DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

LETTER DATED 1 JUNE 1983 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the Declaration by the Soviet

The Declaration states the position of the USSR on a number of questions
relating to item 4 of the agenda of the current session of the United Nations
Disarmament Commission.

I request you, Sir, to have the text of these replies circulated as an official
document of the Disarmament Commission.

(Signed) O. TROYANOFSKY
Head of the USSR delegation
to the United Nations
Disarmament Commission
DECLARATION BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

1. An integral part of the United States Administration's efforts to gain military superiority is the deployment of new medium-range United States nuclear missiles in the territory of Western Europe, which is planned to take place by the end of 1983. Those missiles, capable of hitting targets deep inside the territory of the Soviet Union, are designed to become a direct addition to the strategic nuclear arsenal of the United States and to change the existing regional and global balance in favour of the West. The emplacement of those missiles would lead to a serious change in the situation in Europe, greatly exacerbate nuclear confrontation and increase the risk of war.

2. In all the negotiations related directly or indirectly to the curbing of the arms race, the United States Administration is pursuing a non-constructive and obstructionist line. This is true of the behaviour of the United States in the negotiations at Geneva, at Vienna, at Madrid and in other international forums.

3. The United States position in the Soviet-United States negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons is aimed not at reaching honest agreement but entirely at obtaining unilateral military advantages. By proposing that the Soviet side should reduce its most modern weapons, and a much larger number of them than on the United States side, Washington is clearly showing its intention of leaving practically untouched the foundations of its nuclear arsenals and its broad programmes for the deployment of the latest strategic weapons, including cruise missiles with every kind of basing. The United States proposals in the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons are aimed not at halting the strategic-weapons race but actually at further accelerating it in those directions which the United States considers favourable for itself.

4. In view of the growing threat to the security of the USSR and its allies as a result of the development, production and bringing to battle-ready condition of new land-based, sea-based and airborne United States strategic weapons, the Soviet Union finds itself compelled to take steps in response in order to strengthen its defensive capacity, and those steps include the deployment of appropriate new strategic systems. Such steps on the part of the Soviet Union are dictated by the realities of the present situation and will be the Soviet Union's reply to the actions of the United States. Their only purpose is to prevent a breakdown of the existing balance of forces.

5. Despite the steps forced upon it, the Soviet Union maintains unchanged its principled approach to the problem of the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. It favours making large reductions in those weapons in their entirety, in the interests of improving general military-strategic stability, with strict observance of the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union's far-reaching proposals made at Geneva for a mutual reduction of strategic delivery vehicles and of the nuclear warheads carried by them provide a good basis for this.

6. An equally constructive position is taken by the Soviet Union on the question of the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. As is known, the
Soviet Union proposes reducing these weapons in such a way that it will have no
more medium-range missiles and no more warheads on them than the United Kingdom and
France. This would mean considerably fewer delivery vehicles and considerably
fewer warheads than the USSR had in Europe in 1976, when the modernization of
Soviet missiles had not yet begun. The Soviet Union does not seek to have a single
medium-range aircraft more or a single airborne warhead more than would be
possessed by the NATO countries.

7. However, the United States is continuing to insist on a solution under which
it would proceed in any case to station its new missiles in Western Europe in late
1983, in addition to the forward-based United States-nuclear weapons already
there. The Soviet Union would have to agree to their deployment and, what is more,
reduce its medium-range missile weaponry unilaterally, not only in the European but
also in the Asian part of the country, ignoring the similar United States weapons
of the United States deployed in large numbers in areas adjacent to our country in
the east.

8. The unacceptability of such proposals is so obvious, that the fact that they
are advanced by the United States can indicate only one thing - a definite
unwillingness to seek mutually acceptable solutions based on the principles of
equality and equal security.

9. The Soviet Union considers it necessary to issue a very clear warning: if the
agreement on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, which excludes the
possibility of the stationing of new United States missiles in Europe, is broken
and, as a result, a further threat is posed to the security of the USSR and its
allies, the Soviet Union will take timely and effective response measures in this
area as well.

10. The decision of the United States and NATO to deploy new United States
missiles in Europe will, if implemented, compel the USSR to review the decision it
took last year for a unilateral moratorium on the further deployment of
medium-range weapons in the European area. It would also become necessary to
implement, by agreement with other States members of the Warsaw Treaty, other
measures for the deployment of additional weapons in order to create the necessary
counterweight to the increasing number of forward-based United States nuclear
weapons in Europe and the nuclear weapons of other NATO countries. As the Soviet
side has warned on a number of occasions, it would also have to take the necessary
response measures aimed at the territory of the United States itself.

11. It is possible to find an equitable agreement at the Geneva talks. This goal
undoubtedly could be achieved if the United States and NATO refrained from actually
deploying new United States missiles in Western Europe.

12. The Soviet Union declares that it is still not too late to halt the dangerous
exacerbation of the situation. It expresses the hope that the United States and
its NATO allies will carefully weigh the inevitable consequences of any
implementation of their plans to deploy new United States missiles in Western
Europe and will respond to the constructive Soviet proposals.
13. As the first and most easily feasible step, and at the same time an effective step, pending an agreement on reductions both in nuclear weapons in Europe and in strategic weapons, the Soviet Union once again proposes that there should be a freeze on the number of such weapons and that their qualitative modernization should be limited as far as possible.

14. It is the duty of all States to find a solution to the urgent tasks of limiting and reducing weapons, especially nuclear weapons, and to return to the path of political and military détente. This is required by the interests of all peoples and States, regardless of the geographical region of the world in which they are situated, the socio-economic system under which they live, or the political group or movement to which they belong.