

**DISARMAMENT COMMISSION**  
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Item 10 of the provisional agenda

**VERIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS**

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* Reissued for technical reasons.
INTRODUCTION

REPRISES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

1. On 30 November 1987, the General Assembly adopted resolution 42/42 F, entitled "Verification in all its aspects", the operative paragraphs of which, inter alia, read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"2. Encourages all States that have not already done so to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 31 March 1988, their views and suggestions on verification principles as invited by the General Assembly in its resolution 41/86 Q;

"...

"4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to conclude its consideration of verification in all its aspects at its 1988 substantive session, in the context of pursuing general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, regarding verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification, and to report on its deliberations, conclusions and recommendations to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament and at its forty-third session;

"5. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare for the Disarmament Commission at its 1988 substantive session a compilation of the views received from Member States on the issue;".

2. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the resolution, the Secretary-General submits herewith the replies on the subject received from the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Viet Nam. Other replies, if any, will be issued as addenda.

BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

[Original: Russian]

[11 April 1988]

1. The Byelorussian SSR, pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 40/152 O and 41/86 Q, has informed the United Nations of its views on verification issues. The replies of the Byelorussian SSR on this subject were published in United Nations documents A/41/422 and A/CN.10/87/Add.1. We further wish to note that significant
and positive progress has recently been achieved in the development and implementation of verification procedures. Unprecedented standards are being established for openness, glasnost and the scope and depth of reciprocal verification and monitoring of commitments undertaken. We should mention first in this respect the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which is of historic importance. The verification measures it provides for can serve as a model and a basis for the development of monitoring procedures for further disarmament agreements.

2. A successful start has been made in implementing the agreements reached in 1986 in Stockholm at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, including the one on monitoring. The first inspection on request pursuant to that agreement took place in August 1987 in the territory of the Byelorussian SSR. Similar inspections are also taking place in other States. Observers are also being invited to attend military exercises.

3. The systems of verification measures under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and the Stockholm agreement show what effective results can be achieved if all parties are truly guided by the spirit of business-like co-operation to ensure genuine disarmament measures and strengthen confidence and security.

4. The Byelorussian SSR again stresses that where the monitoring of genuine disarmament is concerned, and systems of measures ensuring the strictest and most effective monitoring need to be developed and implemented. An important element of this monitoring must be the principle of reciprocity, non-discrimination and equal applicability in all aspects, irrespective of differences in the political, legal and socio-economic systems of the States parties to an agreement. Strict and effective monitoring of genuine disarmament must be an important element in the establishment of genuine international security.

5. The socialist States have recently put forward a number of serious and far-reaching specific proposals on verification measures which would ensure adequate verification of the prohibition and limitation of nuclear testing, the prohibition of chemical weapons and the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. At the Disarmament Conference in March of this year the Soviet Union introduced a memorandum entitled "The establishment of an international verification system for the prohibition of the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space", which proposes the establishment of an International Outer Space Inspectorate and a number of other measures making it possible to proceed promptly to the development of such a system even before the conclusion of a corresponding space agreement.

6. In order to strengthen openness and establish a climate of confidence and help achieve and implement agreements on disarmament, including agreement on effective reciprocal verification, measures such as exchanges of relevant data, for example, in connection with the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the elimination of stockpiles of such weapons, and for advancing the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe...
from the Atlantic to the Urals, might be useful. The extension of verification measures to foreign military bases would also be in keeping with these goals.

7. The Appeal to the States members of NATO, and to all countries participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, adopted at the session of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty on 27-30 March of this year, stresses that in order to arrive at and successfully implement the agreements in all priority areas of disarmament, "it would be of special significance to ensure greater openness and predictability in the military sphere to have an exchange of the necessary information and to establish a stringent and effective system of monitoring and verification of the commitments undertaken by all Parties."

8. The Byelorussian SSR favours maximum strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, within a very broad context. For example, in order to strengthen confidence and mutual understanding under the auspices of the United Nations, one might establish machinery for extensive international verification of the observance of agreements on reducing international tension and limiting armaments and for monitoring the military situation in regions of conflict. This machinery might operate by using the various forms and methods of monitoring to collect information and forward it efficiently to the United Nations, thus affording an objective picture of events as they occurred and making it possible to detect preparations for military actions in good time, render surprise attack more difficult and take measures to avert military conflicts and prevent them spreading and becoming more serious.

9. The Byelorussian SSR regards the work on the problem of verification in all its aspects being conducted in the United Nations Disarmament Commission as extremely useful, and took an active part in it in 1987. Specifically, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR co-sponsored with the delegations of Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, and submitted to the Commission, working papers on principles of verification (A/CN.10/1987/WG.IV/WP.2) and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification (A/CN.10/1987/WG.IV/WP.4). The Byelorussian SSR favours the productive conclusion of this work at the forthcoming session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. That would be a substantial contribution to the success of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

CHINA

[Original: Chinese]

[30 March 1988]

1. The Chinese Government has stated its basic positions on the issue of verification in the note (CM 86/17) dated 25 April 1986 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General; they are contained in document A/41/422.

2. The Chinese delegation, at the forty-second session of the General Assembly of
the United Nations, voted for resolution 42/42 F, in which the Secretary-General is requested to prepare for the Disarmament Commission at its 1988 substantive session a compilation of the views received from Member States on the issue.

PAKISTAN

[Original: English]

[11 April 1988]

1. Agreements for arms control and disarmament are not likely to be concluded unless the States concerned are confident that they will be implemented. Verification measures can help to create confidence in compliance with arms control or disarmament agreements. Verification procedures must not only relate to the scope and nature of the agreement, but also with the tenor and climate of political relations among its major potential parties.

2. In its broadest sense, verification could encompass three distinct activities: (a) establishing the facts regarding the behaviour of parties; (b) interpreting the facts; and (c) studying the political or other response flowing from that interpretation. Ideally, sound and reliable verification procedures help to prevent violations, contribute to building confidence and trust among parties and provide confirmation of the value and significance of specific arms control and disarmament agreements.

3. Paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), the first special session devoted to disarmament, stipulated that verification should be adequate; should be related to the purposes, scope and nature of the specific agreement; and should provide for the participation of parties in the verification process, directly or through the United Nations. Adherence to these principles and those already agreed upon in the Stockholm agreement and the INF treaty (Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and short-range nuclear missiles) will be challenging in the current and emerging political and technological environment. While no general discourse on this subject can provide all the answers, identification of some of the present and emerging issues and problems relating to verification of arms control and disarmament agreements leads to certain general conclusions regarding the approach to verification:

(a) The degree of assurance required about compliance is dictated very largely by the political context in which an agreement is negotiated and implemented. When relations are tense and confrontational, the States concerned will wish to make the assurance provided by verification "doubly sure". The normalization of international relations, especially among the major Powers, could not only provide impetus to disarmament agreements, it could also ease the levels of verification considered adequate. Therefore, the process of building mutual confidence and trust should be pursued steadily at the global, regional and subregional levels;
(b) In promoting normalization and arms control, the vaule of non-use and non-first-use agreements should not be discounted. Compliance with such commitments can be promoted through political measures, if not by physical verification;

(c) In devising verification measures, complete and foolproof assurance of compliance can rarely be achieved. Verification can supplement but never supplant the presumption of mutual interest of the States concerned to implement the obligations involved in any agreement;

(d) The stringency of verification must be evaluated within the total strategic and political context. Possible violations of accords relating to secondary weapons systems, e.g., conventional armaments and chemical weapons, would be less serious than those relating to primary systems, e.g., nuclear missiles;

(e) The capacity of States to flout arms accords depends on their power, size and degree of autarky in international relations. The focus of verification should be on States which possess the political and military capabilities to violate accords with a measure of impunity. In this context, greater emphasis must be placed on elaborating the international response to violations of arms accords, rather than on merely policing the behaviour of States. In the procedures for the formulation of responses to violations, there is no justification to accord special privileges, such as the right of veto, to major Powers;

(f) Arms control accords which are unequal or contain discriminatory verification procedures will be inherently unstable. The concept of equal security should be given an agreed and global dimension, at least as an objective of the process of disarmament. The thesis that larger or richer nations have the right to larger military power is not compatible with the principle of sovereign equality of States on which the structure of international relations is based at present. Since complete disarmament is a distant goal, some interim means of balancing the security concerns of smaller States have to be evolved. The provisions for collective security in the Charter of the United Nations must be given at least some measure of substance;

(g) As a general rule, disarmament accords must aim at the elimination of complete weapons systems rather than their limitation, since such agreements are easier to verify. However, limited approaches can be successful, at the initial stages of the disarmament process, especially in the bilateral or regional context;

(h) The multilateralization of disarmament and verification measures appears to be inevitable. Several agreements already depend on the United Nations to promote compliance. Since the early 1960s the principle that disarmament is to be promoted "under strict international control" has been accepted. An international verification agency was proposed at the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, in 1978. Consideration of such an international agency should commence as soon as possible within the United Nations;

(i) Since such an international organization or agency might not possess sufficient resources and capabilities to duplicate the national technical means of
the super-Powers, at least in the immediate future, continuing reliance on those States' capabilities would be indispensable. In such circumstances, non-discrimination could be ensured only if those countries gave all parties to various agreements full access to information collected by their national technical means;

(j) Verification arrangements, especially intrusive mechanisms, would be more acceptable, more effective and less costly, if promoted within the context of broader international co-operation for peaceful purposes;

(k) Knowledge regarding verification is still limited, both as regards its potential and the problems that would arise. Independent and objective research into various aspects of verification, conducted by governmental or private institutions, could make an invaluable contribution to evolving realistic methodologies and mechanisms and thus facilitate the process of arms control and disarmament.

PERU

[Original: Spanish]

[31 March 1988]

1. Verification measures may be included in bilateral disarmament and arms limitation agreements, which would essentially use national technical means of verification, and in multilateral agreements in which verification basically involves a delegation of authority for the purpose by the signatory States of the agreement in question.

2. In the specific case of multilateral disarmament and arms limitation agreements, the essential aim of verification must be to guarantee faithful compliance with the obligations entered into. In this respect, the verification procedures indicated would not necessarily prevent agreements from being violated through non-compliance with the obligations entered into, but rather would seek to dissuade the State party from failing to comply because of the high political price it would incur if detected.

3. Similarly, to some extent, verification constitutes a mutual confidence-building mechanism which helps to guarantee States parties the necessary transparency which would result from the full implementation of the international instrument in their respective territories.

4. In this respect, the verification procedures contemplated in multilateral disarmament and arms limitation agreements imply, inter alia, an obligation by States parties to provide all necessary information on authorized activities engaged in by them.
5. With the aim of adhering to the principles of verification at the operations site, multilateral disarmament and arms limitation agreements might contemplate the establishment of an international authority empowered to conduct on-site inspections, as appropriate, of activities by States parties. This would include machinery for on-site inspections as a result of denunciation, either at the request of the State party which suspects the other of infringing upon its obligations, or of a signatory State seeking to clarify any doubt which may have been raised concerning it.

6. The procedures established for verification in the framework of multilateral disarmament and arms limitation agreements must be genuinely universal, meaning that there can be no differentiated or discriminatory treatment between States parties to the same international instrument.

7. In the same way, verification measures must be credible, i.e. sufficient to establish the certainty that through them, the desired objectives will be attained.

8. Verification machinery must operate swiftly and effectively, and be sufficiently expeditious that in the event of violation or infringement, action can be initiated in the political forum responsible for curbing or preventing such violation or infringement.

9. Verification necessarily entails mutual consultations and co-operation between the States parties.

10. Adequate methods and procedures applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to different multilateral disarmament and arms limitation agreements can be devised in the abstract. However, this exercise must in no way prejudice the scope and modalities which verification must have in each specific case. For this reason, Peru believes that every multilateral agreement of this type must have its own *ad hoc* system of verification.

11. In no case may the application of verification measures harm or impede the economic and social development of either of the States parties, but neither may it serve as a pretext for avoiding transparency.

POLAND

[Original: English]

[19 April 1988]

1. The signing of the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and short-range nuclear missiles and the prospect of an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic weapons give a new dimension to the issue of verification of disarmament accords by moving it onto the plane of practical efforts.
2. Together with the other socialist States, Poland has repeatedly expressed her conviction in the need to work out comprehensive confidence-building measures and a comprehensive system of international security, through efforts which would involve far-going measures to monitor the disarmament process. Poland has given it yet another expression in the latest appeal addressed by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty in Sofia, Bulgaria, to NATO States and all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe process, supporting the strict and effective system of monitoring and verification of the obligations adopted by both sides.

3. The Government of the Polish People's Republic expresses satisfaction at the fact that the issue of verification ceases to be an artificial obstruction to the process of disarmament, thus allowing accelerated progress in freeing mankind from the fear of a war involving mass-destruction weapons. It is the more so that possibilities of on-site inspection, including inspection on demand, have been considerably broadened, with respect to such critical points of the disarmament process as checking the starting data and monitoring the process of destruction of the weapons, observing of the ban on storage or manufacture of a particular category of arms, and - as far as peacetime military activity is concerned - of the ban on military exercises or redeployment of particular contingents of manpower and equipment. That has already been reflected, inter alia, in the results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. In this context, Poland has proved, on one hand, her interest in the consolidating of the credibility and reliability of such a vital element of the disarmament process as verification, and, on the other hand, her readiness to take up efforts to clear jointly the obstacles impeding the progress in the disarmament process which are of vital interest to her.

4. Poland is confirming that the scope of verification should be proportional to the depth of disarmament solutions, and that the need to maintain the broader interest of States at all stages of disarmament and of all other fundamental principles (economy, rationality, immediacy of reaction, etc.) cannot be contradicted by verification measures, because it could lead to a growth of suspicion in relations among States. Poland strongly emphasizes that verification cannot replace disarmament, but, at the same time, that there cannot be genuine disarmament without verification. Verification is an indispensable element of the disarmament process.

5. The Jaruzelski Plan, providing, inter alia, for strict verification of undertaken obligations, is a practical reflection of Poland's position on verification in the process of disarmament. The Polish Government is ready to seek together with other States, such detailed solutions that will be acceptable and will not undermine anybody's interests of security.

6. Poland is interested in keeping on and expanding the role of the United Nations in studying all aspects of the disarmament verification process as well as in the practical participation of the United Nations in the application of verification measures and procedures. Poland fully recognizes the role played by other international organizations, such as, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency, stressing that the already existing and newly established mechanisms  

/.../
can and should be used in the process of international disarmament monitoring. In this context, one should point to the possibilities offered by the Soviet proposal to establish the system of international monitoring of the preservation of the peaceful character of outer space.

7. The Polish Government is ready to adopt all necessary and mutually agreed procedures and measures of verification in the disarmament process and is determined to continue its contribution to their development.

SWEDEN

[Original: English]

[19 April 1988]

1. Sweden considers verification to be an integral and vital component of the process of disarmament and confidence- and security-building. Thus, agreements in this field ought to include adequate procedures for verification. Sweden endorses the guiding principles for such procedures as outlined in paragraphs 31, 91 and 92 of the Final Document (resolution S-10/2) of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the further elaboration of these principles that has taken place within the framework of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

2. Effective verification can serve several purposes. The first and overriding purpose is to ensure that undertakings entered into are fully complied with by all parties. Adequate verification provisions serve to safeguard against unfounded suspicions and accusations. They also deter violations by posing a risk of detection of non-compliance. By ensuring compliance and confidence in compliance, verification enhances the prospects of concluding new disarmament agreements.

3. Verification is of course not an end in itself. However, in order to achieve significant agreements on disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures, adequate verification procedures are required. Experience has demonstrated the close interrelationship between the elaboration of an agreement as such and its verification provisions. Experience from various negotiating forums also shows the importance of defining parameters in such a way that they can be verified without excessive intrusiveness. As stated in paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the forms and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. The successful elaboration of the 1987 treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and short-range nuclear missiles (the INF treaty) is one example of how a thoroughly developed verification system can be integrated in a substantive disarmament agreement.

/.../
4. Two general observations can be made in this connection:

   (a) First, there is a relationship between the military significance of an
       agreement and the need for verification. The greater the significance, the greater
       the need for ensuring compliance;

   (b) Second, the shorter the time-span between a hypothetical violation of an
       agreement and the security-related effects of the violation, the greater the need
       for effective verification.

5. Sweden has consistently considered verification issues to be matters of direct
   concern to all countries. Consequently, Sweden is of the view that it should not
   be left to the nations most advanced in military technology to determine what
   constitutes the adequate verification of agreement which are of vital importance
   for the security also of other States. Therefore, Sweden has invested over the
   years considerable resources, mainly in its National Defence Research Institute, in
   order to contribute to, for example, effective methods of verification for a
   comprehensive test-ban treaty or a chemical weapons convention. Sweden has also
   made available scientific expertise and technical facilities in the field of
   verification in order to promote various international disarmament negotiations.

6. In the case of multilateral agreements, the national technical means of the
   major military Powers cannot alone assure verification. Verification methods must
   be agreed upon which take into account the interests of all States parties to
   agreements, i.e. also those States which have at their disposal comparatively
   limited national technical means to verify compliance. Verification arrangements
   set up within the framework of the United Nations should be of considerable
   importance.

7. The "six nation initiative", in which the Prime Minister of Sweden,
   Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, participates, has recognized, in the Stockholm Declaration
   (A/43/125-S/19478), the need to establish an integrated multilateral verification
   system within the United Nations. It should constitute an integral part of a
   strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during
   the process of disarmament as well as in a nuclear-weapon-free world. A joint
   proposal along these lines will be put forward at the United Nations special
   session on disarmament this year.

8. Many practical problems relating to verification of disarmament agreements can
   be solved by using monitoring satellites. Satellite-monitoring has been and
   remains a prerequisite for bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the
   United States of America. The solution of problems relating to verification of
   existing and future multilateral disarmament agreements could be facilitated by
   international satellite verification. France has proposed that an international
   satellite monitoring agency (ISMA) should be established. The United Nations study
   on the implications of establishing such an agency concluded in 1981 that
   satellite-monitoring not only can make a valuable contribution to the verification
   of compliance with certain disarmament agreements but that it could also play a
   positive role in preventing or settling international crises and thus contribute to
   confidence-building among nations. Bearing in mind the usefulness of
After satellite-monitoring, it should be further considered how this technology could be used for international verification.

9. The cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, is the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been assigned the task of verifying through its safeguards system that no fissile material is diverted from peaceful use to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty. Certain nuclear facilities in nuclear weapon States are also safeguarded by IAEA. Sweden supports the principle of universal application of the IAEA safeguards with regard to all civil nuclear facilities in all countries. In order to maintain the credibility of NPT it is of vital importance that sufficient resources be allocated to IAEA to enable the Agency to continue to fulfill its safeguards obligations.

10. The confidence- and security-building measures regime, laid down in the Document of the Stockholm Conference, aims in part at giving mutual assurance that the military activities of the participating States are non-threatening in character and thus at giving effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force. The measures agreed upon are provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content, including the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State. Various instruments of verification will most probably need to be further developed and refined when the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is resumed, and with the knowledge and experience gained through implementing the Stockholm Document.

11. It goes without saying that a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty must be adequately verifiable. Sweden is of the view that the present state of the art of seismic detection and identification, particularly when supplemented by other available methods, makes adequate verification of a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear testing feasible. To prepare for such a global verification system to be established there is now a need to embark on further substantial work, both in terms of treaty drafting and in the technical field. The Group of Scientific Experts set up within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva should continue its important work of elaborating the methods to be used to verify a nuclear-test ban.

12. Advanced and detailed discussions on verification are going on in the Conference on Disarmament negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. Such a convention would certainly constitute a breakthrough not only as a true disarmament convention prescribing the abolition of an entire weapons category, but also with respect to the mechanisms for ensuring the compliance of an important and far-reaching agreement. Much work is being put into elaborating a variety of verification measures adapted to the different provisions and undertakings to be verified. A whole spectrum of measures are envisaged, from exchange of data to routine inspections and challenge inspections, depending on the need in each case. Efforts are being made to make the routine verification provisions as widely applicable as possible in order to minimize the need for special challenge verification. An effective verification regime for a chemical weapons ban would have obvious beneficial implications for disarmament agreements in other fields.
In the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, work has also come very far as regards the setting up of an international organization for handling the implementation of verification procedures.

13. Sweden has always considered the provisions for verification and complaints of the biological weapons convention to be inadequate. Sweden therefore welcomed the outcome of the Second Review Conference of the Convention in 1986, at which it was agreed, inter alia, to strengthen the multilateral procedures for verification under the convention and for solving any problem that may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of, its provisions. Sweden participated actively in the Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts that the Review Conference decided to hold in 1987. The purpose of the meeting was to finalize the modalities for the implementation of the confidence-building measures relating to, inter alia, exchange of information concerning biological research of relevance to the convention that was agreed at the Review Conference. Sweden notes with satisfaction that this exchange of information has been initiated and that the Department of Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations is playing a key role in this activity. Sweden intends to continue to work for further improvement of the convention, particularly as concerns the procedures for verification and complaints.

14. A future agreement to ensure the prevention of an arms race in outer space must, in the view of the Swedish Government, contain procedures for international verification.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Original: Russian]

[4 April 1988]

1. The Soviet Union is convinced that, in the transition to real disarmament, verification is becoming the most important factor for establishing and ensuring international security. Proceeding from that conviction, the USSR consistently advocates the most rigorous and most effective monitoring of the observance of agreements in the area of arms limitation and elimination and of confidence-building measures through the application of both national technical means as well as international procedures, including on-site inspection.

2. The conclusion of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles has proven convincingly that, when partners demonstrate political will, a mutually acceptable solution can be reached on any - even the most complex - problems of disarmament, including the issue of verification. The verification procedure set out in the Treaty has no counterpart either in the thoroughness of its procedures for eliminating nuclear systems or in the specific forms and methods of verifying its observance. Undoubtedly, the provisions on verification contained in the Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles provide a useful guideline for working out a verification system in future agreements.

/...
3. Considering the fact that disarmament affects the national security of all States and that, consequently, all States are interested in ensuring effective verification, the Soviet Union is in favour of the internationalization of efforts in that area and of the inclusion of the greatest possible number of States in the disarmament process and the verification of arms limitation, reduction and elimination.

4. The USSR attaches particular importance to the role of the United Nations, which must become the sole centre for co-ordinating efforts to ensure security through disarmament. In that connection, it is satisfying to note that the international community is at present reaching a broad mutual understanding on the role, principles, forms and methods of verification, as can be seen, in particular, from the consensus adoption, at the last three sessions of the General Assembly, of resolutions on the subject. The comprehensive study of the issue by the United Nations Disarmament Commission is helping to bring closer together the positions of all countries regarding the conceptual and applied aspects of verification.

5. The Soviet Union believes that the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament could be consolidated, and confidence and universal security strengthened, through the creation, under United Nations auspices, of a mechanism for the broad international monitoring of the implementation of agreements on reducing international tension and on arms limitation, as well as the monitoring of the military situation in regions of conflict. The mechanism would use the various forms and methods of verification to collect information and forward it efficiently to the United Nations, thus affording an objective picture of events as they occurred and making it possible to detect preparations for military actions in good time, render surprise attack more difficult, and take measures to avert military conflicts and prevent them spreading and becoming more serious.

6. Obviously, the time has come to give thorough consideration to all specific proposals on the co-ordination of the diverse forms and methods of multilateral verification, including the creation of international inspectorates to monitor the prohibition of nuclear testing, the prevention of the spread of arms to outer space, and the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. In order to make strict compliance with disarmament agreements absolutely certain, the Soviet Union considers it necessary to open for inspection military bases situated in foreign territories.

7. The USSR believes in the urgent need to develop a comprehensive international dialogue on ways and means for establishing verification mechanisms, and is ready to participate in the constructive consideration of all proposals aimed at improving verification procedures and developing international co-operation in that area.
1. The Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is of the view that in order to ensure that all the disarmament and arms limitation agreements be scrupulously and strictly complied with, there should be effective verification measures which are satisfactory to all parties concerned. These measures must be adequate, non-discriminatory, proportional to the actual disarmament measure and acceptable to all parties. All reasonable and constructive efforts are encouraged to promote appropriate methods and procedures of verification with regard to creating mutual necessary confidence among States, and must not be misused to interfere with internal affairs of other States or impede their cause of national defence and development.

2. In accordance with paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 42/42 F, the Permanent Mission of Viet Nam to the United Nations has further the honour to request the Secretary-General to include the views of Viet Nam in a compilation of the views received from Member States on the issue to be prepared for the Disarmament Commission at its 1988 substantive session.