DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
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Agenda item 10

VERIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

Working paper submitted by Cameroon

I. OVERALL OBJECTIVE

1. The issue of arms control and disarmament, whether conventional or nuclear, is
the primary responsibility of the United Nations in strengthening and maintaining
international peace and security. Verification is a basic prerequisite of
confidence-building measures in the implementation and observance of arms control
and disarmament agreements. In view of the fact that verification is a vital
component in the disarmament process, the commitment of States to pursue
appropriate and mutual effective confidence-building measures in a specific context
will also make it possible to resolve the question of verification.

2. In this connection, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus
resolution 41/86 Q on verification in all its aspects, with the view to ensuring
that the global consensus on the aims, principles and characteristics of
verification proper be developed for application within the United Nations. This
complex component of arms control and disarmament has been entrusted to Working
Group IV of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

3. Furthermore, paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session
of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament,
contains certain principles relating to verification. Notwithstanding this initial
step, it is nevertheless essential and vital for Member States, within the
framework of the United Nations, to formulate broader verification provisions in
conformity with those principles, for it would be a futile exercise should arms
control and disarmament accords lack dependable binding verification measures. The
concept of verification, the principle of verification, supplements the concept of
confidence-building measures which requires a universal scope and character. In
the instance, the United Nations must exercise its central role and primary responsibility in this sphere taking into account that ways and means affecting the verification process already exist.

4. In this connection, it is important to recall paragraphs 91 and 92 of the Final Document, /1/ in which it is stated:

"91. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

"92. In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development."

5. A review of bilateral negotiations focusing on the question of national technical means shows that verification, too, is the consequence of existing distrust between potential contracting parties. Wherever unlimited trust prevails, on the basis of converging political, ideological, legal and military objectives of States, confidence and reliable transparency are taken for granted. In reviewing multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements, certain common elements can be found: (a) a separation of the fact-finding component from the political decision-making component of the verification process; (b) the provision of some form of international consultative procedure to address compliance issues; and (c) a general weakness of their verification provision.

6. In the world in which we live today, the basis for confidence has to be established. This applies in particular to military-relevant areas. If specific multilateral and bilateral approaches towards arms control are to be realized in a concrete manner and definitely, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed so that all agreements include co-operative measures. If other steps to ensure the effective verification of the treaty provisions were taken, the assurance of compliance with the treaty provisions would be a less uncertain matter. Given the vital importance of verification to disarmament, a United Nations capacity to provide this service would constitute a valuable asset in the implementation of future disarmament agreements.

7. The measures aimed at through these actions are to be militarily and non-militarily significant and politically binding, and ought to be accompanied by mutually effective adequate forms and provisions of verification. In the interest of the prevention of all conflicts and the necessity of genuine peace, the universally applicable principle of the non-use of force must be translated into quantifiable and verifiable measures.
8. According to General Assembly resolution 41/86 Q, Member States of the United Nations believed that

"Verification techniques should be developed as an objective means of determining compliance with agreements and appropriately taken into account in the course of disarmament negotiation".

Furthermore, an ever-increasing number of Member States from various regions of the globe have answered the request, contained in paragraph 2 of that resolution,

"to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 31 March 1987, their views and suggestions on verification principles as invited by the Assembly in its resolution 40/152 Q;"

and it should be also noted that the Disarmament Commission, in paragraph 4 of the above-mentioned resolution, has been requested to consider

"... in the context of pursuing general and complete disarmament under effective international control, verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification, and to report on its deliberations, conclusions and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-second session in 1987".

9. If the United Nations is to achieve the goal and objective of a comprehensive global disarmament under effective international control, all Member States have the right to contribute to the formulation of principles, guidelines and standards which should be taken into account during the actual negotiations. Collective endeavours are vital in co-ordinating and harmonizing the views of all States in light of the fact that the United Nations continues to perform verification tasks such as peace-keeping (in the Middle East and Cyprus) and of the confidence-building, made possible by the excellent work of the United Nations in peace-keeping missions.

10. There are other examples of verification, compliance and confidence-building performances by the United Nations, such as the implementation of the inspection responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has been effective in maintaining international confidence in the fact that nuclear material, present in peaceful installations covered by the Treaty or other safeguard agreements, is not being diverted for military use.

11. Against this backdrop, in compliance with existing treaties, parties to them must, in good faith, honour their treaty obligations in adhering to the intent, purpose and scope of such existing treaties. Proven violations of existing arms limitation treaties would not only threaten the purposes implicit in the treaty in question, but would also jeopardize the prospects for future negotiations, making it more difficult to motivate universal support for additional and farther-reaching treaties.
12. In addition to having to proceed to a comprehensive examination of the "definitions, principles, procedures and techniques" of verification, the United Nations has the central role and primary responsibility to discharge its responsibility more effectively and efficiently in the area of arms control and disarmament and in the formulation and execution of verification provisions.

13. It is the view of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, expressed in his annual report, 2/ that

"the ability of the Organization to assist in verification and compliance arrangements should be explored".

In conjunction with arms control agreements, and with a view to facilitating verification, these measures should be intended to have a stabilizing effect, thereby strengthening confidence both in the military data to be exchanged and in the compliance with treaty obligations.

II. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE

14. Two basic factors constitute the nucleus of the verification process: (a) verifying the observance of contractual provision of a long-term nature - this is applicable to the observance of agreed limitations, permanent obligations and information as well as consultations requirements; and (b) controlling the implementation of agreed measures in accordance with the relevant contractual provision - that means especially verification of pre-reduction data and reductions. From this perspective, it is obvious that an adequate mutual and effective method of verification must be agreed upon for each subject of negotiation. Hence the problem that verification agreements, although the principle underlying them may be of significance to several diverse agreements, must be tailored to each topic specifically.

15. As regards the methodology of verification, three lines of approach must be mentioned and considered: (a) modalities relevant to national technical means; (b) modalities on procedures for verification; and (c) modalities necessary for the exchanges of information and regular consultations and modalities on measures that require the contracting parties to co-operate in the interest of reliable control. The measures envisaged range from the attempt not to interfere with national technical means to the modalities of obligatory on-site inspections.

16. Equally important, like the concept of confidence-building measures, verification provisions should endeavour to include: adequacy, so that one could detect, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the violation of an agreement which would allow a State to acquire a military capability does not threaten the national security of any other party; appropriate provisions as to the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement; the principle of universality, to be respected in the participation of all parties in the verification process which affirms the sovereign equality of States in each process; and modalities of enhancing the role of the United Nations; and should be complemented and reinforced by: (a) possibilities and modalities of avoiding non-discriminatory and undue
interference which might jeopardize the socio-economic development of States; (b) possibilities and modalities of strengthening the United Nations' capacity to investigate allegations of non-compliance; (c) possibilities and modalities of examining the concept of the organization of international verification in order to assume the verification responsibilities in future multilateral agreements; (d) possibilities and modalities of examining and monitoring natural disasters; and (e) possibilities and modalities of Member States versed in the verification process to assist the United Nations in regional arms control and disarmament process.

17. Without confidence in the real sense of confidence-building measures, and without effective verification, substantial steps from bilateral to regional and global co-operative security are inconceivable. Such measures are clearly the intent and purpose to be sought for a suitable means of promoting and enhancing regional and global peace.

Notes

1/ General Assembly resolution S-10/2.