DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
1989 substantive session
New York, 8-31 May 1989
Agenda item 4 (a) and (b)

NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1. The sponsors of this working paper submitted comprehensive views on nuclear disarmament and related questions at the 1988 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/110). Taking into account the deliberations at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and recent developments they would like to present some additional ideas in this regard.

Main lines of further nuclear disarmament

2. The Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles represents the very first nuclear disarmament agreement. This valuable initial step should be followed by a treaty between the two States on the reduction of their strategic offensive arms by 50 per cent while strictly adhering to the ABM Treaty of 1972. Such a treaty would constitute major progress towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

3. The radical reduction of the Soviet Union and the United States nuclear arsenals should be followed by negotiations on nuclear disarmament, in which all nuclear-weapon States would participate. A comprehensive programme of nuclear disarmament should be elaborated on the basis of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. Far-reaching ideas have been developed in recent years by the USSR, India, China and other countries.

4. In this context, the Conference on Disarmament would have an important role to play. It would facilitate this process by preparing, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, recommendations as to how to initiate multilateral
negotiations on nuclear disarmament. This could include also the consideration of principles of nuclear disarmament.

5. The following main issues would have to be taken up in this process:

- Interrelationship between bi- and multilateral consideration of the cessation of the nuclear-arms race;
- Security concepts relating to nuclear weapons;
- Stages and measures of nuclear disarmament;
- Interrelationship between measures for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and disarmament measures in other areas;
- Verification of compliance with agreements on nuclear disarmament.

6. The cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes will be an important element of the nuclear disarmament process. The unilateral decision of the USSR to stop in 1989 the production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes and to close in 1989 and 1990 two further reactors for the production of weapon-grade plutonium should be viewed in this context. The socialist countries advocate the conclusion of a special international agreement on the cessation and eventual complete prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons.

7. The early achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban remains a priority. It could be promoted by progress in the comprehensive, step-by-step negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the limitation and eventual complete cessation of nuclear tests.

8. At the same time, the Conference on Disarmament should pave the way for a comprehensive, necessarily global solution. As a first step, it could take up the consideration of elements of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Special emphasis should be devoted to the elaboration of a comprehensive system of verification of a nuclear-test ban. Pertinent proposals in this regard have been tabled by socialist countries at the Conference on Disarmament.

9. In view of the ongoing process of the elimination of the Soviet Union and United States medium-range missiles and the beginning of new negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, the question of tactical nuclear weapons is assuming great importance. The continued existence and, more important, the modernization of these weapons would contribute to destabilizing the military situation in Europe and to complicating conventional disarmament. The removal of tactical nuclear weapons could facilitate world-wide nuclear disarmament.

10. Guided by these considerations the Warsaw Treaty member States have proposed to the NATO member States to start separate negotiations on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear components of dual-capable systems. The preparation of these negotiations could be considered in
special consultations. The mutual renunciation by both alliances of the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons would improve the atmosphere for negotiations and enhance confidence.

11. It could also be agreed to implement the reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons by stages. This would have to be accompanied by effective verification measures.

12. Regional measures, such as nuclear-weapon-free zones, will contribute to the nuclear disarmament process. Recent unilateral disarmament steps by socialist States in Europe, including the reduction of the Soviet Union tactical nuclear weapons, have improved the conditions for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central Europe, the Balkans and Northern Europe. Measures taken by some socialist States in Asia to reduce their armed forces and armaments will also promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on that continent.

13. The socialist countries attach special importance to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Its further strengthening would facilitate the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament.

14. The United Nations Disarmament Commission should elaborate a set of specific recommendations with a view to promoting a dynamic and irreversible process of nuclear disarmament leading to the ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. It could, inter alia:

(a) Welcome the intention of the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce as soon as possible their strategic offensive weapons by half while strictly adhering to the ABM Treaty;

(b) Stress the necessity that the other nuclear-weapon States join in the process of nuclear disarmament following drastic cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States;

(c) Request the Conference on Disarmament to elaborate, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, recommendations as to how to initiate multilateral negotiations of agreements, with adequate measures of verification, in appropriate stages, for the implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

15. The recommendations should stress the need for using all appropriate negotiating and other forums for this purpose. The following could be useful:

(a) Talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the overall complex of nuclear and space weapons;

(b) Comprehensive step-by-step negotiations between the USSR and the United States on nuclear-weapon tests and elaboration by the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests;

(c) Negotiations on the reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe;

...
(d) Elaboration of a programme of nuclear disarmament by the Conference on Disarmament;

(e) Comprehensive negotiations on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States;

(f) Measures to strengthen the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as regional steps such as the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

**Collateral measures promoting the nuclear disarmament process**

16. The Paris Conference has underlined the urgency of the global prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and has called upon the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts with a view to concluding the convention at the earliest date. That general agreement should now be translated into practice. A meeting of the Conference on Disarmament at the level of foreign ministers could be useful to resolve principal political issues in regard to the convention.

17. To make headway on nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space will be important. The Conference on Disarmament should proceed to a result-oriented consideration of this subject, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives.

18. The socialist countries have welcomed the start of the new negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe. In these negotiations they pursue the following objectives:

(a) To strengthen stability and security in Europe through deep cuts in the conventional armed forces, including conventional armaments and equipment, of the Warsaw Treaty member States and of the NATO member States and thereby to establish a balance at lower levels at which both military alliances will retain only forces and systems necessary for defence and insufficient to launch a surprise attack or conduct offensive operations;

(b) To restructure and redeploy their armed forces on strictly defensive principles.

19. These aims could be achieved by reductions, limitations, corresponding measures of redeployment as well as the determination of equal collective ceilings on armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe as a whole and in its regions. The disarmament process could be implemented by stages.

20. First stage (no later than 1991-1994): all participating States will eliminate above all imbalances and asymmetries between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as regards both troop numbers and main armaments and will take steps to eliminate the capability to launch a surprise attack or initiate large-scale offensive action.

21. Second stage (1994-1997): the armed forces of each side would be cut by approximately 25 per cent (by about 500,000 troops) along with their organic armament.

/...
22. Third stage (1997-2000): armed forces and conventional armaments will be further reduced. The armed forces will be given a strictly defensive character.

23. Confidence-building measures are playing an increasing role in the process of reducing international tensions. Confidence- and security-building measures as agreed in Helsinki in 1975 and Stockholm in 1986 have proven their worth and have contributed to restoring the situation in Europe to greater stability and predictability. The danger of military confrontation could be further reduced by a set of confidence- and security-building measures of a new generation.

24. In this regard, Warsaw Treaty member States have submitted proposals on measures to limit military exercises, to include activities of air forces and naval forces into confidence- and security-building measures, to develop further the provisions of the Stockholm Document, and to create zones of confidence and security in Europe.

25. The socialist countries deem it necessary to proceed from confidence-building measures in singular aspects to a comprehensive policy of confidence encompassing confidence-building in their entirety. This concerns e.g. the inclusion of air and naval forces as well as new steps in the fields of verification, exchange of information and consultation.

26. Naval armaments should be included in the disarmament process. Negotiations could especially concern

- Limitation and prohibition of naval military activities;
- Reduction and limitation of military forces, especially their nuclear compounds;
- Extension of confidence-building measures to the naval area.

The socialist countries advocate the start of negotiations on naval forces between the USSR and the United States, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO.

27. The socialist countries emphasize the need to prevent the use of new scientific and technological achievements for creating new types and systems of weapons. Scientific and technological progress should be exclusively for peaceful purposes.