REPORT

OF THE

DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OFFICIAL RECORDS: THIRTY-NINTH SESSION

SUPPLEMENT No. 42 (A/39/42)

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1. At its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly, by resolution 38/183 E of 20 December 1983, took note of the report of the Disarmament Commission and the recommendations contained therein. 1/ The operative part of the resolution reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Takes note of the report of the Disarmament Commission;

"2. Notes that the Disarmament Commission has yet to conclude its consideration of some items on its agenda;

"3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph 3 of resolution 37/78 B, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations, at its substantive session in 1984, on the outstanding items on its agenda, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly as well as the results of its 1983 substantive session;

"4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1984 and to submit a substantive report, containing specific recommendations on the items inscribed on its agenda, to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;

"5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Committee on Disarmament, on the work of its 1983 session, together with all the official records of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;

"6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled 'Report of the Disarmament Commission'."

2. At the same session, the General Assembly also adopted resolution 38/71 B of 15 December 1983. The operative part of the resolution, in connection with the Disarmament Commission, reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Expresses its conviction that increased solidarity in the field of development would serve the cause of international peace and security and that the resources released by the reduction of arms expenditures would contribute to the growth and stability of the world economy, and particularly the economies of developing countries;
2. Invites Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General, by 1 April 1984, their views and proposals concerning the relationship between disarmament and development, in particular with regard to the following:

(a) The evaluation of the burden of armaments in the world;

(b) The impact of military expenditures on the world economic situation and development;

(c) The contribution that a reduction in arms and military expenditures, in particular by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States, or a contribution by those States, as appropriate, would make to development tasks;

(d) The ways and means that would enable this contribution to be made, in particular in the interests of the economic and social progress of the developing countries;

(e) The consideration of proposals relating to the convening of a conference;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the replies of Member States to the Disarmament Commission in good time;

4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to include this item on the agenda of its session to be held in 1984, to consider the replies received and to make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

Also at the same session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 38/73 A of 15 December 1983. The operative part of the resolution, in connection with the Disarmament Commission, reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

...

1. Urges all States to encourage and assist all efforts designed to explore further the ways in which confidence-building measures can strengthen international peace and security;

2. Invites all States to consider the possible introduction unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally of confidence-building measures in their particular regions and, where possible, to negotiate on them in keeping with the conditions and requirements prevailing in their respective regions;

3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue and conclude at its 1984 session the consideration of the item entitled 'Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level';

4. Further requests the Disarmament Commission to submit a report on its deliberations on this item, containing such guidelines, to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session;"
"5. Recommends that all States consider the inclusion of a reference to, or an agreement on, confidence-building measures, as appropriate, in any joint statements or declarations of a political nature;

"6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled 'Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures'."

4. The General Assembly, at the same session, further adopted resolution 38/181 B of 20 December 1983. The operative part of the resolution, concerning the Disarmament Commission, reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Condemns the massive build-up of South Africa's military machine, including its frenzied acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail;

"2. Expresses its full support for the Governments of the independent States of southern Africa in their efforts to guarantee and safeguard their territorial integrity and national sovereignty;

"3. Reaffirms that the racist régime's acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

"4. Requests the Disarmament Commission to consider substantively and as a matter of priority South Africa's nuclear capability during its session in 1984, taking into account, inter alia, the findings contained in the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field, with a view to adopting concrete recommendations on the question;

"5. Requests the Security Council, for the purposes of disarmament and to fulfil its obligations and responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, to take enforcement measures to prevent any racist régimes from acquiring arms or arms technology;

"6. Further requests the Security Council to conclude expeditiously its consideration of the recommendations of its Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa with a view to blocking the existing loopholes in the arms embargo so as to render it more effective and prohibiting, in particular, all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field;

"7. Condemns all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa since such collaboration enables it to frustrate, inter alia, the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa which seeks to keep Africa free from nuclear weapons;"
"8. Condemns, in particular, recent decisions by some Member States to grant licences to several corporations in their territories to provide equipment and technical and maintenance services for nuclear installations in South Africa;

"9. Calls upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime, including the provision to it of such materials as computers, electronic equipment and related technology;

"10. Demands once again that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;

"11. Requests the Secretary-General to follow very closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session."

5. Also at the same session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 38/183 H of 20 December 1983. Paragraph 6 of the resolution, relating to the Disarmament Commission, reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"6. Calls upon the Disarmament Commission to intensify its work in accordance with its mandate and to continue improving its work with a view to making concrete recommendations on specific items on its agenda."

6. At the same session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 38/184 A of 20 December 1983. The operative part of the resolution, regarding the Disarmament Commission, reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"1. Declares once again its conviction that it is possible to achieve international agreements on the reduction of military budgets without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty;

"2. Reaffirms that the human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures could be reallocated to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries;

"3. Calls upon all Member States, in particular the most heavily armed States, to reinforce their readiness to co-operate in a constructive manner with a view to reaching agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures;

"4. Appeals to all States, in particular to the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military
expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocations the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of developing countries;

"5. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its 1984 substantive session the consideration of the item entitled 'Reduction of military budgets', including consideration of the suggestions of the Chairman of the working group, as well as other proposals and ideas on the subject-matter, with a view to further identifying and elaborating the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage;

"6.Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled 'Reduction of military budgets'."

7. The Disarmament Commission met at United Nations Headquarters on 1 and 8 December 1983 for a brief organizational session. During that period, the Commission held two meetings (A/CN.10/PV.71 and 72). In the course of its deliberations, the Commission considered various questions regarding the organization of its work for its 1984 session, in particular the question of the election of the officers of the Commission, taking into account the principle of rotation of the chairmanship. In that connection, the Commission elected its Chairman, three Vice-Chairmen and its Rapporteur; however, it decided to postpone the election of other Vice-Chairmen to the substantive session in 1984 (see A/CN.10/PV.71 and 72). The Commission also considered the provisional agenda for its next substantive session, to be held in May/June 1984.
11. ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF THE 1984 SESSION

8. The Disarmament Commission met at United Nations Headquarters from 7 May to 1 June 1984. During the course of its session, it held 9 plenary meetings (A/CN.10/PV.73-81).

9. At its 73rd, 75th and 77th meetings, on 7, 9 and 11 May, the Commission elected five Vice-Chairmen. The bureau of the Commission was constituted as follows:

**Chairman:** Mr. James Victor Gbeho (Ghana)

**Vice-Chairmen:** Representatives from the following States:

- Argentina
- Bahamas
- German Democratic Republic
- Germany, Federal Republic of
- Greece
- Nepal
- Pakistan
- Sudan

**Rapporteur:** Mr. Sergey Martynov (Byelorussian SSR)

10. At its 73rd meeting, on 7 May, the Commission adopted its agenda (A/CN.10/L.14), as follows:

1. Opening of the session.

2. Election of officers.

3. Adoption of the agenda.

4. (a) Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war;

   (b) Consideration of the agenda items contained in section II of resolution 33/71 H, with the aim of elaborating, within the framework and in accordance with priorities established at the tenth special session, a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament.

5. Reduction of military budgets:

   (a) Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, noting the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

   (b) Examination and identification of effective ways and means of achieving agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain, in a balanced manner, military expenditures, including adequate measures
of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned, taking into account the provisions of General Assembly resolutions 34/83 F, 35/142 A, 36/82 A, 37/95 A and 38/184 A, with a view to identifying and elaborating the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles into a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

6. Substantive consideration of the question of South Africa's nuclear capability as requested by the General Assembly and the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid (resolutions 37/74 B and 38/181 B and document A/CN.10/4).

7. Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level.

8. Consideration of proposals concerning the relationship between disarmament and development.


10. Other business.

11. At its 73rd meeting, on 7 May, the Commission adopted its programme of work and also decided to establish the Committee of the Whole, with the following tasks: consideration of agenda item 4 (a) and (b); of reports of the Working Groups; and of other business (agenda item 10). The Committee of the Whole met under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the Commission and held 2 meetings on 10 and 31 May. At its 1st meeting, on 10 May, the Committee of the Whole decided to establish a contact group with the task of dealing with item 4 (a) and (b), under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the Commission. The Contact Group held 12 meetings between 10 and 31 May, and submitted its report to the Committee of the Whole at the 2nd meeting of the Committee on 31 May.

12. In accordance with its programme of work, the Commission also decided, at its 73rd meeting, to establish Working Group I to deal with agenda item 5 regarding the question of reduction of military budgets and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Ion Diaconu (Romania) and held 9 meetings between 11 and 25 May.

13. At the same meeting, the Commission decided to establish Working Group II to deal with agenda item 6 concerning the question of South Africa's nuclear capability and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Davidson L. Hepburn (Bahamas) and held 11 meetings between 11 and 30 May.

14. The Commission decided, at the same meeting, to establish Working Group III to deal with agenda item 7 concerning the question of confidence-building measures and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Henning Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany) and held 11 meetings between 11 and 30 May.
15. Also, at the same meeting, the Commission decided to establish Working Group IV to deal with agenda item 8 regarding the relationship between disarmament and development and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Uddhav Deo Bhatt (Nepal) and held 9 meetings between 11 and 30 May.

16. On 8 and 9 May, the Disarmament Commission held a general exchange of views on all agenda items (A/CN.10/PV.74-76).

17. At its 80th meeting, on 1 June, the Commission considered the reports of the Working Groups as well as the results of deliberations in the Committee of the Whole on agenda item 4 (a) and (b), 5, 6, 7 and 8. The reports of the subsidiary bodies of the Commission and recommendations contained therein are included in chapter IV, entitled "Conclusions and recommendations", of the present report.

18. In accordance with the previous practice of the Commission, some non-governmental organizations attended the plenary meetings as well as the meetings of the Committee of the Whole and also addressed communications to the Commission (A/CN.10/INF.12).
III. DOCUMENTATION

A. Reports and other documents submitted by the Secretary-General

19. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 38/193 B, the Secretary-General, by a note dated 12 April 1984, transmitted to the Disarmament Commission the report of the Committee on Disarmament, 2/ together with all the official records of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters (A/CN.10/56).

20. In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of General Assembly resolution 38/71 B, the Secretary-General, by a note verbale dated 31 January 1984, invited Member States to express their views and proposals concerning the relationship between disarmament and development. The Secretary-General subsequently submitted a report containing the replies received from Member States (A/CN.10/57 and Add.1-12).

B. Documents submitted by Member States

21. In the course of the Commission's work, the following documents dealing with substantive questions were submitted:

(a) Working paper entitled "General considerations for the elaboration of guidelines for confidence-building measures", submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/58);

(b) Letter dated 7 May 1984 from the head of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission containing an extract from a speech delivered on 2 March 1984 by K. U. Chernenko, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, concerning the international situation, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/59);

(c) Working paper entitled "Considerations for elaborating guidelines for confidence-building measures", submitted by Finland (A/CN.10/60);

(d) Working paper entitled "Prevention of nuclear war", submitted by a group of socialist States (A/CN.10/61);

(e) Working paper entitled "Agenda item 4 of the current session of the Commission", submitted by China (A/CN.10/62);

(f) Working paper entitled "Doctrines of nuclear warfare: agenda item 4 of the current session of the Commission", submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/63);

(g) Letter dated 11 May 1984 from the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, containing a proposal by the States participating in the Warsaw Treaty to the NATO Member States for negotiations on the non-increase and reduction of military expenditures, submitted by Romania (A/CN.10/64);
(h) Working paper entitled "Agenda item 4 of the current session of the Commission", submitted by Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Turkey and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/65);

(i) Letter dated 29 May 1984 from the representatives of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/66).
22. At its 80th meeting, on 1 June, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus the reports of its subsidiary bodies and the recommendations contained therein regarding items 4 (a) and (b), 5, 6, 7 and 8 of its agenda, and agreed to submit the texts of these reports, recorded below, to the General Assembly.

23. The report of the Committee of the Whole on item 4 (a) and (b) reads as follows:

"REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE ON AGENDA ITEM 4 (a) AND (b)

"1. At its 1st meeting, on 10 May 1984, the Committee of the Whole considered item 4 (a) and (b) and established a contact group open to all delegations to deal with that item, under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the Commission.

"2. The Contact Group held 12 meetings between 10 and 31 May 1984. It had before it the following documents, which are annexed to the present report of the Commission:

"(a) Letter dated 7 May 1984 from the head of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/59); a/

"(b) Working paper entitled 'Prevention of nuclear war', submitted by a group of socialist States (A/CN.10/61); b/

"(c) Working paper entitled 'Agenda item 4 of the current session of the Commission', submitted by China (A/CN.10/62); c/

"(d) Working paper entitled 'Doctrines of nuclear warfare', submitted by the German Democratic Republic (A/CN.10/63); d/

"(e) Working paper on agenda item 4, submitted by Mexico (A/CN.10/1984/CW/WP.1/Rev.1); e/

"(f) Working paper on agenda item 4, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/1984/CW/WP.2); f/

"(g) Working paper on agenda item 4, submitted by Romania (A/CN.10/1984/CW/WP.3); g/

"(h) Working paper on agenda item 4, submitted by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CN.10/1984/CW/WP.4); h/

"3. The Contact Group continued the work on agenda item 4 on the basis of the compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4 contained in annex VIII to the report of the Commission on its 1983 session. i/ In that connection, the Contact Group considered proposals contained in the documents listed in paragraph 2 above.
4. At the request of the Chairman of the Contact Group, Mr. Sergio de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil) chaired an informal group to deal with recommendations 1 to 4 of the compilation referred to above.

5. The state of the deliberations of the Contact Group is reflected in the 'Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4' which is annexed to the present report of the Commission. 

6. As indicated in the 'Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4', the Contact Group was unable to reach a consensus on a complete set of recommendations. Those recommendations, the formulation of which appears in the 'Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4' without brackets or alternatives, were generally acceptable, without prejudice to the right of delegations to review their formulation as appropriate. The Commission should pursue its efforts with a view to reaching agreed formulations on recommendations dealing with other issues under item 4.

Notes

a/ See annex I.

b/ See annex II.

c/ See annex III.

d/ See annex IV.

e/ See annex V.

f/ See annex VI.

g/ See annex VII.

h/ See annex VIII.


j/ See annex IX.

24. The report of Working Group I on item 5 reads as follows:

Report of Working Group I

1. The General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session adopted resolution 38/184 A of 20 December 1983 in which it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its session to be held in 1984, the consideration of the item entitled 'Reduction of military budgets', including consideration of the suggestions of the Chairman of the working group, as well as other proposals and ideas on the subject-matter, with a view to further identifying and elaborating the principles which should govern further actions of States in
the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 73rd meeting, on 7 May 1984, decided to establish Working Group I to deal with agenda item 5 (a) and (b) as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 38/184 A.

"3. The Working Group had before it the working paper containing the Chairman's suggestions concerning principles and ideas which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures, a/ the working papers submitted during the previous sessions of the Commission by the delegations of Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, b/ by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland, c/ by the delegations of Romania and Sweden d/ and by the delegation of India. e/

"4. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Ion Diaconu (Romania) and held nine meetings during the period from 11 to 25 May 1983. Furthermore, the Chairman of the Working Group conducted informal consultations on different proposals and ideas.

"5. The exchange of views revealed serious concern among Member States about the continuing arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race, and growing military expenditures, which constituted a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and had extremely harmful consequences with regard to international peace and security. It was reaffirmed that it was possible to achieve continued and systematic reductions in military expenditures without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security, self-defence and sovereignty.

"6. Some delegations stressed the primary responsibility vested with the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States to be the first to reduce their military budgets. The view was also held that the freeze and reduction of military budgets should begin with those nuclear-weapon States with the largest military arsenals and the biggest military expenditures, to be followed by other nuclear States and other militarily significant States. Some delegations underlined the importance of a proposal which was addressed in March 1984 by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty to the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization concerning negotiations on the non-increase and the reduction of military expenditures, distributed as a document of the Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/64).

"7. Some delegations stressed that an agreed and balanced reduction of military expenditures would only be possible if it was based on the principles of transparency and comparability, which could best be achieved through regular availability of meaningful and reliable data. They held the view that agreed methods for measuring and comparing military expenditures constituted an essential requirement for meaningful negotiations on balanced reductions of military budgets. The same delegations also held the view that an important first step to that end was the systematic use of the standardized international reporting instrument established in pursuance of General
Assembly resolution 35/142 B, presenting national expenditure data in a format suitable for international comparison. They stressed the need for the reporting instrument to be used by an increasing number of States from different geographic regions and representing different budgeting systems.

"8. Other delegations stressed that conceptions of transparency and comparability should not be used as a pretext for delaying the commencement of concrete negotiations on the halting of the increase and the subsequent reduction of military expenditures. In their opinion, the availability of additional data and comparability of military budgets were not necessary for the freezing and reduction of military budgets and the insistence on them would only create obstacles to the initiation of such negotiations. The same delegations referred to the essential role of the exercise of political will on the part of Governments, which should result in the initiation of negotiations on the reduction of military expenditures and expressed the view that it was timely and most urgent to enter such negotiations, including those mentioned in paragraph 6 above. The proposals to assess the 'military efforts and potential' of States and the proposals, in the guise of ensuring that military expenditures are 'open', to expand the collection of data on the military utilization of human and material resources are designed to mask the true reason for the arms race, which is that certain States lack the political will to undertake real disarmament measures.

"9. It was also stated that a greater openness in military matters, including military expenditures, could be achieved as part of the confidence-building measures, mutually agreed by the interested States. It was emphasized, in the same context, that the questions of data and comparability could only be resolved satisfactorily in the course of negotiations, which should start as soon as possible.

"10. Some delegations stressed the need for agreements to reduce military expenditures to contain effective and adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties. Some other delegations did not see the necessity of verification of such agreements. Other delegations stated that adequate measures of verification should be determined during the negotiations, as part of the respective agreements.

"11. It was also stated that agreements on the reduction of military expenditures should not only be interrelated with other measures of disarmament, but also with concurrent measures for the security system provided for in the Charter.

"12. Some delegations objected to the concept of freezing of military budgets on the ground that a freeze would not be verifiable, would consolidate possible existing imbalances in military budgets and would suppress an incentive to reduce military budgets. Other delegations maintained that the freeze of military budgets would be an extremely useful and feasible measure that did not require verification.

"13. Some delegations stated that the principles and provisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) were a sufficient basis for adopting, without delay, practical and concrete measures for the freezing and reduction of military budgets. Other delegations referred to General Assembly resolutions which
expressed the conviction that the identification and elaboration of a set of principles or guidelines which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military budgets could contribute to harmonizing the views of States and create confidence among them conducive to achieving international agreements on the reduction of military budgets. Still other delegations were of the view that principles alone cannot build confidence and underlined the need to follow a pragmatic course in working towards the adoption of concrete, balanced and verifiable measures.

"14. Continuing the substantive work of identifying and elaborating the principles on the basis of the Chairman's working paper and other proposals and ideas, the Working Group noted that many principles and ideas were generally accepted, on a provisional basis and subject to an agreement on the whole, while on some of the proposed principles and ideas important divergencies persisted. Some proposals and suggestions were extensively discussed and taken into account during the meetings of the Working Group, while others have to be further considered. Accordingly, the stage reached by the Working Group in the identification and elaboration of the principles that should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military expenditures is expressed in the working paper annexed to the present report. f/

"15. In the light of its consideration of agenda item 5 (a) and (b), the Disarmament Commission recommends that the General Assembly should request the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its next substantive session, the consideration of this agenda item, on the basis of the working paper annexed to this report, as well as other proposals and ideas on the subject-matter, with a view to finalizing the identification and elaboration of the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

"16. The Disarmament Commission also recommends that at its next substantive session, further consideration should be given to other proposals and ideas, as well as recommendations, including those contained in document A/CN.10/35.

"Notes


"b/ Ibid., annex IX.

"c/ Ibid., annex X.

"d/ Ibid., annex XI.

"e/ Ibid., annex XII.

"f/ See annex X."
25. The report of Working Group II on item 6 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group II

"1. The General Assembly, at its thirty-eighth session, adopted resolution 38/181 B of 20 December 1984 by which it, inter alia, requested the Disarmament Commission to consider "substantively and as a matter of priority South Africa's nuclear capability during its session in 1984, taking into account, inter alia, the findings contained in the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field, with a view to adopting concrete recommendations on the question.

"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 73rd meeting, on 7 May 1984, decided to establish Working Group II to deal with agenda item 6 regarding the question of South Africa's nuclear capability and to make recommendations thereon to the Commission, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 38/181 B.

"3. In connection with its work, the Working Group had before it the following working papers as contained in annexes XV and XVI of the report of the Disarmament Commission on its 1983 session: a/

"(a) 'Nuclear capability of South Africa', submitted by Mauritius on behalf of the African States members of the Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/43/Rev.1);

"(b) 'Possible elements for concrete recommendations concerning agenda item 6 on the question of South Africa's nuclear capability', submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/53).

"4. In carrying out its work, the Working Group also took into account other relevant documents on the subject, inter alia:

"(a) 'South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field' (A/35/402 and Corr.1);

"(b) 'Report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa'. b/

"5. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Davidson L. Hepburn (Bahamas) and held 11 meetings between 11 and 30 May 1984. It also conducted informal consultations through the Chairman during this period.

"6. At its first meeting, on 11 May, the Working Group decided that the working paper submitted by Mauritius on behalf of the African States members of the Disarmament Commission (A/CN.10/43/Rev.1) should serve as basic document for consideration of the subject, taking into account the working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/53).

"7. On that basis, the Working Group endeavoured to draft conclusions and recommendations on the issue. In this connection, various views were expressed and a number of suggestions for a possible compromise were put forward. They are, to a considerable extent, reflected in the text contained in document A/CN.10/1984/NG.II/CNP.1.
"8. In view of the lack of consensus on the text, the Working Group, at its 10th meeting, on 29 May 1984, decided to recommend to the Disarmament Commission to refer to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly the issue of South Africa's nuclear capability as well as the present report to which the text contained in document A/CN.10/1984/WG.II/CRP.1 is annexed for its further consideration. c/"

"Notes"


"c/ See annex XI."

26. The report of Working Group III on item 7 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group III"

"1. At its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly, on 15 December 1983, adopted resolution 38/73 A by which it, inter alia, requested the Disarmament Commission to continue and conclude at its 1984 session the consideration of the item entitled 'Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level'. The Assembly further requested the Disarmament Commission to submit a report on its deliberations on this item, containing such guidelines, to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

"2. The Disarmament Commission, at its 73rd meeting, on 7 May 1984, decided to establish Working Group III to deal with agenda item 7 as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 38/73 A.

"3. The Working Group met under the chairmanship of Mr. Henning Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany) and held 11 meetings between 11 and 30 May. Furthermore, the Chairman of the Working Group conducted informal consultations on various aspects of the Group's work.

"4. In connection with its work, the Working Group had before it, in addition to the documents listed in paragraph 26 of the report of the Commission on its 1983 session a/ and, in part, annexed to that report, the following documents, which are annexed to the present report:

"(a) Working paper entitled 'Draft conclusions of the Working Group of the Disarmament Commission at its 1984 session on the subject of the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global and regional level, submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/58); b/

"(b) Working paper entitled 'Considerations for elaborating guidelines for confidence-building measures', submitted by Finland (A/CN.10/60); c/"
"(c) Working paper on the item 'Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level', submitted by Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/CN.10/1984/WG.III/WP.1), d/

"(d) Chairman's composite draft of guidelines for confidence-building measures (A/CN.10/1984/WG.III/WP.2). e/

"5. The Working Group conducted an extensive general exchange of views on the subject, but agreed that the main thrust of its work should be on elaborating a body of guidelines in accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/73 A. As a flexible instrument to ensure an orderly working process, the Working Group, on 17 May, took as a basis, a proposal by the Chairman on structure (A/CN.10/1984/WG.III/CPR.1/Rev.1) with the understanding that final decisions on structure of the guidelines would be taken at a later date. Some delegations reserved their view as to the proposal on structure and the nature of the work process.

"6. In the course of its general exchange of views and of its more specific work, the Working Group had an in-depth consideration of many aspects of the agenda item. The debate highlighted a great number of views contained in the report of the Commission at its 1983 session and in the various working papers.

"7. Despite considerable efforts the Working Group did not complete its work fully. In the view of some delegations the consensus on many sections of the future guidelines was substantially broadened, and conceptual progress achieved, but a limited number of divergences persisted on points considered of importance by a number of delegations. In the view of other delegations, progress was achieved only in broadening understanding of some sections of the future guidelines and divergences persisted on many points of importance. At what he considered the conclusion of the drafting stage, the Chairman submitted a composite draft of the guidelines on confidence-building measures with a view to reflecting existing agreement, as he saw it, and promoting consensus where it had not yet been achieved. This was not a negotiated text and was circulated under the sole responsibility of the Chairman with no commitments by delegations. The Chairman's draft is annexed to this report.

"8. The Working Group, on the conclusion of its work, was of the opinion that while the guidelines could not be finalized as planned, the extensive debate had been useful - and in the view of some delegations particularly useful - and that a considerable gain in insights had resulted from it on the part of all delegations. Some delegations felt that the concept of confidence-building measures, despite some divergence of approach, had been further clarified, and that the future elaboration and implementation of confidence-building measures, in all relevant contexts, had been facilitated by the exercise. Other delegations felt that no agreement had been reached on the concept of confidence-building measures despite in-depth consideration of the issue. The Working Group also felt that the documents elaborated during the two-year work period, especially the reports of the Commission at the 1983 and at the present session, with their respective annexes, would remain of value for any further work in this field. The Working Group expressed the wish that work on the guidelines should be concluded as early as possible. Some
delegations stressed that in such further work the level of consensus attained should be fully preserved, so that previous efforts could be translated into further progress. Other delegations were of the view that primary importance should be attached to the approaches which had not been considered during the Commission's 1984 session.

"9. In the course of the Group's work divergences became apparent on the approach to the problems under discussion. Some delegations supported the approach according to which confidence-building measures must incorporate significant agreements of a military and political nature, as well as other steps, in order to build confidence. They emphasized the need to concentrate attention primarily on such large-scale confidence-building and security measures as prevention of nuclear war, assumption by the nuclear-weapon States of an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and mutual agreement of States not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other. These delegations believed that such measures must be carried out without delay and that their adoption would promote the elaboration of other additional measures to build confidence. Agreements on military and technical measures must take place simultaneously with agreements on political issues.

"Some other delegations strongly rejected that approach, and maintained that the essence of confidence-building measures was concrete action which could be examined and assessed, to be taken in a sustained, consistent manner over time. Declaratory policies or mere promises of future behaviour might have a value of their own, and possibly contribute to confidence if substantiated by consistent subsequent behaviour, but they could not substitute for concrete action. In many areas where confidence-building was particularly needed - as, for instance, in Europe - such declaratory policies had only marginal or no significance at the present time, and, instead, genuine confidence-building measures in the form of concrete action - aiming, for example, at providing reliable information on military activities and intentions - were needed. The drafting work of the Group had largely been based on this concept. The sole emphasis placed by some delegations on the declaratory approach, and their refusal to even take into consideration measures leading to more openness and information in military matters, prevented the Working Group from making further progress towards establishing guidelines and thus to engage in an effective confidence-building process as advocated by a majority of the members of the Working Group.

"Other delegations expressed the view that confidence-building measures should contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the settlement of the existing international problems and for the improvement of international relations in general. Dynamic by nature, they should aim at the strengthening of international peace and security and the promotion of justice, co-operation and solidarity in international relations. In their view, confidence-building measures must neither be a substitute nor a pre-condition for disarmament measures nor divert attention from them. Yet their potential for creating favourable conditions for progress in this field should be fully utilized at global and regional levels in so far as they might facilitate and did not impair in any way the adoption of disarmament measures. They stressed that confidence-building measures related to a wide spectrum of activities in the interaction among States and were necessary in the political, military, economic, social and cultural fields. These should
include, in particular, the removal of mistrust and political tensions, progress towards disarmament, restructuring of the world economic order, and the elimination of all forms of colonialism, racial discrimination, hegemony, expansionism, domination and foreign occupation.

"Still some other delegations, pointing to the fact that not all views put forward in the Working Group were adequately reflected above, expressed the hope that the elaboration of the guidelines for confidence-building measures should continue in a spirit of mutual understanding and that all efforts would be undertaken to come to a successful conclusion of this work at the earliest possible time.

"10. In the light of its consideration of agenda item 7, reflected in the present report and the aforementioned documents, the Disarmament Commission recommends:

" (a) That the Member States of the United Nations be fully aware of the heightened importance of confidence-building measures as well as of measures of disarmament in the present international situation;

"(b) That the General Assembly and all States take note of the views expressed and the work accomplished during the 1983 and 1984 sessions of the Commission on the item on confidence-building measures;

"(c) That the General Assembly reiterate its invitation to Member States to encourage and assist all efforts designed to explore further the ways in which confidence-building measures can strengthen international peace and security and promote disarmament;

"(d) That the General Assembly urge all States to consider the widest possible use of confidence-building measures in their international relations, taking into account the views expressed during the Commission's work;

"(e) That the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session should decide on an appropriate format to conclude work on the guidelines as early as possible.

"Notes


"b/ See annex XII.

"c/ See annex XIII.

"d/ See annex XIV.

"e/ See annex XV."

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The report of Working Group IV on item 8 reads as follows:

"Report of Working Group IV

1. The General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session adopted resolution 38/71 B of 15 December 1983 in which it requested the Disarmament Commission to include the item concerning the relationship between disarmament and development in the agenda of its 1984 session, to consider the replies received by the Secretary-General on the basis of resolution 38/71 B and to make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session.

2. In accordance with this resolution, the Commission inscribed the issue in the agenda for its 1984 session.

3. At its 73rd meeting, on 7 May 1984, the Disarmament Commission decided to establish Working Group IV to deal with agenda item 8 as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 38/71 B.

4. The Working Group met under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Uddhav Deo Bhatt (Nepal) and held 9 meetings during the period from 11 to 30 May 1984. Furthermore, the Chairman of the Working Group conducted informal consultations.

5. The Working Group considered 29 replies from Governments, as contained in documents A/CN.10/57 and A/CN.10/57/Add.1 to 12 and heard several statements on the subject. It also discussed a working paper presented by the delegation of France (A/CN.10/1984/WG.IV/WP.1).

6. On the basis of its consideration of the subject the Commission reached the following conclusions.

7. The Commission recalled that the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2) stated that in a world of finite resources there was a close relationship between expenditure of armaments and economic and social development (para. 16). The colossal waste of resources for military purposes was even more serious in that it diverted not only material, but also technical and human resources which were urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries (para. 16). The same document further stressed that progress in disarmament would help greatly in the realization of development. Therefore, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries (para. 35).

8. The Commission agreed that world-wide military spending had acquired a staggering magnitude and the global trend continued to be towards a faster rate of annual increase in those expenditures. That stood in dramatic contrast to the sombre state of the global economy and had serious implications for the economic prospects of the world and particularly those of the developing countries. The Commission, therefore, expressed the renewed commitment of all its members to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

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under effective international control and their belief that the world economy, and particularly that of developing countries, would benefit from appropriate international action that took into account the close relationship of disarmament and development.

"9. Several delegations took the position that in view of the importance and urgency of giving international consideration and practical expression to that relationship, the time had come for a comprehensive discussion of the subject at a high political level. Those delegations wanted the Disarmament Commission to recommend:

"(a) That the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session should decide to convene an international conference on that subject which should be preceded by thorough preparations;

"(b) That welcoming the French initiative in this respect, there should be an early convening of a preparatory meeting to be followed by an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development, both under the auspices of the United Nations;

"(c) That the purpose of the conference should be:

"(i) To review the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects and dimensions with a view to reaching appropriate conclusions;

"(ii) To undertake an examination of the implications of the level and magnitude of the continuing military expenditures for the world economy and international economic and social situation, particularly for the developing countries, and make recommendations for remedial measures;

"(iii) To consider the ways and means of giving a concrete expression to the idea of channelling a significant part of resources devoted to military purposes for socio-economic development, particularly of the developing countries through:

"a. A reallocation of resources released through disarmament measures;

"b. The setting-up of an international disarmament fund for development;

"c. Any other proposals for making available additional resources for development purposes, even before the commencement of the disarmament process, in such a manner as establishes a relationship between disarmament and development.

These delegations underlined that none of the conclusions and recommendations contained in this paragraph could be interpreted as affecting in any way:

"(a) The priorities established in paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;
"(b) The responsibilities of the developed States to provide resources for development. The resources released by the implementation of disarmament agreements should be understood as being complementary to and not as a substitute for regular contributions to developmental purposes.

"10. A number of delegations expressed the view that while the relationship between disarmament and development could not be discussed in isolation from the disarmament process, such a discussion could not also be confined to recommending only measures for reaching and implementing disarmament agreements. These delegations stressed that it would be necessary to make a well-planned and conscious effort in advance to ensure that ways and means, including necessary institutional mechanisms, were devised and commitments undertaken so that a significant portion of the resources released from disarmament measures became available for economic and social development, particularly of the developing countries.

"11. Other delegations proposed that the Disarmament Commission should express its understanding of the demand being made by many States, especially developing States, for the adoption of measures to limit and reduce armaments in close conjunction with the solution of the problems of economic development. They further proposed that the Commission should reaffirm that only real steps of disarmament could make it possible to reallocate resources to the solution of the truly acute social and economic problems in the developing countries. Those delegations expressed the view that the implementation of specific measures on the whole complex of problems of arms limitation and disarmament, particularly aimed at preventing nuclear war, achieving nuclear disarmament, banning chemical weapons, preventing an arms race in outer space and other measures, would release substantial resources for development. The elaboration of certain norms governing relations between States possessing nuclear weapons would in this respect be of great importance. They stressed that the strengthening of confidence and an improvement in the international situation inevitably resulting from such measures would enable States to allocate for developmental purposes an increasing portion of the resources currently spent on armaments. They took the position that the holding of a special conference on various aspects of the relationship between disarmament and development, which would in fact have nothing to do with disarmament measures, not only seemed inappropriate but might lead to the use of such a forum by the opponents of disarmament as a screen to conceal their unwillingness to take real steps for arms limitation. These delegations proposed that the Disarmament Commission should recommend:

"(a) That the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session should appeal to the Conference on Disarmament, in accordance with its mandate as the sole multilateral organ for disarmament negotiations, to accelerate the elaboration of international agreements on all items of its agenda and to call upon all the States members of the Conference to make a constructive contribution to the negotiations, an action which would really help to release resources for development purposes;

"(b) That the General Assembly should appeal to all Member States to take account during those negotiations of the importance of ensuring that the resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures will be used to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve economic conditions in the developing countries.

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"12. The Commission recommends that efforts should be continued to enable the General Assembly to reach, at its thirty-ninth session, a broad measure of agreement on this subject, taking into account the views expressed above."

* * *

Notes


2/ Ibid., Supplement No. 27 (A/38/27).
ANNEX I

Letter dated 7 May 1984 from the head of the delegation of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the
Chairman of the Disarmament Commission
(A/CN.10/59)

I have the honour to transmit herewith an extract from a speech delivered on
2 March 1984 by K. U. Chernenko, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, concerning the international situation.

This speech outlines the position of the USSR on a number of issues discussed

I request you to have this text distributed as an official document of the
Disarmament Commission.

(Signed) V. ISSRAELYAN
Head of the USSR delegation
to the United Nations
Disarmament Commission

APPENDIX

Extract from a speech delivered on 2 March 1984 by K. U. Chernenko,
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR, concerning the international situation

Now let us turn to international affairs. One of the most important and
insistent instructions of Soviet voters was, is and will remain the instruction to
cherish peace like the apple of the eye and to ensure the security of our
homeland. I can tell you that the Party and the Soviet State have been following
this instruction unwaveringly and in difficult circumstances.

As you know, the past few years have been marked by a sharp intensification of
the policy of the most aggressive forces of United States imperialism, a policy of
blatant militarism, claims to world dominance, resistance to progress, and
violations of the rights and freedom of the world's peoples. The world has seen
quite a few examples of the practical application of this policy. These include
the invasion of Lebanon and the occupation of Grenada, the undeclared war against
Nicaragua, threats to Syria and, finally, the turning of Western Europe into a
launching site for United States nuclear missiles targeted at the USSR and its
allies.

All this compels us to give the most serious attention to strengthening the
country's defences. The Soviet people do not want an arms build-up; they want a
reduction of armaments by both sides. But we must take care to ensure sufficient
security for our country, its friends and allies. This is precisely what is being
done. And let everyone know that none of those given to indulging in armed ventures will catch us unawares, and no potential aggressor can hope to avoid devastating retaliation.

At the same time it is precisely the complexity of the situation that forces us to redouble and triple our efforts in pursuing a policy of peace and international co-operation.

It is hard to recall a problem of importance for strengthening peace on which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have not put forward concrete and realistic proposals during the past few years. The initiatives of our countries are winning ever broader support from other States. This was convincingly confirmed by the United Nations General Assembly at its latest session.

Imperialist policy-makers are striving in every way to limit the international influence of the socialist countries. They are attempting to impair the cohesion of these countries and to erode the foundations of the socialist system wherever they think they can count on success. In these circumstances it is particularly important to maintain and strengthen the solidarity of fraternal socialist countries. The leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries again unanimously expressed their conviction of this during their recent meeting in Moscow.

The United States has imposed an economic blockade and uttered military threats against socialist Cuba. But the hopes of frightening it and making it swerve from its chosen path are doomed to failure. This is guaranteed by the unflinching will of the heroic Cuban people, rallied around their Communist Party. It is also guaranteed by the solidarity shown by the independent countries of Latin America and by many participants in the non-aligned movement with the Island of Freedom. The Cuban people are resolutely supported by the fraternal socialist States. As for the USSR, it was, is and will remain on Cuba's side in fair weather and in foul.

The normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China could, of course, help to enhance the role of socialism in international affairs. We are consistent advocates of this normalization. Political consultations show, however, that there remain differences on a number of questions of principle. In particular, we cannot arrive at any understanding which would prejudice the interests of third countries. However, the exchange of views continues, and we find it useful. The Soviet Union favours raising the level of contacts to the extent that is acceptable to both sides.

It is also useful that mutually beneficial contacts in the economy, culture, science and other fields are being gradually re-established. This is not to the liking of those who want to take advantage of the deterioration of relations between the USSR and China. But it is to the good of both our countries and helps to improve the overall world situation.

The danger of the imperialist policy of constant escalation of tension has become obvious. The graver the threat it poses to human civilization, the stronger become mankind's forces of self-preservation. Indignation is rising in Western Europe over the actions of those who are sacrificing its security to the imperial ambitions in Washington. Millions of participants in the anti-missile movement are quite vocal in making this known. In addition, by no means all the leaders of Western countries and influential political parties approve of the adventurism of
the United States administration. It also worries a large section of the public in
the United States itself. It is becoming ever clearer there that the United States
has not derived and will not derive any military superiority or political
achievements from intensified militarization and aggravation of the international
situation. Such actions simply lead throughout the world to growing criticism of
Washington's belligerent course. People want peace and tranquility, not war
hysteria. I can say that our conversations with the leaders of the many foreign
departments which attended the funeral of Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov confirmed
that quite convincingly.

All this inspires the hope that it will eventually be possible to reverse the
course of events and direct them towards consolidating peace, limiting the arms
race and developing international co-operation.

Détente has struck deep roots. This is attested to, for instance, by the
convening at Stockholm of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building
Measures and Disarmament in Europe (see General Assembly resolution 38/73 of
15 December 1983).

Of course, the curbing of the nuclear-arms race is of key importance to the
peace and security of peoples. The Soviet Union's position on that issue is
clear. We are against rivalry in building up nuclear-weapons arsenals. We have
been and remain proponents of the prohibition and destruction of all types of such
weapons. Our proposals on this matter were put forward long ago, both in the
United Nations and in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, but discussion on them
is being blocked by the United States and its allies.

As for Europe, we are in favour, as in the past, of it being free from nuclear
weapons, both medium-range and tactical ones. We stand for both sides making the
first major step in this direction without wasting time. In so doing, the Soviet
Union has no intention of strengthening its security at others' expense, but wants
equal security for all.

Regrettably, the United States has turned its participation in the talks on
this subject into a tool of propaganda to camouflage the arms race and the policy
of the cold war. We have not joined in such a game and are not going to do so. By
deploying missiles in Europe, the Americans have created an obstacle to the talks
both on "European" and on strategic nuclear weapons. It is the removal of these
obstacles - which would also remove the need for the measures we have taken in
response - that offers the way to work out a mutually acceptable agreement.

The United States Administration has recently begun to make peaceful-sounding
statements, urging us to join in a "dialogue".

World-wide attention has been drawn to the fact that these statements are in
sharp conflict with everything that the present United States Administration has
said, and - what is most important - with everything it has done and continues
doing in its relations with the Soviet Union. Assurances of its good intentions
can be taken seriously only if they are substantiated by real actions. As far as
the Soviet Union is concerned, it has always favoured a search for mutually
acceptable, practical solutions to concrete questions for the benefit of both
countries, for the benefit of peace. There are quite a few such questions. The
United States administration has many opportunities to prove its desire for peace
by its deeds.
Why does the United States, for example, not ratify the treaties with the USSR on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which were signed almost 10 years ago, and why does it not complete the work of drawing up an agreement on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests? Remember that it was the United States which broke off the talks on these issues. The United States can also make no small contribution to the strengthening of peace by concluding an agreement to renounce the militarization of outer space. As everyone knows, the USSR has been proposing this for a long time.

The peaceful assurances given by the United States Government would inspire far more trust had it accepted the proposal for a mutual freeze on American and Soviet nuclear weapons. So many weapons have already been accumulated that this step would not create even the slightest threat to the security of either side. But, at the same time, it would greatly improve the general political atmosphere, and, it must be believed, would facilitate reaching agreement on a reduction of nuclear arsenals.

A very important task is to save mankind from the possible use of chemical weapons. Talks on this issue have been in progress already for a long time, but now it seems that the prerequisites for resolving this question are beginning to materialize. The point at issue is the complete and general prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, and of their development and production, and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons. We are for effective control of the implementation of such an agreement, and the control should cover the whole process of destruction of nuclear weapons, from beginning to end.

We cannot rule out the possibility that reaching an agreement on those issues would signal a genuine turning-point in Soviet-American relations, and in the international situation as a whole. We would wish for such a change. Now it is up to Washington to act.

The policy of those Powers possessing nuclear weapons is of special significance in our times. The vital interests of the whole of mankind and the responsibility of statesmen to present and future generations require that relations among these Powers should be regulated by certain norms. We feel that these norms should be something like the following:

To regard the prevention of nuclear war as the main objective of one's foreign policy, and to avert situations fraught with the danger of nuclear conflict. In the event that such a danger emerges, urgent consultations should be held to prevent a nuclear conflagration from breaking out;

To renounce the propaganda of nuclear war in any of its various forms, either global or limited;

To undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

Not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against non-nuclear countries in whose territory there are no such weapons; to respect the status of nuclear-free zones already created; and to encourage the creation of new such zones in other parts of the world;
To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form: not to hand over these weapons, or control of them, to anyone; not to deploy them in the territory of countries where there are no such weapons; and not to spread the nuclear-arms race to new spheres, including outer space;

To strive, step by step, on the basis of the principle of equal security, for the reduction of nuclear weapons, to the point of eliminating them in all their various forms.

The Soviet Union has made these principles the foundation of its policy. We are ready to reach agreement at any time with the other nuclear Powers on the joint recognition of norms of this kind and on imparting to them a mandatory character. I think that this would meet the fundamental interests not only of the participating countries but also of the peoples of the whole world.
ANNEX II

Prevention of nuclear war

Working paper of a group of socialist States
(A/CN.10/61)

At the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament the socialist countries stated their views on the reasons for the increasing threat of nuclear war and on the practical steps to be taken for its elimination, as well as on the organization of the consideration of the issue in the Committee (working papers CD/355 of 21 March 1983 and CD/406 of 4 August 1983). Recent developments in world events confirm the correctness of the judgements and the significance and timeliness of the proposals contained in those documents.

The 1984 session of the Conference on Disarmament is taking place under conditions of marked aggravation of the international situation and increased danger of nuclear war caused by the militarist policies of the United States.

These policies find expression, above all, in attempts by the United States of America and their NATO allies to destroy the existing military balance. The large-scale programmes of development of strategic and other nuclear weapons adopted in the United States of America, the spreading of the arms race to outer space, and the deployment in Western Europe of new medium-range United States missiles are clearly designed to provide a material basis for these adventurist policies. These actions are intensifying the very real danger that the United States of America will bring catastrophe upon the peoples of Europe and the whole world.

By deploying its new nuclear missiles in European countries the United States of America has created obstacles both to the Soviet-United States talks on nuclear-arms limitations in Europe and to the talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons.

The socialist countries have declared more than once that they will under no circumstances tolerate military superiority over them. At the same time they remain committed to the principled course which they have jointly adopted towards the cessation of the arms race, above all the nuclear-arms race, and towards the reduction and ultimate complete elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

The prevention of nuclear war is, in the full sense of the word, the number one global problem. Not only the solution of other problems affecting all mankind but the very existence of life on Earth depends on whether this threat can be successfully eliminated.

That is precisely how the matter is seen by the overwhelming majority of States, as the results of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly confirmed. In a whole range of resolutions the General Assembly spoke out in favour of the adoption of urgent measures for the prevention of nuclear war.

Of particular importance among them are the Declaration on the Condemnation of Nuclear War and the resolutions on the renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons, on the nuclear-weapon freeze, on starting nuclear disarmament negotiations and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
The socialist countries are convinced that the problem of prevention of nuclear war should now take a central place in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. This is further supported by the fact that in a number of resolutions, including its resolution 38/183 G, the General Assembly addressed a request to the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish an ad hoc working group for that purpose. The socialist countries fully support that recommendation and are in favour of its earliest implementation. They propose that efforts towards the prevention of nuclear war should be concentrated in the following areas:

1. The policy of States possessing nuclear weapons is of special significance for solving the problem of prevention of nuclear war. The vital interests of the whole of mankind require that relations between those States should be regulated by certain norms which they could agree among themselves to recognize and which should be given a mandatory nature. The socialist countries draw attention to the specific proposals in that connection contained in document CD/444.

2. With the emergence of new types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, which facilitate the establishment of a nuclear first-strike potential, it is urgently necessary to create a moral and political atmosphere in which any attempt to unleash nuclear war would be doomed to failure.

(a) The socialist countries consider it essential that all States, and especially the nuclear-weapon States, should regard the prevention of nuclear war as the main objective of their policy, should prevent situations fraught with nuclear conflict and, in the event of such danger, should hold urgent consultations to prevent a nuclear conflagration from breaking out.

(b) As a development from the provisions of the resolution on the condemnation of nuclear war adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session (resolution 38/75 of 15 December 1983), the socialist countries propose that all States should be recommended to consider the question of including provisions condemning nuclear war in the appropriate unilateral and joint statements or declarations of a political nature.

(c) The socialist countries also consider it necessary that all States, and particularly nuclear-weapon States, proceeding, inter alia, from United Nations decisions on the prohibition of war propaganda, should renounce propaganda for nuclear war in any of its variations, either global or limited. In particular, it is necessary to renounce the elaboration, advancement, dissemination and propaganda of political and military doctrines and concepts designed to support the "legitimacy" of first use of nuclear weapons and, more generally, the "permissibility" of unleashing nuclear war. They are convinced that no aim whatsoever can justify the first use of nuclear weapons.

(d) The socialist countries reiterate their proposal concerning the renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear weapons. Obligations to that effect could be assumed unilaterally by each nuclear-weapon State which has not yet done so. This method, which does not involve holding special talks or reaching agreement, would help to strengthen confidence and reduce the level of nuclear danger. At the same time the undertakings by nuclear-weapon
Powers to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons could also be incorporated in a unified instrument of international law, which, in practice, would be equivalent to the complete legal prohibitions of the use of nuclear weapons. The socialist countries again declare their support for the proposal for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons with the participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers.

(e) Such measures as the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons and ultimately the complete prohibition of their use would be an active means of preventing nuclear war and would represent the concretization, in a manner applicable to present-day conditions, of norms of international law and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Proposals by socialist countries for the general exclusion of the use of force, both nuclear and non-nuclear, from international relations pursue the same purpose. At the global level, that could be done by concluding a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. An important step in the same direction is also the proposal put forward by a number of socialist countries in January 1983 to conclude a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO member States, whose core would be the commitment of the States members of the two alliances not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional arms against one another.

(f) The creation of conditions for the prevention of a nuclear conflict would be assisted by the adoption by all nuclear-weapon Powers of an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against non-nuclear countries in whose territory there are no such weapons, to respect the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone already created and the encouragement of the creation of new nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

(g) The socialist countries reaffirm their readiness to consider other appropriate measures, such as the prevention of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, the avoidance of the possibility of surprise attacks, etc., as was proposed, inter alia, in document CD/406. At the same time they consider it necessary to stress that various confidence-building measures can contribute towards the removal of the nuclear threat only in conjunction with far-reaching political undertakings in that field. The confidence-building measures should be genuinely large-scale ones aimed first and foremost at the prevention of nuclear war.

3. Of no less importance would be measures of a material nature designed to ensure that various kinds of doctrines and concepts justifying the unleashing of nuclear war should not be supplied with a material basis in the form of new armaments systems.

(a) One of the most effective and relatively easily applicable measures towards that end could be the freezing, under appropriate verification, of nuclear weapons in quantitative and qualitative terms. This step should be taken by all nuclear-weapon Powers or, in the first instance, only by the USSR and the United States of America on the understanding that the other nuclear-weapon States would follow their example.
To agree to a freeze would mean:

- To cease the build up of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all kinds of nuclear weapon delivery systems and all kinds of nuclear weapons;

- Not to deploy nuclear weapons of new kinds and types;

- To establish a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and on tests of new kinds and types of their delivery systems;

- To stop the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of creating nuclear weapons.

A nuclear-weapon freeze would significantly improve the general political atmosphere and facilitate agreement on the reduction of nuclear arsenals.

(b) The cessation of the qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons and the development of new models and types of such weapons would be assisted by the earliest completion of the preparation of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and, until the conclusion of such a treaty, by the proclamation by all nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

(c) Another important obligation of nuclear-weapon States which bears a direct relationship to the prevention of nuclear war is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. That means, first of all, not handing over such weapons or control over them to anybody. It is also essential not to deploy them on the territory of countries where there are none. Another pressing task is that of preventing the spread of the nuclear-arms race to new spheres.

(d) The socialist countries continue to hold that nuclear disarmament and the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons is the most effective guarantee against the threat of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons. They call once again for efforts to achieve, step by step and on the basis of the principle of equal security, the reduction of nuclear weapons until they have been completely eliminated in all their forms.

(e) Side by side with measures directly relating to nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war would be greatly assisted by the cessation and prevention of the arms race in other high-risk areas. Of particular significance in that connection would be the prevention of the arms race in space, which is fraught with the further increase of the risk of nuclear war. The programmes of development of a large-scale anti-missile system being elaborated at present in the United States of America cannot remove the threat of further nuclear arsenals hanging over the world but will only make their use more probable.

The socialist countries draw attention to the fact that the USSR has given an undertaking not to be the first to place any type of anti-satellite weapons in space, which is to say that it has imposed a unilateral moratorium on such launchings for as long as other States, including the United States of America, refrain from placing anti-satellite weapons of any kind in space.
To prevent an arms race in space altogether would, of course, be a still broader and more far-reaching measure. That purpose would be served by the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth.

4. The socialist countries are also prepared to consider other measures aimed at the prevention of nuclear war. The time has come to proceed from words of a general nature about the threat of nuclear catastrophe to specific deeds, namely, to constructive negotiations on the above-mentioned proposals with a view to the conclusion of appropriate international agreements.

The socialist countries reaffirm once again their resolute desire to embark upon the elaboration of urgent and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war and the establishment, to that end, of an appropriate subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament.

They appeal once again to all participants in the Conference on Disarmament whom it may concern to show political good-will and to adopt a constructive position on the vitally important problem of the prevention of nuclear war.
ANNEX III

Agenda item 4 of the current session of the Commission

Working paper: China
(A/CN.10/62)

1. As disarmament and international security are inseparable, disarmament efforts must be combined with efforts for the maintenance of world peace and security. In order to create a favourable climate and conditions for disarmament and to achieve real progress in this field, the Charter of the United Nations and the established norms of international law must be strictly observed in international relations. All countries should respect each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and refrain from committing any act of aggression, intervention or domination. All foreign occupation troops must be withdrawn without delay.

2. The super-Powers, which possess far more armaments, nuclear or conventional, than any other country, should truly assume their special responsibilities for disarmament in accordance with paragraphs 48 and 81 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2).

3. The fundamental approach to the prevention of nuclear war involves the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Pending the attainment of this goal, the countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead and stop testing, improving and manufacturing nuclear weapons and reduce drastically their existing nuclear weapons. After that, corresponding measures should be taken by the other nuclear-weapon States according to a reasonable ratio and procedure.

4. Conventional disarmament should be carried out in conjunction with nuclear disarmament so as to reduce the danger of war, including the outbreak of nuclear war through conventional war. The super-Powers possessing the largest conventional arsenals should substantially reduce their heavy and new-type conventional weapons, especially those for offensive purposes. Thereafter, the other militarily-significant countries should also reduce their conventional armaments according to a reasonable ratio and procedure.

5. As the common heritage of mankind, outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Urgent measures must be adopted to halt the arms race in outer space pursuant to the principle of non-militarization of outer space. In the first instance, negotiations should be held on the prohibition of space weapons of all types, including anti-satellite weapons, with a view to formulating the necessary international legal instruments.

6. Negotiations on chemical weapons should be expedited on the basis of the progress already made, so as to conclude at an early date a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons and to eliminate this dreadful weapon from the face of the earth once and for all.

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ANNEX IV

Doctrines of nuclear warfare

Agenda item 4 of the current session of the Commission

Working paper: German Democratic Republic
(A/CN.10/63)

1. In order to contribute to removing the obstacles which impede the solution of the tasks that have the highest priority for nuclear disarmament, appropriate attention should be given to the doctrines of nuclear warfare, especially the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

2. The United Nations has commented repeatedly on such doctrines:

(a) The Final Document adopted at the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2) stated in paragraph 13:

"Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority";

(b) Resolution 35/152 B, which was subsequently reaffirmed by resolutions 36/92 E and 37/78 C, stated, inter alia:

"Noting with alarm the increased risk of a nuclear catastrophe associated both with the intensification of the nuclear-arms race and with the adoption of the new doctrine of limited or partial use of nuclear weapons giving rise to illusions of the admissibility and acceptability of a nuclear conflict";

(c) Resolution 38/183 D added that the new doctrines of limited or partial use of nuclear weapons "are incompatible with ... resolution 110 (II) of 3 November 1947, entitled 'Measures to be taken against propaganda and the inciters of a new war'"

(d) Resolution 38/183 D, reaffirming what was stated for the first time in resolution 37/78 C, underlined:

"Noting ... with alarm that to the doctrine of a limited nuclear war was later added the concept of a protracted nuclear war, and that these dangerous doctrines lead to a new twist in the spiral of the arms race, which may seriously hamper the reaching of agreement on nuclear disarmament,

"Gravely concerned about the renewed escalation in the nuclear arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which in fact are heightening the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and lead to increased tensions and instability in international relations,";
(e) The Declaration on the Prevention of a Nuclear Catastrophe, adopted as resolution 36/100, noted:

"Any doctrines allowing the first use of nuclear weapons and any actions pushing the world towards a catastrophe are incompatible with human moral standards and the lofty ideals of the United Nations";

(f) In its resolution on the condemnation of nuclear war (resolution 38/75), the General Assembly:

"Condemns the formulation, propounding, dissemination and propaganda of political and military doctrines and concepts intended to provide 'legitimacy' for the first use of nuclear weapons and in general to justify the 'admissibility' of unleashing nuclear war";

In addition, the Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons a/ and a number of documents of the Committee on Disarmament and/or the Conference on Disarmament relating to the question of the prevention of nuclear war, inter alia, documents CD/341 of 4 February 1983, CD/355 of 21 March 1983 and CD/484 of 28 March 1984, deal with doctrines of deterrence and other strategies concerning nuclear weapons. The resolutions quoted and the documents mentioned point out that such nuclear warfare doctrines are particularly dangerous and destabilizing since they are oriented to strategic superiority and nuclear first strike.

3. These specifically threatening characteristics of nuclear warfare doctrines have become increasingly manifest in the second half of the 1970s in connection with long-term arms programmes and other decisions on the development, production, introduction and stationing of qualitatively new nuclear-weapon systems. Since the beginning of the 1980s the escalating nuclear-arms race has been reflected in the escalation of new concepts to fight and win a nuclear war, which have been elaborated above all by the main Western Power.

4. These nuclear warfare concepts are closely linked with the doctrine of deterrence, which is increasingly becoming an instrument of direct nuclear war preparations. It includes, inter alia, the use of nuclear weapons, in particular first use of nuclear weapons, both in the regional and global framework; the offensive use of conventional weapons combined with chemical and nuclear weapons; and the use of outer space for offensive military purposes and for averting possible counter-attacks. All this dangerously increases the risk of a global nuclear catastrophe.

5. Such concepts are aimed at achieving overall military and strategic superiority, which would also serve as an instrument for political and military threat and blackmail against peoples all over the world. They also lead to an escalation of the arms race, in particular in the nuclear field, undermine confidence, destabilize international security, jeopardize existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements and prevent further arms limitation and disarmament. An approach to arms limitation and disarmament negotiations, based on such concepts, is counterproductive and entails the danger that such negotiations end up in an impasse.

6. In contrast to this, the Political Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, adopted at the session of the Political Consultative Committee held at Prague on 4 and 5 January 1983 (A/38/67), states:
"The States represented at the session wish to stress as forcefully as possible that any expectation of winning a nuclear war after unleashing it is senseless. If a nuclear war is started, there can be no winner. Such a war would inevitably lead to the destruction of whole nations, to enormous devastation and catastrophic consequences for civilization and life itself on earth."

These States have no doctrines which contain the threat or first use of nuclear weapons. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics explicitly renounced each form of the first use of nuclear weapons, and the Warsaw Treaty member States proposed to the member States of NATO the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and on the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member States, whose core would be the commitment of the States members of the two alliances not to be the first to use nuclear or conventional arms against one another. They are prepared to start negotiations on this question based on the principle of equality and equal security.


"The renewed escalation in the nuclear-arms race, both in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as reliance on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, has heightened the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations."

In the endeavour to prevent a nuclear war, the majority of Member States attach great importance to those measures which most directly oppose the main danger arising from preparations for nuclear war and related doctrines.

8. In this connection, the Disarmament Commission should include in its recommendations to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session:

(a) The condemnation of all military doctrines and concepts which are based on the admissibility of nuclear warfare and aimed at strategic superiority and first use of nuclear weapons, leading to a further escalation of the nuclear arms race, to an increase of the danger of war and impediment of disarmament;

(b) The proposal that the Disarmament Commission should be requested to further examine such doctrines and concepts as well as its consequences under item 4 of its present agenda, with a view to finally achieving a renunciation of such doctrines and concepts by all States.

Notes

ANNEX V

Working Paper: Mexico
(A/CN.10/1984/CW/WP.1/Rev.1)

It is suggested that the first four recommendations on agenda item 4 of the Disarmament Commission should read as follows:

"All States are urged to contribute effectively to the strengthening of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In this context, all States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should do everything possible to enable the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, to fulfil its mandate of negotiating and adopting specific disarmament measures, particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament, such as the following:

"(a) Immediate multilateral negotiation of a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests;

"(b) Urgent negotiation of the agreements referred to in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) with a view to halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and bringing about as soon as possible the achievement of the final objective defined therein, namely, the ultimate and complete elimination of nuclear weapons;

"(c) Speedy negotiation of effective and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war, such as a freeze on nuclear weaponry, which could begin with that of the two super-Powers; the conclusion of an agreement giving full legally binding force to a commitment by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use these terrible instruments of mass destruction; and the merging of the bilateral negotiations known as START and INF in a single forum, broadening their scope to include also tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons;

"(d) Immediate multilateral negotiation of one or more agreements, as appropriate, with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space in all its aspects."
ANNEX VI

Working paper: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(A/CN.10/1984/CW/WP.2)

1. The following paragraph should be appended to annex VIII contained in the report of the Disarmament Commission on its 1983 session, a/ and should appear before Recommendation No. 1:

"Definite norms that would govern the relations between the Powers possessing nuclear weapons should be agreed upon and be given an obligatory nature. It is important that all the nuclear Powers put the task of preventing nuclear war at the apex of their policy and arrange their mutual policies with account of this."

2. The following paragraph should come after Recommendation No. 6:

"Agreements should be concluded eliminating from international relations the use of force in both nuclear and non-nuclear versions. At the global level, this goal could be achieved by the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. An important step in this direction would be the conclusion of a treaty on the reciprocal non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO States, the crux of which would be the obligation incumbent on States parties of both groups not to be the first to use either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons against each other."

Notes

ANNEX VII

Nuclear disarmament

Agenda item 4

Working paper: Romania

(A/CN.10/1984/CW/WP.3)

"The Disarmament Commission recommends the General Assembly to urge the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics to take action - after the adoption of measures to
halt the emplacement of United States medium-range nuclear missiles and
implementation of the nuclear countermeasures announced by the Soviet Union -
to ensure the resumption of their negotiations with a view to arriving at
adequate agreements and arrangements regarding the termination of the
deployment of nuclear missiles, the withdrawal of existing ones and the
liberation of the continent from any kind of nuclear weapons whatsoever.

"All European States as well as all interested States are called upon to
do their utmost in order to overcome the present impasse and to assist the
process of negotiation, after their resumption."
ANNEX VIII

Agenda item 4

Working paper: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

(A/CN.10/1984/CW/WP.4)

It is suggested that a recommendation on agenda item 4 of the Disarmament Commission should be added as follows:

"The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America are urged to resume, without pre-conditions, their bilateral negotiations at Geneva in order to achieve positive results in accordance with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament."

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ANNEX IX

Compilation of proposals for recommendations on agenda item 4

I

Recommendation No. 1

All States are urged to contribute effectively to the strengthening of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In this context, all States members of the Conference on Disarmament [in particular the nuclear-weapon States] should do everything possible to enable the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, to fulfil its mandate to negotiate and adopt concrete measures of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament and other priority matters.

Recommendation No. 2

In order to implement the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should urgently engage in negotiations to fulfil the priority tasks set forth in its Programme of Action.

Urgent negotiation of agreements in conformity with paragraph 50 of the Final Document with a view to halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and bringing about as soon as possible the achievement of the final objective defined therein, namely the ultimate and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, should be undertaken.

Additional text proposed

[The ongoing] negotiations should be pursued and concluded, in appropriate forums, which would lead to substantial [equitable] reductions in weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all States concerned on the basis of undiminished security.

Recommendation No. 3

Proposed texts:

(a) [The Disarmament Commission recommends to the General Assembly to urge the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to take action - after the adoption of measures to halt the emplacement of United States medium-range nuclear missiles and implementation of the nuclear countermeasures announced by the Soviet Union - to ensure the resumption of their negotiations with a view to arriving at adequate agreements and arrangements regarding the termination of the deployment of nuclear missiles, the withdrawal of existing ones and the liberation of the continent from any kind of nuclear weapons whatsoever.

All European States as well as all interested States are called upon to do their utmost in order to overcome the present impasse and to assist the process of negotiation, after their resumption.]
(b) [The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the 
Government of the United States of America are urged to resume, [without 
pre-conditions] [as soon as measures are taken to restore the situation which 
existed prior to the deployment of new American missiles in Western Europe], their 
bilateral negotiations at Geneva in order to achieve positive results in accordance 
with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress 
towards disarmament.]

Recommendation No. 4

Proposed texts:

(a) [A comprehensive treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons] 
[A comprehensive treaty on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States] 
[A comprehensive treaty on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States 
within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process] [A comprehensive 
nuclear-test ban] should be speedily negotiated and concluded, [since it is 
generally agreed that there are no more technical obstacles for its conclusion] 
[overcoming any technical obstacles there may be for its conclusion.]

(b) [A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty should be negotiated and 
concluded within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process.]

(c) [A treaty on a nuclear-test ban should be speedily negotiated and 
concluded.]

(d) [The multilateral negotiation of a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon 
tests should begin immediately.]

(e) Text to be added at the end of recommendation No. 4: [Declarations 
should be collectively or individually made by all nuclear-weapon States of a 
moratorium on all nuclear explosions for the time until a treaty on the complete 
and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is concluded.] [Pending the 
conclusion of such a treaty, the two major nuclear Powers which conducted the most 
of nuclear explosions are called on to stop immediately their nuclear tests in 
order to facilitate the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and other 
nuclear disarmament measures.]

Recommendation No. 5

Measures for the prevention of nuclear war and for the promotion of nuclear 
disarmament must take into account the security interests of nuclear-weapon and 
non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

Of particular importance among such measures are the following: a/

(1) Strict observance of the principles and realization of the purposes 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. In this connection, the following 
principles and purposes are of special importance:

a/ While some of the measures set forth in this recommendation are free of 
brackets, it is understood that agreement thereon is only tentative pending 
agreement being reached on all the measures to be included in the recommendation.
(a) Refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State;

(b) Non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States;

(c) Peaceful settlement of international disputes;

(d) Sovereign equality of States and self-determination of peoples;

(e) Co-operation among States for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55 of the Charter.

(2) [Definite norms that would govern the relations between the Powers possessing nuclear weapons should be agreed upon and be given an obligatory nature. It is important that all the nuclear Powers put the task of preventing nuclear war at the apex of their policy and arrange their mutual policies with account of this.

(3) Agreements should be concluded eliminating from international relations the use of force in both nuclear and non-nuclear versions. At the global level, this goal could be achieved by the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. An important step in this direction would be the conclusion of a treaty on the reciprocal non-use of military force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO States, the crux of which would be the obligation incumbent on States parties of both groups not to be the first to use either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons against each other.]

(4) [Full implementation of recommendations 1, 2 and 4 above.]

(5) [Immediate multilateral negotiation of one or more agreements, as appropriate, with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.]

(6) [Urgent resumption of the bilateral negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces leading at the earliest possible time to significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, those forces.]

(7) [Merging of the bilateral negotiations known as START and INF in a single forum, broadening their scope to include also tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons.]

(8) [A freeze on nuclear weaponry which could begin with that of the two nuclear-weapon States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals. Such a freeze would be subject to all relevant measures and procedures of verification which have already been agreed by the parties in the case of the SALT I and SALT II treaties, as well as those agreed upon in principle by them during the preparatory trilateral negotiations on the comprehensive test ban held at Geneva.]

(9) **Proposed texts:**

(a) [Conclusion of an agreement giving full legally binding force to a commitment by all nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use these terrible weapons of mass destruction.]
(b) [In accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter, States should never use any weapon except in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence.]

(10) All States should co-operate to achieve the goal of nuclear non-proliferation which is, on the one hand, to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States and, on the other, progressively to reduce and eventually to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. Nuclear-weapon States in particular should urgently adopt effective measures for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race. States should fully implement all the provisions of relevant international treaties to which they are parties. All States are urged to take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(11) Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons, as provided for in recommendation No. 13.

(12) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, as provided for in recommendation No. 14.

**Recommendation No. 6**

[The fundamental approach to the prevention of nuclear war involves the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Pending the attainment of this goal, the countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead and stop testing, improving and manufacturing nuclear weapons and reduce drastically their existing nuclear weapons. After that, corresponding measures should be taken by the other nuclear-weapon States according to a reasonable ratio and procedure.]

**Recommendation No. 7**

[A convention on prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States should be urgently negotiated and adopted, pending effective measures of nuclear disarmament.]

**Recommendation No. 8**

[Pending the adoption of such a convention, declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, collectively or individually, on non-first-use of nuclear weapons would be a means of strengthening the climate of confidence and a first step towards lessening the risk of nuclear conflict.]

**Text proposed as an alternative to recommendations 7 and 8**

[Reaffirming the prohibition of the threat or use of force under the Charter of the United Nations, States should commit themselves, collectively or individually, never to be the first to use any weapon, nuclear or conventional, except in exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.]
Recommendation No. 9 b/

[Pending more effective measures of nuclear disarmament, States should co-operate in the development of a comprehensive set of measures for the prevention of nuclear war and of all armed conflict. These should include a wide array of confidence-building measures, including measures relating to nuclear weapons, to be negotiated in appropriate frameworks, for regional or global application.]

Recommendation No. 10

(a) [A freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons should be immediately imposed, as a first step to the reduction and, eventually, the elimination of nuclear arsenals.]

(b) [It is of paramount importance for the nuclear Powers which possess the largest nuclear arsenals to take the lead in halting and reversing the nuclear arms race between them and reducing drastically their existing nuclear arsenals so as to create propitious conditions for all the nuclear States to further adopt nuclear disarmament measures, including a freeze on the development, production, stockpiling and deployment of nuclear weapons.]

(c) [Negotiations should be conducted and concluded which would lead to substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. These reductions must be mutual, balanced and verifiable.]

Recommendation No. 11

(a) [The nuclear weapons deployed by nuclear-weapon States outside their own territories should be withdrawn. In regions where the concentration of nuclear weapons has attained the most dangerous levels, as an interim measure, all tactical nuclear weapons in such regions should be urgently removed. No future deployments of any nuclear weapons should be carried out.]

(b) [In regions where an accumulation of military forces exists, these should be reduced in a mutual, balanced and verifiable manner.]

Recommendation No. 12

[The nuclear-weapon States should refrain from military manoeuvres in which nuclear energy is used for non-peaceful purposes, especially in situations where nuclear armaments are deployed in close proximity of States not possessing nuclear weapons, thus endangering their security.]

Recommendation No. 13

Text proposed by the Chairman

Bearing in mind that the nuclear-weapon States should guarantee that non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons and unilateral declarations made in this context, negotiations should proceed

b/ The placement of this recommendation is yet to be determined.
without delay for the conclusion of an agreed international instrument of effective international arrangements to assure all non-nuclear-weapon States, without any discrimination, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Proposals concerning the above text:

(a) In line 5, delete "all";

(b) In lines 5 and 6, delete "without any discrimination".

Recommendation No. 14

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements and/or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitute an important disarmament measure and should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. Those agreements or arrangements should by fully complied with and the effective respect for the status of such zones by nuclear-weapon States should be subject to adequate verification procedures, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.

Recommendation No. 15

All States should co-operate to achieve the goal of nuclear non-proliferation which is, on the one hand, to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States and, on the other, progressively to reduce and eventually to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. States should fully implement all the provisions of relevant international treaties to which they are parties. Nuclear-weapon States in particular should urgently adopt effective measures for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race.

Recommendation No. 16

Since the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects is a matter of universal concern, all States are jointly urged to take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Recommendation No. 17

(a) [The major nuclear-weapon States are urged to pursue their negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament with greater vigour and to keep the United Nations informed of the progress achieved in these negotiations.]

(b) [All States, in particular the major nuclear-weapon States are urged to pursue their negotiations on arms limitations and disarmament with vigour and to keep the United Nations appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.]
Recommendation No. 18

[All military doctrines and concepts which are based on the admissibility of nuclear warfare and aimed at strategic superiority and first use of nuclear weapons, leading to a further escalation of the nuclear arms race, to an increase of the danger of war and impediment of disarmament, should be condemned.

The Disarmament Commission should be requested to examine further such doctrines and concepts as well as their consequences under item 4 of its agenda, with a view to finally achieving a renunciation of such doctrines and concepts by all States.]

II

Introductory sentence

While nuclear disarmament has the highest priority, the following recommendations on other priority measures of disarmament [should] [could] be pursued [concurrently]:

Recommendation No. 1

Efforts should be made to conclude urgently a treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons. To this end, the Conference on Disarmament should expedite its work with a view to presenting a draft treaty to the United Nations General Assembly without further delay.

Recommendation No. 2

The qualitative development and the growing accumulation of conventional weapons in many parts of the world add a new dimension to the arms race, especially among States possessing the largest military arsenals. Therefore, conventional disarmament should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament.

Recommendation No. 3

The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in a manner that would ensure the right of each State to undiminished security. However, massive arms supply to States that base their security on false claims in order to obtain advantages over others as well as to enhance colonial domination and foreign occupation leads to the perpetuation of intolerable situations and the exacerbation of conflicts and gravely endangers international peace and security and should therefore be ended.

Recommendation No. 4

Proposed texts:

(a) [Immediate multilateral negotiation of one or more agreements, as appropriate, with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.]
(b) [The extension of [the] [an] arms race into outer space should be prevented through further measures and appropriate international negotiations and the use of outer space [exclusively] for peaceful purposes should be [promoted] [ensured].]

(c) [The extension of an arms race into outer space should be prevented.]

Recommendation No. 5

In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, refrain from actions [and programmes aimed at arms build-up] which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements. The climate of confidence among nations would be significantly improved with agreements on measures for halting the arms race and effective reductions of armaments leading to their complete elimination. The objective at each stage of this process of disarmament should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments.

Recommendation No. 6

Proposed texts:

(a) [In the context of the World Disarmament Campaign measures should be adopted in order that the public in all regions of the world has access to a broad range of information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament, and the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war [to facilitate informed choices about these vital questions] [concerning efforts to halt and reverse the arms race]. Such a campaign should promote public interest in and support for the goals set out in the paragraphs referred to above and in particular for the reaching of agreements on measures of arms limitation and disarmament with a view to achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.]

(b) [In the context of the World Disarmament Campaign measures should be adopted in order that public opinion would be aware of the unacceptability of a world system based on the continued development, possession and deployment of nuclear weapons. Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.]

(c) [In the context of the World Disarmament Campaign measures should be adopted in order that the public in all regions of the world have access to a broad range of information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament, and the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war. Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments, and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.]
ANNEX X

Working paper: Synopsis of the texts on principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures

1. Concerted efforts should be made by all States, in particular by those States with the largest military arsenals, and by the appropriate negotiating forums, with the objective of concluding international agreements to freeze and reduce military budgets [, including adequate verification measures acceptable to all parties.] Such agreements should contribute to genuine reductions of armed forces and armaments of States parties, with the aim of strengthening international peace and security at lower levels of armed forces and armaments. [In the conditions of grave international tension,] definite agreements on the freeze and reduction of military expenditures are assuming special importance and should be reached within the shortest period of time.

2. All efforts in the field of freezing and reduction of military expenditures should take into account the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2).

3. Pending the conclusion of agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures, all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, should exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures.

4. The reduction of military expenditures on a mutually agreed basis should be implemented gradually and in a balanced manner, either on a percentage or on an absolute basis, so as to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage, and without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security and sovereignty and to undertake the necessary measures of self-defence.

5. The freezing and reduction of military budgets should be achieved in accordance with the principle of the greatest responsibility. Therefore the freezing and reduction of the military budgets should be implemented in stages, [beginning with nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States.] This should not prevent other States, if they so wish, from initiating negotiations and reaching agreements on the balanced reduction of their respective military budgets.

6. Human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures should be devoted to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

7. [Negotiations on freezing and reduction of military budgets would be facilitated by the elaboration of agreed methods of comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between different countries, as well as by using an agreed instrument for reporting the actual military budgets in a standardized manner.]

8. [In the process of negotiations on freezing and reduction of military budgets, a reasonable amount of data on the military budgets should be made available by the]
participating States. In this respect, the participating States may use the standardized international reporting instrument established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B or any other methods agreed among them.]

9. [Armaments and military activities which would be the subject of physical reductions within the limits provided for in any agreement to reduce military expenditures will be identified by every State party to such agreements.]

10. [Agreements on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures should be subject to strict and efficient verification. The agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures should contain adequate measures of verification, satisfactory to all parties, in order to ensure that their provisions are strictly applied and fulfilled by all States parties.]

11. Unilateral measures undertaken by States concerning the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, especially when they are followed by similar measures adopted by other States on the basis of mutual example, could contribute to favourable conditions for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures.

12. Confidence-building measures could help to create a political climate conducive to freezing and reduction of military expenditures.

13. The United Nations should play a central role in orienting, stimulating and initiating negotiations on freezing and reducing military expenditures, and all Member States should co-operate with the Organization as among themselves, with a view to solving the problems implied by this process.

14. The freezing and reduction of military expenditures may be achieved, as appropriate, on a global, regional or subregional level, with the agreement of all States concerned.

15. The agreements on freezing and reduction of military budgets should be viewed in a broader perspective, including respect for and implementation of the security system of the United Nations, and be interrelated with other measures of disarmament, within the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The reduction of military budgets should therefore be complementary to agreements on the limitation of armaments and disarmament and should not be considered as a substitute for such agreements.

16. [This declaration should be regarded as a firm political commitment to start negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures as soon as possible.]

Amendment to paragraph 5 by China

Replace the fourth line with the following:

"... beginning with those nuclear-weapon States with the largest military arsenals and the biggest military expenditures, to be followed by other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States."
Amendment by Mongolia

Replace paragraphs 7 and 8 by the following:

"In order to achieve specific agreement on non-increase and reduction of military expenditures, there is a need to make maximum efforts to assist in creating a favourable atmosphere for progress in the relevant negotiations, and not to take any action that might hamper them.

"The elaboration of principles for reduction of military expenditures should not be made a pre-condition for taking practical steps to limit and reduce them. The only essential condition for this is the presence of political will on the part of all States to begin constructive negotiations to that end."

Amendments by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America

1. Replace paragraph 7 by the following:

"According to the principle of transparency and comparability, the elaboration of agreed methods for measuring and comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between countries representing different regions and different budgeting systems is a necessary condition for meaningful negotiations on balanced reductions of military budgets."

2. Replace paragraph 8 by the following:

"The gradual reduction of military expenditures should be subject to strict and effective verification. The agreements to reduce military expenditures should, therefore, contain adequate measures of verification, satisfactory to all parties, in order to ensure that the provisions are strictly applied and fulfilled by all States parties. For such agreements the use of the reporting instrument established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B of 12 December 1980 constitutes a necessary precondition, although not sufficient in itself."

3. Delete paragraph 10.

Amendment by Czechoslovakia

Add the following to paragraph 14:

"The non-increase and reduction of military expenditures of States members of the Warsaw Treaty and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be of particular significance in view of the large size of the military expenditures of these States. Corresponding agreements in other regions of the world would also have a positive impact."
ANNEX XI
Conclusions and recommendations on agenda item 6
(A/CN.10/1984/WG.II/CRP.1)

1. Against the background of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the sovereign right of all peoples to self-determination and independence, the establishment and perpetuation of a racist minority régime in South Africa and Namibia over the majority of the population represent not only a violation of the relevant principles of international law but also criminal conduct.

2. South Africa's adoption of apartheid, an institutionalized form of racial discrimination, as an instrument of policy runs counter to the human rights provisions of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the human rights and right of all peoples to self-determination. As a result, South Africa's policy of apartheid has been and remains condemned as inhumane and contrary to basic human principle by the international community and a crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind by the Security Council.

3. It has become clear that, in its isolation and desperation, the Pretoria régime has resorted to the pursuit of a military option as an instrument of internal oppression and external aggression. It must be suspected that in the pursuit of its military capability in the direction of increased sophistication and ominous dimensions South Africa has placed emphasis on the development and acquisition of nuclear weaponry, which has been made possible through the active nuclear collaboration with it by certain Western countries, Israel as well as transnational corporations.

4. In the event, the issue of South Africa's nuclear capability has been brought to international attention by resolution 34/76 B and included in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission since its first substantive session in 1979 at the instance of the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid (A/CN.10/4) following the conclusion of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, held in London in February 1979. 3/

5. In consideration of the item, the Commission affirms the conviction already established by consensus in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) that

"the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm. It is, therefore, essential for purposes of disarmament to prevent any further acquisition of arms or arms technology by such régimes, especially through strict adherence by all States to relevant decisions of the Security Council" (para. 12).

6. The Commission is of the firm view that nuclear weapons in the possession of racist régimes can become an instrument of policy for State terrorism, aggression and blackmail and thus increase the danger to international peace and security. It therefore notes with grave concern the danger and serious threat which the established technical capability of South Africa to produce nuclear weapons and the
necessary means of delivery pose to the security of African States as well as to international peace and security. This concern is further increased by the reported development by South Africa of a cruise missile, a neutron bomb and various delivery systems in collaboration with Israel.

7. The Commission notes that the discovery of a reported nuclear-weapon-test site in the Kalahari Desert in 1977, the 22 September 1979 event in the South Atlantic in particular and other data, including the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field (A/35/402 and Corr.1), have caused legitimate and particular concern to the African States and the international community in general, the more so since this nuclear capability may be put at the service of the abhorrent policy of apartheid.

8. The Commission, in fulfilment of its mandate, considers it its responsibility to alert the General Assembly, and through it the Security Council, to the deleterious consequences of South Africa's capability to produce and/or acquire nuclear weapons, its reported and potential possession of nuclear weapons and the implications of this for the security of African States, international peace and security, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the collective decision of the African States regarding the denuclearization of Africa, which has been endorsed by the General Assembly.

9. The Commission considers it at variance with the declared principles of international law relating to the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States to allow, enable and assist, directly or indirectly, South Africa to continue its policy of aggression and destabilization against the countries of the African continent through the development of a nuclear-weapon capability which has been achieved mainly through collaboration in the military and nuclear fields with certain Western countries, Israel and transnational corporations.

10. The Commission holds the view that the current exploitation of Namibian uranium by South Africa and transnational corporations violates the principle of international law which recognizes a people's permanent sovereignty over its natural resources for the benefit of its socio-economic development. It further holds the view that South Africa should not be allowed to continue its illegal exploitation of Namibian uranium - made possible through its illegal occupation of Namibia - which strengthens its nuclear base and hence reinforces its policy of apartheid.

11. Given the very nature of the racist régime of South Africa, the Disarmament Commission believes that it is an urgent necessity that the intolerable policy of apartheid be terminated. In this connection, all States and international organizations have the duty and responsibility to contribute to the strengthening of United Nations efforts for the attainment of this goal. It is therefore the responsibility of the international community to ensure that effective and concrete measures are taken to stop the further development of South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability which poses a threat to international peace and security. To this end, the Disarmament Commission recommends the following:

(a) All States have a particular obligation towards the achievement of the above objectives. Those States collaborating with South Africa should cease forthwith all collaboration with South Africa in the military and nuclear aspects which may contribute directly or indirectly to the further development of South
Africa's nuclear-weapon capability. They should also put an end to transfers of all equipment, material, technology and personnel, relevant to South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability in order that South Africa adopt a conduct in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the relevant resolutions and decisions of the United Nations;

(b) Considering that no decision has been taken by the Security Council since 1978 to give effect to the provisions contained in paragraph 12 of the Final Document, adopted by consensus (see para. 5 above), the Disarmament Commission recommends to the General Assembly to request the Council, in assuming its full responsibility, to take urgent and appropriate measures in this regard by, inter alia, enforcing and extending its arms embargo against South Africa to cover all aspects which may contribute directly or indirectly to the further development of South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability;

(c) In the interest of global peace and security and the security and stability of Africa in particular, the Commission recommends that all States should respect their obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and desist from any nuclear co-operation with South Africa which would strengthen directly or indirectly the already established technical capability of South Africa to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States which collaborate with South Africa in this field must accept joint responsibility with that country for endangering the peace and security of the region and the world;

(d) The Commission recommends that all States should consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965 which endorsed the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted in 1964 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. To this end, the Commission recommends that the Assembly should request the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective;

(e) Notwithstanding the statement by the South Africa Government on 31 January 1984 (International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document INFCIRC/314), the Commission recommends that, given the military and reported nuclear-weapon capability of the abhorrent policy and practice of South Africa's racist régime which endanger regional and international peace and security, those States which have collaborated with that country in establishing its nuclear capability should now prevail upon South Africa to comply without delay with all resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, particularly those regarding acceptance of an internationally binding nuclear non-proliferation commitment and the placement of all its activities under IAEA safeguards. Those States should seek to endorse further specific, practical, time-limited and collective measures that would enhance implementation;

(f) South Africa should be prevailed upon to practise transparency and openness in its military affairs, in order to allow for an unimpeded and full assessment of its activities in the nuclear field by the international community and, in particular, by its neighbouring States;

(g) The Commission recommends further that the Secretary-General should follow more closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and report
regularly to the General Assembly on the progress of these recommendations and on all new developments which would require the attention of the international community.

Notes

ANNEX XII

Draft conclusions of the Working Group of the Disarmament Commission at its 1984 session on the subject of the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global and regional level

Working paper: Federal Republic of Germany
(A/CN.10/58)

I

General considerations for the elaboration of guidelines for confidence-building measures

1. In resolution 37/100 D of 13 December 1982, adopted by consensus at its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly requested the Disarmament Commission "to consider the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level". The Disarmament Commission was further requested "to submit a progress report on its deliberations on this item to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session".

2. In resolution 38/73 A of 15 December 1983, adopted by consensus at its thirty-eighth session, the General Assembly requested the Disarmament Commission "to continue and conclude at its 1984 session the consideration of the item entitled 'Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level'. The Disarmament Commission was further requested "to submit a report on its deliberations on this item, containing such guidelines, to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session".

3. The Disarmament Commission agreed that the following documents afforded a suitable basis for its discussions: the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), the validity of which was unanimously and categorically reaffirmed by all Member States in the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session (A/S-12/32); the relevant resolutions adopted by consensus by the General Assembly; a/ the replies received from Governments informing the Secretary-General of their views and experiences regarding confidence-building measures; b/ the Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures by the Group of Governmental Experts; c/ and the proposals made to the General Assembly by individual countries at the twelfth special session. d/

4. The following points were considered to be of particular relevance:

(a) The fact that the concept of confidence-building measures is enshrined in paragraphs 24 and 93 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, which state that

"collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for
the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension" (para. 24) and that

"in order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament" (para. 93);

(b) The belief expressed by consensus by the General Assembly that confidence-building measures, where appropriate conditions exist, will significantly contribute to facilitating the process of disarmament, its conviction that commitment to such measures could contribute to strengthening the security of States and, based upon this, its recommendations to consider the introduction of such measures with a view to enhancing security between States and facilitating progress in arms limitation and disarmament;

(c) The large degree of agreement on the concept of confidence-building measures achieved within the Group of Governmental Experts, whose members came from all parts of the world, as well as the illustrative list of concrete measures unanimously proposed by that Group (see appendix).

5. While relating in principle to a wide spectrum of government activities beyond the military field, confidence-building measures bear a close relationship to disarmament, as expressed in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and the relevant General Assembly resolutions. So as not to render confidence-building measures undistinguishable from other measures in inter-State relations through selection of an excessively comprehensive strategy and in the light of the mandate of the Commission, as contained in paragraph 118 (a) of the Final Document, namely "to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament", the Commission decided therefore to focus mainly on measures relevant to the security field.

6. Nevertheless, the Commission is aware of the fact that the concept of confidence-building measures, if it is to yield lasting results, must be incorporated into an overall network of political relations marked by the will to co-operate constructively. It therefore expresses the view that measures designed to increase confidence in the non-military and non-security-related areas should be further studied and developed in other appropriate United Nations bodies.

7. With regard to the substance of the guidelines to be elaborated, it was agreed that the study by the Group of Governmental Experts afforded a highly suitable basis since it was detailed and precise.

8. It was agreed that the following guidelines were of fundamental importance to the building of confidence among States.
II

Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for their implementation on a global and regional level

A. General considerations and principles

1. The importance of confidence-building is growing in a world which is characterized by political tension, mistrust and fear and an increasing recourse to the threat or use of force on the one hand and the escalation of the world-wide arms build-up on the other.

2. As a prerequisite for enhancing confidence among States, the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations must be strictly observed, particularly the following:

   (a) Refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State;

   (b) Non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States;

   (c) Peaceful settlement of disputes;

   (d) Sovereign equality of States and self-determination of peoples;

   (e) Co-operation among States in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights.

3. Confidence-building measures must neither be a substitute nor a pre-condition for disarmament measures nor divert attention from those. Yet their potential for creating favourable conditions for progress in this field should be fully utilized in all regions of the world.

B. Objectives

1. The ultimate goal of confidence-building measures is to strengthen international peace and security, thus creating and improving the conditions for fruitful international co-operation.

2. Their immediate objective is to reduce or even eliminate the causes of mistrust, fear, misunderstanding and miscalculations with regard to military activities of other States, factors which impair security and encourage the continuation of the international arms build-up.

3. Thus confidence-building should in particular facilitate the process of arms limitation and disarmament as well as the prevention or the settlement of international disputes and conflicts.

4. Confidence-building measures may serve the additional objective of facilitating verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. Conversely, adequate verification measures and co-operation in implementing them have a considerable confidence-building effect of their own. Confidence-building measures cannot, however, supersede verification measures, which are an inseparable part of arms limitation and disarmament.

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5. Action in pursuit of these objectives will enhance rationality and stability in international relations and contribute, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to inhibiting the use or threat of force. In so doing, they help to create a political and psychological climate in which the momentum towards a competitive arms build-up can be reduced and in which the importance of the military element is gradually diminished. Thus, confidence-building measures can be conducive to meaningful progress in present and future negotiations on the limitation and reduction of armaments and armed forces ultimately aimed at general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

C. Characteristics

1. Confidence is the result of a dynamic process, based on past experience, present perceptions and future expectations. It will increase to the extent that the concrete conduct of States gives reason to expect the continuance or renewal of the desired non-aggressive and co-operative behaviour in the future.

2. Confidence-building requires a consensus of the States participating in the process. States must therefore decide freely and in the exercise of their sovereignty whether a confidence-building process is to be initiated and, if so, which measures are to be taken and how the process is to be pursued.

3. Confidence-building measures can only achieve their desired stabilizing effect and contribute to progress in disarmament if they give tangible evidence of a non-aggressive political and military posture.

4. Favourable experience, which is the essential prerequisite of the growth of confidence, is gained by actions only, not by mere promises. This implies that neither mere declarations of intent nor a repetition of generally recognized principles can effectively dispel perceptions of threat and suspicion. It is ultimately only on concrete actions which can be examined, assessed and verified that confidence can be built.

5. While statements of intent cannot in themselves be regarded as a confidence-building measure, they may in specific situations have some value as part of a confidence-building process, providing, inter alia, for the identification and authoritative recognition of common vital interests, the formulation of certain common goals, as for instance in the Declaration of the Final Document, and as a collateral measure to genuine confidence-building measures.

6. The effectiveness of a concrete measure will increase the more it is adjusted to the specific perceptions of the threat or the level of confidence required in a given situation. Hence, confidence-building measures should be attuned to the regional requirements of the States concerned.

7. One of the major causes of distrust, insecurity and threat perception is the lack of reliable information on the military activities or other States and other matters pertaining to mutual security. The distrust caused by insufficient knowledge about opposing military forces is often aggravated by subjective misconceptions and a resulting lack of trust concerning the intentions of States. Consequently, confidence-building measures should provide for reliable information by enhancing knowledge of military activities and other matters pertaining to mutual security. Besides facilitating the dissemination and exchange of pertinent
information, regular personal contacts at all levels of political and military decision-making should be encouraged.

8. If the circumstances of a particular situation and the principle of undiminished security allow, confidence-building measures could go further and, while leaving the overall military potentials intact, limit the permissible use of military forces.

D. Approach

1. Several possible approaches to confidence-building measures exist. Since many, if not most, problems of security and the perceptions thereof derive from regional factors, in most cases a regional approach to confidence-building will be the most effective. The initiative on confidence-building will almost invariably have to be taken on a regional basis. In order to determine what might be a suitable "region", it will not suffice to apply strictly geographical and security considerations. Since confidence-building measures are mainly concerned with security perceptions, such additional factors as the prior existence of cultural, economic, ideological and/or political links will have to be borne in mind.

2. Stressing the importance of a regional approach does not mean, however, that interactions among different regions or between the regional and global levels can be disregarded. Measures creating and strengthening confidence in one region will usually have a stabilizing effect at a wider level. Conversely, international developments may be relevant to a regional security situation. Once the confidence-building process in a particular region has been consolidated, consideration should be given to enhancing the gains in regional security thus achieved by broadening the geographical scope of suitable measures into interregional arrangements.

E. Legislative options

1. Confidence-building measures can be adopted in various forms. They can be agreed upon with the intention of creating legally binding obligations, in which case they represent international treaty law among the parties. They can, however, also be agreed upon through politically binding commitments.

2. Although agreement on legally binding measures would undoubtedly be of the greatest value in confidence-building, political commitments to specific means would also be of great significance. An advantage of a purely political commitment to such measures is that they could take effect without the need for a complex and often lengthy ratification process. They can thus in a particularly speedy manner help to deal with the relevant security problems and be adapted more easily to changing security requirements.

F. Implementation

1. For the implementation of confidence-building measures it is indispensable that the factors which favourably or adversely affect confidence among States in a specific situation should be identified with the highest possible degree of clarity.
2. Since States must be able to assess the progress made in implementing confidence-building measures and to verify the proper implementation by the other participating States of a confidence-building arrangement, it is indispensable that the parameters of the established confidence-building measures should be defined as precisely and clearly as possible.

3. Long-term confidence cannot be built by the implementation of one specific confidence-building measure. The seriousness, credibility and reliability of a State's commitment to confidence-building should be demonstrated by the continuous, regular and full implementation of confidence-building measures. Confidence grows as experience increases.

4. The implementation of confidence-building measures should take place in an equitable and uniform manner which ensures the right of each State to undiminished security and which guarantees that no individual State or group of States obtains advantages over others at any stage of the confidence-building process.

5. In the step-by-step process of confidence-building it should be a general rule that mutually implemented steps are built up gradually until there is a comprehensive network of confidence-building measures that provides the sound basis on which more far-reaching agreements in the field of international security can be built.

6. Obligations undertaken in agreements on confidence-building measures must be fulfilled in good faith.

6. Opportunities

1. Opportunities for the introduction of confidence-building measures are manifold. The following compilation of some of the main possibilities may be of assistance to States wishing to define what might present a suitable opportunity in their region.

2. Confidence-building measures should not be developed and implemented only when the political climate improves, when the internal and external political conditions are particularly conducive to their introduction and development. There is a particular need for appropriate measures, such as adequate communication channels, including "hot lines" or bilateral and multilateral fora for crisis prevention or crisis management, at times of political tension, when they can have an important stabilizing effect.

3. A particular opportunity might arise upon the introduction of peace-keeping forces into a region or on the cessation of hostilities between States.

4. Negotiations on arms limitations and reductions may offer another opportunity to agree on confidence-building measures. Certain confidence-building measures may, in this context, form an ingredient of the envisaged agreement itself. Other confidence-building measures may supplement the arms limitation agreement concerned. Both types can have a beneficial effect on the parties' ability to achieve the purposes and goals of their particular negotiations and agreements by creating a climate of co-operation and understanding, by facilitating measures of verification and by fostering reliable and credible implementation.
5. Review conferences of existing arms limitation agreements could provide an opportunity to strengthen such agreements by the development of supplementary confidence-building measures. Such confidence-building measures as may be agreed could form part of the concluding document of those conferences.

6. Still further opportunities may arise in conjunction with agreements among States on co-operation in other spheres of intergovernmental relations, for example, in the case of joint development projects, especially in frontier areas.

7. Confidence-building measures, or at least a statement of intent to develop them in the future, could also be included in any other form of political declaration on goals shared by two or more States.

H. Development and prospects

1. A very important qualitative step in enhancing the credibility and reliability of the confidence-building process may consist in strengthening the degree of commitment with which the various confidence-building measures are to be implemented. Voluntary measures should, as soon as possible, be developed into mutual, balanced and political binding provisions, and if appropriate, into legally binding obligations.

2. The nature of a confidence-building measure may gradually be enhanced to the extent that its general acceptance as the correct pattern of behaviour grows. As a result, the consistent and uniform implementation of a politically binding confidence-building measure over a substantial period of time, together with the requisite opinio juris, may lead to the development of an obligation under customary international law. In this way, the process of confidence-building may gradually contribute to the formation of new norms of international law.

3. Statements of intent and declarations, which in themselves contain no obligation to take specific measures and can, therefore, only supplement genuine confidence-building measures, must be made more concrete by agreements on specific measures.

4. Taking into account the desirability of global implementation of confidence-building measures and drawing on the experience gained in various regional and international spheres, an international convention to codify a number of basic and universally applicable obligations for the implementation of confidence-building measures may eventually be considered.

1. The role of the United Nations

1. In carrying out its manifold tasks the United Nations can promote confidence in various ways. All organs and other bodies of the United Nations should participate in encouraging the process of confidence-building. In particular, the General Assembly and the Security Council can further this process by adopting decisions and recommendations containing suggestions and requests to States to agree on and implement confidence-building measures. The Secretary-General could also contribute significantly to the process of confidence-building by suggesting specific confidence-building measures or by providing his good offices, particularly at times of crisis, in promoting the establishment of certain confidence-building procedures.
2. The Conference on Disarmament could identify and negotiate such confidence-building measures as are related to or included in agreements on disarmament and arms limitation under negotiation in the Committee. Among these, measures to enhance the verification of existing agreements or measures to facilitate the conclusion of new agreements would be of primary importance.

Notes

a/ Resolutions 34/87 B, 35/156 B, 36/97 F, 37/100 D and 38/73.

b/ A/34/416 and Add.1-3 and A/35/397.

c/ A/36/474; United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3.

d/ See A/S-12/AC.1/59.

APPENDIX

An illustrative catalogue of confidence-building measures

1. Information and communication of a military nature

Publication and exchange of information on:

(a) Military activities and other matters related to mutual security;

(b) Matters of arms limitation and disarmament;

(c) Military structures and capabilities;

(d) Military expenditure.

2. Prior notification of military activities

Prior notification of:

(a) Major military manoeuvres meeting agreed criteria;

(b) Other military manoeuvres on a voluntary basis;

(c) Major military movements;

(d) All military activities above certain dimensions taking place out-of-garrison.

3. Observation of military activities, exchanges and visits

(a) Invitation of observers in connection with military activities (inter alia manoeuvres);

(b) Establishment of observation posts;
(c) Exchange of delegations;

(d) Provision of scholarships in military academies for personnel of other States.

4. Consultation

(a) Regular bilateral or multilateral consultations;

(b) Establishment of consultative mechanisms to promote communication and mutual understanding on security-related issues.

5. Military conduct

Establishment of patterns and standards of routine peace-time military conduct, thereby creating warning indicators.

6. Constraints

(a) Limitations on, or prohibition of, certain military activities;

(b) Further constraints on the permissible use of military forces, wherever the principle of undiminished security for all States concerned allows.

7. Further arrangements

Establishment, where appropriate, of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace and co-operation on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by all States of the region in question, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security of all States and with the relevant recommendation of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament.

8. Verification

Continued and enhanced elaboration of procedures for verification as an integral part of confidence-building measures and arms limitation and disarmament agreements, as well as co-operation of States in the implementation of such procedures.

9. Crisis management

(a) Establishment of procedures for improving communication and for the reduction of misunderstanding as well as the prevention and containment of conflicts including the establishment of hot lines and multilateral or bilateral communication centres;

(b) Separation of forces;

(c) Peace-keeping measures such as the establishment of observation posts.
ANNEX XIII

Considerations for elaborating guidelines for confidence-building measures

Working paper: Finland
(A/CN.10/60)

The purpose of the present working paper is to submit some considerations that the delegation of Finland regards as particularly relevant to the work of the Disarmament Commission in fulfilling the task of elaborating guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global and regional level.

1. Delimitation of the concept

Confidence between States, or, in a broader sense, between nations, is the function of various factors - historical, cultural, political and economic - that encompass virtually the entire scope of international interaction. This basic and obvious relationship was underlined, inter alia, by the Group of Governmental Experts in the Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures. a/ It is suggested, however, that the Disarmament Commission, in fulfilling its task, take the following into account when considering guidelines for confidence-building measures:

(a) As a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the function of which is to consider and make recommendations concerning various problems in the field of disarmament, the Disarmament Commission is intended to deal with the military aspects of security;

(b) Both as a theoretical concept and as concrete arrangements, confidence-building measures, both envisaged and implemented, pertain essentially to the field of military activities. This has been notably the case in the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe;

(c) A delimitation of the concept of confidence-building measures so as to concentrate on the military aspects of security should be seen as a pragmatic approach aiming at ensuring that the Disarmament Commission effectively discharge its task.

2. Contents of confidence-building measures

In the light of the above, the contents of confidence-building measures should derive from the overall objectives of confidence-building to promote security and stability, in particular the following:

(a) Reducing the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities;

(b) Reducing the risk of military confrontation and giving effect to the duty of States to refrain from the use or threat of use of force.
The implementation of confidence-building measures, even if on a voluntary basis, or even if such measures are marginal from the military point of view, may assume major political importance. However, an overall aim should be the attainment of both militarily significant and politically binding measures, i.e. measures which cover a major part of military activities, in particular such as may be perceived to be threatening. Such measures would include arrangements for providing and obtaining information on military activities as well as qualitatively different measures, including constraints, and would provide for appropriate procedures for verifying compliance.

The building of confidence through such measures could be seen as a dynamic process: early, largely voluntary, militarily less significant measures could successively be followed by more far-reaching measures. Both in a political and technical sense, experience gained from the implementation of such early measures could facilitate agreement on further measures. Evolution of politically binding confidence-building measures into obligations under international law could also be envisaged.

3. Indivisibility of security

Irrespective of the ways of delimiting the concept of confidence-building measures, the interdependence of the security of Member States and the complementary nature of military and political aspects of security should be kept in mind: the consideration of confidence-building measures is possible only in a broader context of international relations. In considering such measures, it is the sovereign right of every State to assess and define its own security interests.

4. Global and regional approaches

A global and a regional approach to tackling questions of international security have in various contexts been found to be complementary rather than contradictory. The Charter of the United Nations, inter alia, specifically provides for the possibility of regional arrangements.

Considering the nature of confidence-building measures as concrete and practical undertakings, a regional approach may be particularly useful in view of the following:

(a) A "region" could be conceived so as to correspond as closely as possible with a regional security system, so as to comprise all States responsible for the security of the region concerned;

(b) In view of the immediate purposes of confidence-building measures, geographical proximity plays a major role;

(c) Measures to be adopted could be designed to reflect the particular political and military situation of the region concerned;

(d) The elaboration of confidence-building measures could constitute a part of other arrangements of regional co-operation already existing or envisaged, with the voluntary participation, and on the basis of sovereign equality, of all States concerned;
(e) As many confidence-building measures may involve arrangements for various kinds of information on military activities and therefore costs for providing and obtaining such information, the efficiency of such measures in a regional context may be optimal;

(f) Commitment to pursue confidence-building measures on a regional level serves in itself to increase confidence in the intentions of others: such commitment implicitly recognizes the existence of shared interest which can be translated into mutually beneficial practical measures. In this regard the conditions for pursuing confidence-building measures may significantly vary from region to region;

(g) A regional approach should be pursued in full recognition of the relationship between the security of the region concerned and the security of adjacent regions as well as world security in general.

5. **Confidence-building measures and disarmament**

As contributions to the realization of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, confidence-building measures should be seen as an avenue to increased rationality and stability in international relations and thus to enhanced international security. As such their basic aims are not dissimilar to those of disarmament efforts. Yet, confidence-building measures should not and cannot be considered a substitute for disarmament. Nor can they affect the priorities established for disarmament negotiations as elaborated, inter alia, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2).

In considering guidelines for confidence-building measures, it should be envisaged that the elaboration of such measures can be pursued independently or as measures collateral to disarmament. By their very nature, confidence-building measures could be seen as action aimed at creating conditions for agreements on arms control and disarmament and, in appropriate cases, also be instrumental in the verification of such agreements.

**Notes**

a/ A/36/474 and Corr.1; United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3.
ANNEX XIV

Elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building
measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or
regional level

Working paper: Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia,
Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

(A/CN.10/1984/WG.III/WP.1)

1. Renunciation by all nuclear-weapon States of the first use of nuclear
weapons: obligations to that effect could be assumed unilaterally by each
nuclear-weapon State which has not yet done so. At the same time such an
undertaking could also be incorporated in a unified instrument of international
law, which, in practice, would be equivalent to the complete legal prohibitions of
the use of nuclear weapons.

2. Mutual obligations of States not to be the first to use either nuclear or
conventional weapons against one another, e.g., not to use force: at the global
level that could be done by concluding a world treaty on the non-use of force in
international relations. An important step in the same direction is also to
conclude a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of military force and on
the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Warsaw Treaty and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization member States, whose core would be the commitment of
the States members of the two alliances not to be the first to use nuclear or
conventional arms against one another.

3. Adoption by all nuclear-weapon Powers of an undertaking not to use nuclear
weapons under any circumstances against non-nuclear countries in whose territory
there are no such weapons; to respect the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zones
already created and encouraged the creation of new nuclear-free zones in various
parts of the world.

4. Other appropriate measures, such as the prevention of accidental or
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and avoidance of the possibility of surprise
attacks.

5. Freezing, under appropriate verification, of nuclear weapons in quantitative
and qualitative terms.

6. Moratorium on all nuclear explosions until the conclusion of a treaty on the
complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

7. Prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons of any form. That means,
first of all, not handing over such weapons or control over them to anybody. It is
also essential not to deploy them on the territory of countries where there are
none. Another pressing task is that of preventing the spread of a nuclear-arms
race to new spheres.

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8. Prevention of the arms race in space and, for that purpose, the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth.

9. Reduction of military spending.

10. Prohibition of chemical weapons; non-deployment of chemical weapons where there are none.
ANNEX XV

Chairman's composite draft
(An asterisk (*) indicates that the appendix should be consulted for proposals and amendments.)

This composite draft has been elaborated as a summary of the drafting activities of the Working Group up to the end of its normal working period (25 May 1984), with a view to reflecting existing areas of agreement, and promoting consensus where it has not yet been achieved.

It is not a negotiated text and is circulated under the sole responsibility of the Chairman.

1. General considerations

1.1 Frame of reference

1.1.1 The present guidelines for confidence-building measures have been drafted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in pursuance of resolutions 37/100 D and 38/73 adopted by consensus by the General Assembly, in which the Disarmament Commission was requested "to consider the elaboration of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level".

1.1.2 In elaborating the guidelines the Disarmament Commission took into account, inter alia, the following United Nations documents: the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2), the relevant resolutions adopted by consensus by the General Assembly, a/ the replies received from Governments informing the Secretary-General of their views and experiences regarding confidence-building measures, b/ the Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures by a Group of Governmental Experts c/ the proposals made to the General Assembly by individual countries at the second special session d/ as well as the views of delegations as expressed during the annual sessions of the Disarmament Commission in 1983 and 1984 and reflected in the relevant documents of those sessions.

1.2 General political context

1.2.1 The present guidelines have been elaborated at a time when it is universally felt that efforts to heighten confidence among States are particularly pertinent and necessary. There is common concern about the deterioration of the international situation, the continuous recourse to the threat or use of force and the further escalation of the international arms build-up, with their concomitant rise in the danger of military conflagration, in political tensions and in mistrust.*
1.2.2 The situation calls for every effort by the international community to take urgent action for the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war, and for concrete measures of disarmament, but also for efforts to reduce political confrontation and to establish stable and co-operative relationships in all fields of international relations.

1.2.3 In this context, a confidence-building process embracing all these fields has become increasingly important. Confidence-building measures, especially when applied in a comprehensive manner, have a potential to contribute significantly to the enhancement of peace and security and to promote and facilitate the attainment of disarmament measures.

1.2.4 This potential is at present already being explored in some regions and subregions of the world, where the States concerned — while remaining mindful of the need for global action and for disarmament measures — are joining forces to contribute, by the elaboration and implementation of confidence-building measures, to more stable relations and greater security, as well as the elimination of outside intervention and enhanced co-operation in their areas.

The present guidelines have been drafted with these significant experiences in mind, but they also purport to provide further support to these and other endeavours on the regional and global level.*

1.2.5 These guidelines are part of a dynamic process over time. While they are designed to contribute to a greater usefulness and wider application of confidence-building measures, the accumulation of relevant experience may, in turn, necessitate the further development of the guidelines at a later time, should the General Assembly so decide.

1.3 Delimitation of the subject

1.3.1 Confidence-building measures and disarmament

1.3.1.1 Confidence-building measures must be neither a substitute nor a pre-condition for disarmament measures nor divert attention from them. Yet their potential for creating favourable conditions for progress in this field should be fully utilized in all regions of the world, in so far as they may facilitate and do not impair in any way the adoption of disarmament measures.

1.3.1.2 Effective disarmament and arms limitation measures which directly limit or reduce military potential have a particularly high confidence-building value and, among these measures, those relating to nuclear disarmament are especially conducive to confidence-building.*
1.3.1.3 The provisions of the Final Document relating to disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, also have a high confidence-building value.

1.3.1.4 Confidence-building measures may be worked out and implemented independently in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures, or as collateral measures in connection with specific measures of arms limitation and disarmament.

1.3.2 Scope of confidence-building measures: military and non-military measures

1.3.2.1 Confidence reflects a set of interrelated factors of a military as well as of a non-military character, and a plurality of approaches is needed to overcome fear, apprehension and mistrust between States and to replace them by confidence.

1.3.2.2 Since confidence relates to a wide spectrum of activities in the interaction among States, a comprehensive approach is indispensable and confidence-building is necessary in the political, military, economic, social and cultural fields. These should include removal of political tensions, progress towards disarmament, reshaping of the world economic system and the elimination of racial discrimination, of any form of hegemony and domination and of foreign occupation. It is important that in all these areas the confidence-building process contribute to diminishing mistrust and enhancing trust among States by reducing and eventually eliminating potential causes for misunderstanding, misinterpretation and miscalculation.

1.3.2.3 Notwithstanding the need for such a broad confidence-building process, and in accordance with the mandate of the Disarmament Commission, the main focus of the present guidelines for confidence-building measures relates to the military and security field, and the guidelines derive their specificity from these aspects.

1.3.2.4 In many regions of the world economic and other phenomena touch upon the security of a country with such immediacy that they cannot be disassociated from defence and military matters. Concrete measures of a non-military nature that are directly relevant to the national security and survival of States are therefore fully within the focus of the guidelines. In such cases military and non-military measures are complementary and reinforce each other's confidence-building value.
1.3.2.5 The appropriate mixture of different types of concrete measures should be determined for each region, depending on the perception of security and of the nature and levels of existing threats, by the countries of the regions themselves.

2. **Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for their implementation**

2.1 **Principles**

2.1.1 Strict adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), the validity of which had been unanimously and categorically reaffirmed by all Member States at the Twelfth Special Session, the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, are of overriding importance for the preservation of peace and the realization of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.*

2.1.2 In particular, and as a prerequisite for enhancing confidence among States, the following principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations must be strictly observed,

(a) Refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State;

(b) Non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States;

(c) Peaceful settlement of disputes;

(d) Sovereign equality of States and self-determination of peoples.

2.1.3 The strict observance of the principles and priorities of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session is of particular importance for enhancing confidence among States.*

2.2 **Objectives**

2.2.1 The ultimate goal of confidence-building measures is to strengthen international peace and security and to contribute to the prevention of all wars, in particular nuclear war.*

2.2.2 Confidence-building measures are to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the peaceful settlement of existing international problems and disputes and for the improvement and promotion of international relations based on justice, co-operation and solidarity; and to facilitate the solution of any situation which might lead to international friction.
2.2.3 A major goal of confidence-building measures is the realization of universally recognized principles, particularly those contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

2.2.4 By helping to create a climate in which the momentum towards a competitive arms build-up can be reduced and in which the importance of the military element is gradually diminished, confidence-building measures should in particular facilitate and promote the process of arms limitation and disarmament.

2.2.5 A major objective is to reduce or even eliminate the causes of mistrust, fear, misunderstanding and miscalculation with regard to military activities and intentions of other States, factors which impair security and provide justification for the continuation of the global and regional arms build-up.

2.2.6 An important task of confidence-building measures is to reduce the risk of surprise attacks and of the outbreak of war by accident.

2.2.7* Confidence-building measures may serve the additional objective of promoting respect for and facilitating verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

In addition, strict compliance with obligations and commitments in the field of disarmament and co-operation in the elaboration and implementation of adequate measures to ensure the verification of such compliance, have a considerable confidence-building effect of their own.

Confidence-building measures cannot, however, supersede verification measures, which are an important element in arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

2.3 Characteristics

2.3.1 Confidence in international relations is based on the belief in the co-operative disposition of other States. Confidence will increase to the extent that the conduct of States, over time, indicates their willingness to practise non-aggressive and co-operative behaviour.

2.3.2 Confidence-building requires a consensus of the States participating in the process. States must therefore decide freely and in the exercise of their sovereignty whether a confidence-building process is to be initiated and, if so, which measures are to be taken and how the process is to be pursued.

2.3.3 Because confidence-building is by nature a process in which each previous measure forms the basis for further measures which progressively and cumulatively consolidate and strengthen the building of confidence, States must, at each stage, be able to measure and assess the results achieved. This implies that it is only on concrete actions which can be examined and assessed, that confidence can be founded.
2.3.4* Declarations of intent or promises for a certain behaviour in the future (e.g. in cases of armed conflict), however welcome they may be, cannot substitute for concrete measures which can be examined and assessed. Such declarations and promises should be substantiated by concrete action.

2.3.5 Confidence-building measures must be tailored to specific situations. The effectiveness of a concrete measure will increase the more it is adjusted to the specific perceptions of threat or the confidence requirements of a given situation or a particular region.

2.3.6* One of the major causes of distrust, insecurity and threat perception is the lack of reliable information on pertinent military activities and intentions of other States and on other matters pertaining to mutual security.

The distrust caused by insufficient knowledge about opposing military forces is often aggravated by subjective misconceptions and a resulting lack of trust concerning the intentions of States.

Consequently, confidence-building measures should provide for reliable information by enhancing knowledge of pertinent military activities and other matters pertaining to mutual security. This is particularly significant in connection with concrete disarmament negotiations, or in order to enhance the prospects of specific disarmament agreements.

Requests for information should aim only at obtaining a rational basis on which to measure the presence or absence of a military threat, and unreasonable requests, unrelated to the objectives of confidence-building measures, should be avoided.

2.3.7 If the circumstances of a particular situation and the principle of undiminished security allow, confidence-building measures could within a desirable step-by-step process go further and (though not by themselves capable of diminishing military potentials) limit available military options.

2.4 Implementation

2.4.1 For the implementation of confidence-building measures it is indispensable that the factors which favourably or adversely affect confidence among States in a specific situation should be identified with the highest possible degree of clarity.

2.4.2 Since States must be able to examine and assess the implementation of, and to ensure compliance with, a confidence-building arrangement, it is indispensable that the details of the established confidence-building measures should be defined as precisely and clearly as possible.
2.4.3 Misconceptions and prejudices which may have developed over an extended period of time cannot be overcome by a single application of a confidence-building measure. The seriousness, credibility and reliability of a State's commitment to confidence-building, without which the confidence-building process cannot be successful, can be demonstrated only by consistent behaviour over time.

2.4.4 The implementation of confidence-building measures should take place in such a manner as to ensure the right of each State to undiminished security on the basis of the principles of equality, balance and reciprocity, guaranteeing that no individual State or group of States obtains advantages over others at any stage of the confidence-building process.

2.4.5 The building of confidence is a dynamic process: experience and trust gained from the implementation of early and less significant measures can facilitate agreement on further and more far-reaching measures.

The pace of the implementation process both in terms of timing and scope of desirable measures depends on prevailing circumstances. Confidence-building measures should be as substantial as possible and effected as rapidly as possible. Whilst in a specific situation the implementation of far-reaching measures at an early stage might be attainable, it would normally appear that a gradual step-by-step process is necessary.*

2.4.6 Obligations undertaken in agreements on confidence-building measures must be fulfilled in good faith.

2.4.7 Confidence-building measures should be implemented on the global as well as on regional levels. Regional and global approaches are not contradictory but rather complementary and interrelated. In view of the interaction between global and regional events progress on one level contributes to advancement on the other level; however, one is not a pre-condition for the other.

In considering the introduction of confidence-building measures in particular regions, the specific political, military and other conditions prevailing in the region should be fully taken into account. Confidence-building measures in a regional context should be adopted on the initiative and with the agreement of the States of the region concerned.

2.4.8 Confidence-building measures can be adopted in various forms. They can be agreed upon with the intention of creating legally binding obligations, in which case they represent international treaty law among the parties. They can, however, also be agreed upon through politically binding commitments.
2.4.9 For the assessment of progress in the implementing action of confidence-building measures, States should, to the greatest extent possible, provide for procedures and mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation. Where possible, time-frames could be agreed to facilitate the assessment of confidence-building measures in both quantitative and qualitative terms.

2.5 Development, prospects and opportunities

2.5.1 A very important qualitative step in enhancing the credibility and reliability of the confidence-building process may consist in strengthening the degree of commitment with which the various confidence-building measures are to be implemented; this, it should be recalled, is also applicable to the implementation of commitments undertaken in the field of disarmament. Voluntary and unilateral measures should, as early as appropriate, be developed into mutual, balanced and politically binding provisions and, if appropriate, into legally binding obligations.

2.5.2 The nature of a confidence-building measure may gradually be enhanced to the extent that its general acceptance as the correct pattern of behaviour grows. As a result, the consistent and uniform implementation of a politically binding confidence-building measure over a substantial period of time, together with the requisite opinio iuris, may lead to the development of an obligation under customary international law. In this way, the process of confidence-building may gradually contribute to the formation of new norms of international law.

2.5.3 Statements of intent and declarations, which in themselves contain no obligation to take specific measures, should be made more concrete by agreements on specific measures.

2.5.4 Opportunities for the introduction of confidence-building measures are manifold. The following compilation of some of the main possibilities may be of assistance to States wishing to define what might present a suitable opportunity for action.

2.5.4.1 A particular need for confidence-building measures exists at times of political tension and crises, where appropriate measures can have a very important stabilizing effect.

2.5.4.2 Negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament offer a particularly important opportunity to agree on confidence-building measures. As integral parts of an agreement itself or by way of supplementary agreements, they can have a beneficial effect on the parties' ability to achieve the purposes and goals of their particular negotiations and agreements by creating a climate of co-operation and understanding, by facilitating adequate measures of verification acceptable to all the States concerned and by fostering reliable and credible implementation.

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2.5.4.3 A particular opportunity might arise upon the introduction of peace-keeping forces into a region or on the cessation of hostilities between States.

2.5.4.4 Review conferences of existing arms limitation agreements could provide an opportunity to strengthen such agreements by the development of supplementary confidence-building measures, provided that such action is within the purview of the review provisions of the respective agreement.

2.5.4.5 Many opportunities exist in conjunction with agreements among States in other areas of their relations, such as the political, economic, social and cultural fields, for example in the case of joint development projects, especially in frontier areas.

2.5.4.6 Confidence-building measures, or at least a statement of intent to develop them in the future, could also be included in any other form of political declaration on goals shared by two or more States.

2.5.4.7 Since it is especially the multilateral approach to international security and disarmament issues which enhances international confidence, the United Nations can contribute to increasing confidence by playing its central role in the field of international peace, security and disarmament. Organs of the United Nations and other international organizations could participate in encouraging the process of confidence-building as appropriate. In particular, the General Assembly and the Security Council can further this process by adopting decisions and recommendations containing suggestions and requests to States to agree on and implement confidence-building measures. The Secretary-General, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, could also contribute significantly to the process of confidence-building by suggesting specific confidence-building measures or by providing his good offices, particularly at times of crises, in promoting the establishment of certain confidence-building procedures.

2.5.4.8 In accordance with paragraph IX of its established agenda and without prejudice to its negotiating role in the other areas contained in that agenda, the Disarmament Conference could identify and develop such confidence-building measures as are related to or to be included in agreements on disarmament and arms limitation under negotiation in the Conference.

(Pro memora e/)

3.* Illustrative catalogue of types of measures
Notes

a/ Resolutions 34/87 B, 35/156 B, 36/97 F, 37/100 D and 38/73.

b/ A/34/416 and Add.1-3; A/35/397.

c/ A/36/474; United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3.

d/ See A/S-12/AC.1/59.

e/ This subheading, which was included in the agreed structure of the guidelines (document A/CN.10/1984/WG.III/CRP.1/Rev.1) on a tentative basis, was not considered in the drafting process, and some delegations maintained their doubts as to whether it should be elaborated as part of the guidelines at the present time. However, draft catalogues are contained in a working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany (A/CN.10/58) and in a working paper submitted by a group of socialist States (A/CN.10/1984/WG.III/WP.1). There are also two proposals submitted, respectively, by the delegations of the Soviet Union (CRP.6), and the delegations of Brazil and Mexico (CRP.11). The latter proposals are reproduced in the appendix, without prejudice to an eventual decision by the Working Group as to whether an illustrative catalogue of types of specific measures should be included in the guidelines or not.

APPENDIX

Compilation of amendments and proposals submitted in connection with the draft guidelines
(An asterisk (*) denotes amendments submitted after 25 May, and therefore not discussed by the Working Group.)

1.2.1 Proposal by the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic

The arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, is the main source of lack of confidence and mutual understanding between States.

1.2.1 Proposal by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic

Replace "military conflagration" by "danger of nuclear war".

1.2.4 Proposal by the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR

Delete the last sentence of 1.2.4.

1.3.1.2 Amendment by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

"The major way to confidence and prevention of any war is the cessation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and nuclear disarmament."

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1.3.1.4 Proposal by the delegation of the USSR

"Confidence-building measures should be worked out and implemented in connection with specific measures of arms limitation and disarmament and of military détente."

1.3.1.4* Amendment by the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR

"All States should proceed, inter alia, from United Nations decisions on the prohibition of war propaganda, to renounce propaganda for nuclear war in any of its variations, either global or limited.

Confidence-building measures should be elaborated and implemented in relationship with specific measures of military détente, arms limitation and disarmament. Within the framework of confidence-building measures, large-scale steps of a political and international legally binding nature should be taken in combination with military-technical measures."

1.3.2.1 Amendment by the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR

"Confidence-building measures should be adequate to the scale of the existing threat to peace and security. They should be of a mutually complementing character and represent a combination of large-scale steps of a political and international legal nature with measures of a military-technical nature. To limit oneself by one of these directions would mean to narrow the available possibilities."

1.3.2.3 Amendment by the delegation of Viet Nam

Replace "military and security field" (6th line) with "disarmament and security field".

2.1.1 Amendment by the delegation of India

"Ensuring at all cost survival of mankind threatened by the imminent danger of nuclear war. Therefore, priority attention must be given to measures for halting the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament."

2.1.3* Amendments by the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR

"Commitments by nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, freeze on nuclear weaponry, and a moratorium on all nuclear explosions by all nuclear-weapon States are aimed at this goal. Various confidence-building measures can contribute towards the removal of the nuclear threat only in conjunction with far-reaching political undertakings in that field."

"Elaboration of confidence-building measures should be carried out along the following main directions of arms limitation and disarmament:

1. Nuclear weapons in all their aspects (including comprehensive nuclear test ban, nuclear-weapon freeze, establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and other questions)
2. Chemical weapons
3. Other weapons of mass destruction
4. Conventional weapons
5. Prevention of arms race in outer space
6. Curbing the naval arms race: limitation and reduction of naval armaments, extension of confidence-building measures to seas and oceans
7. Reduction of military budgets."

2.2.1 Amendment by the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

"The primary objective of confidence-building measures should be the prevention of nuclear war."

2.2.1 Amendment by the delegation of the USSR

"One of the major objectives of confidence-building measures is to contribute to a mutual freeze on nuclear weapons of all the States possessing such weapons and to facilitate reaching agreement on a reduction of nuclear arsenals."

2.2.1 Amendment by the delegation of Mexico

Add the following text at the end of paragraph 2.2.1:

"..., which represents a threat whose removal is the most acute and urgent task of the present day."

2.2.7 Proposal by the delegations of the Byelorussian SSR and the German Democratic Republic

Delete paragraph 2.2.7.

2.3.4 The delegations of the USSR and Byelorussian SSR have expressed doubts as to the inclusion of this paragraph.

2.3.6 The delegation of the USSR has expressed doubts as to the inclusion of this paragraph. (The paragraph has, however, been amended.)

2.4.5 Amendment by the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR

"The process of confidence-building may develop both on a step-by-step basis with mutually implemented steps building up gradually until there is a comprehensive network and on the basis of far-reaching arrangements in the field of international security and disarmament."
3. Proposal by the delegation of the USSR (CRP.6)

"The elaboration and acceptance of certain norms which should regulate relations among the Powers possessing nuclear weapons. These norms should be something like the following:

"To regard the prevention of nuclear war as the main objective of one's foreign policy, and to avert situations fraught with the danger of nuclear conflict. In the event that such a danger emerges, urgent consultations should be held to prevent a nuclear conflagration from breaking out;

"To renounce the propaganda of nuclear war in any of its various forms, either global or limited;

"To undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

"Not to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances against non-nuclear countries in whose territory there are no such weapons; to respect the status of nuclear-free zones already created; and to encourage the creation of new such zones in other parts of the world;

"To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form: not to hand over these weapons, or control of them, to anyone; not to deploy them in the territory of countries where there are no such weapons; and not to spread the nuclear-arms race to new spheres, including outer space;

"To strive, step-by-step, on the basis of the principle of equal security, for the reduction of nuclear weapons, to the point of eliminating them in all their various forms."

Proposal by the delegations of Brazil and Mexico (CRP.11)

Classification of confidence-building measures

I. Not specifically designed as confidence-building measures, but which may generate or increase confidence:

1. Unilateral: statements of intention, policy declaration, compliance with political commitments, respect and observance of binding legal obligations.

2. Bilateral or multilateral: agreement in the field of disarmament, arms limitation, international security, international co-operation.

II. Specifically designed to generate or increase confidence:

1. Arrangements to establish or improve channels of communication:

(a) Of a general character ("hot lines", bilateral or multilateral forums for crisis prevention or crisis management, including full utilization of existing multilateral mechanisms such as the system of collective security provided for in the United Nations Charter;
(b) Of a specific character (information and communication on military activities, exchanges and visits, notification of manoeuvres etc.)

2. Bilateral or multilateral mechanisms of consultation on security-related issues.

3. Procedures for verification of compliance with agreements in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

III. Relevant to the promotion of further progress in disarmament:

1. Assessment by States of the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament.

2. Reports by the United Nations Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.
ANNEX XVI

Agenda item 4 of the current session of the Commission

Working paper: Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Japan, Turkey and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (A/CH.10/65)

1. The Disarmament Commission notes with deep concern that developments in the field of disarmament since 1978 have not lived up to hopes engendered by the first special session devoted to disarmament. The Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2) stated that disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security were directly related to each other. Progress in any of the spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others. The past five years have witnessed increasing recourse to the use or threat of use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. Open threats, pressures and military interventions against independent States and violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter are taking place, posing the most serious threat to international peace and security. The consequent tensions and confrontations have retarded progress in disarmament and have in turn been aggravated by the failure to make significant progress towards disarmament.

2. The Disarmament Commission recommends that all States should be urged to respect their commitments and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and, therefore, not to use or threaten to use any of their weapons against any State except in the exercise of their inherent right to individual or collective self-defence as provided for under Article 51 and other relevant provisions of the Charter.

3. The Disarmament Commission stresses the need to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, to implement the security system provided for in the Charter and to enhance the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body.

4. Guided by these considerations, the Disarmament Commission emphasizes the importance of the negotiation and the adoption of effective measures of disarmament, and for the prevention of war, in particular nuclear war. In that context, the Disarmament Commission adopts the following recommendations:

   (a) All States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and especially those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should pursue as a matter of urgency negotiations to fulfil the priority tasks set forth in the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session. These negotiations must take into account the legitimate security interests of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Agreement should provide for effective measures of verification and compliance;

   (b) Negotiations should be pursued and concluded, in appropriate forums, which would lead to substantial equitable and verifiable reductions in weapons, in particular nuclear weapons;
(c) A nuclear test ban should be negotiated and concluded within the framework of an effective disarmament process;

(d) Pending more effective measures of nuclear disarmament, all States, in particular the major nuclear-weapon States, should co-operate in the development of a comprehensive set of measures, for the prevention of nuclear war and of all armed conflict;

(e) Bearing in mind assurances already given, negotiations should continue on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(f) Since the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects is a matter of universal concern, all States are urged to contribute effectively to the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. States should fully implement all provisions of relevant international treaties to which they are parties;

(g) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements and/or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. Those agreements or arrangements should be fully complied with and nuclear-weapon States should respect the status of such zones, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons;

(h) All States, in particular the major nuclear-weapon States, are urged to pursue their negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament with vigour and to keep the United Nations appropriately informed of all steps in this field, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations;

(i) The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America are urged to resume, without pre-conditions, their bilateral negotiations at Geneva in order to achieve positive results in accordance with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament;

(j) Determined efforts should be made to conclude urgently a treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons, including adequate verification provisions. To this end, the Conference on Disarmament should expedite its work with a view to presenting a draft treaty to the General Assembly without further delay;

(k) The limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued concurrently with nuclear disarmament, especially in regions where there is a concentration of armed forces and armaments. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in this field;

(l) Where the necessary conditions exist, confidence-building measures should be negotiated in appropriate frameworks for regional or global application, in order to increase trust and confidence and to decrease the risk of misunderstanding among nations;
(m) The extension of an arms race into outer space should be prevented;

(n) In the context of the World Disarmament Campaign, measures should be adopted in order that the public in all regions of the world might have access to a broad range of information and opinions on questions of arms limitations and disarmament, to facilitate informed choices about these vital questions.