DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWELFTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 16 May 1979, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. VELLODI (India)

- General exchange of views (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS (continued)

Mr. TROYANOFSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Allow me first of all, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to greet you, Sir, as the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission. It gives us profound satisfaction that such an important representative of a country with which the Soviet Union enjoys ties of friendship and co-operation in the interests of détente and general peace has been chosen to preside over our work.

The Disarmament Commission, as one can see from its name, is called upon to deal with questions bearing directly on the most major and most pressing problem of international relationships, that of stopping the arms race and disarmament.

Over recent years, thanks to the collective efforts expended by States and peoples, détente has become a leading trend in international developments. Relations among States with different social systems have been changing for the better. An important contribution to this process has been made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

But even given the well-known positive political progress in the international arena, the pace of the arms race, which has now assumed truly global proportions has not lessened. And this does not promote the strengthening of the security of each State individually or of international security as a whole; on the contrary, it weakens it.

The arms race is putting obstacles in the way of economic and social progress, including that of the developing countries. Now we are on the threshold of a new spiral in the arms race which might increase the danger of war and subvert the security of States. Therefore we can state quite definitely that there is no task that is more urgent and pressing than real disarmament.
Fresh efforts are constantly required to make real progress in disarmament. At the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the Soviet Union put forward a peace programme, one of the central provisions of which is the struggle for the halting of the arms race. These concrete proposals, which are completely realistic, at the same time are part and parcel of the many initiatives taken by the Soviet Union in an effort to eliminate the threat of war.

As the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev emphasized:

"Halting the arms race, securing progress in lessening and ultimately removing the threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe is the basic problem on the agenda of our lives. That is the context in which will be resolved the fundamental question of how the international situation will develop further."

The policy of the Soviet Union in regard to the halting of the arms race and to general and complete disarmament has been strengthened in the new Constitution of the USSR, which guarantees in legal form its stability and invariability.

The Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, consistently and purposefully seeks a slow-down of the arms race. This is borne out in particular by the constructive and realistic proposals contained in the Declaration of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Moscow on 23 November 1978. That Final Document of the Moscow meeting of the Political Consultative Committee contains proposals, indeed a whole range of radical disarmament measures, which might be implemented without further ado, given the existence of goodwill on all sides.

Laying great stress on the successful outcome of the talks on various aspects of halting the arms race, the parties to the Warsaw Treaty declared that there was no type of weapons which they were not prepared to restrict or cut back on, on the basis of the strict observance of the principle of undiminished security for either side.
At the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, held last year, the Soviet Union came forward with a great number of constructive initiatives and formulated a number of concrete proposals, to be found in the document entitled "Practical measures for ending the arms race: proposals of the Soviet Union". (A/5-10/AC.1/l)

The initiatives taken by the Soviet Union, as a whole, form a realistic integrated programme for eliminating the arms race from people's lives: it was natural that many of those ideas should have become an organic part of the Final Document of the special session, which enshrines the basic principles to govern disarmament talks and contains concrete measures which might help to guide States in taking part in such talks and in concluding agreements in the near future.

It is now important for the decisions taken at the special session to be translated into the language of practical action to be taken by States; otherwise, those decisions would remain a dead letter. In this connexion, an important contribution to solving the problem of disarmament can be made by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which is a consultative body subordinate to the General Assembly and whose functions include making recommendations on various problems having to do with disarmament, and examining the situation regarding the decisions taken at the special session of the General Assembly - in particular, considering the elements of a comprehensive disarmament programme. In our view, in considering the elements of such a programme one should bear in mind the following. The main danger to the cause of peace is the ever-increasing nuclear arms race. Therefore, the keystone here should be the question of the need to halt and then reverse the nuclear arms race, and the achievement of nuclear disarmament.
Of great positive significance for translating nuclear disarmament into practical terms are the recommendations made by the United Nations General Assembly at its special session and the thirty-third session. Mindful of those recommendations, the delegations of seven socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, introduced in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament this past February a working document on talks on halting the production of all types of nuclear weapons so as gradually to reduce and finally eliminate their stockpiles. The elaboration and implementation of nuclear disarmament measures should be conducted in parallel with, and in fact should be an inseparable part of, the strengthening political and international legal guarantees to ensure States' security.

An important step in that direction would be the conclusion of a universal treaty on the non-use of force in international relations which would take into account the duty of all States to renounce the use or threat of force in all its forms and manifestations, together with a ban on the use of nuclear weapons.

In order to avert the danger of a nuclear war, the Soviet Union favours the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States: the non-emplacement of nuclear weapons on the territories of States not yet possessing such weapons. We are in favour also of a complete and general ban on nuclear weapons testing, the universal strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the creation of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace.

In the curbing of the arms race, the forthcoming conclusion of the new Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of strategic arms will be of enormous importance.

As is known, in accordance with the agreement already reached, in mid-June this year in Vienna there will be a meeting between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, and President Carter of the United States, to sign the treaty on the limitation of strategic arms, the work on which has just been completed. Other questions of common interest to the Soviet Union and the United States will be examined as well.
In reducing the arms race in its most dangerous forms it is extremely important to prohibit chemical weapons, as well as the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Urgent measures should be taken finally to avert the emergence of the nuclear neutron weapons.

The Soviet Union is in favour of the reduction and limitation of armed forces and conventional armaments and the elimination of foreign military bases in the territories of other countries.

We favour the withdrawal of foreign troops from those territories. An important step in this direction would be the renunciation by permanent members of the Security Council and countries allied to them by military agreements of any expansion of their armies or increases in their conventional weapons.

An effective way of reducing the arms race would be an agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council and other States with major economic and military potential on the specific magnitude of reductions in their own military budgets, either as a percentage or in absolute terms.

As a result of this measure, agreement could be reached on reallocating specific sums to increase aid to developing countries.

An important contribution to limiting the arms race and achieving disarmament, particularly in those regions where military confrontation is especially possible, could be regional measures of military détente. An example of this could be found in the case of Europe where there are broad-based possibilities for strengthening peace and promoting good neighbourliness.

Now, after the European conference held in Helsinki, the most pressing task is that of extending détente to the military field, to agree on concrete steps to reduce the level of military confrontation on that continent.

The Soviet Union, as is known, has done and continues to do everything in its power to find mutually acceptable solutions in the field of military détente in Europe. Of great significance are the new Soviet proposals mentioned in the statement of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev on 2 March this year which are aimed at strengthening mutual trust between States in Europe. In particular, we are talking about prior notification of all significant movements of troops in the relevant region and of major naval exercises held near the waters of other countries participating in the European Conference. Also mentioned was
the conclusion between the participants in the European Conference of a treaty in which the parties undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional armaments against each other.

To our way of thinking, in order to solve the problems posed by life in the sphere of ending the arms race and achieving disarmament, States should make effective use of all channels for negotiations and of extensive discussion of these matters within the United Nations.

Making real progress in resolving the disarmament problem requires examination of the matter in the broadest and most authoritative international forum, namely, a world disarmament conference, and the necessary steps should be taken to convene such a conference at the earliest possible time. It should be duly organized with working bodies for the careful elaboration of decisions and practical agreement on them. The world disarmament conference could thus produce concrete and effective measures aimed at restraining the arms race and promoting disarmament.

The Soviet delegation is carefully studying the replies submitted by States in response to the questionnaire sent by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We are also studying the statements made during the discussion in our Commission. Both in the replies and in the interventions we find many thoughts that are dictated by an interest in working out a comprehensive programme that would really promote progress in disarmament. This cannot be said about one intervention, however, that we heard yesterday. Although there were many words spoken about disarmament in that statement, nevertheless - as I said before - there was evident an obstructionist approach whose aim was to block the resolution of the disarmament problem and also to provide unlimited opportunities for an uncurbed escalation of armaments, including nuclear armaments. It was a case of providing material bases for a policy of expansionism and hegemonism so that it might have enough forces for new attempts at teaching sovereign States "lessons".

In response to the questionnaire sent by the Secretary-General, the Soviet Union gave its answer on where the main purpose and principles concerning disarmament are to be found as well as the main trends for providing efforts in that field. We think that the provisions of that answer, as well as other constructive proposals made by us, could provide a basis for elaborating elements for a comprehensive disarmament programme.
Of course, during this work due account must be taken of the provisions of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, wherein we find the reflection of the carefully balanced positions of States, the result of lengthy, tense discussions.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to express the conviction that the Commission will be able to discharge the tasks facing it and that, as a result of this session, will be able to place recommendations before the General Assembly containing elements for a comprehensive disarmament programme.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, speaking on behalf of the nine countries members of the European Community, I wish first of all to express to you our best wishes as this session gets under way. Everyone is aware of the outstanding role you have played in past discussions on disarmament. Your authoritativeness and your competence are a guarantee of the success of our remaining work. Our Governments attach major importance to the Commission's role in the consideration of disarmament problems. They are anxious to make the most active contribution to these deliberations.

A year ago, the General Assembly, meeting in special session, established the will of the international community to give new impetus to the disarmament enterprise. To that end it created a new structure in order to make possible debate, negotiation and the gradual implementation of appropriate measures. Questions, however, have been asked about how our Commission fits into that new structure.

The General Assembly, and now the First Committee exclusively, remains the body where Member States air their concerns and express their positions with a view to translating them into resolutions. Negotiation, meaning the drafting of agreements, is now the task of the Committee on Disarmament.
As for our Commission, it exemplifies the principle of universality in the fullest possible way. The fact that it has been brought into existence indicates that disarmament is now the concern of everyone. As a forum for debate, the Commission will have the task of considering problems free from the pressure of circumstances and the vicissitudes of negotiations. Its task will therefore be to identify problems, to seek a common approach to them, to promote the efforts of the international community and to guide those efforts to those subjects which seem to lend themselves to negotiation, and thereby to provide political inspiration from which other bodies might then derive benefit.

It is against this background that I should like today, on behalf of the nine members of the Community, to explain how we intend to contribute to the consideration of item 3 of the agenda devoted to the constituent elements of a comprehensive disarmament programme. It is for the member States of the European Community that have replied to the questionnaire of the Secretary-General to comment on the views which they have set forth in their memoranda.

However, our countries as a whole have a common historical experience which underlies their approach to the problems of disarmament. Thus, as Madame Oestergaard, Minister-without-portfolio of Denmark, stated on behalf of the nine member States of the Community at the special session of the General Assembly, the creation of the European Community:

"... reflected a will to move away from old rivalries towards reconciliation and constructive co-operation. Our wish to promote détente in our part of the world has, inter alia, found expression in our joint contribution to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. ... the Final Act of that Conference represents a unique endeavour to deepen the process of détente and to develop concrete programmes of action and measures capable of establishing confidence.

"Disarmament, world security and détente are closely interrelated. ... The Nine strongly feel that a disarmament process should go hand in hand with a sustained effort to eliminate the sources of tension and injustice in the world." (A/S-10/PV.4, pp. 16 and 22)
The member States of the Community agree that the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control can be attained only point by point, at the end of a long process; but they are pleased to note that this undertaking gained fresh momentum at the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

Today it is our task to make a contribution to that undertaking by considering the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the performance of our task, the Commission should bear in mind, in our view, the following considerations:

The disarmament measures making up such a programme should be balanced in such a way that the right of every State to security would at all times be guaranteed; an equal security can be assured at a lesser level of armaments;

The criteria for security for States vary according to their geographical position. A global programme must therefore, to be realistic, bear in mind the needs of a regional approach;

In addition to that regional balance, we believe that it would also be desirable to maintain a balance between the measures to be adopted, particularly between nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament.

Adequate verification measures, making use of the progress of the most modern technology, should be provided in order to strengthen security and confidence and to ensure respect for disarmament measures by all the parties concerned.

Disarmament and the slowing down of the arms race can only really take place in a climate of confidence; that, without doubt, would surely be promoted by the adoption of collateral measures of which the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe set an example in Europe. We note that resolution 33/91 B on confidence-building measures, adopted by an overwhelming majority, reflects that same concern.

The build-up of weapons and the risk of military confrontation often arise from suspicions which prevail in the international community. A comprehensive disarmament programme will stand a better chance of being implemented if the conditions needed to restore confidence among States can be strengthened and if we can be in a better position to prevent violations of the peace by the means made available to us in the United Nations Charter.
That is why the member States of the European Community believe that a comprehensive disarmament programme must take into consideration measures to promote a return to a peaceful means of settling disputes and to strengthening international peace-keeping machinery.

Mr. BOEL (Denmark): Once more we meet against the background of a continuing world-wide build-up of nuclear and conventional weapons capabilities. Because of the dangers and the stunning costs involved, this continuing international arms race gives cause for deep concern at the opening of this first substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

In these circumstances, the announcement that the signing of a SALT II agreement is very close is very encouraging. This is an event which we have been looking forward to for a long time. The agreement opens up new prospects over the whole field of international disarmament negotiations. It also confirms that the two super-Powers recognize a community of interests in vital areas and a shared responsibility for world peace. My Government has expressed the hope that the SALT II agreement will soon be ratified by both countries and that it will be followed up by new negotiations - SALT III - aimed at further and substantial reductions in nuclear arms.
As a general observation, I think one may say that international disarmament efforts are being pursued fundamentally at two levels. At one level you have negotiations on substance which, if successful, lead to the conclusion of binding international agreements. At another level you have the debates, resolutions and recommendations of the United Nations which express the views and aspirations of the international community. Both processes are necessary and they should be regarded as mutually supportive. In the longer run, deliberations in the United Nations can have great impact. With time, the broad dialogue which goes on in the United Nations on broader and longer-term aspects of disarmament can lead to a better understanding of issues and positions. It can influence thinking in capitals and contribute towards a raising of consciousness in public opinion in our societies concerning these vital issues. Speaking for Denmark, I wish to reaffirm our belief in the central role of the United Nations - also in the field of disarmament. And in particular, we feel that the United Nations Disarmament Commission can and should play an important role.

Sceptics have asked: Do we really need another forum? They have argued that a "proliferation" of disarmament bodies is counter-productive. My delegation is not convinced by that line of reasoning. In general, we feel that the disarmament machinery should be adapted to changing conditions in such a way that all issues and aspects could be dealt with in an appropriate context.

If we look at the network of existing disarmament forums we perceive a pattern of interaction and division of labour. While a number of negotiating bodies of varying composition carry out detailed negotiations on various aspects of what one might call "hardware disarmament", it is up to the world-wide political forum of the United Nations to provide necessary political inspiration. The broadest disarmament forum so far has been the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - which inaugurated a new dimension in international disarmament efforts and achieved consensus on a programme of action. The consensus reached at the special session was a significant achievement. The Final Document of the special session proves that progress can be made on the basis of consensus decisions.
Within the broad terms of reference defined in the Final Document, acting as a deliberative body and working on the basis of the principle of consensus, the Disarmament Commission will, we hope, perform an extremely useful function as a political background forum for further initiatives in the field of disarmament. At our organizational meeting next December we shall, I suppose, discuss our future programme of work. At this stage I should simply like to suggest that we might do well, as far as future substantive meetings are concerned, to centre our agenda around specific issues, perhaps taking as a basis for focused debate one or more of those United Nations studies now under way. Another task for future meetings could be to exchange views on the objectives of the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982.

At our present session - the first substantive session of the Disarmament Commission - the priority item on our agenda is consideration of the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament.

It should be noted that the Final Document entrusts the Committee on Disarmament with working out such a programme. That means that the Disarmament Commission does not have to go into all the elements of the programme. The task of this body is to prepare recommendations for submission to the next General Assembly and for subsequent and more detailed consideration in the Committee on Disarmament.

In view of the limited time at our disposal my delegation would favour a relatively short paper describing such measures and concepts as are generally regarded as important elements in a comprehensive programme for disarmament. While we should certainly not try to renegotiate the Final Document of the special session, our recommendations could to a large extent be based on relevant passages in that Document which expresses a certain degree of international consensus on principles and priorities.

If general agreement could be reached on identifying certain disarmament initiatives which are ripe for action and which should have the highest priority in the relatively near future, my delegation would be in favour of setting a clear order of priority for the tasks concerned. We realize that this may prove difficult, because of the rather short time at our disposal. In that case,
the report might have to be limited to the format of something not much more than a catalogue while leaving a discussion in depth of priorities and phases to the Committee on Disarmament. In any event, our report should be balanced, comprising aspects of nuclear as well as conventional disarmament, and relate to existing disarmament agreements as well as to ongoing negotiations.

My Government attaches particular importance to the inclusion of the following elements on which an international consensus already exists: the continuation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiating process, the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, the prohibition of chemical and radiological weapons, the continuing review of the question of new weapons of mass destruction, the prohibition of certain conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects, and restraints in international arms transfers. In general, our recommendations should reflect the vital importance of political control of technological developments.

An idea which should be stressed is the concept of concurrent steps such as the introduction, whenever appropriate, on a bilateral, regional or world-wide basis, of confidence-building measures which would contribute towards increasing international security.

There are two of those elements which I should like to emphasize. The first is non-proliferation. Behind the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was the recognition of the need to counteract an extremely dangerous development which might lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities by a rapidly increasing number of States. If anything, that need is stronger today. The unique significance of the NPT lies in the build-up of confidence through formal renunciation of the nuclear option and application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

Some countries have expressed disappointment because they feel that the nuclear Powers have not lived up to their undertakings to engage in serious negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and because they feel that the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty concerning the right of all countries members of the Treaty to partake in the peaceful use of nuclear power has been
unsatisfactory. Such grievances should be fully discussed at the forthcoming NPT Review Conference with a view to meeting the legitimate concerns of all parties. Access of all countries to peaceful nuclear technology should be facilitated. But criticism of certain features of the implementation of the NPT should neither detract from the overriding importance of strengthening the non-proliferation régime nor from the fact that the NPT is the corner-stone of non-proliferation strategy.

The second point on which I should like to comment concerns conventional arms, including conventional arms transfers.
In the global context military over-consumption has reached frightening dimensions, not only in the nuclear but also in the conventional field. At present the conventional arms race absorbs about 60 per cent of the world military expenditure. Highly sophisticated and ever-more-destructive weapons systems are being introduced in many parts of the world. This carries a risk of the starting or acceleration of dangerous and costly regional arms race. Nor should it be forgotten that since the Second World War a considerable number of wars have been fought with conventional weapons. For most countries, what is perceived as a risk to their national security is connected with the existence of conventional – not nuclear – arms.

In recent years the international community has become increasingly aware of the continuing world-wide build-up of conventional weapons. My Government has welcomed the initiative taken by President Carter on international arms transfers as well as the positive response of the Soviet Union. Similarly we welcome the Mexican initiative which is now being considered by the Latin American countries. And as a European country Denmark is of course particularly interested in ongoing efforts with a view to strengthening security in Europe by establishing a more stable relationship at a lower level of military potential.

Growing interest in international discussions on conventional arms, including transfers, was reflected in the Final Document of the special session which states that together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued. Let me refer also to the recommendations of the Final Document concerning consultations to be carried out among major arms suppliers and recipients on the limitation of all types of international transfers of conventional weapons.

My delegation feels that as part of the follow-up of the Final Document the general question of conventional arms – including international arms transfers – should in some form be placed on the agenda of international arms control and disarmament discussions. Disarmament steps in the conventional field should accordingly figure among the elements to be included in the report which we are going to prepare. Subsequently the possibility of
initiating a United Nations study of these complicated problems should be considered, as proposed by Denmark together with a number of other countries during the preparatory talks leading up to the special session - and I am referring to document A/AC.187/96. Another possibility to which I referred in my statement in the First Committee during the thirty-third session of the General Assembly would be to have a general discussion of this subject at a later session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Leaving the multilateral aspects for a moment, I would add that unilateral restraint may play a useful role. For instance, as far as the rather limited arms exports of my country are concerned, any application for permission to export arms is studied on a case-by-case basis in the light of a policy mainly based on the principle that exports are not allowed to countries which are involved in military conflicts, or to areas in which conditions are so troubled or unstable as to give cause for fear of escalation into armed conflicts.

We have to face the fact that the arms race goes on. But the effort to control the arms race also goes on. To stop that effort would be unthinkable. Our Governments can never give up the search for a safer world. Let me conclude by expressing the hope that this Commission will be able during the coming years to contribute constructively towards the continuing process started by the special session.

Mr. KOMATINA (Yugoslavia): It gives me great pleasure to salute you, on behalf of my delegation, in your capacity as Chairman of our Commission. India's active involvement in the field of disarmament is well known to us and we interpret your election as Chairman of our Commission as a tribute to your country and to you personally for the efforts you have been exerting in this sphere. We are certain that under your guidance the Commission will successfully complete its work and contribute towards laying down foundations for the elaboration of a comprehensive programme on disarmament. I wish to assure you that in the accomplishment of the tasks facing us you can count on the full support and co-operation of my delegation.
This session of the Commission marks the beginning of its work concerned with substantive disarmament issues and a qualitatively new involvement of the United Nations in this area of international relations. The role played by the world Organization in the field of disarmament during the last two decades has not been in harmony either with the actual needs or with the necessity that all the members of the international community should contribute to the consideration and speedy solution of disarmament problems.

The holding of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the decisions and recommendations embodied in the Final Document have made it possible to place the examination of these problems on a broader and firmer basis. The decision that the First Committee of the General Assembly should deal exclusively with questions of disarmament and international security has confirmed the central role and responsibility of the General Assembly with regard to the consideration and solution of disarmament problems. The resumption of the work of the Disarmament Commission is a further positive step in that direction. We believe that the relationship between the First Committee and the Commission is characterized by the fact that these two bodies are complementary, because, acting within the framework of their respective fields of competence and responsibility, each of them makes a concrete contribution towards the achievement of our common objective - general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

The laying down of new foundations for the work of the Committee on Disarmament was an essential prerequisite for promoting democratic and equitable relations among its members, for making it possible for all nuclear-weapon States to take part in its work and for enabling the Committee to become a more effective multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. We interpret the changes in question as an expression of the endeavours and readiness of all the members of the international community to intensify their efforts in the search for more effective ways to solving numerous disarmament problems speedily. The complexity of these problems and the urgency of their solution make it incumbent upon the international community to be constantly and actively involved on all the aforementioned levels.
It is not my intention to deal in this statement with problems involving wider areas of disarmament. Yugoslavia's positions on these problems are known and were explained in greater detail at the tenth special session and during the last regular session of the General Assembly. There have not occurred since then any substantive changes or events deserving special attention, with the exception, of course, of the successful completion of negotiations on SALT II.

Although this agreement is concerned primarily with the regulation and, partly, with the limitation of the nuclear arms race, and not with nuclear disarmament, its conclusion represents nevertheless a significant step opening up prospects for the realization of new achievements in this field, a step liable to exert a positive influence on international relations as a whole. SALT II can provide a strong incentive for further negotiations aimed at halting the current unrestrained nuclear arms race and at achieving initial and genuine results in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. It is with such hopes that we are looking forward to the signing of SALT II in the middle of June this year.
Mr. Chairman, in response to your appeal I shall limit this intervention to explaining our positions on a comprehensive programme of disarmament - that is, on the elements that a comprehensive programme should in our view contain - as well as our views on the possible frames of a comprehensive programme of disarmament that the Commission could recommend to the General Assembly and, through it, to the Committee on Disarmament.

The consideration of the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament constitutes the beginning of the organized planning, elaboration and adoption of a new significant international instrument which should serve as a means and a guideline in the long-term efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

We interpret the comprehensive character of a comprehensive programme of disarmament according to the Final Document of the tenth special session, as actually meaning that that programme should encompass all the disarmament measures considered necessary for the realization of the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict international control and establishment of the New International Economic Order. From this we can conclude that what is involved is a concept that encompasses various fields such as disarmament in its broadest meaning, verification, international security and disarmament and economic development. Those are the areas that should be included in a comprehensive programme of disarmament and should represent its basic elements and content.

We must also agree on what we understand by the term "programme on disarmament" within this context. We conceive that programme as an internationally agreed document specifying all disarmament measures, phases of their implementation and measures of verification - that is, as an instrument that should promote the process of negotiations on disarmament. Consequently, that programme differs from the Programme of Action adopted at the tenth special session, is of a long-term character and contains all the aforementioned measures. A comprehensive programme of disarmament should therefore be viewed as an agreed framework for international action, including negotiations on different levels - bilateral, regional and multilateral - on wider international bases, on a specific measure or specific measures of disarmament whose successive and progressive implementation should lead to realization of the final goal.
of general and complete disarmament. In that sense a comprehensive programme
of disarmament is not intended to replace the Programme of Action but to supplement
and complement it.

In our view, the immediate aims and tasks should basically be to maintain and
further the momentum engendered by the tenth special session of the General Assembly:
to ensure the constant and active participation and involvement of all States in
disarmament negotiations, especially of the nuclear-weapon States and, among them,
the two leading Powers in particular: to implement the commitments undertaken at
the tenth special session; and to create necessary conditions for the initiation
of negotiations on halting the arms race and beginning a process of genuine
disarmament on a new internationally agreed basis.

In considering approaches to a comprehensive programme of disarmament we
must proceed from the assumption of the urgent necessity of its elaboration and
adoption, which should evolve parallel with the on-going negotiations on
various disarmament measures agreed in the Programme of Action at the
tenth special session and the thirty-third session of the General Assembly.

It seems to us that the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of
disarmament depends to a great extent on the character of our recommendations. It
is therefore important that we should undertake the task of elaborating the
elements with a high degree of responsibility.

My delegation believes that a comprehensive programme of disarmament
should at the same time be ambitious enough with regard to the clarity and
definiteness of its aims, realistic in setting concrete tasks and flexible with
respect to time limits. Only in this way can it stimulate the elaboration of a
new strategy and, I would add, philosophy of the United Nations in this field.

In the opinion of my delegation, a comprehensive programme of disarmament
should consist of two parts, an introduction and an operative part. The
introduction should contain a short historical background, give reasons for the
elaboration of the programme and its urgent implementation, emphasize the need for
the active involvement of all countries, particularly nuclear-weapon States and
other militarily significant countries, and deal with some other relevant questions.
In the operative part it is necessary to elaborate in separate chapters the nature
and character of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, aims and objectives
principles and priorities, approaches to disarmament measures, and other measures
of a similar nature. It would also be necessary in that part to elaborate disarmament measures, instruments of international control, measures concerning international security that are connected with disarmament, measures relating to disarmament and economic development, and so on. It would also be necessary to elaborate the question of the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and especially the role of the United Nations in monitoring its implementation.

My delegation believes that the list of measures in various fields of disarmament, verification, international security and disarmament and development should be in accordance with the priorities agreed upon at the tenth special session. Besides, it is necessary to elaborate the first phase of implementation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, including measures on which negotiations should start immediately after the adoption of such a programme. The following phases of implementation could be elaborated and agreed gradually depending on the course of negotiations on the first phase. When elaborating the first phase of the implementation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, it is necessary to ensure that measures of the highest priority — those directed towards halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and elimination of the danger of nuclear war — are included.

We hope that the agreement on the principles and priorities on which a comprehensive programme of disarmament should be based will not constitute a major difficulty since consensus on this matter has already been reached at the tenth special session of the General Assembly. We deem the basic principles of disarmament contained in paragraphs 25 to 42 of the Final Document and the priorities established in paragraph 45 to be of permanent value. Should there be any new ideas or proposals, the Commission could consider them at its current session or at subsequent sessions.

We feel that the disarmament measures themselves and the manner in which they are presented should not occasion great difficulty either, as agreement on the order of priorities has already been reached and individual disarmament measures have been indicated according to areas and categories of weapons. Agreement has also been reached with regard to the ultimate goal, whose realization should lead to such levels of armaments and armed forces of States as are necessary for the maintenance of internal security and provide agreed-upon manpower necessary for an international peace force. That would facilitate the tasks of the
Commission and the Committee on Disarmament. The presentation of measures according to types and categories of weapons and systems of armaments should be comprehensive; that is, it should include all weapons - nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, including the so-called inhumane weapons. It should include also the reduction of military expenditures, the cessation of research for military purposes, the reduction of the armed forces of States, and the like. It goes without saying that priority should be given to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as to offensive arms in general, such as bombers, fighter-bombers, tanks, long-range heavy artillery, and so on, weapons which pose the most dangerous threat to the security of States. At this stage the Commission need not elaborate upon or enumerate individual disarmament measures to be covered by a comprehensive programme of disarmament, but it could in each area give examples of measures that could be included in such a programme.
Verification constitutes a significant element of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, and full attention should be devoted to it. Accordingly, at the tenth special session of the General Assembly it was agreed that each disarmament measure should be accompanied by a corresponding measure of verification. There still remains the question of the establishment of an international machinery of verification, which has been indicated only as a possibility. Paragraph 31 of the Final Document provides for the possibility of the participation of States parties to disarmament agreements, through the United Nations system, in the verification process. We feel that during the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament measures should be envisaged for the establishment of such an international machinery of verification as would meet the interests of all countries, particularly the interests of small and medium-size countries which are not able to participate on an equal footing with other countries in the process of verification by using their national means of verification. The establishment of a United Nations agency for the verification of armaments could provide one of the most adequate answers to that question.

The tenth special session recognized that there was a close relationship between disarmament and international security in the sense that progress made in one area affects favourably developments in the other, and vice versa. In that context the General Assembly has drawn attention to the areas of international security most directly connected with efforts exerted in the field of disarmament. It has been pointed out that measures should be taken to strengthen the institutions for the maintenance of peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means as well as measures to maintain international peace and security. We consider that a comprehensive programme of disarmament should also include confidence-building measures, zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

There is a similar link between disarmament and economic and social development and the establishment of the New International Economic Order. At the tenth special session the decision was also taken to elaborate a study on the relationship between disarmament and economic development, with specific
emphasis on the question of channelling the resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures to economic and social development and assistance to developing countries. The results of this study could be used as guidance in the formulation of practical measures to reallocate those resources at the local, national, regional and international levels. It seems to us that the establishment of a suitable fund or funds on the basis of such resources and the elaboration of a United Nations programme for channelling assistance to developing countries could be examined in that context.

The question of the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament should also be posed as clearly as possible. We should devote the utmost attention to this matter, if we are not to lose, even at this moment, the race against time. Therefore, measures of implementation should constantly be directed towards accelerating the process of negotiations. Consequently, it is indispensable to complete the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament as soon as possible and not later than the beginning of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982.

It is particularly important to strengthen the role of the United Nations and, within that framework, of the Disarmament Commission. At the current session, apart from identifying the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Commission should take a step forward in determining the framework of the programme. Later on, during its future sessions, the Commission should consider the progress report of the Committee on Disarmament on the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and, should the need arise, the Commission could again submit its recommendations through the General Assembly. All this is, it seems to us, in accordance with the Commission's function and role in the field of disarmament.

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope that the results of the current session of the Commission will contribute first and foremost to making the process of disarmament and improvement of international relations more dynamic.
A successful outcome of the Commission's work would no doubt have a positive effect on the situation in many spheres of international life - a situation which is worsening due primarily to the failure to solve outstanding world problems, the standstill in the process of détente, the deterioration in the focal points of crises and interventions against sovereign States.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is happy to convene again under your able and experienced chairmanship. The organizational matters pertaining to our work having been clarified, we are convinced that your wise and expedient guidance will enable the United Nations Disarmament Commission to achieve the best possible progress in its substantial deliberations.

Last fall I had the privilege, on behalf of my Government, to stress the great importance which the Federal Republic of Germany attaches to the deliberations of this subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, which was established pursuant to paragraph 113 of the Final Document of the United Nations special session devoted to disarmament. I should like to reiterate my Government's determination to co-operate constructively in the efforts of this body to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it by the session on disarmament.

One of the most important tasks with which the United Nations Disarmament Commission has been entrusted is to consider the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament. Consequently, this task has been incorporated in the agenda of this session.

Following the request of the Secretary-General that it submit its views on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, my Government availed itself of the opportunity to outline its perception of the ways and means by which the long-term goal of complete and general disarmament under effective international control could be achieved. Since that statement - together with the statements of other Member States - is before us in document A/CH.10/1, I do not intend to repeat its contents in detail. Hoping, however, that this statement will contribute to expedite this body's deliberations and assist it in preparing its recommendations to the General Assembly, I should like briefly to explain the ideas and the concept behind our approach.
There is agreement that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control can only be achieved step by step as a result of a long-term process based on a whole series of efforts in different fields.

The need now is to draw up a disarmament programme which meets the following requirements: balance between the measures to be taken in the different disarmament fields, in particular between nuclear and conventional armaments; a step-by-step approach in order to avoid imbalances and destabilizing effects; effective verification measures to ensure that disarmament commitments are fully carried out by all parties; and safeguarding the security of the States concerned.

In what follows I should like to set out the elements which should be taken into account in elaborating a comprehensive disarmament programme. We have divided them into three categories: first, disarmament and arms control measures; secondly, associated measures, such as the creation of the conditions and the climate for disarmament and arms control measures; and, finally, the form of negotiations.

The order in which the measures and the different categories are listed is not binding in the negotiations to be conducted. Reciprocal benefits can be derived from conducting negotiations concurrently on different issues. This applies particularly to negotiations on disarmament and arms control measures, on the one hand, and to associated measures, on the other.

In the first category, disarmament and arms control measures, belong, in our view, the following measures in the nuclear weapons field: a comprehensive and complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests; the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime; the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements by the States of the region; and the limitation, balanced reduction and finally complete elimination of nuclear weapons and their launchers.

Next in that first category come the following measures relating to other weapons of mass destruction: the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction; the prohibition of the development, production and use of radiological weapons; the prevention of the emergence of new
types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles; and further development of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof.

Finally in the first category belong the following measures in the conventional weapons field: agreements on the reduction and limitation of conventional weapons and armed forces, and the promotion of regional measures; agreement between supplier States and recipient States on the limitation and reduction of the international transfer of conventional weapons; and the restriction or prohibition of the use of certain conventional weapons.

I turn now to the second category, namely, associated measures, that consist of the following: the introduction of greater transparency in and the reduction of military budgets in conjunction with a standardized reporting system; the elaboration and adoption of principles for achieving effective verification of the fulfilment of commitments assumed in the disarmament and arms control field; confidence-building measures such as agreements on the notification of manoeuvres, the invitation of observers and the exchange of information; and study of the relationship between disarmament and development.

Then there is the third category, that is, form of negotiations. Since all disarmament and arms control measures have to be agreed to in negotiations, it is crucial for the outcome that States should be ready to participate constructively. The negotiations can be conducted on a bilateral, regional or multilateral level, depending in each case on how effective disarmament agreements can most readily be achieved.

In this connexion, the United Nations General Assembly has an important part to play. It should help to facilitate the conclusion and implementation of disarmament and arms control agreements. It can, by appropriate means, encourage the parties involved to enter into negotiations. It can also help to establish a climate in which successful negotiations can be conducted.

My Government welcomes with particular satisfaction the intensification and widening of the international debate on arms control which has taken place as a result of the special session on disarmament. In our view, there is no doubt that the ever-growing interdependence of all States and regions
requires the inclusion of the process of arms control not only in the East-West but also in the North-South dialogue. The results of the special session on disarmament have shown that, although States or groups of States may have different views on the priorities of the disarmament process because of their different geographical, political and strategic situations, they all agree on the overriding necessity for enhanced international efforts in the field of arms control. The importance of the fact that in the special session on disarmament the General Assembly was able to formulate in its Final Document a consensus of the international community of States on the principles, a programme of action and the machinery for the arms control process can hardly be overestimated.

It is evident, on the other hand, that the Final Document represents a compromise which is not entirely satisfactory in all respects. In particular, the lack of balance between nuclear and conventional aspects represents a notable weakness. While we agree that high priority has to be given to the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, we hold that measures of control on conventional arms are of equal importance. The mere fact that four fifths of the present arms expenditure is spent for conventional weapons and that the growth rates of conventional arms expenditure are especially high underlines the urgency for measures in the conventional field.

If we want to release a considerable amount of the real resources now being used for military purposes for use in economic and social development, especially that of the developing countries, it is imperative to curb the arms race in the field which consumes most of these scarce resources, that is, the conventional sphere.

Another requirement for the achievement of general and comprehensive disarmament is a gradual, step-by-step process based on a realistic assessment of the security conditions and aimed at the establishment of a stable political and military balance, both at the regional and the global level.

In this context, measures which enhance the security of the States participating in arms control arrangements are of crucial importance. Progress from one phase to the next will materialize only when States are
convinced that their security has not been diminished during the preceding phase. One necessary precondition for such assurances is the existence of adequate and reliable instruments of international verification. In addition, the security of States can be strengthened to a considerable extent by confidence-building measures which contribute to the predictability and calculability of the political and military conduct of States, thereby removing mistrust and fear.
Pre-conditions for predictability and calculability are openness and transparency. It is, therefore, indispensable to base concrete arms control arrangements on reliable data on military capacities. We welcome the fact that this necessity has found international recognition meanwhile, especially in the SALT and mutual and balanced force reductions contexts. We are prepared to continue our support for the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the comparability and disclosure of military budgets, which way, we hope, lay the basis for a verified and balanced reduction of military spendings in due course.

Bearing these general principles in mind, we have to base our considerations on a realistic negotiating programme for disarmament on the assessment of the recent disarmament activities.

In the nuclear field, the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons systems (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union represent an essential contribution to stability between East and West and an important prerequisite to wider efforts towards stabilization. My Government, therefore, welcomes the successful conclusion of the SALT II negotiations, a result which enhances global security and creates a favourable climate for further successful disarmament efforts.

In order to eliminate the danger of the stability achieved at the intercontinental level being threatened by destabilizing developments in levels not regulated by SALT II, it is decisive to continue the SALT process with a view to establishing a more stable over-all balance between East and West.

Another major event will be the NPT Review Conference which is just being prepared. We hope that this Conference will further strengthen and consolidate the nuclear non-proliferation régime and will help to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing the development of and the access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Other positive developments have taken place in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, which just ended the first part of this year's session. The Committee on Disarmament decided on its rules of procedure and an agenda for 1979, thereby establishing a sound basis for fruitful negotiations on disarmament and arms control matters.
Besides, it initiated a discussion of substance in the course of which a number of substantial and action-orientated statements and proposals were put forward. One of the two items being dealt with, namely, "the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", reflected the high priority the Committee on Disarmament gives to nuclear disarmament measures.

At the same time, we see with satisfaction that developments in other fields are not stagnant either. We welcome especially the fact that the international dialogue on the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction has continued at various levels, especially within the Committee on Disarmament. We hope that the two chemical weapons workshops held in the United Kingdom and in my own country contributed to finding solutions to the difficult and complex problem of an adequate system of verification by showing, inter alia, that verification through on-site inspections of the civil production is possible without hampering the interests of the chemical industry.

The second session of the Preparatory Conference for the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects was able to establish a satisfactory organization, as well as a substantial basis for a successful conclusion of agreement at the Diplomatic Conference in September 1979, although, naturally, certain areas of disagreement still exist.

The ad hoc group on the relationship between disarmament and development started a new round of discussions in Geneva at the beginning of this month on this highly important topic.

Similar observations of progress could be made in other fields. I would only want to point to the field of confidence-building measures. Having initiated, together with 19 co-sponsors from various parts of the world, General Assembly resolution 33/91 B, which recommends all Member States to consider the conclusion of arrangements on confidence-building measures on a regional basis, we appreciate that the Committee on Disarmament included this in its decalogue.
In accordance with operative paragraph 3 of the aforementioned resolution, my Government is going to transmit its views and experiences made with confidence-building measures to the General Assembly. We hope that a large number of States will also submit their views so that they can be taken into account for our future common efforts in this field.

I should also like to touch briefly upon the importance of peace-keeping measures as elaborated in paragraph 110 of the Final Document. My delegation, as one of the co-sponsors of resolution 33/114, believes that this paragraph gives some indication of what could be done in this field. I reiterate our preparedness for full co-operation in order to achieve real progress.

Summing up, these developments are proof of the fact that the call of the special session on disarmament for intensified efforts in the field of disarmament and arms control found a favourable response. They justify, in the view of my delegation, a cautious optimism as to the chances of success of our task to elaborate the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Mr. OGISO (Japan): Mr. Chairman, at the outset I wish to express the great satisfaction of my delegation that we can participate in the first substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission under your experienced and able leadership.

It was just one year ago that 145 delegations from the Member States of the United Nations met at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and reaffirmed their will to achieve mankind's ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. As one concrete result of the improvement and strengthening of the international organs on disarmament that was achieved through the efforts of the various States at the special session, the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva was reorganized in January of this year, and now the long inactive United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is holding its first meeting to discuss substantive matters of disarmament. These facts encourage us further to promote disarmament measures.
It is the strong wish of my delegation that the Commission should, by discharging its functions as a deliberative body, discuss the subject-matters entrusted to the Commission by the Final Document of the Assembly session on disarmament, as well as by the resolutions adopted at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, and that, without being abused as a forum for political campaigning, it should contribute to the progress of the disarmament negotiations.
Paragraph 118 (a) of the Final Document of the General Assembly session devoted to disarmament provides that the various elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament shall be submitted as recommendations by the United Nations Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly of the United Nations and, through it, to the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament.

My delegation considers that the question of the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is one of the most appropriate subjects to be discussed and elaborated by the Commission as a deliberative body and that the Commission should exert its full efforts on these deliberations.

In this connexion, I should like to express the views of my delegation on the various principles to be considered in relation to the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament as well as on the main elements to be included in the programme. I hope that by so doing I will make a useful contribution to the deliberations of the Commission.

I hold the view that discussions on the various elements of a comprehensive programme should be based on the following principles.

The first principle is that of due regard for the security of each State. In paragraph 29 of the Final Document it is proclaimed that

"The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces". (A/S-10/4)

Needless to say, the final goal is to achieve comprehensive and general disarmament so as to establish real peace in the world. Accordingly, if the security of any State is hampered by the implementation of specific disarmament measures, we will be unable to avoid the criticism of having confused the means of achieving our goal with the goal itself.

The second principle, as provided for in paragraph 30 of the Final Document, is a balance between the responsibility and duties of the nuclear-weapon States and those of the non-nuclear-weapon States. It is self-evident that the nuclear-weapon States bear the principal responsibility in nuclear disarmament. Yet, because the disarmament measures affect the security of each State, both the
nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States have the duty and responsibility to promote disarmament and neither group of States should be forced to bear a greater share of their duty and responsibility than is their due.

The third principle is the formulation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament that is feasible and does not contain aspects of political propaganda. Far too much time has been wasted in fruitless political campaigning during the 30-year history of post-Second-World-War disarmament negotiations. We would really take a giant step towards achieving the final goal of disarmament if we would only attempt to reach that goal through a step-by-step approach in implementing feasible measures of disarmament. But before we can do that it will be necessary to eliminate the bootless practice of political campaigning from genuine deliberations on disarmament. Moreover, I consider that a comprehensive programme of disarmament should be flexible enough to meet the situation of the world as it really is, and in this sense it is not appropriate to fix rigid time-tables for the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The fourth principle is the necessity for effective verification measures. Effective verification measures are vital in that they secure compliance with disarmament agreements by the contracting States as well as providing the basis for confidence-building among States and for the further promotion of disarmament measures. I should therefore like to point out that it is imperative that the disarmament measures to be included as elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament should provide for effective verification procedures and that it is therefore necessary to continue the elaboration of technologies and systems that would enable such procedures to be more effective.

Following the aforementioned principles, I should like to mention the views of my delegation on the disarmament measures that should be included as elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Negotiations on the various disarmament measures that I will put forth should be started at a time appropriate to their priority. Moreover, I hold the view that we should not preclude the possibility of negotiating some of these disarmament measures concurrently and that we should carry out studies and preparatory consultations on those disarmament measures on which negotiations have still not matured. The measures we should include are as follows.
The first is nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament measures have been a matter of main concern to the international community ever since nuclear weapons emerged. At the United Nations, a number of resolutions on nuclear disarmament have been adopted, beginning with the first resolution of the United Nations on the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946. This problem has also consistently been a major subject for deliberations outside the United Nations. Yet, the complexity of the problems involved is shown by the fact that, despite the efforts and concern of the international community, nuclear disarmament has still not progressed very far.

Bearing these basic facts in mind, I should like to propose that the following measures be included as main elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament in the field of nuclear disarmament.

The United States-UBSR Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) can be one of the nuclear disarmament measures to be listed and implemented in the early stages of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. My Government has urged in various forums - such as the United Nations, the Committee on Disarmament and others - that SALT II be concluded and that negotiations on SALT III be initiated as soon as possible. My delegation therefore welcomes the announcement of the conclusion of SALT II, and we should like to express our appreciation for the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union that led to that conclusion.
I believe that the conclusion of SALT-II will promote the stabilization of strategic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, thereby contributing to the stability and peace of the world and providing an impetus to other negotiations on disarmament, such as those on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Furthermore, adherence by both parties to the obligations provided for in article 6 of the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) will mean that the United States and the Soviet Union should soon start negotiations on SALT-III, which is to be aimed at quantitative reductions, as well as qualitative regulations, of strategic nuclear weapons. In so doing, they will contribute to an improvement of the inequality between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States that is inherent in the NPT, as well as to the realization of the universal participation of States in the Treaty.

No one would disagree that a comprehensive test ban treaty should be listed in a comprehensive programme of disarmament as a nuclear disarmament measure on which negotiations should be started in the first place in the Committee on Disarmament. I consider that discussions at the Committee on Disarmament, as well as the tripartite negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, provide the basis for starting substantial negotiations on this problem. The only outstanding question to be solved is whether the leaders of these three States will make political decisions on the conclusion of the comprehensive test ban treaty. Further, I should like to remind members that the majority of the Member States of the United Nations, including my own country, hope for the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty — a fact that is clearly shown by the resolutions adopted at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly. My delegation therefore urges that all Member States of the United Nations, particularly all nuclear-weapon States, should refrain from all nuclear testing until a comprehensive test ban treaty is concluded.

With regard to the strengthening of the régime of the non-proliferation, paragraph 65 of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly states that

"It is imperative, as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

(resolution S-10/2)
My delegation holds the view, as I mentioned in a statement at the summer session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in 1977, that despite various problems due to the inequality inherent in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), that Treaty, to which more than 100 States are contracting parties, is the most important legal framework in the prevention of nuclear proliferation. In this regard, my delegation is of the view that the realization of universal participation of the States in the Treaty constitutes one of the principal nuclear disarmament measures, and should therefore be included in a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In this connexion, my delegation welcomes the ratification of the NPT by States like Turkey and Sri Lanka, and hopes other non-contracting States will follow suit. In addition, my delegation would like to reaffirm its view that it is imperative to ensure the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States with respect to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to alleviate the inequality inherent in the NPT by urging nuclear-weapon States to take further measures on nuclear disarmament. In this way, the universal participation of States in the Treaty may at last be realized.

However, the development of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the NPT on account of the inequality inherent in the NPT, or for some other reason, would seriously affect the security not only of neighbouring States but also of the world, and would lead to the dangerous situation of nuclear proliferation. For this reason, these States are urged to refrain from undertaking such actions.

Turning to the cut-off of the production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapons purposes, I should like to propose the cut-off of the production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapon purposes as a nuclear disarmament measure following a comprehensive test ban treaty. I believe that realization of the cut-off, together with effective safeguards and verification measures, is a substantive measure crucial for freezing the qualitative expansion of nuclear weapons. We should also give due consideration to the step-by-step liquidation of the existing fissionable nuclear materials for military purposes once the cut-off has been realized, and to the diversion of these materials to peaceful uses.
With regard to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, my country, as a non-nuclear-weapon State and a party to the NPT, believes that it is desirable that, at the appropriate opportunity, the question of the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States should be discussed as one of the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. I believe that if each measure we undertake to solve the problems before us corresponds to the political and military conditions of the States or regions involved, then we shall have taken a concrete and realistic step to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. In this regard, my delegation cannot support the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of nuclear weapons, as was proposed at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, because it seems to us that this proposal does not take fully into consideration the political and military conditions of the world as it really is.
Secondly, with regard to the ban on chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction, my delegation believes that the international community widely supports the inclusion of the question of the banning of chemical weapons in the comprehensive programme of disarmament as an item that has the same priority in the framework of general and complete disarmament as the question of a complete test ban has in the framework of nuclear disarmament. My own State, which has actually tackled this problem by submitting a draft convention to the session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1974, hopes for the early realization of an agreement aimed at banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, as well as of their ultimate destruction, but one which does not harm industrial activities for peaceful purposes. My State in the Committee on Disarmament this year strongly urged that the progress report on the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union should be submitted at the first part of the annual session of the Committee on Disarmament and, in that connexion, my delegation welcomes the statements of the two negotiating parties that they will make a progress report at some appropriate time during the second part of the session of the Committee on Disarmament this year. As a follow-up step to the question of the ban on chemical weapons, my delegation considers that the question of banning other identifiable weapons of mass destruction must also be examined.

Thirdly, there is conventional weapons disarmament. It is a grave situation that during the 30 years since the end of the Second World War tensions have continued to persist in certain areas of the world, and that on some occasions those tensions have even led to armed conflict. Furthermore, there is an escalation in the use of accurate and destructive conventional weapons in these conflict areas. For that reason, we should make every effort to promote disarmament in conventional weapons even while setting nuclear disarmament as our first priority.

However, we must remember that conventional weapons disarmament has its own difficulties. Most of the countries in the world depend upon conventional weapons for their national security. In this sense, my delegation considers that attention must be given to the effects of conventional weapons disarmament on national security.
Given this situation, it is clear that the question of the limitation or prohibition of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, as well as the question of mutual and balanced reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, which are mentioned as priority items in paragraph 45 of the Final Document, must be examined as elements of a comprehensive disarmament programme.

In addition to the matters I have already mentioned, I should like last of all to discuss confidence-building measures and the reduction of military budgets as other measures of disarmament.

With regard to confidence-building measures, the existence of suspicion among States and the lack of trust and confidence must be mentioned as a cause of international tension and the expansion of armaments. Although confidence-building measures to remove distrust among States cannot themselves be said to be disarmament measures, they should, as paragraph 93 of the Final Document points out, make an important contribution to the preparation for further progress in disarmament. In that sense, my delegation considers that various confidence-building measures should be examined as elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

As concrete measures, the improvement of the means of communication and the exchange of military information could well be considered. Furthermore, my delegation considers that the strengthening of international means of verification and the utilization of existing United Nations organizations in this field must be considered in the framework of general and complete disarmament, since the improvement of an effective verification system would play an important role in confidence-building.

The reduction of military budgets, which currently amount to $400 billion per year, is an important means of controlling the arms race. However, a haphazard advocacy of the necessity for reducing military budgets cannot further the solution of this problem. In order to realize such a reduction, steady efforts are necessary, starting from a just and fair calculation of actual military expenditures. My country, having the
conviction that a just and fair calculation of military expenditures will strengthen confidence among States, and in fact constitutes the basis for an agreement on the reduction of military expenditures, has engaged in the development of standardized reporting of military expenditures and has sent experts to the Ad Hoc Panel on Military Budgeting which was set up by a resolution of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly as the experimental run for this system. Also, my delegation considers that the voluntary publication of military expenditures will remove mutual distrust among States and will have favourable effects on the early execution of the standardized reporting of military expenditures. In this sense, my delegation hopes that a series of measures, such as the publication of military expenditures, the execution of standardized reporting of military expenditures, and the realization of the actual reduction of armaments will be examined as elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

My delegation has today stated the fundamental principles and the disarmament measures which should be considered in the examination of the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. My delegation now wishes to conclude its statement by emphasizing that in order to secure international peace and to strengthen national security, all States must make efforts to observe the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to co-operate in strengthening the functions of the United Nations in the field of international security.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.