Disarmament Commission
2013 substantive session
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Agenda items 4 and 5

Recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons

Working paper submitted by Egypt

Introduction

1. Egypt strongly believes in the potential of the Disarmament Commission, as a deliberative body aiming at making recommendations on critical subjects in the field of disarmament. The Commission should be the nurturing ground for new ideas and the launching pad for new initiatives. It should also enable us to continue discussions on “unfinished business”, in a further attempt to bring positions closer, hoping to reach consensus. There are many simple ideas that can further strengthen the unique character of the Commission in the multilateral disarmament machinery.

2. Egypt has proposed a number of such ideas with the aim of enhancing the Commission’s ability to make use of the vast knowledge base that it has built over the years. Egypt highlights in this regard the development of a portal that contains all former proposals and working papers that were discussed in earlier sessions. It would provide an institutional intellectual memory for the Commission and allow us to build on previous discussions. That will be the case even where the Commission was unable to reach consensus on earlier work. Another idea is to hold side events on the margins of Disarmament Commission meetings where fresh ideas can be tested and conclusions shared with the Commission. These are simple ideas, yet they promise to inject some energy into the Commission, with a view to increasing its efficiency and effectiveness.

With regard to Working Group I: recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

3. When considering recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it should be underscored
that nuclear disarmament is the highest priority, as established by the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

4. We should highlight the necessity of implementing the multilateral commitments in the field of nuclear disarmament. In this regard, meeting the deadlines set by the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the highest priority with regard to the preparation of the upcoming review process. The first such deadline was the convening of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. This deadline was not met. Non-compliance with the 2010 commitments will undermine the Treaty review process. Despite the confirmation of participation by all States in the region except one, the Conference was not held on its agreed date. The League of Arab States has continuously urged the conveners to fulfil their commitments. This is the only way to restore the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and ensure success for the 2015 review process. Egypt is watching closely the developments in this regard and will be acting accordingly. This issue should occupy the place it deserves in the work of the Commission. We expect a conclusion highlighting ways to ensure the implementation of the 2010 Review Conference commitments and to convene a conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in 2013.

With regard to Working Group II: practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons

5. The issue of practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons is now even more relevant in the light of the outcome of the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty. Any serious confidence-building process needs to address the following issues:

  • Overproduction and ever-increasing stockpiles of conventional weapons in the hands of major arms exporters and producers. Every effort must be exerted to bring production and stockpiles in major arms-producing States under international scrutiny.

  • Mutual international accountability, as it is the only guarantee against potential abuse of the existing imbalance between major arms producers and the rest of the world.

  • Addressing protracted threats to international peace and security. In this regard, there is no more profound threat to peace and stability, international law, international humanitarian law, human rights law and the core principles of the Charter of the United Nations itself than the crimes of aggression and foreign occupation which employ arms arsenals to threaten and dominate peoples and deny them their most basic human rights.

6. The role of the Disarmament Commission is crucial in developing such “confidence-building measures” that go beyond the traditional sense of the term often used to restrict the agenda in order to protect the narrow interpretation of a limited but privileged group of countries.