DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 26 May 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. MICHAELSEN (Denmark)
later: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

- Tribute to the memory of Mr. Jaime Roldos Aguilera, President of Ecuador
- General exchange of views (continued)

This record is subject to correction.

Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages, preferably in the same language as the text to which they refer. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also, if possible, incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, Department of Conference Services, room A-3550, 866 United Nations Plaza.

Any corrections to the records of the meetings of this session will be consolidated in a single corrigendum, to be issued shortly after the end of the session.

81-61158
The meeting was called to order at 11.05 a.m.

TRIBUTE TO THE MEMORY OF MR. JAIME ROLDOS AGUILERA, PRESIDENT OF ECUADOR

The CHAIRMAN: We have learned with deep regret that President Jaime Roldós Aguilera of Ecuador died in a plane crash on Saturday, 23 May. The President's wife and the Defence Minister also died in that crash. Since this is the first opportunity the Commission has had to be apprised of this sad event, I would ask members of the Commission to stand and observe a minute's silence in tribute to the memory of President Roldós Aguilera.

The representatives, standing, observed a minute's silence.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS (continued)

Mrs. CASTRO de BARISH (Costa Rica) (interpretation from Spanish): I have already had the honour of extending my greetings to you, Mr. Chairman, on a previous occasion, but I should like now to reiterate, on behalf of my delegation, our warmest congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission, as well as our congratulations to your colleagues on the Bureau. Costa Rica has always appreciated the genuine efforts made by Denmark and the Nordic countries in general for disarmament and peace. We join the previous speakers in expressing our gratitude to Mr. Vellodi of India, who preceded you in presiding over the important work of this Commission.

We have heard the sad news you imparted to us today, and we should like to express our deep feelings of regret at the death of the President of Ecuador, his wife and the other travellers accompanying him. Costa Rica feels a deep sense of loss at their death.

In order to fulfil the objectives of this deliberative body, we have before us the programme drawn up on the basis of several resolutions of the General Assembly adopted at its tenth special session and of subsequent General Assembly resolutions adopted at the thirty-third and thirty-fifth sessions. My delegation recognizes the importance of this programme and should like to recall General Assembly resolution 35/152 F, operative paragraph 2 of which requests
the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate contained in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly and resolution 35/156 F, which recalls the recommendation of the Disarmament Commission itself as contained in its report of last year to the effect that, in the course of the decade of the 1980s, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and the specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should, as appropriate, undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of the arms race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations. This takes on even greater relevance when we realize that we are on the eve of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That resolution also reaffirms the conviction that wide dissemination of the report or comprehensive study on nuclear weapons contained in document A/35/392 will contribute to a better understanding of the threat represented by those weapons and of the urgent need for progress in the various negotiations aimed at the horizontal and vertical prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation and the urgency of achieving nuclear disarmament. Operative paragraph 1 of that resolution emphasizes the need to generate the necessary political will to bring about effective disarmament measures, inter alia, by promoting public awareness in that regard.
Much has been said about the political will needed to generate new measures and decisions with a view to limiting or reversing the arms race. Political will is not only necessary, it is an essential precondition for disarming. My delegation can affirm that, because Costa Rica is a country which practises disarmament and, although we agree with those who say that security measures are necessary for a disarming world, we must also have a measure of faith and we must seek to mobilize political will to achieve this by beginning with nuclear disarmament, because real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could lead us to concrete steps in the reduction of conventional weapons. That idea was recently outlined by Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico in his statement. Costa Rica shares that view.

It seems logical, therefore, that items 4 and 6 should be considered jointly, for obvious reasons. My delegation attaches great importance to those items on our agenda and we therefore supported in recent days the proposal made by Brazil that the provisional agenda be amended so as to include the reference to the study mentioned in the resolution that I have referred to. My question to the Chair as to whether the document would be available, if the Brazilian amendment were not adopted, was also motivated by our interest in that study. Our attention was also drawn to the fact that the same delegations that abstained in the voting on the resolution A/35/156F, which of course maintain very different political stands, are the same delegations that now oppose the inclusion of any reference to that important document.

My delegation shares the view of Nigeria and other delegations that this session of the Disarmament Commission should contribute in the most positive and effective way to the holding of the second special session of the United Nations on disarmament, and that every effort should be exerted to come up with the necessary recommendations to check the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and contribute to the consideration of the reduction of military budgets. I wish to recall here what appears in a document of the Preparatory Committee at its recent session, document A/AC.206/4, which says:
"At the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in Geneva in 1980, the States members of the Group of 77 participating in the Conference proposed (NPT/CONF.II/C.1/2) that the following be duly reflected in the final document of the Conference: 'The accomplishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which has been constantly identified as worthy of the highest priority, would create a very favourable international climate for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which is to be held in 1982. Pending such an accomplishment, the three nuclear-weapon States Party to the NPT should proclaim the immediate cessation of all their nuclear-weapons tests, whether through simultaneous unilateral moratoria or through a trilateral moratorium.' The Conference, however, was unable to adopt a substantive final document due to differences of opinion on this and other points." (A/AC.206/4, para. 12)

My delegation can only deplore the fact that owing to differences of opinion a substantive final document could not be adopted. However, this is not unusual or surprising, because history tends to repeat itself in regard to all aspects of disarmament. The same things happen again and again.

My delegation shares the view that it is important for the Commission to consider item 5 relating to the reduction of military budgets also as a high priority. That point is directly related to a problem that is becoming more and more urgent every day, given the situation of violence in the world today. It is necessary to take effective steps to slow down or check the race in conventional weapons, in other words to reduce military budgets. Evidently, that affects the immediate interests of many, because it is a political, economic, and social factor of great importance to those that possess military industries and use them for purposes of political hegemony, to increase their domination or for interference or profit. All of that, we know, involves great costs particularly, but not exclusively, for the developing countries.
In the annex to document A/CN.10/3 of 11 May 1979, the Secretary-General lists the proposals contained in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the tenth special session, to which my delegation attaches great importance. We wish to stress certain specific proposals submitted by Latin American countries for the limitation of conventional weapons and for the reduction of military budgets: for example, the proposal for the limitation of conventional weapons which recalls the Ayacucho Declaration adopted by the Latin American countries of Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, on 22 June 1978 (A/S-10/AC.1/34); and the proposal of Costa Rica on economic and social incentives for halting the arms race, which was not adopted because of a lack of consensus. On that same topic, Ireland also submitted a proposal relating to a study on the possibility of establishing a system of incentives to promote the control of armaments and disarmament. Among the reasons why a number of delegations did not adopt our proposal, there was the argument that disarmament was an obligation that all States contracted under the United Nations Charter upon becoming Members of the United Nations and that we should not promote disarmament as a means of achieving economic gain. Costa Rica believes it is realistic to promote incentives for disarmament, especially if such incentives are not intended to lead to personal profit but rather to increase the resources necessary for development in countries that reduce their military budgets, and if they apply particularly, but not exclusively, to developing countries. Obviously, if all Member States fulfilled the principles of the Charter and of so many declarations and resolutions on disarmament and on international security, we would not be meeting here.

I wish to mention something that is important to stress whenever an opportunity arises: namely, that Latin America has already established its own Treaty of Tlatelolco for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. We are also pleased to stress the fact that this idea has been mentioned in many documents and has served as an inspiration for other, similar proposals in other regions of the world. In recalling the Declaration of Ayacucho here, we see in it an initiative which may be important as an inspiration for the conclusion of regional agreements which may perhaps check the arms race in conventional weapons in our region and other regions of the world.
Stress has been laid here on the importance of regional measures to reduce arms and on the establishment of zones of peace and security. Such measures can help to eliminate intervention, interference and violations of territorial integrity, which are some of the sequels of the hegemonistic tendencies in the world today, and at the same time strengthen the security of a given region at a lower level of armaments. Costa Rica would be very satisfied to see such developments in our own Central American region and in other areas of our continent and other continents which also urgently need such steps.

Accordingly, let me also express my delegation's appreciation of the proposal by Denmark contained in document A/CN.10/25 relating to a general approach to the study of conventional disarmament by the United Nations. Of special interest to my delegation are paragraphs 6 and 8 of that document, which deal with the regional arms races which, "even if modest by global standards, can have deleterious consequences for the economic and social development of the countries concerned and of other countries in their regions."

(A/CN.10/25, para. 6)
I would add that this is not only true of economic and social development, but of human development itself and the peace of those regions. We are also pleased to see the reference in paragraph 8 to:

"the study of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, the comprehensive study of confidence-building measures, the study on reduction of military budgets and the study on the relationship between disarmament and development." (A/CN.10/25, para. 8)

We also regard as very positive the proposal put forward by Romania and Sweden in document A/CN.10/26, on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures.

We share the views expressed by the representative of Chile in this regard, recalling that the idea of self-monitoring by States, especially nuclear States, is particularly important. My delegation feels that this would be the most reliable demonstration of serious intentions to carry out disarmament and to contribute truly to the aims of disarmament, rather than the repeated proposals and declarations which tend to lack substantive content and tend to be used as a mask for growing arsenals of weapons. Portugal made a very relevant suggestion in this regard, and the representative of Canada stressed and we share his view - that it is important to provide details relating to military budgets, because comparison and evaluation of such data would be a very concrete and valuable factor in the achievement of faster disarmament.

Finally, we attach great importance to the working document submitted by India, document A/CN.10/27, which stresses that:

"The highest priority in disarmament negotiations has always been the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons." (A/CN.10/27, para. 2)

We all know that the precarious peace prevailing in the world today is based on a balance of power, a give-and-take essentially between the large nuclear Powers which also have the greatest arsenals of conventional weapons. Agreements and negotiations with a view to curbing the arms race have thus far brought about a peace based on threats and on fear. The representative of Austria quoted Kennan, to the effect that we should overcome military
fixations on both sides. My delegation considers that, if we could overcome those fixations, we could make great progress along the way towards general and complete disarmament, which is our final goal.

Mr. FONSEKA (Sri Lanka): As this is the first formal occasion on which my delegation is taking part in the proceedings of this Commission, may I take this opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the office of Chairman, and to assure you of the co-operation of my delegation, particularly in the coming weeks when we get down to the real work of this Commission.

Looking round this room, I suspect that most delegations, like you Mr. Chairman, have come back refreshed after this long weekend and are in a mood to deal with the work of this Commission, however unenthusiastic certain delegations might from time to time appear to be as regards the need for perhaps, and also the work of, the Disarmament Commission.

Following the debate that has taken place during last week, I suspect that the current exchange of views has been mainly guided by a wish to determine how the United Nations Disarmament Commission can most usefully spend its time during this current third session. On that basis, it would appear that the agenda that is before us has been carefully looked at, and that there has been a shift in the focus or emphasis of what is really important.

I find that most delegations have proceeded on the basis that, when they reached the substantive part of our agenda, they almost ignored agenda item 4 (a) and (b). As the focus of the debate or the exchanges has been on the basis of a presumption that agenda item 4 barely exists, or is no longer important, it does seem to my delegation at least to be important to read again agenda item 4 (a) and 4 (b). This is how it goes. It says:

"(a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race . . . in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war

"(b) Consideration of the agenda items ... with the aim of elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with the priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament" (A/CN.10/L.7, para. 4)
However, as I said a moment ago, the exchanges so far in this debate - or at least the more pronounced views of certain delegations - have been as if nuclear disarmament and nuclear weapons had ceased to have the priority which was given them in the special session. I have in mind the views of one of a group of delegations which has taken up the position that the United Nations Disarmament Commission has just two tasks before it, and those two tasks are agenda item 5, reduction of military budgets, and agenda item 6, the study on all aspects of conventional disarmament.

Whatever the other reasons for this change of emphasis or this trend in the debate, one argument which has been heard, and which perhaps is not entirely unfounded, is that nuclear disarmament has been discussed ad nauseam in the special session and has been reflected in the Final Document of that special session, and annually in the First Committee of the General Assembly and, of course, in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. This argument goes on to say that it is neither realistic nor feasible for the Disarmament Commission to consider nuclear disarmament as its current task or, if I were to develop this argument a little further, it goes on to say: "Let us change the subject, let us go on to the next item on the agenda, and that is conventional disarmament".

My own reaction on hearing this point of view is that it almost sounds as if there is a demand on the part of some delegations for equal time to discuss issues other than nuclear disarmament, notwithstanding the emphasis and the priority which nuclear disarmament has been given in the special session and in all our deliberations, here in the Disarmament Commission, in the General Assembly and, of course, in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.
My delegation does not disagree about the importance of discussing conventional disarmament, but it is for an entirely different reason from the one I have just repeated. There are other reasons and at this point, while speaking of this interesting request for equal time, I might make a passing reference to what the representative of Brazil recounted in his statement on the outcome in the Committee on Disarmament of attempts to achieve even a procedural agreement on two important issues of nuclear disarmament, namely, the comprehensive test ban and the nuclear arms race. The Committee on Disarmament during its spring session, he told us, was unable even to take a procedural decision to start substantive discussion on either of those priority items.

So much for the difference in the treatment accorded to what is considered the priority item and what, on that same basis, comes far lower down in the scheme of disarmament outlined at the first special session devoted to disarmament.

However, my delegation agrees that the conventional arms race is a matter which concerns a very substantial number of the Members of the United Nations and, of course, those of us who are in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We agree to the consideration of conventional disarmament for another reason and that is because, as the Final Document states:

"Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently." (General Assembly resolution S-10/2, para. 46)

That, we believe, is a good enough reason to give some attention in the Disarmament Commission to the subject of conventional disarmament.

All the exchanges that have taken place so far have invariably led to the procedural suggestion that the Disarmament Commission might create a working group to consider the general approach to and the structure and scope of the study on conventional disarmament. My delegation agrees to the setting up of that working group. It would be open-ended and, we trust, organizationally so arranged as to permit all delegations to play the active role that they would wish to undertake. However, the terms of reference of that working group must take into account the priorities established at the special session and must not overlook items 4 (a) and 4 (b) which appear first on the Disarmament Commission's agenda for this year.
A number of proposals have been made on the scope of the study which the working group is to outline. In that context we should like to raise the following question. In considering various aspects of the armaments race, including all aspects of the conventional arms race, can conventional disarmament be divorced from nuclear disarmament? Or, if some so wish, it could be put the other way: Can nuclear disarmament be divorced from conventional disarmament? My delegation will remain open-minded until that working group commences its work on outlines for the study.

Here I shall refer to the Danish note verbale which certainly poses some interesting questions on the subject of what connexion there is between nuclear and conventional disarmament. It states that the general approach, structure and scope of the study:

"... should take ... into account existing relationships between conventional arms buildup and the development of the nuclear-arms race." (A/CN.10/25, p. 4)

My delegation would not put it exactly like that. It is not merely a matter of the "existing relationships"; we have to look a little beyond that. Relationships between conventional and nuclear disarmament certainly exist, although, as I said, not necessarily in the form expressed in the Danish delegation's paper.

Another question that my delegation would like to pose is: Should we not in the study ascertain the size of the present conventional armaments arsenals? Should we not begin by ascertaining some facts and figures about the production and sources of conventional armaments? And thereafter should we not also ask: Where are conventional arms deployed? And should we not bear in mind that those having the largest military arsenals at their disposal and within their alliances should take on a greater share of that responsibility? Should we not consider in the context of conventional arms, the sale of arms, arms transfers, arms given as aid and other movements of conventional arms?

While on the subject of conventional disarmament, reference has been made to regional disarmament – regional conventional disarmament, we presume. A proviso has been made that the initiative for that should come from the countries of the region against the background of the fact that the largest arsenals
of conventional arms are in countries which focus attention on regional disarmament. We should like to inquire whether we ought not to begin by asking those countries with the largest arsenals of conventional arms if regional conventional disarmament might not begin precisely in those areas. Otherwise those who advocate regional conventional disarmament might risk incurring the Biblical admonition that the physician should heal himself.

The other agenda item on which a good deal of our exchange has taken place has been the reduction of military budgets. Over the week-end I had an opportunity of taking a closer look at the documents which have been submitted to the Commission and I thought that some of the references would be of more than ordinary interest. Among the proposals made by Member States are the following:

"... As the disarmament programme proceeds, it may well be found that budgetary control provides one of the most effective safeguards. The Sub-Committee should also consider the suggestion that among the first steps towards world disarmament there should be a freeze or a standstill agreement on military expenditures, which would bind the signatories not to increase their expenditures for military purposes in any way." (A/CH.10/24, p. 3)

Another reads:

"Under the provision related to the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the States parties to the convention are under obligation to reduce their military expenditures within one year by no less than one third of the ... level of expenditure for the preceding year." (ibid.)
Yet another proposal I came across was 'that over-all military expenditures, both atomic and non-atomic, shall be limited to amounts spent in the year' immediately preceding. (ibid.)

I have not been speaking in order deliberately to mislead members of the Commission but have been reading cut certain proposals which the Secretariat has made available to us - proposals that were made in a better and happier time. The first proposal I read out was advanced by the United Kingdom in 1951; the second by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1954; and the third by France and the United Kingdom also in 1954. The only reason I read them out was to draw attention to and emphasize the very significant changes that appear to have taken place in the thought processes of some of the major Powers on the question of military budgets.

For that reason alone my delegation completely agrees with the proposal that has been made during our exchanges of views that we set up a working group to continue the study of the subject of military budgets. Of course, we would ask that that working group be open-ended and organizationally so arranged as to enable all members to participate.

While on the subject of military budgets, it seems hardly necessary to emphasize that the escalation of military budgets is eventually traceable to escalation of armaments, and the largest budgetary outlay in armaments is on nuclear weapons. That increasing outlay on armaments is by nuclear-weapon States and their allies. In the course of our exchange of views, statistics have been quoted confirming that.

Another point of view that has been expressed, or another subject that has been recurrently raised, in the course of our exchanges - concerns the need or the importance of transparency, comparability and verifiability of military expenses as prerequisites for freezing and reducing military budgets. Comments have been made on the need for refining the reporting instrument as well as on the reluctance of some States to respond to the request for information and on the reporting instruments.

My delegation would express the hope that the working group's efforts will not be hampered by controversy over that aspect of the reporting instrument and that there will be a willingness by all to co-operate in the study now being conducted by a United Nations expert group.
Before concluding my remarks, I should like to say that my delegation has welcomed the working paper that has been provided by Sweden and Romania (A/CN.10/26). My delegation finds that the operative paragraphs of a draft resolution contained in that working paper provide a suitable basis which the working group could consider as guidelines for freezing and reducing military budgets.

Mr. Elfaki (Sudan): Sir, I should like at the outset to extend my delegation's warmest congratulations to you on your election as Chairman of the Commission. I also take this opportunity to convey to your colleagues on the Bureau our congratulations and best wishes. I wish to assure you of our full co-operation for the attainment of the objectives of the current session.

I intended to be brief, not only in full deference to you, Sir, and to your very objective appeals but also because this subject of disarmament - important as it is - has been discussed intensively in many regional and international forums. I shall not therefore elaborate on the precarious situation of international peace and security caused by the nuclear and the conventional arms race. I have no doubt that we all know the major peaks of the road, if not the minor details. We know that simply because history has taught us how the excessive accumulation of arms is a threat to the very survival of mankind. Since the end of the Second World War millions of words have been uttered on this subject, and here we are, several decades later, with growing arsenals of conventional and nuclear weapons capable of destroying life on earth several times over.

The sources of threats to international peace and security having been identified, it is incumbent upon this current session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to continue to seek all possible and practical means that could achieve tangible results in the solution of the problems posed by the nuclear and conventional arms race. It is equally imperative that our current session should work out the appropriate mechanism to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which has twice brought about untold calamities to mankind during this century. Our current session can therefore be successful if it can meet the United Nations General Assembly mandate stipulated in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament calling on the Disarmament Commission to be
...a deliberative body... the function of which shall be to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament had to follow up the relevant decisions of the first special session devoted to disarmament." (resolution S-10/2, para. 118)

My delegation believes that the recommendations of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in the field of disarmament should take into consideration that progress towards the objectives of disarmament requires primarily an agreed reduction of military budgets, the conclusion and implementation of agreements on a cessation of the arms race and effective measures to eradicate the threat of nuclear weapons and eliminate the production of weapons of mass destruction. Super-Power compliance with the consensus formula of reducing military budgets has to be accorded highest priority in the quest for a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures should go along with negotiations on a balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. Moreover, the implementation of declarations of regional nuclear-free zones, coupled with the respect and compliance of the nuclear-weapon States on the basis of institutional arrangements and agreements freely arrived at among the States of the zone, could constitute basic and important disarmament measures.
Any consideration of the implementation of the declarations concerning nuclear-free zones leads inevitably to stressing the importance of item 9 of the agenda, concerning South African nuclear capability. South Africa's increased sophistication in the nuclear field, including the advanced processing and enrichment of uranium, and the threat such a capability poses to the peace and security not only of our continent but of the entire globe are well known and need no emphasis. South Africa's endeavours to strengthen its nuclear capability are obviously aimed at protecting and sustaining its inhuman system of apartheid in full defiance of all United Nations and regional organization decisions in that respect. The Secretary-General's report which has been referred to in General Assembly resolution 35/46 has left no doubt that South African nuclear capability constitutes an eminent threat to African countries and an acceleration of nuclear proliferation in the African continent. South Africa and its Zionist ally in the Middle East are currently entrenching themselves behind thicker walls of power, guns and nuclear devices and indulging in the false belief that by consolidating their nuclear alliance they can for ever stifle the winds of change blowing from within and outside. Our current disarmament session is therefore called upon to take practical measures to save the people of Africa and of the Middle East from threats of nuclear devastation and annihilation by the bloodthirsty régimes in South Africa and occupied Palestine.

Mr. Findlay (Australia): Before addressing the substantive matters at hand the Australian delegation would like to congratulate the current Chairman of the Commission and offer to him our full co-operation in furthering the work of the Commission. We should also like to congratulate the members of the Bureau and we are pleased to see you yourself, Sir, in the Chair from time to time as you are this morning.
Australia sees this third substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission as having a certain urgency. Not only is it a shorter session than normal, but it is taking place only 12 months before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Therefore, like the Committee on Disarmament, the Commission has only a short time left in which to prove itself capable of substantive and useful work. Australia believes that not only will the Committee on Disarmament be under the spotlight of international scrutiny at the special session, but so will the Disarmament Commission.

Australia attaches great importance to nuclear disarmament. We have particularly favoured the priority of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and we participated in the nuclear weapons study. However, we believe that, with less than two weeks to go, the Commission should be concentrating on the two items on which it can have some impact, namely the reduction of military budgets and conventional disarmament. We have noted that many other delegations share this view and we welcome the efforts that States such as Sweden, Romania, Denmark and India have made to advance the work of the Commission in those areas by producing working papers. All those efforts are helping to focus our attention on the issues before us.

On the question of reduction of military budgets, Australia regards it as essential that the Commission address the twin problems of comparability and verifiability. We are unable to agree with those who see these aspects of the military budgets issue as unnecessarily delaying the eventual implementation of reductions. Although some States might now decry the need for comparability and verifiability to be thoroughly resolved before reductions are negotiated, we believe that once such States entered into negotiations they would soon discover such a need. We cannot believe that any State could negotiate on the reduction of its own military budget without knowing how others matched up and in which respects the proposed mutual reductions were comparable.
Australia participated in the test of the military budget reporting instrument provided for in General Assembly resolution 34/83 F and it sees the development and refinement of such an instrument as being the key to the future success of any international move towards reduction of military budgets. This will, however, require universal participation and Australia urges those States which did not participate in the test of the reporting instrument to give consideration to their future involvement. In particular, we would urge participation of those States with different socio-economic systems from those which have submitted responses so far.

On the question of conventional disarmament the Australian delegation believes that the proposed study should be wide-ranging and flexible. It should not attempt to focus on particular regions or on any particular major military Powers. Australia sees the problem of conventional disarmament as a global one, affecting all States and regions, whether developed or developing. While the major military Powers may have the highest military expenditures in absolute terms, there are others whose percentage of gross national product spent on weaponry is also reason for serious concern. It is not only the super-Powers which have recently engaged in massive arms build-ups. The projected conventional weapons study should therefore concern itself with the entire problem of conventional disarmament, not just a part of it.

These are the general views of the Australian delegation concerning the major tasks facing the Commission at this session. We look forward to participating in a more detailed manner during the coming meetings of the proposed working groups on the reduction of military budgets and conventional disarmament. We believe that the Commission should focus its attention on these two issues and establish these two working groups to enable it to achieve such a focus.

Mr. Economides (Italy): I shall confine my remarks to some general observations on items 5 and 6 of the agenda, namely the question of freezing and reduction of military budgets and elaboration of the general approach to the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces.
These points have already been commented upon by the representative of the Netherlands, speaking on behalf of the Ten, and of course the Italian delegation fully shares the viewpoints expressed in his statement.

The discussions on and the agreements for reduction of military budgets, which is an item contained in the general issue of disarmament, should take into full account the same fundamental principles applied to disarmament. Among those principles, the maintenance of balance, which is a condition of security, and international verification are fundamental.

Since defence expenditures vary considerably from one country to another, it does not seem appropriate or realistic to propose reduction of either a fixed percentage or absolute figures to be applied uniformly to all countries. To the extent that it could interfere with the fundamental defence needs of the countries concerned, such a solution might have undesirable destabilizing effects.

This Commission is also aware that estimates of the military expenditures of States vary according to the sources considered. It is therefore necessary to use an instrument capable of reporting, in an objective and verifiable manner, the actual military budgets.

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 35/142 B, this reporting instrument is being further refined by a group of experts which has also been requested to examine and suggest solutions to the question of comparing military expenditures, as well as the problems of verification that will arise in connexion with agreements on reduction of military budgets.
My delegation believes that the solutions to be proposed by the group of experts on the issues of comparability and verifiability are necessary conditions for and prerequisites to meaningful negotiations on the question of the reduction of military expenditures.

Another basic element is the question of transparency of budgets. The reporting instrument will be effective and the future reductions possible only if an increasing number of States make use of it, especially those whose budgetary structures and categorization procedures are different from those so far considered.

An important contribution to progress on the question of the reduction of military budgets could be given by the Commission by inserting in its report a recommendation on the lines of that contained in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 35/142 B in particular the part which states:

"that all Member States should make use of the reporting instrument and report annually to the Secretary-General their military expenditures of the latest fiscal year for which data are available ...".

I am pleased to say that, for our part, we responded to the appeal of the General Assembly and sent some days ago to the Secretary-General the data on the Italian defence budget for the latest fiscal year available, namely, 1980.

We hope that our submissions, made for the second consecutive year, will be followed by those of a large number of other countries.

The question of the freezing and reduction of military budgets was the subject of a working paper submitted by the delegations of Romania and Sweden. We wish to thank them for their efforts and for the contribution they have made to our work.

However, the general remarks I made previously apply also to the question of the freezing of military budgets. Indeed, that proposal refers to one among the possible measures that States might envisage in the framework of the reduction of military budgets and hence should be subject to the achievement of a greater transparency and to the satisfactory solution of the problems of comparability and verifiability.
Therefore at this stage, and pending the conclusions of the group of experts established by resolution 35/142 B, we do not see any basis for a useful discussion of the point and of the preparation of a declaration. Moreover, the freezing of unknown expenditures or the freezing of a possible substantial imbalance does not contribute, in our view, either to the achievement of confidence among States or to that of progress in the disarmament field.

I should now like to address a few remarks to the question of the elaboration of guidelines for the study of conventional weapons.

We are convinced that the study, which will begin soon after the conclusion of this Commission's work, will prove extremely useful in that it will cast light on many important aspects of conventional disarmament and will contribute to an enhanced understanding of a problem which is undoubtedly of common interest.

The representative of the Netherlands, speaking on behalf of the Ten, has rightly pointed out that all wars in the last 30 years have been waged with conventional weapons and that there is an ever-increasing arms race in this field which calls for a determined response by the international community. In our view, this situation cannot by any means be neglected or ignored.

The Disarmament Commission, in particular, should fully comply with the task assigned to it by the General Assembly, namely, to work out a general approach to the study, its structure and scope. The positive conclusion of that exercise would confirm the ability of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to carry out effectively, the specific mandate given to it by the General Assembly as it has done so far.

I should like to say in conclusion that my delegation looks forward to a constructive discussion of the valuable and objective working paper presented by the delegation of Denmark on the question of the study on conventional weapons.
Mr. DROUSHIOTIS (Cyprus): I should like first to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and the other members of the Bureau, on your well-deserved election to your respective posts. Under the able guidance and with the skill of our Chairman, we are confident that the Disarmament Commission will successfully carry out its tasks.

The Disarmament Commission meets against a background of a lack of substantive progress towards disarmament and in a worsening world situation.

Thus, the international community must intensify its efforts towards disarmament and our task, as the deliberative body established by the first special session on disarmament, becomes all the more important and greater. We must squarely address the questions whose priority we confirmed in the Final Document of the first special session and which was reconfirmed by the Commission last year. In our deliberations we should continue in particular to seek the means to achieve progress on the priority aspects of disarmament, namely, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war and to give impetus to those bodies that are negotiating instruments for nuclear disarmament, in particular, our related negotiating body, the Disarmament Committee. That becomes all the more necessary since the Disarmament Committee's recent session has failed to produce concrete results. None the less, we wish to commend the constructive efforts of the Group of 21, to be seen in documents CD/180 and CD/181 of 24 April 1981 of the Disarmament Committee, which contain the statement of the group, and we express the hope that their proposals will receive positive consideration by the other members of the Committee.

Last year in the Commission we all reiterated the fact that "among all disarmament measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war had the highest priority, and that all nuclear-weapon States ... bore a special responsibility in achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament". Yet this year we are further from the realization of our common goal. Along with the vast majority of nations, we express our dismay at the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament negotiations and voice our deep concern over the fact that nuclear-weapon States, in particular those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, continue to accumulate, improve and increase the overskill capacity of their nuclear weapons.
Moreover, in the face of efforts to curb the nuclear arms race, that race is becoming more vicious and complicated. The so-called balance of deterrence, that is, the capability of nuclear-weapons States to annihilate each other, is now compounded by the "feasibility" of the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Thus, in light of the prevailing situation, item 4 of our agenda takes on special importance and is one which we should particularly address ourselves to in our deliberations.

In this respect, intensified efforts should continue on two important items which are on the agenda of the Disarmament Committee, namely, the nuclear test ban, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

A comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is a necessary element towards the halting and reversing of the nuclear arms race. We underline the need for the Disarmament Committee to conclude negotiations on the treaty for its submission to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and call upon those States concerned to heed the repeated appeals of the General Assembly to bring the negotiations to a positive conclusion.
Multilateral negotiations on ending the nuclear arms race are long overdue, and States - particularly the nuclear-weapon States - must manifest the necessary political will in order that such negotiations may bear positive results. The comprehensive study on nuclear weapons contained in document A/392 (Annex) clearly evinces that the nuclear arms race runs counter to efforts for the relaxation of tensions and the strengthening of international peace and security. An examination of that study should stimulate us, the Commission, to take urgent measures and to make effective recommendations towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

Also important in their relevance to nuclear disarmament are the continuation of the SALT process and negotiations on theatre nuclear weapons. We urge the two super-Powers to take urgent action towards achieving the objectives of paragraph 52 of the Final Document.

Another important item on our agenda is the reduction of military budgets, since such reduction would effectively lead to general and complete disarmament. There is no doubt that the primary responsibility for the reduction of military budgets falls on the nuclear-weapons Powers and on the most heavily armed States. Furthermore, it is inherent in the process of the reduction of military budgets that the resources released will be made available for economic and social development, especially for the developing countries.

Item 6 of our agenda deals with the proposed study on conventional arms and disarmament relating thereto. In this connexion we wish to recall that nuclear disarmament is the task of first and highest priority; which will necessarily need to be borne in mind when we consider this item, and that the achievement of nuclear disarmament measures should not be predicated upon corresponding progress on conventional disarmament. Also, balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments must be based on the principle of the undiminished security of the parties. In that light we whole-heartedly welcome the proposed study, since conventional disarmament is an important aspect of disarmament.

On a general note, an underlying factor if we are to achieve the objectives of the Final Document is the successful maintenance of international peace and security through the implementation of the principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter. Doctrines of nuclear deterrence and the balance of power,
by engendering and perpetuating the arms race, run counter to security, these doctrines are therefore far from being conducive to the maintenance of international peace and security.

As regards the organization of work, a number of representatives have expressed views with which we can agree with regard to the establishment of two working groups, one to deal with agenda items 4 (a), 4 (b) and 5, and another to deal with item 5. As I indicated earlier, however, nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, and the consideration of item 5 should not divert our maximum necessary attention from items 4 (a) and 4 (b). The working groups should therefore be set up on that clear understanding.

Finally, it is worth emphasizing that the Disarmament Commission is a deliberative body composed of the whole membership of the United Nations, and that a necessary element for fruitful results in this particular case is consensus. We should therefore - and we hope that this will be the case in the future - exert all possible efforts in our decision making to take into account the views of all members, thereby ensuring a positive outcome of our work.

Mr. ANDREASSEN (Norway): As this is the first time my delegation has spoken at this session, I should like to use this opportunity to extend to the Chairman the warmest congratulations of my delegation on his election to the chairmanship of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey to you, Sir, and to the other officers, our warmest congratulations.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission has, in the course of its two previous substantive sessions, succeeded in elaborating and finalizing two important documents, on elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament and on the Declaration of the 1980s as a second Disarmament Decade. Their adoption constitutes a firm and important basis for further negotiations in the field of disarmament.

The first document, on elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament, is now subject to further elaboration within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and will be a major subject during the second special Assembly session devoted to disarmament which will be held here in New York next year. The other document is the Declaration of the 1980s as
the second Disarmament Decade, and it too will play an important role
at the next special session of the General Assembly.

In our view, the United Nations Disarmament Commission should, at this
session, focus on all aspects of the conventional arms race as well as on the
question of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures.

My delegation welcomed General Assembly resolution 35/156 A, which, in
principle, approved the carrying out of a United Nations study on all aspects of the
conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons
and armed forces. This session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission has
been charged with working out the guidelines for that study. We see the efforts
to restrain the conventional arms race as a necessary supplement to efforts
to curb the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament. My delegation,
therefore, fully supports the approach presented in the Danish working paper
contained in document A/CN.10/25 of 15 May 1981. It is our hope that the
Commission will fulfil its mandate during the present session by reaching
agreement on the guidelines for the study.

As has been stated by others, we too consider that the regional approach
is an important element in the work towards disarmament. That is particularly
true in relation to conventional disarmament, given the very different character
of the conventional arms build-up in various parts of the world.

The question of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures has
been on the agenda of the United Nations for several years. Norway is among the
countries which actively participate in and strongly support those efforts. We
consider that transparency and comparability of military expenditures is a
prerequisite for negotiations and agreements on the reduction of military budgets.
We, therefore, welcome the standardized reporting instruments which have been worked
out by a group of experts. Norway has reported on its military expenditures and
has actively co-operated in this project. We should like to express the hope that
more States - especially States with different socio-economic systems - will
decide to participate in this work by reporting on their military expenditures.
We hope that further progress can be made in this field by establishing the
necessary basis for concrete decisions on reduction of military budgets. We see
the question of reduction of military budgets as part of the efforts to reallocate
resources from military purposes to economic and social development, particularly
for the benefit of developing countries.
Mr. ABDEL MEGUID (Egypt): I heard with deep regret and sorrow the sad news of the death of the President of Ecuador in an aeroplane crash. In the name of my Government, I should like to extend my profound sympathy and condolences to the Government and people of Ecuador.
I should like at the outset to congratulate the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission on his election. I am confident that his able and wise leadership will bring our work to a successful conclusion. I wish also to take this opportunity to express my felicitations to the other members of the Bureau, and to assure them of the close co-operation of the Egyptian delegation.

The Commission met last year amid a turbulent and deteriorating international situation permeated by the use and threat of use of force. I regret to say that we meet again today surrounded by circumstances that are not qualitatively different from those that prevailed last year. The phenomenon of the use and threat of use of force continues to persist, manifesting itself in the articulation of new strategic doctrines based on the volatile and inherently unstable concept of nuclear deterrence as well as on the antiquated concept of the balance of power. Furthermore, the use or threat of use of force is systematically being used against the independence and territorial integrity of States, as well as to deprive subjugated peoples around the world of the exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination.

Coupled with the recourse to force in international relations is the disturbing phenomenon of a world-wide deteriorating economy. These two phenomena interact and reinforce one another, thereby diverting scarce resources from social and economic development to military build-up. These disturbing circumstances should not, however, drive us to pessimism, but should rather strengthen our resolve to fulfil our task of achieving genuine disarmament. We should proceed with a singular determination to create suitable conditions for halting and reversing the arms race. The greatest responsibility rests, however, with the nuclear-weapon States.

Only two weeks ago we concluded, on a mildly encouraging note, the first substantive session of the Preparatory Committee for the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I choose to characterize the work and outcome of the Preparatory Committee as "mildly encouraging" because, while it underlined the universal commitment to the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, it did so against the background
of an escalating arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race. Although the Programme of Action adopted at the tenth special session in 1978 clearly set out the priorities and measures in the field of disarmament, little progress - whether within the framework of the United Nations or outside it - has been achieved to date, the exception being the conclusion of a Convention on prohibitions and restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. This was adopted late last year and was signed by Egypt on 10 April 1981.

In the course of the Preparatory Committee meetings, universal support was reiterated. It is our sincere hope that this verbal exercise will manifest itself in an effort to conclude negotiation, before the special session on disarmament, of the instruments for disarmament now subject to negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. The realization of such an objective will allow the special session on disarmament to focus on devising specific and concrete measures, within the framework of a comprehensive programme for disarmament, to arrest and reverse the arms race.

The agenda of the Commission contains a number of extremely important items, namely, items 4 (a) and (b), item 5 on the reduction of military budgets, item 6 on the study of conventional weapons and, finally, item 9 on nuclear collaboration with South Africa.

With regard to the reduction of military budgets my delegation would like to emphasize the importance it attaches to an early agreement on this matter. It is our view that the freezing and reduction of military expenditure should start with States possessing the largest and most sophisticated military arsenals. So long as such States refrain from taking concrete steps towards this end, mistrust and insecurity will prevail. To dispel the feelings of mistrust, insecurity and vulnerability that plague the present state of international relations, the resources released by the reduction of military expenditure by the heavily armed States should be channelled towards aiding the developing countries.
I wish now to turn to agenda item 6 on the study of the conventional arms race. It is relevant to recall that Egypt abstained in the voting on General Assembly resolution 35/156 A. In explaining its vote my delegation made it clear that, while it supported the principle of the study, it hoped that the study would not divert the attention of the international community away from the more important—in fact, crucial—task of nuclear disarmament. I wish to confirm once again Egypt's consistent position in support of any effort aimed at contributing to general and complete disarmament, including the undertaking of studies on the various aspects of the arms race.

However, it is our view that any effort, including the undertaking of studies, should not distort the priorities already agreed upon by the international community at the tenth special session. The highest priority remains progress on nuclear disarmament. Unless there is substantial progress on nuclear disarmament, the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons cannot be effectively pursued. Since we are now seized of the question of the structure and scope of the study, I wish to put forth the views of my delegation in that respect.

Only a handful of States, which also happen to be nuclear-weapon States, are responsible for the production of a substantial proportion of conventional arms. Such States compete among themselves in marketing their inventory of conventional arms. They find in conventional-arms transfers a useful tool to spread their influence and ideology, as well as to redress a deteriorating balance of payments. At the same time, many middle-sized and small countries are forced, by the existence of a structure of international relations I have described earlier, not only to procure, but also to develop their indigenous capacity to produce, conventional arms as a means of safeguarding their security, independence and territorial integrity.
Any study, therefore, must draw a distinction between countries that use conventional arms to exercise domination and those that are forced to safeguard their security and independence. In other words, the study must address itself to the root causes of the conventional arms race and not restrict itself to the visible manifestations of that race. Failure to proceed along those lines will be self-defeating.

Once the approach and structure are agreed upon, it is our view that the study should encompass not only traditional conventional weapons, but also those weapons that are still being developed. Furthermore, it may be appropriate to consider how the international community should react to the development of certain rocket research projects which, although they purport to be exclusively for peaceful uses, could nevertheless be diverted and used for military purposes. Technological progress requires that the international community prepare itself for a development that could aggravate the arms race.

I should now like to refer to a concrete step taken by Egypt as a contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Commission will recall that upon Egypt's initiative, the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly adopted, without objection, resolution 35/147 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. In fact, it was the first time that all the parties directly concerned supported the creation of such a zone. Encouraged by such a development, and in pursuance of operative paragraph 1 of resolution 35/147, Egypt completed the process of ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on 26 February 1981. Such a step should be seen, in particular, as an additional concrete manifestation of Egypt's desire to prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, as well as a confirmation of the importance it attaches to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world in general.

In ratifying the Treaty, Egypt acted from its conviction that the nuclear-weapon States will fulfill their obligations as prescribed by the Treaty. It is our view that it is the latter, more than anything else, that will induce
other States to accede to the Treaty, thereby contributing to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, the fact that Egypt has become a full-fledged party to the Treaty in no way means that we are blind to its shortcomings, particularly when it comes to its actual implementation.

In that respect, we wish to register our dismay and deep dissatisfaction at the failure of the second review conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve positive results, particularly in the areas of vertical proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In that connexion, my delegation is of the view that the objectives of the Treaty will be better served through the following: first, nuclear-weapon States should conclude, in conformity with article VI of the Treaty, and on an urgent basis, a comprehensive test ban treaty. Such a step will significantly contribute to halting horizontal proliferation.

Secondly, nuclear-weapon States should provide legally binding negative security guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States, with a view to preventing horizontal proliferation.

Thirdly, all States should urgently conclude and implement effective agreements on disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, thereby contributing towards achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Towards that end, and as a first step, an agreement among the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against one another should be seriously considered.

Fourthly, the responsibility of States possessing nuclear technology faithfully and effectively to implement articles IV and V of the Treaty, thereby conceding the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to develop research production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

Fifthly, the effective implementation of article VII of the Treaty on regional arrangements to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons. In that connexion, I wish to reiterate Egypt's commitment to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as well as the great importance it attaches to the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.
Mr. ESPECHER GIL (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): In speaking for the second time in this debate, we have the advantage of having benefitted from the statements made by previous speakers. In the light of that discussion, we now wish to express our views on several items of the agenda and on how we can best pursue our work in the time remaining.

Our very broad-ranging agenda has led to a debate emphasizing the link between the nuclear arms race and the conventional arms race, the question of the reduction of military budgets, and the preparation of various reports from this Commission to the Assembly.

At the root of problems affecting the individual security of States and international security is the fact that the system of collective security laid down by the Charter of the United Nations is being replaced by a system based on the threat of the use of nuclear weapons possessed by a handful of countries, chiefly the two super-Powers.

Countries that do not possess or wish to possess nuclear weapons, such as my own and that oppose the very existence of such instruments of mass destruction view with concern the spread of threatening signs of a growth of the arms race. Whether we refer to the now dubious effectiveness of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), or the deployment of new mobile missile systems, or the increase of their deployment in the European theatre, or budgetary increases in military expenditure, or encumbrances hampering the Geneva negotiations on priority topics facing the Committee on Disarmament, or the growth of trouble spots in strategic areas of the world, the result in all cases is the creation of conditions that make the outbreak of a conflagration easier rather than more difficult.

We should not transform our discussion into an abstract debate that does not deal with historical realities. When we speak of nuclear weapons, who has nuclear weapons by definition? When we speak of conventional weapons, who has the most sophisticated conventional weapons in the largest quantities?
Are we talking about military budgets? Well then, who spends the most both in absolute terms and in comparative terms? If we analyse the situation from the standpoint of research, design, development, production, refinement, stockpiling or distribution of different kinds of arms, once again we are led to the conclusion that it is the super-Powers and their allies who hold primacy in the arms build-up in the conventional field as well, and the most serious aspect is that, when we come to the use or threat of use of force, whether in terms of nuclear or conventional weapons, we are faced with the fact that the historical reality that I have referred to demonstrates in many cases, quite directly or indirectly, once again that there is instigation, backing or intervention in the internal affairs of States on the part of Powers that belong to that same category of countries. Hence the importance of focusing upon these topics in a suitable over-all perspective.

It should be said that over the last 30 years all armed conflicts have been waged with conventional weapons. This has actually been so throughout all history: war has been waged with conventional weapons. But that is not the point of the discussion. Conventional weapons proportionate to defence needs cannot be called in question. That is part of the sovereign attributes of States. On the other hand, what is objectionable is the possession of nuclear weapons, whose very presence is unacceptable and whose use exceeds the defence needs of countries, because of their very nature as instruments of mass destruction. That is the crux of the matter because there is no symmetry, no possible comparison between one type of weapon and the other.

In the course of this debate repeated reference has been made to a regional approach to conventional disarmament. We must express our views in that regard as well. It must be remembered that the study contained in document A/35/416 analyses all aspects of regional disarmament and virtually exhausts the topic in its conventional military dimension. With the exception, perhaps, of the case of Europe, the regional approach is not compatible with the principle of a strategic consistency whereby every negotiation, conclusion
and implementation of disarmament measures must involve participation by the States whose security may be affected by such measures and all those whose military power enables them to affect regional security, whether they belong to the region or not. Those requirements make it improbable that the regional approach can be successful in the conventional field. The military might of the great Powers which enables them to station strong naval forces close to all regions and rapidly to deploy their troops to all areas would place in an even more disadvantageous position any State that attempts to restrict its arsenals under a regional approach.

As regards restrictions on the trade in and transfer of conventional weapons, another topic alluded to in the debate, consideration of this problem is of course a valid one, but it cannot be separated from the over-all approach I have referred to. It would in any case have to be a collateral measure to be negotiated multilaterally after an agreement on the foregoing approaches that I have described. Otherwise it would violate the principle of undiminished security, since the defence of most of the developing countries is linked to the international arms supply.

The sixth item on our agenda refers to the preparation of a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, as well as its structure and scope. Some delegations have expressed interest in this, saying that the Commission should assign to a working group the preparation of this over-all study. My delegation would have no objection at all to proceeding in that fashion. However, for the reasons I have described, my delegation believes that items 4 (a) and (b) and 6 of our agenda are very closely interrelated, and consequently we believe that it would be advisable for a single working group to deal with both agenda items simultaneously. My delegation feels that in that way we would satisfy two concerns that have been emphatically expressed throughout the debate. We could make progress in considering agenda item 4 (a) and (b) which is closely linked to the priority which the disarmament process has in the United Nations and which has not been exhausted either in deliberations or in actions. The Commission could also ensure that the scope, the approach, the structure for the study, whose preparation has been approved
in principle by the Assembly, would remain within an appropriate context. We are confident that the Disarmament Commission can carry out a fruitful debate on the scope of this study within the framework of a working group. A study whose scope is defined as the outcome of a true consensus in the United Nations would be more fruitful than a hastily undertaken study that did not give sufficient time for ideas to mature, or for ideas to be suitably exchanged on a topic which directly affects the individual and collective security of States and international security as a whole.

As for military expenditures, we would urge the establishment of an ad hoc working group to continue the discussion on that item, that is, agenda item 5. On 16 April 1981, my Government expressed its views to the Secretariat and those views are to be found in document A/CN.10/23, which is available to delegations.

Finally, my delegation wishes to express its appreciation to the delegations of Denmark, India, Romania and Sweden who have contributed so much to our debate in documents that we feel will help us greatly to do fruitful work in the time available to us. My delegation will express its views on the specific contributions contained in those documents in whatever working groups are established.
Mr. R. KHAN (Pakistan): As this is the first time that I have spoken at this session, let me extend to you, Sir, my delegation's felicitations on your election as Chairman of the Disarmament Commission. We are confident that, with your wide experience, expertise and qualities as an outstanding diplomat, you will be able to steer the deliberations of the Commission to a successful conclusion. To that end, I wish to assure you of my delegation's full co-operation.

Our main task at this session of the Commission pertains to agenda items 4, 5 and 6 which, respectively, refer to the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, the question of reduction of military budgets and that of the general approach to the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race. In addition, we have to give consideration to the letter from the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid addressed to the Secretary-General, and the preparation of a report of the Disarmament Commission on its work to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

Since many of the aspects pertaining to those agenda items have been extensively covered in the general debate, I shall state briefly the thinking of my delegation on those questions.

The primary concern expressed by most of the delegations on agenda item 4, which relates to the consideration of the arms race, particularly its nuclear aspect, and nuclear disarmament, is fully shared by my delegation. The demand for nuclear disarmament originates in the most fundamental human desire for survival and continuity and to save itself from a nuclear holocaust. Logically, therefore, the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which provides no less than a blueprint for international disarmament efforts, attaches the highest priority to nuclear disarmament.

However, the goals set forth at the first special session remain as distant as ever. The process of the SALT negotiations is apparently deadlocked. The progress on even the first steps towards nuclear disarmament, namely, the comprehensive test ban and negative security guarantees to
non-nuclear-weapon States has been halting and disappointingly slow. The Committee on Disarmament, despite the efforts of the countries of the Group of 21, has failed to commence any meaningful negotiations with regard to the two top priority items on its agenda, namely, the ban on nuclear-weapon testing and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The repeated calls of this deliberative body for urgent action to be taken to prevent the further spiralling of the nuclear arms race have so far proved to be mere empty words. Nevertheless, those failures and disappointments cannot be allowed to induce pessimism and indifference to the objectives and priorities of disarmament. We have no choice but to persist in our endeavours and to impress upon those who are primarily responsible to bring the nuclear arms race to a halt.

Our primary concern for nuclear disarmament should not diminish our commitment to conventional disarmament or, worse, be allowed to become a pretext for an unrestricted development and acquisition of conventional arms. Disarmament calls for integrated efforts in all its aspects.

We have witnessed, time and again, that the cause of disarmament, whether in its nuclear or conventional aspects, becomes one of the first casualties of the military adventurism of the great Powers. As in the past, conventional weapons remain the primary vehicle for advancing strategic ambitions of States which are indeed at the heart of conflicts and tensions in the world. If those conflicts intensify and if the major Powers continue to violate with impunity the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States, the world will inevitably draw closer to a nuclear conflict.

My delegation therefore attaches due importance to agenda item 6, which seeks elaboration of the general approach to the study on all aspects of the conventional arms race. Elaboration of that important aspect of the arms race cannot by itself detract from the emphasis and priority attached to the nuclear aspect of the arms race.

There is one other reason why my delegation supports the compilation of a study on the conventional arms race. At this stage of disarmament endeavours, despite our desire to achieve concrete results, we have
accomplished no more than an articulation of thinking on various aspects of disarmament. Already an expert-level study has been prepared on nuclear disarmament. It is therefore timely that we have also a similar study on the conventional arms race. However, that study should not lose sight of the overriding reality that the States which are responsible for the nuclear arms race are also primarily responsible for the conventional arms race. Of course, in this case the responsibility is shared also, to a certain degree, by those other States which have been described as "militarily significant" in the Final Document of the first special session. In this context, judging from the point of view of balance and the requisite details, we find that the two papers on the subject contained in documents A/CN.10/25 and A/CN.10/27 complement each other and are useful as a basis for our work related to agenda item 6. By delegation will offer detailed comments on those papers in the working group discussions which are expected to follow the general debate.

Both nuclear and conventional disarmament are essentially issues of global dimension and measures to halt and reverse the arms race, and both those aspects call for global measures. At the same time, however, we cannot underestimate the usefulness of regional and interim measures for disarmament. The Final Document has commended specific nuclear disarmament measures, such as the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, negative security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States, and so on. We consider that regional disarmament measures in their conventional aspect can also contribute a great deal towards the achievement of the ultimate objective of general and comprehensive disarmament. The initiative for the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean is a case in point.

In respect of conventional disarmament, whereas the creation of such a peace zone in the Indian Ocean would call for undertakings of non-intervention and non-interference on the part of the great Powers, it would also necessarily require the regional States to take appropriate steps for the reduction of military forces and armaments and simultaneously enter into commitments to respect each other's sovereignty, political independence and
territorial integrity. Such measures are justified with equal validity for subregions, where through dialogue, mutual trust and mutual agreements, the States of the area should try to ensure their security at the minimum possible levels of armament. As the study on regional disarmament has observed:

"... the more effectively the countries in a region can reduce tension among themselves, strengthen intra-regional co-operation and eliminate mutual military competition, the better will they be able to keep the region free from external interference, and to prevent it from becoming a zone of confrontation and rivalry for outside powers. Resolute efforts to resolve regional conflicts and settle disputes by peaceful means, and steps to promote regional co-operation in various fields, can go a long way towards diminishing the scope for external interference and the occasions for confrontation at the global level, thus paving the way for appropriate regional and global disarmament measures." (A/35/416, annex, para. 151)

It is necessary that a dialogue be initiated at both the global and regional levels between the two Powers with the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals, as well as among other States. Through such a dialogue we can hope to reduce international tensions and improve the international political climate which has dangerously deteriorated on account of increasing military interventions and conflicts, particularly in the recent past.
Accordingly, when dealing with our agenda we should not overlook the intrinsic relationship between considerations of international political and security and the prospects for disarmament. A study on the question of the arms race must also consider such political and security measures as can make it feasible to achieve meaningful progress in nuclear and conventional disarmament as well as towards the goal of reduction in military budgets.

On the organizational level, my delegation shares the preference expressed by a number of other delegations for the establishment of two working groups, one of which would deal with agenda items 4 and 5 and the other with agenda item 5. For us this is a logical allocation of work because conventional and nuclear aspects are two organic aspects of the arms race and they ought to be studied in the context of established priorities. The other working group could deal exclusively with agenda item 5 with a clear mandate that the consideration of the question deals with military spending on both nuclear and conventional armaments. The transfer of resources to development should also be studied in the same light.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.