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Agenda item 4

NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Working paper submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the
German Democratic Republic, Mongolia and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics

The treaty signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United
States of America on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range
missiles is the first step towards nuclear disarmament. This treaty is historic,
both in terms of its purpose - the complete destruction of an entire class of
nuclear arms of the USSR and the United States - and the novelty and scope of the
verification measures stipulated in it. It opens an entirely new chapter in the
efforts to achieve disarmament: an irrevocable arms reduction by mutual
agreement. It should be a common objective of all States to go ahead with the
process of nuclear disarmament, with the ultimate aim of eliminating all nuclear
weapons, using therefore all appropriate forums - bilateral, regional and
multilateral.

Main lines of further nuclear disarmament

1. A 50 per cent reduction of the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the
United States with strict observance of the ABM Treaty would mean fundamental
progress in the disarmament process, in the pursuit of a world free from nuclear
weapons. The understanding reached at the Washington summit for the negotiations
on reducing strategic offensive weapons augurs well for the early conclusion of
such an agreement. The understanding that the USSR and the United States will work
out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in
1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which
are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a
specified period of time is a significant step towards banning the danger of arms
competition spilling over into outer space.
2. The Socialist countries advocate the beginning of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. The potential of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations, in particular its Security Council, should be utilized as effectively as possible for this purpose. In order to promote such negotiations it would be useful to initiate a multilateral exchange of views among all nuclear Powers on specific issues relating to nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament should be the priority matter in the Conference on Disarmament. It is necessary to uphold the standing of the Conference as a major forum for reaching agreements in this field.

3. There is general agreement that the beginning of reductions of nuclear armaments should provide new impetus to the efforts concerning a nuclear-test ban. The Conference on Disarmament should take up the elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It should set up a subsidiary body on agenda item 1. In their document "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests", the Socialist countries submitted in 1987 substantive proposals regarding the terms of the treaty. A group of scientific experts to consider a system of verification of a nuclear-test ban could be instrumental in achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty. At the same time, the start of comprehensive, step-by-step negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the limitation and eventually complete cessation of nuclear tests is an important political development in this regard. These negotiations should soon produce tangible results and stimulate multilateral efforts to stop nuclear testing. The ratification of the 1974 Soviet-United States treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and of the 1976 treaty on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and a further reduction of the yield and quantity of the nuclear tests of both States would improve the conditions for a comprehensive test ban.

4. The treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles should be followed by the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Therefore, separate negotiations on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear components of dual capacity systems, leading to the subsequent elimination of such weapons, should be commenced.

5. The elimination of the intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles of the USSR and the United States and the 50 per cent reduction of their strategic offensive weapons would open the door towards a multilateral nuclear disarmament process and a world free of nuclear weapons. This requires that the reduction of the Soviet and United States nuclear arsenals should be followed by concerted efforts by all nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, at a certain stage of nuclear disarmament, all nuclear-weapon Powers should take part in negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament.

6. In the process of nuclear disarmament, verification becomes a principal means of ensuring security. It is therefore necessary to apply a system of stringent measures to verify the reduction of nuclear weapons at all stages. Verification must be assured everywhere: at the sites where these weapons are dismantled and destroyed, as well as on test sites; at military bases, including those in third countries; in storage facilities; and at manufacturing plants, State-owned and
private. Verification should be bound up with agreements on confidence-building measures, such as the exchange of basic data on the armaments at the disposal of the parties which have relevance to the agreements and on the sites concerned where such armaments are deployed or stored, as well as the checking of these data through on-site inspection. Verification could comprise the use of national technical means of verification, permanent or systematic on-site inspections, mandatory on-site challenge inspections on short notice, and provisions prohibiting concealment or other activities which impede verification. In verifying nuclear disarmament the experience available within the International Atomic Energy Agency could be of great value.

7. To bring about a nuclear-free and non-violent world, regional efforts, such as the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, also have an important role to play. The Socialist States welcome the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and the South Pacific and support proposals to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. The question of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Balkans, in Central and Northern Europe and in other parts of Europe is becoming increasingly important.

8. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has proved to be an effective instrument. Further efforts are now required to achieve its universality.

Collateral measures promoting the nuclear disarmament process

9. An early prohibition of chemical weapons would further the process of nuclear disarmament. The negotiations on a convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons have made important progress so that the aim of delivering mankind from the danger of chemical weapons has come within reach. What is required now is that all participants in the negotiations display realism and a sense of responsibility in order to conclude the work on the convention as early as possible. Everything should be done to avoid the agreement within reach to be compromised by new armament programmes.

10. To prevent an arms race in space effectively, it will be necessary to undertake additional concrete measures. As the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament issues and in the light of the decisions adopted at the forty-second session of the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament bears crucial responsibility for working out effective and verifiable multilateral disarmament agreements. To facilitate result-oriented negotiations, the Ad Hoc Committee, on agenda item 5 should discuss as the next step the main elements of an agreement or of agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in space, and should identify the subject-matter of future negotiations.

11. Nuclear disarmament should go hand in hand with steps to reduce conventional armaments and armed forces, especially in Europe. The military equilibrium should be lowered to a level at which neither side, while safeguarding its own defence, would have means to launch a surprise attack against the other or to conduct attack operations. The asymmetries and imbalances which have arisen over the years in
conventional weapons in Europe could be redressed on a reciprocal basis through
cuts by the party that has a lead in a particular type of weapon. This process
should be accompanied by adequate reductions in the military expenditures of States.

12. Mutual confidence and understanding of the other side's intentions is a matter
that becomes increasingly important. Mutual confidence and co-operation should
replace the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Consultations between the members of
the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the
issue of military doctrines would encourage the overall process of military détente
in Europe and help remove each other's perceived threats and enemy images. The
verifiable withdrawal of nuclear and other offensive weapons from the frontier
areas and the subsequent establishment of militarily thinned-out corridors and
demilitarized zones would be significant practical steps in this respect.
Multilateral consultations should be started on this question. A commitment by the
nuclear Powers not to be the first to use nuclear arms, as has been undertaken by
the USSR and the People's Republic of China, would likewise be an important step in
reducing the danger of nuclear war and building confidence.

13. Steps must be taken to start negotiations between States possessing
substantial naval military potential, especially nuclear-weapon States, but also
other interested States, on the limitation and prohibition of naval military
activities, on the reduction and limitation of naval military forces and the
extension of confidence-building measures to the naval area, thus enhancing
security and freedom of sea navigation.

14. It appears necessary already at this stage to find ways and means to ensure
security in every phase of the disarmament process and in a world free of nuclear
weapons with considerably reduced levels of non-nuclear armaments. The
establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security could
contribute to this aim. Such a system could work on the basis of the Charter of
the United Nations and within the framework of the United Nations. Its
effectiveness would be guaranteed by the strict observance of the principles of the
Charter, by additional obligations of States and by measures of confidence-building
and international co-operation in all spheres - military-political, economic,
ecological, humanitarian and others. The international community should also work
out contingency measures to be able to react to any violation of the general
agreement on the non-use and elimination of nuclear arms or to any attempt at
violating this agreement.

15. The third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament should, on
the basis of a thorough analysis of the main aspects of the arms race and of
dismament negotiations, outline the basic directions of disarmament, give a
positive impetus to all related bilateral and multilateral negotiations on
dismament, especially on enhancing the effectiveness of the Conference on
Disarmament. Special attention should be devoted to questions of nuclear
dismament.