DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTIETH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 3 June 1983, at 10.00 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil)

Concluding statements (continued)
Organization of work
Closure of the session

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

CONCLUDING STATEMENTS (continued)

Mr. OTT (German Democratic Republic): The delegation of the German Democratic Republic has actively participated in the deliberations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and has made a constructive contribution to the elaboration of its report. It has been guided in its work by the principled view of my Government that the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe, the cessation of the arms race and the achievement of progress on the road to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, are of the utmost significance for ensuring the peaceful future of my country and all other countries. As everyone can see, the questions which are at present the most topical are those which have come up in connection with the planned stationing by the United States of new medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe and the new strategic armaments it has envisaged, which would begin a new round in the arms race. The statement made a few days ago in Williamsburg demonstrates anew the extent of the danger.

Jointly with the other States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the German Democratic Republic, in Prague in January this year, submitted constructive proposals whose implementation would help to prevent a new round in the arms race and to strengthen security in general. The far-reaching proposals towards that end made by the USSR could bring about agreements acceptable to all sides on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and on the reduction of strategic weapons. It is not yet too late to find solutions through agreements which would promote the security of all States.

In contrast to this, the main Power in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continues to persist in its intention to achieve strategic superiority through the introduction of new weapon systems or through unbalanced arms limitation. Official statements are made to the effect that the new missiles would be used as bargaining chips in negotiations. Such attempts at exerting pressure have already failed in the past and have no chance of succeeding at present or in the future. Apart from the fact that it has always been a pretext for justifying the deployment of new weapon systems, such an approach is incompatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and undermines the confidence to which, here in the Disarmament Commission, the same group of States has attributed paramount importance as the basis for international co-operation and for disarmament negotiations.
My Government fully approves of the statement by the USSR of 28 May 1983, in which the fateful consequences of the stationing of new medium-range missiles in Western Europe is pointed out. That statement takes the realities into account and is an expression of the determination of the socialist States to take necessary counter-measures in case such missiles are deployed. This is no threat, but it reflects historical experience and the need to preserve peace. The policy pursued by socialist States remains consistent and calculable, even in this case.

These developments, as well as the general issues of nuclear disarmament, have played an important role at this session of the Disarmament Commission. They have been discussed under agenda item 4 and in other contexts as well. Several related working papers have been presented, by my delegation among others. Working paper A/CN.10/45 of the group of non-aligned countries deserves particular attention. It contains ideas about the solution of the most urgent question of nuclear disarmament, with which my delegation widely agrees. This is also true of working paper A/CN.10/43 on the nuclear capability of South Africa.

However, much to our regret, we have to state that the formulation of joint texts on those questions could not be achieved in the Commission owing to resistance on the part of some delegations. In this connection, it cannot be overlocked that it was those very delegations which, in open contradiction of paragraph 13 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, attempted to justify the strategy of deterrence and, with reference to those doctrines, tried to explain their resistance to any concrete step towards nuclear-arms limitation and disarmament, their rejection of the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons and the creation in central Europe of a zone free of nuclear battlefield weapons. It became very obvious that there is a close connection between the justification of such doctrines and concepts of use, particularly the first use of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and the basically negative attitude towards nuclear disarmament, on the other hand.

My delegation wanted to call attention to that connection through its working paper A/CN.10/44. The deliberations at the session have confirmed that further discussions on those doctrines of nuclear warfare are imperative and should be appropriately taken into account for the future work of the Commission.
Even though the results of the Commission's work on the major issues continue to be largely unsatisfactory for the reasons previously outlined, it was, however, possible for the working groups to prepare papers and reports which could constitute an improved basis for further discussions on those issues during the years ahead. Altogether, this is a very limited outcome, but it is certainly useful in view of the continuing aggravation of the international situation and the deadlock in the disarmament negotiations.

In this connection, my delegation has basically in mind possible starting points for formulating recommendations or principles on such important issues as the non-increase and subsequent reduction of military expenditures and, similarly, for furthering the efforts to create more confidence among States. We share the view that progress on those subjects may contribute to normalizing the international situation and to creating conditions for re-establishing a more favourable climate for the conduct of disarmament negotiations. The German Democratic Republic will, however, continue to reject any attempts aimed at impeding effective substantial negotiations on important issues of arms limitation and disarmament under transparent pretexts, at replacing urgent disarmament steps by collateral measures or at making such measures a precondition for disarmament.

Sir, your diplomatic skills and your able handling of the preparation and the chairmanship of this session have largely contributed to the results that have been achieved in the circumstances I have just described and to the predominantly businesslike atmosphere of the discussions.

I should like to express the thanks of my delegation to you, Sir, to the chairmen of the working groups and the members of the Bureau, as well as to the representatives of the Secretariat for all the work that has been accomplished.

Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): We are quite close to the end of the session of the Disarmament Commission for 1983 and that is why, at this closing meeting of the session, I think I should make some points which, in the light of what has occurred here during our four weeks of work, will supplement the points I made at the 67th meeting of the Commission, on 11 May. Those points refer, first of all, to the operation of the Commission and, secondly, to the urgent need to take seriously the provisions of the Final Document which relate to the imperative need to proceed to nuclear disarmament without delay.
With regard to the first point, as I already noted in my aforesaid previous statement, we must bear in mind the provisions of paragraph 118 of the Final Document, adopted by consensus in 1978 and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed last year. The content of that paragraph clearly shows that the Disarmament Commission is "a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly" (A/S-10/4, para. 118), which "shall function under the rules of procedure relating to the committees of the General Assembly" (ibid.), although making "every effort to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on substantive issues be adopted by consensus" (ibid.). This is a basic provision since the "every effort" referred to in paragraph 118 should be understood, as expressly stated therein, to mean something that will be carried out "in so far as possible" and which obviously entails a common effort, not just an effort on the part of those members that support majority positions.
Indeed, were that not the case, as I emphasized last month,
this Commission, which is a deliberative, subsidiary body of the
General Assembly, that is to say, a body which essentially should be
viewed as fundamentally identical to the First Committee of the Assembly
itself, would otherwise be weakened in its very essence and in its functions.
We would run the risk of having the same thing happen here that has happened
with the Committee in Geneva, where a very small number of States,
sometimes two or even one, have paralysed the proceedings through exercising
the kind of veto which the so-called rule of consensus has become
in practice. (*A/CH.10 PV.67, pp.17-50*)

What has happened at this session of the Commission is the most eloquent
proof that our conviction, which I have just recalled, is well founded.
As everyone knows, the Commission has not been able to take a stand on any
of the most important items on its agenda. The 20 recommendations that have
been submitted on agenda item 4 by the group of non-aligned countries, which
in itself represents two thirds of the entire membership of the United Nations,
have almost all met with objections, although they basically constitute
more appeals for compliance with the provisions of the Final Document.
Despite the extraordinary flexibility that has been shown by the African States,
something similar has happened with the recommendations on agenda item 6,
entitled "Substantive consideration of the question of South Africa's nuclear
capability as requested by the General Assembly and the Chairman of the Special
Committee against Apartheid." But the most conclusive proof of the inadmissibility
of allowing the Commission in future to continue as if handcuffed and reduced
to impotence owing to a lack of non-compliance with the constitutional
provisions of paragraph 118 of the Final Document can be seen in what happened
with regard to agenda item 7, dealing with the report of the Independent
Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, entitled "Common Security:
A Blueprint for Survival." A brief summary of the most relevant points, which
I shall now submit, speaks for itself and, we feel, does not require any
additional comment.
As is well known, Mexico took the initiative which resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and has always attached particular importance to paragraph 61 of the Final Document, in which the Assembly declares:

"The process of establishing 'unclear-weapon-free zones 'in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons." (A/5-10/4, para. 61)

We consider that various factors, among them the enormous concentration of nuclear weapons in Europe, make it axiomatic that the establishment of such a zone on the European continent would constitute one of the most important contributions to peace and disarmament that could be envisaged in this field.

We are equally convinced that in the present circumstances the only approach that seems practical in this connection will have to be, as the Palme Commission so astutely observed, a gradual one.

In order to assess at its true value the significance which that Commission has recognized in its report as the 'establishment of a battlefield-nuclear weapon-free zone' in Central Europe, suffice it to note that, among the 20 "short-term measures" listed in the report, that referring to the zone I have just mentioned occupies no less than fourth place.

In the Final Document, the Assembly highlighted "the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race"; it declared disarmament to be "the vital interest of all peoples of the world in this sphere"; and attached the highest priority to nuclear disarmament measures, having given pride of place in its Programme of Action to the following provisions in paragraph 47 of the Final Document:

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons." (A/5-10/4, para. 47)
The foregoing more than adequately demonstrates the sound basis and legitimacy of the reasons that led the delegation of Mexico to submit the working paper in document A/CN.10/47 aimed at promoting compliance with the proposal of the Palme Commission on the establishment of a battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. Unfortunately, as indicated in the report of Working Group III entrusted with agenda item 7, it was not possible to attain unanimity on our proposal. In accordance with the general rule in these cases, the working paper in question would have appeared as an annex to that Group's report. Nevertheless, and in view of the opposition of one delegation to proceeding in this manner, my delegation at the meeting of the Committee of the Whole held here two days ago in the afternoon consented to an exception being made to that rule if there were at least another report of another working group to which no document would be appended.

That has not been the case and all the reports of the other working groups have documents annexed to them. Consequently, my delegation would have been fully entitled to maintain a firm position and demand that working paper A/CN.10/47 be annexed to the report of Working Group III. Furthermore, the delegation which had opposed the application of the usual procedure in these cases threatened to withdraw from the consensus on the report on agenda item 7, which would have made it necessary to adopt it by resorting to a vote.
Since we did not want to give any semblance of discrimination with regard to the Palme Commission's report to which item 7 refers, yesterday we did not insist, when the report of Working Group III was being considered, that it should include as an annex the working paper of the Mexican delegation circulated in document A/CH.10/47. That important show of goodwill, however, compels us today to read out, as we already said we would do, the entire text of that paper so that, since its inclusion in its rightful place has been vetoed, it will be incorporated in the verbatim record of this plenary meeting of the Commission. The text reads as follows:

1. In the Final Document approved by consensus in 1978 the General Assembly, after declaring that establishment of nuclear-weapon free zones 'constitutes an important disarmament measure', went on to stress that:

   'The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons'.

2. Unfortunately, although the agenda of the Assembly has included several times items on the creation of such zones in different regions of the world – Africa, Central Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and South Asia – up to now the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco continues to be the only one of such zones in existence covering densely populated territories, although Antarctica, outer space and the sea-bed also have a régime of military demilitarization.

3. In view of the awesome size of the nuclear arsenals in Europe and of the fact that this is the main theatre of confrontation of the two large military alliances, there is no doubt that the most significant nuclear-weapon-free zone which could be established in the world would be a European zone.

4. Since existing conditions are not too propitious for the immediate realization of such an initiative, which would certainly be one of the most important contributions to peace and disarmament ever made, it is obvious that the only practical approach needs to be a gradual approach.
"5. That is why the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues has proposed in its report entitled 'Common security - a programme for disarmament', as the first step for 'the gradual removal of the nuclear threat posed to Europe', the 'establishment of a battlefield nuclear-weapon-free zone' in that continent. The main provisions of the report dealing with this matter are the following:

'We call special attention to the dangers posed by those nuclear weapons whose delivery systems are deployed in considerable numbers to forward positions in Europe. These are known as "battlefield" nuclear weapons. A large portion of NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's nuclear munitions in Europe are of this type. The weapons are designed and deployed to provide support to ground forces in direct contact with the forces of the opponent. Their delivery systems have ranges up to 150 kilometres, and are primarily short-range rockets, mines, and artillery. Most of the delivery systems are dual-capable, i.e. they can fire either conventional munitions or nuclear munitions. Because of their deployment in forward areas battlefield nuclear weapons run the risk of being overrun early in an armed conflict. Maintaining command and control over such weapons in "the fog of war" would be difficult. Pressures for delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons to local commanders and for their early use would be strong. The danger of crossing the nuclear threshold and of further escalation could become acute. It should be remembered in this connection that the areas close to the East-West border in Central Europe are densely populated and contain large industrial concentrations.

'The Commission recommends the establishment of a battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone, starting with Central Europe and extending ultimately from the northern to the southern flanks of the two alliances. This scheme would be implemented in the context of an agreement on parity and mutual force reductions in Central Europe.
No nuclear munitions would be permitted in the zone. Storage sites for nuclear munitions also would be prohibited. Maneuvers simulating nuclear operations would not be allowed in the zone. Preparations for the emplacement of atomic demolition munitions and storage of such weapons would be prohibited.

There also should be rules governing the presence in the zone of artillery and short range missiles that could be adapted for both nuclear and conventional use. The geographic definition of the zone should be determined through negotiations, taking into account the relevant circumstances in the areas involved, but for illustrative purposes, a width of 150 kilometres on both sides may be suggested. Provisions for verifying compliance with these prohibitions would be negotiated. They would have to include a limited number of on-site inspections in the zone on a challenge basis.¹

6. There have been subsequently some encouraging developments in connection with this question.

The Soviet Union informed the Swedish Government last January that it endorsed the idea, although it felt that the present proposal did not go far enough and that the width of the zone should be, in its view, between 500 and 600 kilometres.
The German Democratic Republic, in a letter addressed to the Government of Sweden on 27 January 1983 and reproduced in the Disarmament Commission document A/CN.10/39 of 9 May 1983, expressed similar views, adding that 'it is prepared to make available its entire territory for such a zone provided the principle of equality and equal security is observed.'

The International Herald Tribune of 15 March 1983 published a report from Washington in which it was stated, inter alia, that:

"The Pentagon, in a reassessment that would reverse 20 years of army policy, is questioning the need for thousands of short-range, battlefield nuclear weapons that it has deployed or plans to build, according to top Defense Department officials."

7. Finally, one of the most serious specialized magazines of the United States, the Scientific American, in the leading article of its April 1983 issue, after posing the question of 'what would the implementation of the battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone accomplish?', answers it in the following manner:

"For one thing, it would strengthen the barriers against the inadvertent or accidental initiation of nuclear war. It seems clear that nuclear war is not likely to result from a cold-blooded calculation of advantage during normal times; the forces of both sides are too large for either side to see any meaningful advantage to be gained. It is likelier that nuclear war would emerge from desperate decisions in an intense crisis, probably one in which the conventional forces of the two sides had already been engaged. Under such circumstances one side or the other might initiate a nuclear attack because it saw no other option for averting a catastrophic defeat, or because it had concluded that its adversary was about to escalate to the nuclear level."
"The removal of all nuclear weapons from a zone of substantial width on both sides of the East-West boundary in central Europe would reduce the chances of the contingency most likely to precipitate such desperate decisions ... The implementation of a battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone would not eliminate the risk of nuclear war in Europe. Some risk will remain as long as nuclear weapons remain in the inventories of the major powers ... The proposed battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone, however, is a pragmatic and politically feasible measure to control the danger of nuclear war in Europe. It merits serious consideration by all citizens and governments."

8. Bearing in mind all the preceding facts and considerations, the delegation of Mexico believes that the report which the Disarmament Commission must submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session should include a paragraph like the following:

"The Disarmament Commission endorses the proposal outlined by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues in its report entitled "Common security - a programme for disarmament" for the establishment of a tactical or battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe. It firmly believes that the provisions on geographic delimitation, verification machinery and other relevant points for the treaty or convention which would have to be concluded to that effect should be negotiated without delay between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact military alliances."

That was the last paragraph of working paper A/C.10/47, which the Mexican delegation submitted to Working Group III of the Disarmament Commission. My delegation would also like to state, for inclusion in the verbatim record of this meeting, that there is a limit to everything and that the extreme goodwill which we have shown in this case will not be repeated. Should a similar situation arise in the future, my delegation will demand, in accordance with the right expressly recognized in the rules of procedure of the General Assembly applicable to all its subsidiary organs, that a controversial question, be it procedural or substantive, is decided by a vote."
I have come to the end of the first point which I wished to cover in this statement, that of the operation of the Disarmament Commission. I shall now come to the second point.

I described at the beginning of my statement the need to take seriously the provisions on nuclear disarmament in the Final Document. A few moments ago I quoted from the relevant provisions of the document. To complete the definition of what we might term the United Nations philosophy on that matter I shall now add that in the Secretary-General's report distributed in September 1980 under the title "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" it was stated that:

"It is inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization is used by some States to promote their security.

..."

"If nuclear disarmament is to become a reality, the commitment to mutual deterrence through a balance of terror must be discarded. The concept of the maintenance of world peace, stability and balance through the process of deterrence is perhaps the most dangerous collective fallacy that exists." (A/35/392, paras. 497, 519)

This year has been especially rich in basically similar statements from the most prestigious civil and religious institutions of the highest moral authority. Among them, and to be brief, I shall mention simply three examples.
In a report adopted in February of this year by the Union of Concerned Scientists, which was prepared with the co-operation of some generals and admirals of States members of NATO: Field Marshall Lord Carver, Brigadier General Karl Christian Krause and General Jochen Loser, as well as many experts of the stature of George Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, Gerard C. Smith and Lord Zuckerman, one may read inter alia, the following:

(spoke in English)

"Nuclear warfare is not merely an extension of conventional warfare to a higher level of violence. It is an entirely different phenomenon ... The survival of the engaged nuclear powers, their allies, and many other nations depends upon preventing permanently the outbreak of general nuclear war ..."

"To rely on nuclear forces to deter or defeat conventional attack ... will with high probability, sooner or later, in one crisis or another bring on disaster ..."

"The present strategy of first use will very probably lead to the catastrophe of nuclear war. It is intellectually and morally insupportable, it is internally divisive for the nations of the alliance."

(continued in Spanish)

In addition to the above assessments, among the conclusions of the report to which I have referred one finds the following, which seems especially relevant in the light of some of the documents which have been considered during our work on item 7:

(spoke in English)

"The report examines the existing balance of forces in Central Europe and elsewhere and finds that present United States and allied conventional forces pose a serious counter to conventional attack without resort to nuclear weapons. The report explores the nature and costs of measures to strengthen allied conventional defenses so that they could, with high probability, deter conventional attack or defeat it should deterrence fail. It finds that such a level of conventional strength is within the limits of political and economic feasibility for the United States and its allies."

(continued in Spanish)

The second document, to which I shall refer very briefly.
is the one arising from the debate of the Synod of Bishops of the Church of England which took place on 10 February 1983 and as a result of which that distinguished religious authority stated that it

(spoke in English)

judges that even a small-scale use of nuclear weapons could never be morally justified in view of the high risk that this would lead to full-scale nuclear warfare.

"believes that there is a moral obligation on all countries (including the members of NATO) publicly to foreswear the first use of nuclear weapons in any form.

(continued in Spanish)

Finally, the third and last document which I deem very relevant to mention in this statement is the pastoral letter on war and peace of the Bishops of the United States adopted nearly one month ago, on 3 May, which contains, inter alia, the following important concepts:

(spoke in English)

"We do not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare on however restricted a scale can be morally justified. Non-nuclear attacks by another state must be resisted by other than nuclear means ...

"The nuclear age is an era of moral as well as physical danger. We are the first generation since Genesis with the power to virtually destroy God's creation ..."

"In simple terms, we are saying that good ends (defending one's country, protecting freedom, etc.) cannot justify immoral means (the use of weapons which kill indiscriminately and threaten whole societies)."

(continued in Spanish)

In addition to the above general concepts, the pastoral letter contains a few specific recommendations which are suggested to support the concept of sufficiency as appropriate deterrents, among which the following two relate to the proposal of the Palme Commission which were considered in particular in Working Group III. The pastoral letter recommends:
(spoke in English)

"Removal by all parties of short-range nuclear weapons which multiply dangers disproportionate to their deterrent value. "Removal by all parties of nuclear weapons from areas where they are likely to be overrun in the early stages of war, thus forcing rapid and uncontrollable decisions on their use."

(continued in Spanish)

I am now coming to the end of this statement which has taken longer than I would have wished. I hope that calm and well-balanced reflection on the many facts to which I have referred herein may some day in the not-too-distant future help to enable the suggestions on nuclear disarmament of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Questions to receive the unanimously favourable welcome which in my view they deserve and which, unfortunately, it was not possible to bring about for some of them at this fifth session of the Disarmament Commission.

I cannot think of any better way in which to conclude than to express to you the most sincere congratulations of the Mexican delegation for the exemplary manner in which you have planned and conducted our work. I have been a personal witness of how a month before the start of this session, you began in Geneva to address yourself to organizing everything so as to make the most and best use of the little time available. If the meagre results have not been commensurate with the magnitude of your efforts, it has certainly not been due to a lack of vision or tenacity on your part.

Our congratulations are also addressed to the chairmen of the four working groups and the chairman of the contact group. to the other members of the Commission and to all other members of the Secretariat. those who are visible and those who are not to use the customary expression.
Mr. COLOD (Yugoslavia) : I should like first of all to make some comments on our deliberations during the past four weeks. We of Yugoslavia feel that the Commission did not adopt recommendations which would contribute to an improvement in negotiations on disarmament. This was due to a great extent to the fact that again we have been deliberating in a political environment akin to the one in which the second special session devoted to disarmament resulted in failure. I think that too little was done to overcome the environment of failure and the environment of stalemate, and regrettably, the differences within the Commission are becoming greater with the acceleration of the arms race. Plainly we lack a high degree of responsibility.

The lack of substantial results should not be ascribed to the Disarmament Commission itself as a body. Indeed it has already been said and it is a fact that the Disarmament Commission as a body is being used as a forum for minimizing its importance and usefulness. I should like to recall at this point that the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee of the General Assembly are the only two bodies dealing with disarmament that have the universal membership of the United Nations. Neither the Disarmament Commission nor the First Committee is suffering because of its size, but both of them suffer because of a lack of will to enter into serious deliberations on substantive questions.

The other trend with which we have been struck is the trend that is leading us into a comfortable position and accustoming us to the lack of substantial results in the work of the Disarmament Commission - the trend that is leading us into short-sighted complacency. We hope that at the next session of the General Assembly more energy and effort will be invested in giving additional substance to the work of the Disarmament Commission. We hold that the Commission can be effective only to the extent to which its agenda is adequately structured and to the extent to which member countries want to make it such. It is important at this juncture, in our opinion, to keep in sight the fact that it would be very dangerous to allow this body, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, to deteriorate into a body that either deals marginally with important issues or just deals with marginal issues. Thus we must stress once again that
it is for all of us to strengthen the role of the Commission and to enable it to discharge its functions in conformity with the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament.

In other words, on the political side, we should like to see a better structured agenda, a higher degree of responsibility and more serious deliberations on substantive questions.

On the organizational side, we found it difficult to cope with parallel meetings of a number of subsidiary working groups. This has been raised many times, but we feel we might draw some conclusions from our work during the past four weeks. The subsidiary working groups, a number of them meeting concurrently, even if there are only two concurrent meetings, may not constitute a problem for the larger delegations but represent what is almost a prohibiting factor for smaller countries, with a negative effect on overall participation. The concurrent working groups somehow make universality in the participation in this Commission's work practically impossible. If I remember correctly, universality is something that we had inter alia in mind when we established the Disarmament Commission. I believe that at that time we were not only seeking universal membership but were also seeking the possibility of universal participation.

Now I should like to address myself to some specific questions concerning the agenda items we have dealt with in the past four weeks.

The development of South Africa's nuclear capability is, from our point of view, an extremely serious matter. Nuclear capability in the hands that have a grip on Namibia -- an illegal grip on Namibia at that -- and the hands that maintain the apartheid régime is in itself a serious threat to the security of the region of South Africa and the adjacent regions and it is the same régime that continues the policy of destabilization of neighbouring countries. I should like to emphasize that it is not good for either peace or disarmament that we have failed to agree on recommendations concerning South Africa's nuclear capability, and we have failed in this at the very same time as, one floor above us in the Security Council, South Africa has been condemned by speaker after speaker for its illegal occupation of Namibia. We hold that the countries most concerned should reflect on this with a greater sense of responsibility, should show more co-operation in the consideration of this item and should refrain from any co-operation in this field with the régime of South Africa.
The second point I should like to make it that, in our view, the Commission has fulfilled an important task by completing deliberations on the so-called Palme report. We are convinced that the numerous recommendations of the Commission headed by the Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Palme, could prove stimulating in the relevant disarmament negotiations. However, we believe that in these matters account should be taken of the legitimate interests and concerns of the countries of the region that are not members of the political and military alliances.

The third aspect upon which I should like to comment is the paper submitted by the non-aligned countries. We have been guided by the long-term objectives of all Member States. Yugoslavia, with other non-aligned countries, has participated once again in such an effort, and we have proposed the package of comprehensive recommendations.
The first and foremost goal of those who submitted that paper is the prevention of nuclear war and the launching of the process of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. Regrettably, their recommendations have not been adopted owing to the lack of political will of those who bear the greatest responsibility for the arms race. This should certainly be a subject of our future deliberations: it is an issue of the utmost importance, as was clearly recognized and underlined in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

I should like to say at this point that the more we negotiate and hold serious discussions, the more room for agreement we create. We should bear in mind that it is our common duty to use any opportunity to try concurrently to reach agreements in various fields of disarmament.

I should like finally to address some words of thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, to the other officers of the Commission and to the Secretariat for taking care of our work. You have acquitted yourself well, Sir, and thanks to your well-known wisdom and acumen you have given us the high-quality guidance that left everyone in this room assured that the Commission's affairs were being managed reliably and even-handedly by a person who knows full well what these meetings are all about.

Mr. SHUSTOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): Like other delegations, we should like to share with the members of the Commission some of our general impressions on the results of the session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission which is now concluding.

According to the terms of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session and those of its agenda, the Commission was to consider a number of important matters relating to the limitation of the arms race in order to arrive at recommendations which could prove useful for working bodies in which disarmament talks are going on.

In my delegation's opinion, adequate possibilities existed for the achievement of that goal. But they were not utilized. We had available to us some perfectly good building materials, in the form of the proposals made by various States, but we were unable to build anything with them. The report of the Commission, which records the results of its work, consists essentially of a record of the failure of its attempts to reach agreement and mere descriptions of the discussions that took place.
This is true particularly of the most crucial item on the Commission's agenda this session: item 4, which concerned nuclear disarmament and under which consideration was given to such urgent and timely measures for the prevention of nuclear war as a comprehensive treaty on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests; a prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and, as an initial step in that direction, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; a freeze on the development, manufacture, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons safeguards for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; and so forth.

In the case of all these proposals, the Soviet delegation, like the vast majority of the other delegations taking part in the work of the Commission, was prepared to reach agreement on positive solutions, which would have fostered further progress towards nuclear disarmament. But the Western countries were not prepared to do this. To literally every one of the measures to which I referred they put forward numerous reservations and various preconditions unacceptable to both the socialist and the non-aligned States. All this made it virtually impossible to arrive at agreed conclusions.

In order to clothe the nakedness of their position and their lack of any specific initiatives, the Western delegations submitted, towards the end of our discussions, a working paper (A/CN.10/54) on agenda item 4. One need only compare this document with the proposal made by the non-aligned countries (A/CN.10/45) to see that the Western paper contains nothing but a selection of general, vague and nebulous ideas whose implementation is hedged about with various conditions. To put forward such a document was a rather naive and ingenuous manoeuvre, as many delegations were perfectly aware.

Without proposing any specific steps in the field of nuclear disarmament, and rejecting the suggestions of others in this connection, the Western delegations were extremely eager to discuss the question of so-called confidence building measures, which came under agenda item 3.

We are very serious about the question of confidence-building measures, and we are prepared to take an active part in developing them. But at the same time we believe it is wrong to exaggerate their importance. In our opinion such measures alone cannot serve to dispel the climate of general distrust. More is needed: normalizing the situation and refraining from preaching hostility and hatred and the propaganda of nuclear war. And, of course, the main way to bring about trust is to halt the arms race and to return to tranquil, stable relations among States and to détente.
That being the case, the Soviet delegation takes an extremely cautious - indeed, suspicious - view of the position of those countries which make progress in the limitation of armaments essentially dependent on the question of confidence-building measures and which, in their discussion of such measures, try to create a smoke-screen behind which to disguise the negativism of their own position.

A similar line, as we saw, was taken in the working group on the reduction of military budgets, where the absence of any desire to reduce military expenditures was disguised by Western delegations by lengthy perorations on "openness", "transparency", "comparability", "accountability" and so on and so forth. The same was true in the working group on the nuclear capability of the Republic of South Africa. There again the representatives of Western countries spared us no generalizations about condemnation of the racist régime and the danger involved in its gaining access to nuclear weapons, while at the same time exerting every effort to prevent the adoption of recommendations which would in fact have nipped Pretoria's nuclear ambitions in the bud.
When it comes to specific disarmament negotiations, as experience showed in the latest session of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Western countries obstruct them from the very outset, particularly on the most important issues of the prevention of nuclear war and of nuclear disarmament.

The same approach appears year by year in the discussions on disarmament issues in the General Assembly. If we take, for example, the voting record at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, in the case of all those resolutions which referred either to the freezing or the non-use of nuclear weapons or the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, it can be seen that on each of them the United States voted against them as did those Western States which support it.

In the light of this fact, the position of the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), particularly the United States, the situation can be construed only as a continuation of exactly the same political course that they pursue elsewhere wherever problems of disarmament are discussed. Actually, as far as that is concerned, this Commission is simply an isolated example which confirms the general trend.

The Declaration by the Soviet Government, dated 28 May 1983, which has just been distributed by our delegation as document A/CH.10/55, emphasizes that: "In all the negotiations related directly or indirectly to the curbing of the arms race, the United States Administration is pursuing a non-constructive and obstructionist line. This is true of the behaviour of the United States in the negotiations at Geneva, at Vienna, at Madrid and in other international forums." (A/CH.10/55, para. 2)

The United States is against the idea of freezing nuclear missiles: at the same time it is doing all it can to make any disarmament negotiations result in a deadlock.

Many delegations in the present debates held in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, particularly in connection with agenda item 4, have shown concern at the state of the bilateral Soviet-American talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons and also the limitation of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. A reply to the questions related to this issue can be found in concise terms in the Declaration by the Soviet Government to which I just referred.
In connection with the talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons this document says:

"The United States position in the Soviet-United States negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons is aimed not at reaching honest agreement but entirely at obtaining unilateral military advantages. By proposing that the Soviet side should reduce its most modern weapons, and a much larger number of them than on the United States side, Washington is clearly showing its intention of leaving practically untouched the foundations of its nuclear arsenals and its broad programmes for the deployment of the latest strategic weapons, including cruise missiles with every kind of basing. The United States proposals in the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons are aimed not at halting the strategic-weapons race but actually at further accelerating it in those directions which the United States considers favourable for itself."

(ibid., para. 3)

As far as the talks on the reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe are concerned, the Declaration by the Soviet Government goes on to say:

"As is known, the Soviet Union proposes reducing these weapons in such a way that it will have no more medium-range missiles and no more warheads on them than the United Kingdom and France. This would mean considerably fewer delivery vehicles and considerably fewer warheads than the USSR had in Europe in 1976, when the modernization of Soviet missiles had not yet begun. The Soviet Union does not seek to have a single medium-range aircraft more or a single airborne warhead more than would be possessed by the NATO countries.

"However, the United States is continuing to insist on a solution under which it would proceed in any case to station its new missiles in Western Europe in late 1983, in addition to the forward-based United States nuclear weapons already there. The Soviet Union would have to agree to their deployment and, what is more, reduce its medium-range missile weaponry unilaterally, not only in the European but also in the Asian part of the country, ignoring the similar United States weapons deployed in large numbers in areas adjacent to our country in the east."

(ibid., paras. 6 and 7)
The situation which arose at the Geneva talks must force us to conclude that the planned deployment at the end of 1983 in the territory of Western Europe of new United States medium-range missiles is part and parcel of United States efforts to acquire military superiority. Those missiles, which have the capability of striking targets deep in the territory of the Soviet Union, are intended to become a direct adjunct to the strategic nuclear arsenal of the United States and to tip the existing regional and global balance in favour of the West. The emplacement of those missiles would lead to a serious change in the situation in Europe and even to greater nuclear confrontation and would thus increase the risk of the outbreak of war.

The Soviet Government has stated in very clear terms that, in the light of the growing threat to the security of the Soviet Union and its allies as a result of the development, manufacture and bringing into battle readiness of new United States strategic weapons, which are land, sea and air based, and also in the light of the decision by the United States and NATO to proceed to deploy new United States missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union would be obliged to take timely and effective counter-measures in order to secure its own defence capabilities. These are steps that the Soviet Union would be forced to take. They would be dictated by the actual situation as it prevails and would be its response to United States actions. Their sole purpose would be to avoid any violation of the existing balance of forces.
Certain countries which have been reluctant to take concrete steps to reduce the arms race try to justify the absence of progress in this field by referring to difficulties inherent in the international situation. It is our profound conviction - which is shared by many other States - that it is precisely in such circumstances that we should redouble our efforts to curb the dangerous process of the escalation of nuclear and other weapons which might lead to catastrophic consequences for all mankind. It is incumbent on all States to decide to embark on the important tasks of limiting and reducing weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, and to return to the path of détente. This is something which is dictated by the interests of all peoples and States, irrespective of their geographical situation or of the socio-economic system or political grouping or trend to which they belong.

During the general discussion, as in the discussions on individual agenda items in the working groups, we sometimes heard the view expressed that responsibility for the arms race and the lack of any progress to bring about its cessation lies equally with both the leading military Powers, which are supposedly competing in the arms race. But, if we take a realistic and objective look at the present situation, we should not refer to rivalry between two countries or two blocs but to the meeting and confrontation of two essentially different world policies. The military course that refuses détente and disarmament and increases tension in international relations is something which the Soviet Union counters by a consistent and unwavering policy which is in accordance with the interests of peace-loving peoples to develop their relations with other States, including the United States, in a way which is dictated by the urgent need to prevent nuclear war. At the meeting which took place yesterday between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Andropov, and the United States political and public figure Mr. Averell Harriman, the following was stated by the Soviet side:
"In view of the overall strategic situation and the growing number of explosive problems around the world, the USSR and the United States cannot allow themselves to be drawn towards military competition. The interests of all peoples demand constructive interaction between them. It is clear that each year lost in reaching accords on the limitation of armaments generates new problems and complicates the solution of the task of curbing the arms race."

Specific examples of the policy of the Soviet Union with respect to the prevention of nuclear war are the initiatives that were put forward by the Soviet Union quite recently: the commitment by all nuclear-Powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons; the mutual freezing of the nuclear arsenals of all nuclear-weapon States or, as an initial step, only those of the Soviet Union and the United States; the proposal that there be an immediate cessation and prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests everywhere; and new proposals at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons and the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Those and other proposals in the field of disarmament are mentioned quite clearly and unambiguously in various Soviet documents, particularly the replies of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Mr. Andropov, to the questions asked by representatives of a number of public organizations in Finland, which at the request of our delegation have been distributed as an official document of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/49).

The prime purpose of the Soviet initiatives is to undertake an attack on a wide front against the growing threat of nuclear war and to ensure the fruitful outcome of the ongoing talks on arms limitation. We are prepared to consider carefully any other constructive proposals capable of reversing the arms race. This is the approach we have taken, for example,
to many of the ideas contained in the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues - the so-called Palme Commission - which was discussed during our meetings.

However, in order to make these positive ideas a reality, it is always and in the first place essential to have the political will of States. Only with this prerequisite will it be possible for progress to be achieved in any of the international forums dealing with the question of arms limitation, including the United Nations Disarmament Commission. If such will is evinced by all States, there can be no shadow of a doubt that our Commission's session next year will not look as it has this year and will be crowned with success.

In conclusion, I wish, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to convey our deep gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, for the skilful, strict and organized way in which you conducted our work. We should like to wish you every success in your future endeavours in working for disarmament. We should also like to express our gratitude to all the staff of the United Nations Secretariat concerned with disarmament and other staff for the excellent services they provided to us during this session of the Disarmament Commission.  

Mr. Racz (Hungary): Since my delegation has not yet had an opportunity to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission for the current session, I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to do so now. My congratulations are also extended to the other officers of the Bureau.

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Mr. Lidgard (Sweden), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.
The current session of the Disarmament Commission has taken place in a deteriorating international situation owing to increasing activity by aggressive forces. The arms race has entered a qualitatively new and much more dangerous stage involving all kinds of weapons. The escalating United States arms build-up, especially in the area of nuclear weapons, which is coupled with dangerous strategic concepts and doctrines, represents a serious threat to world peace and security.

At the second special session devoted to disarmament the General Assembly therefore rightly pointed out that the prevention of nuclear war remained the most acute and urgent task of our times. My delegation fully shares this view and it was against this background that it welcomed and supported the solemn commitment of the Soviet Union concerning the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the Western nuclear-weapon States have not yet assumed such an obligation to take reciprocal steps. They are trying to justify their continued reliance on the first use of nuclear weapons by alleging that there exists the threat of the use of conventional weapons - an area in which the Warsaw Treaty States, they say, have an advantage.
Taking into account this argument - which, by the way, is at variance with reality - it is hard to understand why the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) do not give a positive answer to the far-reaching proposal put forward by the States members of the Warsaw Treaty in their Political Declaration to conclude a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations. According to the proposal, the core of that treaty could be a mutual commitment not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons.

The Political Declaration adopted by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization also put forward a broad and realistic programme aimed at stabilizing the international situation, and renewing and strengthening the process of détente, and comprehensive proposals to prevent the world from sliding into a nuclear catastrophe. It also stressed the need to make progress in the Soviet-United States talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. In this latest context, I should like to call attention to the growing resistance of the people of Europe to the planned deployment of United States medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Since those weapons would directly threaten my own country, too, Hungary wholeheartedly supports the latest proposals put forward by the Soviet Union that parity of medium-range nuclear missiles should be maintained at a considerably lower level, taking into account the nuclear weapons of all NATO member States in Europe both with regard to delivery means - that is, missiles and aircraft - and the number of warheads. Those proposals are a further demonstration of the sincere effort to reach a just agreement acceptable to both sides and should be reason enough for the Western side to give up its unrealistic unilateral demands and agree to negotiations in the interest of the security of all.

The necessity of effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race was also reflected in the work of the General Assembly last year. A number of resolutions have been adopted on various aspects of nuclear disarmament,
such as a freeze on nuclear weapons, a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon, non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, and so on. My country, together with a great number of others, supported and cast affirmative votes for those proposals and also welcomed the fact that the Commission this year again put on its agenda the question of nuclear disarmament. It is more than deplorable that, as a result of the reluctance of certain countries, it was not possible to work out any concrete recommendation, and we cannot but hope that next year, when the Commission will again deal with this important question, those countries will give up their unconstructive approach.

From the point of view of nuclear disarmament, it is likewise of importance to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and not permit the emergence of new nuclear weapon States - and that applies particularly to the racist apartheid régime of South Africa. The emergence of the nuclear weapon in the arsenals of that aggressive régime, which persistently violates United Nations resolutions and decisions, would doubtlessly increase the threat to peace and security not only in the African region but also throughout the world. We therefore share the concern of many delegations, in particular those of the countries of that region, about Pretoria's nuclear ambitions and hold the view that South Africa should be prevailed upon to renounce those ambitions. The countries involved should also cease their collaboration with South Africa in the development of its nuclear potential. This year, unfortunately, the Commission was again prevented from devising effective steps in that direction by the very same States which refuse to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and directly or indirectly support South Africa's drive for nuclear weapons.

The Commission also had on its agenda the consideration of recommendations in the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. That report, in our view, was a positive contribution to efforts promoting disarmament and adequately reflected the concern that mankind feels about the threats of our day, especially the threat of a nuclear war.
My delegation is pleased that the Disarmament Commission welcomed the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues as a timely and constructive contribution to international efforts to achieve disarmament and maintain and strengthen international peace and security, and that it recommended that the report should be duly taken into account in ongoing and future disarmament efforts.

As regards the preparation of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures, my delegation holds that the Commission held a useful exchange of views in the first part of this two-year exercise. My country is an active supporter of measures that would promote the strengthening of confidence among States, complies strictly with the confidence-building measures adopted at Helsinki and advocates that the Madrid follow-up meeting should soon be concluded with a substantial and balanced final document, including a decision on the convening of a conference on confidence-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

The reduction of military budgets has been on the agenda of the United Nations for several years. From the very beginning we supported the proposal made by the Soviet Union in 1973 and adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 3093 A (XXVIII) on the reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries. We also supported the proposal made at the first special session devoted to disarmament providing that States with a large economic and military potential, including all States permanent members of the Security Council, should agree on specific amounts by which each of them would reduce its military budget, not in terms of percentage points, but in absolute terms.

The Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty member States called upon the NATO countries to conclude a concrete agreement on the freezing of military expenditures and their subsequent reduction in percentage or absolute terms which would apply to all States with a large military potential. The Declaration also stated that the funds released as a result of the reduction of military expenditure would be used for economic and social development,
including aid to the developing countries. In this last respect, I should like to recall the statement made by the Soviet Union at the previous session of this Commission that a special committee could be established for the distribution of those funds.

In spite of their clear-cut and constructive nature, those proposals have not been accepted and no practical progress has been made so far in the real reduction of military budgets. A number of States, including some permanent members of the Security Council, are refusing to reach a practical understanding, disguising their unwillingness and setting unjustifiable preconditions such as what they call transparency and comparability. Abstract discussions of dates cannot contribute to the reduction of military expenditures; they will divert attention from the substance of the matter. The achievement of a practical understanding on the reduction of military budgets requires all States to demonstrate the necessary political will and determination which are also required for the solution of other questions on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission.
Finally, Sir, allow me to express the appreciation of my delegation for the outstanding and excellent work you have done in conducting the proceedings of this Commission at its present session. Our congratulations are extended also to the other officers of the Commission, the chairmen of the working groups, the contact groups and members of the Secretariat.

Mr. ALEXANDROV (Bulgaria): The present session of the Disarmament Commission, with its intensive debate on a broad range of issues, is drawing to a close. The urgent necessity for practical measures in the field of disarmament, which was rightly emphasized in the statements of the Chairman and of the leaders of many delegations has been the focus of this debate. It seems to me that should we content ourselves with the traditional diplomatic evaluation of the Commission's work and simply note the various positions and ensuing deliberations, we would be showing disrespect for the genuine alarm felt by the vast majority of members of the Commission at the dangerous proportions of the growing nuclear military threat. This alarm was precisely the leitmotiv of a number of drafts and proposals submitted in the various working groups of the Commission in the past four weeks. The ideas embodied in all those proposals have together laid a constructive basis for the discussion of practical steps aimed at curbing the arms race.

Regrettably, those ideas were not translated into recommendations of the Commission. Instead of focusing on the search for mutually acceptable solutions to the vital problems of peace and disarmament, the debate on the basic agenda items developed from the very beginning into a confrontation of two completely opposed tendencies.

On the one hand, we have the desire of the vast majority of the Commission's members to formulate genuine measures for halting the arms race and for disarmament while, on the other, we have a policy of outright rejection of those measures and renunciation of the very need for disarmament. The deliberations in the working groups have revealed once again the stand of those who are opposed to measures for nuclear disarmament.
We have heard statements to the effect that nuclear weapons are a blessing, rather than a mortal threat to mankind's existence; that the overkill nuclear arsenals strengthen, rather than impair, international security. We have witnessed open renunciation of fundamental provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as repeated efforts to revise both the letter and the spirit of that document. These were not just personal views and unofficial considerations uttered in the heat of debate. We are confronted here with a concerted plan on the part of certain Western States aimed at thwarting the efforts of the majority of delegations to reach a meaningful and substantive consensus on the basic issues of security and disarmament, set forth in the agenda for this 1983 session.

In fact, the tactics of systematic rejection of the various constructive proposals - and even of deleting them from the documents of the Commission - are eloquent in themselves. Those tactics attest in the final analysis to continued reliance on nuclear forces as a political instrument and to strategic plans aimed at achieving military superiority.

We have been repeatedly admonished that the Commission is not in a position to solve the global issues of war and peace. How can anyone question that? The lessons of history are as a rule, however, a useful guide in efforts to solve present-day problems. The lessons of the nuclear age are explicit enough. Nuclear weapons cannot be a rational political instrument and the policy of nuclear blackmail, whether we call it nuclear deterrence or nuclear warfare capability, has not solved and cannot solve a single important international problem.

At the same time, the unabated accumulation of nuclear means of destruction is steadily increasing the risk of conflagration which threatens not only human civilization but also the biological survival of mankind.
Together with many other delegations, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria contributed to the best of its ability towards reaching accord on the problems under discussion. We supported all - I repeat, all - compromise proposals and formulations which were more or less conducive to the solution of the basic and most urgent problem facing this world Organization and the international community at the present time, namely, the strengthening of world peace and the achievement of disarmament, first and foremost in respect of the most horrendous weapons - nuclear weapons of mass destruction. What we have not supported, and cannot support, is the stubborn negativism of a few participants in the discussions who opposed and blocked the positive solutions sought by the overwhelming majority of members of this Commission.

My country has stated on more than one occasion its position of principle on the vital questions of peace and disarmament. I should, however, like to dwell briefly on several further substantial points which have determined the stand of the Bulgarian delegation in the debate just concluded.

We are profoundly confident that in the present explosive international situation it is imperative to take immediate action to prevent a nuclear war, to curtail the arms race and to achieve disarmament. In this respect the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States would be of momentous stabilizing importance. Such a commitment would in practice be tantamount to the renunciation of using nuclear weapons in general. That is why we highly appreciate and support the declaration to that effect made by the Soviet Union at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As is well known, in January 1983 the States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization proposed to the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the conclusion of a treaty which would be open to third parties, on the mutual non-use of force, nuclear or conventional, and the maintenance of peaceful relations. That initiative still awaits a response from the States to which it was addressed. By according high priority to the elimination of the material potential for waging a destructive nuclear war, the People's Republic of Bulgaria is in favour of collaborating in and adopting a programme for gradual nuclear disarmament. Essential elements of such a programme would be relevant agreements on the cessation of the development and manufacture of new systems of nuclear weapons, of the production of fissionable materials for new types of such weapons and of new vehicles for their delivery to target.
There is no doubt that strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons occupy a special place in the list of priorities in the field of disarmament. We have repeatedly stressed the overriding importance which progress in the Geneva talks, based on the fundamental principles of equality and equal security, would have had for ameliorating the international climate and for reducing permanently the military threat facing humanity. Together with the overwhelming majority of Member States, the People's Republic of Bulgaria has always maintained that the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests would raise a solid barrier to the unfeigned spiral of the arms race. In this context, I should also like to emphasize that the prevention of nuclear-weapons proliferation would definitely be a major contribution to the maintenance of world peace and security. This Commission as well as other bodies of the United Nations has underlined the grave danger that would be posed by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by militaristic and racist regimes which could resort to their use in pursuit of aggressive goals.

I cannot bypass a particularly topical problem which, quite typically is the focus of all the pressing questions of putting an end to the arms race. In consonance with the position taken by the vast majority of States in the world, my delegation views the freezing of the existing nuclear arsenals as an important first step towards their gradual reduction and elimination.

Speaking about the work of the Commission at its present session, I do not wish our dissatisfaction in this respect to be misconstrued as an expression of negativism and pessimism. Despite the reluctance of the Western delegations to make headway in the work of this responsible organ of the General Assembly, the discussion of the agenda items has proved that, given political will and in spite of the complexity of the problems, the representatives of individual States of different political and social systems are fully capable of uniting around various peace proposals and of giving them their support. In spite of all the difficulties, the present session furnished a forum for the deliberation
of important problems and useful ideas, much of the credit for which goes to the efforts, the skills and the tact of our Chairman. It is contingent upon the efforts of all of us whether the experience and the knowledge accumulated throughout the work of the Commission since its inception will be utilized in its later activities, in fulfilling the paramount duty of the day as embodied in the mandate and in the very name of the Commission whose substantive session for 1983 we are concluding today.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I would like in the first place to express our appreciation and gratitude to the Chairman of the Commission for the very effective and wise way in which he has carried out the work of this Commission.

The Disarmament Commission, as a deliberative body, in accordance with the Final Document of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has the significant task of considering in depth the conditions and circumstances that would render agreements for the reduction or regulation of armaments realistically attainable. We are facing a situation where there are no agreements reached. The Committee on Disarmament has not been able to reach any agreements and therefore the task of this Commission is to create the conditions and circumstances that would render agreements possible in the Committee. One of those conditions is that there can hardly be any agreements on disarmament measures, proper disarmament measures, while the arms race continues in an escalating process. It is hardly logical to expect that the two processes can be concurrent. Consequently, the full attention of the Disarmament Commission should be centred primarily and essentially on the main causes of the arms race with a view to finding possible ways and means of bringing it to a halt.

It is not enough to say we want a halt to the arms race. We must see how the arms race can be halted. In our submission, the only way to halt the arms race is to provide alternative security for nations which are too dependent solely on weapons for their security. Unless we have alternative security, the arms race will inevitably continue no matter how much we say that we want
to halt it. If we want to halt it, we should provide for alternative security as required by the Charter.

In order to see how we could stop the arms race more specifically, we should examine how it began. It began soon after the establishment of the United Nations and one of the main causes of the arms race is the failure to provide the Security Council with the means to take effective decisions as expressly required by the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. In the absence of effective decisions by the Security Council, there can be no order or security in the world, and the security system provided for in the Charter has thereby been rendered inoperative since the very beginning of the United Nations.

When the world community found itself with a United Nations whose decisions were ineffective, it had to rely on something else for security than security from the United Nations, and therefore the tendency was to increase its armaments. So the United Nations, established in a manner that deprived the Security Council of the ability or the means to enforce its resolutions, was the cause of the beginning of the arms race. If we want to halt the arms race, we must remedy this original sin of establishing an organization and depriving it of the very essence of its purpose and of its raison d'être. What could the international community, finding itself with a United Nations that was ineffective, do to ensure the security of nations? The answer was nothing else but armaments. This led to the arms race. Therefore, when we hear in this hall many countries and major Powers saying we want to halt the arms race, we would answer to the major Powers: see it that the Security Council provides the means of security otherwise than through armaments so that there can be, at least for the smaller nations, security through the United Nations and spend less on armaments. In such a situation new confidence would be created in the United Nations, that is, through compliance with Article 43 of the Charter for a United Nations force to give effect to the decisions of the Security Council and render operative the security system of the Charter. Confidence will be created in the United Nations and, through that, confidence among Member States themselves. In an atmosphere of growing détente resulting from such confidence in the United Nations, it would be much easier for the major Powers to agree on the reduction of their armaments and on disarmament.
Where are we now? We have a United Nations that is not effective. It cannot be denied that there are wars all over the world being waged without even compliance with the requirements that existed before the United Nations was established. To go back to the time of Grotius, when international law was first started, after the Treaty of Westphalia a kind of order was gradually developing. Wars could not be waged without being declared. Now a war can be started without any declaration of war: diplomats and others can be taken prisoner without any regard for the principles of international law; and there is the greatest anarchy that has ever existed. We have seen this in recent developments in many countries: in the present war between Iran and Iraq, in Lebanon and in other wars, insecurity and anarchy prevail everywhere. In a word, insecurity and anarchy are created by the fact that the Charter has not been complied with since the establishment of the United Nations. With all good will, the arms race cannot be halted, nor can the major Powers or the other countries proceed to disarmament. Therefore, let us not waste our time in trying to find agreements on the reduction or regulation of armaments without halting the arms race and let us not try to halt the arms race without creating alternative security through the United Nations to take the place of armaments, at least for those countries that depend on the United Nations for their security.

If we ignore the United Nations and proceed without any security from the United Nations, we shall never halt the arms race or have disarmament. This was set forth in the Final Document in the third paragraph of its Declaration, which states:

"Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms" (resolution S-10/2, para. 13).
Thus the Final Document itself prominently, from its first paragraphs, points out that it is necessary to proceed first to international security in order to be able to reduce armaments. That is the gist of this part of my statement.

I should like to refer to the work of this Commission. It seems to us that the concept of consensus is certainly very good and should be applied as far as possible, but it should not go to the extent of resulting in having no agreement on an important matter because there are one or two or perhaps three objections. If we allow this, we are introducing the principle of the veto from the Security Council into the Disarmament Commission. Let us see how many are voting for and how few are voting against. Then we shall realize whether a measure is acceptable or not. Otherwise we destroy the very essence of the work of this Commission. We want this Commission to proceed, because on it depends the development of the world situation.

We were very happy to hear the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union that it is strongly in favour of halting the arms race. I am perfectly certain that we shall hear a similar statement from the representative of the United States. But I say to both of them, "If you do want a cessation of the arms race, create the conditions of collective security in the world so that it will be possible to halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament."

An item on our agenda is the Palme report, the short name for the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. It was placed on our agenda by a resolution of the General Assembly. The Palme report expresses the wisdom of its members, persons experienced in government at high levels from all parts of the world, who have given the essence of that report in their message, which is to replace the negativeness of security, sought through an adverse arms race which leads to mutual self-destruction, by collective co-operation in security for peace and survival. We must follow up in specific terms the objectives of the Palme report. One first step in that direction, as mentioned in the report is to take the
necessary measures for common and collective security, namely, by complying with Chapter VII, and particularly Article 43, of the Charter in order to restore to the decisions of the Security Council their effectiveness, as required by the Charter, and set in motion the security system provided for in the Charter.

The main objective of my concluding statement is to give prominence to the primary duty of this Commission, to seek a positive way out of the escalating arms race by replacing it with common collective security.

The Disarmament Commission in 1982, in its report to the special session devoted to disarmament, included the following statement as a result of a proposal by my delegation:

"The Commission recalled that in parallel with measures towards disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, there should be measures for applying the system of international security as expressly provided for in the United Nations Charter and as emphasized in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly; and also political or international legal measures to promote international security. In this connexion, the Commission recalled the provisions contained in General Assembly resolution 35/156 J of 12 December 1980." (A/S-12/3, para. 22)

That resolution, which was adopted by consensus, called on the Security Council to proceed to the measures for collective international security as provided for in the Charter and requested the permanent members of the Security Council to facilitate the work of the Council towards carrying out that essential responsibility under the Charter.

I believe that this Commission will promote the cause of disarmament in the world and will facilitate the work of the Committee on Disarmament if we proceed more effectively towards international security and peace through the United Nations.
Mr. ADAMSON (United States of America): As the 1983 substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission concludes its work, I should like to make a few closing remarks on behalf of the United States delegation.

On the whole, this year we have had some useful discussion in this deliberative forum. At the same time, as Ambassador Fields suggested in his statement of 11 May to the Commission, we have at times, including today, been disheartened to hear hollow proposals and tendentious rhetoric emanate from familiar quarters. A prime example of this is document A/CN.10/44, on which, as delegations will recall, we had occasion to speak at greater length in the Committee of the Whole on 20 May.

This is perhaps not the time to get into an extended discussion of substantive arms-control matters, particularly as we have already done so in Ambassador Fields' statement, to which I have alluded. I would, however, recall the ambitious proposals made by the United States, notably on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which so far have not brought forth a heartening response from the Soviet Union.

In light of the statement made this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union, I should like to make a few comments about trends in the military balance over the past two decades, as well as on the question of détente. As President Reagan stated in his speech of 23 March 1983, over the past 20 years in particular, the Soviet Union has been accumulating enormous military might. It did not stop when its forces exceeded all requirements of a legitimate defensive capability and it has not stopped now. During the past decade and a half the Soviets have built up a massive arsenal of new strategic nuclear weapons.

To cite an example, the United States introduced its last new intercontinental ballistic missile, the Minuteman III, in 1969 and we are now in the process of dismantling our even older Titan missiles. But what has the Soviet Union done in these intervening years? Since 1969 the Soviet Union has built five new classes of intercontinental ballistic missiles and upgraded them eight times. As a result their missiles are much more powerful and accurate than they were several years ago, and they continue to develop more, while ours are increasingly obsolete.

The same thing has happened in other areas. Over the same period the Soviet Union built four new classes of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and over 60 new missile submarines. We built two new types of submarine missiles and actually
withdrew 10 submarines from strategic missions. The Soviet Union built over 200 new Backfire bombers and their brand-new Blackjack bomber is now under development. We have not built a new long-range bomber since our B-52s were deployed about a quarter of a century ago; we have already retired several hundred of those because of old age.

I should like to cite another example of what has happened, and this is on an issue which has been discussed rather amply this morning from a rather different perspective. In 1973 the Soviets had 600 intermediate-range nuclear missiles based on land and were beginning to add the SS-20, a new, highly accurate, mobile missile with three warheads. We had none. Since then the Soviets have strengthened their lead. By the end of 1979, when then Soviet leader Brezhnev declared that “a balance now exists”, the Soviets had over 500 warheads. We still had none. A year ago, Mr. Brezhnev pledged a moratorium or freeze on SS-20 deployment, but by last August their 500 warheads had become more than 1,200. We still had none. Some freeze. At this time, Soviet Defence Minister Ustinov announced that “approximate parity of forces continues to exist”, but the Soviets are still adding an average of three new warheads a week and now have more than 1,300. These warheads can reach their targets in a matter of a few minutes. We still have none. So far, it seems that the Soviet definition of parity is a box score of 1,300 to nothing in their favour.

As a result, together with our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), we decided in 1979 to deploy new weapons beginning this year, as a deterrent to Soviet SS-20s and as an incentive to the Soviet Union to meet us in serious arms-control negotiations. We will begin that deployment late this year. At the same time, however, we are willing to cancel our programme if the Soviets will dismantle theirs. This is what we have called a zero-zero plan. The Soviets are now at the negotiating table, and I think it is fair to say that without our planned deployment they would not be there.

Let us now consider conventional forces. Since 1971 the United States has produced 3,050 tactical combat aircraft. By contrast the Soviet Union has produced twice as many. When we look at attack submarines, the United States has produced 27 while the Soviet Union has produced 61. As for armoured vehicles including tanks, we have produced 11,200. The Soviet Union has produced 54,000, nearly five to one in their favour. Finally, with artillery, we have produced 950 artillery and
rocket launchers, while the Soviets have produced more than 13,000, a staggering
14-to-one ratio. I might ask, is this an arms race? Normally, it takes at
least two protagonists to race.

I could add many comments on the world political situation and, in particular,
the series of actions taken by the Soviet Union to undermine the détente of the
1970s. I shall, however, confine myself to quoting Andrei Sakharov, the Soviet
physicist and Nobel Peace Prize winner who, I think all members know, is now exiled
in the city of Gorki. He wrote as follows, late last year for the Pugwash
Conference, commenting on détente:

"Some 10 to 13 years ago, when what is called détente came into existence,
there was an approximate strategic equilibrium in the world, although the West
had yielded to the USSR and its allies in the field of conventional weapons.
It was then possible to hope that favourable conditions had been created for
disarmament, for international trade, for the peaceful resolution of conflict and
for joint efforts in solving such global problems as surmounting the backwardness
of the underdeveloped countries, in preserving the environment and the course of
progress as a whole, in overcoming the closed nature of the socialist countries
and the violation of human rights.

Unfortunately, the apprehensions of those who pointed out that the USSR
might try to use détente to shift the equilibrium to its own advantage have
proved justified.

"In the last decade there has been a very substantial increase in the
Soviet army, navy, missile arsenal and air force, while the countries of the
West have weakened their efforts. The SS-20 missiles have changed the strategic
equilibrium in Europe, although those who have taken part in pacifist
demonstrations seem not to notice this fact. The Soviet Union continues to
expand its zone of influence throughout the world, in Africa, Asia and Latin
America. All these events culminated in the intervention in Afghanistan, which
has led into a dead end: a brutal war.

Soviet society remains as closed as ever. The most important decisions are
made in antidemocratic fashion. The freedom to exchange information, the
freedom of conscience, the freedom to choose one's country of residence are
violated. Conditions for monitoring Soviet compliance with the international
agreements to which it is a signatory are practically non-existent."
All the above does not, of course, mean that the principle of resolving conflicts peacefully and by compromise is itself flawed. This principle remains the only alternative to global destruction. The problems of peace, international security and disarmament have absolute priority over other problems, including some which are extremely important. Disarmament negotiations must be held constantly and persistently despite all the difficulties entailed.
"But there is no question that these principles should be supplemented by a number of other elements. I consider it especially necessary to inform the public about the truth of the world situation, including what has been said above, and to conduct a practical policy which corresponds to these realities.

"It is necessary to restore strategic parity in the field of conventional weapons. Both sides have to be confident of their security without relying on atomic and thermonuclear weapons and other weapons capable of mass destruction, which imperil the existence of mankind and civilization. Today, according to widespread opinion, the West would be unable to withstand the forces of the USSR and its camp if such weapons were excluded from the balance. For that reason, equilibrium in the field of conventional weapons is a necessary condition for a general repudiation of atomic and thermonuclear weaponry and other means of mass destruction."

I will end my selection of quotes from Mr. Sakharov there. But, in closing this part of my statement, I would note that the representative of the Soviet Union this morning impugned in the strongest terms the sincerity of the West in seeking arms control. In this connection, as a representative of the host country, I would simply recall the Williamsburg declaration on arms control, which closed as follows:

"We commit ourselves to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war. We have a vision of a world in which the shadow of war has been lifted from all mankind, and we are determined to pursue that vision." (The New York Times, 30 May 1983, p. 36)

Returning now to a review of the present session, as I have already said, our deliberations proved useful on the whole. The bulk of our work was, of course, conducted in the four working groups and the contact group created to address specific agenda items.
In commenting briefly on the work of these groups, I should first pay tribute to their chairmen, who performed with such diligence and tirelessness. In the working group on the reduction of military budgets, agenda item 5, which was ably chaired by Mr. Diaconu of Romania, we found extremely helpful the introduction of a document by Italy and a number of other Western countries. This working paper, which was discussed in the group, notes that an agreed and balanced reduction of military expenditures will only be possible if it is based on the principles of transparency and comparability. These principles, in the view of my delegation, are critical to any agreement on reducing military expenditures. My delegation also believes that there is a need for new initiatives to give a fresh impetus towards universal reporting of military expenditures, such as, for example, an international conference on the subject.

As in past years, the Commission was unable to reach any substantive accord on agenda item 6, on the question of South Africa's nuclear capability. This was not due to any lack of effort or leadership. Indeed, on the latter score we applaud the efforts of the chairman of the group, Ambassador Hepburn of the Bahamas. Nor was there anything but universal condemnation, in the working group, of apartheid. Rather, the real problem stemmed from deep differences among delegations on some matters of fact and of judgement - differences which did not prove resolvable this year, any more than in 1982 or 1981. In this light, I believe we should all reflect on the question of how long this matter should be left on the agenda of the Commission. That said, I would recall Ambassador Fields' comments on United States non-proliferation policy, particularly our strong support for an Africa free of nuclear weapons.

I am gratified to note that the working group on item 7 was able to reach consensus on the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues - the Palme Commission - composed of a group of prominent private citizens. My delegation notes with appreciation that you, Sir, ably accommodated differing views into the consensus recommendation.
My delegation is pleased with the initial work which has been done in the working group on item 8, confidence-building measures, and we wish to congratulate Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany for his able chairmanship of this group. The working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany made a major contribution to the group's discussions by providing a solid basis for our work. As a result of an active exchange of views on this document and some others, we now have a good framework within which to conduct our work next year, when we will begin elaborating actual guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures. The development of such measures to build confidence contributes greatly to paving the way for actual arms limitation and disarmament. We therefore look forward to moving ahead with this work next year.

Not surprisingly, in view of the deep and fundamental differences of approach of many delegations and despite the skilled chairmanship of Mr. Duarte of Brazil, the contact group on nuclear disarmament was unable to reach agreement on a consensus text. My delegation, however, believes that the working paper submitted by a number of Western countries, in document A/CN.10/54, represents a constructive and valuable contribution to the dialogue on this vital question.

In concluding, I should like to pay tribute to our Chairman, Ambassador de Souza e Silva, for the highly impressive way he has conducted our work. We remain much in his debt for his efficient oversight, wise counsel and unparalleled leadership in the Commission.

Mr. GARCIA ITURBE (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): Allow me first of all, Sir, to express my delegation's appreciation to you for the work you have done as Chairman of this Commission and to convey our gratitude as well to the chairmen of the working groups which dealt with the various items and to the members of the Secretariat who have made our deliberations possible.
We have all been able to appreciate the efforts made by you to ensure the success of this session or, at least, to ensure that it may be considered a significant step towards disarmament and world peace.

Unfortunately, despite such arduous work, the time spent on it and the many contacts that were made, the results achieved cannot be considered to be of the desired magnitude, and my delegation once again, like many other delegations, leaves this room with a deep feeling of dissatisfaction at the negligible progress made compared with the vital importance of the question that we have been considering.

In regard to item 4, on nuclear disarmament and other priority areas, we believe that the working paper submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement reflects the just aspiration to achieve, in the shortest possible time, effective measures conducive to averting a nuclear holocaust. During the debate on that paper, a good number of countries desiring progress in nuclear disarmament set forth their positions and, precisely because of that, they were confronted with the positions of the United States and other countries which have at no time been prepared to accept any formulation that implies considerable progress on this item.
We concluded our work with a paper in which most of the recommendations proposed are in brackets, including the conclusion of treaties on the prohibition of nuclear tests, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the freezing of the development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, the demilitarization and use of outer space, among others.

As we have previously stated, any initiative proposed with the aim of creating a climate less conducive to nuclear proliferation and hostile confrontation was objected to by those who are in favour of deterrence and so-called nuclear superiority, a philosophy for perpetuating the latent danger of war.

With regard to the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets" the Cuban delegation believes that, even though that was an item that was extensively discussed during our work in the Commission, unfortunately, the desired result was not achieved owing to the obstructionist position of some States which at all times tried to impede the adoption of effective measures for reducing military budgets by diverting attention away from that item and towards other questions such as the accessibility and transparency of military data. In that connection, our delegation reiterates that no positive results will be achieved in this area until truly effective agreements are concluded on disarmament and on the non-increase of military expenditures, be it in percentages or in absolute figures, and until the international community prepares a programme to rechannel those resources to social and economic development, especially for the benefit of developing countries.

With regard to item 6 on South Africa's nuclear capability, once again it has not been possible to reach consensus on a document which contains recommendations to the General Assembly and whereby the international community can contribute, within the framework of the United Nations, to putting an end to the dangers for all of Africa and for international peace and security entailed by the acquisition of a nuclear capability by the minority racist régime of South Africa. As delegations were able to see, it was obvious that a group of countries, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and led by the United States, those very countries that maintain links of all kinds with South Africa, including conventional and nuclear military links, decided to impede adoption of the document submitted by Mauritius on behalf of the African delegations and supported by the non-aligned countries. That document reflected the true danger entailed in
South Africa's nuclear capability and the responsibility borne for this by certain Western countries and Israel as a result of the continuous co-operation they have provided to the Pretoria régime.

With regard to the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, my delegation considers that it is a valuable initiative and that its recommendations are indeed motivated by the desire to promote measures aimed at reducing the danger of nuclear war and bringing about disarmament and arms control. Contrary to the views expressed by some delegations that the measures proposed in this report would increase the risk of confrontation, we consider it a valuable contribution to international peace and security.

The Disarmament Commission, at this working session, was not able to recommend the adoption of concrete measures with regard to nuclear disarmament and South Africa's nuclear capability, two items which, for my delegation and for the vast majority of delegations present here, are the most important and significant aspects of our agenda, matters on which the international community is calling for a solution in the near future. However, progress has been made in other fields, such as confidence-building measures. My delegation shares the view that confidence-building measures are collateral disarmament measures, important for creating the right climate for furthering the disarmament process, but in no way can they replace concrete disarmament measures, among them the important measure of strengthening the role of the United Nations at the international level. What kind of confidence can be offered by countries which show their willingness to negotiate confidence-building measures but are not willing to negotiate or even hear about the danger of South Africa's having a nuclear capability and about the responsibility they bear for that, which do not co-operate with a view to negotiating on nuclear disarmament, which do not show the necessary political will to reduce military budgets, insisting on measures such as the transparency and comparability of military data instead of halting their own runaway military budgets that are rising to astronomical levels for times of peace and which introduce serious suspicions of their warlike intentions?
When one reflects on the aggressive and warmongering policy that the United States, a warlike Power possessing large conventional and nuclear arsenals, is developing on a world-wide scale, assuming the role of international policeman for the defence of its so-called national interests, which apparently and in accordance with its views cover Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, it is difficult to speak seriously about confidence building. So long as the aggressive policy against countries like Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique, among others, does not come to an end, countries which have determined their own futures based on the will of their peoples, none of the confidence-building measures which we may consider in our Commission will be effective. When day after day the highest officials of the country which wishes to return to the policy of the big stick make statements and engage in hostile activities which result in poisoning the international environment, in insecurity and in the promotion of tension, it is contradictory and, if the matter were not so serious, we might even say that it is a joke for that same country to speak in our Commission about confidence building, about interest in nuclear disarmament and about the reduction of military budgets.

In the initial statement of our delegation we said that our country is peace-loving and our greatest wish is to see ignorance, hunger, racial discrimination and social injustice eliminated from the face of the earth and that for that purpose we came to work in this Commission for a world without weapons of mass extermination, without an arms race, in which the philosophy of exploitation - the philosophy of war - has no place. Now that we are coming to the end of a period of work and although we still have far to go with regard to the adoption of effective measures that may result in disarmament and the total elimination of the danger of war, we ratify our statements and the willingness of my country to make the maximum possible contribution to the attainment of these purposes.
Mr. ABADA (Algeria) (interpretation from French): Sir, first of all my delegation would like to express its gratitude for your efforts and pay you a well-deserved tribute for your outstanding performance as Chairman. We also highly appreciate the work done by the chairmen of the various working groups and the contact group and by the Rapporteur.

My delegation also wishes to thank all the members of the Secretariat who have contributed to facilitating our work. Since the problems we encountered during this session - or at least during the first half of the session - were real ones, this has at least demonstrated the need to mobilize all the human and material resources required for the United Nations to carry out its central role with regard to disarmament and to allocate to the services concerned the means necessary for accomplishing their tasks.

The representative of India, the current Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, will have an opportunity, on its behalf, to express general satisfaction with the work of this session of the Commission. As a member of this Movement, Algeria of course endorses that assessment. Nevertheless, I should like, on behalf of my delegation, to add the following remarks.

In expressing our genuine regret and disappointment at the scant results we have achieved, we should like first to reaffirm our faith and confidence in the Commission. When there was a will to work out solutions, the Commission was able adequately to fulfil its mission. That was particularly the case at the 1979 and 1980 sessions, when it prepared general guidelines for a comprehensive disarmament programme and the declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.

Hence this Commission, like other forums that are at present hamstrung, is not intrinsically flawed. Rather, it is the victim of the absence of political will on the part of some of its members, in particular certain nuclear Powers, to join in the collective effort aimed at, on the one hand, halting dangerous trends in the world today and, on the other, furthering the cause of disarmament through serious negotiations and specific measures.

In this context we must also note a negative trend in some quarters consisting in diverting certain practical rules from their intended purpose. Thus consensus - which in any case is not the official working procedure of this Commission - which at the outset was construed as persevering in the search for compromise and
hence inevitably implied mutual concessions, has been twisted by some delegations into a kind of veto. For the majority of delegations to achieve agreement in this framework often means to adopt the position of the minority. This situation is all the more unacceptable when we note—and, unfortunately, this is more and more often the case—that the intransigent position which some wish to impose is contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

In this connection we must point out that the work on nuclear disarmament and on the question of the nuclear capability of South Africa has suffered from this state of affairs.

Regardless of its status and of the unavoidable different evaluations of this or that part or of some of its recommendations, the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues was rightly welcomed as a significant contribution to the debate on disarmament and international security. My delegation wishes to stress the importance of the very concept of "common security", which is at the core of that document. We hope that this concept will be strengthened and further developed in its essential elements, which are in keeping with the well-known claims of the Non-Aligned Movement, as follows: that security cannot be based on armaments, particularly nuclear weapons; that peace and security cannot be genuine and lasting without being at the same time global and universal; that security will remain inadequate so long as it has not taken into account certain non-military elements, mainly the necessary economic aspect.

Confidence-building measures are also a means of strengthening security, so long as the various concerns are taken into account and the very reason for our work is not linked exclusively to viewing the world through the specific situation of only one region, whatever its importance.

Similarly, the reduction of military budgets can contribute to the success of the general effort we have embarked upon provided that technical considerations do not take precedence over substance and that the responsibilities are clearly established and the correct implications drawn from them.
My delegation wishes now to make some brief points with regard to Working Group II, which was entrusted with studying the question of the nuclear capacity of South Africa and preparing recommendations on it.

After several working meetings based on document A/CN.10/43 and taking into account the objections and proposals submitted, the African group decided, in a spirit of compromise, to submit document A/CN.10/43/Rev.1, in which we took due account of the ideas expressed in the working group, incorporated the paragraphs that were negotiated and adopted and also the gist of the formulations the Chairman of the group had proposed as compromise solutions and included the ideas contained in the document submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany.

My delegation must point out with regret that this important step taken by the African States was not reciprocated and that the intransigence of a few delegations made it impossible to achieve a compromise. Among the difficulties that were encountered in this respect, emphasis should first be laid on the very manner in which our work on the question was approached.

It is obvious that the question was assigned to the Commission and that it decided to consider it by virtue of the specific nature of the Pretoria régime and of the threat it has long represented for Africa and world peace. This has been fully established and repeated consistently by the United Nations.

By limiting apartheid to a simple violation of human rights, the attitude with which we found ourselves confronted was aimed, on the contrary, at having us agree to deal with South Africa like any other State Member of the United Nations.

Secondly, there was a refusal to mention facts or, at least, certain facts. Thus the condemnation of apartheid in the revised version of our document was transformed into an enumeration of facts, in which it is simply stated that apartheid has been condemned by the overwhelming majority of States as a crime against mankind and by the Security Council as a challenge to the conscience of the world.

Even this enumeration, which engages the responsibility only of those who have already condemned apartheid was rejected.
Thirdly, in that same context, we must also stress the outright refusal to include certain important ideas, such as the illegal exploitation of Namibian uranium, in paragraph 10, and the request addressed, through the General Assembly, to the Security Council to assume its responsibilities in the matter and to give effect to the provisions contained in paragraph 12 of the Final Document relating to the danger which the racist régime represents and the need to prevent any development of its military potential. Is it really necessary to recall in this connection that the text was adopted by consensus?

Those points do not of course constitute an exhaustive list of the events. We mention them simply to illustrate the kind of debate that was held, clarify the reasons that led to failure and show where the responsibilities lie.

However, it is gratifying to be able to say that the discussions on nuclear disarmament were not merely declarations but were focused on specific recommendations. We hope that that trend will be further developed at future sessions.

Finally, the failure on many vital points is attributable to political and military options and to geostrategic options for which justification was sought on the basis of arguments which the overwhelming majority of States regard as morally unacceptable, legally invalid and politically dangerous.
Mr. SREEVANASAI (India): I should like to pay a compliment to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission and his delegation for the purposeful manner in which the work of the Disarmament Commission was organized this year. Although the enlarged agenda of the Commission was not matched with the required resources, the Chairman was able to provide ample opportunities for the entire membership of the Commission to participate fully in the deliberations. The chairmen of the various working groups also deserve a tribute for their efforts. The fact that the results of the session left much to be desired and no agreement was reached on the crucial question of nuclear disarmament should not detract from the significance of the leadership that the Chairman provided to the Commission this year.

My delegation will have an opportunity to speak on behalf of the non-aligned countries on the abysmal failure of the Commission to agree on at least some urgent measures for the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and for nuclear disarmament. We associate ourselves fully with the sense of disappointment and despair that the non-aligned world as a whole has felt over the negative attitude of a group of countries that prevented the adoption of a set of proposals put forward by the non-aligned. The bizarre drama of the second special session on devoted to disarmament was virtually re-enacted when old, familiar, flimsy arguments were used once again to block a consensus.

The working group on the reduction of military budgets has managed to create a façade of progress by engaging in an intellectually stimulating but politically futile exercise of discussing the principles that should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military expenditures. My delegation has consistently maintained that the freezing and reduction of military expenditures must be conceived in the context of a global approach to disarmament, taking into account the established objectives, principles and priorities. Negotiations must be based on the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. What is now required is the identification of concrete steps to be undertaken by States on the freezing and reduction of military
expenditures based on principles that are already well known and established by consensus. To engage in a so-called identification and elaboration of principles would merely serve to detract attention from the urgent need for adopting concrete measures in this field. Furthermore, inherent in such an exercise is the real danger of diluting or even distorting the principles already accepted by consensus. The deliberations of the working group on the reduction of military budgets have proved, if anything, the validity of the approach that we have advocated.

The working paper containing the Chairman's suggestions which has emerged this year incorporates some of the suggestions made in the course of the discussions, but it does not take us any nearer to consensus. We sincerely hope that the proponents of the idea will not insist on continuing the search for new principles and ideas and that they will let the Commission concentrate attention on concrete measures for the freezing and reduction of military expenditures and a programme for the reallocation of resources released as a result to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.

The working paper presented by the African group on the question of South Africa's nuclear capability represented a sincere effort on the part of the African and other like-minded countries to frame a set of recommendations on the subject to the General Assembly. The revised working paper presented by the African Group went a step further in this direction. It is a matter of regret that the negative attitude of some countries, particularly the major trading partners of South Africa, rendered the Commission unable to conclude its work on this item. It is well known that the acquisition of a nuclear-weapon capability by South Africa has added a new dimension to the threat to international peace and security that Pretoria poses. The countries which shield South Africa in its nefarious activities; its perpetuation of the obnoxious apartheid régime and its illegal occupation of Namibia will have to realize sooner than later that they are not serving the cause of peace. We do hope that the Commission will make a greater effort next year to conclude the work on this item.
The Disarmament Commission has happily carried out its mandate with regard to agenda item 7 on the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. We participated in the working group and joined the consensus on the conclusions and recommendations without prejudice to our position of principle, expressed during the last session of the General Assembly, that the United Nations should not be called upon to discuss or even commend a private study, however eminent the participants in the study.

My delegation has serious difficulties with some of the principles, proposals and recommendations of the Palme Commission and, therefore, we would like to place on record that nothing stated in the report of the Disarmament Commission on this agenda item will constitute an endorsement by the Commission of the observations and conclusions contained in the report of the Palme Commission. We also have some doubts about the new concept of common security that the report appears to advocate if it is in any way different from the concept of collective security which is the basis of the United Nations Charter. We believe that it is for the Governments of various States Members of the United Nations to take the recommendations and proposals of the Palme Commission's report into account and it is the Governments alone which should decide whether they would wish any of those recommendations and proposals to be further pursued, whether in the present form or in some modified versions in disarmament negotiations that are being conducted in different forums. In our understanding, paragraph 13 of the conclusions and recommendations of the Disarmament Commission on this agenda item states this position precisely. We also note with satisfaction that the consideration by the United Nations of the report of the Palme Commission has been concluded.
Our views on agenda item 8, dealing with confidence-building measures, have been set forth in our working paper (A/CM.10/46) dated 23 May 1983. The Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament provides the basis for the elaboration of the objectives, concepts and approaches to confidence-building measures. Disarmament measures are required to be adopted and implemented on a priority basis and are themselves indispensable for the building of confidence. We believe that confidence building is not a narrow, restrictive or regulatory concept. Regulatory measures are provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and it is by scrupulously observing the Charter of the United Nations that States can best promote confidence among themselves.

A regional approach to confidence-building measures cannot be pursued in isolation from the global approach. There can be no confidence in a region unless and until the overwhelming and all-encompassing threat of nuclear war has been eliminated and the major Powers have undertaken to give up their policy of global rivalry and spheres of influence and remove their military presence, including military bases and facilities, from different regions.

Any approach to confidence-building must not be limited to the military field; it must be a comprehensive one, involving the adoption and implementation of measures in the political, economic and social fields. These should include the removal of political tensions, progress towards disarmament, the restructuring of the world economic system and the elimination of racial discrimination and foreign occupation. We do hope that our views, which are shared by a number of delegations, will be given due consideration in the next stage of our work relating to this agenda item.

Our excursions into relatively less important areas, like the reduction of military budgets, the recommendations of the Palme Commission and confidence-building measures, should not blind us to the reality that the Commission has not made any progress on the path towards the elimination of the danger of nuclear war or towards the achievement of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. Our delegation has repeatedly pointed to the danger that the various exercises undertaken by the Commission might distract us from our main goal, the elimination of the danger of nuclear war and the consideration of measures
that would prevent a nuclear catastrophe. We do hope that in the future the
Commission will address itself to those issues that have a bearing on the very
survival of all life on our planet, rather than fritter away its energies on
matters of marginal significance.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of India, Mr. Rathore,
in his capacity as Chairman of the Group of Non-Aligned Countries.

Mr. RATHORE (India): On behalf of the non-aligned countries I have
the privilege of extending to Mr. de Souza e Silva our sincere gratitude for the
way he has steered the deliberations of the current session of the Disarmament
Commission. It is a tribute to his well-known diplomatic skills and qualities
of leadership that the work of the Commission proceeded in a smooth and efficient
manner. Notwithstanding the great demands that have been made on his time,
energy and patience, he acted with wisdom, exemplary impartiality and unfailing
good humour.

May I also take this opportunity to express our gratitude and sincere
appreciation to the chairmen of the various working groups, including the contact
group, who carried out their onerous duties with dedication. We note with pride
and satisfaction that a distinguished member of a non-aligned country has carried
out the difficult duty of Rapporteur of this Commission with commendable skill
and thoroughness.

During the past few weeks the members of the Disarmament Commission have
witnessed unproductive polemics which do not advance the cause of disarmament.
The non-aligned countries have been disappointed at the lack of results from our
work. It is the major Powers, with the primary responsibility for the pursuit of
disarmament, which must bear the burden of frustrating the work of the Commission.
We are all for consensus. We welcome the evolution of agreed positions on
matters of international security. However, over the past several years
consensus documents have been contemptuously ignored by the militarily most
powerful members of the Commission. The Final Document of the first special
session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was adopted by consensus.
and yet, five years later, its principles, priorities and provisions remain in 
the realm of paper hopes. Efforts are still being made to repudiate the 
commitments solemnly entered into in 1973, even though a reaffirmation of the 
Final Document was made at the second special session of the General Assembly 
dedicated to disarmament without any reservation by any Member State. We firmly 
believe that without a determined political will no progress is possible.

In a sincere effort to make progress and in a spirit of compromise, the 
group of non-aligned countries, in a departure from past practice, presented 
a working paper containing concrete measures for the prevention of nuclear war. 
It is regrettable that there was a total lack of interest in making serious 
efforts to reach agreement on these concrete proposals on the part of some 
of the nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies. Obsessed by their own narrow 
security concerns, they adopted a negative attitude which made progress impossible. 
Furthermore, on their part a tendency to block agreement on priority issues of 
nuclear disarmament and to play up collateral and peripheral issues was clearly 
discernible. We therefore cannot but stress what is contained in the Declaration 
of the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, 
held in New Delhi in March this year that

"... the greatest peril facing the world today is the threat to the 
survival of mankind from a nuclear war"

and that

"... the Heads of State or Government called for urgent consideration by 
the world community of the proposals advanced by the non-aligned countries".
(A/30/132, paras. 28 and 35)

The non-aligned countries are greatly disappointed at the lack of agreement 
on the agenda item dealing with the nuclear capability of South Africa, because 
of the obstructionist attitude taken by some countries. The lack of agreement 
on this item, due to the inflexibility of these countries, which collaborate 
with the racist minority regime of South Africa in the nuclear field, will only 
encourage the racist regime to continue its frenzied acquisition of nuclear 
weapon capability, thus posing an increasingly dangerous obstacle to disarmament 
and a threat to international peace and security.
The non-aligned countries represented in this chamber yearn for a peaceful and orderly world in which they can pursue urgent goals of economic and social development. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspects, runs counter to our vital interests and threatens our very survival. The destiny of our peoples and the future of our children are being held hostage to the rivalry and confrontation among the major Powers and the alliances headed by them. Despite setbacks, we retain faith in the Disarmament Commission as an authoritative multilateral deliberative forum for recommending to the General Assembly measures for disarmament. The non-aligned countries will accordingly continue their endeavours to arouse the collective conscience of this Commission towards achieving that goal.  

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* The Chairman resumed the Chair.
Mr. de LA GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, speaking yesterday on behalf of the countries members of the European Communities expressed views which are thus those of the French delegation. I shall therefore confine myself here to a few comments in order to make clear our national position on some points.

We have all noticed today that the results of our session are only partial. The same can be said, in varying degrees, of previous sessions. But the experience of this year is new in some respects: it is somewhat similar to that of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and it largely gives rise to the same reflections.

This comment, of course, concerns agenda item 4, the most ambitious of all since it covers disarmament, both nuclear and conventional. Despite the major difficulties inevitably involved in the preparation and adoption by consensus of a document on item 4, the Commission succeeded in this task during the sessions in 1980, 1981 and 1982. This would not have been possible had all delegations not pursued their efforts in compliance with the provisions of the Final Document of 1978. In this way, they arrived at constructive compromises. At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, measures were put forward which go beyond the framework in the Final Document and affect its balance. Some were such as to call into question the principle of equal security, which is the very condition for any progress towards disarmament. These could not be subject of an agreement. Among the recommendations which we have considered at this session, we find these again. The outcome could not be otherwise.

The French delegation attaches great importance to agenda item 4. We hope that it will be possible for us next year to arrive at a consensus on a set of recommendations and conclusions consistent with the comprehensive and balanced approach propounded in 1978.

The representative of the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of several Western countries, submitted a working paper on this topic which my delegation entirely endorses and which could prove a useful contribution to this end. I should
not like to close my comments on this aspect of our discussion without paying a
tribute to Mr. de Queiroz Duarte who guided our deliberations with such authority,
competence and objectivity.

Two other agenda items dealt with specific measures both of which appear
among the recommendations in the Final Document of 1978: the reduction of
military budgets and confidence-building measures. The French delegation is
deeply interested in our work on these topics because, as far as we are concerned,
they fall within the specific mandate of our Commission: the thorough
consideration of the problems of disarmament in order to arrive at agreed
approaches. In the case of military budgets, in spite of the meritorious and
persevering efforts of the Chairman, Mr. Diaconu, the working group was unable
to arrive at a consensus on any recommendation. We note with regret that the
essential concepts of verification and comparability are still challenged by some
of our partners. We hope that our recent discussions on this point will serve
to bring about the developments necessary for any progress.

My delegation welcomes the substantial progress reached in such an important
area as confidence-building measures. We are now well prepared, therefore, for
the second stage of our exercise, namely, the drawing up of guidelines. In this
connection, Ambassador Wegener, Chairman of the working group, has earned our
thanks and congratulations.

In the course of our discussions we heard very comprehensive and useful
statements on the concept and scope of confidence-building measures. We wish to
repeat that neither must be set aside to any extent and that there is no ground
for weakening the link which we regard as fundamental between them and disarmament.
These measures belong essentially, by their very nature, to the practical aspects
of security. I wish to recall that, so far as the French Government is
concerned, confidence-building measures cannot be mere declarations of intent.
If we want them to be effective, they must be binding, militarily significant
and verifiable.

Our discussions on the item concerning the nuclear capability of South
Africa once again have led to no agreed text. Ambassador Hepburn, Chairman of
the working group, placed all his skill and patience at the service of finding an agreement. The French delegation, with many others, endeavoured to assist him as far as possible. It hoped that our common aim as far as essentials were concerned - the refusal of anything that might contribute to the acquisition or enhancement of South Africa's nuclear capability such as might threaten peace and stability in Africa - would enable us to arrive at a conclusion. Today my delegation hopes that a calmer atmosphere in our discussions will enable us to achieve this aim next year.

Our agenda also included one exceptional item: that concerning the report of the Palme Commission. The French delegation has a very real interest in this document. To our mind, this outstanding contribution to the work on disarmament and security derives its value from the independence of its authors vis-à-vis Government. During the discussions in the working group, presided over skilfully and with conviction by Ambassador Légrand we sought to exclude from the recommendations any formula which would go beyond what the Disarmament Commission, an intergovernmental body, could say with respect to a document from a private group, however eminent its membership.

If consideration of our work has sometimes called forth critical comments from the French delegation, they are not directed at the institution. We consider that an important role remains for the Commission to play as a universal deliberative body devoted to disarmament.

In this sense this body has a specific place in the institutional system set up pursuant to the Final Document of 1978. We firmly hope that the difficult experience of this year will prove useful in steering the Commission on its way and will prompt us all to reflect on conditions for greater success.

In closing, I wish, on behalf of the French delegation and on my own behalf, to pay a tribute to the authority, competence and courtesy of our Chairman in conducting our business. We assure him of our highest consideration and gratitude.
Miss AFOUL MAGA (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): Today, as we conclude the work of this session of the Disarmament Commission for 1983, it is necessary and useful to make an evaluation of the results of our work during the past weeks. I would recall that the Egyptian delegation, in its general statement at the beginning of our work, referred to the importance of the Commission as a deliberative organ which includes all the Members of the United Nations and to the importance of making every effort to defend the Commission against all the accusations levelled at it concerning its usefulness, its effectiveness and even its existence and continuation. Can we say now that we did actually save the Commission? Can we really refute those accusations? In general, the last few weeks have proved, through the work of the special working groups on the different items on our agenda, that the main obstacle threatening our Commission and its ability to produce specific recommendations concerning the main items that have been on its agenda for many years is not the actual membership of the Commission or its rules of procedure but, as in the case of other disarmament bodies - the First Committee or the only negotiating body within the United Nations system, that is, the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva - the main obstacle is the absence of political will, on the part of those who must apply it, to achieve any objective and material progress in halting the arms race and promoting disarmament. Hence it is unfair to make accusations against any of those bodies.

Despite the efforts that have been made within the contact group on item 4, regarding which the Non-Aligned Movement submitted a working paper including specific recommendations for the first time concerning this item in the hope that the group would be able to formulate specific recommendations that would be transmitted by the Commission to the General Assembly at its forthcoming session, the negative attitude of some delegations and the absence of the necessary political will frustrated those hopes. However, we still believe that we must insist on continuing the deliberations on this item. Perhaps the list of proposals clarifying the deliberative status of the contact group vis-à-vis the working paper presented by the Non-Aligned Movement emphasizes that, despite
some of the recommendations on which a consensus was reached and which are not placed in parentheses, such as the importance of the free zones, the security guarantees, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and other recommendations concerning other aspects of disarmament and the arms race, such as the necessity for the Committee on Disarmament to draft a convention on the prevention of chemical warfare and also recommendations on the right of undiminished security for all States and the necessity to end the policy of the massive supply of strategic weapons, pursued by States that base their security on unfounded arguments, a policy which may lead to an increased threat to international peace and security, nevertheless the contact group could not reach a consensus on the main recommendations concerning the core of the subject, which is the halting of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of nuclear war, and all the proposals therefore remain in parentheses. We hope that the Commission will be able at the forthcoming session to begin where it ended at this session, basing its work, in further deliberations, on this list of proposals in the hope that the forthcoming session will achieve objective and material progress concerning those proposals.

I must express the appreciation of the Egyptian delegation to the Chairman of the contact group, Mr. Duarte of Brazil, for his patience in conducting the deliberations of the group.

The item concerning South Africa's nuclear capability has been on the agenda of the Commission since 1979. It is extremely regrettable that, despite the seriousness of the situation in South Africa and its deterioration, despite the universal condemnation of the racist policy of the Pretoria régime and its insistence on the policy of apartheid, and despite the results of the study undertaken by the Secretary-General with the help of experts, which concluded that without any doubt South Africa's nuclear capability represents a serious threat to the security of the whole continent, at a time when the Security Council has been considering the question of Namibia and the illegal occupation of that Territory by South Africa and has adopted a resolution, the working group did not reach a consensus on any specific recommendations. It is extremely
regrettable also that the intransigent attitude of some States which has prevented us from arriving at specific recommendations in past years is still continuing. They have even intensified their intransigence. This occurred despite the serious endeavours of the African group to achieve a consensus, but their endeavours were not greeted in the same spirit by some other delegations. That is why we believe that it is necessary for the Commission to continue to consider this item, which is particularly important for security in Africa and for international security, in the hope that those delegations will abandon their attitudes which prevent the achievement of progress and that they will realize the seriousness of the situation and carry out their obligations in keeping with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, especially the right of all peoples to self-determination and independence.

Before I conclude my observations on this item, I should like to express the appreciation of the Egyptian delegation to Mr. Hepburn who, in presiding over Working Group II, displayed his well-known wisdom and experience.

The Egyptian delegation followed the work of Working Group IV, which was concerned with confidence-building measures, and took an active part in its work, as we have said before, in view of our belief in the importance and necessity of such measures. Since we are in a part of the world that has endured tension for many years, we in the Middle East and in Africa realize the importance of confidence-building measures but, if their effectiveness is to be ensured, they must be universal and comprehensive, so as to include confidence-building measures of a political nature also, especially the establishment of new international economic order and the enhancement of international economic co-operation.
Confidence-building measures must also encompass the social and cultural sectors and not be confined to political and military matters. As to regional aspects of confidence-building measures, we have already mentioned the need to take account of each area's particular characteristics. We believe that confidence-building measures can be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, and we reiterate that in certain regions, such as the Middle East and southern Africa, unilateral confidence-building measures are extremely important.

The report of Working Group IV reflects the differing points of view on this subject and constitutes a first step towards following up on this item. I should like at this point to thank Ambassador Wegener who guided the work of this Group.

With reference to the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, we welcome the results of the deliberations of Working Group III and its recommendations concerning that report. We have already said how much we welcome that report. We believe that the recommendation that the report be taken into consideration in present and future disarmament negotiations is a positive one. The report of the Palme Commission and the ideas expressed in it could be extremely useful in disarmament negotiations. I congratulate Ambassador Lidgard on his achievement.

The report of Working Group I, on the reduction of military budgets, refers to the difficulty of achieving any progress unless progress is made in halting the arms race on the road to complete disarmament. With the necessary political will, the reduction of military budgets will present no real problem. We hope that the Commission will be able in the future to achieve progress in this field. In this context I should like, on behalf of the Egyptian delegation, to thank Ambassador Diaconu for his efforts as Chairman of this group.

I should like now to make some general observations concerning the work of the Commission.

First, the results of this session, which are very far from what we had hoped for, must serve as a basis for our work in the coming year: we must make use of them and even add to them.
Secondly, General Assembly resolution 37/78 H, which sets guidelines for the work of the Commission, must be the basis on which we organize our work of considering certain items. This must be followed up when we formulate our report to the coming session of the Assembly.

Thirdly, the Disarmament Commission has been striving, since it was established in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to adopt recommendations only by consensus. We accept this, because we consider consensus to be a guarantee of the implementation of our recommendations and of their binding nature. We must therefore make every effort to achieve consensus. But we wish to make it clear that in no circumstances should our wish for consensus be interpreted as conferring the right of veto on any delegation. Otherwise this Commission would be paralysed. It is clear from the Final Document that our rules of procedure are the same as those governing the General Assembly and its Main Committees.

Finally, in my delegation's first statement during this session we expressed our congratulations to you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the Commission and we said that this was not just a conventional gesture towards a new chairman. I should like now to thank you and this is not just a conventional expression of thanks to a chairman at the end of a session. Your commendable efforts to organize, manage and preside over this session compel us to express our appreciation and admiration for your patient guidance in bringing this session to a successful conclusion.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: I have three remarks to make on administrative matters.

First, I would point out that document A/CN.10/54, distributed this morning, was processed before the Committee of the Whole, at its meeting of 2 June, adopted its decision concerning its sponsors and the question of annexing it to the Commission's report. A revised version will be issued accordingly, as document A/CN.10/54/Rev.1.
Secondly, it has been brought to my attention that Press Release DC/1619 of 24 May 1983 concerning the statement I made on that date about the organization of our work misquotes my statement and does not reflect what appears in the Commission’s records. I request the secretariat of the Commission to convey my remarks to the responsible officers of the United Nations.

Thirdly, members may have noticed that in today’s Journal, in spite of the decision taken here and duly conveyed by the secretariat of the Commission to the editor of the Journal, it is stated in the English version that today’s meeting was to start at 10.30 a.m., while in the French version it is stated that it was to start at 10 a.m. I request the secretariat of the Commission to convey my remarks to the officers responsible for this mistake.

CLOSURE OF THE SESSION

The CHAIRMAN: At the close of this 1983 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, I should like to share with my colleagues some thoughts on the past experience and future work of the multilateral deliberative body.

I feel particularly gratified at having been able, with the co-operation of all delegations, to start the implementation of a new approach to our work. The guidelines contained in General Assembly resolution 37/78 H permitted the Commission to move away from merely recording dissenting views and to adopt instead a report whose format is oriented towards the achievement of concrete recommendations.

The next step in the new direction indicated by the General Assembly would be the streamlining of our agenda so as to enable the Commission to direct its attention to specific subjects from among those which have been under its consideration.
The Commission will submit to the Assembly a final report on item 7, and the work on item 8 should be completed at the 1984 session. On items 5 and 6, the record of the Commission's work seems to warrant an interval in their consideration so that positions can be reassessed in the light of accumulated experience.

The Commission could then take up those items again in a couple of years. At its thirty-eighth session the General Assembly will certainly look carefully at the possibilities opened up by the implementation of resolution 37/78 H and issue complementary guidelines which should ensure the transition to a more action-oriented style for the Commission's future work.

I wish to stress in this connection that the results of our deliberations on item 4 in my view demonstrate the advisability of narrowing down the focus of our attention regarding the broad range of questions comprised within the scope of its formulation. The report of the Commission on item 4 provides a good basis for the continuation of the effort to achieve a specific recommendation. Delegations might also wish to reflect further on the possibility of concentrating the attention of the Commission at its next year's session on a single issue under item 4, without having to tamper with the present formulation of the item. After finishing consideration of the issue chosen, the Commission could turn to another aspect, and thus successively at each subsequent session.

At its thirty-eighth session the General Assembly might, for instance, request the Commission to work out in 1984 the specific recommendations on the prevention of nuclear war, drawing _inter alia_ on the experience of the debate scheduled to take place this summer in the Committee on Disarmament.

I offer these comments and suggestions for the purpose of stimulating preliminary thought on the consideration of our report to the General Assembly later this year and particularly with a view to a meaningful and constructive participation by interested delegations at our organizational meeting next December, when I will again have the honour of serving as Chairman of this body.
Finally, I wish to express my warm thanks to the officers of the Commission, the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies and the Rapporteur, for their co-operation, support and understanding. I am sure that all members of the Commission will also wish to join me in expressing sincere thanks to the Department for Disarmament Affairs and particularly to the Secretary of the Commission, Mr. Lin, and to the officers who assisted the five subsidiary organs for their valuable and tireless assistance provided to the Commission. Our thanks also go to the conference services personnel and the interpreters.

I declare the 1983 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission closed.

The meeting rose at 2.05 p.m.