NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1. Today the human race is at a decisive turning-point in history. Nuclear weapons threaten to annihilate not only everything created by man over the centuries, but mankind itself and even life on earth.

The universal understanding that a nuclear war cannot be fought urgently requires agreement on effective measures for its prevention and measures of nuclear disarmament, including the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

On 15 January 1986, the Soviet Union put forward for the consideration of the world community a phased programme for the complete and universal elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. It proposes specific measures for the creation of a nuclear-free world and a time frame for their implementation.

2. This programme was developed further in a series of proposals made by the USSR at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik.

The Reykjavik meeting made the nuclear disarmament issue the subject of practical negotiations and confirmed the real possibility of solving the cardinal problems of the nuclear space complex.

3. If the American side were to respond to the USSR proposals put forward during the meeting, this would mean an end to the arms race and a basic turn-around in the direction of disarmament and removal of the nuclear threat in the shortest possible time.
4. Solutions must be found in the interest of achieving a nuclear-free, non-violent world and avenues must be sought leading to mutually acceptable understandings and equal security.

The Soviet proposals designed to secure decisive advances at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons were an example of this search.

The USSR is proposing to the United States the immediate conclusion of a separate agreement on the complete elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and a sharp reduction - to 100 warheads - of such missiles in the Asian part of the USSR and within the national territory of the United States. At the same time, the USSR is prepared to incorporate in the agreement on medium-range missiles the obligation completely to eliminate its operational-tactical missiles (with a range of from 500 to 1,000 kilometres) in Europe, within a comparatively short and precisely designated period of time, for example one year.

5. The cause of international security would also be served by measures to reduce the huge concentration of tactical nuclear and non-nuclear weapons on the European continent as well as the armed forces confronting each other.

In order to correct the extremely unsatisfactory state of affairs prevailing there, the situation must be radically altered by the adoption of measures to preclude the possibility of surprise attack. The achievement of this goal would be greatly facilitated by the implementation of the USSR proposal for the elimination of tactical battlefield missiles.

The majority of tactical nuclear weapons are "dual purpose" weapons, capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear warheads. This is another reason for considering together the issues of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in combination with tactical airforces, atomic artillery and other tactical nuclear devices.

This is the approach underlying the appeal adopted in Budapest on 11 June 1986 from the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty addressed to the States members of NATO and to all European countries for a programme of reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

The holding in Vienna of a meeting of all Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will be timely and it could take a decision on the initiation of full-scale negotiations with a view to the radical reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, armed forces and conventional weapons.

6. In supporting the Soviet proposal on medium-range missiles, designed to achieve within a short time real progress towards the complete liberation of Europe from nuclear weapons, the socialist countries submitting this working paper continue to attach great importance to the question of the substantial reduction, followed by the elimination, of strategic weapons. The conclusion of such an agreement must depend on a decision not to allow weapons to be placed in outer space, in view of the organic link between these issues.
7. The process of nuclear disarmament can be spread over 10 years, starting with a radical reduction, scheduled over five years, of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States.

During the first five-year period, the USSR and the United States will reduce by 50 per cent their inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers. At the same time, the Soviet Union will also reduce its heavy ICBMs by 50 per cent. By the end of this period, the USSR and the United States will have not more than 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles and not more than 6,000 warheads on them.

With respect to long-range sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles, which are not part of the strategic triad, a separate mutually acceptable solution is being worked out to limit their deployment.

In order to ensure an uninterrupted process of nuclear disarmament, concurrently with the implementation of the practical measures described above, during this initial five-year period talks will be held to reach agreement on subsequent steps towards the universal elimination of nuclear weapons.

8. The elimination of nuclear weapons requires a very firm stand on the question of verification.

Checks and inspections are needed everywhere - at the places for dismantling and destruction of missiles, at test sites and military bases, including those on foreign territory, at depots and plants, whether private or State-owned.

9. The transition to a nuclear-free world means not only the elimination of nuclear arsenals but also not establishing another equivalent - particularly a space equivalent - of nuclear weapons and not refining nuclear weapons.

The solution of the nuclear disarmament problem is inseparably linked to the prevention of an arms race in space. In wresting mankind from a nuclear nightmare, it is unforgivable to subject it to a laser-space nightmare.

Once nuclear weapons are eliminated, there must be a solid guarantee against attempts to achieve military superiority through space. The deployment of weapons in space is in essence a way to create an attack echelon of forward-based strategic offensive forces. The significance of this echelon is that it can be brought as close as possible to strategic targets in the territory of a potential adversary and will be capable of ensuring minimal flight time in comparison with other components of strategic offensive forces.

If the United States plays havoc with space ABM missiles, then there will be no agreement on strategic weapons.

10. At the same time, the sharp reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear arsenals will also be made possible through agreements leading to the ultimate goal of preventing the deployment of weapons in space and agreements on strengthening the régime established by the Soviet-American ABM Treaty. These measures would
provide for strict compliance with all the provisions of this Treaty and renunciation of the right to withdraw from it for 10 years, i.e., for the period during which the USSR and the United States, in accordance with the mutual understanding reached at Reykjavik, would eliminate their strategic offensive weapons. This would allow the continuation of ABM research but would confine it to the laboratories, i.e. scientific research on earth – in institutes, at test sites and in plants. The list of devices whose introduction into space would be prohibited during this research must be agreed on by experts.

At the conclusion of the ten-year period, a new situation would arise in which the two sides might hold special negotiations over a period of three to five years in order to formulate mutually acceptable decisions on how to proceed further in the ABM field.

11. The first step towards reducing and subsequently eliminating nuclear weapons, as is widely recognized in the United Nations, is a nuclear-weapon test ban.

Negotiations must be started immediately to conclude as soon as possible a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. At full-scale negotiations on a radical solution of this question, a step-by-step approach is possible by means of agreement, in particular, on interim limitations on the quantity and yield of nuclear explosions. These measures must also be substantive and provide for a significant reduction in the permitted yield of explosions and the number of tests per year and must also be truly interim and temporary, with the establishment of clear deadlines for the transition to a complete nuclear test ban.

The USSR is also prepared to work out with the United States a formula making it possible to ratify the Soviet-American agreements of 1974 and 1976 on the limitation of underground nuclear explosions.

Negotiations on a nuclear test ban are the task of the Conference on Disarmament. In addition to trying to solve this question at the Geneva Conference, the USSR is ready to conduct such negotiations in any forum and with any composition, but of course with the participation of the United States.

Effective verification machinery to ensure compliance with the provisions of a future agreement must be established. This international inspection machinery may be established within the United Nations or the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

12. The USSR and the United States could work out "key provisions" concerning strategic offensive weapons, ABM missiles and nuclear tests. Together with the signing of a treaty on medium-range missiles, these might become the subject of a high-level understanding and the basis on which legally binding agreements between the USSR and the United States might be prepared.

13. The content of the negotiations at the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik confirmed the reality of nuclear disarmament in a historically not-too-distant future. At present it is important not to allow erosion of those specific reference points for nuclear disarmament that were mapped out there, and it is important to achieve the implementation of practical measures in this field.

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Of special significance in this regard is the unanimous support given by the international community at the forty-first session of the General Assembly to resolution 41/59 F, "Nuclear disarmament".

Noting that "the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons", this resolution stresses in particular that "the Governments and peoples of various countries expect that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will reach agreement on halting the nuclear-arms race and reducing nuclear weapons, so as to start the process of nuclear disarmament".

14. Because of the interdependent nature of survival, which has become a reality of our nuclear space age, all States have a vital interest in ensuring that nuclear weapons are eliminated and that the arms race does not spread to outer space.

Co-operation among all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, large and small, has now become a vital necessity. The potential of the United Nations and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament must be used as effectively as possible in this connection. In order to promote such co-operation, it would be useful to initiate an exchange of views among all nuclear Powers, which could be conducted both at the Conference on Disarmament and within the framework of the United Nations by making use, in particular, of the machinery of the Security Council. In the course of such a multilateral exchange of views, consideration should be given to a number of essential, specific issues, particularly the cessation of the production of fissionable and fusionable nuclear materials used to develop and create weapons, the order for eliminating nuclear weapons, the basic methods for verifying multilateral nuclear disarmament measures, and also the timetable for involving the nuclear Powers in the process of nuclear disarmament.

The practical implementation of nuclear disarmament measures concerning the United Kingdom, France and China would take place after the radical reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States.

15. A special meeting of the Security Council could also be devoted to the consideration of the question of halting the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament.

More effective use should also be made of the potential of the Disarmament Commission in searching for common ground in the positions of the nuclear-weapon States regarding possible ways and means of eliminating such weapons.

16. In the struggle to bring about a nuclear-free and non-violent world, regional efforts, such as the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, also have an important role to play.

As consistent advocates of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the socialist countries submitting this working paper are deeply convinced that progress in this direction will undeniably promote the strengthening of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war, the creation of a climate of international trust and détente, and the elimination of nuclear weapons.
They support the agreements in force in this field - the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco) and the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty) - and actively promote the burgeoning process of transforming the other regions of the globe into nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The implementation of the proposals to establish zones which are completely free of nuclear weapons depends on the political will and a joint decision of the States concerned in the particular regions. Agreements on establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones must be in accordance with the generally recognized norms of international law and must ensure faithful observance of their truly non-nuclear status with suitable verification. The establishment and effectiveness of nuclear-weapon-free zones to a large extent also depend on the attitude of other States, particularly the nuclear Powers, with regard to such zones.

In this connection, the nuclear-weapon States must assume the obligation to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States situated in such zones.

The question of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Balkans, in Central and Northern Europe and in other parts of Europe is becoming increasingly important. Noting, in particular, that the Soviet Union firmly advocates the establishment of such zones and expresses a readiness to provide the necessary guarantees, the socialist countries submitting this working paper once again call on the United States as well as on the United Kingdom and France to show the same readiness.

17. The German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic made a proposal to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe. This proposal received widespread support in Europe.

The following would be subject to removal from such a zone: all nuclear munitions including nuclear mines, operational-tactical and tactical missiles, nuclear artillery, launcher strike tactical aircraft and also nuclear-capable surface-to-air missile systems.

The Soviet Union has declared its readiness to withdraw all Soviet nuclear weapons from such a corridor and to guarantee and respect the nuclear-weapon-free status of the zone. Of course, a corresponding agreement must stipulate that there will be no NATO nuclear weapons either in the corridor proposed by the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

18. Of great importance for the practical implementation of the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe would be the acceptance by the Soviet Union and the United States of the mutual obligation to refrain from deploying any nuclear weapons in the territory of States where there are no such weapons and also not to increase nuclear stockpiles or replace such weapons with new ones in those countries where they are already deployed. Furthermore, the non-nuclear States, in whose territory there are no nuclear weapons at the present
time, must not permit the deployment of such weapons there. These measures would help prevent the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons, limit the nuclear-arms race, ensure a balance of forces at the lowest level and maintain the truly nuclear-weapon-free status of those States in whose territory there are no nuclear weapons.

19. The process of ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must include the seas and oceans. Steps must be taken to remove nuclear weapons from certain sea regions. This question could be resolved initially with regard to the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.

20. The nuclear danger can and must be eliminated. Energetic and decisive action by all States - nuclear and non-nuclear, members of military and political alliances, and neutral and non-aligned States - constitutes a guarantee for successfully solving this very important problem.

21. A more active role in this regard must also be played by the United Nations, which, as stressed in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, "has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament".

The successful accomplishment by the United Nations of this important task entrusted to it also depends to a considerable extent on the effective functioning of the Disarmament Commission. This deliberative body of the General Assembly can and must make a sizeable contribution to the search for mutually acceptable solutions, particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament questions, and help to enhance the effectiveness and productivity of the negotiations being held on this subject.