DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
1988 substantive session
New York, 2-20 May 1988
Agenda item 10

VERIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS: ADDITIONAL PRINCIPLES

Paper submitted by the Chairman of Working Group IV

1. The Working Group on Verification at the 1987 session of the Disarmament Commission in its report reaffirmed the continued relevance of the basic principles on verification enunciated in paragraphs 31, 91 and 92 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), which was adopted by consensus in July 1978. The Working Group agreed that these principles should be elaborated upon and added to in order to gain the benefits of the experience which had accrued since July 1978. Pursuant to this requirement, the Working Group on Verification was able to adopt by consensus an illustrative non-exhaustive list of 10 principles that elaborate upon or add to the basic principles of the Final Document.

2. In the view of the Chairman, the list of 10 verification principles adopted by consensus at the 1987 session of the Disarmament Commission should form the foundation for further deliberations by the Working Group this year. The Working Group might now focus its attention on the possibility of developing additional principles to add to the list.

3. In order to facilitate the work of the Working Group to this end, a number of draft principles are listed below. They have been developed on the basis of the discussions at and submissions to the 1987 Working Group on Verification as well as on the basis of new developments since that time. They are put forward for the consideration of the Working Group as possible additions to the list of 10 principles adopted in 1987.
4. Suggested additional verification principles

(a) Adequacy and effectiveness

(i) To be adequate and effective, verification systems must be able to detect beyond a reasonable doubt and in a timely fashion any circumventions of an agreement which would permit a party to acquire a military capability that is threatening to the national security of any other party.

(ii) Adequate and effective verification arrangements must be capable of providing sufficient information that is both clear and capable of convincing parties in the event that non-compliance has taken place.

(iii) Adequate and effective verification must apply at all stages of the implementation of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement and continue throughout the full life of the agreement.

(iv) Information exchanged to establish a baseline inventory of forces to be limited or reduced as part of an arms limitation or disarmament agreement, should be subject to adequate and effective verification.

(v) Co-operative measures to enhance the effectiveness of verification by the national technical means of the parties to an arms limitation and disarmament agreement should be considered when negotiating verification provisions.

(b) Negotiating verification provisions

(vi) The specifics of a verification system, including the implementing provisions, should be spelled out and constitute an integral part of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement.

(c) Approaches

(vii) Verification provisions for global arms limitation and to disarmament agreements can be enhanced by complementary regional or bilateral verification arrangements.

(d) Amendments

(viii) Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include provisions for resolving ambiguities relating to verification and compliance.

(e) Treaty specificity

(ix) Determinations about the adequacy, effectiveness and acceptability of specific methods and arrangements intended to verify compliance with the provisions of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement can only be made within the context of that agreement.

/...
(f) **Responsibility for verification**

(x) The elaboration and implementation of an effective verification system are the joint responsibility of all parties of an agreement.

(xi) Verification is an activity conducted by the parties to an arms limitation and disarmament agreement or by an organization with the explicit consent of the parties. Monitoring by non-parties without the explicit consent of the parties to an arms limitation and disarmament agreement does not constitute treaty verification.

(g) **Miscellaneous**

(xii) Requests for inspections or further information pursuant to the provisions of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement should be considered as a normal component of the verification process and not as provocative acts. Continued confirmation of compliance is an essential ingredient to building and maintaining confidence between parties.