# Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

## Report of the Secretary-General

**Table: Replies Received from Governments**

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*79-12482*
LUXEMBOURG

[Original: French]
[20 April 1979]

The Government of Luxembourg has no suggestions to make regarding the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

 NORWAY

[Original: English]
[1 May 1979]

1. The approach pursued by the international community in seeking disarmament spans from the aspirations of the 1950s for comprehensive disarmament to the more limited present objective of seeking partial arms control measures as steps towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Although arms control efforts certainly have had important political and confidence-building effects and some limited results have been achieved, this method however has not fulfilled expectations. So far it has not been possible to control and curb the arms race.

2. Central to this development is the technological factor and the search for qualitative innovations, which engenders uncertainties and unpredictability. Technological inventions tend to outstrip the pace of negotiations. This factor, in conjunction with political distrust and traditional fears constitute an interplay of forces which contributes to maintaining the momentum of the arms competition.

3. The special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament in May/June 1978 entrusted the United Nations Disarmament Commission, inter alia, with the task of considering the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament. The Final Document of the special session also lays down that a comprehensive programme should encompass "all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

4. The special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament created renewed expectations for real progress in the field of disarmament. Efforts should now be made to implement the Programme of Action of the special session. In this respect the United Nations, through its bodies, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament and the General Assembly, will have to play an instrumental role. However, the actual agreements, embodying progress made at the political level, will have to be worked out in the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament, as agreed in paragraphs 109 and 118 of the Final Document.
5. The discussion at the special session made clear the urgent need for action based on new approaches to curb the arms race. The international arms competition represents a threat to the security and well-being of mankind and implies an abuse of resources in a world marked by poverty and distress.

6. Disarmament efforts should be undertaken in the perspective of reallocating the use of scarce human and material resources from military purposes to social and economic development, particularly for the benefit of the developing nations.

7. The problems of controlling the arms race require different approaches and emphasis in the major industrialized countries and in the developing nations. Measures should be adopted to curb the transfer of the armaments competition of the industrialized countries to areas of the world not yet afflicted.

8. Against this background there would seem to be a strong need for a more unified approach to disarmament and arms control that combines measures of quantitative limitations and reductions with simultaneous efforts to curb the qualitative aspects of the armaments development.

This approach should be truly comprehensive in the sense that it should embrace the whole life cycle of weaponry from the generic stages to actual deployment.

Negotiations in the various fields of disarmament should aim at addressing all the relevant aspects of the particular group of weapons under discussion. To achieve this end it might be useful to consider arranging negotiating topics in groups or "packages" in which both quantitative and qualitative aspects be considered together.

9. Certain elements of the programme are closely interrelated and should be pursued concurrently.

In the field of nuclear disarmament the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States to agree on measures to curb the nuclear arms build-up, and halt the further development of such weapons, correlate with obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States to forgo the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The technological factor is critical to all aspects of the arms race, but seems to have particular bearing on the possible development of new means of mass destruction.

Reduction of military budgets relates to the reallocation of resources for development purposes, as well as to the general aim of curbing the arms race.

10. In accordance with the principles outlined above, Norway would suggest that the comprehensive programme of disarmament include, inter alia, the following elements:

/...
10.1. Nuclear weapons

10.1.1. The early conclusion of a SALT II agreement between the United States and the USSR and continued efforts within the framework of SALT III to reach agreement on actual reductions of strategic armaments.

10.1.2. Universal adherence to the non-proliferation régime through a strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, and the development of more proliferation-resistant technologies.

10.1.3. The so-called grey-area nuclear weapons should be made the subject of arms control negotiations in a suitable forum.

10.1.4. The early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments, including nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, is an essential prerequisite to curbing the nuclear arms race.

10.1.5. A treaty should be worked out on the cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes (cut-off).

10.1.6. Under certain specific conditions, nuclear-weapon-free zones may be an important supplement to the régime of the non-proliferation Treaty. When such conditions exist, States should initiate regional discussions with a view to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. Such zones could have a stabilizing effect in areas of tension and conflict.

10.1.7. Nuclear-weapon States should extend their co-operation in the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and should enter into binding undertakings never to use nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons against States that have entered into a binding agreement establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone encompassing their territory.

10.1.8. In this respect the negative security guarantees given at the special session on disarmament could be further strengthened and formalized. Nations which are not protected by a nuclear security system and which meet the same conditions of denuclearization have a legitimate claim to universally applicable security guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

10.2. Other weapons of mass destruction

10.2.1. All States should adhere to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

10.2.2. There is an urgent need to reach agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Since this question has been a priority item in the United Nations
and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for several years, efforts should be intensified to find solution to the remaining technical problems in the near future. Despite the complicated character of the control issues, the main obstacle to an agreement now seems to be of a political nature.

10.2.3. Strong efforts should be made to avoid further development of destabilizing weapons of mass destruction. In this connexion, specific measures must be taken to prohibit the development of new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles. Agreements should be drawn up on a case to case basis.

10.3. Military research and development

10.3.1. To restrain one of the main elements in the arms race, and avoid the danger of circumvention and nullification of existing arms control agreements, as well as further complication of ongoing negotiations, restrictions must be placed on military research and development of weapons based on new as well as existing scientific principles. The political control over this sector should be strengthened.

10.3.2. In accordance with previous United Nations resolutions, part of the technological resources now devoted to military research should be converted to serve social and economic development, particularly in the developing countries. Investigation should also be made as to the possibilities of increased use of military research and development facilities for such purposes.

10.4. International arms transfers

10.4.1. Restrictions should be placed on accelerating international transfers of conventional weapons. Such transfers represent both a danger for escalation of local conflicts and a misuse of scarce resources.

International and regional agreements should be reached on the limitation of arms transfers. An important instrument in this connexion would be the registration under United Nations auspices of such transfers.

10.4.2. The major military powers, accounting for approximately 90 per cent of total arms sales, should take the lead in initiating a policy of restraint. It would be of particular importance to limit transfer of arms to areas of tension and conflict, and to place restrictions upon the introduction of highly sophisticated technology into an area. This question should therefore be considered both within a multilateral and a regional framework.

10.5. Reduction of military budgets

10.5.1. As a first step towards limiting the conventional arms race, States should supply information with more openness of their expenditures for military purposes and mechanisms should be established to collect such information. The proposed reporting instrument for military budgets should be further developed
based on the results of the practical tests to be undertaken by the ad hoc panel of experienced practitioners in the field of military budgeting.

10.5.2. In addition to efforts to reduce military expenditures on a global scale States should, on a regional basis, enter into discussions with a view to limit their military expenditures.

10.6. Disarmament and development

10.6.1. The United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and development, which will be completed in 1981, should clarify the basic conditions for the release of resources through disarmament, and particularly focus on the mechanisms for reallocating material and human resources to development efforts in the developing countries.

10.7. Arms control impact statements

At the special session on disarmament Norway proposed that countries adopt a procedure whereby major new weapons and military programmes should be made the subject of analyses of their effects on arms control efforts. Such analysis should contribute to a better understanding of the effects on arms control of military planning and procurement, and be helpful in directing arms control efforts.

Pakistán

original: English

18 april 1979

Pakistan has consistently expressed itself in favour of the early elaboration and implementation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

2. The prospects for the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament have been enhanced considerably as a result of the consensus reached at the tenth special session of the General Assembly on a Final Document which deals with disarmament in a comprehensive perspective. The special session made a significant contribution to conceptualizing the problems of disarmament and charting the course for their resolutions. It reached agreement on the broad goals of disarmament, the principles to guide negotiations and a programme of measures to be implemented in the relatively near future. The special session on disarmament has initiated a process which should culminate in the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

3. It is notable that the disarmament machinery established at the special session - the Committee on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission - is designed both to promote the implementation of the measures contained in the Final Document as well as to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Disarmament Commission should consider the "elements" of the comprehensive programme as a
matter of priority during its 1979 session and submit its recommendations to the Committee on Disarmament as soon as possible. This is necessary if the negotiating body is to complete its work on the comprehensive programme in time for its submission and approval by the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament to be held in 1982.

4. The following considerations should be borne in mind in the elaboration of the comprehensive programme:

(1) The objective of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

(2) The goal of general and complete disarmament is to ensure:

(a) That disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and

(b) That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

(3) The comprehensive programme of disarmament should be both a programme of work and a commitment to act. It should be adopted in the form of a legally binding international instrument.

(4) General and complete disarmament will have to be achieved, under a comprehensive programme, in a step-by-step process which clearly establishes the linkages between the various stages and the different kinds of disarmament negotiations. Three kinds of linkages seem inescapable:

(a) That between global and regional measures;

(b) That between nuclear and conventional disarmament; and

(c) That between arms control and measures to promote confidence among States.

(5) The comprehensive programme should ensure that disarmament is achieved, at each stage, in a balanced manner so as to ensure equal security for all States. Reduction in armaments and arms expenditure should be brought about in such a manner that these do not promote instability or disequilibrium globally or in any region.

(6) The primary responsibility for progress towards general and complete disarmament and for initiating the process would have to be assumed, both globally and in various regions, by those powers with the largest nuclear and conventional military arsenals and by other military significant States.
(7) The comprehensive programme of disarmament should be framed in the context of the goals, principles and measures approved at the special session; it should not involve renegotiation of these goals, principles and measures but their further elaboration.

(8) The efforts to implement the Programme of Action adopted at the special session should proceed simultaneously with the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

(9) The United Nations will have to play a central role in the formulation, adoption, implementation and review of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

(10) For the sake of convenience and clarity, the disarmament measures to be included in the comprehensive programme could be categorized in three broad phases: immediate, short-term and final. The first or "immediate" phase would include those measures that are indispensable to prevent the further escalation of the arms race and to bring it to a halt, as well as those on which an international consensus has been evolved. The second or "short-term" phase would consist of measures designed to actually reduce the existing arsenals of nuclear, conventional and other weapons. The third and "final" phase would comprise measures to bring about the complete elimination and destruction of nuclear, conventional and other weapons. There would be, of course, some overlap in the implementation of the measures in the three phases and they could follow a different sequence as international conditions change.

5. Bearing in mind the above considerations, Pakistan suggests the following 'Elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament'. It is hoped that these suggestions will be duly taken into account by the Disarmament Commission in its work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

ELEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME ON DISARMAMENT

Nuclear:

(i) Conclusion of internationally binding assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(ii) Immediate conclusion of a second strategic arms limitation agreement between the United States and the USSR and early conclusion of a third agreement envisaging significant reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals, and a halt in their qualitative development;

(iii) The conclusion of an international treaty for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; the declaration of a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing by the most advanced nuclear-weapon States;

\ldots
(iv) Action to prevent the main sources of nuclear proliferation - including measures to bring all nuclear facilities under international safeguards;

(v) Elaboration of an international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation (envisioned in para. 66 of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament).

Regional:

(i) Promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia;

(ii) The limitation of nuclear and conventional armaments in Europe and other regions of arms concentration.

Conventional:

(i) Conclusion of an international agreement to halt the qualitative development of conventional weapons;

(ii) Elaboration of an agreement to halt the production or prohibition of conventional weapons, especially in sensitive regions of the world.

Other weapons:

(i) Conclusion of an international convention to ban chemical weapons;

(ii) Conclusion of an international agreement or agreements to ban other weapons of mass destruction, including new types of such weapons.

Confidence-building measures:

(i) Elimination of foreign military bases and withdrawal of troops from foreign territories;

(ii) International measures to prevent external intervention, interference in internal affairs of States and domination of small States in a regional context;

(iii) Establishment of modalities to transfer resources from the largest arms spenders to the economic and social development of developing countries.

Second phase: short-term measures

Nuclear:

(i) Conclusion of an agreement among the nuclear Powers committing each of them not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against any State, nuclear and non-nuclear.
(ii) Conclusion of a further strategic arms limitation agreement among the two major nuclear Powers bringing their strategic forces in approximate parity with other nuclear Powers;

(iii) Conclusion of a general agreement among all the nuclear Powers to limit and reduce their nuclear weapons and delivery systems by stages;

(iv) Conclusion of an international agreement to eliminate "tactical" and "theatre" nuclear weapons from military arsenals of the nuclear Powers;

(v) Adoption of concrete measures to implement the new consensus on nuclear non-proliferation, e.g., possible modification of the non-proliferation Treaty, application of universal safeguards, transfer of nuclear technology, etc.

Regional:

(i) Conclusion of international agreements for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, including Africa, the Middle East and South Asia;

(ii) Conclusion of international agreements to establish zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other suitable parts of the world.

Conventional:

(i) Reductions in the conventional weapons and military budgets of the militarily significant States (in step with progress in nuclear disarmament measures);

(ii) Corresponding reductions in military spending in various "sensitive" regions through international agreements covering limitations on production and acquisition of conventional weapons.

Other weapons:

(i) Adoption of an international convention prohibiting the development, use, etc. of new weapons of mass destruction;

(ii) An international agreement on the non-use of science and technology for military purposes;

(iii) Total prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space, on the sea-bed and in other environments.

Confidence-building measures:

(i) Concerted measures to resolve outstanding international disputes and causes of tension on the basis of United Nations Charter principles and United Nations decisions;
(ii) Steps to strengthen the ability of the United Nations to maintain and promote international peace and security, e.g. through the establishment of self-executing machinery for the settlement of disputes;

(iii) Creation of an international disarmament authority - under the Security Council or the General Assembly - to oversee and supervise implementation of disarmament agreements.

Final

Nuclear:

Agreement for dismantling and destruction of remaining deployments and stockpiles of nuclear weapons retained until this stage and of missiles, aircraft, ships and submarines, and artillery systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons (along with verification and control methods).

Conventional:

International agreement for the complete elimination of armed forces and conventional armaments, complete cessation of military production, etc.

Other weapons:

Complete destruction of all other weapons capable of being used for military purposes.

Confidence-building measures:

(i) Agreement by States to make available contingents of militia to the Security Council to maintain international peace and security and prevent re-emergence of armaments, etc.

(ii) Establishment of an international control council under the disarmament authority to ensure compliance with measures for general and complete disarmament.

PERU

[Original: Spanish]
[24 April 1970]

First of all, it would seem appropriate to reiterate the importance of the Disarmament Commission, the United Nations deliberative body in this field, which is the result of one of the most auspicious agreements reached at the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.
The democratic nature of this Commission, the participation of all States Members of the United Nations in the Commission, and its ties with the Committee on Disarmament through the General Assembly make it, in Peru's opinion, the most suitable forum in which to make known the positions of all States on fundamental questions connected with this problem, in a specific, specialized body which had become a recognized necessity.

Consequently, in accordance with the provisions of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Disarmament Commission should give priority to the consideration of the components of a broad disarmament programme which would be submitted in the form of recommendations to the General Assembly and, in due course, to the Committee on Disarmament.

The Government of Peru feels that in the consideration of those components, account must be taken of certain essential points, and particularly the scale of priorities for disarmament measures set out in the Final Document of the above-mentioned special session.

Similarly, it will be borne in mind that the disarmament process, which calls for the maintenance of the security of all States, must be accompanied by measures to ensure that that security is not diminished. We therefore consider that adequate verification measures are an essential component of the various disarmament agreements.

A comprehensive disarmament programme must, by its very nature, establish general principles and priorities on which there is broad agreement and on the basis of which the set of measures designed to attain the objective of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control must be established.

This set of measures must be linked to specific time-limits not only for the implementation of each specific measure but also for the establishment of a climate of international confidence and security which will facilitate the conduct of new negotiations.

At the same time, the implementation of concrete measures should make it possible, gradually and to an increasing extent, to release human, financial and other resources which should be channelled to the priority aims of economic and social development of all peoples, and especially of the developing nations.

POLAND

[Original: English]
[30 April 1979]

With reference to resolution 33/91 A of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Government of the Polish People's Republic wishes to present its views on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the achievement of which has been recognized by the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to
disarmament and by the thirty-third session of the General Assembly as the main goal of diplomatic negotiations and of the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Polish People's Republic is deeply committed to the cause of halting the arms race and to disarmament. That commitment arises from its Constitution, in which action to prevent aggression and consolidate peace has been set as a major task of the State. In implementing this constitutional imperative throughout the 35 years of its existence, People's Poland has been taking an active part in disarmament negotiations and has advanced a number of initiatives of its own. Questions of disarmament remain in the focus of attention of the Diet (Sejm) as well as of the Government of the Polish People's Republic, reflected as it is in the decisions being passed by both of them.

1. In the opinion of the Government of Poland, the programme of disarmament, in order to be realistic, should take account of the basic development trends in the world of today.

The principal factor to affect the shaping up of contemporary international relations is the policy of peaceful coexistence - the foundation of the establishment and the functioning of the United Nations. Respect for its principles, as spelled out in the Charter and in other basic documents of the Organization, particularly those of the non-use of force, respect for the territorial integrity and the inviolability of State frontiers as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes, is at present one of the overriding conditions of security and of the development of international co-operation. Durability of the principles of peaceful coexistence is also at the foundation of any efforts aimed at disarmament.

An indispensable condition for an elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme is adoption of the basic guidelines along with a realistic plan of its implementation. The special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has significantly contributed to this end. It has served as an important stimulus to accelerate progress in disarmament negotiations. It has also stressed the importance of efforts aimed at convening a World Disarmament Conference.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic supports the Final Document of the special session and believes that the principles and the programme contained therein are the basis for the functioning of the Committee on Disarmament. In the light of the results of the special session and the resolutions of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, the Committee has an important role to play in discussing disarmament problems and preparing new disarmament agreements.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament should be subordinated to the main objective of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Efforts and joint action on a global scale are called for on the part of all States Members of the United Nations with a view to eliminating sources of tension...
and international conflicts as well as the material preparations for the conduct of wars. It makes opposition to all forms of arms race a particularly pressing task. Whether the international community will be developing in conditions of peace and co-operation or in those of a growing risk of conflict, deepening mutual distrust and constantly increasing threat to the individual and collective security of peoples and States, will hinge on the implementation of that task.

By aiming at lowering the level of military confrontation in central Europe, with its particular concentration of troops and modern armaments, Poland strives for the consolidation of security in this region. It is manifested in Poland's actions towards a full implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The same purpose is also served by proposals put forward by Poland and other Socialist States in the Declaration of the Consultative Political Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty of 23 November 1978, including the proposal on the mutual reduction of military activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty and on the liquidation of the two military organizations. The conclusion of an agreement by States which participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe that should commit them never to be first to use nuclear or conventional weapons against any other, in keeping with the relevant proposal by the USSR, would also be of utmost importance in that respect. In Poland's opinion, these proposals as well as the suggestions advanced by other States, meant to achieve military détente and build mutual confidence, could become subject of discussion in connexion with the meeting of representatives of States signatories of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to be held at Madrid in 1980.

Poland, for well understandable reasons, has focused its attention on problems of disarmament and détente in central Europe. Progress in resolving them can also contribute to facilitating disarmament solutions on a wider plane. Guided by these considerations Poland is participating in the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

3. Poland voices itself in favour of observing, in every agreement leading to disarmament, the principle of sovereign equality of its parties, based on the equity of rights and duties, reciprocity of obligations and undiminished security of all of them. Equal security of all parties can be ensured only if none of them pursues actions to gain unilateral military advantages. At each stage, the latter remains an indispensable condition for the successful implementation of the disarmament process. It must be ensured that accords on limiting armaments and armed forces result in enhancing the security of States entering such commitments. Should it not be so, peace and lasting international security might only be impeded.

4. The comprehensive disarmament programme should be centred on the implementation of the basic goals and requirements of the consolidation of international peace and security. At the same time, it seems only proper that selection be made and agreement be reached on priority measures leading to general and complete disarmament. Their implementation could proceed by stages.

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However, success of the disarmament programme also largely depends on the realization of partial measures which might facilitate more complex and ambitious solutions in future.

5. The Government of the Polish People's Republic believes that the central question of the comprehensive disarmament programme to attract the main efforts of all Governments and peoples is eliminating the threat of a nuclear war through effective limitation, gradual reduction and complete liquidation of all types and systems of nuclear weapons. The latter is linked with unconditionally banning the use of such weapons as part of renunciation by all States of the use of force in their mutual relations.

Poland's position on nuclear disarmament was contained in the document submitted jointly with other socialist States in the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, on 1 February 1979.

The problem of nuclear disarmament could be solved by way of first concluding an agreement on ending the production of all types of weapons concerned: nuclear, thermonuclear and neutron. An accord like this should provide for a gradual limitation and elimination of nuclear weapons, including in subsequent stages such measures as halting the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, ceasing the production of fissionable material for military purposes, gradual reduction of the stockpiles of nuclear warheads and their means of delivery. In order to make nuclear disarmament effective, it is indispensable that all nuclear-weapon States participate in the negotiations thereon and in the very process of the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear armaments. Poland likewise shares the view that it might be desirable that such negotiations be also attended by some States with significant non-nuclear military potentials.

In the view of the Government of the Polish People's Republic, curbing the arms race in the field of nuclear armaments could be assisted by conclusion of agreements on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, prohibition of the development, manufacture and introduction to the armories of States and of the use of neutron weapons as well as on the prohibition of creating new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

6. The requirements of security and disarmament make it imperative not to allow any further proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is thus necessary to guarantee that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 'Weapons become universally binding and that the system of guarantees be further strengthened with respect to the Treaty's observance, on the basis of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the international principles and guidelines on nuclear technology, equipment and material transfers, worked out in keeping with the non-proliferation Treaty. It is important at the same time that nuclear energy be used for peaceful purposes without obstacles nor discrimination, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty.

Poland attaches significant importance to measures designed to consolidate the guarantees of security to States which have renounced possession of nuclear weapons. Consequently, Poland has lent its support to the proposal submitted by
the USSR to conclude a convention on strengthening the guarantees of security of States which have renounced production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and have no such weapons on their territories. The régime of non-proliferation could be strengthened by signing a convention not to introduce nuclear weapons in the territories of States which have no such weapons at present.

7. Establishment of zones of limited nuclear armaments or nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace is of considerable significance for the halting of the nuclear arms race. In the past, Poland had pursued efforts towards creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. The idea of establishing such zones was later developed, to be reflected in numerous proposals on the denuclearization of various regions of the world. Poland continues to support these efforts and is in favour of the continuation of work with a view to materializing these ideas.

8. The Government of the Polish People's Republic lends its full support to the signing of and implementing further measures at limiting the strategic offensive nuclear arms within the framework of SALT. That support is based on the conviction that the expected agreement shall create necessary conditions for further negotiations on significant reductions and limitations of strategic arms and shall add to the intensification of other disarmament talks. It should also contribute to the stabilization of equal security, to averting a nuclear conflict and thereby to the consolidation of the foundations of international security.

9. The Government of the Polish People's Republic also wishes to recall that it has invariably been and continues to be in favour of discussing and seeking effective solutions to every aspect of arms limitation, given no detriment to the security of either party. The latter goes, too, for the question of a possible limitation of other armaments, which so far have not been subject of negotiations.

10. Parallel to efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in Poland's view there is urgent need to speed up negotiations on the prohibition and elimination also of other weapons of mass destruction. The latter includes talks on complete and universal prohibition of chemical weapons. Completion of work is also necessary on the convention prohibiting development and production of radiological weapons.

11. There is much important merit in the provisions of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. However, the durability of this international agreement calls for an expansion of its scope and effecting a full demilitarization of that environment, which would have an important bearing on ensuring the peaceful utilization of the areas in question for the benefit of all mankind.

12. Poland recognizes the desirability of giving priority to the question of reducing military budgets. In keeping with the proposals of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, such a reduction could be effected either by equal percentages or by magnitudes of the same order in absolute terms. The reduction of military
budgets could start without undue delay and should comprise the permanent members of the Security Council as well as a group of other States with significant military and economic potential.

The reduction of military budgets, in which States parties to the Warsaw Treaty are ready to participate on the basis of reciprocity with member States of NATO, would positively contribute to setting certain limits to the arms race and facilitating concrete disarmament measures. Consequently, vast financial and material resources would be released, which might be used for peaceful and humanitarian purposes of the socio-economic progress, particularly in the developing countries.

13. Poland is convinced of the need for taking simultaneous measures in the field of conventional disarmament, particularly not to increase the armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council and of other States with great military potential.

Of much importance are talks initiated between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of the international trade in and transfers of conventional armaments, especially in the context of the prohibition of such transfers to régimes pursuing the policies of racism, apartheid and aggression against other States.

14. The Polish Government believes that convening a World Disarmament Conference would be of utmost importance to bring about a major breakthrough in disarmament negotiations. In Poland's opinion, concrete preparations to convene such a conference, as the most universal and authoritative forum in the field of disarmament, should begin without delay.

15. The functioning of the United Nations as well as of other international governmental and non-governmental organizations testifies to a constant deepening in the consciousness of the broad public opinion of the latter's need for active involvement in strengthening peace, in the struggle to halt the arms race and for disarmament.

In the considered opinion of the Government of Poland, that process should be constantly enhanced and promoted by efforts of all States along with their endeavours designed to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament. Guided by these considerations, Poland came out with the initiative of a declaration on the preparation of societies for life in peace. At its recent session the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the relevant Declaration on this extremely important subject.

Full implementation of that Declaration will make an outstanding contribution to the cause of ensuring the supreme value of man - man's right to life in peace. It will serve the development of relations among States in an atmosphere of mutual confidence, based upon the principles of peaceful coexistence.

16. Poland supports, too, efforts and activities related to the preparation and conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force or its threat in
international relations, recognizing as it does that the disarmament process calls for a proper environment of political confidence, accompanied at the same time by legal safeguards of the craving of nations to live in peace.

Likewise important is proper co-ordination of the disarmament programmes with those of socio-economic development. Action towards this end pursued by the United Nations can indeed play a significant role.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic duly appreciates the importance of United Nations activities for disarmament and thereby wishes to reaffirm its determination to continue Poland's active contribution to that cause.

TURKEY

[Original: French]  
[13 April 1979]

Work towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control should be conducted so as to cover both nuclear and conventional weapons. In other words, an integrated approach should be adopted towards disarmament problems and attention should focus on realistic measures which take into account the security requirements of States and would therefore have a chance of eliciting general support.

In view of present levels of armaments and the rapid advances in military technology, quantitative reductions and qualitative limitations should be negotiated in tandem.

In these efforts, questions of nuclear disarmament should naturally have priority. What is essential is to stop both horizontal and vertical proliferation. The nuclear Powers must work towards arrangements designed to end the nuclear arms race, to set limits on existing nuclear arsenals and to establish restrictions on the qualitative development of nuclear weapons.

The early elaboration of the treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and the accession of all nuclear States to that treaty are of particular importance.

Among nuclear disarmament measures, priority should be given to the preparation of an international treaty prohibiting fissionable material which can be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons and putting a stop to the production of such material.

An important objective is to endow the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with a truly universal character; in this regard, the nuclear States should discharge the obligations they have assumed under that Treaty. (Turkey, a signatory of the Treaty, is about to complete formalities for ratification.)
The conclusion of agreements establishing "nuclear-weapon-free zones", in which States will participate of their own free will, is an important step, providing that the initiative comes from the States of the region and that due account is taken of certain special security conditions. In order to encourage such efforts and initiatives, real and convincing security guarantees should be offered the non-nuclear States.

As in the case of nuclear weapons, the production, use and stockpiling of other weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited and ways and means of effective monitoring should be worked out. In this context, the early conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of existing stocks is especially important.

Similarly, an international convention prohibiting the development, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons and providing effective ways and means of monitoring should be worked out at an early stage.

It is essential to conclude a convention prohibiting the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction. In that connexion, an agreement in principle must also be drawn up, to cover the interim period pending the conclusion of that convention.

The control and limitation of the conventional arms race is an objective no less important than nuclear disarmament. Rapid technological advances in this field today, qualitatively and quantitatively, have reached such proportions as to constitute a serious threat to world peace and security. Conventional weapons absorb a large share of defence expenditure and are therefore a serious obstacle to the economic and social development of developing countries.

Since the existence and development of nuclear weapons is, in some specific cases, intended only to offset an imbalance between conventional forces, nuclear disarmament measures must be conceived together with conventional disarmament measures and, in so far as practicable, disarmament efforts should include both categories of weapons.

Regional arrangements should be envisaged for phased reduction of conventional weapons. Negotiations for troop reductions in central Europe should be pursued in an expanded second phase covering the other European regions.

In order to increase the chances of success of disarmament and arms control efforts regional arrangements should be entered into to build mutual confidence; experience suggests that the scope of confidence-building measures should be expanded and that they should be developed as an ongoing process.

In order to control the conventional arms race, which alters priorities in the allocation of resources, leads to waste and also constitutes an obstacle to economic and social development efforts, it has become imperative to develop controls upon transfers of and trade in conventional weapons. For controls to be effective, it is very important that a registry of weapons transactions be established.

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Certain conventional weapons which cause needless suffering and are therefore of inhuman character should be limited and their development, production and use should be prohibited.

Progress towards general and complete disarmament depends on the development and acceptance of effective methods of monitoring. This aspect of the problem should never be lost sight of in disarmament efforts. With a view to developing national monitoring methods, rendering them international, and monitoring nuclear disarmament measures, the establishment of an international agency for monitoring by satellite should receive special attention.

In order to introduce moderation and control into the arming process, budgetary methods and techniques should be agreed upon as a basis for limiting military expenditure and making reasonable reductions in military budgets.

Finally, it would be very useful for an international scientific study to be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations to bring into focus the contradictions between disarmament and development.

The concrete results which can be expected from disarmament efforts depend largely on the progress of détente in the world and on building an effective system of collective security to guarantee international peace and security. In that context, the strengthening of the United Nations as an organization, support of its peace-keeping activities, the development and strengthening of existing methods and machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes between States, expansion of the base for representation in international disarmament conferences and in international disarmament bodies in keeping with realistic criteria, and the conclusion of regional arrangements and agreements are important elements in a concerted effort.

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Original: English
24 April 1972

The Government of the United Kingdom endorses the objective of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and has been prominent in efforts to achieve that goal. A Franco-British plan for world-wide phased disarmament put forward in June 1954 received considerable support. A British three-stage disarmament plan was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly on 17 September 1959 and transmitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission by resolution 1378 (XIV). Negotiations then continued for several years. The joint United States/Soviet declaration of principles published in September 1961 remains the basis for a treaty on general and complete disarmament. But the negotiators failed to reach agreement because of fundamental differences of view over verification, the rate of reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles, and international arrangements for keeping the peace in a disarmed world. By the early 1960s attention was shifting to specific measures of
disarmament - to such questions as the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and later to the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons - although general and complete disarmament remained the ultimate goal.

The measures negotiated have not been insignificant. In important ways the arms race has been halted or limited. The multilateral treaties concluded in recent years have succeeded in limiting the testing and spread of nuclear weapons in the case of the partial test-ban and non-proliferation Treaties; in prohibiting specific weapons in the case of the biological weapons convention; in limiting armaments in certain environments in the case of the outer space and sea-bed Treaties; in banning new techniques in the case of the environmental modification Convention; and in banning military activities geographically in the case of the Antarctic Treaty. These international agreements are helping to create the kind of trust between nations which is needed to make more ambitious measures possible. The United Kingdom is a party to all these treaties and a depository power for nearly all of them.

In the preparations for the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, the United Kingdom and other countries put forward on 1 February 1978 a draft Programme of Action (A/AC.107/96) setting out our views on a phased and co-ordinated approach to general and complete disarmament through a series of specific agreements. This Programme included immediate measures of arms control and disarmament, concurrent action for the further strengthening of international security and confidence, and studies to facilitate the negotiation of further measures. Many of these proposals were included in the Final Document of the tenth special session (resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978). The Government of the United Kingdom has already made known its disappointment at the lack of balance in the Final Document between nuclear and conventional measures in disarmament priorities, and wishes to reiterate its view that nuclear disarmament cannot be accomplished in isolation without corresponding measures of control on conventional arms. Notwithstanding this reservation, the Programme of Action in the Final Document represents a consensus of all Member States and should be seen as providing the framework for phase I of a comprehensive negotiating programme for disarmament.

Specifically, phase I should concentrate on the following activities:

(a) Bringing to a successful conclusion those negotiations in progress identified in the Programme of Action in the Final Document;

(b) Concluding an international agreement on the prevention of accidental nuclear war;

(c) Developing an international consensus on further measures to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation;

(d) Taking steps to ensure that any new weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles that may be identified are not developed or deployed;
(e) Broadening adherence to existing arms control and disarmament agreements;

(f) Taking further measures to extend the application of the arms control régime in outer space;

(g) Encouraging the regional approach to disarmament, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas where security is not founded on nuclear deterrence;

(h) Opening consultations between arms suppliers and recipients on conventional arms transfers, possibly on a regional basis;

(i) Extending the scope of confidence-building measures to strengthen international peace and security;

(j) Increasing the supply of information on military expenditure and intensifying efforts to establish a standardized reporting system and an agreed basis for negotiating a multilateral, balanced and verifiable reduction of military budgets;

(k) Giving support to the various studies commissioned by the United Nations General Assembly.

In the early stages it is the aim of disarmament to reduce levels of arms and resources spent on them without disturbing the level of security enjoyed by States. More far-reaching steps are, however, likely to depend on progress in removing the underlying causes of tension and suspicion among States which may give rise to a build-up of arms. Although an arms race may aggravate conflicts between States it does not normally cause them in the first place. Similarly, although carefully negotiated arms control measures may help to reduce tension, they will not in themselves solve international problems or remove sources of conflict. Increasing work should therefore be devoted to international mechanisms for crisis anticipation, peace-keeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes and to additional measures of confidence-building.

The discussions at the tenth special session produced many additional ideas (some of them contained in the Final Document) which should be taken into account in future planning of a long-term disarmament strategy. Depending on the outcome of the studies by the United Nations Secretary-General and the results of phase I, some examples of measures which could be envisaged as forming phase II of a disarmament negotiating programme are: acceptance by all States of voluntary inspection of their civil nuclear facilities; publication of detailed information on armed forces, the total value of military production and the total value of arms transfers; negotiations on a multilateral, balanced and verifiable reduction of military budgets; agreements to curb the world-wide build-up of conventional weapons, including the question of international arms transfers and the possibility of reciprocal limitations; a study of technical measures such as demilitarized zones, zones of limited forces, and surveillance and early warning systems as a
contribution to confidence-building and the verification of arms control agreements; consideration of an international disarmament body to monitor compliance with arms control agreements; and consideration of the nature and functions of an international control organization to preserve the peace in a disarmed world.

Later phases could focus on more radical disarmament measures. These might include the abolition of specific types of offensive weapons; the difficult task of seeking to negotiate a formula on which minimum force levels necessary for internal security might be based; and the finalization of the international control organization considered in phase II.

The final phase might be the convening of an international conference to complete the negotiations and sign a world disarmament treaty. In this way the course towards general and complete disarmament would be charted by international agreement at every stage.

The Government of the United Kingdom requests that these comments be brought to the attention of the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1st meeting in May 1979.

VENEZUELA

[Original: Spanish]
[30 April 1979]

The increasing seriousness of questions connected with the arms race, and especially the nuclear arms race, is undoubtedly one of the most pressing problems confronting mankind and consequently calls for effective and immediate solutions. This sense of urgency has been recognized by the international community and, in the last few years, has resulted in increasing frequent meetings and conferences, which have indicated specific guidelines to be followed in order to halt and reverse the arms race, as an indispensable prerequisite for the achievement of peace and security in a world in which international justice prevails.

The tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament was a historic event of special significance, which established the framework for concerted and co-ordinated efforts to ensure specific disarmament measures. The Assembly established the objectives and principles which must govern negotiations and deliberations on disarmament, drew up a Programme of Action to be implemented in the coming years and decided on the machinery for the conduct of these negotiations. In the opinion of Venezuela, the guidelines contained in the Final Document of the special session set forth the basic course to be followed in disarmament negotiations at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.

In the light of the above considerations, of its repeated statements on the subject and in accordance with resolution 33/91 A adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1978, Venezuela considers that the following points might be taken into account in the elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme:
A. **Nuclear disarmament measures**

The threat of complete self-destruction as a result of a nuclear war is the greatest danger confronting the world today. For many years now, nuclear arsenals have had the capacity to destroy the entire planet and nuclear weapons have been steadily accumulated and technologically refined and this is increasing the danger and creating ever more powerful means of destroying mankind completely. It is therefore clear that the adoption of measures in the nuclear field is a matter of the highest priority, and obviously the primary responsibility for attaining this objective lies with the nuclear-weapon States, and particularly by the super-Powers. To achieve nuclear disarmament, the following measures could be envisaged, among others:

(a) Complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapon States;

(b) Significant qualitative limitations and considerable reductions in strategic nuclear-weapon systems until the final elimination of such weapons is achieved;

(c) Cessation of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons;

(d) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones;

(e) Universal accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(f) Security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States.

B. **Prohibition of weapons of mass destruction**

In addition to the nuclear threat there is the devastating danger that can be caused by new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Man, instead of using his imagination and creativity for uplifting and constructive ends, is using them to devise and perfect means of mass annihilation. In order to halt and reverse this alarming trend, the adoption of such measures as the following is indispensable:

(a) Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction;

(b) Prohibition of the development, production and storage of chemical weapons and destruction of existing weapons;

(c) Prohibition of the development, production and storage of radiological and bacteriological weapons and destruction of existing weapons.

C. **Other disarmament measures**

No less important as a means of helping to attain the goal of general and complete disarmament is the adoption of measures in fields such as the following:
(a) Prohibition or restriction of the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects;

(b) Considerable reductions in the military budgets of States, and particularly of the nuclear-weapon States and other military Powers;

(c) Limitation and reduction of the armed forces of States and of their conventional weapons;

(d) Conclusion of agreements to limit conventional weapons at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels;

(e) Limitation and control of the transfer of conventional weapons.

D. Disarmament and development

This subject deserves separate consideration in view of the increasingly close relationship between disarmament and development and the vital need to release resources now being used for military purposes for the economic and social development of peoples. This relationship has been and is still the subject of very thorough studies made by qualified experts under the auspices of the United Nations.

The proper implementation of the above-mentioned measures would make a significant contribution to the promotion of common development and welfare aims, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

E. General and complete disarmament

Parallel with the adoption of all the above-mentioned measures, efforts to draw up a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, with the participation of all States should continue.

F. Information and education concerning the dangers of the arms race and efforts to promote disarmament

A comprehensive disarmament programme should comprise, as an important component, the adoption of measures to mobilize and sensitize world public opinion concerning the risks and implications of the arms race and the efforts being made, principally in the United Nations, to contain it.

To this end, the implementation of the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, is indispensable, as is the implementation of General Assembly resolution 33/71 G.