in his co-ordination of the activities of the United Nations and specialized agencies in the field of disarmament should be strengthened.

(4) **Conference on Disarmament**

The unique character and importance of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body was underlined. The need for the Conference on Disarmament to review its procedures and organization with a view to improving the performance of this single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament measures was recognized. In this regard, the Conference's formal and informal discussions on questions related to its improved and effective functioning were welcomed. Accordingly, it was recommended that the Conference continue its consideration of its improved and effective functioning as well as the question of the expansion of membership of the Conference, with a view to it adopting concrete recommendations and decisions on those subjects at the earliest opportunity.

The Commission also recognized that observers were unable to contribute fully to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and recommended that the Conference consider changes to its rules of procedure so as to enable observers to participate more effectively in its work.
(5) Other organs

(a) Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies

United Nations disarmament studies play a useful role as a means of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament. The invitation of the General Assembly to Member States to take note of the conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Board in presenting proposals for disarmament studies or research should be taken into consideration. In that connection, it was recommended that:

(i) The contribution of United Nations studies to the practical solution of disarmament issues should be enhanced;

(ii) The Board give timely consideration to study proposals and to the means by which they might best be carried out;

(iii) A co-ordinated approach to make the most effective use of the facilities and resources available to the United Nations Secretariat's Department for Disarmament Affairs and to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research be established;

(iv) The future role of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies should also be addressed.

(b) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

It was agreed that the role played by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research-UNIDIR in the field of disarmament studies and research is important and it was recommended that its work should be supported.

16. Further to the recommendations recorded above, other proposals were submitted to the Commission on the same elements of the disarmament machinery. In addition, proposals were submitted on the following elements of the machinery: the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean; the World Disarmament Campaign; the specialized agencies; review conferences; Disarmament Week; and regional arrangements.