DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
1988 substantive session
Item 10 of the provisional agenda

VERIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

Addendum

CONTENTS

REPLIES RECEIVED FROM GOVERNMENTS

Czechoslovakia ............................................................. 2

...
CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[Original: Russian]

[10 May 1988]


2. Further to that already stated, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic wishes to observe the following: the guaranteeing of universal security for all States at all stages of the disarmament process requires the strictest verification measures to ensure the parties' full confidence in the unswerving observance of obligations.

3. The Stockholm Conference has vividly confirmed the sober-minded approach to questions of verification and their constructive solution. That Conference has succeeded for the first time in reaching agreement on far-reaching provisions for verification of the reduction of military tension, including on-site inspections. Czechoslovakia considers that this important achievement by all States participating in the Helsinki process should be developed and transformed into reliably verifiable steps for disarmament in Europe.

4. With regard to measures for verification of nuclear disarmament, the Washington Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which incorporates a whole régime of verification measures covering a 13-year period, is of crucial importance. The Treaty once again confirms the well-known fact that the constructive settlement of issues involving the reduction and elimination of weapons opens the way simultaneously to agreement on all, even the most complex, questions of control and verification.

5. Czechoslovakia, as one of the countries in whose territory Soviet OTR-22 operational missiles have been stationed, also has its own role to play in the verification system laid down by the Washington Treaty in connection with the conduct of inspections in its own territory. In that regard, on 19 April 1988 the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly approved the corresponding treaty on inspections concluded by the Governments of the USSR, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, and the Czechoslovak-American agreement on verification measures in our territory. All the conditions have thereby been created to enable these to enter into force simultaneously with the Soviet-American Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

6. Appropriate attention to this problem was given by Czechoslovakia and the other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in the document on the military doctrine of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted at last year's meeting in Berlin of the Political Consultative Committee of those States, in which the task of ensuring broad verification of all measures relating to arms limitation and reduction was set as a priority disarmament goal under the Warsaw Treaty. The
Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which met on 29 and 30 March 1988 in Sofia, has once again unambiguously reaffirmed its clear position, to the effect that,

"in order to arrive at and successfully implement the agreements in all areas [of armaments limitation and disarmament], it would be of special significance to ensure greater openness and predictability in the military sphere, to have an exchange of the necessary information and to establish a stringent and effective system of monitoring and verification of the commitments undertaken by the parties".

7. Our general approach is that, hand-in-hand with measures for reduction of the levels of armed forces, armaments and military activity, there should be an increase in the importance of verification and in the strictness of the verification measures and procedures considered by mutual agreement to be adequate. In this connection the socialist countries propose in their initiatives that, even before the entry into force of the relevant agreements, there should be an exchange of verification data on the existing levels of armed forces and armaments; subsequently, verification of actual reductions achieved at the appropriate time and in a painstaking manner at all stages of the reductions should be instituted. Lastly, a regular and reliable system should be established for verifying the levels of armed forces, armaments or military activity remaining after the relevant elimination, reduction or conclusion of treaties has been effected.

8. Such an approach is embodied, in particular, in the far-reaching proposals of the socialist countries concerning all fundamental aspects of the efforts to enhance security, reduce armed forces and armaments and bring about disarmament, the final aim of which is the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. The broad range of verification procedures and means has become an integral part of such initiatives by the socialist countries as: (a) "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests", submitted on 8 June 1987 to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva; (b) "Main Provisions of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Anti-Satellite Weapons and on Ways to Ensure the Immunity of Space Objects", of 31 July 1987; (c) "The Soviet memorandum on the establishment of a system of international verification of the prohibition of the stationing in outer space of weapons of any type"; (d) Proposals for establishing a strict regime of verification of the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons and of the industrial base for the production of such weapons in the form of commercial chemicals in both state and private enterprises. This is also entirely true of the task of monitoring the limitation and reduction of States' conventional military potential to levels of reasonable sufficiency, primarily in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, as called for in the Budapest programme adopted by the Political Consultative Committee of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

9. Czechoslovakia also supports proposals to strengthen the Convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons, and to make its verification machinery more effective by means of political, legal, scientific and economic co-operation. We are convinced that the exchange of
information which has begun in this area on the basis of the agreements reached after the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention is a sign of significant progress. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was active in the formulation of those recommendations. Since last October it has taken part in the exchange process and provided the necessary information in the areas agreed. We believe that if the undertaking to exchange information is honoured in full, it will not only help to strengthen the agreement but also promote the accumulation of vital experience which can be drawn on in other negotiations concerning force reductions and disarmament.

10. At this stage, bearing in mind the universal nature of the problem of disarmament and, thus, of verification, Czechoslovakia favours on overall expansion of the role of the United Nations in this area. It believes that, in the interests of greater trust and mutual understanding, it would be possible to set up under United Nations auspices a mechanism for the wide-ranging international monitoring of compliance with agreements to reduce international tension, limit forces and weapons and resolve conflicts at crisis points around the planet. This mechanism would use a variety of monitoring techniques and methods to gather information and make it available to the United Nations. This would provide an objective picture of events taking place, enable preparations for military activity to be identified in good time, make surprise attacks more difficult and allow steps to be taken to forestall military conflicts or prevent them from growing larger or worse.

11. Between 1985 and 1987, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic together presented the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany with specific proposals for the establishment in central Europe of a chemical-weapon-free zone and a nuclear-free corridor. They foresee a realistic monitoring régime, including on-site inspections, based upon respect for reciprocity and equality of obligations. At the same time, Czechoslovakia assumes that the nuclear Powers will guarantee the status of such zones. In that regard, it is highly appreciative of the willingness of the Soviet Union to guarantee and respect the status of the nuclear-free corridor in central Europe.

12. As part of a general settlement of the issues relating to a ban on chemical weapons, appropriate controls over the peacetime chemical industry must be instituted. Czechoslovakia here takes a positive view of the latest joint statement, issued on 6 April 1988, by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the German Socialist Unity Party and the German Social Democratic Party, which expresses the view that the three States in the proposed chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe should be ready to accept controls over their chemical industries. Czechoslovakia also considers that all European States should weigh the possibility of joining this initiative. By so doing they would gain the right to participate in the monitoring of the zone.

13. Important verification measures are also proposed in the new, all-embracing Czechoslovak initiative calling for the establishment of a zone of trust, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations along the line that divides the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. This initiative was advanced in February 1988 by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Miloš Jakeš. Within such a zone it is proposed to establish a
corridor of enhanced trust and reduced forces - sufficient for defence but not enough for a surprise attack or offensive operations. A trustworthy verification system including on-site inspections, arrived at jointly by the parties to the agreement, would be used to monitor all activity taking place within the corridor. Clearly, the implementation of such an initiative would further promote the development of the Helsinki process.

14. At the two most recent sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, Czechoslovakia has sponsored resolutions on the monitoring of and compliance with disarmament accords. It participates actively within the United Nations Disarmament Commission in the development of joint principles, provisions and instruments for the adequate monitoring of compliance with agreements on force reductions and disarmament. We believe the concrete results of efforts by the Disarmament Commission in this area should spur on the related disarmament negotiations and lead to the formulation and adoption of practical disarmament measures that are binding under international law.