DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 20 April 1993, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. DE ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil)

later: Mr. WHANNOU (Vice-Chairman) (Benin)

later: Mr. DE ARAUJO CASTRO (Chairman) (Brazil)

- General exchange of views (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS (continued)

Mr. BATIONUK (Ukraine): At the very beginning of my statement, Mr. Chairman, let me convey to you and the other officers of the Commission the congratulations of the Ukraine delegation on your election and to express our confidence that your able guidance will enable us to achieve tangible results from our deliberations during the current session of the Disarmament Commission. I should like to assure you that the Ukrainian delegation extends to you its fullest support and cooperation.

In the not so distant past, members of the Disarmament Commission were used to promoting disarmament without much hope that their reasoning, however sound it might be, would reach the minds and souls of those who were responsible for the non-stop functioning of military hardware assembly lines. Nowadays the situation has somewhat changed. We can see definite progress in the internationally verified process of arms limitation and reduction. Nevertheless, what is happening every day shows us convincingly how far we still are from our final goal of the "maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources" - if I may be permitted to borrow some language from Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The agenda of the current session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission gives us enough ground to demonstrate both achievements and shortcomings in the area of multilateral disarmament measures.

The agenda item entitled "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons" touches upon the most dramatic problem of our century. The
delegation of Ukraine is convinced that further progress in securing nuclear disarmament should continue to be a top priority. Nuclear sabre-rattling brought the world to the point of a catastrophe. The disappearance of the ideological rivalry, and the cuts carried out or agreed upon in respect of the two biggest nuclear arsenals, have given us reason to breathe easier but have provided no justification for soothing the world's conscience. Overkill capacity is here; nuclear terror is a fact of everyday life. That is why the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons has rightly been established as the final goal of the whole process of nuclear disarmament, which we visualize as having certain intermediate stages before the nuclear arms present in the world today can reach the "zero level".

The initial stage of nuclear disarmament is characterized by the substantial reduction in the strength of the two biggest nuclear arsenals though the realization of the Treaties on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I and START II). But even with this reduction the danger of nuclear war will be lowered but not eliminated, since up to 10,000 or even more nuclear warheads will still be left at the disposal of the five declared nuclear Powers.

In the second stage, the necessity is implied of involving in the disarmament process all other nuclear Powers, in addition to the United States and the four countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States on whose territory there happened to be nuclear weapons at the time of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The next stage may be the result of the efforts in the previous one - that is, the realization of the principle of a minimum nuclear deterrence that is 10 times lower than the present level of nuclear armaments.
But if there is to be even further movement and if we are to presume that a multinational nuclear deterrence will be created not for use against one another but as a protection against blackmail by someone who had developed such weapons in secret, then an international agency under the Security Council will need even less for such a purpose - at most, 100 to 200 warheads, as stated by a former United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert McNamara, in his article in *The New York Times* a few months ago.

Logically, this level of nuclear reduction, if achieved, will after some time reveal the feasibility and advantages of the complete liquidation of nuclear arms. The "zero option", which was officially taken in the case of other known means of mass destruction - that is, biological and chemical weapons - seems to be equally applicable to nuclear arms.

Comparison with other means of mass destruction reminds us that their use is banned. It appears to us that modern international law comes to the conclusion that use of weapons of mass annihilation is a crime against humanity. There is no reason to consider one weapon of mass destruction in a way different from the others. In addition to conventions banning the use of chemical and biological weapons, in addition to unilateral obligations by China or Russia not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, an ever-growing number of political figures, non-governmental organizations and representatives of peace movements are demanding that the international illegality of the use, or at least the first use, of nuclear weapons be formalized and that such use be considered as a heinous crime against humanity.

There is also no doubt that a comprehensive test ban is one of the most effective tools for speeding up the final choice in favour of a world free of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction. The non-proliferation
(Mr. Batiouk, Ukraine)

regime is of crucial importance for the achievement of this goal. We shall have a nuclear-free world if each and every State contributes to its attainment. Some countries contribute by refraining from acquiring nuclear status; some, by reducing their nuclear capability; some, by getting rid of the nuclear arms they inherited from the confrontational cold-war period. Ukraine is, of course, in the last category; after independence, Ukraine found on its territory thousands of nuclear warheads. Having proclaimed the ultimate goal of becoming a non-nuclear State, last spring Ukraine transferred 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling. Ukraine also declared its desire to ratify START I and the Lisbon Protocol. Having proclaimed that it would renounce nuclear weapons, which are undoubtedly an effective means of deterrence against any potential aggressor, Ukraine has the undeniable right to demand from the nuclear Powers guarantees of its national security. After all, does not the Commission, under the relevant item, consider nuclear disarmament in conjunction with international security?

Confronted here and there with territorial claims, Ukraine, while deciding to destroy nuclear weapons on its territory, would like to see a legally binding political instrument adopted – at least by Russia and the United States – that would state that these Powers will not use either nuclear or conventional weapons or the threat of use of force against Ukraine, will refrain from applying economic pressure to resolve any contested issues, and will respect Ukraine's territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders.

In embarking on the process of nuclear disarmament in Ukraine, we are actually being forced to finance on our own the large-scale programme of destruction of these weapons inherited from the former super-Power. And this
(Mr. Batiouk, Ukraine)

presupposes that in destroying the weapons we shall have due regard for the requirements of environmental safety and economic efficiency - which we would have to do in any case - and that we shall destroy them in compliance with the extremely complicated and very expensive procedures laid down in the START Treaty for the sole purpose of preventing the former USSR from circumventing its provisions.
However, carrying out the costly destruction of these weapons in the
interests of international peace and security entitles Ukraine to adequate
international assistance. So far we have not received a single cent for this
purpose, and it is common knowledge that we simply cannot do this job on our
own.

We are grateful to the United States for its offer to provide financial
and technical assistance to the amount of $175 million for the destruction of
the nuclear weapons in Ukraine. But it is evident that that appropriation
will cover only a small part of the necessary expenses. And we hope that
other States, particularly nuclear States, will join the United States in this
endeavour. It is with that aim in mind that our President has launched an
initiative to establish a special international fund for nuclear disarmament.

It can hardly be expected that in the present grave economic situation in
Ukraine priority in the allocation of scarce resources will be given to the
nuclear-arms-reduction programme to the detriment of laying the foundation of
a sound, socially oriented market economy. In view of the crisis in our
economy, Ukraine can allocate from its own budget only limited sums for the
realization of the programme to eliminate strategic offensive weapons.

All these considerations are in play nowadays, when the Ukrainian
parliament is considering the ratification of START I. Talk of "bargaining
chips", which we hear sometimes, is improper in this respect. We demand
nothing excessive. What we say is this: let those who are interested in
liquidating nuclear deterrence on Ukrainian soil provide a substitute for it
in the form of security assurances. If States want to liquidate it as soon as
possible, they should help us cope with the task. We seek nothing more,
nothing less: "fair exchange and no robbery", as our Canadian colleagues say
in such cases.
(Mr. Batiouk, Ukraine)

For the sake of time I will not dwell upon our differences with Russia as to the ownership on the physical components of these weapons.

In this situation, in some political quarters they have chosen to send to Ukraine only "negative incentives", having replaced all the carrots with sticks and trying to impose on Ukraine nuclear-disarmament obligations at any devastating security and economic cost.

What a contrast this policy presents by comparison with other known examples. It is common knowledge that today there are at least 15 so-called threshold States which are close to the creation of their own nuclear weapons or are suspected to have such ambitions. Many are sure that some of them already possess nuclear weapons. All these countries relied on the support of one or another of the nuclear Powers. Some non-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), suspected of possessing nuclear weapons or already possessing them, are comfortably receiving from nuclear Powers large-scale military, economic or other assistance measured in the billions of dollars. They feel no real pressure to encourage them to accede to the NPT and renounce their nuclear ambitions.

To conclude this subject it should be stressed again that for the speediest realization of its wish to become non-nuclear, Ukraine needs assistance not pressure.

A regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security may provide crucial results. The conclusion of the Treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe and the further development of the all-European process have brought about the greatest progress in implementing regional disarmament measures. The Treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe has helped enhance predictability and stability in that region.
After the disappearance of previous security arrangements in Eastern Europe, further efforts of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including the subregion of the Black Sea, aimed at closer cooperation among them in the field of security, as well as cooperation with existing security arrangements in Western Europe, will help to strengthen the peace structure in Europe.

By the same token, any attempts to proclaim or ascertain a special role, a special responsibility, or zones of particular interest by one or another country in a region or subregion dangerously undermine the existing trend towards good-neighbourly relations in Europe. That is why we categorically reject all ambitions for regional hegemony irrespective of who is expressing them.

Science and technology play an ever growing role in stabilizing or destabilizing international security. Ensuring effective international control over the proliferation of the most destructive and other advanced types of weaponry, nuclear materials, missiles and missile technology has become an extremely urgent problem. Ukraine is taking a growing part in coordinated international efforts to prevent the export of technologies, materials and know-how for the manufacturing of mass-destruction and destabilizing types of weapons.

Recognizing the unquestionable necessity of a non-proliferation regime for high technology with military applications, we cannot ignore some procedures that effectively hamper our opportunities to participate in world markets in technologies for outer space exploration or other areas. We would like to see a closer relationship in the consideration of this subject with the problem of the conversion of military industries for civilian purposes. In our view, effective legal measures in that direction could influence the
enhancement of our economic security, and at the same time contribute to the
world disarmament process, effectively reducing the number of enterprises
working in the military sector.

Mr. STELZER (Austria): I have the honour to convey to you, Sir, my
delegation's congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of the
Disarmament Commission at its 1993 session. Your election to that important
office reflects respect for your outstanding professionalism and recognition
of your contribution to the Disarmament Commission as Chairman of the Working
Group on the role of science and technology in the context of international
security, disarmament and other related fields during the first year of its
deliberations, when you successfully laid the groundwork for further
progress. Furthermore, I should like to express my appreciation to you and to
your predecessor, Ambassador Erdös of Hungary, for your efforts in conducting
extensive consultations in the process of establishing this year's working
agenda.

I should also like to take this opportunity to congratulate the other
members of the Bureau.

Finally, Sir, my delegation would like to thank you for the kind words
directed, at the beginning of yesterday's meeting, at the Permanent
Representative of Austria, Mr. Peter Hohenfellner, as Chairman of the
Disarmament Commission at its 1991 session.

The implementation of the reform paper entitled "Ways and means to
enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission" provided the necessary
organizational structure for the revitalized Commission. A focused agenda now
allows for the envisaged in-depth deliberations on specific and priority
disarmament issues. With the timely conclusion of the first of the four items
on its agenda, "Objective information on military matters", the Disarmament Commission, the only specialized deliberative body within the multilateral disarmament machinery, proved its efficiency. Austria welcomes the democratic nature of the Disarmament Commission, which is open to participation by all interested delegations. Thus, consensus on the guidelines and recommendations reflects the collective awareness and political will of the world community and enhances the sustainability of the impact of those guidelines and recommendations on the process of disarmament.
The opening statements of last year's substantive session of the Disarmament Commission expressed general optimism about the prospects for disarmament and the ability of the Commission to fulfil its mandated role within the multilateral disarmament machinery. The reformed Disarmament Commission was expected to translate the new international spirit of cooperation into renewed efforts to bridge traditional and well-known differences and to identify and extend the areas of agreement. With the conclusion of one agenda item and progress in the remaining three Working Groups, the Disarmament Commission has been able to reaffirm its role within the multilateral disarmament machinery.

The experience gained during the last two years has reconfirmed the reformed concept of the Disarmament Commission. The limitation of the agenda to no more than four substantive items has concentrated all efforts and has streamlined the deliberations. The three-year time frame envisaged for the consideration of each item has proved to be realistic. Past experience has also highlighted the need for a constructive approach and for the necessary pragmatism to adapt the existing structures to evolving requirements.

This need continues to enhance the ongoing reform process was reflected in last year's General Assembly resolution 47/54 A, as well as in the resolution adopted by the resumed session of the First Committee. Hence, the 1992 organizational session decided to move the agenda of the Disarmament Commission to a three-item, phased approach with one item in its first year of consideration, one item in its middle year and one item in its concluding year.

Regrettably, the present stage of the Commission's continuing reform remains incomplete and somewhat unbalanced since it has up till now been impossible to reach any consensus on the inclusion of new items in the substantive agenda. My delegation hopes that after the envisaged conclusion
of two agenda items during the current session, efforts will continue to reach agreement on their replacement by two new substantive items so as to implement the organizational session's consensus decision on a three-item, phased approach.

This 1993 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission decided to consider the three remaining items on its agenda, two of which require conclusion during the current session. Although this year's deliberations will be facilitated by the solid basis built during the two previous working sessions, the two Working Groups in question will face the considerable challenge of identifying, among the large number of multifaceted contributions, those areas of agreement from which future guidelines and recommendations can be derived.

The consensus rule, while requiring an often arduous search for areas of agreement, will successfully enhance the universal application of the guidelines and principles for the agenda items under consideration, all of which are increasingly relevant for disarmament and international security.

The deferral of the conclusion of the question of nuclear disarmament to the next substantive session, in 1994, in no way suggests any diminution of its relevance. While the conclusion of the START II agreement has added yet another significant item to the impressive list of achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament during the last few years, all of which should facilitate progress in the deliberations of the relevant Working Group, recent developments further illustrate the complexity of the issue: with the expansion of the group of nuclear-weapon States after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the question of non-proliferation has gained a new dimension.

The ratification and implementation of important agreements on the dramatic reductions of nuclear weapons will therefore have to be preceded by
the accession of all the countries concerned to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon States.

Austria regards the indefinite extension of the NPT, a strengthening of the safeguards regime and an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty as priority issues. Appropriate attention should be given to the implementation of nuclear disarmament agreements and their verification. Although deliberations on the process of nuclear disarmament will not have to be concluded this year, a few Working Group sessions may none the less be required to sustain the momentum and to prepare the structures for the deliberations during the next session.

The question of the regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security has constantly been gaining in relevance. Substantial progress in the settlement of conflicts in some regions contrasts with a dramatic worsening of the security situation in others. Whereas the successful peace process in Central America initiated by the Esquipulas agreements is also being facilitated by global developments, other regions have been torn into open warfare in the aftermath to the end of the old systems. In many cases, ideological conflicts have been replaced by ethnic strife.

The issues of economic deprivation, high population growth, environmental problems and development have become international security concerns. The conflicts in some of the States on the territory of the former Soviet Union, the resumption of the war in Angola and the ongoing catastrophe in the former Yugoslavia all call into question the sustainability of the acclaimed improvements in the global situation. The spectres of the past will have to be counteredacted by the enhanced implementation of confidence- and security-building measures on a regional level.
Increased openness and transparency are preconditions for building improved cooperative structures on a regional level, for the successful implementation of preventive diplomacy and, ultimately, for the enhancement of global stability, international security and universal peace.

The positive experiences acquired in some regions could be made use of in order to secure progress in other regions. Thus, the successful promotion of peace in Central America, the implementation of the Treaty on conventional forces in Europe, the continued efforts to promote further arms control, transparency and the codification of security relations by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe forum for security cooperation in Vienna may all produce helpful instruments. The interregional seminar on the role of confidence- and security-building measures in preventive diplomacy, which Austria has offered to host in early June, may contribute to furthering the understanding of regional security issues.

Although very few regional achievements can be applied unmodified in other regions, the distilled essence of past experience may serve Working Group II in its effort to define universally applicable guidelines and recommendations on the issue of regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security.

The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields has enjoyed increased interest during the last year, and the many working papers have facilitated deliberations in that Working Group. Recent agreements on the destruction of nuclear warheads as well as the chemical-weapon Convention continue to highlight the questions of weapons disposal and verification.

Environmental restructuring, especially the cleanup of contaminated nuclear production and test sites, is gaining increased attention. The
questions of the conversion of former weapons industries and of expanded, improved and universally adopted safeguards to secure the future employment of dual-use technologies for peaceful purposes only will have to be considered carefully. The use of the scientific and technological resources currently being employed for military purposes to promote economic and social developments will be addressed in our deliberations, as will the question of universally applicable international norms and guidelines to regulate international transfers of sensitive technologies.

Several new aspects of this complex agenda item were introduced into the discussion only towards the end of last year's session. The report of the Working Group reflects the progress achieved as well as the vast spectrum of relevant suggestions and ideas. Whether there are substantive results during this concluding session may largely depend on whether the Working Group is able to focus its deliberations on the most relevant topics of special interest.

During the ongoing debate on the restructuring and strengthening of the multilateral disarmament machinery, many suggestions have been made with regard to the Disarmament Commission. Some refer to a greater degree of coordination with other disarmament bodies so as to make the Commission's deliberations more relevant and result-oriented. Others concern internal restructuring to enhance the efficiency of the Commission's work.

Austria attaches great importance to the Disarmament Commission as the specialized deliberative body within the United Nations disarmament machinery which allows for universal participation. Thus, my delegation will support every effort to improve its efficiency and, consequently, its capacity to enhance arms control and disarmament.
Mr. PATOKALLIO (Finland): Let me begin by joining other speakers in congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the United Nations Disarmament Commission for this year. Your diplomatic skills and accomplishments are well known to my delegation. You can count on our full cooperation in your important task.

Last month, the First Committee of the General Assembly reconvened for a week to reassess the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery. In our view, the resumed session was a step forward – a small one, but important none the less. It was a beginning. There was widespread recognition that disarmament should be integrated more closely into the broader structure of international peace and security under United Nations auspices.

We are convinced that the integration of disarmament into the United Nations overall business of maintaining international peace and security is the way of the future. In the post-cold-war world, business as usual is not a viable proposition. It is a prescription for increasing irrelevance.

It is thus somewhat ironic that those who in other forums consider it extremely important to emphasize that the General Assembly is, by virtue of the Charter of the United Nations, vested with responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security are the ones most enamoured of business as usual as far as the role of the First Committee is concerned. It seems to us that for those responsibilities of the General Assembly to be exercised effectively the First Committee should have a key role to play. It is, after all, the Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly.

The Disarmament Commission has already rationalized its work to a certain extent. A three-item, phased approach has been agreed upon in principle. The Commission can concentrate on a limited range of issues for a limited time.
We would have preferred an orderly transition by beginning with a new item already at this session.

In the run-up to the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Conference, a deliberation of non-proliferation concerns in this body as well would be desirable.

Right now the nearly universal non-proliferation regime based on the NPT is facing an unprecedented challenge. The decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT is a source of serious concern for my Government. Finland continues to urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reconsider its decision as soon as possible. In this context, Finland fully associates itself with the statement issued by the depositary Governments of the NPT on 1 April.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is one of the cornerstones of international security. An indefinite and unconditional extension of the life of the Treaty in 1995 is the best way to ensure that the cornerstone stays in place.

We welcome the many new accessions to the NPT since the Fourth Review Conference. We welcome South Africa's recent disclosure that it has dismantled its nuclear-weapons capability, which was a source of long-standing concern for the international community. A threshold State can indeed step back. There is a lesson here that should not go unnoticed.

Accession to the NPT and adherence to full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards are the best means available to ensure nuclear non-proliferation worldwide. We urge Ukraine and Kazakhstan to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States without any further delay.

Let me now make some remarks on the items currently on the agenda of the Commission.
(Mr. Patakallio, Finland)

The item "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security" is on the agenda for the third and last year. Building upon the work done last year, it should be possible to reach consensus recommendations on this key issue in Working Group II.

We see regional and global disarmament efforts as mutually reinforcing. To achieve concrete results, both need to be pursued at the same time. But all opportunities in this regard should be weighed on their own merits, without making progress in one field hostage to progress in another. It goes without saying - but I will repeat the nostrum anyhow - that any regional approach to disarmament has to take into account the specific conditions and characteristics of the region concerned.

The importance of confidence-building measures for regional disarmament is beyond doubt. Through mutually agreed confidence-building measures States can prevent or allay undue suspicions and misunderstandings of each other. Confidence-building measures can also pave the way for actual disarmament. Cooperative approaches, bringing with them increased openness and transparency, can strengthen regional security.

Openness and transparency should be an inherent element of all regional disarmament efforts. The Commission should endorse the concrete steps already taken at the United Nations to increase openness and transparency, in particular the Register of Conventional Arms and the standardized reporting instrument on military expenditures.

It is essential to have as wide a participation as possible in the Register of Conventional Arms from the very beginning. Finland is about to supply its relevant data for 1992. We trust that others will do the same.
In Europe, the commitments within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) framework, as well as the Treaty on conventional forces in Europe, have been of the utmost importance in consolidating confidence and furthering disarmament. Everyone has gained through these undertakings. Increased openness and transparency have not jeopardized the vital security interests of anyone.

The United Nations has promoted regional disarmament efforts through organizing regional seminars. Such concrete support is invaluable and should be continued, particularly in regions where there is no extensive infrastructure of organizations and contacts to build upon in the field of security policy and disarmament. Finland has supported such United Nations activities financially.

The seminar on confidence-building measures in southern Africa held earlier this year in Windhoek was a good example of relevant and timely support for regional security efforts. We look forward to an equally productive seminar on the security implications of refugee flows to be held in June in Nairobi.

The United Nations can also strengthen regional capabilities through disarmament research. With that in mind, Finland has funded a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research fellowship programme for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

It is often emphasized - and rightly so - that science and technology as such are neutral. In our view, the best approach to the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament is increased openness and transparency. Only an examination of the intentions, policies and practices of States makes it possible to judge whether the
application of a specific technology for military purposes is serving offensive or defensive ends.

Science and technology can have a substantial bearing on arms control and disarmament efforts. This applies especially to many of the new challenges, such as weapons disposal, military conversion and verification arrangements.

In the field of verification, Finland has for more than two decades developed scientific methods and technology for the verification of chemical disarmament. We have made the results of this work freely available to other countries. In addition, we have conducted training courses for analytical chemists from developing countries for the past three years. Finland is prepared to continue this unique contribution in order to facilitate implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

As to transfers of high technology with military applications, the central issue here is how to ensure non-proliferation, with regard to both weapons of mass destruction and conventional capabilities and related equipment.
The existing supplier and transshipper controls are an important complement to non-proliferation efforts. They are constructed to strengthen international security. At the same time, they facilitate legitimate international trade through removing or reducing proliferation risks. They do not impede trade. As a small country relying heavily on foreign trade for its prosperity, Finland has a national interest in the effective implementation of these controls.

In our view, existing controls could be strengthened through wider unilateral adherence to them, followed by a gradual and measured expansion of their respective memberships. Demands for a dialogue on controls concerning transfers of high technology with military applications should be matched by an equal readiness to increase openness and transparency in military matters.

Mr. CHEN Jian (China): May I first of all extend my sincere congratulations to you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the current session of the Disarmament Commission. Brazil is a major developing country and is playing an important role in world affairs. There exists a traditional friendship between China and Brazil. The Chinese delegation is confident that with your remarkable talents and rich diplomatic experience you will successfully guide the work of the Commission's current session to its expected results. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation and thanks to His Excellency Ambassador Erdös of Hungary, Chairman of last year's session, for his efforts leading to the positive results achieved at that session.

The breakup of the Soviet Union marks the end of the bipolar structure of the world and the beginning of multipolarization. It is likely that a new world war can be averted for a relatively long time to come. However, factors
leading to instability have multiplied. Some countries and regions are beset by grave political, economic and social crises, and ethnic secession and armed conflicts there have intensified. The gap between the poor South and the rich North has grown wider. Hegemonism and power politics persist. The contradictions within the developed countries, and between them and the developing countries, have become more complex. World-wide economic competition sharpens day by day. The world is far from tranquil, and there are still major obstacles to the achievement of the peace and development all peoples long for.

In such a situation, the people of the world look forward even more to the establishment of a new international order and the eradication of hegemonism, power politics and other forms of inequality from world affairs, so as to genuinely realize the democratization of international relations and achieve peace and development.

The new world situation has both created conditions for disarmament and increased its urgency. Over the past year, thanks to the efforts of the international community, further progress has been achieved in the field of disarmament. The United States and Russia have ratified START I and signed START II. After many years of negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention has finally been concluded. These are major encouraging and welcome developments. Nevertheless, while noticing these positive developments, we should not lose sight of the arduous tasks confronting us. In the field of disarmament, the international community still has a long way to go.

The disarmament agreements reached between the United States and Russia contain no provisions either on destruction of the reduced nuclear warheads or on prohibition of quality improvement of their nuclear weapons. Even after
the implementation of the current nuclear reduction agreements by the two countries, the reality that the two possess the largest and most sophisticated nuclear and conventional arsenals in the world will remain unchanged. Some nuclear-weapon States have yet to give up their policy of nuclear deterrence and stop the manufacture and development of space weapons aimed at maintaining their strategic superiority. In addition, the nuclear weapons in the Commonwealth of Independent States are arousing more and more concern and attention from all sides. With regard to the transfer of conventional arms, some countries do not match their words with their deeds, and practise a double standard. On the one hand, they talk about openness, transparency and restriction regarding the transfer of conventional arms, and, on the other, they blatantly break the commitments they have undertaken in international agreements by selling large quantities of advanced offensive weapons and equipment, thus grossly interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and adversely affecting the balance of power and stability in the regions concerned. All this cannot but cause grave concern in the international community.

It is under these circumstances that the current session of the Disarmament Commision is taking place. In the coming three weeks, we will deliberate on the three items on the agenda. The Chinese delegation already submitted its working papers on these items at previous sessions, and they gave a detailed exposition of the Chinese Government's principled positions and propositions. I should like here to reiterate the main points contained therein.

Nuclear disarmament has for many years remained the centre of attention of the international community. That is reflected by the item "Process of
nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with
the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons" on the agenda of the
current session. In this connection, the United States and Russia, as the
leading nuclear Powers possessing the largest and most advanced nuclear
 arsenals, should continue to undertake their special responsibilities and
primary obligations in the field of nuclear disarmament. While working to
implement the existing nuclear reduction agreements between the two countries,
they should continue to drastically cut their still colossal nuclear arsenals
with overkill capabilities, they should stop improving the quality of their
nuclear weapons, halt testing, manufacturing and deploying nuclear weapons and
cease developing space weapons.

The Chinese Government understands and respects the reasonable concern
expressed by a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States. It has all along
stood for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and
has made tireless endeavours towards this end. China declared, from the very
first day when it came into possession of nuclear weapons, that it would never
be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.
China urges other nuclear-weapon States to unconditionally undertake, together
with China, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and
nuclear-weapon-free zones. On this basis, negotiations can be started on an
international convention, with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon
States, on the banning of the use of nuclear weapons. This will create
favourable conditions for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and the final realization of the complete prohibition and thorough
destruction of nuclear weapons.
Changes in the international situation, particularly the outbreak of the Gulf war and the regional conflicts after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, have made regional disarmament all the more important and urgent.

The Chinese Government always attaches importance to regional disarmament and it believes that bilateral, regional and multilateral disarmament should complement each other. The Chinese Government believes that regional disarmament and the relevant confidence-building measures should be carried out by the countries in the regions concerned on a voluntary basis and in light of the characteristics of their own regions. Such measures should be fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced and should ensure the undiminished security of all countries.

As indicated in the title of this agenda item, regional disarmament is carried out within the framework of global security. It is, therefore, inevitable that regional disarmament is under the direct influence of the situation with regard to global security, and especially with regard to the actions and behaviour of extra-regional military Powers. The smooth conduct of regional disarmament depends, to a large extent, on whether the countries with the most powerful military strength earnestly observe the United Nations Charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; and whether they create a good external environment and provide the necessary cooperation and support for regional disarmament measures.

Therefore, countries with the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals should not shirk their responsibilities under the pretext of attaching importance to regional disarmament; rather, they should adopt practical measures and take the lead in drastically reducing their massive military
strength, which far exceeds their legitimate defence needs; they should drastically reduce, and eventually completely withdraw, all forms of military presence abroad; and they should refrain from any activity that threatens the security and interferes in the internal affairs of other countries. This would constitute a basic prerequisite and condition for regional disarmament.

Another agenda item for the current session of the Disarmament Commission is the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields. In the present world, with rapid scientific and technological development, the importance of this item is self-evident. Scientific and technological achievements are the common wealth of the whole of mankind and should be used for the peaceful development and the economic construction of all countries. It is regrettable, however, that some countries with advanced science and technology have, on the one hand, tried their utmost to lay obstacles in the way of international scientific and technological exchange under the pretext of preventing proliferation, while, on the other, applied a great deal of advanced science and technology to the arms race. Therefore, how to check the qualitative arms race and promote international scientific and technological exchange should be the focus of our deliberations on this item.

This year we will conclude our deliberations on the agenda items, "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security" and "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields". This is not an easy task, but we are happy to see that under the competent leadership of the Chairmen of previous sessions and their Working Groups, we have before us a very good Chairman's paper on every agenda item.
The Chinese delegation is in favour of conducting this year's deliberations on the basis of these papers. The Chinese delegation is willing to participate, in a spirit of active cooperation, in the deliberations of the current session. Finally, I wish this session complete success.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Let me at the outset, Sir, congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the United Nations Disarmament Commission at this important time of new opportunities and challenges. My delegation looks forward to cooperating with you as the Commission addresses in a new manner priority issues related to disarmament.

In this post-cold-war era, East-West relations are no longer strained by confrontation but are conducted increasingly in a spirit of cooperation. In various parts of the world, however, ethnic and religious rivalries are erupting into conflicts across national boundaries as well as within a country's borders. While the United States of America and the Russian Federation have agreed to large-scale reductions in their nuclear arsenals, the risk of weapons proliferation, especially weapons of mass destruction, has become more serious. In addressing these issues, it is increasingly important that arms control and disarmament efforts be pursued globally, for example by strengthening non-proliferation regimes, particularly as regards nuclear weapons. At the same time, the regional approach, utilizing such forums as the Middle East peace talks, is also important. Japan hopes that these integrated, multifaceted and complementary approaches to arms control and disarmament efforts will enhance international peace and stability.

In contrast to the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission is not a forum for negotiating specific disarmament measures. It is, however,
an important forum for deepening understanding among United Nations member countries of key issues relating to disarmament. In the meetings of the resumed session of the First Committee of the General Assembly held last month, a recommendation was made to continue efforts to enhance the working methods of the Disarmament Commission so as to enable it to give focused consideration to a limited number of priority issues in the field of disarmament. The decision of the Commission to move its agenda towards a three-item, phased approach in order to achieve that end was welcomed.

The General Assembly has requested the Disarmament Commission to conclude its deliberations this year on two issues: on the regional approach to disarmament and on the role of science and technology. Japan hopes that the Disarmament Commission will arrive at a consensus on specific guidelines for these two subjects. We will participate actively in the work of the Disarmament Commission as it searches for common denominators based on the discussions and proposals made by various countries.

Japan has observed that there already seems to be a shared perception that, in promoting concrete regional disarmament measures, full consideration should be given to the specific requirements of the region concerned. With respect to the Asia-Pacific region, it is appropriate to pursue simultaneously and in parallel the following two approaches: first, subregional multilateral cooperation for the purpose of solving conflicts and confrontations in such subregions as the Korean peninsula and Indo-China; and, secondly, political and security dialogues among a wider number of countries in order to promote mutual reassurance.

In the Asia-Pacific region, at the present time the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Post-Ministerial Conference provides the most
suitable forum for the latter approach. Japan intends to avail itself of every opportunity, such as that provided by the Post-Ministerial Conference, to promote political and security dialogues at the regional level and thus contribute to mutual understanding. Moreover, it encourages consultations and cooperation among various non-governmental organizations of various countries and exchanges between intellectuals in both the governmental and private sectors. Other initiatives arising out of similar motivations are also welcome. Also, Japan is complementing these multilateral approaches by making various bilateral efforts to contribute to confidence-building in the region, for example, by expanding its exchange programme with the Russian Federation to include officers in uniform and by holding bilateral non-proliferation talks with India and Pakistan.

In the meeting held at the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific in Kathmandu last February, it was recognized that there are many security issues that need to be considered in the context of the Asia-Pacific region at large. It was argued, however, that efforts should be made first of all to build confidence on a subregional basis. The United Nations Regional Disarmament Centre, by conducting such meetings, is fostering confidence-building through the free exchange of views of the participants, who are deeply committed to the region. Japan hopes that by strengthening the activities of such Centres mutual understanding among countries will be enhanced.
Global confidence-building efforts, such as the United Nations Register of Conventional Weapons, can also be made more effective by adopting measures that address the realities of each region. It was for this very purpose that the Regional Workshop on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms for Asia-Oceania was held in January this year, cosponsored by Japan and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Japan believes that this seminar contributed to creating a favourable environment for the smooth operation of the United Nations Register in the region and that the seminar will facilitate its further development in a manner appropriate to the region. Furthermore, just last week the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues was held in Kyoto under the banner "Disarmament and National Security in the Interdependent World". The free and intensive discussion of security and related issues by leading figures in the field of disarmament not only from Asia but also from countries in various parts of the world produced significant results that have important implications for Japan and, indeed, for the entire region. I should like to stress the importance of continuing these efforts at the regional level.

Notable progress has been made in nuclear disarmament since the dissolution of the rivalry between the United States and the USSR. The United States and the Russian Federation reached agreement on drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals and signed the Treaty on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) in January this year. Japan welcomes these achievements by the two countries, which may be regarded as implementing article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which calls upon countries "to pursue in good faith effective measures" relating to nuclear disarmament (resolution 2373, annex, art. VI).
(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

These concrete agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament, accompanied by the implementation of the moratorium on nuclear testing by the United States, the Russian Federation and France, and the commencement of substantive deliberations in the Conference on Disarmament on such topics as a nuclear test ban and negative security assurance will, I believe, create a favourable international environment for the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review-Extension Conference.

In considering the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields, the Disarmament Commission has focused its attention on the following issues: scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security; science and technology for disarmament; the role of science and technology in other related fields; and the transfer of high technology with military applications. So far, there is a consensus that science and technology per se are deemed to be neutral and that their application for peaceful purposes should be promoted. Moreover, norms or guidelines for the transfer of high technology with military applications should take into account legitimate requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, while ensuring that they do not deny access to high technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes.

In its report, adopted by consensus, on the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era," the Conference on Disarmament noted that the concept of disarmament and arms regulation "addresses the production, stockpiling and transfers of military equipment and technology, as well as the conversion of military capacities to peaceful uses" (A/C.1/47/14, annex, para. 6)
and that

"the multilateral elaboration of norms containing verification provisions based on international controls ensures confidence in their implementation and therefore their universal acceptance; in this respect the rights of States to have access to technologies necessary for their economic and industrial development should be ensured." (ibid., para. 12)

In the wake of the recent announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that it was withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the confirmation by South Africa that it had possessed nuclear weapons, there is a growing recognition of the need to promote more vigorously the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The existing export-control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australian Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime, have played key roles in this regard. In the interest of ensuring world peace and security, it is important to continue to strengthen these regimes, for example by gaining cooperation in the control of exports from countries that are not members of such groups.

In the Disarmament Commission, on the other hand, there have been proposals to formulate guidelines on access to high technology. Japan welcomes this as an indication of the intention of those countries that receive high technology and high-tech products, and of those recipient countries which have become new suppliers, to move away from their passive attitude and contribute positively to the further strengthening of non-proliferation regimes. Taking fully into account the point raised in the report of the Conference on Disarmament that

"the rights of States to have access to technologies necessary for their economic and industrial development should be ensured" (ibid., para. 12),
Japan looks forward to more active cooperation by recipient countries with a view to maintaining, supplementing and strengthening the various existing non-proliferation regimes. It is hoped that, towards this end, an agreement on principles that will benefit all countries will be reached at the current session of the Disarmament Commission.

Mrs. ESCALER (Philippines): On behalf of the Philippine delegation, I take great pleasure in congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission. Having seen you serve as Chairman of one of the Working Groups as well as Vice-Chairman of this important body, we have every confidence in your leadership and expertise to steer our complex deliberations to a successful conclusion. My delegation also extends its warmest felicitations to the other officers of the Commission, and I wish to assure all of you of my delegation's full support and cooperation throughout this session.

We are now in a period of transition - a period characterized by increasing economic interdependence, on the one hand, and rising political fragmentation, on the other. While we have witnessed in the past 12 months a number of very remarkable successes in international cooperation, such as the chemical weapons Convention, the Treaty on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), and some of the most complex United Nations peace-keeping operations, we are also seeing unique transnational problems – intractable local conflicts, mass starvation and surging terrorism, which have become new threats to international peace and security.

Here in the Disarmament Commission we have a distinct tradition of deliberating without having to vote on specific issues in the field of disarmament and other related international security matters.
These are issues which cannot be debated in depth in the First Committee, but which at the same time are not sufficiently defined for negotiations. The usefulness of our deliberations and of the specialized deliberative nature of this Commission were reaffirmed last month during the reconvened session of the First Committee.

After last year's success in concluding the item on "Objective information on military matters", the Commission this year will attempt to conclude two more items which we consider very relevant to the international community's quest for a viable global security system in this age of transition. During this general exchange of views, we shall limit our intervention on how we see that the deliberations could be advanced on these items.

The first of these relates to "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security". After the heady optimism generated by the end of the cold war, the world was jolted by the emergence of numerous regional crises in which traditional solutions and existing security arrangements have proved inadequate. It is imperative that novel and cooperative regional approaches to resolving these crises be formulated. And towards that end, my delegation wishes to underscore the terms "regional" and "local", since local conflicts lend themselves more readily to local solutions. We believe that the pursuit of regional approaches is no longer a question of whether but of how.

Despite the very useful spadework initiated by Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti of Indonesia in 1991, work done on this very important item has, regrettably, not made headway as expected. It is in this context that we fully support the timetable proposed by our Working Group Chairman this year, Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffman of Germany. We would like to endorse his planned
approach of commencing deliberations on the three other topics, namely, on ways and means, machineries and modalities and the role of the United Nations. In doing so, we would hope to avoid undue repetition of past debates.

Alongside the structured manner Ambassador Hoffman has suggested, we would offer the following suggestions to further advance the deliberations on the consolidated paper on this item, dated 13 April 1993.

First of all, we recommend the inclusion among the major elements that have been enumerated under the topic "Ways and means" of a heading on global disarmament and security regimes with regional applications, mindful that the Chemical Weapons Convention and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms are two such existing global measures that have regional applications. The "non-proliferation regime" may also be subsumed under this heading.

Secondly, we see a practical need to merge the deliberations on the topics "Machineries and modalities" and "Role of the United Nations". After all, Chapter VIII of the Charter defines the role of the United Nations system on regional arrangements. The emergence of so-called multi-level and multi-track diplomacy has also blurred the distinctions between strictly governmental and non-governmental mechanisms, as well as the United Nations role in these arrangements. The two topics could therefore be combined under the more general title of "mechanisms".

Lastly, there may be a need for an additional heading, "recommendations". We wish to recall the Chairman's statement yesterday along these lines. We all recognize that we should not be too ambitious and should proceed one step at a time. But there should also be a statement of how the Commission intends to move beyond dialogue and debate to more forward-looking, if not action-oriented, measures on a regional approach to disarmament.
(Mrs. Escaler, Philippines)

Increasing economic integration and interdependence in this age of transition have reinforced the desire among States, particularly developing ones, for technology transfer in areas that may have non-military applications and that contribute to socio-economic growth. Time and again, we have emphasized in this Commission and the First Committee the need for greater multilateralism to address this matter resolutely.

On the item "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", we are greatly encouraged by the progress achieved over the past two years. The Commission has managed to generate successive reports of substance on the item. Right now areas of convergence and divergence are more easily discernible.

The non-paper prepared by this year's Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Luvsangiin Erdeneschuluun of Mongolia, is most helpful. The paper attempts to summarize the different views that have been forwarded in the course of the deliberations and the various concerns of the working papers submitted on the four substantive aspects, namely, science and technology developments and their impact on international security, science and technology for disarmament, the role of science and technology in other related fields, and the transfer of high technology with military applications.

It would be useful, however, if the Working Group could focus its tasks on issues where reaching common ground would be desirable. We are encouraged, for example, that some understanding has been reached on a number of consensual principles for both suppliers and recipients of technology. There is, for instance, consensus on the need to widen multilateral dialogue on questions of transfer of technology with military applications. There is also agreement that norms or guidelines for such transfer should take into account the
legitimate requirements for the maintenance of international peace and
security, while ensuring that these do not deny access to high technology
products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes. We are encouraged by
the spirit of cooperation displayed so far by all concerned delegations.

On the other hand, a number of issues need to be addressed in a more
focused and determined manner. We are referring to, first, striking a balance
between the positive and negative implications of science and technology
developments on international security; secondly, the relationship between
existing supplier regimes and universally acceptable norms on transfer of
sensitive technology; and, thirdly, the question of the utilization of
scientific and technological resources currently applied to military purposes
for the promotion of economic and social development, including the protection
of the environment.

In this context, we welcome the decision of Ambassador Erdenechuluun to
designate coordinators, albeit informal, to help forge consensus and resolve
differences. In our view, these coordinators have devoted much thought to the
different questions before us and would therefore be well placed in assisting
the Chairman to complete our work. We note that by General Assembly
resolution 47/44 the Commission was called upon to submit to the General
Assembly as soon as possible specific recommendations on the role of science
and technology. We therefore staunchly support the Working Group Chairman's
efforts to reach viable and concrete measures in this regard.

It augurs well for our work that the Disarmament Commission has now
entered its third year of reform. The Commission continues to streamline its
agenda and methods of work to enable further in-depth consideration of a
limited number of agenda items, including the move towards a three-item,
phased approach.
(Mrs. Escaler, Philippines)

At this juncture we wish to highlight that in resolution 47/54 A the Assembly noted the support for the inclusion of new items in the substantive agenda of the Commission, namely, "General guidelines for non-proliferation with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction" and "International arms transfer, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 H". We register our full support for all these efforts, including the tireless efforts of the Chairman of the Commission, to achieve progress towards the inclusion of these two items in the 1994 substantive session.

While we are cognizant of the Commission's difficulty in defining its substantive agenda for this year's session, we hope this reform process will strengthen, and not weaken, its capacity to fulfil its distinctive role in the United Nations disarmament machinery.

Mr. RICARDES (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): First of all I should like to express to you, Sir, my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission for its 1993 substantive session. All delegations esteemed highly your leadership last year of the Working Group on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields. My delegation would also like to express its great pleasure at the fact that the Chairman of the Commission represents the Federative Republic of Brazil, a country with which the Republic of Argentina has close bilateral relations in all areas, and especially in the field that concerns us here: world disarmament and international security.

With regard to the work we are taking up this year, we believe that we should make every possible effort to fulfil the commitment to conclude the consideration of the agenda items relating to regional disarmament and the role of science and technology.
With respect to nuclear disarmament, my delegation welcomes the important agreement signed on 3 January by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation, on further reductions and limitation of strategic offensive weapons.

We also consider as highly positive the trend towards the reduction of nuclear tests. In our view, moratoriums are a preliminary but very important step towards creating the conditions for progress towards a complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Latin America was the first region squarely to face the dangers of nuclear-weapons proliferation. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was a historic milestone, as the first international instrument banning nuclear weapons. Last year, Argentina, Brazil and Chile successfully brought about major amendments to the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco with a view to its full implementation. This rapid progress makes a basic contribution to the final removal of weapons of mass destruction from our region. Having been approved by the Argentine Senate, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its amendments are being considered for adoption by our Congress. On 28 April it will be taken up by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, where it is expected to enjoy broad support.

International events of recent years prove that the danger of nuclear proliferation affects the security of all States. To guarantee the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction it is necessary to monitor properly transfers of related technology, materials and equipment. In that context, Argentina last December joined the so-called Australian Group, and it attended the signing ceremony for the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, held at Paris last January.
(Mr. Ricardes, Argentina)

The position of our subregion on chemical and biological weapons was clearly reflected in the Mendoza Declaration signed on 5 September 1991 by Argentina, Brazil and Chile. It was subsequently signed also by Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay. In that document the signatory countries pledged not to develop, stockpile or use chemical or biological weapons and to be among the original parties to the Convention on chemical weapons.

In addition, my Government announced in 1991 its full commitment to the guidelines and principles of the missile-technology control regime, and it incorporated the views reflected therein into its legislation on the subject.

With decree 603/92, Argentina has incorporated into its domestic legislation the international criteria for monitoring the export of sensitive nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and missile materials. The text of that decree has been circulated in document A/47/371/Add.2. The monitoring system established by the decree is strictly applied domestically.

As a final example of our resolute policy against proliferation, my country participated as an observer in the last meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, held at Lucerne. That Group's monitoring regime for dual-use nuclear material provides a formula for curbing proliferation. We share the view that agreement on complete safeguards should be a precondition for receiving nuclear supplies.

The Argentine Republic urges all States to meet their international commitments, unambiguously and with no political conditions. Similarly, we agree on the need for respect for agreements on safeguards, and believe that challenge inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are essential for adequately guaranteeing transparency in nuclear activities. The
failure to comply promptly with commitments has a direct impact on the
international safeguards systems in force in the sphere of nuclear
non-proliferation and can affect international peace and security.

With respect to the Korean peninsula, and for the reasons just stated, we
firmly support the statement made on 8 April by the President of the Security
Council.

We attach great importance to the role of science and technology in the
context of international security. In its debates, this Commission has
recognized that science and technology per se are neutral and that it is in
their application that security consequences can arise, so we should try to
identify criteria for this subject. Science and technology can make a
substantial contribution to the effective implementation and application of
arms-control and disarmament agreements, in such areas as the elimination of
weapons, conversion to peaceful purposes, and verification.

In the regional context we would highlight the climate of open harmony
and cooperation among the countries of South America. This is enhanced by
agreements on economic integration, such as the Common Market of the South
(MERCOSUR), and by specific confidence- and transparency-building measures in
the sphere of security. In that connection, Central American agreements were
pioneers in the region. And agreements within the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) constitute an example to which the international
community should give careful consideration. Confidence-building measures and
the agreement on conventional forces in Europe are contributions that
transcend the European continent and serve as a model for other regions.
I want also to stress the importance in this context of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. Buenos Aires was the site of a regional seminar organized by the Office of Disarmament Affairs on 16 and 17 March.

We consider regional agreements to be a useful complement to bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations. We hope that this year will see real progress towards defining the role of the United Nations in the field of regional disarmament. It is our task to identify universal principles that encourage regions to take the initiative in solving their own problems.

Regional and global approaches to disarmament are complementary, and they should be carried out simultaneously in order to promote international peace and security. We also believe that confidence- and transparency-building measures are basic requisites for implementing regional disarmament. Regional measures should vary with the particular characteristics of each region.

We trust that at this session a new, systematic approach to regional disarmament - the working group on which made little progress in the past - will enable us to achieve the maximum consensus possible on each subject.
Mr. JERANDI (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to congratulate you most sincerely on behalf of my delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission. I am sure that under your leadership and with your great experience in the disarmament field this session will achieve its objectives. We should also like, through you, to congratulate the other members of the Bureau of the Commission, and to assure all of you of our complete cooperation in our consideration of the items on our agenda. We should also like to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Erdös for the impressive work he did during the last substantive session.

My delegation would also like to take this opportunity to present its sincere condolences to the Turkish people on the death of President Turgut Ozal, an international figure who constantly devoted himself to the well-being of the Turkish people as well as to international peace and security.

The historic transformations which have upset international relations in recent times, relations that have been polarized over the past few decades by East-West confrontation, are harbingers of new relations in the international scene. This new period we are living through highlights the very urgent need to construct a world society in which the main objective of the international community is the building of solid and consensual bases for the maintenance of international peace and security. The experience of the bipolar era of the past has made it possible to understand the real challenges that States both large and small must meet in all fields, and not exclusively that of disarmament and halting the arms race, so that justice, equality and the balance of interests form the basis of any and all initiatives to make the world secure.
That is the standpoint on which my delegation bases its call for responsible dialogue, without bias or prejudice, in which the strengthening of multilateral efforts in the specific field of disarmament should guide our actions towards mature and responsible thinking to match the present imperatives of the transition and the concerns of all, without any exception whatsoever, in order to establish, in reality, the principles and structures as well as the practical means, acceptable to all, for consolidating and maintaining truly viable world security and peace.*

The fact that the Disarmament Commission is meeting once again, during this substantive session of 1993, highlights two realities that are self-evident: firstly, important disarmament questions are still at the discussion stage and require particular, ongoing attention on the part of the international community in order to clarify certain concepts, bring points of view closer together and reach agreements that can then be implemented; secondly, the continuity of the work of this Commission highlights the growing interest that the international community attaches to the subjects under discussion, which, despite their recognized complexity, require real and truly universal action.

The new shape of the world today is now conducive to collective thinking on international security, not only in its aspects of arms control and disarmament, but also in its human, development and cooperation aspects. Tunisia remains deeply convinced of the usefulness and relevance of this collective thinking, especially in these times, when we are at a historic crossroads.

* Mr. Whannou (Benin), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.
It is certainly true that the fact of reaching a consensus is not necessarily the same as smoothing out major differences, which still remain on the international scene, or as favouring the consideration of some items to the detriment of others. What is, in fact, involved is a common exercise in realism that presupposes a knowledge of the limits of any action, and an insistence on overcoming those limits gradually but resolutely.

With respect to the item on the agenda for this session entitled "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons", it is striking that, despite the major changes that have taken place over the past two years, such as the bilateral agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation concerning the reduction of certain categories of weapons and the moratoriums declared by France, the United States and Russia on nuclear testing, nevertheless, security measures - which we hope will be gradual, up to and including a total halt to nuclear testing and the complete destruction of arsenals that are still well stocked - remain far from dissipating, once and for all, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

In fact the risk of this threat exists not only as a result of the continuation of production and improvement but also as a result of the spread of these weapons and of the clandestine, illicit traffic in them, which is in irresponsible hands. Thus the international community is, more than ever, called upon to push forward with the concept of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to examine seriously whether it might be appropriate to adopt a universal, non-discriminatory regime that would prohibit, in perpetuity, the use, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and ensure the definitive destruction of existing arsenals.
In that respect, over and above the responsibility incumbent primarily upon nuclear-weapon States in this field, there are measures that basically require foolproof guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat of use, or the use, of such weapons and the consolidation on another level of the process of multilateral deliberations on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

It is just as important in this context to strengthen the effectiveness and credibility of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by means of mandatory global arrangements and by expanding the scope of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system in all regions, in particular in the Middle East, over which suspicion still weighs heavily and where a nuclear threat still exists.

With respect to the item entitled "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security", my delegation believes that regional disarmament is one of the essential elements on which world disarmament efforts are based. Consequently, disarmament actions, whether regional or global, are complementary, and can only be conducted concurrently, in the sense that the existence of the necessary security and political conditions at the world level is the cornerstone of any regional disarmament measure.

For a true process of regional disarmament to have any chance of being established, regional measures must not be limited to a predetermined model applied to all regions without taking into consideration the specific natures of those regions. Such measures must promote the strengthening of stability in those regions on the basis of the principle that the security of States must not be diminished by ensuring the elimination of the military imbalances that lead to races to stockpile and improve weapons.
Any regional disarmament measure must be taken within the context of respect for the purposes and principles set forth in the United Nations Charter. The Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly contains elements of fundamental importance in this field, and sets forth, in a detailed manner, the practical measures to be taken in order to achieve effective regional disarmament in the areas of conventional weapons as well as of non-conventional weapons.

I should like to highlight, in this context, that confidence-building measures aimed at making the principle of "open arsenals" a basic axiom of transparency should be non-discriminatory, encompass all types of weapons and should be acceded to voluntarily by all States, and only after ensuring that all States feel that this is a genuine means of guaranteeing international peace and security.

As for the third item on the agenda of our session, "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", my delegation is firmly opposed to the use of technology except for peaceful purposes and development. We support, in this respect, the proposals to establish universally acceptable international guidelines and norms to regulate international transfers of strategic technologies while guaranteeing that such norms do not prevent access to high technology, know-how and cutting-edge techniques for strictly peaceful purposes.

Such harmonized norms should have the effect of preventing industrial Powers from forming technological clubs that are closed to developing countries, which are dependent on scientific and technological progress for their development and environmental protection programmes and for creating
sources of energy. Indeed, discriminatory measures imposed on exchanges of modern technology are no longer in accordance with the realities of the day, when the concept of security has multidimensional connotations. Science and technology do not have only military applications, but also lie at the very root of all economic and social progress in the great majority of countries.

Furthermore, however paradoxical it may appear, the desire to create a new climate of peace requires research and development programmes in the military field. I refer here to the need to develop special disarmament technologies for verification and control purposes, and detection methods and effective systems that can ensure with certainty that arms limitation and reduction agreements are respected.
In our view, the three items on the agenda for this session are of great importance. We are committed to the advent of a more stable and non-militarized world. Only collective thinking can help us reach that objective. The world today is no longer one of fragmented centres of interest. Our actions, to whatever extent must be focused on our hopes as well as on the possibility of fulfilling them. While the various approaches sometimes seem difficult to reconcile, what is at stake is clear: international peace and security.

Mr. SUKAYRI (Jordan): Allow me at the outset to congratulate the Chairman on his election to the chairmanship of the 1993 session of the Disarmament Comission. My delegation is very pleased to see him presiding over the Comission and is confident of his ability to guide our deliberations in the right direction.

May I also extend my delegation's appreciation to last year's Chairman, Ambassador Erdős, and to the chairmen of the Working Groups of the last session. Their dedication has been admirable. The workload for this year's session will be particularly heavy and demanding. Let me assure the Chairman of my delegation's full support and cooperation.

In the field of disarmament, the Commission is entrusted with exploring ways and means for strengthening international peace and security. The three agenda items on which we will focus throughout this year's session are particularly important in view of the global developments we have witnessed in the last few years. Those developments have culminated in the end of both the cold war and the East-West confrontation. The question of regional approach to disarmament stems from the broader question of regional security. In the
Middle East, Jordan has for some time been advocating a regional approach to the problems of the region.

In March 1991, just after the end of the Gulf war, Crown Prince Hassan called for the convening of a conference on security and cooperation in the Middle East. He outlined Jordan's analytical approach to the challenges confronting the region, arguing that regional factors - demography, resources and ideology - interact with military, political and economic security dimensions. This interaction generates complex regional problems. Containing such challenges, the Crown Prince argues, requires thinking beyond the military question.

As regards nuclear disarmament, my delegation joins other delegations that have commended the positive steps taken by France, China and South Africa in acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The declaration by South Africa that it will dismantle its nuclear facilities and abandon its nuclear arms programme is particularly important. Let us hope that other countries involved in covert nuclear activities will follow suit.

In view of the highly volatile situation in the Middle East, Jordan attaches great importance to dismantling all military oriented nuclear programmes in the region. Pending the achievement of this goal, all States in the region should accede and fully adhere to the NPT. All weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and elsewhere should be eliminated. In today's world, national security cannot be achieved through the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. The development, production and stockpiling of such weapons can only enhance the sense of insecurity and further accelerate the arms race which, in turn, endangers international peace and security.
Finally, the use of science and technology for disarmament is a noble objective. One of the previous speakers was completely right in asserting that science and technology are neutral. They could be used for evil purposes as well as for the good of humanity, and our deliberations on this agenda item during this session will undoubtedly enhance the latter.

Mr. VOICU (Romania) (interpretation from French): It is a great pleasure and honour for me to extend to the Chairman the most sincere congratulations of the Romanian delegation on his assumption of the chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission for 1993. I would like to extend our best wishes to the other members of the extended Bureau as well as to the representatives of the Secretariat and also to thank Ambassador Erdös of Hungary for the way in which he so skilfully and successfully guided the work of the Commission in 1992. May I also assure the Chairman of the complete cooperation of the Romanian delegation.

The overall international context, despite the new challenges of which we are all aware, provides us with new opportunities for opening up dialogue in the field of arms control and disarmament. Multilateral disarmament bodies must take advantage of this opportunity. The current session of the General Assembly and the discussions in the special meetings of the First Committee held in March to reassess the multilateral mechanism of arms control and disarmament have provided important analyses and useful guidelines in this regard. As for the Disarmament Commission, several delegations have said that given its revised agenda and its rationalized procedure the Commission can be considered among the most up-to-date bodies of the United Nations. General Assembly resolution 47/54 A is the best devised and most effective resolution
ever adopted on the work of the Disarmament Commission. These are very encouraging signs. Moreover, the preparation at the 1992 session of a substantive document on a very important subject in the current situation, namely, "Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters", subsequently adopted by consensus in a resolution of the General Assembly, provides a good example of the effectiveness of the faithful implementation of the reform programme the Commission agreed on in 1990.
(Mr. Voicu, Romania)

Furthermore, all things being equal, 1992 was a year of striking success for all three main bodies with specific responsibilities in the field of disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament completed its negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention banning the use of chemical weapons. The First Committee of the General Assembly successfully prepared the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms concerning international arms transfers. In addition, the Disarmament Commission gave the General Assembly the opportunity to adopt a document on objective information in the military field. Romania participated in the efforts relating to all three of these noteworthy achievements, which provide eloquent proof of the results, both specific and complementary, that can be achieved, by multilateral bodies in the field of arms control and disarmament.

At its substantive session this year, the Commission has before it a very specific and simplified agenda, which yields the reassuring benefit of consensus. The priorities and operational prospects have been clearly defined in accordance with the Commission's reformed rules, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 47/54 A. In pursuit of our goals let us take full advantage of the possibilities and resources at hand. Our task will certainly not be an easy one, especially since we are still in a transitional situation. As many other delegations have emphasized, our main challenge at this session is to ensure, on the basis of documents containing substantive recommendations, the final consideration of two subjects: the regional approach to disarmament and the role of science and technology.

The final consideration and conclusion of the item "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security" should provide convincing evidence of the present degree of the renewed Commission's efficiency. Indeed, the achievement of a substantive document in this regard would attest
(Mr. Voicu, Romania)

to the fact that, conceptually and in practice, the regional approach to arms limitation and disarmament continues to gain ground. The security of individual States and regional or subregional stability could be considerably improved if one were to take due account of each region's characteristics and requirements and the interests of the parties concerned. Never was the question of the armaments situation, or the disarmament measures taken in different areas of the world, given as much importance as at the last session of the General Assembly, and the discussion of these matters is becoming more and more specific. Indeed, efforts are being made to give priority attention to regional and even subregional measures, in as much as they have a direct bearing upon matters of international stability and security.

In that respect, my delegation's attention was caught by the very elucidating statement made a moment ago by the representative of Japan, Mr. Yoshitomo Tanaka. Speaking of subregional cooperation, the solving of conflicts and confrontations, and the promotion of mutual confidence, he stated:

"In the Asia-Pacific region, at the present time the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Post-Ministerial Conference provides the most suitable forum for the latter approach. Japan intends to avail itself of every opportunity, such as that provided by the Post-Ministerial Conference, to promote political and security dialogues at the regional level and thus contribute to mutual understanding. Moreover, it encourages consultations and cooperation among various non-governmental organizations of various countries and exchanges between intellectuals in both the governmental and private sectors."

(supra, p. 30)
(Mr. Voicu, Romania)

That is a valuable and eloquent example, to which I think we should give some thought.

The experience gained from successful regional initiatives - even though those initiatives had to be adapted for purposes of universal application - provides an important basis for the success of this approach. With regard to Europe, suffice it to mention in this context the Paris Charter, signed at the highest level in November of 1990, as well as the documents adopted during the summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), held in Helsinki last July. The post-Helsinki II forum constitutes an important stage in the efforts to promote arms control and disarmament, adopt confidence-building and security measures, implement and monitor treaties in this field, convert military complexes to peaceful uses and create flexible forms of cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Today, European security would be inconceivable without the harmonious interaction between the United Nations, the CSCE, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU), in association with increased efforts at the subregional level.

Still in the European regional context, of particular importance are the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Open Skies Treaty and the 1992 Vienna accord on confidence-building and security measures.

The European regional experience, like the experience and aspirations of other regions of the world, has in recent years been reflected ever more specifically in the debates of the First Committee as well as in the resolutions and other recent documents of the United Nations. The intensity of the discussions last year reflected the growing importance of regional aspects of disarmament.
In Working Group II on the regional approach to disarmament, we must quickly bridge the gap between the scope of the agreement reached in principle on various subjects and the actual texts that emerged from the 1991 and 1992 consideration of a key - and very promising - subject, the regional approach to disarmament. Our work should be structured and guided so that this last series of deliberations culminates in the elaboration of detailed and substantive recommendations in the five areas envisaged in the working documents drafted up until now. The informal document circulated in advance by the Chairman of Working Group II, Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, provides us with an encouraging basis in this respect. Our delegation will spare no effort to support Ambassador Hoffmann in every possible way as he carries out his very important and exciting work.

Romania's interest and constant commitment in this field were demonstrated at the last session of the General Assembly by our sponsorship of many resolutions on the regional approach to security and disarmament.

Item 6 of our agenda, "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", is also in its third year of consideration by the Disarmament Commission. This complicated issue has gained in importance and interest since its initial inscription in 1991. The many working documents submitted to the 1991 and 1992 sessions, as well as the discussions and deliberations of the Working Group assigned to consider this question, reflect areas of interest and possible agreement; they provide us with a broad basis for work during this decisive session. To be paid particular attention in this context are aspects such as the development of norms and guidelines governing the transfer of
advanced technology for military uses, and the utilization of scientific and technological progress in the field of arms control and disarmament to improve present verification procedures and the methods of arms destruction and elimination.
As for the purpose of our work in this regard, it seems to us that achieving consensus at this stage, with realism and a sense of perspective, would be the most appropriate approach. We appreciate the efforts to consult in a pre-sessional period made by the Chairman of Working Group III, Ambassador Erdenechuluun of Mongolia. We pledge him our support in his work.

Regarding the fourth item on the agenda, "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons", the work at the Commission's last two substantive sessions reveals both the complexity of the problem and the differences in approaches and positions. While taking account of these realities and of the difficulty - if not to say practical impossibility - of concluding a consideration of the three items on the agenda at the same session, the General Assembly decided in resolution 47/54 A that the consideration of the item concerning the process of nuclear disarmament be suspended with a view to being completed at the 1994 substantive session. The Commission's decision to keep Working Group I on the process of nuclear disarmament, with the possibility of its meeting two or three times during the 1993 session and receiving working documents and other relevant proposals, seems to us to be a practical and generally acceptable formula.

As for the prospects for this item, in our view, in approaching such a complex subject within a Commission in which the rule of consensus prevails, realistic choices must be made regarding the aspects and elements that can offer hope for a constructive consideration. Dialogue in this field should be encouraged by the changes and positive steps noted recently, especially following the additional initiatives aimed at nuclear-weapons reduction and the limitation of nuclear testing, and thanks to the recent adherences to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
(Mr. Voicu, Romania)

Romania is fully committed to the strengthening of the global non-proliferation regime. My country's policy is very firm in that regard and it actively participates in international efforts, including those made within the context of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. An effective non-proliferation regime requires the adoption of appropriate measures to prevent access to nuclear materials, equipment and technology for non-peaceful purposes. We are in favour of the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, and other internationally recognized agreements in the field of nuclear transfers, an integral part of the non-proliferation regime.

We are prepared to support the unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 Conference. In May of 1992, the Lisbon Protocol to the START Treaty made Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine partners in the START Treaty with the United States. We attach particular importance to the commitments undertaken by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to become Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as soon as possible.

Still in the context of non-proliferation, we have taken note with concern of the statement made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea regarding its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We appeal to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reconsider its position and to comply with its obligations under the Treaty. At this stage, it is necessary to keep open channels of dialogue and resort to all means to clarify the situation and to ensure the universality of the Treaty and respect for the international regime established under it.
(Mr. Voicu, Romania)

As I pointed out in the first part of my statement, the Disarmament Commission is still in a period of transition towards a system and programme of work based on a triennial cycle of consideration of three items, so that at each substantive session consideration of one item would begin while that of another would end. We favour the consolidation and implementation of this approach. At the same time, we fully share the view that the Commission must reach a consensus on the guidelines, principles and recommendations formulated for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly. The Commission must continue further to strengthen its working methods while focusing on a limited number of priority subjects in the field of disarmament.

Those are the thoughts of my delegation, which represents a country in the category of small- and medium-sized States. Put with respect to the size and potential of countries in general, I should like to recall the very relevant words of the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in a statement on 16 April 1993:

"Every seafarer knows it. In the midst of shoals and storms, safety does not depend on the height of the lighthouse but on the intensity of the light it projects." (SG/SM/4979, p.5)

For its part, my delegation finds these words quite appropriate to the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission.

Ms. MASON (Canada): It is a particular pleasure for Canada to have Ambassador Araujo Castro presiding over the 1993 session of the Disarmament Commission. We have high expectations of him, secure in the knowledge that he will surpass them. My delegation pledges its fullest cooperation and support to him, to the very able Chairmen of the three Working Groups and to the rest of the Bureau, of which we are privileged to be a part.
Turning to my statement, delegations may or may not be interested to hear that I do not intend to read it out. It is being distributed now or should be extremely shortly, and I sincerely hope that delegations might wish to peruse it themselves.

What I should like to do now is simply to highlight two points in the statement. The first is the need to begin to consider how we might salvage the three-item, phased approach in the 1994 session. Like New Zealand, we wonder whether a way out might not be to aim to successfully conclude our consideration of illegal arms transfers - assuming of course that we agree to consider, in 1994, illegal arms transfers - in two rather than three years.

The second item I wish to highlight concerns the subject-matter of Working Group III on science and technology. Brazil and Canada approach this important issue from quite different perspectives. Our two countries have worked hard in advance of the session, and, as my Brazilian colleague Mr. Telles Ribeiro indicated in his statement this morning, we have reached agreement on a joint working paper, which we sincerely hope will help the deliberations of Working Group III.

Mr. ZAINAL ABIDIN (Malaysia): At the outset, my delegation would like to extend its heartiest congratulations to Mr. Araujo Castro on his election as Chairman of this very important Commission. The Malaysian delegation is confident that, under his able and experienced leadership, the work of the Commission will be steered towards a successful conclusion. Our congratulations also go to the other members of the Bureau on their respective elections.

The prospects of rapid disarmament and arms limitation widely hoped for and envisaged by the international community following the end of the cold war and East-West division have certainly not produced the desired results in
ensuring greater peace and security in the world. Although early this year we welcomed the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention as an important development in disarmament work, the recent declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty has to a certain extent brought the awareness that more work and cooperation within the international community are still needed on disarmament and arms limitation. In addition, the recent increase in conflicts around the world reflects the fact that member countries still need to address and establish closer ties, backed by the necessary follow-up machinery, in the linkage between the search for peace and disarmament.
(Mr. Zainal Abidin, Malaysia)

Amidst these developments, the Disarmament Commission has been hampered in its desire to proceed further with its work by including in its deliberations more issues of relevance and of great importance in the field of disarmament and arms limitation. It is unfortunate that a majority of the members of this Commission faced difficulty with regard to including an additional item for this year and one for next year. Malaysia considers the items proposed by Sweden and Colombia — namely those on general guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction, and on international arms transfers — are indeed very important and timely for consideration by this Commission. We hope that out of a sincere desire to work towards promoting international peace and security the Commission will proceed to include those new items for the next one or two years.

The Malaysian delegation fully recognizes the importance of the Commission working on a consensus basis, but we should not allow the work of the Commission to be held hostage by few delegations which, by design or otherwise, seem to be placing constraints on the majority of members of the Commission, who wish to see the important role of this Commission further enhanced. If the work of the Commission is still hampered in this manner, the ability of the Commission to consider disarmament issues will sadly diminish. We cannot allow this to happen; members of the Commission will have to proceed with the heavy responsibilities before them on the basis of a majority decision.

On the first substantive item before the current session of the Commission, "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons", my delegation firmly believes that, in view of the historic changes that are
taking place in the world, Working Group I could build on the work done last year in pushing for a meaningful United Nations role on the issue of nuclear disarmament. The Commission should further concentrate on the specifics of the sub-items, particularly in ascertaining ways of strengthening the role of the United Nations in the process of nuclear disarmament.

Malaysia is firmly convinced that nuclear disarmament should be given the highest priority by the international community. We also believe that the United Nations should play a greater role in our pursuit of efforts at the multilateral level to eliminate nuclear weapons - which, sad to say, still pose a great threat to our peace and security despite the positive developments over the years. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a very important instrument; it can help constrain the spread of nuclear weapons and their development. The decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from that Treaty is regrettable, and we urge that country to reverse its decision. It should indeed be the intention of all member countries further to strengthen the Treaty as the cornerstone of disarmament efforts aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons.

As regards the second item, "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security", my delegation fully supports all efforts and initiatives to advance regional disarmament further. The international community should realize that regional disarmament complements global disarmament. We consider it to be a vital element and a confidence-building measure of immense importance for reducing tension and mistrust in a region. It can promote and strengthen regional and international peace and security. Its importance is very clearly underscored by the regional conflicts that are going on in Europe, Africa and Central Asia.
Above all, recent experiences have exposed the practical limitations of the peace-keeping and peacemaking capabilities of the United Nations, even when there is supposed to be a fairly harmonious working relationship within the Security Council. The situation underscores the need for a greater role for regional organizations and arrangements. Malaysia believes that confidence-building measures are a good start in working towards a greater role for regional groupings in supporting the United Nations on issues relating to international peace and security.*

My delegation also believes that regional disarmament would contribute tremendously to the socio-economic development of the region. In that regard, my delegation wishes to reaffirm our commitments and support for the concepts of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality and of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia, as advanced by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). We sincerely believe that these concepts would provide the best framework for lasting peace and stability in our region, which in turn would enable developments in the social and economic fields to continue to flourish for the benefit of the peoples of the ASEAN member countries.

The role of the United Nations in promoting regional disarmament is very crucial indeed. The existing United Nations Regional Centres for peace, disarmament and development should further enhance their functions in promoting dialogue among regional member countries on regional disarmament, especially on the question of confidence-building measures. We are certain that, by getting rid of mistrust among ourselves, better and effective efforts could be undertaken to facilitate regional peace, security and stability.

*  The Chairman returned to the Chair.
We are glad that the third item, "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", will be concluded this year. This subject is very important indeed, given the very fast pace of the advancement of science and technology; if not properly utilized, this could be used for harmful purposes which in turn could have devastating effects on the world. We should be able at the end of this session to arrive at common positions on using advancements in science and technology for the benefit of disarmament and to promote and maintain international peace and security. We should all agree that science and technology should be applied only for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.

Following the end of the cold war, we face the very big task of turning the vast resources previously used in the military field for refining weapons system to peaceful uses, by utilizing the expertise and capabilities to alleviate the chronic economic problems that face a large number of countries as well as to protect the global environment. We sincerely hope that the international community is now ready to undertake the necessary measures to ensure that this vast pool of talent will not remain in their old profession, perfecting weapons of mass destruction. We also welcome the increasing awareness among the international community of the positive role that science and technology can play in the verification of existing and future disarmament measures. These applications of science and technology could contribute to confidence-building by providing the means to achieve greater transparency in military matters.
We see a very difficult task in front of us, but we should continue further, in the spirit of constructive dialogue and cooperation, to advance our efforts towards securing disarmament.

Mr. IBAÑEZ (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): I want briefly to make a few preliminary general comments; many of the previous speakers have already referred to these same points.

In 1990 the Disarmament Commission began a process of organizational reform. The new format served as the basis for the 1993 substantive session.
Although consideration of the item "Objective information on military matters" has now been concluded, there has been no progress on any other item on the agenda, or such progress has been limited or insignificant. However, there are expectations that that situation might be remedied this year. For this to happen, it will be necessary for us to arrive at consensus documents on the items we have before us, in particular the regional approach to disarmament and the role of science and technology in the context of international security. It will also be very important for the evaluation of new developments in the sphere of nuclear disarmament to be oriented towards achieving results, and practical actions for consideration in 1994.

This is not to call into question the merits of the reform undertaken by the Disarmament Commission; rather, it is an observation and, probably, a warning signal aimed at drawing attention to the causes of the stagnation in multilateral disarmament. As we understand it, the real reasons for the inertia lie basically in the lack of political will, which is constantly insufficient to deal with all the aspects of disarmament in the multilateral sphere; they lie also in a passive and automatic attachment to traditional notions of security and disarmament rooted in a one-track vision of international evolution.

The world continues to be an uncertain place. Instability and the sources of conflict are greater now than they were in the immediate past, and they continue to grow. Centrifugal forces are more powerful that we had originally thought. The perceived power of some States cannot be translated automatically into international authority. Divergent trends and the uncertain and at times apparently out-of-control course of world events are eroding and inhibiting international consensus. These troubling features of
the reality of today may in some cases explain, while not fully justifying, the persistent lack of political determination and of a practical desire to promote multilateral disarmament.

In such circumstances, the organizational reform of the Commission cannot be considered an end in itself, nor can it replace the political determination of Member States, that is essential for the Disarmament Commission to be effective. Therefore, in a phase of organizational transition and with contradictory global events occurring dizzyingly fast, the capacity of the reorganized Commission should not be measured exclusively in terms of what consensus agreements are reached on specific items in pre-set sessions. Rather, the essence of the Commission's deliberative and guiding function is to be found in the dialogue that occurs here and is informal and free of the dogma and prejudices that in the past affected its functioning.

While the items on the current agenda have gone through a fine-toothed political comb and highlight some of the current priorities in the field of disarmament, these priorities are not the only ones of interest to the international community as a whole. In this connection, it is to be hoped that in the near future the Commission will be in a position to begin consideration of proliferation in all its aspects, international arms transfers and other matters of significance to all Member States. Nor does the current agenda reflect properly the consensus goals of the 1978 Final Document.

At the same time, for practical reasons, it would be imprudent to confine the vast range of disarmament issues to their nuclear aspects. This kind of reductionism might perpetuate the inertia. Nevertheless, nuclear disarmament
does continue to be a fundamental priority that demands a deeper commitment. Peru advocates a comprehensive and balanced approach to multilateral disarmament in all its aspects.

For poor countries in structural transition, such as Peru, it is of vital importance to ensure a stable and peaceful international environment that promotes growth in the world economy. In this connection, we consider it imperative, and urgent, to take specific steps in certain disarmament areas that are having a more direct and immediate impact now on the security, the social and the development problems of the developing countries. These areas include conventional disarmament in particular; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the illegal traffic in arms; and ensuring the application of science and technology for disarmament and development.

As a consequence, my delegation has a great interest in the regional approach to disarmament in the context of global disarmament, which is the item assigned to Working Group II, chaired by Ambassador Hoffmann. The way that the Chairman has proposed to conduct the work of the Group has my delegation's support; we are confident that under his leadership it will be possible to reach timely and appropriate conclusions on this item.

We understand that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement and support each other in the common effort to guarantee international peace and security at the lowest possible, balanced levels of armaments, without impairing national and collective defence capabilities or damaging the legitimate security interests of States and regions. To achieve this, it is essential, firstly, for regional disarmament agreements to be compatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with international law, and, secondly, for account to be taken of
the particular characteristics of each region and for voluntary and deliberate participation, by all parties, to be promoted.

Confidence-building through suitable measures in all areas, the peaceful settlement of conflicts and multifaceted cooperation between States enhance international security and promote economic and social development. Transparency, respect by countries outside a region and effective verification machinery are essential factors for the establishment and functioning of regional agreements. The United Nations system can play a central role in promoting regional disarmament by providing the States concerned with conceptual inputs and by disseminating information. The Regional Centres of the United Nations should direct their work towards this task.

Mrs. PEÑA (Nicaragua) (interpretation from Spanish): Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission. It is a pleasure for us to see our work presided over by the representative of a friendly country, Brazil, to which we are bound by strong ties of friendship and cooperation. We know that with your well-known experience and diplomatic skill our deliberations will be successful. We also wish to extend our congratulations to the members of the Bureau and to the Chairmen of the Working Groups.

Our delegation believes that the fact that the Commission will have an agenda with three substantive items from 1993 on instead of four as originally planned is an obstacle that could have adverse effects since we would be missing an unprecedented opportunity to consolidate our gains and make further progress on an item of high priority, namely, the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Deliberations on this item would make it much easier for us to move rapidly towards consolidating a single policy that would also be consistent with denuclearization.
The method of consensus in decision-making used in the Disarmament Commission must continue to be a way of reconciling differing positions. This is a fundamental element for concluding our work successfully.

The Government of Nicaragua attaches special importance to regional disarmament and believes that both bilateral and multilateral efforts are vital aspects in attaining the objective of general and complete disarmament. Given the current weapons situation in the world, the main focal point of our discussions should be those areas where there are the largest stockpiles.

The adoption of confidence-building measures at the regional, subregional and international levels promotes openness and transparency, and becomes an essential way to encourage regional disarmament. During the first three years of the Government of President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, Nicaragua has taken important measures that have helped consolidate the process of peace and democracy, and not just in Nicaragua but in Central America too. Among these achievements, we should like to note the end of the armed conflict, the demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance and the considerable reductions in military troop levels, from 87,000 to 15,200, and in the defence budget, from 176 million córdobas to 36 million.
In this connection, we are continuing to make efforts to promote ever-broader confidence-building measures, with a view to preventing new conflicts, thereby making it possible to initiate the process of limiting armaments and military expenses while improving the regional political climate.

We in the Central American region maintain and share the desire to strengthen the democratic systems which, through so much effort, have been rescued. The governing and the governed are starting to realize that the increase in military expenditures and equipment in recent years has not increased the security of any of our countries. Hence, we must continue to promote confidence-building measures as an unambiguous political fact, in order to strengthen respect for human rights.

In this respect, I express again the importance of the progress made by the Security Commission - for example, the entry into force of the preliminary assistance, cooperation and coordination machinery for the elimination of the illegal traffic in weapons in Central America, the activities carried out in connection with mine-clearing, and the adoption of a thematic outline for the draft agreement on regional security. In Nicaragua, seminars are now being organized for the purpose of ensuring greater effectiveness in combating the arms traffic. We also feel we should emphasize the need for the international community's support for mine-clearing plans in Central America, as a valuable contribution to the eradication of this tragic consequence of armed conflicts. This would avoid the loss of the lives of innocent persons and would make possible the recovery of large areas of arable land.

Nicaragua attaches special importance to nuclear disarmament. We believe that recent events in this domain, particularly the latest agreements between the super-Powers, represent significant progress. The current state of the international negotiations - of course, very promising - provide an
unprecedented opportunity to move ahead towards the final objective: the total elimination, forever, of nuclear weapons. The document of the century, as the START II agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation has been called, provides for the prohibition of the most threatening nuclear weapons - for example, land-based missiles - which means that within 10 years the level of armaments will be the same as that of the 1970s. That will constitute, without any doubt, unprecedented progress in nuclear disarmament.

We believe that the work of the Disarmament Commission should take these recent events fully into account. The goal for the next two years should be forward-looking; it should be to define viable multilateral and bilateral strategies that can make a significant contribution to the achievement of substantive progress in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

We are convinced that the United Nations, as the world body charged primarily with the maintenance of peace, has a central function in the attainment of the goals for the elimination of nuclear weapons. This was demonstrated at the Security Council meetings held on 31 January 1992.

Broad prohibition of nuclear tests is one of the priorities. A first step towards the attainment of this objective would be the expansion of the already existing bans. This would have important implications for the expansion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a project which the Government of Nicaragua fully supports.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the main problems at present troubling the international community. We too should focus our attention on this problem. The real possibility of an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States and the risk of the use of nuclear weapons are dangerous trends that threaten international peace and security.
Aware of the importance of nuclear proliferation, and on the premise that accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is in the highest interest of mankind as a whole, Nicaragua is concerned about the withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the Treaty - the only international instrument in existence on this subject. The Government of Nicaragua hopes that a satisfactory solution to this matter will be found in the context of international law, the good offices of the Secretary-General and, in particular, the principles of the peaceful settlement of disputes and strict respect for treaties and international obligations.

In accordance with its foreign policy, Nicaragua is in favour of demilitarization, general and complete disarmament and the reaching of agreements to reduce to the greatest extent possible, or to eliminate, weapons of mass destruction. Hence, it hopes that all the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will submit their installations to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency as a contribution to international peace and security.

We believe that the item on science and technology has a special relationship to the development of armaments. Each day, we see weapons being perfected to an unimaginable level. Therefore, we believe it is necessary to establish norms and guidelines to govern, in particular, the transfer of technology. In this connection, both developed countries and the developing countries with a growing production capacity have a special responsibility, since only they can develop, use and transfer this kind of technology.

In conclusion, we wish to add that Nicaragua, a peace-loving country that has experienced and lived through the effects of war and violence for a number of decades, firmly believes that the technical and financial resources
currently being used for the production of weapons should be redirected
towards economic and social growth and development activities, thereby helping
to alleviate or eliminate such serious problems as hunger, poverty,
malnutrition and the considerable deterioration of the environment. In that
spirit, our Government has insisted that security depends not only on military
factors but also on economic, social and humanitarian factors. Security also
means social security, food security and the right to development. In this
connection, resolution 47/52 F, adopted by consensus during the forty-seventh
session of the General Assembly, reflects the common views of the
international community on the question of disarmament and development.

Mr. YOO (Republic of Korea): On behalf of the delegation of the
Republic of Korea, I should like to extend sincere congratulations to you,
Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the United Nations Disarmament
Commission. We are confident that your well-proved experience and expertise
in the United Nations, especially in the area of disarmament, will enable you
to guide our deliberations to a successful conclusion.
The year 1993 started with good news for disarmament. By signing
START II on 3 January, the United States and the Russian Federation agreed to
make drastic cuts in their respective nuclear arsenals. We welcome the Treaty
as a watershed development towards full-fledged nuclear disarmament. START II
gives us much reason to be optimistic about the future, and we look forward to
its prompt ratification.

My delegation welcomes other positive developments of the past few years,
including the INF Treaty, signed in 1987, and START I, signed in 1991; but it
seems too early to conclude that we are sheltered from the threat of a nuclear
holocaust. Above all, the world still lacks an effective and comprehensive
nuclear non-proliferation regime, which we believe is essential for the
promotion of international peace and security. In this regard, we attach
great importance to strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, which together
constitute the very cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

My delegation also welcomes the accession of China and France to the NPT
last year. With their accession we have come one step closer to achieving
universality of the NPT. My delegation would like to reaffirm our strong
support for the extension of the NPT beyond its expiry date in 1995.

My delegation endorses the view that in order to arrest the further
development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is essential that the
international community put an end to nuclear testing. In this connection the
Republic of Korea welcomes the recent decision of most nuclear-weapon States
to engage in self-imposed testing moratoriums. We hope that other
nuclear-weapon States will follow that example. As already noted, however,
moratoriums cannot substitute for a multilateral treaty that obligates nuclear
and non-nuclear States alike to forswear nuclear testing. It was with this in mind that my delegation co-sponsored resolution 47/47, entitled "Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty" in the General Assembly last year.

Political and security considerations aside, the international community must not lose sight of a number of other questions that remain unresolved. These include banning the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, environmentally sound disposal of nuclear weapons and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, to name a few. My Government believes these areas deserve the serious attention and scrutiny of the Disarmament Commission.

With the end of bipolar confrontation, increasingly more efforts are being focused on regional approaches to disarmament. The timeliness of the issue led to lively discussion during the past two sessions on the agenda item "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security". Consequently, a number of important considerations have been raised as reflected in the two papers annexed to the Commission's report (A/47/42) to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session. We trust they will be successfully merged during this session.

Despite the divergent views and proposals before us, it is none the less possible to identify a few common elements. My delegation finds last year's resolution 47/52 G, entitled "Regional disarmament", to be a useful guidepost. Among the many important elements of the resolution, my delegation wishes to call the Commission's attention to the two points which we feel have received relatively little emphasis. First, confidence-building and transparency measures are essential elements in the implementation of regional disarmament. Secondly, verification measures are important to ensure compliance with regional agreements or arms control and disarmament.
Many ideas have recently been put forward concerning possible mechanisms of dialogue and consultation in the Asia-Pacific region. My Government, like many others, believes that the time is ripe to discuss such mechanisms. My Government especially welcomes the timely and pertinent proposal by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to hold the post-ministerial conference senior officials' meeting in May 1993 to focus on the longer-term questions about political and security cooperation in the region. My Government will take an active part in this effort.

Until recently too much effort had been squandered on developing sophisticated weapons. The result was only that of adding momentum to a spiralling arms race. With the tremendous changes we have witnessed on the world political scene, however, increasingly more attention has been directed towards the use of science and technology for disarmament purposes. My delegation attaches special importance to the role of science and technology in the area of verification, arms disposal and military conversion.

My delegation is of the view that the questions concerning the transfer of high technology with military applications deserves more serious attention. Developing countries should not be denied access to high-technology goods and services merely because technology may also be utilized for military purposes. My delegation hopes that objective norms and guidelines for transfers of high technology with military application will be established at an early date.

Having listened attentively to the statements of many other delegations in this room on the nuclear issue relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, I can only say that no country can feel stronger concern than the Republic of Korea. As a representative of the country that has been directly exposed to great danger by the refusal of the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea to accept special nuclear inspections and its decision to withdraw from the NPT, I feel obliged to touch upon its security ramifications.

The nuclear issue relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea represents a serious threat to global and regional nuclear disarmament efforts. By announcing its decision to abandon the NPT and by refusing to observe its obligations under the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is challenging the global non-proliferation system at a time when the earnest aspiration of the international community for more effective and complete nuclear disarmament is beginning to make progress. The reasons that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea advances for its decision to withdraw from the NPT are, in our view, more excuse than justification.

We believe the IAEA has acted most properly to implement the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea strongly endorses the efforts of the IAEA and its secretariat. The decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea poses a grave threat to the peace and security on the Korean peninsula. The self-admitted reprocessing capability of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a plain violation of the letter and spirit of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula by the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In that Declaration, which has been in effect since February 1992, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. We also agreed not to possess nuclear-reprocessing and uranium-enrichment facilities and to conduct mutual inspections to verify adherence of each side to this commitment.
The decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT, together with its non-compliance with the safeguards agreement, threatens to reduce the Joint Declaration to an agreement devoid of practical meaning. Worse still, it invalidates the arduous efforts the Republic of Korea has made over the years to realize a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and achieve greater rapprochement with the north. The capability of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to build nuclear weapons puts the security of the Republic of Korea in great danger. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea already possesses the ability to launch medium-range missiles that could reach every inch of the Republic of Korea and even parts of neighboring countries.
If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is left unchecked, the Republic of Korea will be put under potential nuclear threat from the north and inter-Korean relations may possibly be subject to dictating elements of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea cannot accept this kind of situation. That the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is going nuclear indeed resonates beyond our peninsula. In the broader perspective, the defiance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea can seriously undermine global nuclear non-proliferation and the safeguards system.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the first State Party ever to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - and that without any credible reason. The response of the international community will establish an important precedent.

My delegation seriously questions the wisdom of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the steps it has taken. It is not in its interest to confront the entire world community. We once again urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to implement the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 25 February 1993 and retract its decision to withdraw from the NPT.

Furthermore, my delegation strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to respect its commitment to bilateral nuclear inspections under the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Since the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has declared that it has neither the intention nor the capability to develop nuclear weapons, its compliance with its international obligations will be beneficial to its international standing.
We also believe that the efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to improve its relations with the outside world will be more favourably regarded if the suspicions about its nuclear-weapons development programme are completely cleared up.

My delegation is fully confident that this year's Disarmament Commission session will produce concrete results and thus add another cornerstone to disarmament history. My delegation offers its full cooperation to that end.

Mr. PAK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): At the outset I should like to take this opportunity to extend my sincere congratulations to you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of this year's session of the Disarmament Commission. Your personal dynamism and diplomatic skill will undoubtedly make a positive contribution to the success of our deliberations. Let me also take this opportunity to offer my appreciation to the Under-Secretary-General and other Secretariat officials.

New challenges to peace and security in a changing international situation demand the strengthening of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. First of all, I should like to express the view of my delegation that democracy and disarmament should constitute the foundation of the new structure of peace. International relations should be conducted in a democratic way, and promoted on a fair and equitable basis, thereby contributing to the acceleration of the disarmament process. The Disarmament Commission is the specialized deliberative body within the United Nations that allows all States Members of the Organization to present their views on an important issue on its agenda. Its recommendations, therefore, reflect the universally accepted perception that gives all Members authority in disarmament matters.
Last year, the Disarmament Commission adopted a recommendation on objective information on military matters. This would facilitate the adoption of concrete measures in the field of disarmament, in particular for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The three items currently on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission fully reflect the concern of the international community at the present juncture. The item on "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons" focuses on the most threatening and destabilizing category of armaments. The important task before us is not only to ensure that there is no proliferation of such weapons and no deployment of them on the territory of other States but also that existing nuclear weapons are totally eliminated, as an urgent task, so as to preserve life on Earth.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which consistently pursues anti-nuclear and peaceful policies, is making every possible effort to halt the nuclear arms race and eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons.

The Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was adopted between the north and the south and a north-south nuclear control committee was organized as a practical step for its implementation. However, it has been beset by many obstacles blocking the realization of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. While the inspection of the nuclear weapons and the nuclear bases deployed in south Korea is denied, pressure is being placed on us, with increasing nuclear threats and the argument of special inspections and surprise inspections of military sites.
Experience has shown that, in order to realize denuclearization, the nuclear-weapon States should respect the initiatives for denuclearization, and nuclear weapons deployed in the region and its neighbouring territorial waters should be withdrawn. The nuclear umbrella should not be offered to any country in the region. Plutonium should not be supplied and the development of nuclear weapons forbidden.

At the same time, in order to bring about practical progress in nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon States should end their nuclear tests, support a treaty on non-use of nuclear weapons, destroy nuclear weapons on a phased basis and legally guarantee non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States.

The agenda item on "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security" should focus on the issues of security of States, interrelations between regional and global disarmament and the creation of a political atmosphere conducive to disarmament. In order to realize disarmament in the regional and subregional framework, disputes in the region should be solved and the factors of tension should first be eliminated. At the same time, outside interference should be excluded and a political atmosphere for confidence created. With these issues unresolved, any disarmament initiative - no matter how good - cannot be put into practice.

The North-South Joint Military Committee was organized with a view to implementing non-aggression as part of the North-South Agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression, cooperation and exchange. However, before the work of the Joint Military Committee could be normalized, its operation was suspended owing to the resumption of the "Team Spirit" joint military
exercises. Regional disarmament measures should take due consideration of regional history, culture and geography, as well as other factors. In particular, priority should be given to the matter of excluding domination and interference by outside forces.

I should like to clarify once again the position of my Government regarding withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which has been mentioned by some delegations. First, I wish to draw the attention of representatives to the memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, dated 5 April 1993, contained in document S/25538, and the statement of the Minister of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, dated 8 April 1993, circulated as Security Council document S/25576, in which the truth about the issue of nuclear inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency vis-à-vis the Democratic People's Republic was elucidated.
(Mr. Pak, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

My delegation would like to make it clear that the decision of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT was entirely attributable to the nuclear threat from the United States against my country and the unjustifiable behaviour of some officials of the IAEA secretariat. As is well known, it was on the premise that the United States, a depositary State of the NPT, should withdraw its nuclear weapons from south Korea and remove its nuclear threat against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that my country signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and accepted the IAEA inspections. Nevertheless, the nuclear weapons of the United States still remain there, and a nuclear threat continues.

In particular, even today, when north and south Korea have an agreement on non-aggression and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is faithfully fulfilling its international obligations under the NPT and the safeguards agreement, inspection of the United States nuclear weapons and its nuclear bases in south Korea is yet to be made. The United States increased more openly its nuclear threat by resuming the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, which were suspended before the beginning of the IAEA inspection at a time when the inspection of our nuclear facilities was proceeding smoothly. These are contradictory to the ideals and objectives of the NPT and an open challenge to the expectations of our people that the nuclear weapons would be pulled out and the nuclear threat not be imposed.

Next, some of the officials of the IAEA secretariat demanded special inspection of our military sites on the basis of the fabricated intelligence information submitted by a third country, ignoring the impartiality and strict neutrality, and contravening the statute and agreement, of the Agency. Particularly, the United States systematically intervened in the IAEA
inspection and instigated the Agency's secretariats to impose a special inspection upon us. The United States invited the Director General of IAEA to the joint House hearing on 22 July of last year and briefed him on the nuclear programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, while forcing him to conduct the special inspection and surprise inspection in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In September last year, the IAEA Director General abruptly demanded that his inspectors inspect two military sites which have nothing to do with nuclear activities. Although the request was against the spirit of the agreement, we showed them, with the consideration that it was the first request by the IAEA Director General. Despite our good will, however, some officials of the IAEA secretariat used the visit to confirm the espionage information submitted by the third country. In this regard, my Government clearly notified the IAEA Director General that they would no longer be allowed to conduct such groundless visits or inspections on the non-nuclear-related military sites.

Against this background, on 22 December last year, the IAEA Director General requested again that access be given to a military site already visited by the inspection team of the IAEA, and to another site. At the same time, some officials of the IAEA secretariat caused a resolution to be adopted enforcing an inspection of our major military sites, unrelated to nuclear activities, on the basis of the intelligence information fabricated by the United States, a belligerent party vis-à-vis the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Owing to the indiscreet manoeuvre of the United States and its followers, the more we receive the inspections, the more the nuclear threat is
increasing, and peace and security on the Korean Peninsula are being destroyed rather than secured. My Government's joining of the NPT was intended to remove the nuclear threat of the United States against my country, but not to let our sovereignty and security be violated. The United States and its followers charged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with non-compliance with the safeguards agreement and brought the issue to the United Nations on the grounds that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea refused to allow the inspection of the military sites. The opposition to the inspection of the ordinary military sites which have no relevance to nuclear activities cannot be non-compliance with the safeguards agreement. The imposition of the inspection of the military sites by some officials of the IAEA secretariat, following the script of the United States, is an act of abuse of the IAEA statute and the safeguards agreement. Accordingly, the United Nations Security Council has no technical or legal grounds to discuss the report of the IAEA Director General. The issue of our decision to withdraw from the NPT and of our implementation of the safeguards agreement are within the jurisdiction of our sovereignty. It cannot be an act of disturbing world peace and threatening the security of other countries.

If the nuclear suspicion against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea poses a threat to world peace security, the nuclear weapons which actually exist in other countries must be a threat a hundredfold greater. If the Security Council wants to deal with the nuclear problem from the standpoint of guaranteeing world peace and security, it must call into question first of all the United States, which was the first country in the world to develop nuclear weapons and has the largest arsenal of such weapons.
There is no change in our position. We sincerely fulfil our obligations pursuant to the nuclear safeguards agreement, and our position on solving through negotiation the problems that might arise therefrom is consistent. On 30 March, we proposed once again to the IAEA Director General that negotiations be held concerning the implementation of the safeguards agreement. We still hope that the IAEA will revoke its unreasonable resolution charging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with non-compliance with the safeguards agreement and respond to our proposal for negotiation.

It is the United States that increased its nuclear threat against us and compelled us to withdraw from the NPT, and it is also the United States that manipulated the IAEA into abusing the safeguards agreement. So, the final solution of this problem depends on negotiations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America. Therefore, what the Security Council can do with regard to the nuclear problem of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is to take a practical step to make the United States respond to our negotiation proposal and fully discharge its responsibility and duty.

In addition, my delegation would like to make a brief statement on the remarks made by the south Korean representative just now. It is well known to the people of the world that the south Korean authorities cannot say even a word in demand of the withdrawal of the United States nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in south Korea but aggravate the situation on the Korean peninsula, where the foreign forces are engaged in a joint "Team Spirit" nuclear rehearsal against the same nation. Not satisfied with this, south
Korea now joins outside forces to make a fuss about the peaceful nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It cannot be construed as other than a political attempt to conceal their programme of producing nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: We have heard the last speaker in the general exchange of views. I understand that certain delegations have requested to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Before calling on them, I should like to remind members of the Commission that, in accordance with General Assembly decision 34/401, the number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation at a given meeting should be limited to two. The first intervention in the exercise of right of reply should be limited to 10 minutes and the second to five minutes.
Mr. LEDOGRAR (United States of America): I had not planned to speak, but am provoked to do so by the insults and other rubbish we have just heard from the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Before I do reply, Mr. Chairman, I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of your responsibilities and to express to you the high confidence of my delegation in your leadership.

It is unfortunate that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has chosen, once again, to make totally unfactual and inflammatory statements regarding my country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

These statements cannot hide the fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has created a serious threat to regional and international security by its nuclear weapons programme and consequent announced intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

In the past several weeks, many nations have called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reconsider its actions and its Treaty obligations. In any event, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is still obligated by the terms of the NPT. Its refusal to admit IAEA inspectors flouts those obligations.

Once again, the United States rejects categorically all the phony excuses of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its transparent attempts to put the blame on the United States.

Once again, the United States joins the many calls from all parts of the world for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reverse its weapons development programme, to retract its statement of withdrawal and to fulfil responsibly its commitments under the NPT.
Mr. YOO (Republic of Korea): There are several inaccuracies in the statement made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but I shall confine myself to commenting on a few of the more important ones.

The representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea alleged that there are nuclear weapons still deployed in the Republic of Korea and that the Republic of Korea is denying the Democratic People's Republic of Korea inspections within the framework of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. That is completely untrue.

There are no nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea, and we confirmed this as long ago as 18 December 1991, with the special announcement by the President of the Republic of Korea, Roh Tae Woo, on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, that no nuclear weapons existed in the Republic of Korea, and this has been reconfirmed on various occasions, including in this forum.

Also, we have agreed, with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to adhere to the agreed provisions of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which also foresees mutual inspections, by each side, of the adherence and commitment of each side to the agreement.

The Republic of Korea will open its military bases for inspection by the team from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on a basis of mutuality. We will open military bases and civilian facilities in the framework of the reciprocity that is foreseen in the agreement, and we should like to reconfirm this at this juncture.

The representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea mentioned operation "Team Spirit". I should like to say that "Team Spirit" started
17 years ago, in 1976, and has been carried out every year except 1991. It began in a situation where the threat to the security of the Republic of Korea was overwhelming, and has been carried out using conventional weapons of a defensive nature with total transparency guaranteed. This has nothing to do with the North Korean decision to opt to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to resile from the obligations to which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has committed itself with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. PAK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): In view of the lateness of the hour, I shall not repeat what I stated factually in my statement - all the factual figures concerning the violations or abuses by the United States, or the real danger to the Korean peninsula of such dangerous moves by the United States and South Korea.

What I would like to urge at this moment is for the United States to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a nuclear-weapon State. It has the responsibility to give a guarantee, legal or political, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. In the case of the Korean peninsula, it is none other than the United States that poses a constant nuclear threat to the Korean people, as it has done since as long ago as the 1950s-1953 to be precise.

I do not want to involve myself in a lengthy argument about what the representative of the United States said just now, but I do strongly urge the United States to fulfil its obligations under the NPT as a nuclear-weapon State.
As for the remarks by the south Korean representative just now, I strongly urge that representative to look at who is really threatening the security and peace of the Korean peninsula by taking in forces from outside. It is no one other than the south Korean authorities.

They talk about the non-presence of American nuclear weapons and nuclear bases, but who has verified this? Is it south Korea, or is it the United States?

I shall not indulge in any lengthy argument, but I should like to strongly urge the south Korean authorities to think first of the nation and its interests without depending on outside forces to kill that same nation on the Korean peninsula.

The annual military exercises with the United States are very, very adventurous. They pose a real threat to the Korean peninsula, and to peace and security.

As I mentioned in my statement, the Korean peninsula is in a really very dangerous situation with such military manoeuvres being conducted by the United States and the south Koreans. So, for the maintenance of peace and security, it is most important for the Korean nation to get rid of all foreign interference and foreign forces, including nuclear weapons and bases in south Korea. That is, the nuclear weapons and nuclear bases of the United States must be withdrawn and removed from Korean territory.
The CHAIRMAN: No other delegation wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

I now wish to state that I am certain that I speak on behalf of all the members of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in expressing our heartfelt condolences to the delegation and the Government of Turkey on the very untimely death of President Turgut Ozal. I request the representative of Turkey kindly to convey these condolences to the Government and the people of Turkey, and to the bereaved family of the deceased head of State.

I call on the representative of Turkey.

Mr. GUVEN (Turkey): First of all, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your well-deserved election to the chairmanship of this Commission. My congratulations go also to the other members of the Bureau.

On behalf of my delegation and of the people of Turkey, I should like to extend our sincere thanks to you and to all the members of the Disarmament Commission for the kind words of condolence on the sudden demise of His Excellency Mr. Turgut Ozal, President of the Republic of Turkey. My delegation is deeply touched by your solicitude, and wishes to express, once again, its thanks for sharing our profound sorrow.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN: We have now completed the first phase of the work of the Disarmament Commission at this session, the general exchange of views, during which a total of 37 speakers, including the representative of Denmark, who spoke on behalf of the European Community and its member States, made general statements on the various items on the agenda.
I take this opportunity to express, on my own behalf and on behalf of the members of the Bureau, my gratitude for the very kind words that all of you expressed to me and to the other members of the Bureau in your statements during the general exchange of views. If I refrained from thanking you individually, it was in order to compress the time available to the Commission.

Tomorrow we shall begin the Commission’s second phase of work, in which all three Working Groups will begin their deliberations on their respective agenda items.

The meeting rose at 6.45 p.m.