VERIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

Basic issues of verification of confidence-building measures, arms limitation and disarmament at all stages of moving towards a safe and nuclear-weapon-free world

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1. The current precarious situation in the world warrants the formation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security which should ultimately rely on the complete elimination of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction, as proposed in the programme enunciated by M. S. Gorbachev, Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on 15 January 1986. The efforts of the international community and of individual States should be directed towards developing practical and effective measures which would make it possible to rid mankind as soon as possible of nuclear arms and all other types of weapons of mass destruction and to remove once and for all the danger of transforming outer space into an arena of military confrontation. It is precisely the need to achieve these goals that should determine the approach to all issues relating to verification of confidence-building measures, arms limitation and disarmament.

2. Today an entirely new world situation has emerged, marked by growing recognition of the realities and prospects of the nuclear age. Under these circumstances nobody can act as heretofore. The realization that the stockpiling of nuclear armaments and their modernization has brought mankind closer to the fatal brink, when military technology and power politics can no longer provide security, require from all fresh approaches, new political thinking and a new philosophy in politics. This is equally true of verification. The policy of confrontation and the arms race make it difficult not only to reach disarmament
agreements, but to undertake verification measures as well. On the other hand, normal relations and co-operation among States contribute to the elaboration and the successful functioning of reliable systems of verification.

3. The Soviet-United States summit meeting at Reykjavik has demonstrated most vividly that in a larger context the problem of verification has been now removed from the agenda as an alleged obstacle to concluding agreements. Furthermore, taking into account the fact that disarmament measures affect the extremely sensitive area of national security, the Socialist countries reaffirm once again that they are determined to achieve the strictest system of verification, including international verification. Considering that verification must be an integral part of any accords on confidence-building measures, arms limitation and disarmament, they none the less condemn all attempts to use the verification issue in order to evade concrete agreements in this field.

4. The necessity of elaborating and implementing without delay arms limitation and disarmament measures is assuming additional urgency in view of the fact that the arms race has reached a critical point when nowadays the advancement of military technology has rendered the task of verification extremely difficult. Taking into account the critical urgency that the time factor has acquired and the apprehensions expressed by some countries lest verification issues are downplayed at the disarmament negotiations, these negotiations should from the very outset deal simultaneously with verification issues as well so that a comprehensive agreement is reached as soon as possible.

5. The principal objective of verification is to promote the implementation of confidence-building and arms limitation measures, to build confidence among countries as embodied in the very fact of their entering into an arms limitation agreement, and to ensure that there is objective information about the real state of affairs in the field of compliance. For this reason, effectiveness is the basic requirement for verification. To meet this requirement would be the most important guarantee for the stability of any agreement; given the assured confidence of States parties in the strict compliance with the obligations assumed, the validity of the agreement itself will be ensured.

6. Verification must be used to ensure the viability of disarmament agreements. Hence, besides effectiveness, adequacy is another basic requirement of verification. This implies that verification measures should fully correspond to the scope and nature of the envisaged limits. As the compliance record of international agreements in the field of disarmament indicates, the principle of proportionality between verification measures and arms limitation measures has fully proved its usefulness. It is no accident that this principle is codified in a number of universally acknowledged instruments, including in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2).

7. Depending on the specifics of agreements, an optimal combination of various methods of verification should be employed such as national technical means and international procedures, including, when necessary, on-site inspection. The compliance record of existing agreements in the field of arms limitation serves to
reaffirm the indisputable effectiveness of national technical means for verification. The latest advances and relentless progress in science and technology considerably facilitate the elaboration of appropriate verification methods and procedures to ensure compliance with the relevant agreements. Moreover, additional measures could be developed and adopted, as needed, to guarantee effectiveness of control. These involve, above all, various notifications and exchanges of quantitative information concerning levels of armaments. Other verification measures could also be undertaken, including on-site inspection and supranational procedures. It is essential, of course, that such measures should not be used for undue interference in the internal affairs of States nor should they diminish the security of any country and jeopardize its economic and social development. Verification must be based on the principle of the equality of parties in their rights and obligations under any agreement and must be in conformity with the fundamental principles of international law.

8. The Disarmament Commission should focus its attention on the formulation of concerted approaches to the principles, methods and techniques of verification. Scientists and civilian and military experts from various countries could be assigned to this work.

9. The new constructive proposals of Socialist States on verification are designed to impart further momentum to the arms limitation talks. They make it possible to develop and undertake the most radical verification measures within the genuine process of confidence-building and disarmament in the most important fields.

10. In particular, it would be advisable to elaborate specific procedures for the elimination of nuclear weapons, as well as for the dismantling, decommission or destruction of delivery vehicles, pursuant to the implementation of the programme for the elimination of nuclear arms. It would be necessary to agree on the quantity of weapons to be eliminated at every stage as well as on the sites for their destruction, etc. The elimination or limitation of weapons could be monitored by both national technical means and on-site inspection. Any other verification measures are also possible.

11. To make a first and, therefore, most crucial step towards disarmament, an agreement on medium-range missiles should be reached. Verification of the reduction, and even more so of the elimination of entire classes of nuclear weapons in Europe, is becoming one of the most important means of safeguarding security. For this reason, the elaboration of the most stringent verification measures is needed. The remaining missiles and launchers, whether operational or stored at test sites, production facilities, training centres, etc., should be the subject of pertinent control, including the use of on-site inspection. Inspectors must be ensured of access to military bases of the other State party on the territory of third countries. This is essential if there is to be complete confidence in strict compliance with the agreement.

12. Effective and adequate verification, including the strictest exercise of comprehensive international control, is needed to monitor the complete and general elimination of nuclear arms in accordance with the programme proposed by the Soviet Union, the final stage of which would be the signing of a universal treaty banning the reintroduction of these weapons.
13. In the field of banning nuclear-weapon tests, the capabilities of national technical means have long ago disproved all claims regarding the difficulty of verification. The new proposals of the USSR have left no place for any speculative "arguments" to this effect. If, at long last, the United States should agree to halt nuclear testing on a reciprocal basis with the USSR, effective verification could be fully ensured through a combination of national technical means and international procedures, including, when necessary, on-site inspection. To a certain extent, the joint Soviet-United States experiment at Semipalatinsk has become the model for any such monitoring. The implementation of the Soviet proposal to exchange seismic data of level II and a corresponding international experiment in 1988 would contribute to progress in the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. In this connection, Sweden's proposal to devise a standard seismic station merits approval.

14. The Soviet Union proposed to consider the establishment of an international mechanism to verify the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. The United Nations or the Conference on Disarmament would be the most appropriate framework for such a mechanism. The readiness of the USSR, in monitoring a ban on nuclear testing, to avail itself of the assistance offered by the New Delhi Six* as well as to accept recommendations drafted under the auspices of the United Nations is an important positive factor. The meeting of experts from the Six with Soviet and United States experts could be a valuable contribution to achieving the goal of a comprehensive nuclear-weapon-test ban. The consent of the USSR to send its experts to such a meeting even if the United States would not reconsider its negative stand on this proposal of the New Delhi Six is to be welcomed. Taking into consideration the legitimate interest of all States in a nuclear-weapon-test ban, other States could also contribute to accomplishing this objective by proposing, if they so wish, their good offices towards effective verification.

15. A treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is needed for the final disposition of the problem of testing. To this end, all kinds of negotiations could be conducted - bilateral, trilateral or multilateral within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament - which at the very outset could also address the issues of verification with a view to reaching without delay a comprehensive agreement.

16. Verification of a ban on the extension of the arms race into outer space also lends itself to effective solution. Of great importance in this respect is the proposal of the USSR to set up an international monitoring system to prevent the deployment of any type of weapons in outer space, providing for the establishment of an international inspectorate entrusted with the right of access for on-site inspection to all objects designed to be launched and deployed in outer space and their respective launchers. Equally important is the readiness of the USSR to open, on a mutual basis, space research laboratories for inspection to monitor compliance with an agreement prohibiting the development of space strike weapons.

* Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania.
17. The immediate and complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the very facilities for their manufacture is to be carried out under strict control, including international on-site inspections. To these aims systematic international verification is to be carried out of the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and of the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes. In April 1986 and February 1987 the USSR submitted to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament additional far-reaching proposals aimed at ensuring effective control over the destruction and dismantling of production facilities for chemical weapons and envisaging systematic on-site inspections of such facilities. Furthermore, the phasing-out of each facility for the production of chemical weapons would be ensured by means of strict verification, including systematic international inspections.

18. Thus, systematic international on-site inspection, coupled with permanent instrumental monitoring, would become the basic method of international verification of compliance with the key provisions of a future convention prohibiting chemical arms. The experience and practice of the International Atomic Energy Agency could be utilized, as necessary, in working out detailed provisions relating to such systematic international inspections.

19. Reasonable verification will be naturally required for any possible agreement on the reduction of Soviet and United States armed forces and any follow-up freeze on the level of the armed forces of the opposing alliances in central Europe. As to compliance with the obligation for a numerical freeze of armed forces, the Socialist States declared their readiness to set up permanent control posts to monitor the movement of military units at the points of entrance and exit in the areas marked for reductions.

20. In June 1986 the Socialist States put forward a new initiative providing for a considerable reduction in all components of the land forces and the tactical strike air force of the European States, as well as in the respective forces of the United States and Canada stationed in Europe. In addition to conventional arms, reductions should be also made in the tactical short-range nuclear missiles with a range up to 1,000 km.

21. The reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments should be carried out under effective and reliable control using both national technical means and international verification procedures, including on-site inspection. Along with measures to verify the very process of reductions, it has been proposed to monitor the military activities of the armed forces left after reductions. Adequate forms of verification should also be adopted with regard to confidence-building measures to be undertaken under the agreements. For the purpose of verification, at a specified time the parties would exchange data concerning the total numerical strength of their land forces and tactical strike air force units deployed in the area subject to reductions as well as, separately, data concerning the units which are to be reduced and the units remaining after any reductions occur. Also exchanged should be lists of reduced (disbanded) units with information about their names, numbers, location and levels of the principal types of armaments to be reduced. There should be notifications of the commencement and of the finalization of reductions. For the purpose of verification, an international consultative
commission should be established with the participation of representatives from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty countries, as well as representatives from the neutral, non-aligned and other European States concerned. The on-site monitoring of armed forces reductions and of weapons destruction or stockpiling could be carried out, as necessary, with the participation of representatives of the international consultative commission. To this end, control posts manned by representatives of the international consultative commission should be set up at important railway junctions, airfields and seaports.

22. The agreement reached at the first stage of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is of high importance. The provisions of the concluding document of the Conference, particularly those dealing with compliance and verification, are a valuable example of the search for solutions to important problems of military nature.

23. There is another aspect of verification: verification at military bases in foreign territories of compliance with the prohibition of certain activities under an agreement. It would be necessary to have access to these bases for inspection in order to ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken.

24. With regard to the verification of compliance with agreements to reduce military budgets, it is essential to ensure confidence that these agreements are compiled with. In this respect is to be recalled the proposal which the States members of the Warsaw Treaty put forward to the States members of NATO on 5 March 1984. The difficulty of resolving this problems should not be used as a pretext to reject real reductions in the military budgets of States. Like in other disarmament issues, adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned should be agreed upon at the negotiations on the reduction of military budgets.

25. Taking into account the need for intensified participation of the United Nations in verification matters, it is possible for the United Nations, following relevant requests, to participate in the elaboration and implementation of the verification provisions of disarmament agreements by providing assistance, consultative and technical services to its Member States and by using the experience and documentation of the organs and agencies within its system and the Conference on Disarmament. With a view to facilitating the solution of the question of verification of confidence-building measures, arms limitation and disarmament, it is possible to consider in a positive spirit Finland's idea of establishing a United Nations bank of military and scientific-technological data and information to be provided by Member States on a voluntary basis.

26. Since faithful compliance with obligations undertaken to curb armaments and pursue disarmament is absolutely essential for improving the climate of mutual trust and for reaching new agreements, States parties to bilateral and multilateral agreements on arms limitation and disarmament should submit to the United Nations, at their discretion, periodical information concerning compliance with these agreements. Questions and ambiguities relating to compliance should be clarified in a constructive and businesslike spirit, free from rash and unwarranted accusations which could only heighten suspicions and tensions among States and be used as a pretext to abandon existing agreements.

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27. The proposals of the Socialist countries in the field of verification demonstrate vividly their readiness constructively and urgently to resolve the pressing problems of curbing the arms race by reducing the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war and by strengthening security and confidence throughout the world. Under present-day international circumstances and given the lack of mutual trust, verification measures are quite indispensable. Whether exercised by national technical means or by international compliance procedures, verification should be in the interest of concrete disarmament agreements, rather than a mere assessment of existing levels of armaments. Adequate comprehensive verification is an indispensable collateral measure for all efforts to implement confidence-building measures and arms reduction. It is called upon to become one of the most important guarantees of the comprehensive system of international security, providing for reliability of its foundation in the military field.