DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
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Agenda item 9

SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATION OF ISSUES RELATED TO
CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT

Concrete measures

Working paper submitted by Nigeria

I. General principles

1. Conventional Disarmament measures should aim at the strengthening of
international peace and security among States, by providing, at the very least,
their undiminished security, and excluding the use of unilateral, discriminatory
measures which violate the sovereign rights of States in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. These measures should include
multilateral, regional and bilateral efforts as well as unilateral measures aimed
at both qualitative and quantitative reductions, within an integrated framework
based on a step-by-step approach, towards the achievement of general and complete
disarmament.

II. Reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces

2. Measures on reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces should be
envisioned at multilateral, regional, bilateral and unilateral levels, especially in
regions of high levels of military presence.

3. The pioneering reductions by both the United States and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and their allies who together have the largest concentrations
of forces around the world, would enhance global peace and security as well as

* Reissued for technical reasons.
encourage other States to do the same. In order to delineate dangerous areas for reductions, approaches should be:

(a) Subject-based, by distinguishing the various armed forces and weapons;

(b) Territorially-based, by categorizing armed forces and weapons on the basis of their locations, or;

(c) Interdependently-based by mapping out the interrelationship between armaments and armed forces.

4. However, the most effective measures remain the dissolution of military units and the destruction of armaments with which they are equipped.

5. In taking measures on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, account should be taken of existing asymmetries of the types of components of armaments of armed forces, especially in the qualitative and quantitative sense, as well as give top priority to the types of conventional armaments which could be adapted to nuclear weapons.

III. Restraints/Reductions on militarily-relevant research development and testing

6. Measures should be proposed for the prohibition of the development of new models of, and the limitations on the use of research in science and technology for qualitative and quantitative improvements in, conventional armaments. The qualitative improvements of existing conventional weapons have made these weapons technologically so sophisticated that their destructive capacity approaches that of nuclear weapons, to the extent that their use will give military operations an extremely dangerous character with irreversible consequences for mankind.

IV. Reductions of military deployments

7. Restrictions on the deployment of armies and military equipment also constitute an important measure, especially for the regions characterized by a high level of military presence. These restrictions should include the reductions of new or abolition of existing military bases, military installations and armed forces, whether foreign or national.

8. However, proposals on reductions of military deployments must take into account, especially the negative effects arising from the existence of deployments which support foreign occupation, such as violation of the territorial integrity of States, colonial domination and denial of the rights of peoples to self-determination.

V. International arms transfer

9. The issue of international arms transfer is increasingly gaining attention in the developing countries. Apart from deriving political influence, arms transfers have become for the manufacturers, a thriving source of commercial pursuit. Thus competition between suppliers has become so intense, resulting in the escalation of the acquisition of armaments. Efforts should be directed within this Working Group to limit all types of arms transfers within legitimate defence needs.