DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 14 May 1980, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. VELLODI (India)

Agenda item 4:

(a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war

(b) Consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of resolution 33/71 II, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with the priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament

This record is subject to correction.

Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages, preferably in the same language as the text to which they refer. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also, if possible, incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, Department of Conference Services, room A-3550, 866 United Nations Plaza.

Any corrections to the records of the meetings of this session will be consolidated in a single corrigendum, to be issued shortly after the end of the session.
The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

**AGENDA ITEM 4 (continued)**

(a) CONSIDERATION OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE ARMS RACE, PARTICULARLY THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE NEGOTIATIONS AIMS AT EFFECTIVE ELIMINATION OF THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR.

(b) CONSIDERATION OF THE AGENDA ITEMS CONTAINED IN SECTION II OF RESOLUTION 33/71, WITH THE AIM OF ELABORATING, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED AT THE TENTH SPECIAL SESSION, A GENERAL APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT.

The CHAIRMAN: Before we continue the general exchange of views on this agenda item I should like to make two observations.

First, as the Commission agreed yesterday, the list of speakers for this item will be closed today at 5 p.m. We have speakers for the morning and afternoon meetings tomorrow, and for the meeting on Friday morning. The Commission also agreed yesterday that on Friday afternoon the first meeting of the working group on agenda item 3 would take place. Therefore, although a few more representatives could speak at tomorrow's meetings and at the meeting on Friday morning, it is possible that we may have to continue the general exchange of views on agenda item 4 on Monday, 19 May, at at least one meeting. I shall confirm this after 5 o'clock.

There is a second point on which I wish to consult the Commission and have its reaction: as I mentioned on Monday, we have a problem regarding the reproduction of documents submitted by delegations. Members will recall that I did say that, as is the normal practice, and as is required of us by a General Assembly resolution, documents should be distributed in all the languages at the same time. I informed the Commission that that would cause some delay in the distribution of documents. The Secretariat cannot distribute documents in one language alone unless the Commission authorizes it to do so. I have a specific problem before me. We have a document that was submitted to us a couple of days ago. The English version of that document is available for
distribution the translations in all other languages will not be available until Friday morning. Therefore I wish to know from the members of the Commission whether they would agree to the document's being distributed at the present meeting in the English language only. I must have the Commission's view on this matter, because if there is any objection to this procedure the document will not be distributed until Friday morning, along with the texts in the other languages. So, in particular, I wish to know whether there is any objection to this document's being distributed at the current meeting in the English language only. The Secretary tells me that he is trying very hard to get the other language versions of the document distributed by tomorrow afternoon's meeting.

May I take it that, as a special case, and in view of the time constraints under which we are working, the Commission agrees to the document being distributed today in the English language and, we hope, tomorrow afternoon in the other languages?

It was so decided.
The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the first speaker, the representative of Yugoslavia.

Mr. MUJEZINOVIC (Yugoslavia): The Yugoslav delegation attaches, for good reasons, great importance to the current session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Our agenda is rather extensive, and this calls for the full and active involvement of all delegations if we intend to prepare in a relatively short period of time concrete proposals on the items on the agenda, for submission to the General Assembly.

We believe that the Commission should fulfill its mandate - namely, to act as a deliberative organ of the United Nations and enable every Member State to present, within the context of the agenda, its preoccupations and views on the present state of disarmament negotiations and on the intensification of the arms race.

This year's session is taking place at a time of serious aggravation of international relations and threats to international peace and security, which also increases the possibility of military conflicts between the leading nuclear-weapon States and military blocs.

Therefore, it is our desire that the work of the Commission be oriented in two directions: first, to emphasize the growing dangers to world peace and security and call upon the nuclear-weapon States and militarily strong countries to put a stop to the senseless arms race; and, secondly, to prepare practical recommendations with regard to the agenda items. My delegation will spare no efforts to contribute to both of those tasks.

There are many causes of the unsatisfactory state of international relations, and one of the main causes is the rivalry of leading nuclear-weapon States and military blocs, aimed at acquiring or preserving spheres of influence and gaining supremacy in the world by relying on military might. As a result of that policy, we are witnessing military interventions and threats or use of force; the massing of military and naval forces armed with the most sophisticated weapons in regions of potential conflict; attempts to
establish new military bases and obtain military facilities in regions where we had expected to see the conclusion of an agreement on the withdrawal or reduction of the presence of nuclear-weapon States; decisions on deploying new nuclear weapons and delivery systems on the continent of Europe, which has already become saturated with nuclear and conventional weapons and where we had looked forward—true, without excessive optimism—to the conclusion of an agreement on the reduction of arms and armed forces of the military blocs.

An unavoidable consequence of such a disturbing development was the decision to freeze the process of negotiations on disarmament measures as well as the decision of military blocs to accelerate the arms race and increase their military budgets—measures already taken or in the course of implementation.

Such policies have had as results: an increased and unprecedented threat to international peace and security; an inordinate intensification of the nuclear and conventional arms race; and a considerable growth of military budgets and expenditures; as well as the suspension of negotiations on genuine disarmament measures, or the reduction of such negotiations to a mere symbolic exercise, jeopardizing, at the same time, the already-achieved agreements in the field of disarmament.

As we all know, the United Nations Disarmament Commission was established at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, as an expression of the desire of Member States to participate actively in the consideration of disarmament problems and to promote the process of disarmament as a problem affecting the state of international relations most directly. As you said, Mr. Chairman, in your introductory remarks, this session of the Commission would not live up to the expectations of the world community if it failed to adopt clear stands and submit concrete recommendations to the General Assembly on the situation prevailing in the field of disarmament negotiations and related aspects of international security.
The Yugoslav delegation feels that the Commission should recommend to the General Assembly practical steps that would focus attention on the disquieting development of the international situation, on the danger of military confrontation and direct armed conflict, with unforeseeable consequences for the survival of mankind. Those recommendations should be aimed at the taking of urgent measures to arrest the process of deterioration of the international situation, to check the arms race and military expenditures, and to set in motion the mechanism of negotiations on genuine measures of disarmament. The preparation of such recommendations, with the participation of all the Member States, and their further highlighting at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly would truly reflect the interests of the United Nations and call for the exertion of efforts to remove the dangers hanging over the world.

In addition to the drafting of a document on the Disarmament Decade, with which we are going to deal concretely, it is foreseen that we should also consider various aspects of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as well as problems concerning disarmament negotiations and the need for the effective elimination of the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. That is obviously most topical and significant at the present moment. We believe that the Commission should devote close attention to this question and that it should endeavour - if time allows - to find answers and formulate measures to be undertaken as a matter of urgency, with a view to evolving and harmonizing a unique and generally acceptable approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.

The tenth special session of the General Assembly already adopted a stand on this and condemned the arms race, both nuclear and conventional. We had hoped that the leading nuclear-weapon States, as well as other countries belonging to military alliances, would give proof of moderation, in accordance with the obligations they had assumed at the tenth special session with regard to halting and reversing the arms race. Unfortunately, we are compelled to note that there has been - far from such moderation and genuine implementation of the programme of measures adopted at the special session by consensus - a further and serious increase of military expenditures and an acceleration of the arms race.
We all have access to general information about the development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons which are planned or whose development or introduction is already underway. Abbreviations such as MX, MIRV, CM, and SS, accompanied by various numbers, have become synonymous with the acceleration of the nuclear arms race. The theory of the vulnerability of existing nuclear systems and of the need to develop new, and even more sophisticated, weapons of mass destruction leads to a further acceleration of the nuclear arms race. The installation of new types or systems of nuclear weapons by one side is taken by the other side as a pretext for developing new and even more deadly, and of course more costly, weapons. The fear of a "first strike", real or potential, impels one to develop his own weapons of a similar quality.

The international community cannot remain indifferent in the face of such a development. The non-aligned countries have repeatedly stated, openly and clearly, that we reject such a policy and that we do not accept the justifications offered us in this regard. The piling up of nuclear weapons - be it in Europe, in the Indian Ocean or in the territories of the big Powers or countries belonging to military blocs - constitutes a threat to international peace and security and is fraught with the danger of nuclear annihilation. In spite of nuclear saturation - actually, today the nuclear-weapon States possess more than 50,000 atomic and hydrogen bombs of various sizes - nuclear weapons continue to be manufactured, nuclear-weapons tests continue to be carried out with undiminished intensity and new nuclear systems continue to be established. All this seriously jeopardizes the system of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in which we have placed so much hope.
The concern of the international community becomes even more acute in the light of the fact that negotiations on nuclear disarmament have been practically frozen. All hopes that immediately after the special session significant measures would be taken to arrest and reverse the nuclear arms race and to begin the process of the gradual reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States are today seriously shaken. Instead, the press is keeping us informed of the intensification of the nuclear arms race.

Bearing in mind the impact of such a state of negotiations on the overall international situation and on the field of disarmament in particular, we feel that the Commission should propose to the General Assembly that measures be taken to halt the negative trends in negotiation and to reverse them, towards the adoption of effective nuclear disarmament measures.

The Commission should call on the leading nuclear-weapon States to take immediate steps and appropriate measures aimed at freezing the nuclear arms race in all its aspects, to suspend further increases in military budgets and to embark upon negotiations on concrete nuclear disarmament measures in conformity with the obligations assumed at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Here we have in mind primarily the ratification of SALT II and the opening of SALT III talks, as well as the limitation of the Soviet Union and United States military presence in the Indian Ocean, in the Mediterranean and in other regions and focal points of crisis and tension, a call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries; the removal of nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States; and the elimination of foreign military bases.

In addition, the Commission should request that the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain submit a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty, as early as the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, so that the Committee might complete the treaty and submit it to the General Assembly for adoption.

Those are, in our opinion, the elements of an immediate programme that would contribute to the creation of an atmosphere indispensable for the successful consideration of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the forthcoming meetings in Geneva.
In considering the problems of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament negotiations, we cannot but touch upon the third component, which is directly linked to them, namely, the need to intensify negotiations for effectively eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

Such a threat can of course be effectively averted only after the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States. Unfortunately, that is at the moment in the distant and unforeseeable future. Taking into account, however, that we are dealing with a complex and long process, we must not ignore the legal measures that could be taken to lessen the danger of the outbreak of such a war.

Here we have in mind various forms of international instruments designed to limit the freedom of use of nuclear weapons in armed conflicts possibly involving nuclear-weapon States. The current international situation under consideration points to the gravity of this problem and to the need to take urgent measures in this respect. We believe that today it is more urgent than ever before to limit or ban completely the use of nuclear weapons and, to that end, to elaborate an international convention codifying such a ban. The tenth special session of the General Assembly considered that question in greater complexity and, as a result, the Committee on Disarmament has taken the first steps. Two draft conventions with regard to the limitation of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States have been submitted but unfortunately the negotiations on this issue of such importance have not yet started. We hold that, despite the limitations of such a convention, its elaboration should be accelerated and that consideration should again be given to the demand of the non-aligned countries for a comprehensive ban on the use of nuclear weapons. The limitation of the stockpiling of nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States and the complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons to points within the boundaries of nuclear-weapon States would constitute a significant step towards eliminating the threat of nuclear war. We feel that we should devote our attention to that problem.

Although consensus has been achieved to the effect that priority should be accorded to the taking of measures towards nuclear disarmament, no less
important and pressing is the question of the intensification of the conventional arms race in all its aspects. We are witnessing an ever more frequent use of conventional weapons in direct military interventions against sovereign States, aimed at the subjugation of those States and encroachment upon parts of their territories. The conventional arms trade has become a lucrative means for the great Powers to spread their political influence and acquire strategic positions.

The negotiations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the mutual restriction of trade and the transfer of conventional weapons are at a standstill. It is not necessary to stress all the dangers that such a situation poses to international peace and security. The fact that sums exceeding billions of dollars annually are involved in the arms trade points to the seriousness of this problem. It is therefore indispensable to devote full attention to the problem of conventional weapons.

The only realistic approach towards limiting the conventional arms race will be one based on the intensification of efforts to find just and lasting solutions to the situations of conflict in various parts of the world, through strict observance of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. Furthermore, the countries that manufacture and export conventional weapons must take effective measures in order to eliminate the danger of the conventional arms race spreading to all the countries and regions of the world. A first step in that respect could be the reduction of armaments and armed forces in regions of great concentration of such weapons and forces. Here, above all, we have in mind the European continent, which has become saturated with such forces and weapons and where negotiations on armaments and armed forces have been in a state of political stagnation for a long time. We therefore welcome the proposal to convene a disarmament conference in Europe where, parallel with the holding of the European Conference on Security and Co-operation, negotiations would be conducted on the limitation of armaments and armed forces in the Old Continent. That could set an example to other regions in the world where there exists a similar concentration of armaments.
The special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament noted that the wasting of huge resources, so badly needed for solving economic and social problems, on the production or sophistication of means of war does not lead to increased security but, on the contrary, jeopardizes international peace and security.

Unfortunately, the military expenditures of the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and of the Warsaw Pact have increased considerably since the tenth special session, and, as we read in the press, new increases of military budgets are under way.

In fact, it is difficult to figure out the amount spent on armaments every year. It is obvious that it has exceeded considerably the amount of $400 billion per annum and that it is further increasing. The absurdity of this situation is best illustrated by the fact that every day an equivalent of $92 for each inhabitant of the globe is spent for military purposes, while only 57 cents are spent on educational and health-care programmes. The member countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are responsible for the bulk of this expenditure. They account for only 22 per cent of the world's population but their share in military expenditure exceeds 75 per cent. In this case, therefore, we must address ourselves to precisely those countries and demand that they take steps to eliminate the danger that hangs unavoidably over all of us, threatening us with the most sinister consequences. Those countries bear the greatest responsibility for all the consequences that may arise from the present situation. We are willing to contribute, together with other non-aligned countries, to the solution of those difficult problems and to finding solutions that are acceptable to all of us. The strict observance and implementation of the decisions of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament have also become the most urgent task in this field for all countries.
The Commission should demand that the big Powers, especially the leading nuclear-weapon States, which bear the greatest responsibility for the present situation, examine once again the decisions which they have taken or are in the process of adopting and which exert a negative impact on the international situation in general and on the state of détente in particular, as well as on the course of the arms race and disarmament negotiations, and that they should contribute, by their example and in consonance with the obligations assumed by them, towards overcoming the current international tensions and averting the dangers that threaten international peace and security. This would be the best contribution to the success of the Second Disarmament Decade and to the efforts of this Commission.

Mr. SUCHARIPA (Austria): This second substantive session of the Disarmament Commission since its re-establishment by the tenth special session of the General Assembly is taking place at a crucial time in international relations. Heeding your appeal, Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention to dwell on recent developments which have resulted in an all too apparent setback in the process of détente. We have made our position known on these issues in the appropriate forums, including, in particular, the emergency special session of the General Assembly held earlier this year.

Today I merely wish to reiterate my Government's profound concern about the irrational proportions and the inherent dynamic of the current arms race, both in the nuclear and in the conventional fields. Austria has followed with deep alarm the disappointing results of disarmament efforts carried out on different levels over the last years. We have, furthermore, been forced to conclude from recent developments that even in cases where the negotiating process has led to concrete results those results could not be finalized or the taking up of negotiations has been refused altogether.

It is unfortunate that since the tenth special session of the General Assembly, whose important symbolic effect cannot be disputed, no perceivable progress of a practical nature in the field of disarmament could materialize and that States, in particular the most heavily armed ones, continue to proceed with an unabated arms race. In view of the enormous social and economic injustices in the world and in view of the numerous other problems with which
mankind in its totality is faced, this situation is, in Austria's view, totally unbearable. In particular, we must, today, register our deepest concern about the fact that even in relation to those disarmament measures on whose urgency and priority there is general agreement, very little, if any, progress has materialized. This holds true, for instance, for the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Furthermore, there are no signs of an early agreement on a meaningful reduction of the existing vast arsenals of nuclear weapons, and efforts to reduce the massive concentration of conventional armed forces and armaments in Central Europe through the Vienna negotiations, now about to enter their seventh year, have yielded no tangible results.

The pre-condition for genuine disarmament today, maybe even more than before, lies in the political will to achieve concrete results. This political will must manifest itself in a conscious search for contacts and negotiations in order to enhance the military transparency and overcome mutual distrust. We should like to express the hope that the meeting which is scheduled to take place in Vienna later this week between the Foreign Ministers of the two leading world Powers will prove to be a step in this direction.

Increased tensions and uncertainties in international relations render disarmament even more essential than before. Therefore, at a time in which an adverse political climate tends to work against the attainment of real progress in disarmament, intensified efforts to overcome these obstacles and to build an adequate basis for the taking of the necessary political decisions are urgently called for. If this session of the Disarmament Commission can make even a small and modest contribution towards this goal, it will have fulfilled an important task at this juncture. The Austrian delegation is of the opinion that it is therefore of vital importance for this Commission, while certainly being aware of the specific features of the current international climate, to do its utmost to promote whatever chances for disarmament exist through an intensive exchange of views on the specific items on its agenda, leading, wherever possible, to the formulation of agreed and action-oriented recommendations. It is with these considerations in mind that I shall now try to give a brief outline of the position of the Austrian delegation on agenda items 4 (a) and (b),
which, we believe, represent different formulations of one fundamental problem - that is, how to find ways and means for facilitating and expediting negotiations aimed at nuclear and conventional disarmament. Thus, at first sight, these two agenda items combined seem to cover virtually the whole gamut of a very comprehensive disarmament agenda. However, it can hardly be our task here in the Disarmament Commission merely to repeat and update the general statements that were delivered only a few months ago in the First Committee. It is therefore the opinion of my delegation that somewhere between the two clearly defined functions of the General Assembly, on the one hand, and the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, on the other hand, the Disarmament Commission will have to find its own mode of operation. Thus, the Disarmament Commission, without exceeding its inherent limitations as a deliberative body in which the whole United Nations membership is represented, should try to make its own contribution to the negotiating process. In the view of the Austrian delegation, this could best be achieved through a concrete and subject-oriented discussion aimed at identifying possible areas of agreement and reducing existing gaps in the various positions of States on important issues. In our view, there are two important issues which ought to be discussed under these agenda items: (a) the question of further elaborating, on the basis of paragraph 50 of the Final Document, a suitable approach towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear disarmament negotiations; and (b) the question of clarifying the interrelationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament with a view to expediting negotiations in both fields.

The Austrian delegation would like to express briefly its views on these two subjects. The utmost urgency of nuclear disarmament cannot be disputed. For Austria, as for many, if not all, other countries, the existence of vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons is a chief cause of concern. Not even the most extensive interpretation of a country's subjective needs for security can furnish adequate justification for the maintenance of stockpiles of nuclear weapons sufficient to kill all mankind several times over. This accumulated enormous potential for mutual destruction in particular, but certainly not only, in the nuclear field leaves us with no doubt that the major nuclear-weapon Powers could undertake far more courageous disarmament steps without jeopardizing
their security and thus, it is to be hoped, could start a process leading towards genuine disarmament. And still, for various reasons including an apparent lack of mutual trust and confidence, the two leading world Powers have until now not found it possible to take the necessary political decisions for effective measures of disarmament.
This fact is, of course, most discouraging. It should, however, not lead to a situation in which all thinking about nuclear disarmament negotiations in a multilateral framework would be abandoned. Quite to the contrary, this fact makes such thinking even more necessary. In the opinion of the Austrian delegation the following principles are to be taken into account in this connexion.

Negotiations will have to start from the basis and the framework provided by paragraph 50 of the Final Document, which contains the most comprehensive agreed structure for negotiations in the field of nuclear disarmament. An important element in the negotiations must be the maintenance of the existing balance of power, it being understood, of course, that negotiations should aim at a situation in which this balance of power would be safeguarded at a substantially lower level of armaments. Measures of verification are an indispensable element in all disarmament efforts and assume particular relevance in connexion with nuclear disarmament. Any nuclear disarmament measure that by necessity would have a direct bearing on the security perceptions of the participating States would therefore be quite unthinkable without adequate verification procedures. Negotiations on nuclear disarmament are of a very delicate and complex nature. Whereas this statement might sound like a truism, there are certain consequences that are to be taken into account. One of these consequences is that efforts to design a comprehensive approach for nuclear disarmament negotiations, important as they are, should not impede negotiations on individual aspects of nuclear disarmament – as, for instance, negotiations on the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes – whenever such negotiations might promise to yield positive results. The same holds true, of course, for the bilateral negotiations between the two leading nuclear-weapon States. Until now, the SALT process has been the only avenue for at least limited progress in the area of nuclear-arms control. It was for this reason that Austria welcomed the signing of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) by the United States and the Soviet Union in Vienna nearly a year ago as a small, but politically important, step towards nuclear disarmament. The satisfaction with the signing of SALT II was, of course, combined with the earnest hope that the Treaty would soon be ratified and, furthermore, that it would be followed by further negotiations leading towards a progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.
It is certainly more than unfortunate that these hopes, at least for the time being, have been shattered. The fact remains, however, that a continuation or resumption of the SALT process is not only an urgent necessity but would also find its appropriate place within a more general approach towards multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. In this connexion, reference must also be made to the arms race in the field of medium-range and intermediate-range missiles and tactical nuclear weapons on the European continent. Here again one would hope for the exercise of the utmost restraint on both sides and, more specifically, for an early beginning of appropriate negotiations to put an end to this very alarming aspect of the nuclear arms race.

As to the interrelationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament, it should first of all be recognized that in military planning different armament systems are closely interrelated. It appears vital for disarmament efforts in all phases to take this fact into account. Thus, it would hardly appear possible successfully to pursue disarmament objectives relating to only one category of armaments. This holds true, in particular, for the interdependence of nuclear and conventional disarmament. The total military strength of the major participants in the arms race is a composite factor in which the existing vast arsenals of both nuclear weapons and conventional armaments play their roles. This fact has been recognized in the Final Document, in particular in its paragraph 81. Nevertheless, until now relevant discussions in the United Nations framework have paid little attention to the problems of conventional disarmament. This lack of concrete discussion on one important element of the arms race can, of course, be easily explained. First of all, for many reasons the nuclear arms race constitutes the main cause of concern, thus overshadowing, in the eyes of a majority of delegations, the concern over the arms race in the conventional area. Secondly, it has always been widely recognized that effective measures to curb the increasing build-up of arsenals of conventional weapons in many parts of the world will most likely succeed at the regional level. Nevertheless, it appears to the Austrian delegation that the alarming dimensions of the conventional arms race should also be the subject of serious - even if, by necessity, rather general - discussions within the United Nations framework. We shall therefore certainly endorse appropriate proposals aimed at starting such a discussion for which this Commission could very well constitute an appropriate forum.
In this connexion we are particularly grateful to the delegation of Denmark for its very comprehensive working paper on this subject, which at first glance not only seems to contain a considerable amount of relevant background information, but should also serve as a timely reminder of the fact that there are a substantial number of important questions concerning the whole issue of conventional disarmament and its place within the over-all disarmament effort that merit an in-depth analysis and debate.

We should also like to thank the Spanish delegation for its concrete contribution to our work.

These were the comments that my delegation wanted to make at this stage of our work.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I should like to reiterate my delegation’s pledge to co-operate under your most experienced guidance.

Mr. LA ROCCA (Italy): On behalf of the nine member States of the European Community, I wish to offer some brief observations on certain specific items of the agenda submitted this year for the consideration of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

I should like, first, Mr. Chairman, to reiterate our appreciation of the effective manner in which you presided over our sessions last year. I am convinced that under your experienced direction and with your valuable contribution our work will again be successful this year.

The agenda we have approved contains some important points whose wide implications are indicative of the special role attributed to the Disarmament Commission by the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its last session.

As a deliberative body entrusted among other tasks, with the consideration of the general guidelines and basic principles of disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission can make a positive contribution to the development of the disarmament process. To this end, it will be necessary to make every effort to permit the discussion, which we expect will be constructive and enlightening, to be concentrated on the most significant aspects of the items entrusted to us. We must also seek to avoid a duplication of the efforts already undertaken in other forums.
Among the points on the agenda, I should like to mention one in particular
with regard to which the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session conferred
upon this Commission a very precise mandate. In fact, resolution 34/75 specifies
in its second operative paragraph that the General Assembly

"Directs the Disarmament Commission, at its substantive session of
1980, to prepare elements of a draft resolution entitled 'Declaration of
the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade' and submit them to the General
Assembly at its thirty-fifth session for consideration and adoption'."

The Nine are aware of the connexion existing between the disarmament
process and the goals of peace and international co-operation which are the
very basis of the United Nations. The idea of the declaration should be viewed
in this general framework. The declaration should reaffirm the basic principles
set down in the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament
without affecting its status as a basic text in disarmament efforts. It should
contain, in accordance with the specific functions of the United Nations
Disarmament Commission and in the spirit of the mandate we have received,
principles and objectives for the development of the disarmament process in
the course of the Decade, without, however, fixing target dates for specific
measures.
With regard to the principles, the Nine stressed last year in this Commission the need to respect the following essential conditions: the safeguarding of security, the maintenance of balance, which is a condition of security, the necessity of taking into account regional situations, international verification and the progressive building of confidence through appropriate measures.

The States members of the Community intend to contribute actively to the preparation of the relevant draft resolution, in accordance with the observations already individually provided to the Secretary-General.

Among the other points submitted to the Disarmament Commission, the question of military budgets must also be emphasized. On several occasions the States members of the European Community have taken the opportunity to recall the importance that they attribute to this issue, and they are confident that a constructive discussion on this item will take place during the present session. In this context, we are considering with particular interest and attention the study now in progress for the elaboration of a standardized and verifiable reporting instrument for the determination of military expenditures. The Nine trust that this study will be brought to a successful conclusion. All the Nine publish detailed information on their military budgets. Several countries of the European Community have also participated in the test run of the reporting instrument. We wish more countries of other regional groups, and particularly those with different budgetary systems, to participate actively in this endeavour with the aim of making budgets more comparable. Only truly representative participation by countries from all regions will make a contribution to the comparability of budgets, the necessary prerequisite for an agreement on the reduction of military budgets in full respect for the need for undiminished security.

The Nine welcome the opportunity offered the United Nations Disarmament Commission in agenda item 4 (b) to discuss the question of conventional disarmament also. They are, in fact, firmly convinced that this issue is an essential component which must be included in the disarmament process. Only through progress in the nuclear and conventional fields, within the framework of a comprehensive approach taking into account all relevant aspects, including,
in particular, regional situations, can we move towards our common goal of
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control. The Nine hope that the debate which will take place in the
Disarmament Commission on this aspect of the arms race will set in motion
a process out of which a consensus on concepts and approaches will
in time emerge.

Disarmament, pursued in a balanced manner and with adequate means of
verification, will greatly contribute to building confidence, reducing tensions,
strengthening global détente and ensuring peace. It is equally true, furthermore,
that the developments of the disarmament process cannot but be negatively influenced
when fundamental principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter are
flagrantly disregarded and when, in particular – as in the case of Afghanistan,
where foreign troops are still present in defiance of the General Assembly – the
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of a Member State are
violated.

As indicated by the European Council, which met in Luxembourg on 27 and
28 April, the Nine are ready to support, in concert with friendly and allied
countries, any initiative designed to promote a solution aiming at an arrangement
which would allow Afghanistan to remain outside competition among the Powers
and to return to its traditional position as a neutral and non-aligned
State.

Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(interpretation
from Russian): On behalf of the Soviet delegation, I should like first to
welcome you, Sir, to the Chair of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.
We are deeply gratified that the work of this important body is once again
in the hands of the representative of a great country with which the Soviet
Union is bound by links of friendship and co-operation in the interests of
lasting peace and security for all peoples.
As the General Assembly resolution makes abundantly clear, in addition to continuing to consider the various agenda items to be found in section II of resolution 33/71 H, the Commission must also prepare and present to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session the elements of a draft resolution entitled "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade". The Soviet delegation attaches great importance to those instructions given by the General Assembly.

At the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union supported the idea of proclaiming the 1980s the Second Disarmament Decade, and it intends to involve itself actively in drawing up the aims and purposes of that Decade and also in their practical implementation. There can be no doubt that the overwhelming majority of States are anxious to preserve, strengthen and develop the positive results that have already been achieved in restricting the arms race during the 1970s. The 1980s should be years marked by particular progress in efforts to strengthen international peace and security. That purpose can be effectively served only provided that the arms race is restrained and genuine disarmament achieved.

In the course of the 1970s, which were proclaimed by the United Nations as the First Disarmament Decade, certain positive results were achieved: in particular, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor was concluded, as was the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons, as well as the Convention on the Prohibition of Military Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. The agreements on restricting strategic weapons and on the prevention of nuclear war were an important contribution towards détente and a reduction of the arms race. During those years, a definite system of negotiations arose on disarmament matters, both on a multilateral and a bilateral basis.

The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament was held and some extremely useful decisions were taken then which now await implementation.
The past decade was also noteworthy for the fact that certain steps were initiated to strengthen confidence in Europe. The historic meeting in Helsinki of the leaders of 35 States enshrined in a document the developments in Europe for the strengthening of security and co-operation there. In that decade, too, the positive trend in the international situation became a far-reaching process. I am referring to the trend that is known as "the relaxation of tensions". Important documents aimed at strengthening international peace and security and expanding peaceful co-operation among States were also adopted by the United Nations.
The results of the negotiations on disarmament matters during the 1970s very clearly bore out the truth that genuine steps in that field are possible and feasible, provided that States evince political will. What has been achieved during the last decade has provided a fairly good basis for further steps towards a halting of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament.

At the same time, we cannot fail to observe that, unfortunately, as a result of the resistance shown by certain forces eager to increase international tension, the arms race, in a number of very important and dangerous areas, has not only not been halted but in fact has been considerably accelerated. Numerous facts indicate that the United States and its allies have not given up the policy of intensifying their military might. They stubbornly attempt to undermine the principle of equality and equal security for all parties and to create a situation of military superiority for NATO. In referring to this, we are thinking particularly of the decision taken by NATO to increase its military budgets each year over a period of 15 years, and also of the American five-year military programme and the unprecedented financial allocations for armaments.

In undertaking those steps the United States has frozen indefinitely any consideration of the SALT II Treaty in the Senate, although it is well known that, if that agreement were to come into force, it would be of paramount importance, for both a qualitative and a quantitative reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.

One of the most dangerous acts of recent times, which cannot fail to cause concern among the entire international community, was the adoption at the end of last year, at a session of the NATO Council, of a decision regarding the deployment on the territories of Western European countries of new types of ballistic missiles. Viewed objectively, that step will lead to a violation of the balance that has already been achieved, and only a little while before that decision was taken the President of the United States, at a meeting with Mr. Brezhnev in Vienna, had stated that there was military and strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union and, in general, between East and West.
In Vienna both parties came out against that balance being disturbed, and agreed that the most reliable way of restricting armaments was to ensure that no damage was done to the principle of equality and equal security. Unfortunately, immediately after that agreement was reached, the members of NATO took the decision which was intended to guarantee the military superiority of the NATO countries over the Warsaw Pact nations. Thus we have seen attempts to undermine one of the most important material bases for the process of détente.

All such decisions and actions have begun to gather momentum like a snowball. They have been turned into a whole "doctrine", and into the very obvious practice of thwarting détente, all of which is accompanied by the coming back into fashion of such dangerous concepts as "a limited nuclear war", "the acceptability" of the use of nuclear weapons, and so on and so forth. How can we describe such a policy?

It is essentially a wager on a long-term accelerating arms race; it involves the blocking of any disarmament talks and the undermining of the military equality which has been reached in the world; it also involves giving up the principle of equality and equal security. It is a policy that will lead to confrontation with the socialist countries and will involve the threat and even the use of force in order to foist one's will on other countries and peoples.

Now, what should be done, as we see it, to prevent such military dangers, increase détente and achieve practical progress in the field of disarmament?

In the opinion of the Soviet Union, in the present extremely complicated international situation, it is very important that we should not slacken — but rather step up — every effort on the part of peace-loving States in order to strengthen peace, remove the threat of war and achieve specific measures for restriction of the arms race and for the process of disarmament.
Such an approach on the part of the Soviet Union was quite definitely corroborated in a recent statement by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev. Addressing the electorate on 22 February this year, he declared:

"We are true to the peace programme that was put forward at the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth Congresses of our party. Therefore, in the 1980s now, as previously in the 1970s, we favour the strengthening, and not the destruction, of détente. We are in favour of reducing rather than inflating armaments; we favour rapprochement and mutual understanding among peoples, rather than artificial alienation and hostility."

The fundamental position of the Soviet Union remains unchanged: the Soviet Union is prepared to restrict and to prohibit, on a mutual basis, with the consent of other States, any types of weapons, provided, of course, this in no way jeopardizes anyone's security, on the basis of full reciprocity among those States possessing nuclear weapons, or possessing the weapons concerned.

In order to bring about a radical new departure in disarmament, the Soviet Union last year put forward a number of specific proposals on the questions of disarmament and weapons restrictions. These are described primarily in the statement made by Mr. Brezhnev in Berlin on 6 October last year, which outlined the new Soviet initiative on matters of military détente and disarmament.

In that speech it was stated that our country was ready to reduce from their present level the number of medium-range nuclear devices which were deployed in the Western part of the Soviet Union, provided, of course, there was no additional deployment of such nuclear devices in Western Europe.
In trying to circumvent the deadlock which has arisen in the many years of efforts to achieve military détente in Europe and to provide an example of how we can proceed from words to genuine actions, the Soviet Union, with the consent and agreement of the German Democratic Republic and other States members of the Warsaw Pact, decided last October unilaterally to reduce the number of Soviet troops in central Europe and, over a 12-month period, to withdraw from the territory of the German Democratic Republic up to 20,000 Soviet troops, a thousand tanks, as well as a specific quantity of other military equipment.

We wish to emphasize that the enactment of these unilateral measures is being pursued by the Soviet Union, despite the further complications in the international situation.
In October 1979 the Soviet Union also spoke in favour of the further expanding of measures to increase confidence in Europe, and it put forward constructive proposals to that end. The far-reaching programme of steps aimed at disarmament was put forward at a meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact on 5 and 6 December 1979. At that meeting, which was held shortly before the meeting of the NATO Council, particular attention was focused on the problem of military détente and disarmament in Europe as a key area in efforts to strengthen peace and security in Europe, and it confirmed the resolve and the will of the States of the socialist community to act firmly together with other States to further and to strengthen the process of détente.

In emphasizing that the implementation of plans to deploy on the territory of Western Europe new forms of American medium-range ballistic missiles would be extremely damaging to the interests of the security of socialist as well as other countries of Europe, and would run counter to the purposes and the purport of the whole policy of détente, the Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact, on behalf of their Governments, appealed to the Governments belonging to NATO to consider once again, in the light of the constructive and peaceful steps taken by the States of the Warsaw Pact, the situation that had arisen in Europe and not to undertake any action that would complicate the situation prevailing on the continent. In that case, the communiqué from the meeting said, it would be possible immediately to start practical discussions on questions relating to medium-range nuclear devices in accordance with the proposals that had been outlined in the statement made by Mr. Brezhnev in Berlin.

The Soviet Union, now as before, would favour talks on a broad range of issues relating to the complex and many-faceted problem of disarmament. We consider that all talks in this area that have been initiated in recent years in various multilateral forums, and also bilaterally, but are at present for one reason or another either halted or postponed, should be resumed and continued. Talks should also be started on other important aspects of the question of disarmament. The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist
community have set forth a realistic programme of steps that embraces virtually all aspects of the process of halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament. That programme indicates the fundamental areas in which we believe efforts should be focused and concentrated in forthcoming years, particularly in the course of the Second Disarmament Decade.

Further confirmation of the fact that the Soviet Union has adopted a policy aimed at peace and disarmament is the letter that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 7 April 1980 (A/35/175), a letter that discusses the tasks facing the Second Development Decade. If those tasks were performed in forthcoming years it would be possible to give real content to the Second Disarmament Decade. Among these steps priority should be attached to matters relating to the reduction of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction of stockpiles until they are completely eliminated. Under this heading we might also include the further reduction and limitation of strategic weapons, the halting of all nuclear-weapons tests, the strengthening of the régime of the non-proliferation of such weapons, the conclusion of international agreements to strengthen security guarantees for non-nuclear countries, and the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of those States that do not possess such weapons.

The Soviet Union also believes that steps should be taken to prohibit chemical and radiological weapons and the creation of new forms of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet proposals envisage the implementation of a whole range of steps relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, particularly in the Central European region. One important step would be the convening of a world disarmament conference.

It is the profound conviction of the Soviet delegation that the steps outlined in Mr. Gromyko's letter might serve as the basis for determining the constituent elements of a draft resolution to be adopted by the United Nations General Assembly entitled "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade". That would be in consonance with the main purpose of the Second Decade, which the Soviet Union regards as being to halt the on-going arms race, to strengthen and develop the positive results that have already been achieved in restraining the arms race in the 1970s, and to implement even more far-reaching practical steps in that area.
In putting forward these views on proclaiming the 1980s the Second Disarmament Decade, the Soviet delegation would like to express the hope that the discussion of this matter as well as of other agenda items before this session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission will take place in a pragmatic and constructive atmosphere. For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared to help to promote such an atmosphere. However, the development of such an atmosphere in our discussion can hardly be helped by statements such as that made yesterday by the Chinese representative. When he made his completely intolerable and slanderous attacks on the Soviet Union and Viet Nam, on matters that are totally irrelevant to the Commission's agenda, the representative of the Chinese People's Republic was essentially attempting to distract the attention of the members of the Commission from the matter that they should be dealing with. Obviously the representative of the Chinese People's Republic has no desire to be involved in a practical dialogue on disarmament matters.

As for our positions on the matters that were mentioned by the representative of the Chinese People's Republic, they are well known. We feel that we should emphasize that we would not like to get involved in unnecessary polemics that would simply hamper any productive work by the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

In conclusion I should like to emphasize one more important aspect that gives particular significance to our joint work here and now in our attempts to put an end to the arms race and to achieve disarmament. Quite recently all peace-loving peoples celebrated the thirty-fifth anniversary of the victory of the United Nations over Hitler's Germany. Thirty-five years ago, in May 1945, the Second World War ended in Europe. We should never forget that the peoples paid dearly for the possibility of learning the true value of peace, solid friendship and co-operation, The thirty-fifth anniversary of the victory over fascism makes it possible for us better to realize and fully to feel that peace is one of the priority human rights, one that is essential for human well-being.

For the Soviet people this date is filled with particular meaning because it was the Soviet Union that made a decisive contribution to that victory and paid the highest price for it - more than 20 million lives of its sons and daughters. Those losses and the losses of many other peoples must not have been in vain. World war must never be repeated. That is our duty to those who fell in the struggle
against Hitlerism in the name of peace and liberty for peoples. Fully and deeply aware of that debt, the Soviet Union has continued to wage a struggle to end armament, to favour disarmament and to provide solid guarantees for peace.
Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I wish in the first place to express our appreciation for the wise and effective way in which our Chairman has been steering the deliberations of this Commission. We hope, and indeed are confident, that our work will prove constructive in giving guidance for effective disarmament efforts, in the broad-minded sense and from a wider outlook.

Indeed, this Commission, as a standing deliberative body on disarmament and as the product of a special session on disarmament, offers wide and positive scope for action. The long stagnation in the disarmament efforts has been a constant concern of the international community. The present sharp decline in security and order in our world - a state approaching anarchy - makes that concern especially grave and urgent. Pertinently and prominently on our agenda is item 4 (a), the consideration of the arms race in all its aspects. I say "pertinently" for, indeed, so long as the arms race continues unabated, there cannot possibly be any prospect of achieving effective disarmament measures, and particularly of reducing the enormous nuclear stockpiles, with their overkill capacity of 15 times.

The frustrating experience of decades of bilateral and multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and other forums has amply demonstrated the sad reality that there can be no possibility of agreeing on phased and balanced disarmament while the arms race continues. It is astonishing that these efforts go on with little thought being given to the need to stop the arms race. Is it logical to expect that armaments can be reduced when we know that the arms race is accelerating and that new and more terrifying weapons, more sophisticated weapons, are being developed? Therefore, it can only be frustrating to attempt to make progress on measures of disarmament proper, on the reduction of armaments, unless, in the first place, the arms race has been halted, or at least slowed down.

The gravest of the dangers comes from the accelerated escalation of the arms race, quantitatively and qualitatively. The matter is becoming extremely serious, indeed urgent, and a radical approach is required.
The Disarmament Commission has to proceed imaginatively, going to the root of the problem of the arms race and not following the well-trodden path of efforts towards phased disarmament based on strict control, inspection and verification. It cannot do that if it does not first take whatever measures are necessary and possible to halt the arms race. In the long, careful and dedicated discussions and negotiations on disarmament it has been amply demonstrated that the strict inspection and control and the adequate verification so constantly referred to are impossible while the arms race continues. For the arms race creates mistrust, enmity and a lack of the confidence necessary to make phased disarmament possible. Indeed, various efforts towards such inspection and control have failed. I remember very well hearing it stated almost a decade ago that in the meantime the arms race had developed to the point that nuclear weapons had become beyond control and inspection. But we nevertheless still do not attach importance to the cessation of the arms race.

That task is, in our humble submission, one on which the Disarmament Commission should focus its attention, giving the task priority over all other aspects. That is why I say that it was very wise to give it a place of priority on the agenda of this session.

The enormity of the evils and dangers involved in the arms race and the consequences of the arms race are well known and need not be elaborated on further. What is direly needed is an exploration of the causes - not the consequences, but the causes - of the arms race, for the vital purpose of seeking the cessation of this scourge of our times.

A main root cause is the still prevailing notion - a notion that is outdated and outmoded - of the balance of power as a means of ensuring the security of nations. The most dangerous and threatening aspect of the arms race is the nuclear arms race between the major Powers, particularly in regard to qualitative development, because that involves a striving by each side for an edge of superiority, on the grounds of ensuring its security from attack. An outcome of this is the supposed pursuit of balance - a balance that is hypothetical and ever-elusive. It has proved counterproductive to
security by inevitably causing the perpetuation of the arms race. The only way to bring a halt to the arms race is through mutual understanding and co-operation in promoting effective collective security through the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter and in the common cause of protecting mankind from a nuclear cataclysm. That is the constructive and underlying purpose to which all efforts must be directed.

Now, what is international security? It must be clear that the basic characteristic of international security is that it is collective and effective, as clearly stated in Article 1 of the Charter. It is "collective" in the sense of an international, United Nations force; and it is "effective" through enforcement measures being made available to the Security Council, as expressly provided in Article 1, Article 2 (3), (4) and (5), and Chapter VII of the Charter.

The availability of enforcement action is an essential ingredient of international security, for it creates a sense of discipline and order and, as is true of internal order and security within the State, it would in most cases render actual enforcement unnecessary. But enforcement action is not available now, and therefore Security Council decisions remain without effect.

In the introduction to one of his reports to the General Assembly - written in 1976 - the Secretary-General made some observations that illustrate very well the importance of this matter. He said:

"The Charter concept of world order is based on respect for the decisions of the principal organs of the United Nations ... If these are ignored, the system of the Charter for maintaining international peace and security ... will inevitably become a hollow shell which will have little utility when it is needed most - when world peace is seriously threatened" -

as it is now. The Secretary-General continued:

"We have had many recent experiences of the wide discrepancy between the unanimity, or near unanimity, of decisions of the Security Council or the General Assembly and the practical effect which such decisions have on the issues to which they are addressed." (A/31/1/Add.1, p. 4)
It follows from those observations of the Secretary-General that many small countries no longer seek help from the Security Council, because they know that its decisions are worthless. An example of this was to be found in the Horn of Africa, where Somalia and Ethiopia were at war and yet neither went to the Security Council. The decisions of the Security Council have not been and cannot be implemented because of the lack of enforcement action.
There is no rational excuse for the Security Council to evade its responsibility for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements on the composition of a United Nations peace-keeping force, as mandatorily - and I repeat, mandatorily - required by Article 43 of the Charter, where it is stated that agreements "shall be negotiated". The usual explanation that we hear, of lack of political will, cannot be put forward because in this respect there cannot be any freedom of choice for political will. Those in responsible positions have not the option of ignoring the mandatory provisions of the Charter. In this instance, the Charter requirement is for a United Nations force, in order to give validity and effect to the decisions of the Security Council and to the authority and prestige of the United Nations.

We therefore submit that there is a compelling necessity for the Security Council to proceed expeditiously to negotiate and conclude agreements for a United Nations force. How far enforcement action will be possible, in all cases or in many cases, in view of the existence of the veto - that is no concern, either of the Security Council or of us here, because it is the Charter that provides for such action. But there is no excuse for allowing decisions which are not vetoed to go unimplemented merely because the Security Council has not taken the trouble to conclude agreements for a United Nations force.

Recent cases have shown the importance of those decisions. We have recently had a unanimous decision of the Security Council on a matter which concerns a big Power, with regard to its diplomatic personnel, but there was no means of implementing it; and unilateral action, by no matter how big a Power, cannot have any possibility of effectiveness. It is consequently necessary - and the big Powers no less than the small Powers need legal order and security through the United Nations - to establish a United Nations force in accordance with the Charter. We owe it to the Charter. We owe it to our responsibility towards the United Nations, because we are functioning under the United Nations and we have to comply with the Charter. If we do not comply with the Charter, how can we seek disarmament? How can we seek international security? How can we seek the cessation of the arms race?
This is a problem that has to come to this Commission because this is a deliberative body. It is not like the Committee on Disarmament, which has to confine itself to negotiations, no matter how frustrating that trodden path has been. Here we have in our report to emphasize the need for international security in order to meet the requirements of disarmament and also to meet the requirements of order and security in our world, which is in a very obvious and very dangerous decline. In that respect the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly on Disarmament is quite emphatic, and I quote from the Declaration in that document:

"Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces ...". (A/5-10/2, para. 13)

That was the position taken by the General Assembly in the Declaration adopted at its special session devoted to disarmament.

I should also like to mention that in the Declaration of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in 1973, with reference to the arms race as a major threat to the survival of mankind, it was stated:

'This situation is mainly due to the lack of adequate international security as provided for in the United Nations Charter, and the failure to replace the outdated concept of balance of power as a means of security.' (A/33/205, annex I, para. 147)

Thus the great majority of non-aligned countries stand firmly by the provisions of the Charter and by the Declaration of the special session of the General Assembly.

I think, I believe, and I have full faith in what I am saying, that if we, the membership of the United Nations, pursue this in the proper way, satisfactory results may emerge. This should therefore appear in the report of this Commission so as to influence world public opinion and the deliberations in the First Committee and in the General Assembly.
There are two studies which were decided upon by the General Assembly at its special session: one on the relationship between disarmament and international security and the other on the relationship between disarmament and development. Those two studies are proceeding and they are both very important. But I think they would be encouraged, and their importance and significance enhanced, if the report of this Commission were to refer to them. As a matter of fact, they have been thought to be one of the important elements of the Disarmament Decade. In General Assembly resolution 33/91 I, it is stated that an important element of the Disarmament Decade is the maintenance of international security in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and that it is necessary to proceed expeditiously with the study of the relationship between disarmament and international security. That resolution was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly.

I therefore think that we are on safe ground if we send a message in our report, emphasizing the need for international security parallel to that for disarmament. We have already the concurrence of both the United States and the Soviet Union in the McCloy-Zorin Joint Statement, which provided for international security through a United Nations force. That was also contained in both the proposals submitted in 1962 on the very first phase of disarmament, combining it with international security.

Thus, the essence of my speech today is to emphasize the need for international security.

The CHAIRMAN: There are no further speakers for this afternoon. Before we adjourn I should like to inform representatives that there are at present 30 names on the list of speakers, which represents another three or perhaps four meetings, and might even carry us over into Monday morning, depending on the length of the statements. Three or four representatives have, in fact, inscribed their names specifically to speak on Monday, but we shall see as we proceed. Our next meeting will take place tomorrow morning at 10.30.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.