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VERIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

Addendum

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HUNGARY

[Original: English]

[15 May 1987]

1. The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic is convinced that control and verification are of decisive importance in the entire range of arms control and disarmament. Without these advantages there is no confidence and without confidence there is neither disarmament nor arms control. Effective and comprehensive verification is an integral part, an essential element and a major factor of the disarmament process, which serves to ensure the strictest compliance with the commitments undertaken.

2. The elaboration of a new disarmament and arms control agreement is inconceivable without solving the question of control and verification, which in turn is indispensable for strengthening international security and building a streamlined system of peace and security. Guaranteeing common security under conditions of quickly changing security considerations calls for both the reliance on existing experience and forms of control and verification and the elaboration and application of new forms and approaches.

3. The Soviet-United States Summit in Reykjavik outlined the contours of a world free from nuclear weapons. Such a world requires more effective, more stringent and more adequate arrangements for control and verification on a continuing basis. Verification in the post-nuclear age must be global and all-embracing, of a kind to provide full assurance of compliance with agreements in every stage of reductions in and complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

4. Since several categories of nuclear weapons are the subject of negotiations, it is important to have the question of control regulated in a way satisfactory to all the parties concerned. Should the process of destruction of nuclear weapons actually be set in motion, it would be necessary to build a system of strictest control. Control and inspections should cover the sites of dismantling and destroying missiles, testing sites, and military bases, including in third countries, as well as storage sites and production plants. Following the complete destruction of these categories of weapons, the said control and verification measures should provide the most reliable guarantees possible to the effect that the weapons destroyed would never again appear in the arsenals.

5. An integral part of the decades-long struggle for the complete prohibition of nuclear-test explosions is formed by efforts to work out procedures for the verification of the observance of such prohibition, including the establishment of a global international seismic monitoring network. In resolution 41/54 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-first session, the Hungarian People's Republic urged the nuclear Powers, together with a number of other countries, to declare a moratorium on nuclear explosions until the elaboration of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear explosions and to establish without delay an international monitoring network for the verification of compliance with obligations.

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6. The working group of seismological government experts, which has been active within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament for more than a decade, has accumulated a unique body of experience concerning verification of a future convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear explosions. The practice of international exchange of second-level seismic data, which is envisaged for 1988, will furnish additional highly valuable experience concerning the operation of such a system. That experience may provide a basis for specifying and elaborating security-policy, economic and technical conditions for a global monitoring network.

7. The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic is sincerely convinced that prevention of the extension of the arms race to outer space is a global interest. It is therefore necessary to seek and devise new forms, as effective and as strict as possible, of control and verification extending even to laboratories and experiments. It is obvious that the introduction of offensive weapons into outer space would critically reduce the possibilities of any political and even human control over them. Under such conditions, the strictest control of activities for restricting to Earth any research on the development of missile defence systems is a question of prime importance. For this reason we lend full support to the Soviet proposal that experts of the Soviet Union and the United States should start negotiating a list of devices whose placement in outer space in the course of research would be prohibited.

8. The negotiations on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons give ample evidence that the questions of control and verification are complex and grow in importance, but their solution cannot present insurmountable obstacles, either political or technical. The Hungarian People's Republic is in favour of a complete and comprehensive prohibition, as early as possible, of these weapons and of the industrial capacities for their production. Chemical weapons should be destroyed under strict and effective verification procedures, including on-site inspection. It is certain that such verification procedures and inspection will be indispensable in future not only in the course of destroying stockpiles of chemical weapons and dismantling their production plants, but also in respect to certain aspects of permitted activities. In these areas there should be applied forms of control which would not impose unnecessary burdens and restrictions on activities for peaceful purposes, but would offer effective and fully reliable guarantees for compliance with an agreement.

9. The experience of the Second Review Conference on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons shows that the prohibition of all categories of the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction and the verification of full compliance with relevant agreements following the complete destruction of those weapons call for adoption of measures to maintain and strengthen confidence on a continuing basis. For this reason the socialist countries lent full support to the proposals for strengthening the Treaty and increasing the efficiency of its control mechanism through forms of political, legal, scientific and economic co-operation. The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic is convinced that the recommendations of the meeting of experts held at Geneva in April 1987 on the basis of the mandate formulated in the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference represent significant progress in the
right direction. Full implementation of those recommendations will not only serve a useful purpose in strengthening the Treaty, but may also furnish a body of experience to be relied upon at other disarmament and arms control talks.

10. The document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe has registered results that can be expected to exercise a positive effect also in the longer run on the elaboration and application of control measures aimed at strengthening common security. The accord reached leaves scope for co-ordination and the adoption of political and military-technological measures to reduce the risk of war by surprise attack in Europe and to strengthen security and confidence among the participants in the agreements reached. These agreements, which should be followed by additional ones in Europe and possibly in other regions of the world, have testified to the actual possibility of elaborating and adopting mutual confidence-building measures in connection with the activities of military forces having essentially different quantitative and qualitative parameters.

11. It is of symbolic significance that the Stockholm accord has been the first major political-military agreement since the conclusion of the Soviet-United States SALT-II Agreement. This accord has opened the way to significant mutual and balanced reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments as well as in tactical nuclear weapons. In every stage of this process there is a need for effective and strict control of compliance with commitments by the use of national technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspection.

12. The experience of arms control and disarmament negotiations shows that, if the necessary political will is given, control and verification presents no insurmountable obstacles to reaching an agreement. At the same time, control of implementation of existing as well as future arms control and disarmament measures calls for more complex and more comprehensive joint efforts by the Governments, organizations and scientists of all countries in the world.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]

[18 May 1987]

1. The Soviet Union attaches the greatest importance to the problem of verification of confidence-building measures and to the limitation and reduction of armaments.

2. Comprehensive and strict verification is the most important aspect of the disarmament process. Keeping in mind that measures elaborated in the course of this process affect the vital interests of the security of States and their military potential, the USSR feels that there must be complete certainty that all parties to bilateral and multilateral agreements fulfil conscientiously the obligations they have undertaken without the possibility of avoiding them in any way. Only effective and adequate verification can provide this certainty. Disarmament without verification is therefore impossible.
3. That is why the USSR advocates far-reaching measures in this area, even including comprehensive international verification when matters reach the point of comprehensive and complete disarmament. It is prepared to pursue any course that will realize this noble goal, and at every stage and in every area will insist on the strictest verification measures to ensure observance of the agreements reached, including international verification, and where necessary, on-site inspection. Keeping in mind the universal nature of the problem of disarmament and hence of verification, the Soviet Union wants the role of the United Nations in this area to be increased in every way, and primarily in the formulation of general principles and norms providing various ways and means of verification.

4. In approaching the question of verification objectively rather than in terms of general declarations, the Soviet Union feels that the main purpose of verification is to facilitate the implementation of measures to limit the arms race, strengthen confidence among the parties — confidence based on the very act of their entering into an arms limitation agreement — and provide factual information on the actual state of its implementation. Therefore, the basic demand the Soviet Union places on verification is effectiveness. Implementation of this demand is the most important guarantee of the durability of such an agreement. If the parties are certain that the obligations they have undertaken are being strictly observed, the agreement itself will be a lasting one.

5. In the view of the USSR, each arms limitation agreement may embody its own special verification measures, its own specific ways and means of implementation. However, what really matters in any such agreement is tangible measures to limit and reduce armaments. Verification without specific measures loses all meaning. It makes no sense, for example, to design rules of verification and then adjust the scope and nature of obligations to them. It is also inadmissible to replace verification of disarmament with verification of armaments.

6. Verification must be used in order to ensure the viability of a disarmament agreement. Hence, in addition to effectiveness, another basic demand of the USSR's approach to verification is adequacy. This means that verification measures must be fully in keeping with the scope and nature of established limitations. As experience in the implementation of international disarmament agreements has shown, the principle of proportionality between measures of verification and measures of arms limitation has fully proved itself. It is no coincidence that this has been laid down in a number of universally recognized international instruments, including the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

7. Effective and adequate means of verification, designed to give confidence in the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by States, are an integral part of Soviet arms limitation and disarmament proposals.

8. This also applies fully to the programme for the phased elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century put forward by the Soviet Union in the statement of 15 January 1986 by M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the context of implementing the extensive practical measures proposed in
that programme, the demands placed on verification methods are, of course, significantly increased. Specifically, it requires the development of special procedures for destroying nuclear armaments as well as eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles. Agreement must be reached at every stage on how many weapons will be destroyed and where. Of course there must be reliable verification, including international verification and on-site inspection, of the destruction of weapons or the conversion of the relevant equipment and facilities. Special verification procedures are obviously required at the concluding stage of the programme and for the verification of a universal agreement that nuclear weapons should never come into being.

9. An important event in nuclear disarmament was the summit meeting between the USSR and the United States in October of last year in Reykjavik. It showed that genuine agreements are possible on sharp reductions of nuclear weapons, even to the extent of their complete elimination. In these circumstances, a discussion of problems of verification at all stages of nuclear disarmament becomes in effect a platitude. It is precisely for that reason that, at the Reykjavik meeting, the Soviet Union supported the most far-reaching verification, which would ensure full confidence on the part of each side that the agreements in this field will be strictly observed.

10. Now that the new Soviet initiatives in the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons have brought the sides close to adopting wide-ranging measures on the elimination of entire classes of nuclear weapons in Europe, both intermediate-range and tactical, the Soviet Union has endorsed the formulation of the strictest verification measures, going even beyond those proposed by the United States. Appropriate verification, including on-site inspection, must cover the missiles and launch sites remaining after reductions, including military strengths and all other infrastructure: testing grounds, factories, manufacturers, instruction centres, etc. Inspectors must also be admitted to the military bases of the other side in the territories of third countries. This is essential for complete certainty that the agreements are being strictly observed.

11. The Soviet Union favours the most far-reaching steps in the field of verification and in solving the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. If an agreement is reached on the prohibition of space weapons, the Soviet Union is prepared to open up its laboratories on a reciprocal basis for verification of the agreement.

12. The USSR also is proposing the development of a system of international verification concerning the inadmissibility of deployment in outer space of weapons of any kind, including the creation of an international inspectorate with the right of access, for purposes of on-site inspection, to all objects intended for launching into orbit and for deployment in outer space and the corresponding launchers.

13. Striving for a complete and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, the USSR feels it essential to provide reliable international machinery for the verification of a future agreement. In the view of the USSR, the establishment of such machinery
within the United Nations or the Disarmament Conference would facilitate a prompt halt to nuclear tests. Important factors for ensuring verification capable of facilitating progress in the halting of nuclear tests would be the exchange of second-level seismic data and the conduct of a corresponding international experiment in 1988, as well as the implementation of the Swedish proposal for setting up a model seismic station.

14. The Soviet Union favours the earliest and complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the very industrial base for their manufacture, under strict verification, including international on-site inspections, which must be a basic form of verification—of compliance with the key provisions of a future convention on the banning of chemical weapons. It favours the tightest verification measures, ones that would preclude the possibility of producing chemical weapons in the form of commercial chemicals whether in State or in private enterprises or in the subsidiary enterprises of transnational corporations located in other countries.

15. The Soviet Union strongly favours improvement of the verification machinery of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, especially through the elaboration and adoption of an additional protocol to the Convention providing measures to strengthen the system of verification of its implementation.

16. In promoting the consistent limitation of the military potential of States and its reduction to within reasonable limits, the Soviet Union proposes strict control of this process.

17. In June 1986 the Soviet Union, together with its Warsaw Treaty allies, proposed a programme for a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons over a broad geographical area, from the Atlantic to the Urals. This proposal provides for reliable verification at all stages of reduction with the help of both national technical means and international means of verification, including on-site inspection where necessary.

18. It is important to note that this programme would solve the problems of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons together with tactical nuclear systems. The need for precisely such an approach is dictated, inter alia, by considerations of verification and specifically by the fact that tactical nuclear weapons are largely dual-purpose, i.e., they can carry conventional as well as nuclear warheads.

19. Appropriate measures of verification satisfactory to all sides must also be agreed upon during the negotiations on the reduction of military expenditure proposed by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. The difficulty in solving this problem must not be used as a pretext for the rejection of genuine reductions of military expenditure by States.

20. Efforts to solve the problems of verification of compliance with international treaties and agreements on arms limitation and disarmament and on confidence-building measures may be facilitated by the implementation of the idea put forward by Finland for the creation in the United Nations of a bank of
military, scientific and technical data and materials submitted by States Members on a voluntary basis.

21. An important contribution to the constructive solution of the problems of verification was made at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The meeting succeeded for the first time in agreeing on far-reaching provisions for verification of confidence-building measures, including on-site inspections. The Soviet Union feels that this important achievement on the part of all States participating in the European process must be comprehensively developed as part of a transition to reliably verifiable measures for disarmament in Europe.

22. The USSR, believing the conscientious fulfilment of the obligations it has assumed under arms limitation and disarmament treaties to be an indispensable condition for strengthening a climate of mutual confidence and for the formulation of new agreements, is proposing to the other States parties to bilateral and multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreements that they submit periodic reports to the United Nations for its consideration on the implementation by the parties of these agreements. For a comprehensive and thorough study of all aspects of verification, the USSR is proposing the holding in 1988, in the Soviet Union and under the aegis of the World Disarmament Campaign, of a conference of representatives of the public and of non-governmental organizations on problems of verifying compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

23. The Soviet verification proposals clearly show its readiness to solve in a constructive and rapid manner the urgent problems of limiting the arms race in all areas, reducing the danger of a nuclear war and strengthening security throughout the world. The Soviet approach to verification is based on a readiness to take any reasonable steps to help limit armaments. This approach, in all areas of arms limitation and reduction, will help to guarantee the security of all participating States and ultimately lead to a comprehensive system of international security.

24. The argument about the difficulties of verification is by now a threadbare cliché. The problem has been fully eliminated. Behind the deliberate obfuscation there is a clear reluctance on the part of certain States to have their hands tied by any limitations that would prevent them from implementing their long-range plans for building up and perfecting weapons. It is typical that, while paying zealous lip-service to verification, they press for the development of such weapons systems and means of deployment as would be least subject to verification.

25. The experience of Soviet-American and other arms limitation negotiations shows that, when there is a real wish to agree, verification is no obstacle. The problem is not one of verification of compliance with any particular obligation but one of a willingness or unwillingness to accept and comply with such an obligation and a political will for disarmament.

26. As for the Soviet Union, it has shown such will. There is no weapon that it would not be prepared to limit or ban on a mutual basis and with the most effective verification. Convinced that without verification there can be no confidence, the USSR is open to all ways and means of verification.