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Agenda item 10

VERIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

Addendum

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BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]

[7 May 1987]

1. The Byelorussian SSR, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 40/1520, submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a detailed account of its views on questions of verification in a letter dated 23 May 1986 from the Permanent Mission (A/41/422). The views set forth remain the basis of our position and, therefore, should be reflected in the compilation of views to be prepared.

2. Further to what was stated earlier, the Byelorussian SSR considers it necessary to observe that, with the unfolding of the disarmament process, which affects questions of national security more and more intimately, verification must become increasingly rigorous. It must create full confidence on each side that the obligations are being strictly fulfilled.

3. In verification matters, great importance attaches to the principle of reciprocity, non-discrimination and equal applicability in all aspects, irrespective of differences in the political, legal and socio-economic systems of the States parties.

4. There is a need for collective efforts with a view to preventing the creation of new types of armaments which make effective verification impossible, or impede or obstruct it.

5. It is also evident that verification must extend to all the military facilities under the jurisdiction of a State party to an agreement, including those situated in the territory of other countries. Accordingly, access for inspection purposes to the military bases which a State party to an agreement has in the territory of other countries must be ensured, in order to create confidence that no activity prohibited by the agreement is being carried out at those bases. In this matter, the co-operation of the States in whose territory the bases are situated is also required.

6. Recently, many proposals have been put forward by the socialist States advocating the establishment of adequate verification of the cessation of nuclear testing, the prohibition of chemical weapons, the reduction of conventional armaments and the banning of weapons in outer space. They are not, however, eliciting a positive response from those who not long ago were calling for the strictest verification.

7. In this regard, the Byelorussian SSR again emphasizes the lack of integrity and the destructiveness inherent in the attempt to use references to verification questions - whether by asserting that verification is "inadequate" or, in a new variant, that it is "unfeasible" - as a means to avoid reaching agreements on arms limitation and disarmament.

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8. The understandings reached in September 1986 at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe confirm that the problem of verification need never be an obstacle if the parties are genuinely resolved to seek and find mutually acceptable solutions, leading to the reduction and elimination of the danger of war.

9. At the recent Moscow meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the States parties to the Warsaw Pact again affirmed unequivocally their clear-cut position to the effect that the agreements on disarmament questions to be worked out must provide for a strict and effective verification system that corresponds to the substance of disarmament measures, up to and including on-site inspection.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[Original: English]

[12 May 1987]

1. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is convinced that the present situation in the world requires all countries to adopt those approaches which are not encumbered by doctrines based on strength but rather rest on a new political thinking in the sense that security on an equal basis for all in the whole spectrum of international relations can be ensured only by political means. From this understanding of the realities of the nuclear and space era results the proposal of the socialist States designed to generate a comprehensive system of international peace and security. At the same time, a priority role in this complex is played by the questions of disarmament as the most important material guarantee of security.

2. Reflecting on these realities the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic takes the position that effective and adequate measures of comprehensive verification, which will provide a total assurance that all commitments under agreements on the limitation of armament and on disarmament are being strictly complied with, thus significantly strengthening mutual trust and confidence, must be applied at all stages of the disarmament process. As regards the adequacy of verification measures, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic fully endorses the provision of the Final Document (General Assembly resolution S-10/2) of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, of 1978, to the effect that the form and modalities of verification in any specific agreement are contingent on the goals, extent and nature of the agreement and should be determined on their basis.

3. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic also supports the requirement that the participants in an agreement, commensurately with the specific contents of the agreement, use the best possible combinations of various national and international methods and procedures of verification, from the national technical means of verification to international procedures, including - wherever necessary - on-site inspections, including in the territories of third countries.

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4. A non-discriminatory nature of verification must be guaranteed by equal rights and duties of the participating States in the implementation of agreed measures of verification and by an interaction of such measures which must be applicable to all subjects under their respective national jurisdiction.

5. The methods and procedures of monitoring compliance with any agreement in the field of disarmament must preclude the possibility of unwarranted interference with the internal matters as well as any prejudice to the interests of economic and social development of the participating States.

6. In harmony with General Assembly resolution 41/86 Q entitled "Verification in all its aspects", the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has been actively participating in the elaboration of joint principles, provisions and instruments related to adequate verification of agreements on the limitation of armament and on disarmament. We advocate that the concrete results of the Disarmament Commission in this area stimulate the respective disarmament negotiations and lead to the elaboration and implementation of radical contractual legal measures in such priority spheres as the aversion of a nuclear war, general and complete ban on nuclear testing, prevention of a militarization of outer space, general and complete ban on chemical weapons, reduction and limitation of conventional armaments and armed forces.

7. Czechoslovakia, which is located along the direct line of contact between the States members of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, where the concentration of live military force and of the most modern combat equipment is the greatest, is vitally interested in a lessening of the risk of military confrontation in this area. In keeping with this interest, it presented in 1985-1987, jointly with the German Democratic Republic, specific proposals to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the establishment of a zone without chemical weapons and of a corridor free of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has the position that regional and subregional disarmament agreements will contribute to the solution of the global disarmament problems, to enhanced security, to confidence and to a broader international co-operation, if they are governed by a realistic verification régime respecting a reciprocity and equality of obligations - provided that the territories of the participating States are open to inspection. At the same time, it proceeds from the premise that the status of such zones would be guaranteed by the Powers concerned. In this connection, it highly appreciates the Soviet willingness, as stated by the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, M. Gorbachev, on 12 April 1987 in Prague, to guarantee and observe the status of a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe.
1. The United States Government is pleased to respond again to the request for suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques, contained in General Assembly resolution 41/86 Q. Although the United States provided its basic views on verification in October 1986 (see A/41/422/Add.2), this subject is sufficiently important to warrant a follow-up submission in 1987, given significant recent developments in this field.

2. For example, the 35 participating States of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe agreed, in September 1986, on a verification régime involving mandatory on-site inspection, covering the area of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. It provides for on-site inspection from the air or ground or both to verify compliance with agreed measures, with no right of refusal. In our view, this modest step establishes on-site inspection as an integral part of the verification régime for international arms control and disarmament agreements. The United States has long advocated such measures. While future agreements calling for real disarmament measures will require more intrusive means of verification, the inspection measure of the Stockholm document represents an important departure.

3. During the last round of the nuclear and space talks in Geneva, the United States tabled a treaty on the limitation and reduction of intermediate-range nuclear missiles with the most comprehensive verification régime ever set forth. The verification measures proposed by the United States include a series of on-site inspection and monitoring measures to supplement national technical means (NTM). Such a verification régime is designed to detect and thus deter violations; at the same time, it must be pointed out that no verification régime can prevent non-compliance if a party chooses to violate a treaty. At the current round of nuclear and space talks, the Soviet Union has responded to previous United States proposals by tabling its own draft INF treaty which the United States is now reviewing.

4. At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva the States participating in negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons have agreed on the necessity of applying the principle of on-site inspection for verification of compliance with the convention. Inspections would be conducted on a routine basis to verify compliance at declared facilities, such as chemical weapons storage sites, chemical weapons production facilities, and certain commercial plants producing chemicals of concern. The United States has also proposed a stringent mandatory, short notice, on-site challenge inspection régime to help deter and detect treaty violations. Although other members of the Conference on Disarmament have not yet accepted this proposal, there has been movement in this direction.

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5. The United States welcomes application of the principle of on-site inspection in these multilateral and bilateral negotiating forums and notes that a willingness to incorporate on-site inspection measures would constitute progress towards more effective verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

6. The United States welcomes the opportunity to discuss the subject of verification at the 1987 session of the Disarmament Commission and would welcome a similar focus on verification at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1988.