DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 20 April 1993, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. DE ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil)

- General exchange of views (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS (continued)

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): I should like at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission. I am fully confident that your broad diplomatic experience will contribute to the success of the Commission's work. The delegation of Egypt looks forward to continued cooperation and consultation with you, Sir, and will spare no effort in contributing to the Commission's tasks.

May I also extend a well-deserved tribute to Ambassador Erdös for his wise leadership of the Commission's work last year.

In keeping with the new requirements of the international scene, particularly in the field of disarmament, this session finds the Commission at an important stage in the development of the United Nations and its machinery towards greater effectiveness and rationalization. Indeed, the Secretary-General's report on new dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era and the discussions it has prompted in the Disarmament Commission and at the resumed session of the First Committee give us a greater burden of responsibility at this session.

The resolution adopted by the First Committee at its resumed session calls for efforts to promote the work and methodology of the Disarmament Commission and to concentrate on a limited number of disarmament topics of priority importance in order to allow us to achieve concrete results that will contribute to international efforts towards general and complete disarmament.
(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The Commission's decision to split the agenda and concentrate on three topics, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 47/54 A and to follow the approach decided upon in 1990 to strengthen the Commission's effectiveness reflects the seriousness of that commitment to rationalization.
Among the most important results of the discussions that took place during the resumed session of the First Committee was the consensus reached on the nature and aspects of the role of the Disarmament Commission within its mandate under the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its special session on disarmament in 1978.

Some of the most significant points of agreement in that respect are: the importance of the Commission's role as a world forum open to all Members for the discussion of disarmament topics; the large range of ideas that can be discussed in the Commission with a view to reaching general agreement; the time and atmosphere provided in the Commission for the exchange of views on specific subjects; the need for constant coordination with the other United Nations disarmament machinery, particularly the First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament and the Department for Disarmament Affairs in the Secretariat; the identification, during the Commission's work, of the items on which positive results could be reached in negotiations on them within the United Nations disarmament machinery and the disarmament negotiating bodies.

Calls have been made for effectiveness and rationalization. I would observe that the Disarmament Commission was one of the first United Nations organs to respond; indeed, it did so in 1990, when it adopted a document on the ways and means of rationalizing its work. The experience of the past two years has demonstrated that the Commission has shouldered its responsibilities. It has adopted a rationalized approach. It has been able to conclude its work on the item on objective information on military matters. Our decision to postpone our consideration of nuclear disarmament until next year's session should not be taken to mean that we do not recognize the
primordial importance of nuclear disarmament. Our position in this respect is based on technical considerations governing the Commission's work. There can be no doubt that the additional time will enable us to give the item the consideration required to draft a formula for the promotion of nuclear disarmament. The extension of the time that had been scheduled for the discussion of this item should be regarded as an exceptional decision and must not constitute a precedent. We have to adhere strictly to the programme of reform and rationalization. The future of the Commission depends on this.

Hence, our challenge now is to continue our discussion and to make progress on the items on the regional approach and the role of science and technology.

The regional approach to disarmament is indispensable if we are to achieve general and complete disarmament and to promote international peace and security. Therefore, three years ago Egypt proposed that the Middle East should become a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. A verifiable and clear agreement by all parties in the region not to use such weapons would build mutual confidence and would lead to concrete achievements in other areas, such as negotiations on peaceful coexistence. The continued nuclear programme of one of the parties and the possession of nuclear weapons and the threat of their use as deterrence to others are unacceptable in the context of the changes on the international scene. Thus, since the mid-1970s Egypt has been proposing that the Middle East be declared a nuclear-free zone. Egypt has also contributed, and is still contributing, to the work related to the declaration of Africa as a nuclear-free continent.

The efforts to achieve regional disarmament must take into account the specific characteristics of each specific region and must ensure the stability
and security of all countries in the region, in a balanced manner. The regional disarmament measures must include the following elements: First, the security of the countries of the region must be ensured and the proliferation of weapons must be reduced. Secondly, a balance must be achieved between the quantitative and qualitative military capabilities of all the countries of the region. Thirdly, priority must be given to making the region free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Fourthly, regional agreements should be concluded for the reduction of armaments and for disarmament; these agreements should be verifiable, should apply to all the countries of the region and should contain balanced rights and duties for all of them.

In the present international atmosphere, we must use all technological and scientific knowledge to promote international peace and security. All the scientific and technological methods now available should be used in the verification of agreements on international and regional disarmament, to the benefit of all the members of the international community. There is no doubt that the transfer of this scientific and technological knowledge, under just terms and in a manner that creates no difficulties for the members of the international community, particularly the developing countries, is a basic step for disseminating scientific progress to all and using this progress for peaceful purposes, to the benefit of mankind. Considerations about the need to guarantee that scientific knowledge will not be used to develop means of destruction must not be taken as a pretext for confining this knowledge to a limited number of countries.
(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The delegation of Egypt hopes that we can conclude our consideration of the two items on our agenda in accordance with our programme of work. We must bear in mind the fact that we must add another item to the agenda for the next session of the Commission so that the Commission may play its role of achieving international consensus on disarmament matters. In this context, Egypt welcomes the work of the body dealing with the non-proliferation and the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction.
In this respect, I should like to reaffirm that non-proliferation efforts must focus only on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, since these constitute the major threat to international peace and security.

In conclusion, I should like to reaffirm the Egyptian delegation's commitment to cooperating with you, Sir, and with all the members of the Commission in order to attain positive and effective results reflecting the international community's determination to achieve genuine and complete disarmament.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): We are pleased to see a distinguished Brazilian diplomat, Sir, as Chairman of the Disarmament Commission. During your lengthy association with the United Nations, you have shown a keen interest in and deep knowledge of disarmament issues and their treatment in multilateral forums. We wish you and the other members of the Bureau success and assure you of the full cooperation of the Mexican delegation.

We also place on record our appreciation of the way Ambassador Erdős guided our work last year.

In your statement yesterday, Sir, you reminded us that the Disarmament Commission is a forum in which all United Nations Member States can participate in the discussion of various aspects of disarmament with a view to elaborating common positions. This kind of exercise can produce results that are intrinsically valuable or that can help in subsequent discussions of these issues in other forums. We therefore regret that it has as yet proved impossible to include one or both of the proposals aimed at consolidating the three-year phased consideration of items that we agreed on some years ago. In particular, we feel that the issue of non-proliferation in all its aspects
should, as was proposed by Sweden, be examined by the Commission as soon as possible.

The mass media remind us almost daily of the importance of this issue. For over a year now, my delegation has been engaged in informal consultations in the Conference on Disarmament on these matters, and the interest shown by delegations in Geneva proves that there is a generally shared concern on this score. We hope that in the months ahead the possibility will evolve for the Commission to be able to take a decision on this issue in December.

In each of the three working groups, my delegation will clarify its position on the various items on the agenda. We are concerned, however, by the apparent lack of regard which certain groups have begun to show for certain aspects of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly held in 1978. In particular, we must see to it that this Commission and the Conference on Disarmament do not abandon the disarmament priorities that all of us without exception agreed to back in 1978. Until we all decide to change them, those priorities will remain in force. We cannot, in the service of some alleged pragmatism, focus only on such tangential issues as regional disarmament or the transfer of conventional weapons. Undoubtedly, we are talking about major issues in that context, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco demonstrates Mexico's interest in regional matters. But we must not allow nuclear disarmament to be relegated to a secondary level, nor must we lose sight of the goal of general and complete disarmament.

We therefore venture to suggest that the time has perhaps come for us to take another look at the issue of the comprehensive disarmament programme. This would enable us, among other things, to ensure a general agreement as to how our work and the work of other multilateral disarmament forums should
proceed. As we were reminded yesterday by the representative of Denmark speaking on behalf of the European Community and its member States:

(spoke in English)

"While the ultimate aim of general and complete disarmament, including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, is maintained, a balanced and comprehensive approach" - I repeat - "a balanced and comprehensive approach to disarmament is called for in order to reach that ultimate goal and make the world a safer place in which to live."

(spoke in Spanish)

And he added:

(spoke in English)

"Such a new, balanced and comprehensive approach to disarmament should be reflected in the work of the various disarmament forums, including that of the Disarmament Commission". (A/CN.10/PV.174, p. 16)

(spoke in Spanish)

We thus invite delegations to stop and consider the benefits that might accrue to all of us from a universally agreed comprehensive disarmament programme.

Beyond that, we thought very apt the comments made yesterday by our colleague from Chile concerning a consensus. For some years now we have tried to introduce this rule to various United Nations forums, sometimes successfully, sometimes not. Though it involves procedure that makes it possible to elaborate joint positions and documents, some have viewed it as a way of transferring the Security Council's veto into other major and subsidiary United Nations bodies. To those who continue to emphasize the positive aspects of consensus in any decision-making, be it substantive or
procedural, we invite them to adopt it as a rule in the Security Council itself.

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize the obvious: our work is part and parcel of a multilateral machinery that goes far beyond it and is far more complex. The forces that are changing the international scene today are also operating within the United Nations. We must be aware of the fact that these forces are at work and that attempts are being made to transform and strengthen our Organization for the benefit of all, but particularly of the United Nations itself.

Mr. SCHERBAK (Russian Federation) (interpretation from Russian):
Allow me first to join other speakers in sincerely congratulating you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission. You can rely on the full cooperation of the Russian delegation as you discharge the duties of this responsible post.

The Russian delegation is happy to extend its greetings to everyone here. Multilateral disarmament forums have recently gained new influence. It is now clear that predictions that the disarmament agenda was exhausted and had lost its priority meaning have not proven true. Quite the contrary: The post-confrontational disarmament agenda has proved to be no less full and urgent than it was during the years of confrontation. This is clearly borne out by the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" as well as by answers submitted by Member States received pursuant to that report.

If we try to draw a general conclusion here, it would probably be that disarmament has ceased to be a thing in and of itself and that it is increasingly becoming a part of the wider context of international security, bringing new guidelines to the fore. I wish to stress our vision of
disarmament priorities in the light of the present and the future agenda of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

First, recent years have seen a wealth of real changes in the field of nuclear disarmament. The major achievement of this year was the conclusion of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons.
At their meeting held in Vancouver at the beginning of April, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton agreed that the efforts of Russia and the United States would focus on the speedy entry into force of START I and the ratification of Start II. These agreements, which radically reduce the level of nuclear danger, make it possible to involve other nuclear countries in this process. The focus of these efforts in the next year or two could be working out a package of agreements ensuring a general and complete ban on nuclear tests.

We believe that our forum could adopt a recommendation to begin soon multilateral talks on the ban of nuclear tests, bearing in mind the special role played here by the five nuclear Powers. This would preferably be done within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. In this context we support the statement made yesterday by the representative of Denmark on behalf of the European Community in favour of giving priority to the ban on nuclear-weapon tests in the work of the Conference on Disarmament and the proposal of France that the five nuclear Powers at the Conference hold consultations on this matter.

Russia especially emphasizes, as one of the priorities of multilateral disarmament, precise, consistent compliance with agreements already entered into. In this context, the achievement of nuclear disarmament on the territory of the former Soviet Union is of great importance to us. Russia complies strictly with these agreements and is prepared to provide assistance to interested parties in fulfilling their obligations under these agreements.

We believe that in the time leading up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference to be held in 1995, the efforts of the international community should, as far as possible, be mobilized to strengthen that Treaty's regime. That 1995 Conference could be an important stage on the way to making the NPT a global Treaty of unlimited duration. In this context, we attach
great importance to the decision taken by the Supreme Soviet of Belarus to
accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear State, and we look forward to similar steps
being taken by Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

As a depository State of the NPT, Russia favours the continuing
membership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Treaty and that
country's full, consistent compliance with all its obligations under it. We
hope that country will demonstrate a constructive approach and will take the
necessary steps to remove the concern of the international community regarding
its nuclear policy.

Secondly, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, we believe, could
make a significant contribution to regional disarmament by working out
practical recommendations on this score. The spread of regional conflicts
points once again to the need to adopt urgent disarmament measures in volatile
parts of the world.

We have a good basis for working out recommendations here, namely, the
document submitted by Ambassador Hoffman, Chairman of the Working Group on
regional disarmament. We believe that we could agree to a consensus document
and complete work in the Group on this agenda item.

However, this certainly does not mean that these regional problems should
be sidelined in the future work of this Commission. The detection of general
trends in the development of regional processes is important in the context of
creating a stable system of international security in which regional
disarmament would be a component. We believe that it is important to make
fuller use of the experience we have gained in the continent of Europe, where,
as a result of a comprehensive combination of confidence-building and
disarmament measures, there is now a well-developed infrastructure for
security and stability. Of course, the European model for regional security,
the nucleus of which is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), could be applied to other regions only in the context of their own specific circumstances.

The emergence of new and the exacerbation of old domestic and foreign conflicts are generally viewed as constituting one of the most serious basic threats to international peace and security. A decisive role in containing and resolving them is being played by the United Nations peace-keeping operations. We believe that a mandatory element of these operations should be the working out of agreements with a strong disarmament basis in order to reduce the intensity of conflicts and provide guarantees that hostilities will not be resumed. An important contribution here could be the collating, in the form of a Secretary-General's report, of the experience gained in dismantling, under United Nations control, Iraq's military machine and in carrying out the peacemaking operations in Yugoslavia, Cambodia and other regions of the world. At the same time it would be important to adopt very soon a kind of code of conduct for parties to international conflicts that would envisage as restrictive measures a ban on the use of military aircraft and missile-based systems and, in the future, armour-plating technology as well. This could possibly be done within the context of a moratorium on the transfer of such weapons to the parties to the conflict, a system of control on compliance with the regime of non-use of the latest weapons systems and the exchange of information on violations.

Thirdly, Russia believes that the question of the impact of science and technology on international security could remain a United Nations priority. The Organization could promote a broad exchange of scientific and technological information and make use of the scientific and technological progress gained in the field of arms limitation and disarmament to improve
existing methods and control procedures with regard to the destruction and recycling of weapons and also to encourage practical steps by States in attracting investments in the conversion process. Of practical importance for resolving the problem of non-proliferation of military technology would be the universalization of the export-control regime on deliveries of dual-use materials, equipment and technologies.

I should like to inform members that in January this year the Government of Russia, within the framework of setting up the system of export controls over sensitive technologies, endorsed the provision regarding procedures for monitoring the export from the Russian Federation of dual-use equipment and technologies in the nuclear field and the provision on procedures for export and import licenses for military products, materials, and services. We have also set up a Commission, attached to the Government, for export control within the Russian Federation.

One future-oriented measure could be to consider studying the possibility of developing international cooperation among the main industrial Powers that specialize in the provision of technological verification means in the area of arms reduction in order to reduce expenditures on monitoring compliance with disarmament agreements.

The inclusion on the Disarmament Commission's agenda of priority multilateral disarmament questions which really need to be dealt with and which offer real possibilities for agreed recommendations will, to a large extent, determine the role of the Commission in the multilateral disarmament machinery, as was shown at the resumed session of the First Committee of the General Assembly. The overwhelming majority of States favour the maintenance of the triad that has emerged. We think that at this stage we need to implement the decisions already taken to rationalize the work of the
(Mr. Scherbak, Russian Federation)

Commission with this three-item, phased agenda. This approach would make it possible to seek specific results and provide a way for the Commission to carry out the pre-negotiation development of issues with a view to transmitting them to the bodies that do have the mandate to negotiate.

The Russian delegation is prepared to engage in constructive cooperation in order successfully to complete the work at this session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on its main agenda items and to work out concrete recommendations that would promote the disarmament process and strengthen international peace, security and stability.
Mr. TELLES RIBEIRO (Brazil): Allow me, at the outset, to extend warmest congratulations to the members of the Bureau and, particularly, to the Chairmen of the Working Groups: Ambassador Victor Batiouk of Ukraine, Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany and Ambassador Luvsangin Erdenechuluun of Mongolia.

May I also take this opportunity to pay a tribute to the work of your predecessor, Ambassador Erdös.

The 1993 session of the Disarmament Commission is convened at a time when major political transformations in the international scene bring renewed hopes and challenges for the strengthening of world peace. As we are all aware, circumstances prevailing in the past prevented the international community from achieving meaningful results in the field of disarmament through multilateral endeavours. Now, however, new opportunities for cooperation seem to be emerging that may hopefully be seized by the international community, permitting it to effectively address fundamental issues in the field of disarmament and arms control with a view to strengthening international peace and security.

Against this background, Brazil firmly believes that a fundamental role is to be played by the Disarmament Commission. As a deliberative body of universal composition within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery, the Disarmament Commission has, throughout the years, examined specific disarmament issues leading to the adoption of concrete and useful recommendations. The efficiency demonstrated by the Disarmament Commission resides mainly in its democratic composition which provides added authority to its deliberations. The universality of the Disarmament Commission gives all States the opportunity to have a say in a subject which is of concern to the international community as a whole.
The importance of a body such as the Disarmament Commission could also be measured by its methods of work which allow an in-depth, more focused and comprehensive debate in the field of disarmament. The opportunity to benefit from the unique character and distinctive role of the Disarmament Commission in the disarmament machinery of the United Nations should not be lost. The agenda for the 1993 substantive session reflects a number of important current concerns of the international community in the field of disarmament.

The first item refers to the process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Brazil welcomes the recent initiatives of the United States and the Russian Federation to curb some categories of their nuclear arsenals. While strongly encouraged by the fact that the two major nuclear Powers have been undertaking serious and far-reaching negotiations to reduce their arsenals, Brazil firmly believes that this issue should remain a priority item on the agenda of the international community, as it affects the security and survival of mankind.

According to paragraph 8 of resolution 47/54 A, this item will be held over for conclusion at the next substantive session in 1994. Brazil is well aware of the complexities and difficulties involved in the discussion of this agenda item. We stand committed to engage in a constructive exchange of views in order to pave the way for a successful conclusion of our deliberations next year.

The Commission has also before it the item entitled: "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security". Regional initiatives in the field of disarmament are to be welcomed as an important tool to ease tensions and enhance regional as well as global peace and stability.
Meaningful measures of disarmament in any given region can only be achieved if they reflect an awareness of the specific characteristics of that region and their relationship to disarmament measures at the global level. In fact, when considering initiatives in the field of disarmament and arms control, each region must necessarily base itself on its own political realities. Thus, regional approaches to disarmament may vary from one region to another and there is no single formula that would be universally applicable. Regional and global disarmament efforts should, therefore, be viewed as being closely interrelated. As situations vary, so do the responses to issues of disarmament. The ideal of ensuring peace throughout the world would greatly benefit from a balanced perspective and should not place one region at a disadvantage vis-à-vis other regions.

A number of measures undertaken by the Latin American and Caribbean States in the field of disarmament are enhancing confidence and cooperation at various levels. In this respect, the Treaty of Tlatelolco represented a major political effort towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. The amendments to the Tlatelolco Treaty proposed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico and adopted last August at the seventh special session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American and the Caribbean will enable the Treaty to enter fully into force, thus demonstrating the vitality of this multilateral instrument.

The recent establishment of the Common System of Accounting and Control (SCCC) between Brazil and Argentina, and the setting up of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC), also constitute major examples of cooperation at regional and subregional levels.

We are ready to engage in a constructive and open dialogue in Working Group II...
to explore areas of convergence and consensus, with a view to the successful completion of our work this year.

During the 1993 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, we will be dealing with an item that involves fundamental considerations in terms of both security and development. Indeed, the item on "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields" presents complex and challenging aspects never before discussed in a systematic way in the United Nations. After two years of intensive discussions, we feel the item is ripe for conclusion this year and that the Working Group will come up with a set of meaningful guidelines and recommendations.

Again this year in the Working Group, we will be dealing with the military, economic, scientific and technical aspects of our theme.

Sub-item 1, "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security", deals with wide-ranging and complex judgements on the qualitative improvements in the application of science and technology for military purposes.

Sub-item 2, "Science and technology for disarmament", refers to the use of scientific and technological achievements for disarmament purposes, such as verification, weapons disposal and the conversion of military industry to civilian purposes. My delegation is ready to participate actively and constructively in the discussions to be held at the current session.
With regard to sub-item 3, "The role of science and technology in other related fields", the Working Group will continue to address relevant questions such as conversion, development and the protection of the environment. It is my delegation's view that useful recommendations may be extracted from our deliberations this year.

On sub-item 4, "The transfer of high technology with military applications", it is the expectation of the Brazilian delegation that we will this year finalize a set of guidelines regarding the question of international transfers of high technology with military applications, in accordance with resolution 47/44.

There is a widely shared perception that science and technology are neutral per se and it is in their application that security implications may arise. At the same time, there is clear recognition of the fact that international transfers of high technology products, services and know-how for peaceful purposes are essential for the promotion of economic and social development of all nations.
Continued multilateral dialogue is required to enhance confidence, promote international cooperation and ultimately develop universally acceptable guidelines in this field. The delegations of Canada and Brazil will be introducing a working paper on this subject with a view to contributing to a successful completion of our work. This paper seeks to reflect in-depth discussions held in the past two years, and it is our hope that it will now serve to focus our meaningful conclusions on this subject.

It is the expectation of my delegation that the deliberations during the 1993 substantive session will contribute to enhancing our common objective to reduce the growth of world arsenals while promoting the economic and social development of all nations. As a deliberative organ of the United Nations disarmament machinery, the Disarmament Commission should proceed in its tireless efforts towards the achievement of this goal. Brazil is looking forward to participating actively in the three Working Groups and to that end is prepared to work in a constructive and open spirit with all delegations.

Mr. O'BRIEN (New Zealand): We congratulate you, Sir; the Commission is in very good hands. Our congratulations also go to your predecessor, Ambassador Erdös, for his contribution.

Since the Disarmament Commission met last year, further important landmarks have been reached in the field of multilateral disarmament. In particular, the adoption and opening for signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention in January, after over a decade of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, has renewed confidence and optimism in the multilateral disarmament process.

However, the last year has also been a time for considerable reflection and discussion about the adequacy of existing multilateral disarmament machinery. This process has been assisted to a large extent by the
Secretary-General's report, "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", which was issued last October. That report rightly stresses the need for our disarmament machinery to respond to new global realities, and it led directly to the convening last month of the resumed session of the First Committee.

One of the report's central conclusions in terms of its three related themes of integration, globalization, and revitalization is that, now more than at any time previously, discussion of disarmament and security should include all States. The inclusiveness of multilateral disarmament processes therefore constitutes, in our view, one of the crucial factors by which the effectiveness of the processes will be measured.

As you noted in your opening statement, Sir, the universal character of the Disarmament Commission is an important factor that lends weight and legitimacy to the consensus results endorsed by the Commission. Indeed, the value of the Disarmament Commission as a universal forum - the fact that it allows all interested States an opportunity to participate and express views on an equal footing - is the main reason why New Zealand has supported efforts to reform the Commission and improve its functioning in recent years.

The inclusiveness of the multilateral disarmament process is also, in our opinion, an important element in the current discussions on the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament. New Zealand is encouraged that the question of expanding the membership of the Conference is now the subject of direct attention and continuing consultations.

Over a number of years, my country has participated actively as an observer in the Conference and its Ad Hoc Committees. We have also contributed technical and scientific expertise in support of the Conference's work. However, the extent to which any country is able to participate in
negotiations and discussions convened under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament is obviously limited so long as the country remains an observer. Consequently, for some time now New Zealand has sought active full membership of the Conference, and we remain ready to assume the important responsibilities that this entails.

Clearly, the successful completion of the review of the Conference on Disarmament membership is essential if the Conference is indeed to truly unlock the opportunities now available to advance multilateral disarmament objectives and is to maintain, too, the Conference's legitimacy as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament agreements.

This year the Commission has before it three important items, two of which we will be seeking to bring to a successful conclusion through the adoption of consensus findings and recommendations. However, as demonstrated by our experience with the objective information item at last year's meeting, the Commission will need to work both constructively and purposefully under your able direction, Sir, if we are to attain these objectives.

For New Zealand, the nuclear disarmament item on our agenda remains of fundamental importance. We look forward to discussing developments in this field in the Working Group chaired by Ambassador Batiouk of Ukraine. His country has, indeed, a key contribution to make in this area.

New Zealand considers that the strengthening of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the international safeguards system remains an overriding objective. In recent years we have witnessed progress in the field of nuclear disarmament that has exceeded earlier expectations. This progress should in our view serve to facilitate the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995.
We call on all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. As a country of the Asia-Pacific region, New Zealand views with particular concern the notification last month by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its intention to withdraw from the Treaty. We call on that country seriously to reconsider this notification and to fulfil its safeguards obligations.

The prospects for achieving real progress on a comprehensive test ban now seem better than ever before. The importance that the international community places in this goal is evidenced by the overwhelming support given to last year's General Assembly resolution 47/47. We welcome the re-establishment of the Conference on Disarmament's Ad-Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban and the recent intensification of work on verification techniques within the Conference. On top of this, New Zealand attaches special priority to the work of the Working Group considering the regional approach to disarmament. Each day we become aware of the tragic consequences that occur in the world when a climate of confidence and security has not been nurtured at a regional level.

As the representative of Brazil has just said, obviously the specific characteristics of each region need to be addressed in considering the particular regional disarmament and confidence-building measures that might apply to each. We believe, however, that it should be possible for the Commission to reach agreement on some broad principles on regional disarmament that are generally applicable to all States.

Some of the work already accomplished in such matters as objective information on military matters and transparency may also be usefully considered in the context of our discussions on regional disarmament. We
welcome the efforts of Ambassador Hoffman of Germany in producing a new
Chairman's text which might form the basis for agreed conclusions in this area.

The Commission's discussion over the last two years of the role of
science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament
and other related fields has served to identify a number of elements that
should be consolidated in a set of agreed conclusions at this year's session.
We particularly appreciate the efforts made by the Ambassador of Mongolia in
convening pre-sessional consultations to discuss how this item might be
approached.

Through its participation in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts
in Geneva relating to seismic verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban
treaty, New Zealand recognizes the important role that technology can play in
facilitating verification of disarmament agreements. We also see merit in
developing guidelines and recommendations on the transfer of high technology
with military applications. We note in this regard the importance
acknowledged in General Assembly resolution 47/44 of achieving a widened
multilateral dialogue on this issue.
The recent resumed session of the First Committee reaffirmed the role of the Disarmament Commission, recognized the progress achieved in its reform in recent years and called for a supreme effort to be made to continue to enhance the working methods of the Commission. As we proceed with our deliberations at this session, we should have this last point clearly in mind.

Given that the Commission's first priority at the current session must remain the successful completion of the items on regional disarmament and science and technology, I do not in fact expect that there will be time available at this session for a discussion on the further enhancement of our working methods. However, I do think it would be useful to explore such issues further in the course of informal consultations at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. I would like here just briefly to share some of New Zealand's thoughts in this regard.

Like others, we appreciate the difficulties of seeking to conclude more than one item in any given year. We therefore consider that the achievement of a three-item, phased agenda - a goal endorsed at the recent resumed session - would represent an important step in streamlining the working methods of the Commission. That said, the absence of agreement this year to Sweden's proposal for inscription of a new item on general guidelines for non-proliferation with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction - a proposal in which New Zealand sees merit - may lead to difficulties in establishing a three-item, phased agenda in 1994. One possible solution might be that both the item proposed by Sweden and that on international arms transfers proposed by Colombia be inscribed on our 1994 agenda, with the understanding that an effort would be made to conclude consideration of the more focused Colombian proposal within two years rather than three. Such a procedure would serve to bring about a three-item, phased agenda in 1994.
(Mr. O'Brien, New Zealand)

The role played by the general exchange of views within the Disarmament Commission also needs to be further discussed. Unlike the Conference on Disarmament, which meets for a significant period throughout the year, the Commission's annual sessions are limited to three weeks. If the Commission is to achieve results within a reasonable time frame, it is important that it utilize most of the time available to it for discussion of specific proposals and working papers. Bearing these considerations in mind, it might be useful for general statements to focus on the new item or items inscribed on the Commission's agenda in any given year.

Finally, I think that it is important that we bear in mind the importance of ensuring that the various multilateral disarmament forums continue to play complementary roles. We very much agree here with Sweden, whose representative said yesterday that the longer-term future of the Disarmament Commission is interrelated with developments within the other multilateral disarmament bodies, including the reform process currently being pursued within the Conference on Disarmament. It may well be that structural reforms of other bodies will also require a more fundamental re-examination of the role played by this Commission.

New Zealand assures you, Sir, of its full cooperation at this session of the Disarmament Commission.

Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria): The delegation of Nigeria wishes to congratulate you, Sir, on your well-deserved election as Chairman of the 1993 session of the Disarmament Commission. The active role of your country, Brazil, in the sphere of disarmament is well known, as are your own accomplishments as a diplomat. We are confident that, under your guidance, our work at this session will be fruitful and constructive. Our congratulations and best wishes also go to the other members of the Bureau.
The Disarmament Commission is at a crossroads as it pursues important reforms that will turn the forum into a more practical one, responsive to the needs of this peculiar era, which offers both opportunities and challenges in abundant measure. Nigeria is very satisfied to see that the Commission's continued existence and usefulness were reaffirmed at the recently concluded resumed session of the First Committee of the General Assembly. We look forward to a quick implementation of the measures proposed at that session properly to align the Disarmament Commission with other disarmament bodies in order to meet the challenges of the times.

It was agreed last year that 1993 would be the transitional year for the Disarmament Commission to move from its four-item agenda to a three-item one. However, we have agreed to consider only three items this year. While my delegation understands and appreciates the logic of those who would rather concentrate on the two items that we are to complete this session, it is necessary to have a plan in place for handling two new items next year without tampering with the reforms on which we have agreed. These issues can be handled at our pre-session consultations. Other issues that can be dealt with at those consultations are the different work schedules for different items at different levels of consideration. We should be able to sort out during those consultations how to avoid holding simultaneous meetings of Working Groups in order to enable the full participation of all delegations.

Turning to the two substantive issues that we are to complete this session, namely "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security" and "The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields", we consider that they are of the greatest importance to Nigeria, a country in the throes of development and situated in a region plagued with hotbeds of tension and
conflicts. Besides, it is important to note that no region of the globe is now free of regional conflicts and that the risk of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become higher. It is our duty and responsibility, therefore, to agree on guidelines and recommendations that are likely to address these challenges in all their ramifications. We must seize this moment, which offers us a chance to build peace, raise hope and reduce insecurity at all levels.

Nuclear disarmament has been identified as the priority item on the disarmament agenda as long ago as 1978 during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Most recent events concerning nuclear weapons have once again proven that to be right. As we approach the extension conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, Nigeria believes that it would be helpful for Member States to show flexibility in their attitudes towards the need and urgency of eliminating nuclear weapons. In the interests of international peace and security, nuclear-weapon States must, without further delay, make concessions such as ending all nuclear-test explosions. No one needs to be reminded that nuclear weapons proliferation has become very real and that a larger number of States may have control of nuclear weapons. All this points to the fact that there is a need for urgent measures towards nuclear disarmament through the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation, be it vertical, horizontal or geographical. We must set for ourselves a goal in nuclear disarmament for 1995 so as to ensure the universality of membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We must have the long-sought comprehensive test-ban treaty so as to reinforce the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.
Recent developments in the area of non-proliferation pose a threat to the quest for the universality of membership of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The withdrawal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the NPT regime is regrettable. We call on the authorities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to rejoin the NPT and, as a peace-loving country, to honour its obligations under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement.

African States have long sought to denuclearize the continent. Their quest was hampered by South Africa and some of its friends, who denied the existence of a nuclear-weapons programme despite glaring evidence to the contrary. The admission by the South African President of his country's nuclear-weapons programme has now put to rest the question as to whether or not South Africa has nuclear weapons. Bold as the admission was, it cannot obscure the necessity for IAEA to undertake comprehensive and sustained inspection of all the South African facilities at all times.

Much remains to be done on the item "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security", on which we must conclude deliberation this year. Suffice it to say that the guidelines that we formulate here must address military and non-military threats to regional security and be easily adaptable to and applicable in all regions of the globe. They must make allowance for the peculiarities of each region and contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. Such an arrangement should take into account global measures of disarmament because global and regional disarmament must complement each other. For any regional disarmament measures to achieve the double objectives of ensuring regional security and contributing to global security, they must enjoy the support and cooperation of all extra-regional States, all militarily significant States, all
weapon-exporting States and all politically influential extra-regional Powers. In other words, the international community as a whole must be involved. Furthermore, no measures taken in one region must adversely affect the security of other regions. For example, there should be measures forbidding the transfer of weapons released by disarmament in one region to other regions.

In formulating these guidelines and recommendations, let us, however, remember that what we are expected to work upon here are guidelines enabling every region to negotiate its own agreement. We are not negotiating here regional agreements for any one region. This should be kept in mind so as to avoid unnecessary exchanges that will be prejudicial to the successful conclusion of our work. Let us also remember that, if we are not able to conclude our deliberations at this session, no State or region will be the better off for it, for the security of one region is closely linked to that of all the others.

Mankind must be able to harness its resources for its own welfare, not its own destruction. The overwhelming application of science and technology for destructive purposes is an indictment of the international community. We must therefore make conscious efforts to reverse the trend. Science and technology must be used only for the peaceful promotion of security in all its aspects. To us, this excludes its use for the development of the so-called defensive military system. Nigeria is doubtful that, with the present level of armaments, there is further need for new military systems, defensive or offensive. We have been told many times that it is not easy to differentiate between defensive and offensive weapons. Further developments in what is termed defensive military systems can, to our mind, only serve to exacerbate the arms race. The application of science and technology for the peaceful
promotion of security should, in our view, include modalities for reducing existing stockpiles of weapons, protecting the environment, reducing the effects of natural disasters and contributing to social and economic development in all parts of the globe.

A decade and a half ago, at the first special session on disarmament it was agreed, among other things, that dual-purpose technology should be used for peaceful purposes and that the vast resources devoted to the arms race should be ploughed into development. If 15 years ago that statement proved idealistic, it cannot be considered so now. The world now appears more secure at the global level as strategic weapons are being reduced. The resources saved from this historic agreement should be diverted to development. In addition, the technology for the annihilation of humanity should be oriented towards the saving of lives.

We face many challenges, but none is as dramatic as the threat to planet Earth by overarmament and wasteful expenditure on the technology of war. The Disarmament Commission should make its contribution to achieving global peace through agreement on recommendations and guidelines on regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security. In addition, we should be able to agree on some guidelines and recommendations on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields.

Mr. ERDOS (Hungary): May I be permitted to begin with an expression of sincere congratulations to you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the Commission for the 1993 session. Those who have come to know you in the scorching heat of ardent debates at various United Nations forums feel at rest, knowing that your personal qualities and skills, as well as your vast
diplomatic experience, will be instrumental in the conduct of successful and, hopefully, productive deliberations in the course of this session.

Let me convey through the Chairman our congratulations also to the other members of the Bureau and to the Chairmen of the three Working Groups. The Hungarian delegation pledges its full cooperation in the challenging tasks ahead of the Commission once again this year.

In recent years, the world has been witness to enormous and epochal events that are dramatically changing the course of mankind's history. The collapse of the bipolar confrontational world system, the sudden end of the cold war and the downfall of totalitarian regimes have opened a new era in bilateral and international relations. It also appeared that the community of nations, with the United Nations in the forefront, would now be able to respond effectively to all the old as well as any newly emerging challenges to international peace and security. Today, however, we must admit, with deep frustration, that most of the expectations and hopes are still to be met and fulfilled. The tragedies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Angola, Cambodia and several other parts of the world, the persistence of serious economic, social and ecological problems, gross and massive violations of human rights, including ethnic rights, in various continents raise constant and grave challenges to the capacity of the international community to manage crises effectively.
We, for our part, feel convinced that our inability to solve the problems before us is to be found only partially in the structures and mandates of the international institutions. The main responsibility for the difficulties and failures we are experiencing lies with those who are not willing to respect the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, who ignore the decisions of the world Organization and who continue to practice the thesis of "might is right". In this context, we cannot help noting that the response of our world at the end of the twentieth century to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and the measures it has taken so far in that regard, will not, in our view, be recorded as shining pages of our contemporary history. They will rather leave a severe legacy to future generations. These will be pages of bereavement, destruction, complacency and powerlessness. And it seems to us still too early to answer the question of whether the international community will be able to draw the conclusions from this lesson of history.

The forward-looking and action-oriented initiatives and plans contained in the Secretary-General's report, "An Agenda for Peace", can serve as good bases for real efforts in crisis prevention and in the restoration and maintenance of peace. Within our own, somewhat more limited, domain of arms regulation, disarmament and international security, the concept of integration, globalization and the revitalization of existing mechanisms, mentioned in the report, are equally relevant. We can even say without hesitation that such a broad orientation is the only realistic and viable one that holds the promise of success.
The need for such a new approach is clearly proved by the growing recognition that international security cannot and must no longer be conceived as a simple equation of military variables and parameters. Security involves a large spectrum of other, non-military issues. The significance of such issues has not been properly recognized and appreciated in the past, but the reappearance of hitherto dormant conflictual situations and the growing number of newly emerging challenges to international peace and security would convince anyone of the pressing need for a comprehensive way of thinking.

Without any exaggeration, we may state that the various components of the international disarmament machinery, including the Disarmament Commission, have for some time been actively engaged in earnest efforts to adapt themselves to the new realities. In addition to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and the First Committee of the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission too has made good progress in attaining greater effectiveness in the fulfilment of its mandate and in assuring better utilization of time and resources. During the last two sessions, the Commission has worked on the basis of a reformed agenda and a set of streamlined working methods. While the changeover to the new methods was not always easy, the Commission was able during its 1992 session to live up to expectations.

The first substantive report produced in accordance with the new "rules of the game", namely the one on objective information on military matters, is a testimony to the adaptability of this body to the new requirements. The value of the document adopted on that issue lies in the fact that it draws meaningful conclusions from a long debate which went on for three sessions,
establishes a series of valid principles and, finally, boils everything down to a set of future-oriented, practicable guidelines and recommendations. Throughout the deliberations, delegations attached great importance and paid much attention to this subject, mostly because they felt convinced that the provision and exchange of objective information is bound to be conducive to building confidence among States. They were aware that trust is a basic prerequisite for negotiations and agreements on various matters in the broad field of international security and disarmament. Openness and transparency in military matters have lately been acknowledged by a growing number of States as fundamental to confidence in all aspects of international relations.

The success thus scored in 1992 is promising not only for the present session of the Disarmament Commission but also for many sessions ahead, in so far as it demonstrates the possibility of reaching consensus on highly complex and politically motivated issues. And the two issues the Commission is mandated to conclude during the present session, as well as the third issue whose conclusion has been prolonged until next session, can only be characterized as complex and deeply motivated politically. We are convinced, however, that, as a result of serious discussions during the last two sessions in the relevant Working Groups, there is a good basis now to wind up those debates with satisfactory results. The Hungarian delegation is committed to do its best to promote the expected positive outcome.

The end of the cold war and the improvement of international relations at the global level have focused attention on issues of regional approaches to disarmament in the context of global security. The deliberations on this item have reflected well the overwhelming concern and the sense of urgency felt by
(Mr. Erdős, Hungary)

many delegations over the consequences of regional armed conflicts. From the views expressed - so eloquently reflected in today's debate as well by such previous speakers as the representatives of Brazil, New Zealand and Nigeria - we have come to the conclusion that an important way to help prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts could be the systematic elaboration and faithful implementation of a series of regional confidence-building measures. Such measures should start with relatively few fields of activities, but they would have to embrace progressively a growing number of them. In working out such measures, the fundamental nature of the conflicts, as well as the characteristics of the particular regions, should be taken into consideration. We feel encouraged by the growing attention that has been paid to the very important subject of regional approaches to disarmament by the Conference on Disarmament as well. We hope that this item can be concluded during this session with a solid, forward-looking and action-oriented report.

If there has ever been a proper time to deal seriously and with a good chance of success with the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields it is now. The Hungarian delegation will seek a substantive report which might find an acceptable way out of the age-old dilemma: is science really neutral per se and in no way responsible for the application of its achievements? We hope the report will also help find an answer and perhaps some solution to the growing problem posed by the proliferation of weapons-related technology.
Among the numerous complex problems of the present time, there is one that stands out for its real complexity and political sensitivity. Non-proliferation occupies the most prominent place in our concerns, but so far it has not been able to occupy a place on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission. The end of the cold war and the disappearance of the bipolar character of international diplomacy have made it possible for the need for fresh thinking and new approaches to the challenges, old and new, to peace and security to emerge ever more forcefully. The time has truly come to intensify our efforts to curb the proliferation of arms, especially weapons of mass destruction.
(Mr. Erdős, Hungary)

One of the several directions of such increased efforts should be the further strengthening of the existing regimes, in particular, the multilateral regimes, by achieving maximum adherence and by substantially enhancing effective verification. In this context, the Hungarian delegation is firm in its determination to contribute to the successful preparation and conclusion of the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as to the full implementation of the recently concluded Chemical Weapons Convention.

In addition to endeavours for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, greater attention and real efforts for action must be devoted to the excessive and ever more destabilizing build-up of conventional arms. Recent events in many parts of the globe, including Europe, again and again provide disturbing evidence of the grave consequences of the unconstrained accumulations of conventional weapons. In the case of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, for instance, a just and durable solution could hardly be regarded as complete without the creation of a stable balance of conventional armed forces in the territory of the defunct federation.

Far be it for us to dispute the legitimate right of every State to self-defence. Yet no one can deny that excessive build-ups of conventional arms do pose serious threats and may also create dramatic situations. In addition to certain ill-intentioned designs, many such build-ups are fanned, among other things, by misperceptions or suspicions. The latter is often the consequence of the lack or misinterpretation of information concerning the acts of other States in a given region. Better and more information, especially objective information on military matters, as well as greater
transparency in all such matters, could allay such fears and suspicions. Hence, the growing demand for such measures and other similar confidence-building measures.

In conclusion, I wish to mention that the Hungarian Government has already furnished all the data and provided appropriate background information required in accordance with the newly established Register of Conventional Arms. I also wish to express the hope of the Hungarian delegation that next year the fundamental and urgent issue of non-proliferation will find its place on the agenda of the Disarmament Commission.

Mr. NIAZ (Pakistan): Let me begin by placing on record the immense sorrow with which the Government and the people of Pakistan mourn the sudden and untimely death of His Excellency Mr. Turgut Ozal, President of the Republic of Turkey. The late President Ozal was not only the leader of a great and brotherly nation but also a person of extraordinary vision. His commitment to the cause of international peace and security, as well as to the prosperity and progress of his people, will long be remembered. My delegation wishes to express its profound condolences to the Government, the people and the delegation of Turkey on the tragic demise of President Ozal.

I wish to express the satisfaction of my delegation to see you, Sir, the representative of a country with which Pakistan maintains very cordial relations, presiding over the Disarmament Commission. We are confident that under your able leadership, the Commission will not only function smoothly and efficiently but also achieve positive results. In this regard you can count upon my delegation's unfailing support and cooperation.

Since its inception, the United Nations has provided a focal point for the international community in its efforts to promote the maintenance of
international peace and security through disarmament, peaceful settlement of disputes and the promotion of international cooperation in diverse fields. From the very beginning, disarmament emerged as a major factor in the achievement of global peace and security. In the contemporary global scene, characterized by the end of the cold war, disarmament stands at the heart of all efforts for the furtherance of the goal of international peace and security.

Though many old and some new problems, both regional and global, continue to plague us, the recent historic changes in the international political climate have provided us with a unique opportunity to pursue disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and confidence-building in our common endeavour to strengthen international and regional peace and stability and to establish a truly just and equitable system of international peace and security.

Disarmament is possible where causes of insecurity have been eliminated. It is also equally true that disarmament itself can contribute to a reducing of tensions. It has, therefore, been our constant endeavour to strengthen, through forums like the Commission, the argument and support for both disarmament and greater security.

Global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security. We welcome the assertion in the Secretary General's report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", (A/C.1/47/7) that the trend towards regional approach to disarmament and confidence-building measures is to be encouraged, and that there are numerous ways in which regional approaches would enhance the process of global arms reduction.
For a large number of States, perceived threats to their security and the need for military preparedness are primarily connected with conditions obtaining in their own regions. A regional approach, therefore, provides the most practical way to register real progress towards disarmament. My delegation is pleased to note that this approach is steadily gaining ground as was evident by the overwhelming support for resolution 47/52 J on "Regional disarmament", introduced by Pakistan at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

There have been other positive developments also in the context of the regional approach to disarmament. The success of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) process bears testimony to the idea that regional consultations offer the most practical answers to many of the problems of security and arms control. The Declaration issued at the conclusion of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Jakarta in September 1992, also commended the regional approach.

Pakistan believes that a process of regional arms control could envisage steps to build mutual trust and confidence; efforts to resolve outstanding disputes and to clear misunderstandings; endeavours to establish a mutually acceptable military equilibrium among the regional States which could, inter alia, be achieved through renunciation of certain types of advanced weapons, agreed ceilings on armed forces and the creation of fully or partially demilitarized zones on land, sea and in the airspace; and establishment of mechanisms which could facilitate disarmament and security initiatives and develop new approaches to be discussed and concrete steps to be undertaken.
The issue of regional disarmament has been before the Commission for three years now. In view of the importance of this subject and its growing relevance, we hope that this year the Commission will be able successfully to complete its deliberations and come up with a set of concrete guidelines on regional disarmament. My delegation will seriously and constructively contribute towards this objective.

Pakistan remains convinced of the utility and importance of confidence-building measures for defusing tensions, promoting arms control and disarmament, strengthening regional and international peace and security, resolving outstanding disputes, and developing mutually beneficial and friendly relations among States.
In the South Asian context, Pakistan has been working to promote a climate of peace and stability through the adoption of confidence-building measures and the peaceful resolution of outstanding disputes. In pursuance of these efforts, Pakistan, in August last year, signed with India a Joint Declaration on the complete prohibition of the development, production, acquisition or use of chemical weapons. Earlier, Pakistan and India had entered into an agreement on advance notification of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements, as well as an agreement on the prevention of airspace violations. It may be pertinent to recall that not very long ago Pakistan and India signed an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities.

An imperative and vital objective of nuclear disarmament is the acceptance by all States of a permanent ban on nuclear-weapon testing in all environments and for all times. Pakistan has lent its full support to the initiative to convert the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Meanwhile, it is our view that the conclusion of nuclear test-ban agreements between regional States in various parts of the world would not only act as a major confidence-building measure but also facilitate the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Pending the achievement of global nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States are under an obligation to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In our view, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be without qualification, not subject to divergent interpretations, and unlimited in scope, application and duration. In the propitious climate that prevails today with the end of the cold war there is hardly any justification for denying such assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States unconditionally and in a legally binding manner.
Pakistan remains committed to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation which, we believe, can gain universal credibility and acceptance if its scope and application are comprehensive and non-discriminatory. This precondition applies as much to nuclear non-proliferation as it does to the endeavours to control the spread of medium- and long-range missiles.

In view of the renewed attention that is currently being focused on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, we should like to reiterate, once again, our willingness to accept any equitable and non-discriminatory regime which can sufficiently ensure that South Asia will remain free of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan has, over the years, made a number of proposals aimed at the attainment of this objective, including the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. This proposal has been repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly since 1974 and is steadily gaining support, as was evident at the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

In June 1991, Pakistan proposed the convening of five-nation consultations between the United States, the Russian Federation and China on the one hand and India and Pakistan on the other in order to ensure nuclear non-proliferation in the South Asian region. This proposal has been supported by four of the five proposed participants and welcomed by the world community.

Pakistan also places great importance on furthering the reduction and control of conventional weapons both globally and at the regional level. It is a well-established fact that imbalances in conventional forces in any region enhance the sense of insecurity and make both conventional arms regulation and disarmament, and also nuclear non-proliferation, difficult. We have thus proposed several measures for arms reduction and disarmament in South Asia, including an agreement between India and Pakistan on a mutually
agreed reduction of conventional forces to the lowest level of armaments consistent with security needs.

Our proposals reflect our genuine desire that the South Asian countries should concentrate their efforts on economic development through the diversion of resources currently allocated to defence in order to confront the non-military threats of underdevelopment, poverty, food scarcity, resource depletion and severe environmental degradation.

Science and technology is the common asset of mankind and should be commonly shared. There should be a free flow of ideas and information concerning science and technology, the equitable distribution of which constitutes an essential element of international peace and security.

The developing countries are confronted with increasing resistance in their efforts to obtain technology for the development and advancement of their peaceful nuclear energy programmes. The General Assembly, through its resolution 32/50, categorically declared that:

"All States have the right, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality, to develop their programme for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs". (op. para. 1 (b))

The resolution also clearly states that:

"All States, without discrimination, should have access to and should be free to acquire nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy". (op. para. 1 (c))
Pakistan believes that all States Members of the United Nations should abide by these principles.

Mr. DIMITROV (Bulgaria): Unfortunately, Ambassador Pashovski is not able to attend this meeting because he is making a statement in the Security Council, and he has asked me to convey his apologies to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the representatives here.

He has also asked me to introduce his statement to the Commission on behalf of the delegation of Bulgaria.

Mr. Chairman, I take pleasure in extending congratulations to you on your election as chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission for 1993. I wish to assure you of the willingness of the delegation of Bulgaria to contribute to your efforts in making our work together as efficient as possible with a view to achieving progress on the issues on our agenda.

The outstanding contribution to the work of this Commission by your predecessor, Ambassador Erdös of Hungary, provides a good starting-point for your endeavours. Our words of welcome and best wishes for fruitful work go also to the other elected members of the Bureau, as well as to the Secretary of the Disarmament Commission, Mr. Lin.

Bulgaria fully supports the efforts of the international community to update the existing disarmament machinery to match the new priorities in the field of disarmament and international security resulting from the crucial changes in the international environment in the past few years. As an important element of this machinery, the Disarmament Commission began reforming itself as long ago as 1989, and, since then, important results have been achieved. In our view, the Commission remains the major deliberative body for the focused and detailed discussion of a limited number of agenda
items, without the pressure of voting. The Commission should complete the process of streamlining its proceedings and concentrating on a few, specific subjects for deliberation.

Resolution 47/54 A, as well as resolution 47/54 B, reflect, inter alia, the views of Member States on ways and means for reform of the Disarmament Commission to continue. We support the recommendations contained in operative paragraph 8 of resolution 47/54 A, and the decision of the organizational session of the Disarmament Commission of 8 December 1992 to move the Commission's agenda towards the three-item, phased approach, considering the 1993 substantive session as a transitional year.

The delegation of Bulgaria is of the opinion that non-proliferation issues stand high on the international agenda, and that the inclusion, at a suitable time, of an item on non-proliferation, as proposed by the delegation of Sweden, seems apposite.

I should also like to express my delegation's support for the item on international arms transfers proposed by the delegation of Colombia.

In our view, the successful conclusion of the two items on the agenda of the present session, by Working Group II on the regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security and by Working Group III on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields, will prove the usefulness of the reform that has been undertaken and will enable the Commission to implement the recommendations contained in resolution 47/54 A.

We are also looking forward to the successful conclusion next year of the work on the important item on nuclear disarmament.
Within the efforts of the international community aimed at promoting the process of global disarmament, the regional approach to arms control and disarmament is of great importance. Such an approach is capable of taking into due account the specific characteristics of each region and the interests of all parties in the area involved. Regional or subregional measures may effectively contribute to strengthening the security of individual States and to increasing stability in their area, thus contributing to global disarmament and security.

Recent progress in arms-control and disarmament agreements on a regional scale, such as the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe and the "open skies" Treaty, as well as the conclusion of the negotiations on the personnel strengths of conventional armed forces in Europe and the 1992 Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures, provide a stable foundation for the new, cooperative security framework in Europe. The progress achieved is clear evidence of the significant role of the regional approach to disarmament in shaping global security in the changed international environment.

In the context of global security, confidence-building measures in a particular area are an important part of the regional approach to disarmament. Accordingly, Bulgaria has put forward for consideration various measures related to security in the Balkans, including steps aimed at promoting transparency and effective means of verification. Bulgaria looks forward to advancing the dialogue on these and other regional endeavours.

Tremendous successes in the field of science and technology have become one of the characteristics of our century. Even though they are one of the sources of progress for mankind, science and technology nevertheless
contributed to the invention and creation of highly sophisticated and
dangerous weapons during the cold-war era, and have also contributed to the
serious environmental challenges that the entire population of the Earth is
facing.

Because of the recent historic changes in strategic relations,
significant progress in disarmament and arms-control negotiations have
occurred on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral basis. Bilateral and
multilateral disarmament and arms-control agreements, both those previously in
existence and those recently concluded, must be complied with by the
signatories.

Verification and verification techniques have become a major field for
cooperation between countries. The role of science and technology in
verification should also be a part of an in-depth study of the verification
issue; this would, in our view, contribute to the arms-control and disarmament
process.

In our view, reaching consensus on a set of guidelines for the
application of science and technology in complementing the existing
disarmament agreements is of great importance to global disarmament and
security efforts.

Another example of the creative potential of science and technology for
disarmament-related purposes is their positive effect on the process of
conversion of military industries to civilian production, which is a problem
that many countries, including my own, are facing now.

The redirection of considerable financial and material resources from
military industries to the economic and social fields is vital for the
majority of countries. The application of science and technology for peaceful
purposes is one of the major factors in achieving this noble goal.
(Mr. Dimitrov, Bulgaria)

It is our view that the dual-use technology transfer regime should be established in a way that promotes international economic cooperation on a non-discriminatory basis, thus contributing to the solution of a large set of problems of an economic, environmental and social nature.

Bulgaria considers the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime for nuclear weapons and favours its indefinite extension at the 1995 NPT Conference. It is our view that the strict and unconditional implementation of the NPT and the relevant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements under the Treaty are a basic prerequisite for ensuring the viability and the stabilizing role of the non-proliferation regime.

In this context, the intention of a State to withdraw from the NPT is a cause for serious concern and justified anxiety within the international community. This step, if it is taken, may have unpredictable consequences not only for regional security but also for international peace and security as a whole. I should like to express my country's hope that the Government of the State intending to withdraw from the NPT will reconsider its decision, continue to adhere to its international legal obligations under that Treaty and abide strictly by the provisions of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

Speaking of non-proliferation, I should also like to express our expectation of early accession to the NPT, as non-nuclear-weapon States, by Ukraine and Kazakhstan, as well as by the other independent Republics of the former Soviet Union.

I should like, once again, to assure you of the most cooperative intentions of the delegation of Bulgaria at this session.
Mr. HUSLID (Norway): First I should like to congratulate you personally, Mr. Chairman on your election. Our congratulations also go to the other members of the Bureau and the Chairmen of our Working Groups.

The main role for the Disarmament Commission would seem to be encouraging, supporting and supplementing disarmament negotiations conducted in other multilateral, regional and bilateral forums. Norway took an active part in, and supported the reform programme adopted in 1990, which, to a certain extent, has strengthened the Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body for considering and making proposals in the field of disarmament. Despite the promising developments in the Commission's work since the adoption of the reform programme, further improvements in the structure and functioning of the Commission are still necessary. The weaknesses of the Disarmament Commission were underlined during the resumed session of the First Committee earlier this year.

As we embark upon the task of concluding our work on two of the items for this year's session, I should like to offer some remarks concerning the substantive items on our agenda.

Let me first of all turn to agenda item 4, on nuclear disarmament. Since our last session, we have witnessed unprecedented developments in nuclear arms control and disarmament. The START II Treaty, signed in Moscow on 3 January, is of particular importance. This major achievement has been highly welcomed by Norway on previous occasions. The implementation of these commitments will strengthen strategic stability by removing, inter alia, land-based, multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are the most destabilizing systems. Hopefully, the signing of this agreement signifies, once and for all, the end of the nuclear arms race. Both this agreement and its predecessor, START I, must be implemented without delay.
In this connection, Norway has, like other countries, expressed concern that Ukraine has not yet ratified the START Treaty and acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in accordance with the Lisbon Protocol. At the same time, we welcome the ratification of the NPT by the Parliaments of Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Ratification of the two Treaties is essential to maintaining the integrity of the START process and to maintaining the NPT as the cornerstone of international security. We expect Ukraine to carry out its obligations under the Lisbon Protocol in the shortest time possible.

The NPT is the only global instrument through which States can make a formal commitment not to acquire, or to assist other States in acquiring, nuclear weapons, and we call upon all States that have not yet done so to accede to this Treaty.

The preparatory process of the Conference of the parties to the NPT in 1995 will be initiated next month. In 1995, a decision must be taken, in accordance with article X of the NPT, as to whether the Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional period or periods. Norway favours an indefinite extension of the Treaty, and we look forward to participating actively in the preparatory process for the 1995 Conference.
(Mr. Huslind, Norway)

Norway is deeply concerned by and regrets the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its intention to withdraw from the non-proliferation Treaty. Since the Treaty is an essential element of international peace and security, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from it would constitute a serious threat to both regional and international stability.

Norway therefore urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to retract its announcement and to comply fully with its Treaty commitments and its safeguards obligations, which remain in force. Norway associates itself fully with the statement issued by the depositary Governments of the non-proliferation Treaty earlier this month regarding the announcements made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

A comprehensive nuclear-test ban remains an issue of the highest priority. Positive developments in this field prior to the 1995 Conference of the State Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will clearly have an important effect on the possibility of extending the Treaty indefinitely. May I add one further important consideration: Nuclear test explosions represent grave environmental and health hazards. My country would be deeply concerned if testing were to be resumed at Novaya Zemlya, an archipelago located in a particularly vulnerable arctic environment.

Norway welcomes the Vancouver presidential declaration, in which Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton agreed that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear-test ban should commence at an early date. A prolongation of the present moratoriums should also be seriously considered.

The fifth item on the agenda, concerning regional disarmament, is an important one. Significant progress has been made in various regions of the world where States have developed regional approaches to arms limitations and
confidence building. This can only enhance the process of global arms reductions. Progress and experience in arms control and confidence-building measures made in one region could be applied to other regions. Regional security arrangements should be encouraged through an exchange of information and experience in a wider international framework. For many reasons, it is to be expected that regional solutions will be increasingly important in the future.

Against this background, we regret the relative lack of substantive progress on this important item during last year's session. Much work remains to be done. However, we are hopeful and confident that we will achieve our objectives under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Hoffman of Germany.

My delegation attaches great importance to the matter discussed in Working Group III on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields. There is growing concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles capable of delivering such weapons. Last year's deliberations in the Disarmament Commission resulted in an outline in broad terms of the areas of concern and potential agreements in the field of science and technology.

This year we should finalize the discussions on the transfer of high technology with military applications with a view to halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We should bear in mind, however, that it is important to ensure the right of States to access to scientific know-how for peaceful purposes. Last year's report provides us with a good basis for this work.

In our view, it is necessary to intensify international non-proliferation efforts with a view to controlling the transfer of high-technology products, know-how and services related to weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems. We attach importance to the participation in the multilateral export control regimes which have been established solely for this purpose: the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

At a plenary meeting in Oslo in July 1992, an agreement was reached by the member countries of the MTCR to extend the scope of the regime to include missiles capable of delivering all types of weapons of mass destruction - in other words chemical and biological as well as nuclear weapons. Norway appeals to all States to adopt the guidelines for sensitive missile-relevant transfer, as extended at the Oslo meeting. Export controls are an important part of the international non-proliferation regime. They will, however - and this is my final observation - only become truly effective when carried out in conjunction with other measures such as universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention.

Mr. RIVERO ROSARIO (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish): At the outset, I should like to express, on behalf of the delegation of Cuba, our satisfaction at seeing the work of this body directed by a representative of the Latin American and Caribbean region whose experience and insights allow us to feel fully confident that our deliberations will proceed successfully. Please, Sir, accept our congratulations on your well-deserved election. Our congratulations also go to the Vice-Chairmen, the Rapporteur, and the Chairmen of the Working Groups.

This session of the Disarmament Commission is taking place at a special time. Just a few weeks ago the resumed session of the First Committee of the General Assembly was held, at which, following an exchange of views, the international community moved to strengthen the multilateral machinery in
the field of disarmament and reaffirmed that the Disarmament Commission is a specialized deliberative body within the United Nations disarmament machinery, taking due note of progress made in the ongoing reform process.

Furthermore, the resolution adopted on that occasion recommended that everything possible be done to continue fine-tuning the working methods of the Commission, so that we might carefully examine a limited number of priority issues in the field of disarmament. It further welcomed the Commission's decision to modify its agenda to a three-item, phased approach. The formulation adopted in March certainly took into account General Assembly resolution 47/54 A of 9 December 1992 on the Commission's annual report, which represented the outcome of a responsible and delicate balancing of positions with regard to the agenda of this deliberative body.
Our impression on the agenda for 1993 - which is called a transitional year - was that it would include a fourth item, in this case that related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which our delegation was prepared to consider in a broadened form so as to permit examination of all its aspects. It is regrettable that owing to the opposition of a small group of delegations the Commission will be unable to consider that fourth item this year, as had been the wish of the majority. This will certainly limit the wish to discuss at the proper time a subject which is interesting and timely both because of the importance attached by many delegations to questions of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and because of the interest of many other delegations in considering the limitations that in the name of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are being placed on the inalienable right of States to advance the economic and social development of their peoples through the development of programmes in the realm, for instance, of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, chemistry and biology.

It is known that Cuba advocates the true elimination of all weapons of mass destruction from the Earth, and consistent with that position Cuba is a party to the biological weapons Convention and is among the original signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Consistent with that policy, Cuba supports the noble goals of the initiative taken by the Governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the Mendoza Declaration, by which they undertook not to develop, manufacture, acquire in any way, stockpile, transfer directly or indirectly, or use chemical or biological weapons against any other State; they will exercise the
right to make use of all peaceful applications of chemical and biological
science for the economic and technical development and well-being of their
peoples.

In the nuclear sphere, it is known also that at the first Ibero-American
summit conference - in spite of the fact that the circumstances that had
prevented it from joining the Treaty of Tlatelolco remain - Cuba undertook,
for the sake of Latin American unity and the goals to which our countries
aspire, to join the Treaty of Tlatelolco when all the countries of the region
have shouldered their responsibilities with respect to that Treaty.

In the light of the decisions we have taken, we should this year devote
our efforts to completing work on two items on our agenda: "Regional approach
to disarmament" and "The role of science and technology in the context of
international security, disarmament and other related fields". We must also
devote attention to the item on the process of nuclear disarmament, but we are
aware that it will not be completed until next year's session.

At the last session Cuba presented several working papers related to
regional approaches and to nuclear disarmament; we shall continue to
participate in exchanges of views on those questions.

This year, to reflect the importance we attach to the work of the
Commission, our delegation has drawn up a working paper on the role of science
and technology; it has been submitted to the Secretariat with the request that
it be circulated among all delegations. To make a brief introductory comment,
that document offers suggestions and proposals that, as one way to contribute
effectively to the work of the group, dovetailed with the four-part breakdown
on which the working groups agreed last year.
With respect to the first heading, relating to scientific and technological advances and their impact on international security, we have put forward a series of ideas highlighting the indissoluble link between, on the one hand, the transfer of science and technology and its logical effects on the economic and social development of peoples and, on the other hand, the benefits of this for international security.

These are some of the ideas in the working paper: the right of all States to apply science and technology for purposes of self-defence, in accordance with the United Nations Charter; the need for a prohibition of the use of any form of economic blockade against any country for political motives with a view to preventing that country from gaining access to scientific and technological advances of a purely peaceful nature; the adoption of measures to promote the use of scientific and technological advances solely for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all States, in particular developing countries; the adoption of measures to guarantee a fairer and more equitable distribution of leading-edge scientific and technological advances, with proper access to these advances by developing countries; and promotion of the right of all States to benefit from scientific and technological advances for peaceful purposes with no compromise of sovereignty or national security.

With respect to the second heading – science and technology for disarmament – the basic point is to promote exchanges of information on the application of scientific and technological developments to disarmament, with a view to improve present means of carrying out the various verification activities set out in arms-control and disarmament agreements. This could be achieved through international meetings and other events, or through the preparation of documents and reports on the subject.
With respect to the role of science and technology in other related areas, we see the need for unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures to ensure that scientific and technological advances are applied without harm to the environment or causing pollution.

Finally, with respect to high-technology transfers for military purposes, my delegation considers that there must be universally acceptable international norms or guidelines to regulate the international transfer of critical technologies while not blocking access to high-technology products or services or to specialized know-how for peaceful purposes.

By and large, we view as very useful the document submitted by Argentina and Brazil containing draft guidelines for the international transfer of critical technologies; we think it could be the basis for adopting international norms in these areas.

Beyond all this, in its working paper, the Cuban delegation sketches ideas that could be incorporated into draft guidelines on the subject.
One of the ideas proposed is that the technologies and sensitive services that will be subject to international regulation should be identified and the corresponding multilateral agreements covering these technologies should be adopted.

Moreover, we propose that a register should be established in the United Nations in order to monitor and update this type of technology and the corresponding services and to receive information on future trends in the development of dual-use science and technology and on the obligations that may be assumed to guarantee their exclusively peaceful use.

As we weigh the advisability of a role in this sphere for the United Nations, an appropriate institution for the multilateral consideration of this issue, we suggest also that the United Nations should establish and keep up to date the fullest possible register of restrictions or limitations established by States in this field.

Our document points out as well that one of the most important measures that could be adopted at the international level and that should be promoted by the United Nations is the conversion of all military research and development activities carried out by Member States to peaceful purposes for the benefit of the economic and social development of all countries.

We hope that the working paper submitted by the delegation of Cuba will make a useful contribution to the deliberations in the Working Group.

Mr. NYAKYI (United Republic of Tanzania): I congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the Disarmament Commission at this year's session. Your election is a tribute to your country and to you personally. I am confident that your leadership will help guide this session to a successful conclusion.
Once again this Commission has been convened at a time when the global security situation is plagued with escalating conflicts — some old, some new. They are a grim reminder of the task ahead of us and underscore the need for a renewed resolve to forge a new era of peace and progress to bring hope to the lives of many persons around the world at present denied peace and basic human rights.

My delegation is happy with the current arrangement whereby, out of three substantive agenda items before us, two are envisaged for completion during this session and will form the basis of recommendations to the General Assembly in the course of this year. The conclusion of the discussion on them will bring to three the number of completed agenda items since the adoption of the reform package that enabled the Commission to settle on a shorter, substantive, three-item agenda more attuned to the concerns of today.

It is true that the end of the cold war has created an atmosphere conducive to arms control and disarmament. This is evident from the progress made in the work of the First Committee and related bodies of the General Assembly.

During the past three years the General Assembly has adopted resolutions which it would have been impossible to adopt only a few years ago. The adoption of the resolution on the chemical weapons Convention by consensus at the beginning of the Assembly's forty-seventh session and the subsequent signing of the Convention by 142 States early this year are a case in point. There is no doubt that the adoption was facilitated by this favourable atmosphere. It is a historic document that Tanzania is proud to have been associated with, and we join in the calls for the early achievement of universal adherence to it.
We welcome the fact that the chemical weapons Convention goes beyond the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans only the offensive use of chemical weapons. The chemical weapons Convention bans, in addition, the development, production, acquisition, storage, transfer and stockpiling of chemical weapons and requires the destruction of existing ones. The Convention also makes provision for comprehensive verification measures, including challenge inspections and routine verifications in the chemical industry.

The Convention is not, however, without its flaws. During the negotiations in Geneva, as well as the consultations on the resolution at the beginning of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, my delegation and others expressed concern about aspects of the Convention that in our view constitute a serious obstacle to the efforts of developing countries to acquire material and technology for the development of chemical industries in their countries. These concerns have not been adequately addressed. The acquisition of industrial technology for peaceful use is a right of every nation, and it would be unfair, and indeed unethical, to use the United Nations disarmament bodies to obstruct deliberately the enjoyment of such a right by any nation. We shall continue to work to ensure that the newly established Preparatory Commission finds a satisfactory solution to this problem. We trust that it will operate in an impartial manner and will be guided by accepted international norms.

Tanzania recognizes and welcomes the progress made by the United States and Russia towards nuclear disarmament. We welcome the signing of the Treaty on Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) early this year by the United States and the Russian Federation; this will reduce the number of warheads for all strategic weapons to 3,000 for Russia
and 3,500 for the United States. We urge them to press on with negotiations for further reductions and eventually the elimination of nuclear weapons, in cooperation with the other nuclear-weapon States.

If it is true, as Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev admitted in their oft-quoted statement, that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", the question must be posed: of what use are nuclear weapons? If they are not worth keeping for the purpose for which they were developed, are they worth maintaining for their value as a threat to the human race and other life on earth in case of an accident?

While the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons can be regarded as a long-term goal also involving other nuclear-weapons States, decisions regarding the final disposition of the nuclear warheads of dismantled systems and their firing mechanisms cannot be deferred indefinitely without seriously jeopardizing the excellent progress so far made. Contrary to popular belief, the agreements on arms reductions so far concluded call for weapons systems to be disabled by demolishing missile silos. They do not, as has always been believed, require nuclear warheads to be destroyed. They allow for the warheads and their firing mechanisms to be simply dismantled and their nuclear cores either stored pending further disposition or recycled into new weapons. This is not in accordance with the expectations of the international community. We call on the parties concerned to address this problem as well as the related problem of the disposal of hundreds of tons of bomb material like plutonium and uranium.
We are also concerned that the major nuclear weapon States have not permitted any real progress to be made in the discussion of the item on nuclear disarmament in the Disarmament Commission. While we accept the prolongation of the discussion on the item until next year, we must stress that little will be achieved if that prolongation is not accompanied by the necessary political will on the part of the major nuclear-weapon States to allow progress to be made.
As a recent signatory of the Treaty, Tanzania looks forward to participating actively in the forthcoming preparatory meeting for the 1995 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. We hold the view that the 1995 Conference is a historic opportunity for the signatories to correct the Treaty's inherent weaknesses and to combine forces to achieve universality by striving to bring all nations into the non-proliferation regime as we approach the beginning of the twenty-first century. The discriminatory nature of the regime, which exempts those nations which already possess nuclear weapons from the Treaty's prohibition on nuclear acquisition, and the failure of nuclear-weapon Powers to live up to their obligations under the Treaty are a source of instability and insecurity in the international system. We call for the prohibition of the acquisition and proliferation of nuclear weapons to be made universal. By restraining only those in least need of restraint while leaving the nuclear-weapon States free to acquire any weapon systems they want, the Treaty is an unequal arrangement between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. It cannot be sustained.

As my delegation has had occasion to state in this debate in the past, what threatens world peace and security at the moment are the nuclear weapons in the possession of nuclear-weapon States, not non-existent nuclear weapons in some poor third-world country that has neither the desire nor the capacity to acquire them.

My delegation continues to follow with interest the efforts of the President of the Amendment Conference of the States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty, His Excellency Mr. Ali Alatas, for the realization of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My country attaches great importance to this objective and is in favour of reconvening the Conference with a view to the
conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty before the 1995 NPT Review Conference. Naturally, we support the proposal for the inclusion on the agenda of the item on non-proliferation for deliberation at next year's substantive session of the Disarmament Commission. Non-proliferation is an important matter which deserves thorough discussion in relevant disarmament forums as an important way of eradicating nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

In the quest for international peace and security, global and regional approaches to disarmament are complementary and should be pursued concurrently. We therefore consider regional disarmament undertakings in different areas to be very useful in promoting regional stability. In this regard we followed with great interest the work of the Group of Experts that recently met in Harare, Zimbabwe, to finalize the draft convention on the denuclearization of Africa, in conformity with the implementation of the 1964 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Declaration on the establishment of a nuclear-free-zone in Africa. This proposal is a good example of positive regional disarmament initiatives being carried out in various regions and subregions of the world, which help to promote disarmament efforts at the global level. My delegation looks forward to participating actively in the deliberations of the Working Group charged with the responsibility of promoting regional disarmament as a contribution towards international peace and security.

The recent revelation by President F.W. De Klerk of South Africa that the regime had developed nuclear weapons came as no surprise to Tanzania and other critics of the regime's nuclear programme. We trust that the doubters and the allies of the regime will now see the need to join hands with us in demanding
from the regime full compliance with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards agreements concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The item on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and related fields touches on complex and sensitive issues and therefore calls for in-depth study. As my delegation said in its statement in the debate last year, the end of the cold war has provided the world with an opportunity to use the great advances it has made in science and technology to move the world from its present orientation towards defence to the much-needed orientation towards economic and social development. The current emphasis that is being placed on the need for conversion of military industries in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe to civilian industries should not be allowed to obscure the need for similar conversion in the West.

I have not mentioned the role of science and technology in the field of verification of compliance with disarmament agreements because it is self-evident. Where the political will to reach agreements has existed, science and technology have always been able to provide answers to problems of verification. These and other issues have been raised in the excellent non-paper presented by the Chairman of Working Group IV, which my delegation welcomes as an excellent basis for discussion.

As a country bordering the Indian Ocean, Tanzania is disappointed at the lack of progress in the efforts to establish a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. Twenty-one years of strenuous efforts by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean have not been able to bring about the convening of the Colombo Conference. We call upon all concerned to extend their cooperation to the
Ad Hoc Committee in its efforts to find new alternative approaches to accomplish its mandate, which is the convening of the United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean.

Finally, my delegation is pleased to note that the confusion about the mandates and roles of the First Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament has now been cleared up. The agreement that their mandates are separate but complementary should enable each to get on with its work. As a deliberative body, the Disarmament Commission will now be able to press on with its work of exchanging views on various disarmament issues on its agenda with a view to recommending appropriate action by the First Committee. In this task it can continue to count on the support and cooperation of the Tanzanian delegation.

Mr. AYALA LASSO (Ecuador) (interpretation from Spanish): We are very pleased to see a fellow Latin American presiding over the work of this Commission. We are well acquainted, Sir, with your experience and ability, particularly in the field of disarmament, and we have no doubt that under your guidance we will successfully complete the work we have ahead of us.

The resumed session of the First Committee held last month highlighted the international community's support for the work of this Commission as a universal deliberative forum on disarmament. As Ecuador pointed out at that time, its work has not only made it possible to develop the outlines of a consensus that may lead to the preparation of certain subjects for subsequent negotiation at the Conference, but, in certain cases, has also made it possible to establish specific machinery of universal scope, such as the register of objective data on military matters.
Ecuador today reaffirms its support for this body and, in supporting and commending the efforts it is making to restructure its agenda and to enhance its efficacy, we cannot fail to voice our concern at the difficulties it has encountered in recent months.

After difficult negotiations, the General Assembly adopted resolution 47/54 A, requesting the Commission to consider the adoption in the near term of a three-item agenda. That resolution pointed the way in which the new items are to be included once those on regional disarmament and the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament have been completed. Reflecting the feelings of delegations, the resolution, adopted without a vote, embodies the interests of the Member States in the items entitled "General guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction" and "International arms transfers, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 H". The text that was adopted raised the possibility of including the first of these items in the agenda of the session we have now begun and the second during 1994.

Unfortunately, the General Assembly's suggestions have not been fully accepted by the Commission. At its organizational meetings in December 1992 and March and April this year, the opposition of a small number of delegations prevented the wishes of the Assembly from being respected and, in effect, prevented us from being able today to begin our work with confidence in the future course of action of the Commission.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to pay a tribute to your diplomatic skill and the transparency with which you guided the consultations with a view to overcoming the impasse in which we find ourselves, and we pledge our support as you tackle the work still ahead. My delegation appeals
to all member States represented here to do their utmost to bring about an agreement that will allow us to look with optimism to the future of the Commission.

The interest in securing normative guidelines on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction prompted the five permanent members of the Security Council, in May 1992, to adopt a document with provisional guidelines on the matter. We believe the same importance they ascribed to this subject when they agreed upon the norms applicable to the Five should prompt them to cooperate to see to it that this universal forum consider and work out norms of general application.

Unlawful arms transfers are driving the spiral of violence, which is having a tragic impact on certain countries in our region. Hence we firmly support Colombia's initiative seeking to have the Commission study this adverse phenomenon with the seriousness it deserves.

Ecuador is of the view that consensus has proved to be a basic mechanism for the success of the Commission's work. For the sake of the effectiveness of this forum, we all have the obligation to prevent our being compelled in future to abandon this mechanism. Consensus is the practical expression of successful diplomatic negotiation. It cannot, in any event, be an illicit way of tacitly creating a new veto system.

Ecuador's report to the Secretary-General in document A/47/887 contains my Government's basic views on nuclear disarmament. In the relevant Working Group my delegation will elaborate on these views in greater depth, and I shall therefore confine myself here to emphasizing that the new international realities have made unconditional respect for international law more necessary than ever, particularly in the field of disarmament. These new realities,
above and beyond demonstrating that the doctrine of deterrence has become obsolete, indicate that banning nuclear testing, security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States, removal of nuclear weapons deployed beyond national boundaries, transparency, and the adoption of a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons are all steps that are both possible and desirable. Thus, given the strengthened role of the United Nations in the disarmament process, it will be possible to attain the inevitable goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

At our organizational meeting in December 1992, we set for ourselves the objective of concluding at this session consideration of the items on regional disarmament and the role of science and technology. Ecuador reaffirms its support for the Permanent Representatives of Germany and Mongolia, who will have the difficult task of chairing the relevant Working Groups. My delegation will redouble its efforts to contribute to the success of our work and, for the sake of the reliability and effectiveness of our Commission in future to attain the goal we have set for ourselves.

With regard to the item "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security", my Government believes that regional disarmament in the context of world disarmament has special significance both for promoting development and for strengthening international peace and security. In adopting the various mechanisms with regard to this item, particular attention will have to be paid to the special circumstances of the area in which they apply. Moving ahead with machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes and with confidence-building measures will contribute to the attainment of the objective of strengthening international peace.
The item "The role of science and technology in the context of international security" is of special interest to developing countries. On the one hand, it is of fundamental importance to ensure that the processes of technology transfers and of access to data unfold as part of world-wide cooperation in keeping with generally applicable norms negotiated by all. On the other hand, cutting back on the currently huge investments in military technology will make it possible to free the resources urgently required for the economic and social development of our peoples.

Last year the Commission enjoyed a broad spirit of cooperation and secured specific and positive results. We hope that at this session, under your skilful chairmanship, Sir, we will once again carry out our work in the same spirit and with equal effectiveness. To that end, you can count on our unwavering cooperation.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): I should like at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Disarmament Commission. We are confident that under your wise and able guidance our deliberations in the Commission this year will have a successful outcome. I should also like to avail myself of this opportunity to convey my delegation's congratulations to the other newly elected members of the Bureau and to pay a warm tribute to Ambassador Erdös of Hungary for his successful leadership of the Disarmament Commission last year.

As the specialized United Nations deliberative body in the field of disarmament, the Disarmament Commission has today an excellent opportunity to make a truly meaningful contribution in its area of work.
We would be less than honest if we did not readily admit that progress in the field of disarmament has, until very recently, been less than spectacular. While in the past this could, in large measure, have been attributed to the cold war, we no longer have the luxury of that excuse. East-West differences have, happily, given way to a congruity of approach and the signing of START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention earlier this year have shown us that great progress in disarmament can indeed be achieved given the required political will.

The Disarmament Commission must therefore capitalize on the prevailing favourable international climate and make far-reaching recommendations which will take the world decisively towards genuine and complete disarmament under international control.

The current session of the Disarmament Commission has a full agenda with focus on the following items: process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons; regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security; and the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields.

India attaches the greatest importance to nuclear disarmament aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and its views in this regard are amply reflected in the following three papers it presented to the Disarmament Commission in 1992: the relationship between the process of nuclear disarmament and international peace and security; review of the steps taken in the process of nuclear disarmament and strengthening the process of nuclear disarmament.
(Mr. Chandra, India)

While commendable in itself, START II allows the super-Powers to retain nuclear arsenals capable of destroying the world several times over, does little to prevent the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and envisages a world divided into nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

We must, therefore, look beyond START II. This move must be inspired by the vision of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, for that is the sine qua non for the long-term establishment of international peace and security based on an equitable, stable, just and cooperative world order. Against this backdrop, the action plan which was proposed by India five years ago, at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, for achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order is still relevant. The central focus of this action plan is the elimination of all nuclear weapons in three stages, recognizing the need for flexibility in staging some of the measures proposed. Among the nuclear disarmament measures envisaged in the plan are a ban on the production of nuclear weapons and weapons grade fissionable material, a moratorium on testing of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test-ban treaty and negotiations on an international convention outlawing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Given the primordial importance of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons to the theme of disarmament, would it be too much to expect the Disarmament Commission to send a clear and unequivocal message to the Conference on Disarmament that it give a place of pre-eminence to nuclear disarmament issues in its negotiating mode?

Realizing the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons, India has repeatedly urged since 1965 that non-proliferation must be addressed in all its aspects in order to obviate the possibility of mankind being overwhelmed by nuclear disaster. Had this been done, the world would not have been as
apprehensive as it is today of the smuggling of fissionable material, the
clandestine transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists or of what to do with
nuclear-weapon technology scientists. But the hard truth is that we are in
this situation because the overwhelming focus of all efforts at
non-proliferation has only been to prevent non-nuclear States from acquiring
nuclear weapons, while nuclear weapons proliferated in geometrical proportion
and new generations of nuclear weapons were invented and deployed in nuclear-
weapon States. While non-nuclear-weapon States such as India scrupulously
adhered to a policy of non-proliferation despite acquiring a nuclear
technology capability, and refrained from assisting any other State from
developing nuclear weapons, there was free and frantic competition amongst
nuclear-weapon States in acquiring nuclear destructive capacity.

The real issue is how to put an end to proliferation and to eliminate
nuclear weapons. Accordingly, there is need for an international dialogue to
review the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) to plug
existing loopholes and to make it an instrument for achieving the complete
elimination of nuclear weapons. Extending the NPT, which is discriminatory
and imperfect to begin with and which has proved demonstrably ineffective in
preventing proliferation either of nuclear weapons or of nuclear-weapon
States, is not the way to achieve non-proliferation. While India shares the
concerns with regard to proliferation, we do not believe that partial and
unjust measures or punitive action on a selective basis will achieve the
desired result. Just as chemical and biological weapons are matters of global
concern to be dealt with globally, nuclear weapons and the nuclear threat
cannot be addressed without a global approach. A new international
understanding and consensus on what constitutes non-proliferation is urgently
required so that the pursuit of a global approach to non-proliferation which
is universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory is seriously attempted. If the international community is capable of achieving a convention to ban chemical weapons, there is no reason to believe that given the political will it will not achieve a similar convention to ban nuclear weapons. In this respect the Chemical Weapons Convention reflects the model of a future global disarmament agreement in the nuclear field in both its multilateral negotiating format as well as in its universal and non-discriminatory approach.

The issue of a nuclear-test ban has also assumed importance in the present-day context. India hopes that the moratoriums on nuclear tests by France, Russia and the United States will be extended and urges other nuclear-weapon States to join the moratoriums with the aim of a common approach towards conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. India welcomes the agreement reached at Vancouver between President Clinton and President Yeltsin that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear-test ban should commence at an early date. We are encouraged that an early conclusion of such a treaty has been advocated by many countries and that the Conference on Disarmament has set up an Ad Hoc Committee on this issue. Since the development of third-generation weapons depends on nuclear-weapon tests, a comprehensive nuclear-test ban would impede, and might even prevent, a new round of the nuclear arms race. The third-generation weapons programmes which have not been completed would most likely have to be abandoned. A comprehensive test-ban treaty would therefore represent an important step towards nuclear disarmament by preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, with the objective of their complete elimination.

On the question of regional disarmament, while we recognize that the regional approach has some value in so far as it can supplement and help in global efforts in disarmament, the definition of a region must encompass the
full range of security concerns of the countries involved, as also the practicability of the specific measures of disarmament suggested in this context.

Since nations perceive their security indivisibly, compartmentalizing security through artificially designated regions cannot work. Each region has to be clearly defined with the full consensus of the participating States.
Agreements have to be arrived at freely among the States concerned, taking into account the characteristics of the region. Essential prerequisites for any such arrangement are: scrupulous adherence to the basic principles of international relations such as non-interference in internal affairs and non-incitement to terrorism, secessionism or subversion; and appropriate confidence-building measures. Confidence, in turn, must be enhanced on all fronts, and in tandem, if security is to be enhanced. Continuance of hostile acts and inflammatory statements diminish the value of political confidence-building measures.

Pakistan's proposal for five-nation consultations does not meet those criteria and is accordingly deficient. As pointed out by my colleague from Pakistan, India and Pakistan have in the last few years undertaken several confidence-building measures on the basis of a package covering political, communication and technical aspects, offered by India in May 1990. Indeed, India has also undertaken somewhat similar confidence-building measures with other neighbours, including the People's Republic of China.

We must necessarily avoid creating an impression that what is good for one region is necessarily good for another. My delegation is convinced that in the field of nuclear disarmament there is no substitute for the global approach. This must continue to be pursued and indeed intensified further if the goals and priorities in the field of disarmament agreed at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament are to be realized. We must not lose sight of the fact that the importance of the regional approach is subsidiary to that of a global approach. An undue focus
on the regional approach could distract us from our efforts to deal with disarmament on a global basis – which, after all, holds the key to international peace and security on the basis of genuine and complete disarmament.

Given the global reach of the weapons of mass destruction, the spatial and global spread of arsenals and infrastructures to the high seas and territories of countries far removed leading to the nuclearization and militarization of the globe and the presence of nuclear weapons in the oceans surrounding such zones and in the contiguous land masses, moves for the creation of nuclear-free zones and zones free of weapons of mass destruction only serve as partial measures of disarmament. Such proposals should be based on a clear definition of the zones by the regional States, taking into account the specific features and characteristics of the zones, including their geographical and geo-political characteristics, and should be initiated by the States of the region on the basis of prior consultations. The participation of the States should be voluntary and based on arrangements freely arrived at by them. The partial nature of such measures cannot be overemphasized, since the arsenals of nuclear-weapon States and weapons of mass destruction with global reach are not affected or eliminated by such measures unless these States are an intrinsic part of such arrangements.

Science and technology, which should have provided the means for overcoming poverty and disease and which can be a creative unifying force, have unfortunately been devoted to an unconscionable extent to military purposes. The self-interest of the critical catalytic group of the scientific-bureaucratic-military-industrial complex has managed to subdue the
universal concern expressed at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that, along with the quantitative aspect, the qualitative aspect of the arms race must also be addressed. Today a number of technologies that have the potential to transform completely the methods of fighting war and the nature of warfare are in an advanced stage of development. The maturity and application of these technologies would have far-reaching implications for international security and would be a major setback to efforts for disarmament. At the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, India presented a working paper on new technologies and the qualitative arms race; and since then, we have been submitting a resolution entitled "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security" at the General Assembly in order to draw the attention of the world community to this important aspect of disarmament.

A 1988 assessment by Prof. Skolnikoff of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology put the global research-and-development budget at as much as $400 billion annually, of which

"a reasonable estimate, possibly conservative, is that one third is motivated directly or indirectly by military-security concerns".

New scientific and technological developments making use of miniaturization and large-scale computing capabilities, are taking place in the field of third-generation nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defence, directed-energy weapons, materials technology, artificial intelligence, conventional weapons, chemical and biological weapons and superconductivity, to name a few.
A new generation of so-called brilliant weapons have been developed, such as crewless tanks, cruise missiles that behave like kamikaze robots, advanced air-defence missiles and anti-missile satellites. Computers, sensors and related equipment now account for roughly half the cost of weapons of developed countries. With these developments, complex technical problems in future will make the search for verification even more difficult. Given the fact that there are no barriers to human knowledge, what is achieved by a handful of States today can be adopted by many more in the future. It will be prudent, therefore, to agree collectively on the non-pursuit of certain paths that could have a further destabilizing impact on the global security situation in the future, rendering existing arms limitation meaningless.

We recognize that science and technology can also be used for disarmament purposes. Sensor development, communications and computing capabilities can have implications that can prove to be immensely beneficial for the verification of disarmament agreements and for the protection of the environment. We must, however, seek to ensure that scientific and technological developments are channelled exclusively in favour of peaceful purposes. My delegation therefore presented a working paper on this agenda item at the 1991 session of the Disarmament Commission, making concrete suggestions in this regard which inter alia included: first, a technology assessment and forecasting panel to identify and monitor developments relating to new and emerging technologies and make projections and assessments; secondly, national panels of experts for a similar task; thirdly, greater international cooperation in new technology projects and technology missions; fourthly, the banning of technological missions clearly designed for
developing new weapons; and fifthly, guidelines in respect of new technologies with potential military applications, with an emphasis on transparency and the widest possible dissemination of information nationally and internationally.

Closed-door clubs, groups and regimes created to impose unilateral restrictions on trade in technology, equipment and material on a discriminatory basis will not prevent proliferation. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction cannot be achieved by proposals aimed only at arms reduction, though these are welcome. Nor can initiatives which in reality only preserve the monopoly of a few States over weapons of mass destruction, missile technology and export markets for conventional weapons contribute to prevention of proliferation.

Against this backdrop, we look to the Disarmament Commission to give clear direction to ensure that science and technology is harnessed purely for peaceful purposes and that its misuse for militarization is curbed and minimized. There is clearly a need to follow closely scientific and technological developments that may have a negative impact on the security environment and on the process of arms limitation and disarmament.

My delegation will elaborate our views further on the various topics of our agenda during the course of our deliberations and will cooperate fully with all delegations in an effort to ensure a fruitful outcome of this session of the Disarmament Commission.
Mr. SOEGARDA (Indonesia): Allow me to begin by expressing our profound sorrow and extending our condolences to the Turkish delegation on the sudden and untimely demise of His Excellency Mr. Turgut Ozal, President of the Republic of Turkey. He will surely be remembered as a great son of Turkey by the international community for his achievements and his vision of international relations.

May I also join previous speakers in extending my delegation’s congratulations, Sir, on your unanimous election as Chairman of the Disarmament Commission. I also wish to express our felicitations to the other members of the Bureau.

My delegation welcomes the substantial progress made in arms limitation as well as the broadening and deepening of the dimensions of disarmament. We attach particular importance to START I and START II. A process of the gradual transformation of military structures and strategies is now under way. The prospects of a convention on chemical weapons coming into force have significantly improved. It will make an important contribution to regional approaches in eliminating those and other weapons of mass destruction. We are further encouraged by the advances made on conventional arms reduction by the major Powers and on the continent of Europe. Meanwhile, multilateral regulations of arms exports have been initiated by the major arms-exporting countries.

But the disarmament agenda is largely unfinished. Formidable roadblocks continue to exist in the priority issue of nuclear disarmament. The inability so far to ratify the agreements on the reduction of strategic armaments, together with the problems posed by the control and management of vast nuclear arsenals, has ominous implications for security in the post-cold-war era.
Furthermore, the sale, transfer and proliferation of conventional armaments, the main instruments of regional conflicts, have accelerated. Military expenditures as well as armament production have increased precipitously in some regions. Consequently, the disarmament dividend has been meagre compared to widespread expectations and the positive change in the international political climate.

It is against this backdrop that the agenda items now before us call for our renewed attention. It is a truism that, in the nuclear age, the security of each nation is inextricably linked to the security of all nations, as nuclear weapons can reach all corners of the globe. In my delegation's view, an integral relationship exists between the various stages of nuclear disarmament on the one hand and international security on the other. Hence, the process of nuclear disarmament should be implemented within a limited time-frame. We also call for a clear and unambiguous definition of the responsibilities of the nuclear Powers and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States, including on critical issues such as the renunciation of the so-called strategic doctrines and reliance on nuclear weapons. The duties and obligations of the nuclear-weapon States should also include a commitment undertaken in an international convention to refrain from the use or threat of use of these weapons against non-nuclear nations. Although the consideration of this item will be continued next year, my delegation deems it essential that we make substantive progress at this session towards formulating guidelines and/or recommendations for negotiations.

The importance of regional approaches to disarmament has been duly reflected by the inclusion of this question in our agenda. Although the issue of regional armaments and its attendant complexities have been confined to Europe, the urgency of tackling such problems in other areas of the world has
become apparent. As to the agenda item, while attention has been focused on the relationship between regional disarmament and global security, in reality, however, our preoccupation has rightly been with the regional approach to disarmament.

As a result of intensive discussions, the Commission early on explicitly recognized that such an approach is an essential element of global efforts to limit armaments. Furthermore, security concerns are often region-specific and hence constitute an important factor in disarmament efforts. To date these endeavours have already highlighted, among others things, the validity of confidence-building measures, particularly in regions of high tension; the need to eliminate destabilizing military capabilities and imbalances; and the prospects for achieving security at lower levels of armaments and armed forces.

In my delegation's view, the holding of regional dialogues and/or conferences, where appropriate, and taking into account the particular characteristics of each region, can provide a viable framework to promote the objectives of both disarmament and security. Furthermore, such an approach based on a commonality of interests can lead to channels of communication between adversaries and ultimately lead to the initiation of arms-reduction talks. It bears reiterating that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security.

It is self-evident that regionalism has in recent years taken on additional significance against the backdrop of favourable developments on the international scene. It can be attributed to the difficulties encountered in implementing a comprehensive global disarmament programme and to the present inadequacies of the international mechanism for global security.
The Commission's consideration of this question has made a distinct contribution to a better appreciation of this concept. In the past, the discussions in the Working Group have focused attention on two identifiable aspects. As consideration of this item is scheduled to be concluded at this session, my delegation hopes that discussions on all the pertinent issues will be brought to a consensus decision.

On the agenda item on science and technology, we have recognized that it affects all of us in various ways and that its ubiquitous pressures emanate from the globalization of problems. It has also become an inherent element in our continuing search for new infrastructures for peace, security and cooperation. The centrality of technical innovation is pertinent not only to the qualitative arms race but to global security as well. Even the envisaged deep cuts in strategic weapons could be nullified by qualitative improvements and the development of new, even more destabilizing weapon systems. We may even face the possibility of decreased stability, the increased probability of war, greater vulnerability and the rendering of arms-limitation agreements infinitely more difficult.

In the context of new opportunities for significant progress in arms reduction, scientific and technological changes should foster the positive trends and thereby bolster the structures of peace and security. Our consideration of this question has undoubtedly facilitated the identification of scientific and technological developments that offer the greatest prospects for the deceleration of the arms race. Its role in assisting verification agreements is beyond dispute. We have also gained a clearer perspective on developments that complicate efforts to negotiate lower levels of armaments and armed forces. Thus, collective endeavours are necessary to reassess our
(Mr. Soegarda, Indonesia)

thinking and approaches to the role of science and technology in the context of the sophistication of both nuclear and conventional armaments.

General Assembly resolution 47/54 A enjoins us to include two items relating to guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction, and international arms transfer. This falls within the ambit of the three-item, phased approach called for by the Assembly in the same resolution. Hence, my delegation expects that at next year's session these items will be included in our agenda.
Finally, the process of multilateral disarmament negotiations should be revitalized and in this exercise the Disarmament Commission has an important role in analysing and clarifying the various issues as well as in formulating recommendations and disseminating information on crucial aspects of disarmament. It also constitutes an essential component of the United Nations system in the field of disarmament. Accordingly, my delegation is fully committed to the continuation of the Commission's work and to its effective functioning.

The CHAIRMAN: The next meeting of the Disarmament Commission will be at 3 o'clock this afternoon. I would urge delegations to be on time; we have a long list for this afternoon, but I believe we can conclude it if we begin punctually at 3 p.m.

I have been requested to call the attention of delegations - a notice also appears in today's Journal - to the Conference on New Realities: Disarmament, Peace Building and Global Security being held by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, together with the Office for Disarmament Affairs. There is a pamphlet containing information on the meetings which is available at the table near the entrance to this room.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.