DISARMAMENT COMMISSION
1988 substantive session
Agenda item 10

VERIFICATION IN ALL ITS ASPECTS

Addendum

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BULGARIA

[Original: English]

[2 May 1988]

1. The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria wishes to reaffirm its interest in the establishment of a most stringent and comprehensive international control in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. A control of that magnitude is looked upon as a major means in promoting confidence among nations and guaranteeing implementation in good faith of agreements reached among them.

2. Therefore, Bulgaria notes with satisfaction that, of recent, the positions of individual States and groups of States on verification issues have moved closer. The Soviet-United States treaty on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, signed in Washington on 8 December 1987, bears witness to this refreshing process. Indeed, the treaty contains a system for mutual control unprecedented in its scope, another reason why it should not remain an isolated event; rather, it should become a starting point for a process of genuine nuclear disarmament, an example for arriving at effective foreign-policy solutions on verification issues. In the opinion of the Bulgarian Government, issues of control and verification, regardless of their complexity, can be solved in a satisfactory way providing political goodwill is at hand. This is especially true in connection with the expected next major step in nuclear disarmament, i.e. the 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive armaments, in compliance with the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972.

3. The People's Republic of Bulgaria holds the view that, from the point of view of verification, there are no difficulties of principle hindering a speedier conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Soviet Union's proposal to lay down in legal terms the principle of mandatory on-site international inspection without right to refusal has been conducive, to a large extent, to narrowing down further the differing positions in that disarmament area. The still outstanding serious problems of the future convention do not pertain to verification. They lie elsewhere. On this score Bulgaria is hopeful that the political realism necessary to overcome all outstanding matters promptly will be readily available.

4. This country wishes also to reaffirm its desire to see the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva initiate, as a matter of fact, all-embracing negotiations leading to multilateral agreements banning nuclear-weapon tests and preventing an arms race in outer space. In this connection, it would welcome the possibility to proceed with the establishment of relevant verification systems, including international inspection teams prior to the conclusion of such agreements.

5. Should we want confidence among States to be truly complete along with effective international control and verification, then the respective procedures should encompass the widest range of military activities and facilities. Consequently, the People's Republic of Bulgaria deems it necessary that modalities be agreed with respect to inspection access to military bases located on foreign
territories. Solving this issue would ease, on its part, the subsequent dealing with the problem of terminating foreign military presence.

6. The United Nations has stood out as the suitable centre for discussing and solving control and verification issues. The consensus adoption of General Assembly resolution 42/42 F (co-sponsored by Bulgaria) confirmed the general acknowledgement of this fact. Pursuant to that resolution the Disarmament Commission is to conclude its consideration of verification in all its aspects at its 1988 substantive session, and to report on its deliberations, conclusions and recommendations to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament and at its forty-third session. In this respect there is encouragement to be found in the results of the year past. The principles which were agreed upon, although at a preliminary level, reflect a common understanding as to how important verification is and how necessary the more active participation on the part of the United Nations and its Member States in this pivotal area.

7. The People's Republic of Bulgaria has endorsed the views of the USSR to the effect that conditions are ripe for setting up an international verification mechanism under United Nations auspices. This ought to be done by stages, gradually expanding United Nations functions in that area: from receipt and dissemination of information on the implementation of, and compliance with, agreements up to co-ordinating the verification activities conducted by States, various bodies and organizations within the framework of specific agreements, and, finally, up to carrying out its own verification activities.

8. Bulgaria favours constructive and businesslike consideration in international forums of all present and future proposals in that area, particularly in the Disarmament Commission, at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and at its forty-third session. It stands also ready to be of assistance with personally elaborated ideas and suggestions.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[Original: English]

[9 May 1988]

1. The United States Government welcomes the opportunity afforded by General Assembly resolution 42/42 F to offer further views on verification in all its aspects. Although the United States has provided its views on this subject on two previous occasions (in 1986 and 1987), verification remains an important issue, and the United States continues to insist that any arms control agreement to which it is or may become a party must be effectively verifiable. The United States is encouraged that a number of new and positive developments occurred in this field during the past year; however, much remains to be accomplished.

2. Arms control and disarmament agreements cannot promote confidence and lead to stability and peace unless they are faithfully implemented by all parties. Compliance with such agreements, therefore, is a matter of concern to the entire
international community. It is, of course, of paramount importance to the States parties to such agreements, whose security interests are directly involved. To safeguard their security, those States must rely on agreements with effective verification measures to provide them with sufficient confidence that all other parties are abiding by the relevant obligations. Over the past year, this requirement for effective verification has received growing recognition in both the bilateral and multilateral contexts.

3. In the bilateral field, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the treaty on the global elimination of their ground-based intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in December 1987. This treaty has historic significance for two reasons: (a) it provides for the complete, global elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons; and (b) it establishes an unprecedented, innovative verification régime providing for on-site inspections, including short-notice inspections, and giving both parties the right to station their inspectors on each others' territory to monitor an appropriate missile production facility. This is a genuine breakthrough in international verification procedures. A START treaty, however, would require an even more elaborate and extensive verification régime because, instead of banning different types of weapons systems, it will place numerical limits on them. Therefore stringent measures will be required to cover a wide variety of geographic deployments and of production and operational practices.

4. In the domain of nuclear testing, the United States and the Soviet Union adopted a joint statement in September 1987, which included, inter alia, an agreement to design and conduct joint verification experiments. These experiments will be conducted for the purpose of elaborating improved verification measures for the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. These verification measures will, if successful, be used to the extent appropriate in further nuclear-test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached by the two parties.

5. In the regional field, 35 participating States of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe agreed on a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures, including a precedent-setting verification régime, at Stockholm in September 1986. Since the Stockholm document went into effect on 1 January 1987, mandatory inspections have become an integral part of its implementation. For example, nine inspections have already been conducted under the terms of the document. The successful implementation of these inspections has served to build confidence among the participating States, as well as serving as a means to verify compliance with the Stockholm accord. As a follow-up to this agreement, the United States seeks to build upon and expand the measures adopted at Stockholm, including enhancing the current verification régime, in order to promote openness, predictability and stability in Europe.

6. In the multilateral field, in their negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, the 40 members of the Conference on Disarmament are beginning to negotiate more seriously on an effective verification system, including on-site challenge inspection without the right of refusal.
7. At the United Nations, the General Assembly at its forty-second session requested the Secretary-General to bring resolution 42/42 F on verification (as well as resolution 42/38 M on compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements) to the attention of the third special session on disarmament. Both resolutions have been adopted by consensus for two consecutive years (1986 and 1987), demonstrating universal recognition of the interrelated, central principles of verification and compliance. In addition, the Disarmament Commission, at its session in 1987, agreed on an illustrative list of 10 principles relating to verification, subject to further elaboration at its session in 1988. Any role that might be provided for the United Nations in the verification régimes for future treaties would, of course, as in the case of other verification arrangements, have to be subject to agreement among all the parties involved in the negotiations on such treaties.

8. Agreements lacking effective verification provisions, rather than promoting peace and stability, could become the source of mistrust. Therefore, the United States has actively encouraged the above-mentioned positive developments in the field of verification, based upon the conviction that any viable arms limitation agreement must include measures for effective verification of compliance by all parties. The United States welcomes the opportunity to discuss the subject of verification at the 1988 session of the Disarmament Commission and at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.