

THE ROLE OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS IN THE ACADEMY
— *A Case Study of the Formation of the University Athletic Association*

by

Richard A. Rasmussen

*Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the degree
Doctor of Education*

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE

Dr. Jerome P. Lysaught, Sponsor
Dr. G. Jeffry Paton
Dr. Paul J. Burgett

University of Rochester
Margaret Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development

1997

Biographical Background of the Investigator

Richard A. Rasmussen is a graduate of the University of Rochester where he earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in chemistry in 1972 and a Master of Science degree in science education in 1979. He is currently a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Education in higher education administration at the University of Rochester.

Mr. Rasmussen was a dean's list student at the University of Rochester where he played football and baseball. Following graduation he taught high school chemistry and physics for a brief time. In 1973, he returned to his alma mater as head baseball coach and assistant football coach. He coached both sports for nine years. When budget cuts forced a reduction in the status of his coaching positions from full-time to part-time status, Mr. Rasmussen took a position in the University of Rochester Office of Admissions and Financial Aid as a computer programmer and research analyst. He continued to coach baseball during this time, returning full-time to the Department of Sports and Recreation as Business Manager and Head Baseball Coach in 1984.

In 1987, Mr. Rasmussen was named Executive Secretary of the University Athletic Association (UAA), the position which he currently holds. He was a member of the planning team that developed the conceptual and philosophical framework on which the UAA is based. His responsibilities in that regard were the development of briefing materials and financial modeling for various competitive models to be considered by the prospective members.

Mr. Rasmussen's graduate work has focused on the organizational behavior of institutions of higher education with additional emphasis on decision-making, finance, and business practices. He is a member of Kappa Delta Pi honor society and a past president of the Pi Kappa chapter.

He is active in alumni affairs at the University of Rochester, the Honeoye Falls-Lima School District Planning and Budget Review Committee, Psi Upsilon Fraternity, the Newman Community of the University of Rochester, Little League Baseball, and the Boy Scouts of America. He is also a member of the NCAA Division III Management Council, NCAA Committee on Women's Athletics, the Executive Committee of the National Association of Division III Athletic Administrators; chair of the NCAA Division III Membership

Committee; and president of the Division III College Commissioners Association.

Abstract

The role of intercollegiate athletics in higher education is an issue that has drawn considerable national attention at various points in its history. It has been the focus of considerable scrutiny by the media, hearings and legislative action by Congress and numerous state legislatures, and extensive examination by several independent, national commissions.

In 1986, nine major research universities established a new intercollegiate athletic conference — the University Athletic Association. While the announcement of a new athletic conference is not necessarily unique, the impetus for the formation of this conference, its stated philosophical principles, and its organizational and competitive structures are very definitely unique. The membership of the UAA includes nine of the most highly-endowed, major research universities in the United States. All nine are located in major media markets. Although most of the nine institutions have been among some of the most successful major college athletics programs at times in their histories, all are members of Division III of the NCAA. Moreover all nine are committed to continuing their participation within Division III.

This investigation uses an interpretative case study of the formation of the UAA to answer three distinct but inseparable questions. First, why did the nine member institutions of the University Athletic Association choose to affiliate with one another? Second, why did they choose to sponsor athletic competition in the manner which they have prescribed? Third, how did this Association, composed of these particular nine institutions, come to be?

The study found that these nine institutions chose to affiliate with each other for insitutional rather than athletic reasons. Principle factors in this regard included institutional identity and visibility, athletic philosophy, and benefits to students. The study also found that these institutions subscribe to an athletic philosophy that considers athletics a means of educating students and puts major emphasis on supporting the role of student-athlete as student first and foremost, while committing substantial institutional funds to the conduct of a high-quality athletic program. The central role of chief executive officers and senior administrators in the development and implementation of these concepts is also described. The study suggests seven principles that may be applied to intercollegiate athletics generally.

Table of Contents

I.	Introduction and Background to the Case Study.....	Page 1
II.	Review of the Literature.....	Page 5
III.	Methodology and Case Study Protocol	Page 23
IV.	Results of the Case Study	Page 47
V.	Summary and Suggestions	Page 141
VII.	References.....	Page 152

Table of Figures

1.	Alternative Models of Program and Goal Development	Page 6
2.	Excerpted Summary of NCAA Divisional Philosophy Statements.....	Page 19
3.	Fundamental Principles of the University Athletic Association.....	Page 21
4.	Timeline of Key Events in the Formation of the UAA.....	Page 37
5.	Comparative Institutional Profiles.....	Page 48
6.	Participants in the Initial UAA Meeting at Rochester	Page 92
7.	Initial UAA Goal Statement.....	Page 98
8.	UAA Sport Sponsorship and Participation by Institution	Page 130

Chapter I. Introduction

On the morning of June 25, 1986, representatives of eight universities gathered at the New York Hilton Hotel to announce the formation of a new intercollegiate athletic conference. Representing their respective institutions were two university presidents, two chancellors, three vice presidents, and one senior dean. That same afternoon press conferences were also held on the campuses of the newly associated institutions to repeat the announcement and to provide further details to members of the local media and campus communities. Within a year, the eight institutions would be joined by a ninth.

The announcements were not unlike many recent, similar announcements which seemed to have become almost routine. There was a notable difference, however. The members of the newly-formed association covered the eastern half of the continental United States. The geographic expanse of the group stretched south from Boston and New York to Atlanta, and west to St. Louis and Chicago. Located in major metropolitan areas, the eight institutions were highly selective, major research universities with undergraduate, graduate, and professional programs. Each of the eight also ranked among the forty most highly endowed private universities in the country. The academic prominence, national scope, available resources, and access to major media markets of the new association would suggest an athletic conference bound for national prominence and, perhaps, an assault on the heights of big-time intercollegiate athletics. In fact, most of the group could claim storied histories of involvement in big-time athletics in times past. This elite eight included Carnegie Mellon University • Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Case Western Reserve University • Cleveland, Ohio; Emory University • Atlanta, Georgia; Johns Hopkins University • Baltimore,

Maryland; New York University • New York, New York; University of Chicago • Chicago, Illinois; University of Rochester • Rochester, New York; and Washington University • St. Louis, Missouri. Joining them a year later would be Brandeis University located in Boston, Massachusetts; All members of the new association competed in Division III of the National Collegiate Athletic Association. Perhaps more significantly, the members of the new association planned to continue to compete in Division III.

In a statement of principles released at the time of the announcement, the members of the association identified four major themes. First, athletics is integral to the overall educational process of the institution and should be conducted in a manner consistent with the institution's central academic mission. Second, student athletes shall be measured against the same standards as other students in admissions, financial aid, and academic programs. Third, the chief executive officer at each university shall be ultimately responsible for the control of athletics at each institution. Fourth, equal opportunities shall be provided for men and women.

The chief executives present at the New York news conference also articulated a philosophical foundation upon which athletic competition would be based. The schools would continue to embrace the NCAA Division III philosophy, expressing a common belief that academic excellence and athletic excellence are not mutually exclusive. Student-athletes would continue to be just that—students first and athletes subsequent to their role as students. Student-athletes should have the benefit of high-quality coaching, facilities, and equipment. In addition, sports programs were not to be considered cost centers, nor were they to be considered public entertainment. As extracurricular

activities for students they would reflect the academic environment within which they exist.

The members of the University Athletic Association would sponsor competition in 22 sports, including 10 for women and 12 for men. Round-robin competition would be sponsored in football, men's and women's soccer, and men's and women's basketball. Teams in other sports would compete in festivals or championship tournaments or meets. Men's and women's teams would travel together and all championships would be combined events for both men's and women's teams.

The formation of an intercollegiate athletic conference that is national in scope among schools whose major thrust is student participation and athletics programs focused on students, rather than the public or the generation of revenue, is not a natural extension of existing traditions, philosophies, or theories of how intercollegiate athletics programs should be conducted. Such an effort is an unusual hybrid of existing models of intercollegiate competition. Moreover, it is a combination of some of the most divergent aspects of these models.

Why would nine such prominent and highly-endowed universities, located in some of the largest media markets of the country, choose to form an athletic conference of this scope, yet also select to continue to participate within a Division III context? Certainly they have the resources to "do it right" — to become significant players among the membership of Division I. Conversely, why would nine solid Division III institutions spend the money to send their teams traveling all over the country just to play against other Division III schools? Surely, there are more than enough good Division III programs in their own areas to give them a full schedule of competition.

This study attempts to answer three distinct but inseparable questions. First, why did the nine member institutions of the University Athletic Association choose to affiliate with one another? Second, why did they choose to sponsor athletic competition in the manner which they have prescribed? Third, how did this Association, composed of these particular nine institutions, come to be?

The format of the investigation is an embedded case study that is primarily interpretive in nature. It provides a rich, thick description of the processes which led to the formation of the Association. It examines the factors considered by the respective institutions in their decisions to associate with one another. It also examines the formation of the UAA with respect to existing models of athletic competition. The study also attempts to generalize the interpretation of these events and processes to the larger context of intercollegiate athletics, its role within the academy, and how institutions define their own athletics programs in the context of competition with other institutions.

The collective process of the formation of the University Athletic Association by the nine institutions is the principal unit of analysis for this study. The unilateral decision-making processes on each of the respective member campuses form the subunits of the study.

The investigation of these questions is grounded in both existing practices and theoretical perspectives on how colleges and universities make decisions about the role of athletics, its organization, and its governance within and among institutions.



Chapter II. Review of the Literature

Perspectives of Theory, Practice, and History

The role of athletics in colleges and universities — what it is, what it should be, and what it can be — has been the subject of varying degrees of formal examination throughout the history of intercollegiate athletics. In almost every instance, questions about the role of athletics have been asked in response to crises, scandals, or threats of outside intervention. From the beginning, answers to such questions were necessarily sought after the fact. Intercollegiate athletics and their purposes were never defined prior to inception. They metamorphosed out of the mud, sweat, and blood of the student games. Once they had grown large enough to attract the attention of the formal governance structures of higher education, and others concerned with collegiate education, it became incumbent upon those structures to develop a sense of purpose or definition for these activities. The result is a phenomenon of American higher education characterized by a high degree of ambiguity in its role, its organization, and its governance.


Intercollegiate athletics is a well-formed example of why colleges and universities are often described as “organized anarchies” (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972). The goals of these programs tend to be problematic and not well-defined. Colleges and universities tend to discover their directions in athletics through reaction rather than acting on the basis of formulated goals. The directions and goals of their programs tend to be inconsistent, tend to shift over time, and often vary from one part of the institution to another. In many cases, goals which are defined tend to be stated in terms which are difficult to translate

into action. Also, the technology of athletics programs generally tends to be unclear. The processes — how they have come to do what they do, and who or what controls their direction — are not well understood or are not clearly articulated. Programs operate by means of trial and error, learning from past mistakes, or functioning on the basis of pragmatic necessity. They can duplicate what they and others do very well, but they cannot easily change what they do, particularly when the change is unilateral. The patterns of participation in the management of athletics programs tend to be very fluid. Participants in the decision processes vary in the amount of time and effort they can devote to various problems. Often times the decision makers change capriciously. They come and go with no consistent domain or locus of control. In addition, the boundaries of the institutions themselves are uncertain, resulting in the attachment of constituencies to the decision process whose roles in the institutions are not at all clear.

The ambiguity inherent in this “garbage can” model of intercollegiate athletics is reflected in a model of higher education’s program and goal development suggested by Donald Chu (1989).

FIGURE 1

Alternative Models of Program and Goal Development



Chu, 1989

According to Chu's model, it is not necessarily objectives that result in a program for which resources are found, but rather organizations in search of resources that devise new programs or modify existing programs and institutional objectives in an effort to attract resources. Chu suggests that the latter of these models is more the norm than the former.

If this is indeed the case, then it should not be surprising that the actions demonstrated in the conduct of intercollegiate athletics programs tend to be very loosely coupled with the stated objectives and missions of those institutions which they represent. The result is a model of institutional control in which the informal structures of the organization often subvert and sometimes control the formal structures of the organization.

Ambiguity in defining the role of athletics in higher education often leads to conflict. The conflict may be internal to the institutions, or it may be external — between institutions. At times, the conflict may be collectively external, encompassing the composite actions of an athletic conference or even the whole of college athletics as measured against the public conscience. In these situations, the lack of unity between expectation and performance may pose serious concerns about the credibility and integrity not only of intercollegiate athletics but also the very institutions of higher education which sponsor these programs.

Intercollegiate athletics and controversy have walked hand-in-hand from the very beginning. Some of the problems which exist today are new, but most have been visited previously. The scale seems to have grown, though, both in breadth and in magnitude.

Intercollegiate athletics began as games organized by students. At least a portion of their roots lie in the so-called “muscular Christian movement” of the mid-nineteenth century (Noverr and Ziewacz, 1984). They began as games and play between classes and fraternities at institutions like Harvard, Princeton, and Yale. These activities were entirely separate from the formal structures of the colleges and universities. School officials took little note unless the activities got out of hand. Intervention included the assessment of fines, suspension, and dismissal from the institution.

Within a short time the notion of competition crossed the boundaries of local campuses evolving into intercampus rivalries. Crew was the sport of the day, and the first intercollegiate crew race took place between Harvard and Yale in 1852 at Lake Winnepesaukee, New Hampshire. External influences may have already been at work during this embryonic period. It has been suggested that the scheduling of this and subsequent crew matches had as much to do with the promotion of the Boston, Concord, and Montreal Railroad as with the Harvard crew meeting the challenge issued by the men of Yale (Rader, 1983). Other intercollegiate activities were not far behind. Amherst and Williams played the first intercollegiate baseball game in 1859. The Columbia College Athletic Association followed with a challenge to other groups for competition in track and field, and in 1869 Rutgers and Princeton played the first American college football game.

The precursory notion that intercollegiate athletics might be something more than just games between students was put forth in vivid terms by Charles W. Elliot in his 1869 inaugural address as president of Harvard University. Bringing with him a strong belief in sports as a training discipline, he expressed the hope “that Harvard men will ever aspire to belong to the aristocracy which

excels in manly sports and which carries off the honors and prizes of the learned professions, and bears itself with distinction in all fields of intellectual labor and combat; the aristocracy which in peace stands firmest for the public honor and renown, and in war rides first into the muderous thickets." (O'Leary, 1993)

Cornell president Andrew White also took notice of the impact athletics could have on promoting the reputation of a young university in 1873 when he paid the debt of his upstate New York crew team following their well-publicized victory over the likes of Harvard and Yale in the prestigious Saratoga Regatta. He labeled the expenditure as "advertising" (Noverr and Ziewacz, 1983).

In the early years, scheduling, hiring of coaches and managers, and all other aspects surrounding competition were handled by students. The formation of campus athletic associations like the Harvard Athletic Association and the Columbia College Athletic Association gave a formal structure to student administration of these programs, but as the games grew it became more and more difficult for students to maintain adequate control over the direction and scale of activity. In order to bring some semblance of control and legitimate reconciliation with the ideals of higher education, faculties began to exert their influence on these activities.

In 1882, a Committee on the Regulation of Athletic Sports comprising three faculty members was established at Harvard. Its mission was to oversee the activities of the student-run Harvard Athletic Association. The committee established a simple set of rules of concerning amateurism, hiring of trainers or coaches, and physical fitness requirements for participation. In 1893, Harvard took another step in setting the standard for administration of intercollegiate athletics when it hired the first Graduate Manager, the forerunner of the Director of Athletics. Other institutions followed with similar practices.

While efforts like these helped address problems arising within the campus, it was clear that there were problems that required the collective action of multiple campuses. The issues faced then are many of the same ones college athletics faces today — the definition of amateurism, eligibility for competition, playing rules, length of season, unruly spectators, and the health and safety of participants. Several governing associations attempted to provide some measure of inter-campus regulation. Among these were the Intercollegiate Association of Amateur Athletes of America, known as the IC4A and established in 1876; the Intercollegiate Rowing Association, established in 1882; the Eastern College League in baseball; and the Football Association, a national governing body that survived until 1892. Concerns over the demise of true amateurism prompted the formation of the Amateur Athletic Union in 1888. Its mission was to “preserve amateurism or sport for sports sake” (O’Leary, 1993).

Many of these groups attempted to promote their influence on a national scale. Unfortunately, they were often subject to the whims of a few dominant campuses that could bend a particular organization to their own purposes. As a result most were relatively short lived. Their dissolution, particularly the demise of the Football Association, led to the emergence of regional conferences of institutions.

Many of these conferences began as meetings between students and faculty representatives, sometimes separately and sometimes jointly. Their primary objectives were to address the differing practices at their respective institutions which tended to provide one institution or another some form of an “unfair” advantage on the field of play (Rader, 1983). Over time these meetings evolved into permanent “conferences” providing for the adoption of common

rules and practices in the administration of intercollegiate sport, common scheduling of opponents, and various regulatory functions.

The Michigan Intercollegiate Athletic Association, begun in 1888, was among the first of these conferences and today remains the oldest continuous intercollegiate athletic conference. The Michigan group was followed in 1895 by the Western Conference, a group of seven institutions that evolved into the Big Nine, Big Ten, and currently the Big Eleven. The formal name of this group is instructive — the Western Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives. Its initial purpose was “to establish and maintain common standards of eligibility and common rules to curb practices which are detrimental to amateur sport or fair and friendly competition,...to maintain the values of intercollegiate athletics and at the same time to eliminate so far as possible its abuses,...and to uphold the principle of faculty control” (Roberts, 1948)

These efforts may have had a positive effect among the member institutions of the respective conferences, but they lacked the force and effectiveness of a truly national effort. Like many issues in higher education, crisis provided a force for change — in this case in the person of the President of the United States.

Spurred by scandals over recruitment of ringers who powered athletic teams nominally masquerading as students, wholesale raiding of students from one institution by another, and the extreme brutality and incidence of fatal injuries in football, Teddy Roosevelt threatened intervention by the Office of the President to clean up the situation if colleges could not or would not regulate their own activities. The result was a conference of faculty representatives called late in 1905 at which sixty-two schools agreed to form the Intercollegiate Athletic

Association of the United States. The purpose of this association was to codify, promulgate, and enforce rules and regulations to insure the proper conduct of athletics on and off the field of play. In 1910, this body became the National Collegiate Athletic Association (Lewis, 1969). While this new national organization went about the business of prescribing policies and standards, it relied on the good faith of its voluntary membership for compliance. The notion of a strong enforcement role did not come until much later. The young organization did encourage its membership to organize into sections, providing support and increased incentive for the formation and strengthening of conferences.

Through the 1920's, the growing professionalism of college football and irregularities in the recruiting and treatment of athletes prompted a study of college athletics sponsored by the Carnegie Commission and written by Howard Savage. Recommendations contained in the report included an appeal to college presidents and those in control of college athletics to return the enterprise to a truly amateur status. This included the status of coaches as well as athletes and the return of program control to students. Not unlike similar investigations and reports in succeeding years, these recommendations were largely ignored (Hanford, 1979).

Colleges and universities had come to perceive a value in the exposure and reputation a strong football team could afford the institution. This phenomenon was characterized in the wry and unabashed commentary of Robert M. Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago during the 1930's — "There are two ways to have a great university. It must either have a great football team, or a great president" (Nyquist, 1978). Higher education was also learning that athletics could provide significant revenues. By 1928, attendance at

the Harvard-Yale football game had grown to 80,000 at five dollars per ticket. In 1924, Fordham University took in revenues of over half a million dollars. In 1926, Stanford University took in \$194,000 and in 1927, the gate receipts at Ohio State University totaled over \$275,000 (Edwards, 1973). During this period, the media also began to discover college athletics on a wider scale, and significant efforts were made to actively promote college athletics among the public.

Like much of the rest of sport, college athletics enjoyed idyllic times through the thirties and forties. During the years following the second world war, college athletics enjoyed accolades and recognition as a critical element in the preparation of America's military leaders for the rigors of combat. The role of character building and an identity as an unequalled preparation for the "game of life" were readily assigned to athletics at all levels.

This image met with near disaster during the gambling scandals of college basketball in the 1950's. Like the society within which it existed, college athletics was experiencing unparalleled growth. The gambling scandals and concerns about the overemphasis of big-time college football and basketball resulted in the formation of a committee of college and university chief executive officers by the American Council of Education. Among the recommendations of the committee were suggestions that presidents increase the scrutiny of their athletic programs, and that spring football practice and post-season bowl games be abolished. These recommendations were not only ignored, but college athletics moved in almost exactly the opposite direction.

College athletics continued its steady growth fed by increased attendance revenues, successful marketing of athletics by the NCAA through its championship events and television contracts, and increased interest among

alumni and the local communities. During this post-war period, a clear dichotomy began to develop within college athletics. In one direction, moved the big-time athletic programs of larger schools seeking national attention and spending and producing dollars in increasing amounts. In the other direction, moved those institutions, generally smaller in size, whose athletes continued to play more for the love of the game, the school, and the intrinsic rewards of athletic competition free of excessive external influences. In some cases, these institutions had competed successfully on a larger scale but had significantly reduced or eliminated portions of their athletics programs during the war years. With limited institutional resources and growing demands fueled by a rapid growth of scale in higher education, it became difficult for these institutions to return to their previous levels of commitment. The distinction was more than a difference in available resources though. It embodied significant differences in philosophy as well. Chief among these differences was a desire to preserve the amateurism of collegiate sport at its most basic level.

External influences also affected the growth and direction of college athletics in other ways particularly for those institutions seeking a more visible athletic identity. The emergence of the civil rights movement in the sixties and seventies brought the black athlete into the college and university ranks in significant numbers. While college athletics were often described as a means of social and economic mobility for minorities, the results were often simply a continuation of the status quo for black and hispanic athletes (Edwards, 1973).

The confluence of the civil rights, environmental, and anti-war movements affected college students, administrators, and the public in profound ways (Morris, 1968). The collective conscience was raised to a high level of sensitivity, and many of the problems of college athletics were brought to the

attention of the public in dramatic fashion. A \$14 million lawsuit brought by eight black athletes against the University of California at Los Angeles for subverting them into meaningless courses to maintain eligibility and failing to fulfill its promise of a free education; books like Out of Their League by Dave Megessey chronicling systematic abuses of athletes by colleges and professional programs; and reports of unethical recruiting practices including altering of transcripts, changing of admissions test scores, and cash payments to players and their families are a few examples.

In response to this situation, the ACE sponsored a feasibility study regarding an inquiry into the conduct of college athletics (Hanford, 1974) and subsequently formed the Commission on Collegiate Athletics in 1977. The commission was funded with an initial grant of \$200,000 from the Ford Foundation. Its charge was to conduct a three-year study of collegiate athletics focusing on five areas of study (Nyquist, 1978):

1. The care of athletes and financing of athletic programs
2. Policies and governance of college athletics
3. Governmental intervention (Response to Title IX)
4. Professionalization of staff, program direction, and commercialism
5. The future of collegiate athletics.

As the commission members developed their task, they sought to design a broad yet substantive examination of collegiate athletics. They outlined a line of inquiry which would attempt to suggest means of more clearly defining the role of athletics in higher education and assist in removing much of the ambiguity in that process. Unfortunately, a lack of funding beyond the initial allocation precluded the type of in-depth study that had originally been charted. The results of the study were published in the Educational Record in 1979 in an issue

devoted solely to this purpose. The results included a series of articles by commission members as well as a policy statement by the ACE.

The policy statement suggested increased responsibilities for trustees, presidents, and athletic directors in the definition, implementation, and direction of athletics programs. The statement and the work of the commission never got to the issue of clearly defining the role of athletics in higher education however. Many of the recommendations included in the policy statement were assimilated by a significant number of colleges and universities, but it took a series of scandals of extreme proportions, the strong intervention of government in assuring compliance with provisions of the Title IX, and an NCAA convention that rejected the recommendation of ACE to “form a commission of presidents to direct the workings of the NCAA” to move colleges and universities, or more specifically, their chief executive officers to action.

A strong reform movement did develop within college athletics in the mid-1980's driven very directly by the participation of college and university presidents. That movement was given momentum by the work of another independent commission. That group was the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics. The Knight Commission was a panel of current and former college and university presidents and chancellors and other prominent individuals with backgrounds in government, higher education, business, and intercollegiate athletics convened by the Knight Foundation. The task of the Commission was to examine the state of intercollegiate athletics and its governance structures, and to recommend a course of action to address the problems which have grown to dominate big-time intercollegiate athletics.

In its 1991 report, "Keeping Faith with the Student-Athlete: A New Model for Intercollegiate Athletics", the Knight Commission proposed a model of governance emphasizing presidential control, academic integrity, fiscal integrity, and program certification (Lederman, 1991). The commission referred to this as the "one-plus-three" model. The "one" of this model is presidential control directed at insuring the "three" — academic integrity, fiscal integrity, and certification. Members of the commission identified several fundamental assumptions. Rather than focusing on nationally uniform standards, the commission stated the regulatory process must be grounded in the primacy of academic values. Intercollegiate athletics must reflect the values of the university, and where the realities of intercollegiate athletics challenge those values, the university must prevail (Knight Foundation, 1991).

Had the development of intercollegiate athletics been guided by clearly defined objectives, established within the formal context of individual institutions of higher education, it might have been more manageable. Institutional control of athletics, however, has often remained outside the formal structures of governance in many colleges and universities. One college president is said to have characterized athletic programs as "frequently far more autonomous and unrelated to the campus than such tyrannical and cussedly independent siblings as medicine and law" (Nyquist, 1978).

The formation of intercollegiate athletic conferences has served as a vehicle to confront the conflicting elements of college sports that have emerged within and between institutions and to effect common actions to address collective concerns. An examination of the literature concerning the development of intercollegiate athletic conferences and the governance of intercollegiate athletics reveals little about why an institution chooses to associate

with another particular set of institutions. Consequently, there exists a dearth of information regarding how the collective identification of a particular set of institutions affects the conduct of intercollegiate athletics on those campuses. The information that is available tends to be anecdotal or contained in the popular press.

The early history of athletic conferences points toward efforts to address common concerns — eligibility, amateurism, playing rules, recruiting practices, competitive balance. Membership in conferences tended to be regionally driven and focused on achieving a competitive balance. Over time, the conference became a vehicle to help institutions manage the growing dichotomy between the academic mission of the institution and the pursuit of national prominence through athletic success. More recently conference membership has focused on promotion through the visibility and success of its collective athletic programs. Many new conference alignments have based consideration of conference membership on the ability of institutions to enhance the composite television market of the conference, contribute to post-season bowl or tournament revenue streams, or raise the athletic standing of the conference in the national polls. The Patriot League and University Athletic Association have been notable exceptions to this trend (Guttman, 1988).

The formation of an athletic conference, its role in shaping intercollegiate competition, and its effect on the institutions which form its constituent parts is very much dependent upon the context within which it will function. That context is defined by the framework within which intercollegiate competition will be conducted. Several commonly accepted models of intercollegiate competition currently exist.

These models and their divergent approaches to athletic competition are reflected in part by the Divisional Philosophy Statements of the member institutions of the National Collegiate Athletic Association. The membership of the NCAA is currently divided into three principal competitive divisions. Each of these divisions has articulated its own statement of guiding principles for the conduct of intercollegiate athletic competition. These principles are grounded in the practices and philosophical elements most common to the member institutions of each division. Within each division there exists a diversity of institutions, although that diversity is commonly recognized to be broadest among the members of Division III.

FIGURE 2

Excerpted Summary of NCAA Divisional Philosophy Statements

Division I	Division II	Division III
High academic standards and breadth of academic opportunity	Maximum intercollegiate participation for as many students as possible	Highest priority on overall experience Maximize number and variety of opportunities in varsity, club, and intramural sports.
Regional and national excellence and prominence—recruiting, all financial aid, and support structures reflect this orientation	Athletically related aid is permitted but on a more modest basis than in Division I	Participants receive same treatment and opportunities as other students Athletics controlled, financed, and staffed through same procedures as all other departments
Athletics serves the university or college and the general public	Dual objective of serving both the campus and general public	Emphasis on participants and internal constituency
Extensive opportunities for men and women		Equal emphasis given to men's and women's programs
Highest feasible level in football and/or basketball—spectator oriented and income producing sports	Broad participation and competitive excellence, sportsmanship, and positive societal attitudes	Support students in effort to reach high level of performance Emphasis on in-season with encouragement for post-season
Compete primarily against other Division I institutions	Compete against Division II as geography and tradition permit	Equitable competition—minimize infringement on freedom of individual institutions
342 Members	205 Members	353 Members

According to existing practice, institutions competing within the context of a Division III approach tend to confine their competition to their immediate locale or region, committing a modest investment of personnel and financial resources to their programs. Conversely, institutions seeking to compete at the national level (Division I) necessarily require significant investment in facilities, staff, and recruiting. They also employ the use of grants-in-aid to attract highly talented athletes. Emphasis is on institutional visibility through success in national competition. For many institutions, any dichotomy that might develop between academic principles and the success of the athletic interests might well be viewed as a calculated investment, or possibly ignored.

While the members of the University Athletic Association have expressed their firm resolve to continue to conduct their programs within the philosophical framework of Division III, they have also adopted an organizational model that goes well beyond the traditional bounds of Division III. These actions challenge some of the most readily accepted assumptions about the organization and conduct of intercollegiate athletics programs. They suggest an approach to intercollegiate athletics based on new assumptions or at least a reordering of old assumptions. This study examines these assumptions and generates a perspective on the role of intercollegiate athletics in the academy that has implications reaching well beyond the individual and collective boundaries of these nine institutions.

It would appear the members of the UAA have assimilated many of the suggestions offered by the various national commissions that have studied intercollegiate athletics and even foreshadowed the conclusions of the Knight Commission by several years. The opening articles of the 1986 University

Athletic Association constitution, entitled “Purpose” and “Fundamental Principles”, might well have been used as an outline for parts of the commission report. The stated purpose of the UAA is “to encourage athletic competition among a select group of major research institutions that are committed to high standards for academic excellence and to providing a diversity of high quality academic and co-curricular programs for their students” (UAA Manual, 1988). The listing of fundamental principles goes on to define the prime role of the chief executives, the role of athletics within the institution, and the basis on which membership in the Association is granted.

FIGURE 3

Fundamental Principles of the University Athletic Association

Section 1.	The Chief Executive Officers of the member institutions (“The Presidents Council”) shall be ultimately responsible for the direction and all policies of this Association.
Section 2.	The Chief Executive Officer shall be ultimately responsible for the control of athletics at each institution.
Section 3.	Athletics shall be integral to the overall educational mission of the member institutions.
Section 4.	Equal Opportunities in athletics shall be provided for men and women.
Section 5.	The Association and its members place confidence in the integrity of each member to carry out the regulations and spirit of the Constitution and Bylaws of the Association. Membership shall be granted on this basis. Membership in the Association may be continued so long as these principles are conscientiously applied.”

From the UAA Constitution

The political and professional stature of the membership of the Knight Commission and its several predecessors might well be taken as a measure of the significance of the issues enveloping intercollegiate athletics and its role in the academy. At stake is the very integrity of the academic institutions which these programs purport to serve. Considered against this backdrop, the actions and decisions of the members of the UAA are of no little significance.

The members of the UAA are major players in the arena of higher education. They are among the most prominent and selective major research

universities in the country. Their chief executives are among the most respected leaders in American higher education. Home to numerous Nobel laureates and distinguished faculty, these institutions possess substantial resources. The fact that these institutions have anticipated the principles identified by the Knight Commission as critical to the governance of intercollegiate athletics and translated them into significant action deserves close examination. The fact that the context within which these institutions have defined their athletic programs and their association differs appreciably from the existing norms of intercollegiate athletics suggests even more attention is warranted. Embedded in these actions may well be answers and contexts for other institutions to explore as they seek to identify an appropriate role for intercollegiate athletics within their institutions.



Chapter III. Methodology

The Case Study Method and the Case Study Protocol

According to Merriam, the selection of an appropriate research methodology is dependent upon three factors — the nature of the research question, the extent of control the researcher is able to exert over the events under study, and the desired end product of the study (Merriam, 1988). Yin includes an additional factor — the degree to which the research focuses on contemporary or historical events (Yin, 1989).

The questions posed in this study are questions of why and how. Why did the member institutions of the UAA choose to affiliate specifically with each other rather than with other institutions? Why did the members of the UAA choose the particular competitive model, level of competition, and organizational structure which they implemented? How did this association come to be? The case study design is an appropriate vehicle for the investigation of why and how questions in both contemporary and historical contexts.

The events under study took place within the real-life context of the day-to-day administration of the institutions that came to form the University Athletic Association. They cannot be separated from the context within which they occurred, and the investigator, of course, has no control over the events. These facts suggest the case study design as appropriate.

This phenomenon, if it may be described as such, comprised contemporary events and participants. Access to the records of these events and

to the participants was made readily available. The contemporary nature of the phenomenon under study and the degree of access clearly suggested the use of the case study design.

The desired end product of this study is a rich, thick, description and interpretation of the events and decision-making processes which led to the formation of the UAA. Such an account, when coupled with a carefully drawn analytic generalization to the context of intercollegiate athletics as it exists beyond the boundaries of these nine institutions, can provide university and college administrators and educators with information that can be of value to them in their efforts to determine an appropriate role for intercollegiate athletics within and among their institutions. Such a product is provided by the case study design.

The circumstances of this study lend themselves to the application of the case study strategy as the most appropriate research design as noted by Yin and Merriam. This study poses questions of “why” and “how”. It examines a contemporary phenomena inseparable from the real-life context within which it has occurred. It seeks to provide an intensive, holistic description and interpretation of the events and processes involved. Analysis of these descriptions and interpretations may be used to generalize to contexts which extend beyond the boundaries of this study.

This case study makes use of an embedded design. While the overriding unit of analysis is the collective action of the nine institutions, the actions taken in concert are the result of the actions of nine individual institutions. The propositions and factors driving the actions of the individual institutions may or may not vary across institutions. Therefore it is essential to examine the

phenomena under study from the perspective of individual institutions as well as from that of the group as a whole. Each of the nine member institutions of the UAA forms a subunit in this study.

The strengths of case study designs, as noted by Yin, lend themselves well to this study. In particular, the ability to make use of a full variety of evidence such as documents, archival records, interviews, and observations enabled a full, rich examination of the events and factors which led to the formation of the UAA in its specific configuration.

Stake suggests several ways in which case study research differs from other types of research (Stake, 1981). These differentiating characteristics reflect some additional strengths the case study design brings to this investigation. Case study research tends to be more concrete and contextual. Because this study is grounded in the actual experiences and decisions of real institutions, it is likely to resonate with the experiences of educators and administrators from similar institutions. Case study research also tends to be more developed by reader interpretation. When coupled or contrasted with their own experiences, the new knowledge presented in the case study is likely to lead to generalizations applicable to readers' institutions. Readers of case studies also become active participants in determining reference populations for such studies. Taken in concert these characteristics increase the likelihood that the case study will find an audience for whom its results have meaning.

The case study design is not without its weaknesses. Although several authors have enumerated various potential weaknesses in this method, the principal concerns focus on a common theme. That theme is a lack of rigor in the conduct of the case study. The lack of rigor may be driven by bias, emphasis on

equivocal evidence, or a lack of intellectual integrity on the part of the investigator.

There are means readily available within the methodology of the case study to control for these concerns. They lie within the development of a rigorous case study protocol. The case study protocol begins with the research questions to be answered and the identification of the units and subunits of analysis. It proceeds to the development of propositions which reflect the important theoretical issues to be examined and begins to identify sources of relevant information. Data are collected and logically linked to the original propositions. The process of data collection may also suggest other propositions to be investigated. The case study protocol also specifies procedures and techniques to be followed during the process of organizing, interpreting, and presenting the findings which address concerns about the construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability of the study.

The case study protocol that follows provides a reasonably detailed description of the framework of this investigation. It outlines the development of procedures and addresses appropriate safeguards to assure the integrity, validity, and reliability of the study.

The end product of this case study is a report the purpose of which is to provide university and college administrators and educators with perspectives which may be of use to them in determining the proper role of intercollegiate athletics within and among their own institutions. These perspectives emerge from the answers to the three central questions posed in this study and an examination of the propositions they generated.

First, why did the nine member institutions of the University Athletic Association choose to affiliate with one another? Why these nine institutions in particular? Why not other institutions with strong academic reputations or competitive athletics programs? Why not institutions located within their own regional areas? Why not remain independent or maintain current conference arrangements?

Second, why did they choose to sponsor athletic competition in the manner which they have prescribed? Why continue in Division III? Why not move to Division I? Why not compete just in selected sports? Why not require all members to compete in all sports? Why travel over half the country? How can you establish an association requiring significant commitment, yet rely on such a minimum of regulation?

Third, how did this Association, composed of these particular nine institutions, come to be? Who were the decision makers? What were the consultative and decision-making processes on the individual campuses? How did events and processes on one campus affect those on other campuses? What were the collective decision-making processes?

The central questions of this study and the subquestions they generate suggested several propositions to be explored in the process of gathering data. These propositions focus on the identification of decision makers, delineation of decision-making processes, enumeration and weighting of factors considered by individual institutions in their choice of whether to participate in this association. The generation of propositions was a dynamic process, allowing for the identification of additional propositions throughout the investigation and keeping the direction of the investigation flexible and open-ended.

One of the primary sources of data gathering in this study was interviews with the primary participants in the events and deliberations that led to the formation of the UAA. The propositions derived from the central questions of this study provided the framework from which these interviews were conducted.

The propositions to be explored were generated by a review of the literature concerning the organization and governance of intercollegiate athletics; the experiences of the investigator as a college coach and athletic administrator for more than 19 years; the role of the investigator as a participant-observer in the discussions and planning sessions which led to the formation of the University Athletic Association; and an examination of archival documents and transcripts related to meetings and planning sessions held to discuss the formation of what came to be the University Athletic Association. The role of the investigator as participant-observer in this case is both an advantage and a point of potential concern. These issues are addressed at a later point in the protocol.

The following propositions were generated. No implied order or weighting was assigned to any of the propositions.

Proposition No. 1: Institutional Identity — *The opportunity to establish and reinforce a sense of institutional identity was valued because it represented an opportunity to associate with institutions of similar and prominent academic mission rather than an opportunity to associate with institutions of prominent athletic reputation.* The concept of institutional identity in this case is comprehensive in scope. It includes comparisons of academic mission, institutional type, programs, faculty, and students. Its definition is holistic rather than focused on or limited by any single aspect.

Proposition No. 2: Institutional Visibility — *The desire to enhance institutional visibility is directed primarily at constituencies most directly associated with the institutions: alumni, students, prospective students, the communities in the immediate vicinities of the member institutions.* Institutional visibility in the context of intercollegiate athletics among UAA members is viewed more as a vehicle for communication rather than a vehicle for the direct generation of revenue, the enhancement of institutional reputation, or the provision of entertainment for consumption by the general public. Visibility is linked closely to the recruitment of students, both undergraduate and graduate. It is also a vehicle for strengthening and maintaining links with alumni.

Proposition No. 3: Common Athletic Philosophy — *The members of the UAA sought a relationship with institutions of common athletic philosophy rather than attempting to seek a particular competitive level.* It is vitally important to these institutions that philosophy and policies generated by the academic leadership of the institutions drive their respective athletics programs. The concerns of the member institutions focus principally on the role of intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of a well-developed co-curricular program reflective of the quality of the academic environment within which those programs exist.

Proposition No. 4: Student Recruitment and Marketing — *Members of the UAA view their association as a vehicle for the recruitment of both undergraduate and graduate students.* The visibility and common identity engendered by athletic competition among like institutions with overlapping admissions markets provides a natural opportunity for the recruitment of students. Prospective students already familiar with an institution in their own region but disposed, perhaps, to attend an institution outside their own region become familiar with other member institutions through their relationships with the regional

institution and may explore opportunities at those other institutions. The increased visibility of member institutions on the campuses of other member institutions and the exposure of a substantial base of undergraduate students to the campuses of member institutions through travel to competition sites provides an expanded base of potential graduate students among precisely those types of institutions from which UAA members seek to recruit graduate students.

Proposition No. 5: Quality of Student Life — *Participation in an athletic program the focus of which is the student-athlete, and the quality of which is measured by the quality of the total experience of the student-athlete, enhances the quality of life on campus for the student-athlete. The ability of all students to identify with student-athletes and opponents who are genuinely their peers in all respects extends this enhancement well beyond the bounds of the experiences of participants.* Faced with a declining pool of prospective students from which to recruit, the quality of student life on campus has become a significant point of comparison among institutions as they attempt to promote the opportunities available to students on their campuses. The enhanced travel opportunities for student-athletes are a readily identifiable contribution to the quality of life for participating students. The provision of an athletics program where the general student body can identify with participants through the significant common experiences they share as students fosters a sense of community among broad elements of the campus and adds to the overall quality of campus life.

Proposition No. 6: Competitive Equity — *It is important to both participants and institutions that student-athletes be presented with competitive opportunities in which they can have a reasonable expectation of experiencing some level of success.* The opportunity for teams and individuals to compete against opponents bound by the same types of pressures and constraints and operating under similar athletic

philosophies provides participants with a reasonable expectation of experiencing some level of success. Competing in circumstances where artificial constraints or regulations are not required to ensure the existence of a “level playing field”, however mythical that concept may be, minimizes incentives for institutions to operate beyond the level of their available resources. It also allows institutions to focus on the quality of their own students’ experiences rather than on what every one else is doing.

Proposition No. 7: Financial Resources — *Athletics programs are to be funded as a part of the institutional budget, and must operate within the level of resources available to the institution.* The level of funding required to support team travel among UAA institutions represents a substantial increase in funding over levels provided for purely regional competition, but this level remains within the resources of the institution. Further, the returns to the institutions in terms of direct benefits to the participants, the quality of student life, institutional identity, institutional visibility, and other factors suggest an acceptable investment on the part of the institutions. Athletics programs are not to be considered cost centers. Their success is not to be measured in terms of financial returns to the institutions.

Proposition No. 8: Opportunities for Men, Women, and All Teams — *It was absolutely imperative to members of the UAA, that this association provide to female student-athletes the same opportunities afforded to male student-athletes.* Men’s and women’s teams must be afforded the same level of support, as measured in terms of schedule, travel, equipment, lodging and meals, coaching, facilities, recruiting, and all other program areas.

Proposition No. 9: Institutional Determination — *It is the prerogative of each institution to determine the level of sport sponsorship and level of participation in competition within the association that is appropriate to its own student-athletes and resources. Such decisions should not be dictated by other members except at some minimal level to ensure the existence of a credible athletic association. Many institutions attempt to compete to a level of competition rather than to a level that is consistent with the philosophy and resources of the institution. Often there is an expectation that members of an athletic conference will sponsor teams and compete in every sport for which competition is sponsored by the conference. The members of the UAA chose not to do this. Allowing institutions to determine their own levels of participation, provided individual institutions with a significant degree of flexibility in maintaining existing relationships with local institutions and existing conference affiliations. While this strategy may have been successful in enabling institutions to become a part of the UAA , it may have introduced the potential for future conflict as competition within the association becomes more highly valued by its members, especially among those whose level of participation is highest.*

Proposition No. 10: Institutional Integrity — *The confidence of individual members of an athletic conference in the ability and intent of other conference members to operate within the rules, both in practice and spirit, allows institutions to operate under broad philosophical concepts and keeps rule-making to a minimum. Among members of the UAA, it was assumed that all members will operate their programs within the letter and spirit of all NCAA and UAA rules. This assumption is included among the fundamental principles of the UAA constitution. The atmosphere which this belief creates again allows member institutions to focus on their own programs rather than those of others.*

Proposition No. 11: Role of the Chief Executives — *The pursuit of an idea such as the UAA was made possible through the involvement and active leadership of the presidents of those institutions. In cases where the level of presidential involvement was lower, the process of formation of the UAA benefited from collaborative decision-making processes where faculty or academic administrators played a prominent role. The resources needed to make the UAA a reality required substantial involvement by the chief executive officers or their immediate subordinates. The financial challenges were considerable. The willingness of institutions to enter into a close association with other institutions with which they are likely to be identified in a spectrum of public arenas, not just athletics, is also an issue of substantial import. Such decisions require the involvement of individuals capable not only of speaking for the institution but also able to make substantial commitments on behalf of the institution. The high level of involvement of chief executives and academic administrators in the process of the formation of the UAA is also responsible for the uniqueness of the UAA competitive model and its variance from existing models governing the conduct of athletic competition among institutions.*

Proposition No. 12: Coalition Building and Consultation — *A key element in the formation of the UAA was the staging of numerous informal, bilateral conversations among senior academic administrators of prospective members. These conversations served to establish a common philosophical ground and to reinforce the concept of similar institutional identities among potential members. Several years before formal discussions took place exploring the details of a university athletic association, Harry Kisker, vice provost and dean of students at Washington University in St. Louis, visited numerous campuses in an effort to speak with student affairs administrators, presidents, and athletic administrators regarding*

the concept of a new sort of athletic association formed among like institutions with a common athletic philosophy. Mr. Kiskers's efforts spawned similar conversations between and among others who shared his perspectives. During the period when formal discussions were being organized, concerted efforts were made to develop coalitions and to share leadership of the process. These efforts were well-considered and helped to minimize conflicts while establishing an atmosphere of trust and mutual purpose among potential members of the UAA.

Proposition No. 13: Effects of Progress on Other Campuses — *The progress of discussions on individual campuses affected decision-making on other campuses. Specifically, the commitment of institutions with which other institutions sought a common identity or whose leaders enjoyed a high degree of respect influenced the willingness of other institutions to commit themselves to the concept of a university athletic association.* Several institutions were commonly viewed as critical to establishing a prominent collective identity for such an association. These were institutions with the most prominent national academic reputations. The reputations of chief executives who took an active role in shaping the concept of an association influenced other chief executives. Existing personal relationships among several chief executives and other senior academic administrators served to strengthen the level of commitment of several institutions that may have encountered reservations among their athletic administrators regarding involvement in a new association.

As is readily evident, few if any of these propositions, are completely independent of the others. They are more, however, than semantic variations of the same themes. The interactions of these factors are numerous and varied, both in the complexity of the interaction, i.e. the number of interacting factors, and in the depth of the interactions between factors. In some cases, the elements

of one factor may assume a prerequisite role to another. In other instances, the elements of one factor may reinforce those of another. Factors may also assume both roles. They may be prerequisite and perform a reinforcing role as well.

What is most important is not the relationship or interaction of these factors with each other, but rather the relationship of these factors to the determination of the role of intercollegiate athletics within the academy and the decisions of these institutions to form an athletic association. The interactions of these factors are of consequence to the extent that they advance the understanding of why and how these institutions chose to associate with each other in the particular manner they did.

The principal unit of analysis in this study is the collective process of the formation of the University Athletic Association by the nine member institutions. The unilateral decision-making processes on the respective campuses form the subunits of analysis, or the embedded cases. How the decision-making processes on each campus affected or were affected by concurrent processes on other campuses are considered as part of both the embedded cases and the overall study. This fluidity in the boundaries of the embedded cases and the overall case reflects the real life context of this study.


The units of analysis are related to the objectives of the case study. Since one of the principle objectives of this study was to present a series of results which are generalizable to the practice of the administration of intercollegiate athletics, it was important that the units of analysis reflect the context in which the results are likely to be applied. It is important to note that the units of analysis are decision-making processes, not institutions per se. This should

make the results more generalizable since the results are not as likely to be limited by institutional definitions or institutional demographics.

One of the strengths of the case study method is its ability to make use of a wide array of sources of information. This study took full advantage of this strength. The principal sources of information included documents generated by the events leading to the formation of the UAA and interviews with those individuals involved in the decision-making processes on the nine campuses.

Identification of specific sources of data at the start of the study evolved from the participation of the investigator in the chain of events leading to the formation of the UAA. The chain of events initially identified by the investigator began with informal bilateral discussions among presidents, student affairs officers, and athletic administrators of institutions which might be inclined to participate in an athletic association among institutions of common type and athletic philosophy. The process took on a more substantial level of organization with the invitation of thirteen university chief executives to a two-day meeting hosted by the University of Rochester to discuss the concept of a university athletic association. Ten chief executives indicated they, or their representatives, would attend the meeting. To facilitate the meeting a planning group was formed which included this investigator. The planning group compiled background information and produced briefing materials for the meeting at Rochester. Verbatim transcripts were kept of the proceedings at the Rochester meeting and a subsequent two-day meeting at Washington University in St. Louis. During the interim period between these meetings, attendees corresponded with the planning group providing an indication of their commitment to an athletic association and their vision of its organization in the short term and for the long term. Prior to the St. Louis meeting, one institution

withdrew from the discussions, and during the St. Louis meeting another institution withdrew as well. Following the St. Louis meeting, an agreement was reached among eight of the participating institutions to announce the formation of a university athletic association. The announcement was made as work proceeded on the development of a constitution and bylaws, the scheduling of athletic competition, and the organization of a central office for the administration of the association. Within a year the original eight institutions were rejoined by the institution that had withdrawn prior to the St. Louis meeting. A time line of these events is depicted in Figure 5.



Specific documents examined at the outset of the study included the following:

- 1) correspondence in preparation for the initial meetings at Rochester
- 2) questionnaires used to gather background information about the institutions participating in the discussions,
- 3) briefing materials prepared for the Rochester and St. Louis meetings including financial modeling and competitive models,
- 4) transcripts of the Rochester and St. Louis meetings,
- 5) correspondence between attendees of the initial meetings and the planning group,
- 6) minutes of subsequent meetings and resulting documents such as the constitution and bylaws, statements of philosophy, organizational plans, and operating policies

The examination of these archival records and documents generated the propositions which have been enumerated previously. The propositions, in turn, suggested the framework from which an interview guide was developed. Interviews were conducted with most of the principals who participated in the discussions and decision-making that led to the formation of the UAA. Included in this group were members of the planning group, participants from the meetings in Rochester and St. Louis; institutional delegates to the initial meetings of the UAA; chief executives of the UAA institutions; and primary athletic administrators and senior women's administrators of the UAA institutions. There is a substantial amount of overlap among these groups. In the course of conducting interviews with key participants from each campus, efforts were made to identify additional principal participants, if any, who should be interviewed. Two to five individuals from each campus were interviewed either formally or informally. Thirteen formal interviews were conducted and included representatives from each of the nine institutions.

One critical component of the data-collection process is the identification of key informants for each embedded case. The key informants are individuals from each campus who were active participants in the decision-making process on their campuses and the negotiations among the prospective members of the UAA. These individuals have a comprehensive grasp of the events as they occurred and the roles of various players in the unfolding of those events. They were involved in the decision-making processes of their institutions at the highest levels and indeed often spoke for their institutions in the negotiations that led to the final agreement. The key informants also helped make available to the investigator appropriate documents and archival records generated on their campuses as well. All key informants participated in formal interviews.

The interviewing technique employed in this study made use of a combination of the “informal conversational interview” and the “interview guide approach” as described by Patton (1987). The informal conversational interview is an open-ended method that allows questions to emerge from the immediate context of the interview. The interview guide approach makes use of a predetermined outline of topics and issues to be discussed. The outline is provided to the informant prior to the interview, but the wording and sequencing of questions is determined by the interviewer in the course of the interview. In this study, the propositions included in the protocol were used to construct the interview guide. The initial portion of each interview used the informal conversational approach asking each informant to offer his or her own “grand tour” of how the UAA came to be and how their campus decided whether to become a part of this association. Responses to the grand tour question suggested follow-up questions related to the areas outlined in the interview guide.

With prior consent and approval of the informants, the formal interviews were recorded. Transcripts were then created from the interview tape with confidential copies made available to the respective informants for verification of content. All participants in the interview process agreed to permit taping of their interviews.

A copy of briefing materials provided to each informant prior to the interviews is included in the case study database. These materials include a letter of confirmation, a brief description of the study, a listing of the propositions to be examined, and a release form indicating consent to have the interview taped and explaining the rights of the informants and responsibilities of the investigator.

In the course of conducting interviews several informants were also able to make available various archival records. These included copies of correspondence, internal memoranda, briefing papers, and records of meetings. The wishes of the informants regarding the level of confidentiality accorded various documents were honored in each case. In most cases, copies of pertinent documents were made and included in the case database. Where necessary due to concerns of confidentiality, a log derived from a particular item was included in the case database without direct attribution.

It is vital to ensuring the reliability and validity of the case study that a comprehensive and well-organized case database be assembled during the process of collecting and analyzing data. Given access to the case database, subsequent investigators should be reasonably able to make the same interpretations and draw conclusions not appreciably different from those of the original investigator. The key is that they must have at their disposal the same information available to the original investigator. Information used in recording, analyzing, and interpreting the events and processes under study became a part of the database.

The scope of the case database balances both the need to establish a credible base of data which will help ensure the reliability of the case, and the constraints imposed by the limited resources of the investigator. The case database for this study includes the following:

- 1) a copy of the case study protocol,
- 2) copies of all documents and archival records collected by the investigator regardless of the degree to which they are examined,
- 3) copies of correspondence with informants regarding the study including a copy of the interview guide,
- 4) original copies of the tapes of all recorded interviews,
- 5) original and transcribed notes of all unrecorded interviews,

- 6) copies of interview transcripts and logs generated by the examination of documents and archival records,
- 7) copies of the case reports for each embedded case and commentary from the key informants who review each,
- 8) copies of all major drafts of the case report through the final report, and
- 9) an annotated index of all materials included in the database (A copy of this index is included as Appendix B).

The database includes paper copies of all documents, and where documents and other archival records are available in electronic format, they are retained in their electronic format as well.

The case study must, as all other research designs, confront the issue of how to ensure the construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability of the study (Kidder, 1981). This case study must confront an additional source of potential bias—that of the role of the investigator as a participant-observer in the events leading to the formation of the University Athletic Association. The focus of these issues is the extent to which the findings of the case study can be trusted.

Definitions of the terms validity and reliability as applied in the context of the case study vary from their definition in the context of quantitative analysis or statistical inference. Merriam notes that most writers on this topic argue these definitions as applied to qualitative research might better be abandoned in favor of terms such as *truth value* for internal validity, *transferability* for external validity, and *consistency* for reliability (Merriam, 1988). The reason for this variation is that qualitative research paradigms such as the case study are based on a different set of assumptions from quantitative research methodologies. For example, quantitative research methods are based on the assumption that the researcher can, within prescribed limits, control the context of the phenomena under study. The case study researcher, by definition, cannot control the context

of the phenomenon under study. The concepts of validity and reliability as applied to the case study are linked both in their definition and in the means used to address the concerns they raise. Many of the strategies used in the conduct of the case study serve to address more than one of these issues simultaneously.

Construct validity deals with whether adequate operational measures have been developed to collect data which can, in fact, provide answers to the research questions under study (Yin, 1989). It is a measure of whether the sources of evidence are varied and comprehensive enough to provide a thick, holistic account of events. It is also a measure of whether the techniques and instruments employed in the collection of data are effective in accomplishing their purpose.

Internal validity is a measure of the extent to which the findings of a study accurately reflect the reality of the phenomena under study (Merriam, 1988). In the case study, the notion of reality must concern itself with reality as it is perceived by participants in the context of their experience as well as reality as it is perceived by those not limited by the context of the phenomena and reality as it is perceived by the investigator. It is therefore important that the investigator be aware of the perspectives of all informants as well as his own perspectives and biases.

External validity is a measure of the extent to which the findings of one study may be applied to other situations (Merriam, 1988). It establishes the extent of the domain to which a study's findings may be generalized. It is important that the concept of external validity when used in the context of the case study be applied in the context of working hypotheses rather than the

context of sampling logic. The goal of the case study is not to generalize from the one to the many. Its goal is a thorough and in-depth understanding of the particular. Through a process of analytic generalization, the investigator attempts to generalize a particular set of results to a broader theory. As such the results form a working hypothesis which can be applied to other situations to the extent that those situations are consistent with the theoretical constructs that generated the original case study.

Reliability is a measure of the degree to which the operations of a study can be repeated with the same results (Yin, 1989). Toward that end, it is imperative that the operations of the study be clearly defined and recorded. The procedures used to locate and collect data must be included in the record of the study. The data collected and the means used to analyze that data must also be made a part of the record of the study. It has been suggested that attention focused too heavily on the reliability of a study may be misplaced (Guba and Lincoln, 1981). The fact that a study can be replicated with the same, possibly incorrect, results is less important than establishing that the study accurately reflects the reality of the phenomena under study. Guba and Lincoln suggest that attention should be focused more intently on the internal validity of the study. Their rationale for this suggestion is that if the internal validity of a study is thoroughly established, the reliability of the study must necessarily follow.

A number of strategies are employed in this case study to ensure its validity and reliability. These tactics are commonly employed in the use of the case study methodology and have been described in detail by Yin, Merriam, and others. They include the following:

- 1) Triangulation — the use of multiple sources of evidence and multiple methods to confirm emerging findings, including the establishment of a chain of evidence, pattern matching, and explanation building;

- 2) Participatory modes of research — involving the participants in the research in the shaping of the data collection process;
- 3) Informant interviews — the use of key informants in identifying and confirming key events, processes, and details;
- 4) Peer review — the use of colleagues to critique and review the progress of the study on a continuous basis; and
- 5) Case study protocol and database — the use of a clearly defined plan for the conduct of the study, including the investigator's assumptions and theoretical orientation as well as a comprehensive and clearly referenced record of the data collected, its review, and interpretation.

The use of triangulation methods helped to ensure both the construct and internal validity of the case study. The use of multiple data sources—documents, archival records, and interviews—ensured that the procedures of the study provide a comprehensive account of the factors and events leading to the formation of the UAA and the decisions of the respective members to join that association. The participation of informants in the review and development of the propositions stated in the case study protocol and linked to the interview guide helped ensure that the investigation is sufficiently broad and comprehensive.

Matching recurrent decision-making patterns across cases, building and revising explanations of events, and establishing a clear chain of evidence leading from the initial propositions through data collection to the building of explanations and the final report helped ensure the internal validity and reliability of the study. These tactics accomplished this by enforcing a rigor upon the investigator and by providing an audit trail of the study which can be examined and used by subsequent researchers.

The use of key informants helped control for the biases of the investigator and, when combined with other data sources, provided accurate information regarding the events and processes that occurred on the respective campuses.

This served to increase the internal validity of the study. Peer review provided by the members of the dissertation committee also served this purpose. The review provided by these individuals was particularly effective since they were not participants in the events under study.

The use of the case study protocol and development of the case study database are perhaps the single-most important tools in establishing the validity and reliability of the study. The protocol outlined the research questions and propositions they generated. It linked those propositions to the collection of data. It provided procedures to ensure that the “right” data are collected. It specified procedures to be used in the analysis of the data to ensure its validity. With the case study database, it provides a clear audit trail of the study that could enable other researchers and practitioners to replicate the study and to determine the degree to which the results of the study may be applied to other situations.

Merriam has identified several reasons for the conduct of qualitative case study research which is primarily interpretive in nature. They include the following reasons:

- “1) To make the familiar strange and interesting again...
- 2) To achieve specific understanding through documentation of concrete details of practice.
- 3) To consider the local meanings that happenings have for the people involved in them...
- 4) To engage in comparative understanding of different social settings....
- 5) To engage in comparative understanding beyond the immediate circumstances of the local setting.” (Merriam, 1988)

This list could very well have served as a rationale for the conduct of this study. The questions posed in this study are some of the most basic questions that can be asked of intercollegiate athletics programs. They define its role in the

academy. All too often the answers to questions such as these are taken for granted. A revisitation of these basic questions may generate a new vision of the role of intercollegiate athletics, or it may help rediscover and revitalize an old one.

The achievement of this task comes by documenting, examining, and interpreting the actions of a distinctive set of institutions. It is important to understand the meaning and impact the actions and decisions under study held for these institutions. It is important as well to attempt to understand the import of their actions in the larger context of intercollegiate athletics as it is conducted across the whole of higher education.

The answers these comparisons provide, and the questions they raise, may well play a significant role in shaping, or perhaps reshaping, the character of intercollegiate athletic competition in American higher education.



Chapter IV. Results of the Study

The members of the University Athletic Association comprise a unique group of institutions in higher education and intercollegiate athletics. All nine are classified Research I or Research II Universities under the designation system of the Carnegie Foundation (Carnegie, 1987). All are members of the American Association of Universities (AAU), an organization comprising 56 of the most prominent research universities in the United States and Canada. With the exception of New York University, however, the UAA members are among the smallest of these institutions, with enrollments ranging from 2,000 to 4,000 full-time undergraduate students. All sponsor extensive graduate and professional programs ranging from the arts and sciences, music, engineering, and architecture to education, social work, business, law, and medicine. They are among the most highly endowed institutions in the country with eight of the nine consistently listed among the fifty most highly endowed American colleges and universities according to statistics published annually in the Chronicle of Higher Education. Their faculties and graduates include an impressive list of Nobel laureates, and their graduate programs are among the most selective and prestigious in the country. The undergraduate programs of the UAA membership are also highly ranked. Seven of the nine have been ranked in the top thirty institutions nationally in the U.S. News and World Reports rankings of top colleges and universities. The only other group of institutions with comparable composite rankings is the Ivy League.

Figure 5 provides comparative profiles of these institutions. It is drawn from briefing materials that were compiled immediately prior to the first formal meeting at which representatives of these institutions discussed the possibility of forming a university athletic association.

FIGURE 5

Comparative Institutional Profiles

INFORMATION	Brandeis	Carnegie Mellon	Case Western	Chicago	Emory	Johns Hopkins	M.I.T.	N.Y.U.	Rochester	Washington
Founded	1948	1900	1826	1890	1836	1876	1861	1831	1850	1853
Type of Campus	Suburban	Urban	Urban	Urban	Suburban	Urban	Urban	Urban	Suburban	Suburban
Degrees Offered	B,M,D	B,M,D	B,M,D	B,M,D	B,M,D	B,M,D	B,M,D	A,B,M,D	B,M,D	B,M,D
Library Titles	0.8 M	0.3 M	1.6 M	4.6 M	1.7 M	1.9 M	1.9 M	3.1 M	1.7 M	1.9 M
Periodicals	3,900	2,993	13,775	40,000	15,000	12,214	20,000	23,686	9,894	15,558
Resident Undergraduates	2,255	2,740	2,066	2,750	3,220	2,238	4,500	3,000	3,176	4,000
Commuting Undergraduates	517	1,510	1,471	250	1,226	136	90	12,000	1,389	500
Pct Men/Women	49/51	66/34	67/33	61/39	47/53	66/34	75/25	47/53	58/42	55/45
Graduate Students	558	1,600	3,142	4,908	4,187	1,014	5,000	14,381	2,200	3,814
Freshmen Applicants	2,844	5,658	2,800	4,341	4,302	3,921	5,958	9,000	5,219	4,759
Pct Accepted	75%	58%	85%	47%	68%	49%	30%	51%	77%	83%
Pct Enrolled	36%	36%	31%	38%	30%	33%	59%	42%	30%	29%
Pct In-State	25%	30%	55%	30%	20%	25%	19%	80%	54%	23%
Pct In Top 10%	55%	43%	59%	75%	NA	74%	95%	40%	43%	59%
Pct SAT Verbal Over 600	32%	31%	37%	66%	27%	68%	71%	NA	26%	34%
Pct SAT Math Over 600	56%	75%	74%	68%	54%	87%	99%	NA	63%	63%
Tuition & Fees	\$9,590	\$8,450	\$7,970	\$8,802	\$7,635	\$8,860	\$10,300	\$7,850	\$8,478	\$8,646
Room & Board	\$3,985	\$3,400	\$3,390	\$4,100	\$3,050	\$3,475	\$4,100	\$4,100	\$3,545	\$3,594
Pct Offered Aid	79%	67%	71%	66%	35%	62%	63%	79%	61%	63%
Average Aid Award	\$8,723	\$7,809	\$7,294	\$9,636	\$4,671	\$5,929	\$9,929	\$6,574	\$7,475	\$9,173
Pct Scholarship Or Grant	61%	58%	66%	63%	88%	59%	61%	72%	62%	57%

Sources of Information University Athletic Association (UAA) Questionnaire
The College Handbook of the College Board, 1984-85
The College Cost Book of the College Board, 1984-85
Peterson's Guide to Four-Year Colleges 1985

The combination of first rate research facilities and faculty with their relatively small sizes and an emphasis on undergraduate teaching allows this

select group of institutions to afford their undergraduate students education focused on graduate and professional study delivered in a liberal arts setting — perhaps the best of the big and the small. These institutions have also developed national reputations for providing their undergraduate students with excellent co-curricular facilities and opportunities, something reflected in their consistently high ratings in various rankings of undergraduate colleges and universities.

The intercollegiate athletics programs of the UAA institutions have demonstrated a high degree of national prominence as well. Prior to the inception of the UAA, numerous teams from these institutions had participated in NCAA championship playoffs advancing to the highest levels of competition. They included Brandeis, Washington, and Rochester in soccer, Carnegie Mellon and Case Western Reserve in football, Washington in volleyball, Emory in tennis, and Brandeis and Johns Hopkins in baseball. Individual athletes from these institutions had also performed well in cross country, swimming and diving, and track and field.

Since 1986, teams from UAA institutions have won ten national championships in five sports. Ninety-one teams finished in the top ten in their national championships in seven men's sports and five women's sports. Another 90 teams finished in the top twenty in their national championships. Over 950 student-athletes from UAA institutions have received All-America honors and 62 have been individual national champions or national players of the year in their sport. At the same time almost 200 student-athletes were named Academic All-Americans and 39 were named NCAA Postgraduate Scholars.

Administrators and coaches from UAA institutions have also been leaders in the governance and administration of intercollegiate athletics. Many have served on NCAA championship, rules, and administrative committees. One individual was elected NCAA Division III Vice President and another three were elected members of the NCAA Council. The creation of the National Association of Division III Athletic Administrators in 1995 was the direct result of efforts headed by individuals from UAA institutions.

The prominence of UAA institutions in academic and athletic spheres in recent years is reflective of the history of these institutions. Individuals from UAA institutions assumed prominent, and sometimes controversial, roles regarding the conduct and administration of intercollegiate athletics from the earliest years. In 1892, William Rainey Harper, recently appointed president of the fledgling University of Chicago, hired fellow Yale University graduate and football star Amos Alonzo Stagg as football coach in an effort to publicize his young university via a winning football team. That direction came full circle in 1939 when the Chicago president Robert Hutchins stunned the collegiate world by dropping football. In 1907, New York University Chancellor Henry M. McCracken convened a conference of faculty members representing 13 colleges and universities to discuss means of curbing rampant violence of college football. Within a year the group grew to 62 institutions and established a national governing body for intercollegiate sports that eventually became the National Collegiate Athletic Association. In 1946, renowned physicist Arthur Holley Compton, then president of Washington University set a new direction for his institution and others when he declared that the one-time charter member of the Missouri Valley Conference would no longer offer athletic scholarships but

would redirect the emphasis of its programs by embracing a truly amateur approach to intercollegiate athletics.

These examples are not isolated events or one-of-a-kind actions where these institutions are concerned. Most of the UAA institutions conducted athletics programs that at one time competed in the “Big Time”. They won Big Ten Conference championships, sent teams to the Sugar Bowl, Sun Bowl, Tangerine Bowl, and NIT. They routinely competed against the likes of Ohio State, Army, Notre Dame, Missouri, Vanderbilt, Syracuse, Colgate, Yale, Kansas, and Michigan. At some point in their histories, they all made considered decisions regarding the direction of their athletics programs. In every case that decision recognized a very basic principle — that intercollegiate athletics provides a unique means of educating undergraduate students, but only when its programs complement the academic experience; when the academic interest is compromised by athletics, the value of athletics is inevitably compromised as well.

Brandeis University

Each member of the University Athletic Association can claim a story that sets it apart to some degree from the other members of the Association. In the case of Brandeis University, such a claim is well-founded. Brandeis was not among the original eight institutions that announced the formation of the UAA. The Boston institution was involved in the early discussions that led to the formation of the association but initially declined involvement. After a change in institutional leadership and further consideration, however Brandeis became the ninth member of the new association.

Brandeis is the youngest of the UAA institutions by almost 50 years. It was founded in 1948. It is the first and only Jewish-sponsored nonsectarian university in the United States. Early in its history, the leadership of the institution made a conscious decision to use athletics as a means of providing the young institution with national visibility. Toward that end, Brandeis awarded athletic scholarships in its athletics programs and competed at the highest levels nationally. While a number of Brandeis teams enjoyed athletic success, this approach had its difficulties as well, and in 1959-60 the university dropped football and discontinued the awarding of athletic grants-in-aid. When the NCAA created its present divisional structure in the early 1970's Brandeis chose to compete in Division III.

Throughout its limited history Brandeis had always been an independent institution, and its early scheduling efforts, particularly in football and basketball, had often taken its teams outside the New England area. Within the region, their competition was primarily with institutions that later became members of Division I of the NCAA. Given its short history and the original definition of its athletics programs, Brandeis did not enjoy the kind of long-standing scheduling relationships that characterize the athletics programs of the more selective, private institutions of New England. Over time Brandeis developed a solid Division III schedule, however, it was peppered with numerous institutions whose student bodies and institutional profiles were markedly different from Brandeis. Faculty, coaches, and student-athletes consistently viewed this as a less-than-level playing field.

Brandeis had been involved in discussions regarding conference affiliation several times prior to the discussions about a university athletic association. In the mid-seventies, Brandeis declined to pursue membership in the New England

Small Colleges Athletic Conference (NESCAC) a grouping composed of highly-selective liberal arts colleges, including Amherst, Williams, Wesleyan, and Trinity Colleges among others, when the group decided to limit off-campus recruiting and prohibit participation in NCAA team championships. In the mid-eighties, Brandeis participated, through its Senior Woman Administrator, in discussions that led to the formation of the New England Women's 6 (NEW6). The NEW6 (later the NEW8) was comprised principally of small, women's colleges in the Boston area. During the same period, Brandeis was also involved in discussions concerning an East coast men's basketball conference with New York University, MIT, Johns Hopkins University, and others. These discussions never resulted in any formal action, but several individuals viewed them as a precursor to discussions about the UAA.

At the time the concept of the University Athletic Association was emerging, the athletics program at Brandeis was in a state of turmoil. In 1984, a new dean of student affairs was hired. At the same time, a new director of athletics was hired with the expressed intention of splitting athletics and physical education into two separate departments. For the first time, athletics would report to the dean of student affairs. With a new president in place as well, the process created a great deal of anxiety among the athletic staff. In addition, the athletics facilities at Brandeis were in a "decrepit condition" as noted by one senior level administrator. As a result of the uncertainty resulting from the organizational changes and a constant focus on the poor condition of the athletics facilities, little attention was given to the level of competition or scheduling associations.

Once leadership of the athletics program had stabilized and as discussions regarding this new athletic grouping had reached the stage of formal actions, it

became clear that this association offered Brandeis a unique opportunity. Competition with student-athletes whose backgrounds and academic pursuits were comparable to those of student-athletes at Brandeis, the possibility for increased contact and visibility with alumni and potential students, and the kinds of experiences travel to the metropolitan centers represented among the UAA group made membership in this group an attractive undertaking. It was a perfect complement to efforts to upgrade campus athletic facilities and to enhance student life. As one senior administrator said, “The final decision was like getting a shot on an open goal—you take it!”

Carnegie Mellon University

Like many other colleges and universities, the athletic history of Carnegie Mellon University is predominantly a history of its fortunes on the football gridiron. The Carnegie Institute of Technology played its first football game in 1906, six years after its founding. In 1914, the program began to climb when Peter Steffen, a protégé of Amos Alonzo Stagg, was hired as head coach. The Tech schedule was filled with the likes of Pittsburgh, Notre Dame, and West Virginia. In 1928 they handed Knute Rockne and his Fighting Irish their first home loss in 23 years. Ten years later the Irish avenged that loss with a shutout victory, but it was Carnegie Tech’s only loss that year and didn’t prevent the team from appearing in the Sugar Bowl.

Following World War II, the world of college athletics, particularly football, came to a fork in the road. Along one path lay the ever expanding pantheon of big time football and its emphasis on winning and all it took to achieve that end on a national scale. Along the other was a more familiar landscape comprising athletics with a decidedly amateur emphasis, perhaps a

better fit with the academic fabric of the institution. Like many institutions, Carnegie Tech chose the latter. In the mid 1950's Tech joined the newly formed Presidents Athletic Conference, a group of similarly-sized regional colleges and universities in eastern Ohio, western Pennsylvania, and West Virginia determined to avoid the problems of high-pressure athletics. The group's guiding principle was that college athletics should be an integral part of college life but not an entity unto itself. Two of the more prominent charter members of the PAC were Case Institute of Technology and Western Reserve University.

During the 1960's and 70's, Carnegie Tech made the transition from a good regional university to a truly national university under the leadership of President Richard Cyert. In 1967, it became Carnegie Mellon University marking its merger with the Mellon Institute. Carnegie Mellon became a member of the American Association of Universities, the prestige organization for research universities. The university assumed a leadership role nationally in the development of computing technology and its relationship to other fields of study. Under the leadership of President Cyert, whatever Carnegie Mellon did, it tried to do well. This was true in athletics as well.

Carnegie Mellon dominated football in the PAC during the late seventies and early eighties. Several of its teams advanced to the final rounds of the NCAA Division III football championships. Competition within the PAC was satisfactory from an athletic point of view, but when Case Western Reserve University left the conference to join in the formation of the North Coast Athletic Conference it became evident that the remaining members of the PAC held little in common with a national research university.

At the same time, several members of the Carnegie Mellon senior administrative staff felt that research universities in general and Carnegie Mellon in particular were positioning themselves poorly for the future. They felt that Carnegie Mellon had developed an overemphasis on research at the expense of students, particularly undergraduate students and undergraduate education. Looking to the future, they felt it was very important to redirect some of this emphasis. The three traditional revenue streams of research universities were undergoing significant change. Funding for research, particularly academic research as opposed to applied research was decreasing and likely to continue on that trend. Undergraduate tuition rates had risen to the point where many institutions were risking the possibility of pricing themselves out of the market. Increases in gift and endowment income would become increasingly important in providing adequate funding resources to these kinds of institutions. For the leadership at Carnegie Mellon this meant developing the comparative advantages of the residential college environment and providing undergraduate students with a genuinely positive experience in all aspects of campus life. Such efforts had both short and long term implications. It was necessary that the university be able to continue to attract undergraduate students in sufficient numbers despite a decreasing pool of prospective high school students. It was also necessary that the institution develop a lasting relationship with these students that would continue throughout their lives as alumni.

One of the focal points for this effort was a major capital campaign to develop a new university center, a student center. Tied to this effort were plans for significant improvements in the residential housing system, student affairs, athletic facilities, and co-curricular activities. When the possibility of an athletic association of small to medium sized research universities began to be discussed

among various members of the AAU, the possibilities intrigued the Carnegie Mellon leadership almost immediately. As discussions progressed it became clear that this new association could become one of the principal building blocks in efforts to reinvigorate undergraduate life on the campus. Carnegie Mellon became a strong supporter and promoter of the concept.

Case Western Reserve University

The story of Case Western Reserve University athletics is the story of three institutions: Case Institute of Technology, Western Reserve University, and following their federation and merger Case Western Reserve University. Both Case and Western Reserve can boast of a storied past where their athletic programs are concerned. They dominated much of intercollegiate athletics in Ohio during the early 1900's. When Ohio State made application for admission to the Western Conference, forerunner of the Big Ten, their representatives were told that their football team must first prove it was the best in Ohio by defeating the team from Case.

Case and Western Reserve competed at the highest levels during the first half of the century. World War II brought about significant change however. Finding their numbers severely depleted by the war, Western Reserve dropped football. While Case continued to play during the war years, it became increasingly more difficult to meet the increasing demands of maintaining a big time program. The program was simply too expensive to maintain, and in the eyes of many academics it had become contrary to the purpose of intercollegiate sport which they felt was to provide the student with an educational experience. In 1954 Case also dropped football, a decision without much precedent at the time and one that attracted considerable protest.

The absence of football on both campuses was short-lived. In 1955 the Presidents Athletic Conference was formed with Case and Western Reserve among the charter members. Both schools revived their football programs as part of their commitment to the new league and the direction it had charted. Members of the PAC viewed their new league as a unique organization in an era of high pressure intercollegiate athletics. As they watched the programs of their former opponents grow both in scope and distance from the central missions of their respective institutions, the members of the PAC felt it critical that athletics be placed clearly under the control of the institution's academic leadership. Their new conference belonged to their presidents. Athletics was to be an integral part of their campuses, but it would not be a cost center or an entity unto itself. It would be controlled and directed.

The membership of the PAC ranged from small liberal arts colleges to larger universities. There was a spread in the selectivity of the institutional admissions processes as well. As the academic missions and directions of these institutions evolved, the differences in their approach to athletics increased. In 1967 Case Institute and Western Reserve federated to become Case Western Reserve University although their athletic teams did not begin to merge until the early 1970's. Over time, Case Western Reserve found itself sharing less and less common ground with members of the PAC.

When several Ohio schools began to discuss a conference of more selective colleges competing at the Division III level and committed to greater equity across sports and across men's and women's sports, Case Western Reserve expressed interest. The admissions process at Case Western Reserve was driven by strong regional considerations. Most of its students came from Ohio. The name recognition, reputations, and quality of the student bodies of these

institutions were stronger than those of the PAC membership. These were significant issues in the early 1980's when colleges and universities were facing a declining pool of high school students from which to draw applicants. Case Western Reserve took an active role in the effort and the North Coast Athletic Conference was officially constituted in 1983.

Discussions about the possibility of an athletic association of research universities began shortly after the inception of this new conference. To some degree, Case Western Reserve was a bit of an outlier among the NCAC schools. It was the largest; it was probably the most selective in its admissions; it was a research university; and its reputation extended beyond the range of most of the other members.

The membership of the proposed university athletic association offered Case Western Reserve an opportunity to associate with institutions of a more similar profile. The open-ended approach to involvement in athletic competition with other members offered an opportunity to retain its relationships with the North Coast schools while developing new relationships. For Case Western Reserve this was a unique opportunity to preserve its relationship and identity with the most selective of the liberal arts colleges and small private universities in its region while concurrently establishing an identity with a group of prominent research universities spread over the eastern half of the United States. It would provide their students with a built-in schedule that was going to be as good as any Division III schedule in the country.

The leadership of the university knew there would be tradeoffs and some difficulties in balancing relationships with two sets of institutions. The opportunity to be associated with the other institutions of the UAA proved to be

a strong draw. Moreover, the proposed membership of the UAA demonstrated flexibility and a strong sensitivity to retaining local and regional relationships with other institutions from the beginning of their discussions.

Emory University

The history of athletics at Emory University is unique. Although athletic competition at Emory dates to the late nineteenth century, its current intercollegiate program is the youngest of the UAA schools. Emory has never sponsored football as an intercollegiate sport and did not sponsor intercollegiate basketball until after the formation of the UAA.

The course of Emory athletics was set in the last quarter of the nineteenth century when the trustees of Emory College requested the faculty of the Oxford campus not to allow their students to leave campus to play “match games” of baseball against young men from other collegiate institutions. That policy was a reaction to rumors of sizable gambling losses incurred by a number of students wagering on the outcome of such contests. The policy was reinforced the following year when students debated the question whether “athletics as existing in American colleges are detrimental to the highest mental development” (Rozier, 1983). The campus-wide debate was won by the affirmative team. Their view of intercollegiate athletics took root, and those roots grew deep in the culture of the campus.

It was not that the college administration and faculty objected to athletics. They actually valued athletics and athletic competition very highly. What they objected to was intercollegiate athletics. As a result intramural competition on the Emory campus developed to a very high degree.

This orientation continued when Emory College left Oxford to become part of a new university located in Atlanta. President Warren A. Candler, a bishop in the Methodist church, urged and encouraged by his close associates and major benefactors of the new university made his policies clear in a statement to the trustees. He urged improvement of athletic facilities, a strong program of intramural sports, and a ban on major intercollegiate sports. Although a new library was at the top of his list of capital projects, a new gymnasium was close behind it in the list of priorities.

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, intramural athletics flourished on the Emory campus. By tradition most of the coaching was done by members of the faculty. The level of competition was strong and spirited, often rivaling the quality of play at institutions whose focus was intercollegiate competition. These programs were not low-level recreation. They were based upon a philosophy of physical education that held as its goal the fullest development of athletic abilities and talents of all those interested in athletic competition. Their directors sought to get students out of the grandstand and onto the playing fields. To liken the Emory program to an intercollegiate program or athletic conference confined within a single campus, would probably be a fair and reasonably accurate description.

Throughout this period, however, there was a constant push from students for intercollegiate competition. The very first issue of the student newspaper on the new Atlanta campus, in fact, carried a banner urging allegiance to the campus and creation of an intercollegiate program. An intercollegiate program did begin to develop at the grass roots level. Supported by faculty mentors, Emory students participated in a series of road races and state track and field competition. They performed well, and the institution took

pride in their performances. An intercollegiate program evolved over time, but its scope was limited principally to competition in individual sports.

Competition in the major sports — football, basketball, and baseball — remained outside the philosophical limits of the program. Those limits were often reinforced by abuses demonstrated by well-publicized scandals that occurred in various big-time athletics programs sponsored by other institutions in the south and southeast.

In the 1960's the intercollegiate program moved to another level. Emory teams did well in soccer, tennis, and swimming. When the NCAA created its current divisional structure, Emory found a home in Division III. The philosophy of Division III athletics was a close fit to the approach that had guided Emory throughout its history. Meanwhile, the intramural programs at Emory remained among the finest in the country.

In 1977, James Laney was appointed president of the university. One of his chief concerns was the quality of campus life. One of his first tasks was to appoint a blue ribbon committee to look at campus life and recommend ways to enhance life on campus, in particular the quality of life for undergraduate students. The panel worked with students, faculty, staff, administrators, and outside consultants to assess the quality of life and to develop a direction and set of recommendations. The panel found that the campus had lost its sense of community and more attention needed to be given to programs, activities, and services directed to undergraduate students. Significant attention was focused on the intercollegiate athletic program as a vehicle to improve the quality of life on campus and to promote to a greater sense of community. A new physical education center was planned as was a new university student center. Plans were also discussed to expand the athletic program, including for the first time

the formation of a varsity basketball program. Throughout these discussions, it was clear that any expanded program would continue to compete within the Division III framework. There was never discussion of an athletic program competing at a level other than Division III.

As plans progressed it became clear that membership in a conference comprised of the right schools could also contribute in a very positive way to the life of the campus. Competing year after year for a common championship against the same set of institutions could build new and exciting traditions. The question became what was the right set of schools. Officials from Emory discussed possible conference affiliations with a number of institutions. Initially they sought out similar academic institutions in the southeast, however those institutions competed, albeit unsuccessfully, at the Division I level. They also had informal contacts with several very selective liberal arts colleges throughout the south, however these institutions, despite their academic quality, did not have much in common institutionally with a major research university.

When the concept of a university athletic association comprising major research universities began to emerge, the fit was right. The timing was right. Emory was very interested and quickly took a role in moving the concept forward.

Johns Hopkins University

In a number of ways the history of athletics at the Johns Hopkins University demonstrates a parallel with that of Emory. While the Hopkins campus never adopted a ban on major intercollegiate sports as did Emory, the place of athletics in relation to academic endeavor was always clear. The notion

that an athletic program should embody “sport for sports sake” is a theme evident throughout the Hopkins athletic history.

That history is almost as old as the university dating to the early 1880’s when the Baltimore Athletic Club offered to admit Hopkins students as members without payment of an initiation fee. Not unlike its leading role in medical and graduate education, the Johns Hopkins approach to sports and recreational activity was in the forefront of program development. In 1882, the university appointed Dr. Edward M. Hartwell as its first instructor in physical culture. With a Ph.D. degree in physiology and a medical degree he set about developing a program of required physical exercise and hygiene for all first-year students. As the program developed it was accorded a level of status and expectation comparable to that of the academic departments of the institution (Shaffer, 1977).

A football team was organized in 1883 and was soon followed by baseball, tennis, and lacrosse — a sport in which the school continues to enjoy a rich and successful heritage. As with most intercollegiate programs, the sports programs were administered by students. The Hopkins programs, however, seemed to evidence a higher degree of regulation than many other programs with significant attention paid to the academic responsibilities and general deportment of all participants.

In 1919 the organizational structure of athletics changed significantly. Management of the intercollegiate athletics program was turned over to the Varsity Club. The Varsity Club was a group of alumni who had won varsity letters competing on athletic teams at Hopkins. In the hope of providing a more professional approach to the management of the athletics program and a higher level of competition, they negotiated a contract with the university president to

take over complete responsibility for and control of the program. This approach met with varying degrees of acceptance. In succeeding years, however, the Hopkins teams competed with some of the best athletic programs on the east coast and enjoyed substantial success from time to time, principally in football, lacrosse, and track and field. While many of its teams were successful on the playing fields, exclusive management of the program by alumni proved to be less than successful financially. In 1924, the management contract was canceled by mutual agreement of the Varsity Club and the board of trustees.

In the early 1930's the course of intercollegiate athletics took a radically different turn on the Johns Hopkins campus. In 1929, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching had published a lengthy report on the state of intercollegiate athletics. The report expressed major concerns with the growing commercialization and professionalization of intercollegiate sports with a major focus on the sport of football. President Joseph. S. Ames took the report to heart and established a new direction for intercollegiate athletics. While some viewed his approach as a de-emphasis of athletics, others viewed it as a re-emphasis. The approach anchored itself on the principal of "sport-for-sports-sake" so evident in the early traditions of sport on the campus.

The entire program was put under faculty control. The football program was modified and run without the benefit of athletic scholarships and gate receipts. New varsity teams were added in soccer, wrestling, fencing, handball, and golf. The baseball program was resurrected as well. A mandatory physical education program was established for all first-year students, and an extensive intramural program was established and targeted at participation by the entire student body. Those who predicted the demise of the athletic program were

wrong. Participation increased dramatically, and Hopkins teams did indeed fare well against their traditional opponents.

Following the second world war, any hopes that large numbers of institutions would follow the Hopkins lead soon disappeared with the booming growth of intercollegiate athletics and the arrival of television. Hopkins teams settled into competition with a number of small to medium-sized colleges and universities in the Middle Atlantic region. Competition among these institutions grew into a comfortable tradition that continues today in the Middle Atlantic States Athletic Conference and more recently the Centennial Conference. Lacrosse was an exception. Given its strong tradition in the sport and the fact that competition in lacrosse centered among east coast institutions, Hopkins dominated the national lacrosse scene. Its teams were perennial powers and often competed in the national championships. This created a unique, but generally accepted, dichotomy between lacrosse and all other sports at Hopkins. Lacrosse competed at the highest competitive level among NCAA Division I institutions while all other teams competed at the Division III level.

As the other UAA institutions began to evaluate the quality of undergraduate life and the athletics programs on their campuses, Johns Hopkins — very comfortable with the level and direction of its athletic involvement — was in the midst of institutional turmoil on another front. Hit hard by efforts in the United States Congress and various Federal agencies to reduce indirect cost recovery rates at major research universities, Johns Hopkins was facing the prospect of significant program retrenchment and the elimination of a substantial number of tenured faculty positions.

At the same time pressures were mounting to address serious shortcomings in student housing and the quality of the residential experiences of undergraduate students on the Homewood campus. The university maintained dormitory space for first-year students, but the size of the first-year classes had consistently exceeded available housing. Almost all upper-class students necessarily lived in off-campus housing. Dispersed by their off-campus living arrangements, Hopkins students shared few opportunities for interaction with their classmates outside of the classroom.

When the invitation to participate in discussions about a new university athletic association was received by President Stephen Muller, he expressed interest principally because of the reputations of the other institutions and university presidents included in the discussions. His dean of student affairs was intrigued by the prospect as well. He viewed such an association as a vehicle, among other efforts, to reinvigorate undergraduate life on the campus and to create a greater sense of community among the student body. He also saw benefits with regard to broadening student recruitment efforts and improving their yield of students accepting offers of admissions.

The athletic leadership was somewhat ambivalent at the prospect of a new association. They were very comfortable with their current competitive associations, wanted those associations to continue, and did not want the development of a new association to be viewed as a first step in the eventual withdrawal of the institution from its traditional scheduling commitments.

The combination of the potential enhancement of athletics and undergraduate life led to the participation of Johns Hopkins in the new association, but the reluctance to disturb existing athletic associations and the

financial difficulties facing the institution limited participation to a level of involvement below that of the other members. That level of involvement did grow as the association took shape and its organization and its own traditions developed.

New York University

Throughout its athletic history, New York University has experienced both the zenith and nadir of intercollegiate sport. The school has celebrated the heights of winning a national basketball championship and the depths of scandal and financial exigency that threatened the survival of its athletics programs and perhaps the institution itself. Early in its history, NYU played a unique role in shaping the long-term future of intercollegiate athletics.

Athletic competition on the NYU campus during the late 1800's was robust. Like at most other eastern campuses football provided a focus for most of the attention of students, faculty, alumni, and the public. Increasingly, however, that attention focused on the violence of the sport. It reached a peak with a series of scathing exposés published in several national magazines revealing the insidious role of gambling interests in the sport and several common practices such as the “knock-out” or intentional injury of opposing players to ensure victory. Death on the intercollegiate gridiron was not unknown. Teddy Roosevelt attempted to bring the weight of the United States presidency to bear on these problems by inviting representatives from the “big three” — Harvard, Yale, and Princeton — to the White House and demanding they take action to curb the violence. Some described their efforts as half-hearted at best, and the ensuing 1905 season was one of the most violent ever. The Chicago Tribune reported eighteen young men lost their lives playing

interscholastic or intercollegiate football that fall. Among those eighteen was a young man from Union College who was killed in a contest with New York University (Rader, 1983).

New York University chancellor Henry B. McCracken promptly called a meeting of the presidents of the institutions on the NYU schedule to formulate a plan of action to reform the sport of football. These representatives called for a national convention and the formulation of a new football rules committee. Representatives of 62 institutions attended that convention forming the Intercollegiate Athletic Association with its own rules committee. In 1910, that organization became the National Collegiate Athletic Association, or as it is more commonly known, the NCAA.

Throughout the 1920's NYU competed among the big time athletic powers in football and basketball, winning the national championship in 1929. An NYU matchup at Madison Square Garden was a common event and often one that drew national attention.

The Carnegie Foundation report of 1929 did have an effect of football at NYU. In response to growing concerns about the unbridled growth of the sport and its increasing distance from the academic mission of the academy nationally, efforts were made to scale back the NYU program. The program continued to experience success competing against regional teams, and its matchups with Fordham University in the 1930's and 40's were classics.

Entering the decade of the 50's New York City was the center of big-time college basketball. The National Invitational Tournament, held at Madison Square Garden, determined the national collegiate champion and regular season matchups at the Garden were a necessary staple of eastern colleges aspiring to

success on a national level. Then disaster struck. In 1951 the New York district attorney revealed that thirty-two players from seven colleges in the metropolitan area, among them NYU, had been involved in fixing point spreads. This gambling scandal rocked the nation and decimated the basketball programs of most of the New York City colleges and universities. The NYU program survived this struggle, but it did not survive an institutional struggle that was to come.

In the 1960's the university faced increasingly serious financial struggles. Most of its endowment had been expended resulting in a plan to sell its Washington Heights campus in 1971 to remain financially solvent. When the final deal was struck, the university was within weeks of not being able to meet its payroll obligations. In a move designed to send a clear message to legislators and other political powers as to just how serious the financial situation had become, the university president terminated the NYU basketball program . The university moved to its current Washington Square location and began a process of rebuilding that focused on making NYU an academic institution of the first order.

With the move to the new campus all outdoor and indoor facilities were lost. NYU continued to compete at the Division I level in those sports it continued to sponsor, but in name only. With the lone exception of fencing, its athletic teams struggled. Without a playing facility, baseball was eventually dropped as well.

As the university began to emerge from its financial crisis, attention turned to the undergraduate campus experience. A new indoor athletic facility was built and a university committee studied the future of intercollegiate sports.

The committee recommended resurrection of the men's basketball program and the development of a women's athletic program. It was also recommended that the university consider a return to competition at the Division I level. This latter recommendation was rejected. It was the feeling of the academic leadership of the institution that the expenditure of substantial institutional funds on scholarships would send the wrong message to faculty and the public at large about the direction of university resources. Another major concern was the university's desire to attract a highly-qualified pool of applicants and an unwillingness to compromise that effort as a means to achieve athletic success.

The university chose to develop its programs within the NCAA Division III philosophical context, but it was not comfortable with the competitive opportunities available in its immediate area. Throughout the early to mid 1980's, athletic leadership explored several possible scheduling arrangements focused principally around men's basketball. Athletic directors from several institutions, including several future UAA members were invited to a meeting at the Newark Airport to discuss an eastern seaboard basketball conference composed of highly selective colleges and universities competing in Division III of the NCAA. While the concept appealed to many of those present, potential costs appeared prohibitive and nothing further developed. These discussions overlapped some of the informal discussions concerning the concept of a university athletic association, however, and probably motivated the leadership at two of those institutions to turn their informal discussions into formal action that resulted in the formation of the UAA.

When the invitation to participate in the UAA discussions reached NYU, the response was enthusiastic. Then chancellor L. Jay Oliva assumed an active and very hands-on role in the discussions and the development of the new

association. The new association provided NYU with an opportunity to complete the transformation of its athletics programs in a manner that was entirely consistent and complementary to the transformation it had achieved in its academic programs.

University of Chicago

The University of Chicago athletic history is perhaps the most storied among the members of the UAA. Chicago was a charter member of the Western Conference or the Big Ten as it came to be known. Its teams won seven Big Ten football championships and numerous conference titles in other sports as well. Counted among its athletic legions are the legendary coach Amos Alonzo Stagg and Jay Berwanger, winner of the first Heisman Trophy. Also counted among its legends is Robert M. Hutchins, the University of Chicago president who stunned the world of higher education when he declared the university would no longer play football on the intercollegiate level.

The University of Chicago was founded in 1890 with a generous endowment from John D. Rockefeller. In order to publicize the young university, president William Rainey Harper, a Yale graduate, hired Amos Alonzo Stagg, one of Yale's most famous athletic talents. Stagg became the first college coach to be hired with professorial rank. Harper's instructions to Stagg were clear. He was to assemble a football team that could tour the country and defeat the prominent football powers of the day.

Stagg did just that, winning Big Ten titles in 1896, 1899, 1905, 1907, 1908, 1913, and 1924. His teams were known as the Monsters of the Midway. At Harper's direction they were provided a palace car for travel as well as many

other amenities and advantages. The Maroons brought fame to the young university, but there were those who doubted the legitimacy of the connection between the football program and the academic purposes of the institution.

Chief among those individuals was Robert Hutchins. Hutchins was a highly respected leader in higher education. He prized the integrity of the intellectual and academic mission of the university above all else. He assumed the presidency of the Chicago campus in 1929, the year the Carnegie Foundation released its highly critical report on intercollegiate athletics. That report focused particular attention on the excesses of big-time football. Hutchins believed that corruption was inevitable and unavoidable in big-time college football. One could not have a great university and a great football team. In 1939, he persuaded the Chicago trustees to drop football. While few other institutions followed his lead, his actions left an indelible mark on athletics and athletic philosophy at Chicago. Athletics at the University of Chicago, while valued, would never rise to a level that could compromise the academic purposes of the institution. When the university's 50,000-seat stadium, Stagg Field, was eventually razed to make room for a new library the symbolism was complete.

Football did return to the campus in 1969, but in a very different context. Intramural programs had been given greater emphasis. All coaches were members of the physical education faculty and were evaluated using standards similar to those of other university faculty. The university now competed primarily with a group of small liberal arts colleges with which it had some academic ties through the Associated Colleges of the Midwest. The undergraduate college of the university was small, although a bit larger than most of the other institutions in the Midwest Athletic Conference. As the undergraduate college of the university grew during the 1970's, differences in

size, academic standards, and philosophy made this competitive association less of a comfortable fit.

As the notion of something like a university athletic association emerged, the discussions benefited from several overlapping contacts between the University of Chicago and other UAA institutions. John Schael, athletic director at Washington University, was a former athletic staff member at Chicago. Peter Kountz, dean of students at the University of Rochester, had come from Chicago. Mary Jean Mulvaney, director of athletics at Chicago, knew several other UAA athletic directors very well from her work on NCAA committees and the NCAA Council. University president Hanna Gray knew William Danforth of Washington, Dennis O'Brien of Rochester, and several other UAA presidents through their association in the American Association of Universities (AAU).

Chicago participated in the discussions about an east coast men's basketball conference hosted by NYU, but those discussions did not progress beyond that meeting of athletic directors. Its Faculty Athletic Board had been evaluating its athletic programs and scheduling affiliations at approximately the same time the UAA concept began to emerge, but the board had not developed a definite direction. The University of Chicago reacted cautiously to the concept of the UAA, concerned both about its current affiliations and its historic concerns with an expansive athletic philosophy. The Faculty Athletic Council studied the concept in detail and forwarded a strong, positive recommendation to the faculty senate and the university president.

University of Rochester

Throughout its athletic history teams from the University of Rochester often competed against teams from schools with big-time athletics programs. Rochester, however, never competed as what might be called a bona fide member of the world of big-time athletics.

For more than 105 years teams from Rochester competed as independents. Their only formal athletic affiliations with other institutions were through loosely structured state and regional consortia that sponsored limited season-ending championships or facilitated scheduling. The staple of most Rochester schedules were small to medium-sized and academically respected liberal arts colleges of upstate New York and New England — Hamilton, Union, St. Lawrence, Hobart, Rensselaer, Amherst, and Williams. Their schedules often included larger and more competitive opponents — Syracuse, Colgate, Army, and several Ivy League institutions. Overall, Rochester enjoyed a great deal of success on the playing fields during the first half of the century. In the 1950's Rochester followed a path different from that of some of its more prominent opponents.

Rochester generally defined itself as a “small-college” athletic program. Its teams competed in the college division of the NCAA and eventually as a member of Division III. In the early 1970's athletics at Rochester underwent substantial change. A number of its traditional football opponents joined in the creation of the New England Small College Athletic Conference. Because of its geographic separation from most of those schools, Rochester was not included in the group. In basketball and several other sports it had become more and more difficult to remain competitive with the likes of Syracuse, Colgate, Cornell, and

Army. Those programs had grown well beyond the likes of Rochester both in scope and level of competition. Changes in the NCAA Divisional structure also provided incentives for such Division I institutions to include fewer Division III opponents on their schedules. As a result, schedules at Rochester evolved into a pragmatic amalgam of local and regional state and private institutions of varying academic stature.

In many ways Rochester was a fish out of water, or perhaps a big fish swimming in a small pond. The school had developed into a strong research university. Many of its academic programs were among the nation's best. The only comparable academic institution in the region was the much larger Cornell University campus whose teams competed in Division I with the rest of the Ivy League. The image of Rochester suggested by its athletic schedule of local liberal arts colleges and state institutions was clearly not consistent with the reality of its stature as a major research university.

One solution suggested in the late 1970's was a move to Division I. The city of Rochester once had a rich tradition in professional basketball and there was interest among a few community leaders in promoting a Division I basketball program. Often referred to as a "minor league" town, Rochester was caught between Buffalo with its professional football, basketball, and hockey franchises and Syracuse with the lure of its highly successful Division I football and basketball programs. The Rochester press, fueled by suggestions emanating from the athletic department leadership and sports information staff, picked up the cause and pushed hard for consideration of such a change. University president Robert L. Sproull stood firm and would not be manipulated — not by the press, nor by his athletic staff.

As the decade of the 80's began, change of another sort did come to the university. A new president and new athletic leadership would provide a bold new vision and direction for athletics at Rochester. At the same time, the university, like most other institutions of higher education, was facing the very serious prospect of a significant decline in the size of the national pool of college applicants. Attention turned to undergraduate education and what strategies could be fostered to ensure that Rochester would attract sufficient numbers of highly qualified undergraduate students to its campus.

For more than fifty years, a wide variety of strategies had been tried in the effort to explain the nature and excellence of the university, major professorships, and its substantial scholarship programs. National recognition never caught up with the university's academic excellence. Research found that prospective students did not distinguish between the university and the numerous liberal arts colleges of upstate New York and New England. Some even identified Rochester as a state-funded institution.

As the newly-appointed president of the university, Dennis O'Brien began to look for ways to enhance and articulate an institutional identity through what he called "programs of signature". Such programs, academic and otherwise, would promote and reinforce an image of the university as a high-quality, major research university providing the strongest level of pre-professional education in a liberal education setting. A great deal of focus was placed on undergraduate teaching and programs. Attention was also directed toward student affairs and athletics. In athletics, O'Brien found a unique opportunity to create a recognizable program of signature.

That opportunity was the University Athletic Association. O'Brien had been intimately involved in the creation of the Colonial League (now the Patriot League) and its overlapping scheduling arrangements with the Ivy League during his tenure as president at Bucknell University. Discussions with his new athletic director, John Reeves, generated a number of initiatives to establish scheduling arrangements with other similar academic institutions, including Washington University in St. Louis, the University of Chicago, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In developing these arrangements O'Brien and Reeves found others interested in carrying forward an effort to develop a formal athletic affiliation among similar academic institutions. That interest lay chiefly on the campus of Washington University where Chancellor William Danforth, his vice provost and dean of student affairs Harry Kisker, and athletic director John Schael had been considering similar possibilities.

Discussions between O'Brien and Danforth progressed with both providing encouragement to members of their staffs to work out the details of a strategy that could be presented to other institutions. During the summer of 1985, O'Brien and Reeves with the help of a gift from a supportive alumnus invited representatives from thirteen research universities to attend a conference as guests of the university to discuss the possible formation of a university athletic association. For the next eighteen months Rochester played a leading role with Washington University in moving this concept forward to reality.

Washington University

Throughout more than one-hundred years of athletic competition, Washington University enjoyed the benefits of conference affiliation over two extended periods of time. From 1907 to 1946, Washington competed in the

Missouri Valley Conference, and from 1962 through 1971 the school competed in the College Athletic Conference. At other times the institution competed as an independent.

Athletic competition began for the St. Louis school in 1890 with the advent of football. Just over a decade later, the school became the focus of international attention when the World's Fair celebrating the centennial of the Louisiana Purchase and the third Olympiad of the modern Olympic Games were held on the site of the university's new Hilltop campus. Francis Field and Gymnasium remain a historic focal point of the Washington University athletic complex today.

As a charter member of the Missouri Valley Conference, Washington competed against the likes of the Universities of Kansas, Nebraska, and Missouri, as well as Iowa State, Oklahoma State, and Drake Universities. In part because of its smaller size, Washington found it difficult to compete at the championship level against these big-time programs, but did enjoy the success of some very competitive teams.

In 1946 under the leadership of Chancellor Arthur Holley Compton, Washington University adopted a new athletic policy. The policy was one of returning athletics to true amateur status. To some the word amateur signified the activity of a beginner; to others it suggested merely a lack of ability; to Compton it meant participation in athletics without financial inducement or rewards. Washington University would necessarily give up its membership in the Missouri Valley Conference (Schael, 1981).

The new policy received considerable attention. It was established in the face of alumni opposition and much skepticism from the press. Students were

less than enthusiastic. There was little precedent among other universities that would suggest Washington had a correct solution much less a viable one. Johns Hopkins had adopted a similar approach a decade earlier. St. Johns University had dropped intercollegiate sports altogether. Chicago had dropped football. Much of the rest of college athletics had continued on a path of expanding commercialization and professionalization of their programs.

The new policy had been carefully thought out. It was based on an educational philosophy that included athletics as a necessary and proper part of the total educational experience. Compton wanted intercollegiate athletics, but he wanted it on terms that would contribute to and not weaken the educational development of the individual student. This philosophy was a precursor to the NCAA Division III Philosophy Statement and the principles that guided the formation of the UAA.

In 1962, Washington University became a charter member of the College Athletic Conference (now the Southern College Athletic Conference) along with Centre College, Sewanee, Southwestern University of Memphis, and Washington and Lee University. This grouping of regional institutions with strong academic programs located across the south proved a good fit for Washington during this period. As the Washington campus evolved into a more nationally based institution, institutional differences and geographic distance weakened the association. Pushed by student protests, rising costs, and financial stress within the university, Washington dropped its basketball program in 1971. This move also resulted in a request from other members of the CAC for Washington to withdraw from all conference competition.

Much like Rochester, the Washington athletic schedule developed into a pragmatic and often less-than-attractive amalgam of regional institutions. In 1978 Harry Kisker came to Washington as vice provost and dean of student affairs and John Schael began his tenure as director of athletics. Kisker's primary task was to remedy a serious deficiency in the quality of student life on campus. Athletics was a large part of that picture, and together with Schael he set about taking steps to provide a more coherent structure and direction to the athletic program.

In reviewing the scheduling patterns of Washington's athletic teams Kisker and Schael recognized that most of the schools on its schedule were not institutions with which it competed for students. They began to imagine a scheduling arrangement that might provide competition with truly similar academic institutions, perhaps a new athletic association or even an alternative to the NCAA. They found a great deal of support and encouragement from university chancellor William Danforth, who himself began to discuss such a concept with other university presidents. Most of those discussions met with only lukewarm receptions until Danforth discussed the concept with Dennis O'Brien of Rochester. O'Brien was very receptive. He had been conducting a similar exercise with members of his own administrative staff.

Meanwhile Harry Kisker had been traveling to various campuses meeting with student affairs officers, athletic directors, presidents, anyone who would listen and discussing the concept of a new association among like-minded institutions of similar institutional profile. His informal contacts elicited interest on several campuses that were already following a similar path. When the process reached the stage of formal discussions, Danforth and Kisker assumed an active role with their colleagues at Rochester. Both men participated directly in

the planning process and discussions that led to the formation of the University Athletic Association.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Others

The invitation to discuss the possibility of forming a university athletic association was sent to the chief executive officers of thirteen universities. Ten of those indicated they or their representatives would attend the meeting in Rochester. One institution declined outright. Another two indicated interest but declined to attend principally for political reasons related to circumstances on their campuses, although they asked to be kept informed.

The thirteen institutions included the nine current members of the UAA along with California Institute of Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Rice University, and Tulane University.

The list of invited institutions was drawn by representatives from Rochester and Washington. It focused on small to medium-sized research universities with extensive graduate programs that routinely overlapped each other in areas such as the recruitment of students and faculty and the competition for research funding. Because of the obvious geographic spread, the list also focused on institutions in metropolitan areas that would facilitate easy travel arrangements. Most of the institutions on the list competed in Division III of the NCAA. The two that did not — Rice and Tulane — had experienced difficulty competing at the Division I level and were viewed by some as candidates for a move to Division III, particularly if such a move involved significant competition among this group of institutions.

Cal Tech declined to attend the meeting. The California campus was by far the most geographically removed from the rest of the prospective UAA institutions. In several ways it was very different from most of the other invited institutions. Its undergraduate student body was much smaller. Its athletics programs were also smaller in scope. Because of the limited opportunity for competition against other Division III institutions on the west coast, Cal Tech viewed athletics as almost a strictly local and regional endeavor. Travel to any of the other campuses would require the crossing of at least two time zones which meant significant time away from campus for its student-athletes. The assumed travel costs, implications for time away from campus, and a more localized approach to athletics resulted in a declination of the invitation to attend the UAA discussions.

Rice and Tulane might well be described as the long-shots on the list of invitees. Both competed in Division I, Rice as a member of the Southwest Athletic Conference (SWAC) and Tulane as an independent.

As a relatively small research university, Rice was considered by many to be out of place with the large public institutions of the SWAC. Rice's athletic teams were generally not competitive with other members of the Southwest Conference. In addition, the reputation of the SWAC was not one of shining integrity in college athletics. In fact, the Southern Methodist University football program had recently been given the death penalty for serious and repeated violations of NCAA rules. From time to time faculty and student leaders on the Rice campus had suggested seeking athletic affiliations with more similar institutions. There were also hints about the future of the SWAC itself with rumors of several of its members moving to the Big Eight, SEC, and WAC.

Tulane was attempting to deal with the aftermath of a serious gambling scandal in its basketball program. The scandal had caused the university president to suspend the men's basketball program indefinitely. At the time the UAA discussions were proceeding, a select university committee was in the process of evaluating athletics at Tulane and formulating a recommendation for the future of the program. Harry Kisker visited with representatives from Tulane and laid out his vision of a new athletic association comprising competition among research universities like Washington and Tulane. The Division I roots of the institution ran too deep however.

Administrators from Rice and Tulane indicated strong personal preferences for athletic competition within a Division III context. Their current athletic programs were a financial strain, and they routinely faced conflicts between the academic and athletic interests of the institution. But the sagas of their athletics programs, their alumni interest, ties to boosters in the community and state, and the ethos of big-time sports in their area of the country formed what for them was an insurmountable hurdle to a change as radical as moving to Division III. They remained interested in the concept of the UAA but were not likely to come on board themselves unless this new approach developed beyond the scope of the dozen or so institutions likely to be around the table during the initial go round. Some individuals had a vision of the UAA as something larger, perhaps an academically oriented and more athletically rational alternative to the NCAA, but those visions did not materialize.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology did choose to participate in the discussions, but it was the only institution choosing to do so that did not eventually accept membership in the new association. MIT was the only institution represented at the UAA meetings by its athletic director. All other

institutions were represented by their chief executive, a vice president, or a dean — individuals who could speak to some degree on behalf of their institutions. MIT was also the most academically selective of the institutions invited to the UAA meetings. Excluding NYU, its undergraduate college was the largest of the group. Its athletic program was also the most extensive, not just among this group but among all institutions regardless of division within the NCAA. MIT sponsored intercollegiate athletic competition in thirty-six sports. The next closest participating institution offered a total of twenty-four sports for men and women and most were around seventeen or eighteen sports. MIT had its pick of teams when it came to scheduling. Located in Boston, over one-hundred institutions were located within two hours of the campus including a large number of highly selective and prestigious liberal arts colleges, small universities, and several Ivy League schools. Because of its reputation and the nature of the institute, MIT recruited students very successfully on a national basis. Ninety-five percent of its students were from out of state.

In short, many of the factors and circumstances that moved other research universities to consider an association like the UAA did not carry the same import for MIT. The potential association with other members of the UAA was attractive, but those advantages had to be weighed against other concerns. At most the UAA would offer competition in twenty-three sports. The UAA would potentially afford two-thirds of the MIT teams with unique and expanded competitive opportunities. The other third would not share that experience creating, in effect, a tiered athletic program. That prospect was not attractive. The MIT leadership also expressed concern about time away from campus for its student-athletes given the high degree of rigor and expectation in its academic offerings. Athletic director Royce Flippin spoke eloquently in this regard at the

second meeting of delegates to the UAA discussions and wished the group success in their efforts.

Most delegates to those meetings believed there were other factors at work as well. During the two years prior to formation of the UAA, MIT participated in a series of basketball tournaments with Chicago, Washington, and Rochester. Their men's and women's teams were soundly beaten, and some individuals felt their athletic leadership was concerned about a lack of competitiveness on the part of MIT teams. There was also a general feeling that the MIT athletic leadership simply did not believe the UAA would work. It would be too expensive, and that would soon cause the association to fold. Another factor was the possibility that the UAA might evolve into an alternative to the NCAA, that the UAA members might choose to withdraw from the NCAA. That prospect concerned some of the MIT athletic leadership given their high level of involvement in the NCAA and its governance structures.

Emergence of the UAA Concept and Formation of the Association

Change in institutions is often the product of circumstance. It is, more often than not, the opportune joining of problems, solutions, resources, and decision-makers at some coincidental point in time. If unilateral institutional change is driven by such a garbage can model of organizational choice, as Cohen and March (1972) call it, then change across several independent institutions must occur either purely by chance or as the result of some very compelling set of circumstances.

It was not chance that brought the UAA institutions together. Similar circumstances on each of the campuses caused these institutions to examine their

athletics programs in the context of their contributions to campus life and the quality of student life in general. These considerations were driven in part by concerns about national trends in student recruitment and the ability of these institutions to remain competitive in attracting highly qualified and diverse individuals to their campuses. That factors such as these affected these institutions in similar ways is not unexpected. These institutions share very similar institutional profiles and missions. As small to medium-sized, private research universities with similar academic and athletic programs, many of the same factors affected their abilities to recruit students and faculty, attract research funding and support, and maintain alumni and community loyalties.

The changes considered by these institutions were shaped by their own athletic philosophies and the state of collegiate athletics nationally. More importantly, they were guided by a broad view of the institution and the role intercollegiate athletics could and should play in the academic context of the campus. The decision-makers involved in these processes were rooted in the academic side of the institution or were part of a reporting line that placed athletics in the more global context of student affairs and campus life.

It was necessary that these institutions seek out other institutions. The changes they were considering could not be accomplished in isolation. They required the collective action of several institutions. The fact that they came together with other research universities at a common point in time is not coincidental. The set of external circumstances affecting these institutions were common to all — reductions in research funding levels, forecast declines in prospective applicants, scandals in college athletics on the national level. They affected these institutions in similar ways because the institutions were similar almost by definition — size, enrollments, faculty, endowments, academic

program and mission. That these institutions found each other is not surprising. They form a natural grouping against which most of these institutions would compare themselves. The institutions also shared a common athletic philosophy — a belief in amateur athletics, sport for the sake of sport, the notion that athletic and academic excellence need not be mutually exclusive.

Although decision-makers on these campuses were formulating alternatives, what they needed was a catalyst. In many ways that catalyst was the person of Harry Kisker, vice provost and dean of student affairs at Washington University. As change on the Washington campus progressed, it became clear that discussions with other institutions were necessary. With strong encouragement and support from Chancellor William Danforth, Kisker visited a number of campuses describing the potential that might be derived from a new athletic association. He found keen interest on several campuses, perhaps most notably at the University of Rochester.

When a group of athletic administrators met at the Newark New Jersey Airport to discuss a possible eastern seaboard basketball conference that included several research universities but not Washington and Rochester events accelerated. Wanting to be sure that they were a part of such a venture, and moreover wanting to see such a venture move forward in a more global context, the Washington and Rochester contingents agreed the time was right to bring a group together for the purpose of considering some formal action — a new athletic association among like-minded research universities.

In consultation with Danforth, President Dennis O'Brien of Rochester took the risk of moving beyond the stage of bilateral discussions to a collective discussion among all those institutions likely to be concerned with these issues.

During the summer of 1985, he invited the chief executive officers of thirteen universities to a conference to be held at Rochester. The invitation suggested that if the chief executive could not attend, the institution's provost or another senior officer would be welcome. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the possible advantages of forming some sort of athletic association among schools of like background and similar philosophy. All costs of the conference except transportation were to be borne by the University of Rochester.

Ten institutions responded affirmatively to the invitation. The conference was scheduled for early October of that year. A planning committee consisting of Harry Kisker; Peter Kountz, Dean of Students at Rochester; John Reeves, Director of Sports and Recreation at Rochester; and Dick Rasmussen, Business Manager for Sports and Recreation at Rochester began preparing an agenda and direction for the conference.

The planning committee was a highly participatory group. They were enthused with the enormous potential of this undertaking but sobered by the realization that such opportunities are not likely to be repeated. The path to success would be complex. They chose to be guided in their efforts by several overriding concerns.

First, the conference must be presented as an opportunity to explore possibilities rather than an effort to sell a particular plan. To this end, the term "athletic association" rather than "athletic conference" was used. It was felt this term suggested a continuum of relationships rather than the more threatening notion of structure and control often identified with the concept of a conference. To further emphasize the open-ended approach, the conference agenda was arranged to include participants from institutions other than Rochester as major

actors. Participants were welcomed by Chancellor Danforth as well as by President O'Brien. Harry Kisker presented the philosophical rationale of the proposal. Competitive models, their financial implications, and comparative institutional data were presented by John Reeves and Dick Rasmussen. Dean William Fox of Emory moderated an open discussion of issues, concerns, and directions.

Another concern was that the conference must be a participative effort. The institutions involved must have a sense of control of their own destinies and must be able to identify the needs and expectations of their own institutions with the role expectations of a new association. The planning committee made extensive use of the many previous informal bilateral discussions that had occurred to develop a questionnaire that would be used to assemble the type of background information the participating institutions would need to support their decision-making processes. The questionnaire was extensive but also open-ended in order to allow each institution to suggest possible directions and concerns to be addressed at the conference.

Another aspect of participation was attention to the core issues. The planners felt it was important that participants be able to focus on the underlying philosophical issues and a global conceptualization of the proposed athletic association rather than getting bogged down in information-gathering and other minutia. They hoped the conference would generate concrete options and a plan of action. A large amount of effort was devoted to the generation of a briefing book that included profile information on each participating institution, summaries of information collected in the questionnaire, and detailed financial projections of anticipated costs for various models of athletic competition among the participants. The area of financial modeling was a key concern because of the

wide geographic spread of the institutions. While detailed financial modeling could not be provided for every institution for every form of competition, detailed projections for every form of competition were developed using the University of Rochester program as a representative model. The assumptions and parameters of each model were clearly stated, and each institution was provided with an electronic spreadsheet that they could use to substitute their own travel parameters (principally airfares) and determine their own range of costs. This strategy worked as designed. Answers to questions about cost were provided up front. The proposals were not cost-prohibitive. They were within reach. Attention could be focused on other issues of substance and, perhaps, greater import.

The planners were also concerned about issues of protocol and proper level of attendance. Those present must necessarily be able to speak on behalf of their institutions with some reasonable degree of authority and commitment. They must be able to address issues of policy, athletic philosophy, and finance at a fundamental institutional level. Decisions of these institutions whether to proceed with such an association would be made at the highest levels of the institution. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for such a movement to originate among coaches and athletic administrators and work its way through the administrative hierarchy of a single institution much less ten. To a large extent, these concerns were addressed by inviting the chief executive officers of the respective institutions and suggesting they send their provosts or other senior officers if they could not attend themselves.

The responses from the chief executives were encouraging in this regard. The representatives included chief executives, vice presidents, deans, a faculty

athletic representative, and one athletic director. A complete listing of participants is found in Figure 6.

FIGURE 6

Participants in the Initial UAA Meeting at Rochester

<p>Brandeis University Dr. Arthur Gillis • Executive Vice President for Finance and Administration</p> <p>Carnegie Mellon University Dr. John Crecine • Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs</p> <p>Case Western Reserve University Peter Musselman • University Vice President and Treasurer</p> <p>Emory University Dr. William Fox • Vice President and Dean for Campus Life</p> <p>Johns Hopkins University Dr. Robert Welch • Dean for Administration of the Homewood Schools Dr. Lucien Brush • Faculty Athletics Representative</p> <p>Massachusetts Institute of Technology Royce N. Flippin, Jr. • Director of Athletics</p> <p>New York University Dr. L. Jay Oliva • Chancellor Russ Hamberger • Director for Academic Program Review</p> <p>University of Chicago Charles O'Connell • Vice President and Dean of Students in the University</p> <p>University of Rochester Dr. Dennis O'Brien • President Dr. Brian Thompson • Provost Dr. Peter Kountz • Dean of Students Dr. John Reeves • Director of Sports and Recreation Dick Rasmussen • Business Manager for Sports and Recreation</p> <p>Washington University Dr. William Danforth • Chancellor Harry Kisker • Vice Provost and Dean of Student Affairs</p>

The results of the meeting were exceptionally encouraging. A high level of preparation on the part of those in attendance was obvious. What was not readily evident was the amount of consideration many of these issues had been

given on most of these campuses in the preceding months and years. Most of the institutions present had previously concluded that substantial change in the direction and affiliation of their athletics programs was desirable. The only question remaining for them was to find the right affiliation and concurrent direction.

The efforts of the planning group proved of value in making useful information readily available. The financial projections were not challenged. The assumptions on which they were based and the methods by which they were derived were clearly stated and judged reasonable. Further, each institution could test the projections with its own numbers. No reservations were expressed regarding the concept or scope of the association. The dominant concern was that the formation of an association be a statement of substance. It must be of a magnitude that would make it a readily attractive opportunity to their local constituencies. A series of tournaments in a few selected sports would not be enough. The proposed association must have breadth of participation among the members and ideally competition should take place across all programs not just the traditionally more visible sports of football and basketball. Women's programs must be included with the same degree of support as men's programs. Given the desire of several schools to move very quickly while others were bound by existing commitments to other conferences, it was also recognized that any new association must include enough flexibility to accommodate local planning and existing scheduling commitments.

Toward this end, the conference participants agreed to meet again in February of 1986. It was further agreed that each institution would prepare three-, five-, and ten-year plans outlining the scale of participation they might support. In addition to circulating a full transcript of the proceedings, the

planning group was charged to draft a goal statement, constitution, and bylaws for the proposed association.

In the interim the participants shared the proceedings of the conference with associates on their home campuses. Decision-making processes and decision-makers varied on each campus. In some cases there was extensive collaboration between senior administrators and athletic staff. In some cases the athletic staff was purposefully excluded from the process. Some campuses consulted extensively with their faculty; for others the decision was strictly an administrative decision. In every case, the chief executive was thoroughly involved and held sway over the final decision.

Work on a constitution and bylaws proceeded as directed. Mary Jean Mulvaney, director of athletics at the University of Chicago, worked with John Reeves on a draft document. Harry Kisker and Peter Kountz worked on a goal statement. The institutions submitted their short-, medium-, and long-range plans as well. Dick Rasmussen collated those documents and drafted a tentative competitive model based on the projected commitments of the group.

During this period Brandeis University withdrew from the discussions. Brandeis was probably the least prepared of all the participating institutions. There had been no broad-based discussions on the campus regarding the direction of the Brandeis athletic program, nor efforts to explore affiliation with institutions outside their local area. Leadership of the athletic program was in a state of flux, and the senior officer representing Brandeis at the Rochester meeting was not thoroughly familiar with issues related to athletics. In fact, the meeting transcript showed no record of any comment attributable to him.

There were two principal reasons for the lack of interest on the part of the Brandeis representatives. Prior to the UAA meetings, a great deal of attention had been given to the state of the athletic program at Brandeis, but that attention was focused almost exclusively on the physical condition of its athletic facilities and the need to secure funding for major capital improvements and construction. The athletic leadership of Brandeis was also heavily influenced by their colleagues at M.I.T. The fact that M.I.T. did not intend to pursue affiliation with the UAA group weighed heavily with the existing Brandeis athletic leadership. That leadership suffered from problems of its own, and a new athletic director was appointed in the spring of 1986. Under new leadership, the institution re-evaluated its position regarding the UAA and decided to pursue affiliation with the group. In the spring of 1987, Brandeis was formally accepted into the association.

The St. Louis meeting convened with nine institutions represented. In addition to those present at the first meeting, several institutions had included athletic administrators and faculty athletics representatives as participants this time. The meeting quickly became a working session. The draft goal statement presented by the planning committee took the form of an agreement on basic principles regarding the formation and purpose of the new association. The statement was adopted unanimously. A proposed model of competition within the association for the 1987-88 academic year was reviewed, modified, and adopted. The group also agreed to ask their athletic administrators to explore the possibility of scheduling as much informal competition as practical against other UAA institutions in 1986-87.

In the course of discussing the goal statement and scheduling model, MIT athletic director Royce Flippin reported his institution would not participate in

the UAA. He indicated that decision had been made after much thought and consultation with administrators, faculty, and students. Flippin stated the issue at MIT had turned principally on philosophical grounds. Because of the large number of sports sponsored by MIT, participation in the UAA would create a de facto tiering of their program. He also expressed concern about the effect of travel on student-athletes' academic commitments and the ability of MIT to be competitive in team sports given the exceptionally high academic standards of the institute. His concern was not about wins and losses but about whether teams that might be significantly overmatched would have the kind of positive competitive experience the UAA was designed to promote. He also expressed caution about the possibility that this new association might grow to a degree where competition within the group might compromise the stated principles of the association. He did wish the association success and strongly supported its formation. It simply was not the right match for his institution.

Representatives to the St. Louis meeting also reviewed a draft constitution and bylaws, suggesting various revisions. The meeting concluded with a discussion of each institution's timeline for final approval of their participation and plans for a formal announcement. There was some discussion of other potential members as well. It was noted that participation by Brandeis was still a possibility. The eight institutions agreed to move forward and to defer the issue of additional members to some future time.

Initial plans were to make the announcement in conjunction with the spring meeting of the American Association of Universities in Washington, D.C. When it became clear that some campuses would need additional time to present the plan to their boards of trustees, the announcement was delayed to late June. A joint announcement was made at a morning press conference in New York

City on June 25, 1996 followed by similar announcements on each member campus later in the day.

With a change in leadership and after re-evaluation of the UAA proposal, Brandeis attempted to contact members of the group with the intent of being included in the inauguration of the Association. The literal last-minute timing of their request proved to be awkward, and they were not included in the initial announcement. During the following year, the eight institutions accepted a formal request from Brandeis to join the Association as its ninth charter member.

Characteristics of the New Association

The new Association announced by these institutions was unique in several significant ways. Its unique character is reflected well in the goal statement agreed to by representatives at the St. Louis meeting (Figure 7).

The Association focused on the quality of student life generally and the quality of the overall experience of student-athletes in particular. The chief executive officers of the institutions took ownership of the association — not merely in name but in practice. There was a high expectation that athletic policy and practice on each campus would remain under the clear direction of the chief executives. The constitution and bylaws provided an organizational framework but provided minimal regulation. The institutions would rely heavily on their chief executives and the integrity of their respective internal reporting lines. Members of the new Association valued athletics as an integral part of their educational missions — as a genuine complement to their academic programs. The institutions were committed to the Division III athletic philosophy. Their student-athletes would be admitted, measured, and treated like all other

students at their institutions. They would be students first and athletes commensurate with their roles and responsibilities as students.

FIGURE 7

Initial UAA Goal Statement

UNIVERSITY ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT

On this day, February 27, 1986, the undersigned Universities agree to associate for the purpose of encouraging and supporting athletic competition among members that complements the academic mission of each of the institutions. These institutions are major research Universities and have a special and deep commitment to undergraduate education and to a high quality of undergraduate student life. The institutions of the University Athletic Association (UAA) believe the primary benefit of the Association will be a comprehensive improvement of the quality of student life on their respective campuses.

The University Athletic Association is committed to the principle that a program of athletics must be conducted in a manner consistent with the central educational process of its member institutions. Ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the athletics program rests with the Chief Executive Officer of the institution. The Chief Executive Officers shall be intimately involved in establishing and maintaining the standards and direction for the Association. Student-athletes competing for member institutions within the Association will be representative of their peers and will be admitted on the basis of academic performance and potential. Student-athletes will be measured against the same standards as other students in admissions, financial aid policies, and academic programs. Equal opportunities will be provided in athletics for men and women. Competition within the Association shall be significant and valued precisely because its member institutions share the same academic and athletic aspirations. As a result, the dedicated maintenance of high academic and athletic standards among the member institutions should ensure competitive balance within the Association.

The Association did not dictate which sports must be sponsored by its members. Determination of participation levels was left to each institution and was to be based upon factors that made sense for each campus in the context of its academic and athletic philosophy. Members were committed to providing

their teams with the financial resources needed to accomplish the required travel. Further, they hoped to make that travel an educational experience in itself. They were committed to providing effective coaching, good equipment, and first-rate facilities in support of their student-athletes. Those resources and opportunities would be provided to men and women. Men's and women's teams would travel together and compete together whenever possible.

The governance structure of the new association placed the chief executives of the individual institutions clearly in control. Their number comprised the Presidents Council of the Association. An annual budget for the shared costs of central operations would be approved by that group and funded by dues assessed directly to the office of each chief executive. Actions of all other committees of the Association would be subject to review by the Presidents Council, particularly those involving issues of philosophy, substantial financial expense, and student-athlete welfare. The Association Constitution mandated that participation in meetings of this body be limited to chief executives. Alternates or substitute representatives were not allowed.

The primary policy making body of the Association was to be a Delegates Committee. Each institution was allowed up to four representatives to this body, however, it was specified that at least half of those delegates must clearly represent the academic leadership of the institution, i.e., academic administrators and faculty. One of the delegates from each institution would be designated by the respective chief executive as that institution's Voting Delegate and would cast that institution's vote on all matters. In practice, the Voting Delegates were principally vice presidents and deans of student affairs. Other delegates typically included the faculty athletics representative, primary athletic administrator, and senior woman athletic administrator of each institution.

An Executive Committee composed of the officers of this group was given responsibility for oversight of the day-to-day operations of the Association and direct supervision of the Executive Secretary of the Association. The Executive Secretary was hired by the Presidents Council with the Executive Committee serving as a search committee in that process. The role of the Executive Secretary as conference executive was to support and coordinate the governance structure of the Association in the development and implementation of policies and practices through its committee structure. It is important to note that the authority of the Association was vested in its governance structure and exercised through its committees, rather than ceded to the conference executive.

Responsibility for the administration of athletic competition was delegated to an Athletic Administrators Committee. Each institution was allowed up to three representatives to this body and was required to include representatives of both men's and women's athletics. Representation on this committee was set at this number to ensure participation by senior woman administrators and to provide an opportunity for the professional development of associate and assistant directors of athletics. Votes in this body were to be cast by the primary athletic administrator of each institution.

Recommendations regarding the conduct of competition in specific sports were to be made by Sport Committees composed of head coaches of the respective sports from each institution participating in UAA competition and chaired by a member of the Delegates Committee. In sports with men's and women's teams, these committees functioned as single committees rather than as separate men's and women's committees. This practice helped ensure equity of treatment, and it provided a level of expertise and cooperation that benefited both men's and women's teams.

Within this committee structure, recommendations flowed from Sport Committees to the Athletic Administrators Committee to the Delegates Committee and on to the Presidents Council. Initially almost all proposals were reviewed at each level, but as the Association developed a routine, responsibility for final adjudication of specific issues was delegated to various bodies.

Sport Committees meet in person annually, and the Athletic Administrators Committee meets two to three times each year, usually in concert with national conventions of the NCAA and National Association of Collegiate Athletic Directors (NACDA). For several years the Presidents Council and Delegates Committee met twice annually, but as the work of the Association became more routine and confidence in the role of the Executive Secretary grew those two bodies have, at times, reduced the frequency of their meetings to the annual meetings required by the governing documents of the Association.

The primary characteristic of this structure is that it places the authority and responsibility for conducting the business of the Association clearly in the hands of the member institutions. It also demands participation and control by the academic leadership of these institutions. There is a direct linkage from philosophy and operational principle to implementation and practice, and a clear statement that the former directs the latter.

The Questions and the Propositions

It is the unique character of this Association and its process of formation that suggested the questions defining this investigation. Why did the nine member institutions of the University Athletic Association choose to affiliate with one another? Why did they choose to sponsor athletic competition in the

manner which they have prescribed? How did this Association, composed of these particular nine institutions, come to be?

These questions suggested a number of propositions to be studied. The propositions were explored through personal interviews, the examination of archival records and documents, and the experiences of the investigator as a participant-observer of many of the formative events of the Association. The identification of propositions was to be an open-ended and on-going process. During the course of conducting interviews and archival reviews, the investigator made particular efforts to identify additional propositions or factors that might be explored as new propositions. None were identified. All participants in the formal interviews identified the list of propositions as comprehensive. Archival reviews and further reflection on the formative period of the Association yielded no additional propositions either.

The propositions provide a manageable means of organizing the information collected during this investigation. Since the propositions are generated directly from the central questions of the investigation, the information provided by their exploration will necessarily be used to answer those central questions directly. What follows are the investigative results of each proposition. They are presented in the same order they were posited, which is to say their order of presentation implies no relative order of importance.

Proposition No. 1: Institutional Identity

The opportunity to establish and reinforce a sense of institutional identity was valued because it represented an opportunity to associate with institutions of similar and prominent academic mission rather than an opportunity to associate with institutions of prominent athletic reputation.

As noted earlier, the concept of institutional identity used in this investigation is comprehensive in scope. It includes comparisons of academic mission, institutional type, programs, faculty, and students. Its definition is holistic rather than focused on or limited by any single aspect.

Why should the concept of institutional identity be of concern to institutions like the members of the UAA? The concept of institutional identity is important to these institutions and others because it is a statement of what the institution is about, the quality and breadth of its programs, the manner in which education is delivered on its campus, the quality and composition of its faculty and student body, the culture of the campus, and its quality of life.

More often than not, this identity is reference based. As with many concepts, individuals seek to learn about what is less familiar through comparisons with that which is familiar. This principle applies to colleges and universities. The institutions with which a college or university is readily associated form a basis of comparison from which generalizations are drawn. Institutions identified as peer institutions of a college or university lend definition to the identity of the college or university. This is not to imply that such comparisons are accurate or necessarily valid.

The validity of such comparisons is dependent upon how extensively the factors from which the comparisons are drawn describe the whole of the institution. The more comprehensive the scope of those factors, the more valid the generalizations that may be drawn. In the case of colleges and universities the basis of comparison varies. It may be size of institution, geographic proximity, overlapping academic offerings, endowment, tuition, status as a public

or private institution, as well as a number of other factors including athletic competition.

One of the problems faced by most, if not all, of the UAA institutions is that they are “one-of-a-kind” institutions within their respective geographic regions. For the most part, they can be described as small to medium-sized, private research universities located in large metropolitan areas. When prospective students, parents, or the general public attempt to categorize these institutions, they quite naturally focus on this definition as a beginning.

If they make their comparisons on the basis of “small- to medium-sized”, they will tend to classify the UAA school as a small to medium sized liberal arts college since small to medium sized institutions tend to be liberal arts colleges. If they focus on “research university”, they will tend to classify the UAA school as a large, public, possibly land-grant, university. If they focused on the athletic schedule of the UAA institution, they might come away with a rather eclectic but inconsistent institutional profile.

The University Athletic Association offered its members a common identity as members of an athletic association that was consistent with the commonality of the institutions’ more comprehensive institutional identities. Its membership was drawn precisely by seeking institutions of common academic missions, definitions, and programs. If prospective students, their parents, alumni, or the public chose to associate these institutions on the whole based on their association as athletic competitors, so much the better. Such a generalization would promote a reasonably accurate and strongly positive picture of its member institutions.

This was a major consideration for most of the UAA institutions. It resonated in particularly strong terms with presidents, academic administrators, and faculty. One of the high points of the Association for these leaders was to be associated with institutions they respected and whom their faculties respected. One faculty member when told of the proposed association in terms that compared it to the Ivy League was reported to have responded, “Why, are you kidding—this group is a much better group than the Ivies!” This was a group appropriately described as peer institutions. Within the group were institutions to which others often compared themselves or to which they would go to obtain comparable information regarding issues under study on their own campuses.

The proposed association was also very attractive to enrollment management and student affairs officers. Many of the UAA institutions had wrestled for some time with efforts to clearly define and promote the institutional identities of their undergraduate colleges among prospective students and their parents. The UAA offered them a corporate athletic identity they could promote in concert with their institutional identities. It was an identity easily accessed by the public that was, by design, consistent with identities they were charged to promote.

Student affairs officers and athletic administrators often spoke of the need for their student-athletes to be able to identify with their competitors in the athletic arena as peers. Within the UAA student-athletes would find themselves competing with their peers. Many of the UAA schools would be schools to which they or their friends had applied, or would apply as graduates. One chief executive suggested that the concept of a common identity among student-athletes and their student colleagues was much more important than the notion of a common identity at the institutional level.

Although the opportunity to be associated with the other members of the proposed association was a positive inducement to each of the UAA schools, it was a larger factor for some than others. The University of Chicago and Johns Hopkins University had perhaps the most clearly defined and broadly recognized institutional identities. It was widely acknowledged that their membership in the proposed association would provide an easily recognized identity for the group.

The benefit was not unidirectional. The strong reputations enjoyed by Chicago and Hopkins were based largely on their reputations as graduate institutions. Those reputations often overshadowed their undergraduate colleges and may have given those programs an intimidating presence among prospective students. Association with other high quality academic institutions in the context of promoting undergraduate life through high-quality athletic competition would be a benefit to them as well.

The only reservation expressed regarding institutional identity focused on a concern that a common institutional identity might somehow promote the notion of a common mission, a singular level of quality, or an identity based on the lowest common denominator making the institutions rather indistinguishable from each other. Although these institutions share many similar qualities, philosophies, and approaches to academic and athletic issues, they are uniquely different as well. They aspire to different ends in various arenas, and the means to those ends certainly differ as well giving each institution its unique identity.

This concern, expressed early in the history of the Association by some chief executives, kept the Association focused on athletic competition.

Overlapping associations in other areas were not encouraged. There were however informal interactions among administrators who viewed the group as a natural peer group. Student affairs officers, health service administrators, alumni officers, admissions administrators, and others often met informally with each other at professional meetings. Many of the issues these individuals faced on their own campuses shared a common context on other UAA campuses, and their counterparts on those campuses were a natural resource in addressing those issues and generating alternatives.

Proposition No. 2: Institutional Visibility

The desire to enhance institutional visibility is directed primarily at constituencies most directly associated with the institutions: alumni, students, prospective students, the communities in the immediate vicinities of the member institutions.

For the members of the UAA institutional visibility in the context of intercollegiate athletics was viewed as a vehicle for communication rather than a vehicle for the direct generation of revenue, the enhancement of institutional reputation, or the provision of entertainment for consumption by the general public. Visibility was linked closely to the recruitment of students, both undergraduate and graduate. It was also a vehicle for strengthening and maintaining links with alumni and for the promotion of a sense of community on campus.

These institutions were not concerned with building or enhancing their reputations by means of athletic success or notoriety. Their histories clearly demonstrate this. Their reputations were the reputations of their faculty, their achievements in research and teaching, and their prominence in fields of professional study. The quality achieved in these arenas provides the definition and context from which their institutional reputations emerge. Athletics could

properly serve as an extension and reflection of this quality, but it would not become a means — or worse, the primary means — to its end.

The members of the UAA did not seek to play in large stadiums and arenas. They were not driven to appear on national television or maximize the impact of their potential media markets. They were concerned about developing some of the world's pre-eminent research and teaching facilities in medicine, laser fusion, robotics, computer technology, international cultural and media studies, and the like.

Sending athletics teams to compete on the campuses of other UAA institutions would serve to raise the visibility of each institution in those metropolitan areas — among undergraduate students, prospective students, alumni, and also the public. That visibility, however, would be in the context of high-quality athletic competition among institutions of high academic standing and established reputations.

Most importantly, that visibility would become a means to communicate with these constituencies, particularly those internal to the institutions and the new association. This was the focus chief executives, student affairs officers, and athletic administrators. As teams traveled to other campuses, student-athletes would become more familiar with other UAA campuses, a factor that might influence their consideration of graduate schools. As other UAA teams came to each campus, the visiting institutions would achieve greater visibility on those home campuses with perhaps similar results. Watching their student colleagues compete against teams they could consider as peers would help to reinforce a sense of identity among the general student body as part of a quality academic institution that cares about student life.

Athletic events could also become vehicles around which alumni gatherings could be orchestrated. Student recruitment events could be scheduled around these events as well. The coaches and student-athletes participating in such events would likely be some of the most effective ambassadors for these institutions and their programs.

The messages the increased visibility would communicate would be the core values of the UAA. These institutions care about the quality of student life. Their athletic programs reflect this commitment and the quality of the academic programs of the institutions. The athletic programs of the institutions complement the academic goals of the institutions and their students. The academic excellence of the institutions is not compromised by a desire for athletic excellence.

The announcement of the formation of the UAA attracted a great deal of national attention. The major media outlets in all of the UAA cities reacted in a highly favorable manner. Howard Cosell (1986) wrote a column in the New York Daily News in which he dubbed the UAA “a veritable league of notions...determined to put college sports in proper perspective...one of the first real glimmers of hope to emerge in the world of education and sports in many decades...” Interest continued as competition began. Sports Illustrated published a major article on the Association. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution and several other newspapers did pieces as well. Despite this attention, the UAA focused its own public relations efforts internally.

In one of their early meetings, the members of the UAA Presidents Council considered a public relations proposal drafted for their consideration. The proposal spoke to existing directions which focused on internal

constituencies and asked the president for guidance on whether efforts should be redirected or additional efforts mounted to reach beyond the internal constituencies.

One of the presidents responded quickly. "I believe the first part of the proposal says it very well. 'During the last two years, the public relations efforts of the UAA Office have been focused internally. That effort has sought to build and to reinforce a sense of belonging and identity among the members of the UAA and their campus communities.' I think this is very good. It is where we should be, and I hope we will continue in precisely this fashion." With no hesitation the other chief executives indicated their concurrence with these sentiments.

Proposition No. 3: Common Athletic Philosophy

The members of the UAA sought a relationship with institutions of common athletic philosophy rather than attempting to seek a particular competitive level.

It was vitally important to all of these institutions that philosophy and policies generated by the academic leadership of the institutions drive their respective athletics programs. These institutions all articulated a role for intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of a well-developed co-curricular program reflective of the quality of the academic environment within which those programs exist.

The histories of most of the UAA institutions had demonstrated this principle in dramatic fashion. Whether it was Chicago dropping a Big Ten football program, Emory declaring it would not allow big-time college sports, or Washington and Johns Hopkins ending athletic scholarships, all of these institutions had determined the academy would define the role of athletics

within the institution rather than allowing athletics to define the course of the institution.

Many of the UAA campuses had initiated discussions or explorations of their own prior to the emergence of the UAA concept. As these institutions considered where they could best position their athletics programs, they considered first the academic stature and identities of prospective partners. Equally as important, they considered the athletic philosophies of those other institutions as well. The rationale was straightforward. If the athletic philosophy did not clearly place athletics in a proper perspective to the academic mission of the institution, the inherent benefits of common identity, academic stature, competitive balance, and the like would inevitably be compromised beyond repair. For these institutions, that philosophy resonated clearly with the philosophy of Division III of the NCAA.

The Division III philosophy of athletic competition stated that athletic competition exists first for the student-athletes. Athletic competition should be broad based and encourage maximum participation. Student-athletes should be treated and measured in the same manner as all other students. Emphasis should be given to regular-season play, with opportunities for post-season play provided where they fit the context of athletics in these institutions.

In practice, Division III athletics were often defined in negative terms. Division III institutions did not give financial aid. Their teams did not play as many contests as Division I or II institutions. Athletics were not emphasized on their campuses. More often than not, low levels of institutional resources were committed to these programs, whether through staffing, funding, or facilities.

The institutions of the UAA were willing to move well beyond this level of commitment, but without a compromise of philosophical principle. Their teams would travel around the country to compete with their peers. Their travel would be adequately funded but within the resources of the institutions. The emergence of the UAA concept was intimately entwined with a statement of athletic philosophy from its beginnings. This philosophy was put forth in eloquent terms by Harry Kisker during the initial UAA meeting in Rochester.

That philosophy began with a belief, shared by these institutions, that academic excellence and athletic excellence are not mutually exclusive. Implicit within this belief were several sets of assumptions. The first is that the academic enterprise is the primary element. Student-athletes are just that — students first and athletes pursuant to their roles as students.

The second set of assumptions had to do with athletic excellence. Athletic excellence was not to be confused with a win-at-all-costs attitude. It properly related to the caliber of experience offered to students who participate in intercollegiate athletics. Athletic teams should have the benefit of qualified coaching — capable individuals chosen for professional competence and commitment to putting the welfare of the student first. They should play and practice in first-rate facilities at reasonable times. Their equipment should be safe, of high quality, and conducive to the best performance possible. A consistent and challenging level of athletic competition should be provided to both men and women.

The final set of assumptions concerned what might be termed a proper athletic emphasis. Athletic programs were to be considered co-curricular activities conducted for students and should be given consideration similar to

that accorded other such institutionally sponsored activities. They should not only complement the academic experience, but should also reflect the quality of the academic environment within which they exist. The Division III path chosen by these institutions is an approach to athletics — not a synonym for third-rate.

The members of the UAA not only expressed their assent to this philosophy, they embraced it. They made it real through the formation of the UAA. Commitment to this philosophy began with the chief executives of each institution. It was manifest in their ensuing financial commitments and the intense involvement of senior officers from their institutions. It was brought to fruition by the action and management of committed and thoughtful athletic administrators and their staffs.

As such the UAA became a significant statement that the provision of a high-quality college athletic experience is worth the commitment required of an institution. It was worthwhile because it not only benefited student-athletes, but also because it benefited the entire campus and, in turn, the institutions themselves. More importantly, the UAA became a strong statement that the success of intercollegiate athletics is wholly dependent upon institutional integrity and the ability of institutions to complete the full integration of athletics into the academic fabric of higher education.

The fundamental principles of the UAA Constitution stated that membership in the Association is granted with implicit confidence in the ability and commitment of each member institution to fully implement and abide by the principles imbedded in this philosophy.

Proposition No. 4: Student Recruitment and Marketing

Members of the UAA view their association as a vehicle for the recruitment of both undergraduate and graduate students.

All of the UAA institutions actively recruit undergraduate students from a national pool of prospective applicants. Although all of these institutions recruit heavily within their geographic regions, from forty to eighty percent of the students on each campus come from states or countries other than the state within which their respective campuses are located. As might be expected there exists substantial overlap in their recruiting efforts. All of the UAA institutions actively recruit undergraduate students from all of the metropolitan areas within which the UAA campuses are located.

During the early 1980's, colleges and universities across the nation were facing the prospect of a major decline in the number of high school graduates entering the traditional pool of prospective college applicants. The forecast decline in the applicant pool ran as high as twenty to thirty percent in some states. For many tuition-driven colleges this forecast suggested circumstances that might well endanger the survival of their institutions themselves (Carnegie Council, 1980). While the institutions of the UAA are not tuition-driven per se, the forecast decline represented a threat to their financial well being. With 2,500 to 4,500 undergraduates (or over 15,000 in the case of NYU) enrolled and with annual tuition in the range of \$8,000 to \$10,000 at the time, a gap of ten percent between projected and actual enrollments could create a two- to four-million dollar shortfall in operating revenue.

Another dynamic beginning to affect UAA campuses in the early 1980's was the beginning of a decline in funding for academic research and closer governmental scrutiny of indirect cost recovery rates, the so-called overhead

rates charged by universities for conducting research on their campuses. The prospect of a less reliable revenue stream from sponsored research put pressure on these universities to maintain and increase the level of support from their two other principle revenue streams — tuition revenue and endowment and gift revenue.

The obvious message was that these institutions could not assume a passive profile with regard to the forecast decline in the national applicant pool. They could not be content to maintain their current share of the pool of prospective applicants since that pool itself was shrinking. They would have to increase their share. This meant increasing the number of students who applied to their institutions and increasing the yield rate among those students offered admission to their campuses. Such efforts required new, and perhaps radical, strategies, substantial in scope, and tangible in their effects.

Strategies focused on changes and improvements that would make their campuses and the whole of the undergraduate experience on their campuses more attractive to prospective students and their parents. Broadening the focus of these efforts to the whole of the undergraduate experience was something new for these institutions. To some degree it was a rediscovery of a past that had been lost as these institutions evolved into modern research universities with their strong, and at times almost exclusive, focus on scholarly achievement and preparation for professional study.

A great deal of focus was placed on the revitalization of the student affairs function on these campuses. Several campuses convened blue ribbon panels to examine student life and recommend changes. Several hired new chief student affairs officers and charged them assessing and meeting the needs of current and

future undergraduates. New facilities were planned and built — campus centers, residence halls, student unions, dining halls, athletic facilities. Others were renovated, restored, or updated to meet the needs of their changing campuses. Improvements were made in student programming with an increase in the scope and level of support given to an expanding array of activity — including athletics.

On the academic side, significant change also occurred. Deans and faculty reviewed academic offerings. While support was increased in some areas, there were programs and majors that were eliminated or consolidated with other programs on several campuses. These efforts were never without controversy. Many of the campuses employed a strategy of identifying and promoting academic programs that might be called market niches — programs or offerings unique to their institutions that often provided a value-added dimension to their undergraduate curricula. These included new majors, the creation of minors, certificate programs, interdisciplinary programs, mentoring, advanced individual study, field study, and others. Many of these efforts focused on the high level of student-faculty interaction characteristic of the liberal arts college, but offered in the intellectually challenging context of a research university. These programs were directed toward a diversity of interests and talents among prospective students.

The campuses of the UAA promoted not only the diversity of their academic offerings but also the diversity of their undergraduate student bodies as an enhancement of the undergraduate experience. Toward that end they increased efforts to recruit students from diverse academic, ethnic, geographic, cultural, and extracurricular backgrounds. Admissions officers recognized that the recruitment of qualified student-athletes could help achieve diversity goals in

several respects. Student-athletes comprised ten to twenty percent of the undergraduate student enrollments on these campuses. Yield rates among student-athletes offered admission to these institutions also tended to be higher than the yield rates among the respective overall applicant pools. Supporting athletic recruitment could be an effective means of maintaining and increasing the take of prospective students from a shrinking pool. Increased attention to the recruitment of qualified student-athletes thus became part of a larger admissions effort on these campuses.

The visibility provided by athletic competition among the proposed members of the UAA offered a natural opportunity for the recruitment of students. Prospective students already familiar with a UAA institution in their own area but disposed, perhaps, to attend an institution outside their own geographic region could become familiar with other members of the UAA as those institutions competed against their local institution. Subsequently, those prospective students might very well explore admission opportunities at those other UAA institutions.

The visibility of UAA competition could also serve as a vehicle to develop or reinforce contacts with alumni in the UAA metropolitan areas. The positive messages communicated by the formation of the UAA to the alumni of the various institutions about the commitments of their respective alma maters to a high quality of undergraduate life could renew enthusiasm and allegiances among alumni. Those alumni, in turn, might become active participants in the recruitment of students from their local areas.

The UAA could be a strong inducement in recruiting student-athletes. The prospects for a young applicant were enticing. These schools offered

outstanding academic opportunities. They offered a reasonably intimate and personable campus atmosphere. The athletic competition and coaching they offered was among the best in Division III. In addition, they would have the opportunity to travel and see parts of the country they might not otherwise visit. Their college experience could be first-rate in every respect.

All of these institutions looked to the UAA as one of several strategies to bolster their recruitment of prospective undergraduate students. Interestingly, the potential of the UAA as a vehicle for the recruitment of students was not limited to undergraduates. During the initial meetings at Rochester, several individuals suggested the UAA would promote graduate school applications to their institutions from students on other UAA campuses as well.

The increased visibility of UAA institutions on the campuses of other member institutions and the exposure of a substantial base of undergraduate students to the campuses of member institutions through travel to competition sites would create an expanded base of potential graduate students among precisely those types of institutions from which UAA members seek to recruit graduate students.

The rationale was logical and straightforward. It was used by several senior administrators in making presentations about the potential of the UAA to deans and faculty members. Although more than one individual admitted this argument may have been a bit disingenuous at the outset, they found in practice that it did work. Not only were the anecdotal stories of student-athletes using visits to campuses as opportunities for law school, medical school, and business school interviews accurate, they were a reflection of increased interest in the graduate programs of UAA institutions by undergraduates on the various UAA

campuses. Several senior administrators indicated they had tracked the number of UAA undergraduates enrolled in their graduate programs and determined they were a substantial presence.

Proposition No. 5: Quality of Student Life

Participation in an athletic program the focus of which is the student-athlete, and the quality of which is measured by the quality of the total experience of the student-athlete, enhances the quality of life on campus for the student-athlete. The ability of all students to identify with student-athletes and opponents who are genuinely their peers in all respects extends this enhancement well beyond the bounds of the experiences of participants.

Of all the potential benefits projected from the formation of this university athletic association, its positive effect on the quality of life on campus was identified most often and most prominently by chief executives, senior administrators, and student affairs officers when discussing their evaluation of the proposed association. They anticipated benefits to campus life on several levels. The most obvious of these was at the level of the student-athletes. Next was at the level of the student body in general. Finally, was the contribution of this association to the overall ethos of the campus. Woven into each of these levels of consideration was the long-term impact on recruitment of prospective students and development of a loyal and committed alumni base.

The effects on student-athletes would be immediate and very visible. Within their own conference, they would compete on a national level. Their schedules would take them to major cities spread across the entire eastern half of the country. Moreover, they would compete against other student-athletes whose academic backgrounds and college experiences more closely mirrored their own abilities and experiences. These teams and these student-athletes would be their peers in the most comprehensive sense. Their academic

responsibilities and the priority of athletics in the context of their academic commitments would closely resemble their own. This suggested not only a more equitable level of competition, but perhaps a more satisfying competitive experience as well.

Academic and athletic administrators viewed the travel experience as an opportunity to enhance the overall educational experience of their student-athletes. Again this opportunity existed on several levels. Extended air travel itself would be a new experience for many of these students. The cities they would visit offered unique sight-seeing and cultural opportunities. It was the intention of these administrators that coaches and travel coordinators arrange for their student-athletes to take advantage of these offerings. The campuses they would visit also had much to offer. There would be opportunities to see the campuses, explore graduate schools, and speak with faculty and graduate admissions officers. There would be time to interact socially with their fellow student-athletes on these campuses. From the beginning, members of the UAA chose to structure their athletic competitions so that student-athletes would spend time together outside of the competitive arena. Championship events included banquets, receptions, and even a post-competition dance. Teams competing in round-robin sports such as soccer and basketball joined each other for an informal reception with pizza and chicken wings after each contest. For many student-athletes, the initial experience of interacting with their opponents immediately after a vigorously contested event was awkward but one they came to enjoy and appreciate as they matured.

The notion that these student-athletes would respect each other as peers was reinforced most clearly in a letter from the University of Chicago swim team to the chair of their Faculty Athletic Board following the first UAA swimming

and diving championship. In their letter, the Chicago swimmers spoke of how welcome they were made to feel by the other teams in contrast to similar meets in their old conference and how supportive their fellow competitors were throughout the meet. Not only did teams cheer on their own swimmers, they cheered on their opponents as well. Everyone derived satisfaction from knowing that their opponents, as well as their teammates, had achieved personal best performances. By the end of the meet everyone was cheering for their teams, for each other, and for the UAA as well.

The suggestion that these student-athletes would respect each other as peers carried over to the rest of the student body as well. Student-athletes at UAA institutions were and would continue to be admitted to their institutions and evaluated on the same basis as all other students. The level of expectation placed upon them in their academic endeavors would be the same as for all other students as well. Their full integration into the academic and residential fabric of the campuses made it easy for the general student bodies to identify them as their peers as well.

The same was true for UAA teams as they visited other campuses. As high school students, many students at UAA institutions had applied for admission to other UAA campuses or considered other UAA institutions in their college search process. Many students had friends who had applied to or enrolled in programs on these campuses. As upper-class college students, many looked to other UAA campuses as places to pursue their interests in graduate and professional schools. It was natural for students to consider the institutions of the UAA as peers of their own and, by extension, the student-athletes of those institutions as well.

At the time the UAA concept was formulated, all of the UAA campuses were engaged in some sort of process to evaluate the quality of student life on their campuses. The motivation for these efforts came from several sources. Perhaps the greatest of these was the sheer contrast that had grown between the quality of student life and student programs on the one hand, and the quality and scope of the academic programs of these institutions on the other.

During the post-World War II period, the attention of these campuses was focused on the development of academic and research programs and the movement of these institutions from the role of prominent regional universities to that of national research universities. The attention given to undergraduate life focused essentially on the modification of policies based on the concept of universities acting as “in loco parentis” and adjusting to the often adversarial relationships that developed between students and their universities as a result of the various protest movements of the sixties and seventies. By contrast the eighties brought dismal forecasts of declining undergraduate populations and the urgent need to focus on ways to attract prospective undergraduate students to campus. Student life issues took on a much larger institutional role in this context.

Interest in the intercollegiate athletics programs on the respective UAA campuses had languished to a significant degree for some time among students, faculty, and administrators. The revitalization of these programs through the establishment of a university athletic association was viewed as another means of boosting student morale and improving the overall quality of life on the campuses. The energy provided by the formation of the UAA would draw attention to athletics on each campus. Because the UAA was structured to be a group of peer institutions, students, faculty, and administrators could without

compromise identify themselves with this level of competition. They could, in a sense, take ownership of a part of their institution. The UAA along with parallel improvements in residential life, student affairs programming, and other areas could simply help make the campus a more fun place to be.

In turn, this improvement in student culture could make campuses more attractive and in the long run help in the recruitment of students. A more positive undergraduate student body, able to identify with the institution through athletic teams, music groups, or other student groups and activities beyond their academic interests suggested an alumni base that might continue a strong identification with the institution. Loyal alumni also translate into increased financial support, a long-term need faced by research universities experiencing a leveling if not a decline in the funding of sponsored research.

Proposition No. 6: Competitive Equity

It is important to both participants and institutions that student-athletes be presented with competitive opportunities in which they can have a reasonable expectation of experiencing some level of success.

One of the chief complaints of athletic administrators and student affairs officers regarding their athletic schedules prior to the establishment of the UAA was the lack of consistency in the types of institutions with which they were able to schedule athletic competition. They were concerned about the lack of a so-called “level playing field” when competing against certain types of institutions. They were also concerned that their student-athletes, students, and faculties often did not consider competition with some opponents as meaningful because of a lack of identity with the students competing on behalf of those institutions.

These administrators viewed the UAA as an opportunity for teams and individuals to compete against opponents bound by the same types of pressures and constraints and operating under similar athletic philosophies. Competition of this type would provide participants with a reasonable expectation of experiencing some level of success. This was not to imply that success was necessarily synonymous with winning. It did imply that student-athletes and the teams they comprise should provide each other with viable and competitive opponents. When the ball goes up, the pitch is thrown, the whistle blows, or the gun sounds, the outcome should be in doubt. Teams and individuals should be able to take pride in their own as well as their opponents' performances. Sportsmanship and ethical conduct should be an assumption, not a mandate.

Competing within an association of institutions with similar athletic philosophies, academic priorities, and commitments of resources would help to ensure the existence of a level playing field, however mythical that concept may be. It would also allow institutions to focus on the quality of their own student-athletes' experiences rather than on what other institutions are doing.

The competitive equity sought in principle by the members of the UAA has been realized in practice. By the end of the sixth year of competition within the Association, every institution had won at least one team championship, and at least one individual from each institution had been chosen or won athlete-of-the-year honors in a sport. While some institutions have tended to be more successful than others, that success is often related to what might be called niches in certain sports, and those niches are well-distributed among the membership of the Association. No one or two institutions win everything all the time — not even most of the time.

Proposition No. 7: Financial Resources

Athletics programs are to be funded as a part of the institutional budget, and must operate within the level of resources available to the institution.

The institutions comprising the UAA had long established the principle on their campuses that intercollegiate athletics are not to be considered cost centers. Actions establishing this principle were taken in rather dramatic fashion on several campuses as noted previously. The athletics programs of these institutions were and continue to be funded entirely as part of the annual operating budgets of the respective campuses. In each case their budgets and funding resources are housed within the student affairs division or comparable administrative unit of their respective institutions.

The level of financial commitment to intercollegiate athletics on these campuses was substantial prior to the formation of the UAA. Given the relatively comparable levels of sport sponsorship, coaching, travel, support staff, and facilities it is reasonable to assume the level of financial support for athletics was comparable across institutions. The exception to this was Emory University. Given its lower level of sport sponsorship and much more recent entry into the realm of intercollegiate sport, funding for intercollegiate athletics at Emory was not comparable to the other members of the UAA. The institution did, however, anticipate the addition of several new athletic teams, coaching positions, and other enhancements with their entry into the new association.

Despite the substantial level of funding already committed to athletics programs on the various UAA campuses, the level of funding required to support team travel among UAA institutions represented a substantial increase in funding over levels provided for purely regional competition. Estimates provided by Mr. Rasmussen during the initial meetings at Rochester suggested

the increase in cost could range on the high end from \$240,000 to \$326,000 over current levels (Rasmussen, 1985). This generally represented an increase of 10% to 20% in funding for athletics among these institutions.

Because the concept of the UAA was an initiative of chief executive officers and senior academic administrators, these increases were evaluated more in the context of the overall operating budgets of the institutions rather than in the context of their athletics budgets. As one chief executive commented when asked about the financial commitment during a campus press conference to announce the formation of the UAA, the increase amounted to less than two hundredths of a percent of the overall operating budget of the institution. Rather than attempting to justify the expense on that basis, the point was that the cost took on a different perspective when measured against the whole of the institution. Specifically, the expense was well within the resources of the institution. Further, justification of the expense was based on overall institutional perspectives.

The expected returns to the institutions would come in the form of direct benefits to the participants, improvement in the quality of student life on campus, an enhancement of institutional identity through association with the other members, greater institutional visibility, and recruitment of new students as well as by other means. From the perspective of chief executives, their senior staff, and their governing boards, this was an acceptable investment on the part of the institutions. Although the success their athletic programs and the UAA would not to be measured in terms of direct financial returns to the institutions, it was anticipated that benefits derived from membership in the UAA would contribute, along with other initiatives, to the long-term financial health of the institutions.

Financial considerations did constrain the determination of how competition would be conducted in various sports. The competitive model adopted by the association members included a blend of round robin competition and festival or championship competition. The choice of format in each sport was determined by its suitability for round-robin or festival-type competition, its visibility, and whether association competition could or should supplant other regional or local competition.

Proposition No. 8: Opportunities for Men, Women, and All Teams

It was absolutely imperative to members of the UAA, that this association provide to female student-athletes the same opportunities afforded to male student-athletes.

The provision of equitable opportunities for male and female student-athletes was never an issue of dispute or concern in discussions related to the formation of the UAA. It was an assumption from the beginning. All of the competitive models that were drawn by the planning group included competition in all women's and all men's sports for which prospective members sponsored teams. These models assumed the same modes of transportation and per diem expenses for men and women and for all sports. Travel squad sizes in the same men's and women's sports were assumed to be the same as well.

The philosophy of the proposed association articulated in the planning meetings assumed equal opportunities for men and women. The rationale used to support the formation of the association assumed the benefits in areas like student recruitment and contributions to the quality of student life on campuses would apply equally to men and women and derive from both men's and women's athletic competition.

The charter Constitution of the UAA included equity of opportunity for male and female student-athletes as a fundamental principle. Its minimum sport sponsorship requirements for institutional membership were the same for men's and women's teams. The Bylaws mandated representation of both men's and women's athletic interests on the Athletic Administrators Committee, the body primarily responsible for the conduct of athletic competition. The Codes of Conduct for competition in each sport were carefully drawn to ensure equality of treatment and emphasis among all men's and women's sports. Men's and women's teams would travel together. They would participate in joint championships. Each sport would have a Sport Committee comprising the head coaches from each participating institution to make recommendations to the Athletic Administrators Committee concerning the conduct of competition in their sport. In practice, these sport committees functioned as a single committee for each sport rather than as separate men's and women's committees for each sport.

The concern for equity extended beyond equity by gender to equity across sports. There was great concern among participants in the planning meetings that this association not be viewed primarily as a football conference or a basketball conference. The former concern was addressed simply by the fact that only five of the nine institutions would compete in football in the Association, and it would take several years before those institutions could work free of existing scheduling commitments to permit a full association schedule. Because football and basketball tended to be very visible sports and required round-robin play they required substantial financial resources. Round-robin competition was also provided in soccer, but most other sports lent themselves more to festival or championship play. Extended championship opportunities were

provided in all other sports, and care was taken to ensure that all championships were conducted with a level and quality of event management equal to that provided to football and basketball. The emphasis was on equality of treatment across gender and across sports.

Proposition No. 9: Institutional Determination

It is the prerogative of each institution to determine the level of sport sponsorship and level of participation in competition within the association that is appropriate to its own student-athletes and resources. Such decisions should not be dictated by other members except at some minimal level to ensure the existence of a credible athletic association.

Athletic conferences generally set a minimum level of participation in conference competition as a requisite for membership. Often there is an expectation that members of an athletic conference will sponsor teams and compete in every sport for which competition is sponsored by the conference. Alternatively, conferences may require participation in every conference-sponsored sport in which a member institution fields a team. The members of the UAA chose not to do this.

The UAA Bylaws require that at a minimum active member institutions compete annually in one round-robin sport for men, one round-robin sport for women, three festival-type sports for men, and three festival-type sports for women. The UAA sponsors competition in twelve sports for men and ten sports for women. A complete listing of UAA sport sponsorship and participation by institution is included in Figure 8.

Allowing institutions to determine their own levels of participation in UAA competition, provided individual institutions with a significant degree of flexibility in maintaining existing relationships with local institutions and

existing conference affiliations. This was very important for several institutions. Brandeis, Carnegie Mellon, Case Western Reserve, Chicago, and Johns Hopkins held membership in other conferences at the time the UAA proposal was put forward. Chicago elected to withdraw from its other conference commitments immediately. Carnegie Mellon and Brandeis withdrew from their other conferences within the first few years of UAA competition. Case Western Reserve and Johns Hopkins maintain membership in their other conferences and for the most part continue to consider those affiliations their primary commitment in cases of scheduling conflicts.

FIGURE 8
UAA Sport Sponsorship and Participation by Institution

Sport	BR	CMU	CWRU	EU	JHU	NYU	UC	UR	WU	No.
Football	X	U	U	X		X	U	U	U	5
Men's Soccer	U	U	U	U		U	U	U	U	8
Women's Soccer	U	U	U	U		U	U	U	U	8
Men's Cross Country	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	9
Women's Cross Country	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	9
Volleyball	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	9
Men's Basketball	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	9
Women's Basketball	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	U	9
Wrestling	X	X	U	X	U	U	U	X	X	4
Men's Swimming & Diving	U	U		U	U	U	U	U	U	8
Women's Swimming & Diving	U	U		U	U	U	U	U	U	8
Men's Fencing	U	X	U	X	U	U	X	X	X	4
Women's Fencing	U	X	U	X	U	U	X	X	X	4
Men's Indoor Track & Field	U	U		U		U	U	U	U	7
Women's Indoor Track & Field	U	U		U		U	U	U	U	7
Baseball	U	X	U	U	U	X	U	U	U	7
Softball	U	X	U	X	X	U	U	U	X	5
Golf	U	U	U	U		U	X	U	X	6
Men's Outdoor Track & Field	U	U	U	U		U	U	U	U	8
Women's Outdoor Track & Field	U	U	U	U		U	U	U	U	8
Men's Tennis	U	U	U	U		U	U	U	U	8
Women's Tennis	U	U	U	U		U	U	U	U	8
Total	20	17	18	17	11	20	19	18	17	

U — participates in UAA competition, X — does not sponsor sport (From 1996-97 UAA Manual)

In a different direction, the University of Rochester subsequently chose to formalize an existing series of scheduling arrangements by participating in the formation of a conference of private, Upstate New York colleges and universities as an adjunct to its UAA commitments.

Had this flexibility not been available at the time the UAA was formed, it is doubtful that Case Western Reserve and Johns Hopkins would have been part of the original group. While this strategy was successful in enabling the widest range of institutions to become a part of the UAA, it did introduce some tension as competition within the association became more highly valued by its members, especially among those institutions whose level of participation is highest. That tension has been limited primarily to the selection of dates for championships where institutions with multiple conference commitments are faced with their two conference championships scheduled on the same or overlapping dates. In most cases, these scheduling conflicts have been resolved in a manner that allowed all members of the UAA to participate in the particular UAA championship.

The flexibility afforded members and the professionalism displayed by athletic administrators in resolving scheduling issues and similar matters, combined with the very positive experiences of student-athletes participating in UAA competitions, did serve to increase the level of participation of the multiple-conference members over time.

Proposition No. 10: Institutional Integrity

The confidence of individual members of an athletic conference in the ability and intent of other conference members to operate within the rules, both in practice and spirit, allows

institutions to operate under broad philosophical concepts and keeps rule-making to a minimum.

Like equity among men's and women's sports, the principle of institutional integrity was an assumption of the UAA membership from the outset. The chief executives, senior administrators, and athletic administrators of the UAA institutions displayed a universal respect for the integrity of their colleagues on the other UAA campuses. There was never any doubt that the members of the UAA would operate their programs within the letter and spirit of all NCAA and UAA rules. This assumption was included among the fundamental principles of the UAA constitution.

The active and primary role that chief executives played in the formation of the Association gave this principle credibility. The comprehensive involvement of chief student affairs officers and senior administrators gave it substance. The very clear and direct reporting lines from chief executive to student affairs officer to athletic administrator and coach ensured that what was expressed in principle would be evidenced in practice. The assumption was clear to all those around the table. Long before any problem of institutional integrity or responsibility rose to a level requiring the attention of the association membership, it would be handled effectively and appropriately at the institutional level.

The atmosphere of trust and mutual regard which this principle engenders is one that enabled these institutions. It allowed member institutions to focus on their own programs rather than those of others. It allowed the group to direct its attention to what it is that they wanted to achieve — not what they wanted to avoid. For the membership of the UAA, the goal was to make real the philosophy of athletic competition on which they chose to base their association.

They sought to provide their student-athletes with a high-quality athletic experience. That experience included competition against their peers, interaction with coaches who were teachers concerned with the development of the whole student-athlete, unique travel opportunities, access to quality facilities and equipment, and the opportunity to enjoy the success of competing against some of the best student-athletes and teams in Division III of the NCAA. Moreover, it included competition in an atmosphere where good sportsmanship and ethical conduct was assumed and respect for all participants was visibly demonstrated.

Proposition No. 11: Role of the Chief Executives

The pursuit of an idea such as the UAA was made possible through the involvement and active leadership of the presidents of those institutions. In cases where the level of presidential involvement was lower, the process of formation of the UAA benefited from collaborative decision-making processes where faculty or academic administrators played a prominent role.

The active participation of the chief executives in the deliberations leading to the formation of the UAA was absolutely the single most significant factor in the successful conclusion of this process. The issues at hand were significant. They were institutional in scope. It was not unlikely that the members of this proposed athletic association would be identified with each other in an expanding spectrum of public arenas, not just athletics. These considerations and others required involvement at the highest levels of the institution.

The involvement of the chief executives, however, began well ahead of the invitation to attend a meeting to discuss the possibilities of a university athletic association. Almost all of the UAA campuses were involved in comprehensive reviews of their intercollegiate or student affairs programs in the years prior to the emergence of the UAA concept. Many of those reviews were initiated at the direction or with the full support of the chief executive for reasons that have been

described previously. A number of those efforts suggested movement in a direction similar to that afforded by the UAA proposal.

The proposal to consider formation of a university athletic association among major research universities located in prominent metropolitan areas and spread across the eastern half of the country carried with it a high level of credibility precisely because it was a presidential initiative. The solicitation came from two chief executives who, along with their institutions, were known and respected by those colleagues receiving the invitation to participate in discussions. It is unlikely that this concept would have carried anywhere near this level of credibility had it come from a group of athletic administrators or coaches.

The credibility of the initial invitation also benefited from a resonance with efforts already underway on many of the campuses. As previously noted, most of those efforts were themselves presidential initiatives, or they enjoyed the attention given to initiatives that are institutional in scope. The UAA proposal generally offered an intriguing fit with these unilateral efforts, one that could potentially provide a high level of synergy in complementing other campus initiatives.

The resources needed to make the UAA a reality were substantial. The financial challenges were considerable. The evaluation and development of this new concept required the involvement of individuals capable not only of speaking for the institution but also able to make substantial commitments on behalf of the institution. The chief executives made available the necessary resources to meet these challenges.

Most notable of the resources they provided was the time and involvement of senior officers of their institutions. They assigned senior deans and vice presidents to participate in the discussions and encouraged them to follow through on the development of the UAA concept. In several cases chief executives committed significant portions of their own time to planning meetings and discussions. William Danforth, Jay Oliva, and Dennis O'Brien actively participated in the Rochester and St. Louis meetings. They assumed a hands-on role, and their vision helped shape the new association in ways that were different from many other athletic conferences.

Although not all chief executives took active roles in the group discussions, they all played significant roles on their own campuses. The financial implications alone required that there be involvement at the level of the chief executive. The individual decisions of the chief executives to support this concept financially and to support the philosophical tenets on which it was based gave the proposed association the momentum it needed to gain the approval of faculty, other administrators, and boards of trustees.

In this process, the chief executives assumed genuine ownership of this association. Its governance structures were purposefully designed to ensure that its athletic policy would be directed by the academic side of the institution. The chief executives were clearly in charge and would remain thoroughly involved in all matters of policy, philosophy, and finance. They would also assume major responsibility for oversight of the administration of the new association.

The high level of involvement of chief executives and academic administrators in the process of the formation of the UAA was clearly responsible for the uniqueness of the UAA competitive model and its variance

from existing models governing the conduct of athletic competition among institutions. The notion that a group of universities united by a common athletic philosophy but separated by substantial geographic distances would choose to join in formal athletic competition, rely on the integrity and judgment of each member to determine its appropriate level of participation, support their student-athletes in a manner reflective of the quality of their academic institutions, and continue to compete in Division III of the NCAA was indeed different and even inspiring.

Proposition No. 12: Coalition Building and Consultation

A key element in the formation of the UAA was the staging of numerous informal, bilateral conversations among senior academic administrators of prospective members. These conversations served to establish a common philosophical ground and to reinforce the concept of similar institutional identities among potential members.

As noted previously, several institutions in the UAA group were in the process of evaluating the direction of their athletics programs and looking for alternatives prior to the suggestion of the formation of a university athletic association. A few had even come to the conclusion that what they needed was an association with other strong academic institutions willing to support quality athletics programs without compromising the academic responsibilities of their student-athletes. Some had also discussed this possibility with colleagues at other institutions. What this enterprise lacked was coordination. It needed someone or something that would provide the momentum to move these individual undertakings from the level of informal discussions to that of collective action.

That someone was the person of Harry Kisker, vice provost and dean of students at Washington University in St. Louis. The something was the eventual

invitation to attend the discussions hosted by Dennis O'Brien and William Danforth in Rochester and St. Louis.

In the process of investigating alternative directions for the Washington University athletic program in collaboration with John Schael, his director of athletics, Kisker developed a vision of a new sort of athletic association formed among like academic institutions with a common athletic philosophy. With the full support and encouragement of Chancellor William Danforth, "and his foot firmly at my back," Kisker visited numerous campuses in an effort to speak with student affairs administrators, presidents, and athletic administrators regarding this concept. Mr. Kisker's efforts stimulated similar conversations among others who shared his perspectives.

During the same period, Chancellor Danforth conducted a similar lobbying effort among several of his presidential colleagues. He found an enthusiastic ally in Dennis O'Brien of Rochester. O'Brien and his director of athletics, John Reeves, had been engaged in similar studies at Rochester, and the concept resonated strongly with their perspective. Having had experience in the development of the Colonial League (now the Patriot League) while president at Bucknell University, O'Brien and his staff committed substantial resources to surrounding this concept with detail and issuing a formal invitation for others to join in concrete discussions about the formation of a university athletic association.

The Washington-Rochester coalition quickly expanded to include several other institutions. Efforts were made to share leadership with other institutions in moving the formative process forward. These efforts were well-considered and helped minimize conflicts while establishing an atmosphere of trust and

mutual purpose among potential members of the UAA. This was accomplished by taking advantage of Harry Kisker's previous discussions with individuals on various campuses and the relationships he had forged. The process also benefited from the professional relationships of individuals who had worked together at other institutions or in other athletic conferences prior to their current responsibilities. This included athletic directors, deans, faculty members, and several presidents.

These efforts at shared leadership were more than symbolic. They involved responsibilities that vested individual institutions in the success of the overall undertaking. Rochester and Chicago worked on drafts of a constitution and bylaws. Washington organized codes of conduct for each sport into a standard format. NYU coordinated public relations efforts. Carnegie Mellon drafted an organizational plan for a central office and secured a grant of computer equipment for the new association. Several institutions worked on initial scheduling proposals for different sports. It was very important that the initial leaders let go of the process — to cede control to the group. The result was that the group took collective ownership of the process. It was not a Washington or Rochester project. It became the University Athletic Association, and all members shared stewardship of the organization.

Proposition No. 13: Effects of Progress on Other Campuses

The progress of discussions on individual campuses affected decision-making on other campuses. Specifically, the commitment of institutions with which other institutions sought a common identity or whose leaders enjoyed a high degree of respect influenced the willingness of other institutions to commit themselves to the concept of a university athletic association.

The decision-making processes on individual campuses were less affected by events, processes, and persons on other campuses than originally supposed.

With the exceptions of Washington and Rochester, whose chief executives had put forward the concept of the proposed association, each of the prospective member institutions engaged in a thorough internal evaluation of the UAA proposal culminating in a decision at the level of the chief executive and, for most, their boards of trustees. These institutional decisions were driven much more strongly by consideration of the benefits to be derived by each institution's own students, student-athletes, and campuses rather than by comparisons with other campuses.

The reputations of the chief executives who took an active role in shaping the concept of the proposed association influenced other chief executives in that their support gave the proposal initial credibility. It made serious consideration of the proposal acceptable, even desirable. Existing personal relationships among several chief executives, other senior academic officers, and athletic administrators also served to help overcome the institutional inertia inherent in reviewing new initiatives, especially those from outside the institution.

Another major factor in overcoming initial skepticism regarding the scope of the proposal was the work of the individuals involved in planning the Rochester and St. Louis meetings. Their work was thorough. Their approach had been open-ended and responsive to others' perspectives. The level of detail provided was comprehensive but not overwhelming. The plan had a sound philosophical basis. Perhaps most importantly, the group took on the issue of cost up front in a clear and concise yet comprehensive manner. The financial projections developed by Mr. Rasmussen made it impossible for institutional representatives to dismiss the notion of such an association out of hand simply by saying it would be too expensive to consider. The numbers were there as were the means for each institution to test its own numbers. This allowed

discussions to move to a higher plane. Decision makers could focus on the philosophy, rationale, and benefits of the proposed association knowing the financial investment required of their institutions.

Decision makers on individual campuses were affected more by the collective process than by the influence of specific campuses or individuals. The concept of the proposed university athletic association was attractive. It suggested that athletics programs could be conducted as part of a genuinely educational program. To conduct quality athletics programs with an appropriate attitude about their role would be a subject of pride. There was a statement to be made in that regard. Individual chief executives were drawn to make that statement, but the prospect was made even more attractive by the group of institutions from which the collective statement would emanate. The collective reputation of the group was impressive and held sway, even for those chief executives who had reservations regarding the levelling effect on institutional reputations that might come from the suggestion of a common identity.



Chapter V. Summary and Suggestions

Answers to the central questions posed in this study are drawn from an examination of the propositions explored in the study and the historical contexts within which the athletics programs of the member institutions of the University Athletic Association have evolved. The answers, just as the questions they address, are distinct but inseparably linked.

There is one central element embedded in the answers to each of these questions. It is in the background of every issue and at the forefront of most. That element is the student. The effects upon and benefits to students generally and to student-athletes specifically, pervade these issues at all levels. This may not be surprising given the context of higher education during these times.

In the years preceding formation of the UAA, it was evident that the quality of the undergraduate educational experience, in all its dimensions, was becoming more closely linked to the current and future success of institutions to recruit a diverse body of quality students in adequate numbers, develop and retain their loyalty, and in turn maintain and strengthen undergraduate tuition and alumni giving as significant sources of revenue. Whereas the attention of institutions in previous decades was focused more on the development of facilities, programs, and faculty, it was now focused more directly on students.

The institutions of the UAA were no exception. Given their positions within higher education and trends affecting research universities, they may have had an even more compelling motivation to focus on students than many other institutions. There was something more at work on these campuses however. Whether because of leadership style or the educational philosophies of chief executives and senior administrators, there existed on these campuses a

distinctive belief in the value of undergraduate education and a recognition of central position of students relative to the core missions of these institutions. It is not surprising then that the student became such a pervasive element in these discussions and events.

The first question posed in this study asked why the nine member institutions of the University Athletic Association choose to affiliate with one another. It suggested a set of subquestions. Why these nine institutions in particular? Why not other institutions with strong academic reputations or competitive athletics programs? Why not institutions located within their own regional areas? Why not remain independent or maintain current conference arrangements?

First and foremost, the institutions of the UAA chose to affiliate with each other for institutional reasons. They shared a common identity as academic institutions. They were members of a natural cohort of institutions that routinely considered each other to be peer institutions. They also shared common memberships in several respected consortia of colleges and universities. Within these groupings, the UAA institutions shared a number of common characteristics. They were small to medium-sized research universities. They focused on undergraduate education as a preparation for graduate and professional study. They sponsored extensive programs of professional and graduate study. Their faculties and student bodies also shared similar profiles in many respects.

The common element that brought these specific research universities together was the athletic philosophy they shared. Their programs focused on students first and tempered the role of the student as athlete by keeping that role

clearly in the context of academic endeavor. They were all willing to commit the resources necessary to create a quality athletic experience in its fullest sense, but without any compromise to the academic integrity of the institution or the role of athlete as student.

The commonality of institutional contexts, the strongly-held belief in a common athletic philosophy, and a high level of respect for the leadership of each institution created a trust in the integrity of this Association and its constituent parts. It also created a highly desirable collective identity, and in so doing, increased the visibility of individual institutions. The integrity of the Association and its constituents ensured that the athletics programs of the institutions would live within their means. The benefit to student-athletes was a greater degree of competitive equity and competition against opponents with whom they could identify as peers in every respect.

The choice of institutions was also tempered by geography and travel constraints. The potential membership of this association was widely spread geographically. The focus upon institutions in larger metropolitan areas served several purposes. It helped control some of the cost of travel. The accessibility of the campuses helped reduce travel time and the time away from campus for student-athletes. The metropolitan settings of these institutions also contributed to the commonality of their institutional contexts as well.

While each of these institutions could have retained the same identity as independent institutions or as members of other athletic associations, their collective action reinforced these various elements — identity, visibility, athletic philosophy — in a manner and at a level not possible through unilateral action. The import of the collective statement of these institutions about the role of

intercollegiate athletics is greater than the sum of its parts because it is a collective statement made by very prominent institutions and because it reflects choices made for what many would simply call “all the right reasons”.

The second question posed in this study asked why these institutions chose to sponsor athletic competition in the particular manner they prescribed. Several subquestions again followed. Why continue in Division III? Why not move to Division I? Why not compete just in selected sports? Why not require all members to compete in all sports? Why travel over half the country? How can you establish an association requiring significant commitment, yet rely on such a minimum of regulation? The answers to these questions and their various subquestions lie in the common athletic philosophies of these institutions and the respect they held for the integrity of each member institution.

These institutions held a firm belief that intercollegiate athletics is an integral part of the educational fabric of their institutions. It is not just part of the educational experience. It is rather, part of how these institutions educate their students. There is learning that occurs within the athletic context that is related to and positively affects learning in the academic context.

The first consequence of this belief is that student-athletes are students first and athletes subsequent to their role as students. Athletic competition must honor this paradigm. The academic enterprise must be given primary consideration. To compromise its priorities is unacceptable for both the well-being of the student and the integrity of the institutional mission. Conference competition with institutions of similar philosophy and institutional context helps ensure that these principles do in fact become practice.

Conference competition does not take place in a vacuum. Nor does it comprise the entirety of the competitive schedule. For those reasons, the placement of athletic competition within a national organization is critical as well. For the institutions of the UAA, a philosophy of athletic competition consistent with their own is found in Division III of the NCAA. It does not exist within either of the other two major divisions of that organization.

The financial resources committed to the conduct of intercollegiate athletics by members of the UAA are not typical of Division III institutions. These resources do not compromise the integrity of the Division III philosophy. They are not intended to provide a competitive edge. Rather these resources reinforce that philosophy by making it possible for the students of these institutions to compete in a context that complements their priorities as students in research universities and does not compromise their academic priorities or the quality of their educational experience.

The fact that athletic competition within the UAA takes place with a minimum of regulation and without a strong prescription regarding the level of institutional participation reflects two principles. The first is a belief in the integrity of individual institutions. The second is a belief in the diversity of institutions and the need for institutions to determine those directions that best meet the needs of their own students and their own campuses. Both of these principles reflect several underlying factors.

These institutions all operate within very similar structures. The issues they face and the decisions they make from an institutional perspective share similar contexts. They all benefit from strong presidential involvement, academic leadership, and clearly defined reporting lines. Senior administrative

officers of these institutions provide direct oversight and guidance in the formation and implementation of athletic policy. Institutional integrity and the will to act accordingly are inherent in these structures. They are expectations founded on justifiable trust, not mandates borne of regulation.

Although these institutions share many commonalities and a common association, they are their own institutions. Within the framework of this association, institutional autonomy assumes a role analogous to the academic freedom of faculty within individual institutions. Decisions about sport sponsorship, level of participation, and many other issues are best made within each institution. While those decisions may reflect consideration of association-wide perspectives, they must rest upon a rationale that is in the best interest of each institution's students and programs. If this is not the case, the relationship of the institution to the association and its other members may be weakened, and by extension, the association itself. This principle is also founded on a trust in the integrity of individual institutions, their leadership, and their decision-making processes.

The third question posed in this investigation asked how this Association, composed of these particular nine institutions, came to be. This question carried with it a final set of subquestions. Who were the decision makers? What were the consultative and decision-making processes on the individual campuses? How did events and processes on one campus affect those on other campuses? What were the collective decision-making processes?

This Association had its beginnings when the chief executives of several of these institutions charged members of their senior staff to study the state of student life on their campuses in the context of changes that were occurring in

higher education and anticipated to affect a wide spectrum of institutions in the 1980's and beyond. Intercollegiate athletics became a significant point of attention in these inquiries. The role of athletics was examined from an institutional perspective and found in need of a new direction. The chief executives of these institutions encouraged their staffs to develop alternatives.

The result was the concept of a university athletic association. Given the scope and scale of this proposal, it was clear that the participation of other institutions must necessarily be sought at the level of the chief executive. Two chief executives committed themselves to this effort, and they were joined by others. Members of their staffs created a formative process that was participative, open-ended, thorough, and well-considered. The collective process involved chief executives and senior staff members of the participating institutions from start to finish. The group operated on the basis of developing a broad consensus on all issues.

The decision-making processes on every campus involved the chief executive and senior staff. Several institutions involved their governing boards also. The breadth of consultation within each campus community varied considerably, but generally included faculty, athletic staff, and students. It was clear, however, that these decisions were being made at the institutional level and for institutional reasons.

While individual institutions were influenced by the collective identity of the group and the visibility to be gained from association with this set of institutions, their decision-making processes were guided by unilateral concerns and determinations rather than the level of support for the proposal on other campuses.

The continued involvement of chief executives and senior administrators along with the work of a highly capable group of athletic administrators was responsible for guiding the development of the new Association and its unique character. Ultimate responsibility on each campus and within the Association rested with the chief executives, and they remained thoroughly involved. Academic administrators guided the development of policy and assumed a strong oversight role. Athletic administrators implemented those policies in a manner entirely consistent with the philosophical basis on which they were developed.

Equally important in the translation of philosophy and operating principles into practice was the role of the conference executive and the definition of that office. By defining the role of the conference executive as executive secretary, the members of the association acknowledged that responsibility for carrying forward the principles they enumerated would rest with them. The authority and subsequent actions of the association would come from a governing committee structure comprising administrators, faculty, and coaches of the member institutions, not from an individual employed to act as a policing agent.

By hiring an experienced administrator who was intimately involved in the formative processes of the association as their conference executive, the member institutions helped ensure the association would evolve in a manner consistent with their expectations. By taking responsibility for hiring this individual and assigning oversight of that office to an executive committee composed primarily of academic administrators, the chief executives reinforced their role as primary stewards of the association.

Suggestions

The answers to the central questions posed in this study suggest a set of seven principles that may guide institutions of higher education, individually and collectively, as they seek to clarify the role of intercollegiate athletics on and among their campuses. While the unique character of this Association and the process of its formation generated the questions defining this investigation, it is the context of intercollegiate sport nationally, against which backdrop these questions are answered, that provides contrast and gives meaning to these results. It is the substance of this contrast that suggests the following set of principles and their generalization to other institutions, conferences, and the larger context of intercollegiate athletics generally.

First, intercollegiate athletics is an institutional issue and as such it demands the ongoing attention and commitment of chief executives and senior academic administrators. The leadership of these individuals can ensure that athletic policy and practices are guided by broad institutional perspectives and not limited by purely competitive perspectives. This principle must be applied at the conference level and beyond, as well as within individual institutions.

Second, the integrity of all individuals concerned with intercollegiate athletics must rise to a level of expectation equal to that demanded of research, scholarly writing, teaching, and learning. Integrity is the fabric of the educational institution. It is an expectation at all levels. It is demanded, because without it the advancement of knowledge cannot occur. Intercollegiate athletics requires no less. Institutional integrity makes possible the trust that allows athletic competition to realize its great potential.

Third, institutions must respect the diversity of missions that exist within higher education and accept the inherent differences in resources and directions that this implies. Institutions serve different constituencies. They must determine their direction based on choices that best serve the interests of their own students and their own levels of resources. The level playing field is a myth. The fact that institutions may benefit from advantages inherent in the diversity of their recruiting pool, location, size, or other factors is not itself inherently unfair. It simply reflects reality. This issue is best addressed through conference affiliation, selective scheduling, and a focus on competition within those kinds of associations.

Fourth, athletics programs should be funded by the institution, not as cost centers. This ensures a more direct link between philosophical principle and program direction. It motivates institutions to conduct their programs within their available resources. When athletics programs are conducted as cost centers, guiding principles become secondary. Affordability and revenue generation then become the defining forces.

Fifth, the student-athlete should be what the athletic enterprise is all about in colleges and universities. These are programs for students. Without them, there is no intercollegiate athletic program. The student-athlete is by definition a student first and an intercollegiate athlete only as a consequence of that role as student. All athletic policy must be guided by principles that support, complement, and promote the academic endeavors of student-athletes. Student-athletes should be provided a quality athletic experience in its fullest sense.

Sixth, the academic enterprise is primary. Institutions of higher education are first, last, and always academic enterprises. The primacy of the central mission of the institution must manifest itself in every endeavor of its constituent parts. Athletics programs should reflect the quality and the mission of the institutions within which they exist. Control of the enterprise must remain within the institution, and that institution is an academy of scholars, educators, and researchers. Intercollegiate athletics benefits from a broad institutional view of its role in the academy.

Seventh, student-athletes and athletic teams should be afforded equity of treatment across all sports and across genders. If the conduct of athletics programs is approached from a broad institutional perspective, this should be a natural consequence. Men, women, and all teams should have the benefit of good coaching, adequate facilities, proper equipment, consistent scheduling and competitive opportunities, comparable travel arrangements, and equitable access to support services.

There may be other principles that can be drawn from this study, but these seven stand out. They are not necessarily new. Several notable studies and commissions have made similar recommendations in the past. What the members of the University Athletic Association have done is offer an alternative to Division I and II institutions and a challenge to Division III institutions. Colleges and universities can conduct their intercollegiate athletics programs within the framework of an athletic philosophy firmly grounded in the academic mission of the institution, while providing their student-athletes, campus communities, alumni, and other constituencies with a first-rate athletic experience. This can be accomplished without compromise to the integrity of the academy or the academic and athletic pursuits of its students.

VI. References

Eight major universities establish national athletic association. (1986, June 25). Press release issued by University Athletic Association at New York Hilton Hotel, NYC.

Keeping faith with the student-athlete: a new model for intercollegiate athletics. (1991). Report of the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics. The Knight Foundation.

Three thousand futures: the next twenty years for higher education. (1980). The Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education.

The University Athletic Association makes news... (1986, Summer). A collection of journal, magazine, and newspaper accounts of the formation of the UAA. New York University Public Affairs Office.

1988-89 UAA Manual. (1988). University Athletic Association.

Allen, George H. and O'Leary, Holly. (1993). The National Collegiate Athletic Association. The centennial celebration of our profession. National Association of Collegiate Directors of Athletics.

Anderson, John F. (1986, Fall/Winter) The days when Case was Ohio grid king. Case Alumnus. Case Alumni Association.

Andre, Judith and James, David N. (ed.). (1991) Rethinking college athletics. Temple University Press, Philadelphia.

Atwell, Robert H. (1979, Fall). Some reflections of collegiate athletics. Educational Record, 60 (4).

Broeg, Bob. (1990, October 5). A century on the gridiron. Washington University football centennial banquet program.

Cable, Lynette. (1993). Conferences. The centennial celebration of our profession. National Association of Collegiate Directors of Athletics.

Cady, Edwin. (1978). The big game - college sports and American life. The University of Tennessee Press: Knoxville.

Castagnera, Jim. (1974, October). From varsity 11 to spartans: Case Reserve football 1891-1974. Images. Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.

Chu, Donald. (1989). The character of American higher education and intercollegiate sport. State University of New York Press.

Coakley, Jay J. (1990). Sport in society - issues and controversies. Times Mirror/Mosby.

Cohen, Jeffrey. (1988, Summer). Towers of learning and the University Athletic Association. Brandeis Review.

Cohen, Michael D., March, James G., and Olsen, Johan P. (1972, March). A garbage can model of organizational choice. Administrative Science Quarterly.

Cosell, Howard. (1986, September 21). It's a veritable league of notions. New York Newsday, Daily Sports News.

Davidson, James F. (1983, Winter). Three illusions of college football. Liberal Education, 69 (4).

Dickason, Donald G. (1979, Fall). The future of collegiate athletics. Educational Record, 60 (4).

El-Khawas. Elaine. (1979, Fall). Self-regulation and collegiate athletics. Educational Record, 60 (4).

Edwards, Harry. (1973). Sociology of sport. The Dorsey Press.

Fetterman, David M. (1989). Ethnography step by step. Sage Publications. Newbury Park, California.

Funk, Gary D. (1991). Major violation—the unbalanced priorities in athletics and academics. Leisure Press. Champaign, Illinois.

Getzels, J.W. and Guba, E.G. (n.d.). Social behavior and the administrative process. (A paper).

Gerber, Ellen (1979, Fall). The legal basis for the regulation of intercollegiate sport. Educational Record, 60 (4).

Grant, Christine. (1979, Fall). Institutional autonomy and intercollegiate athletics. Educational Record, 60 (4).

Guba, E.G. and Lincoln, Y.S. (1981). Effective evaluation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Guttman, Allen. (1988). A whole new ballgame—an interpretation of American sports. University of North Carolina Press. Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

Hanford, George H. (1974). An inquiry into the need for and a feasibility of a national study of intercollegiate athletics: A Report to the American Council on Education, Washington. D.C. American Council on Education.

Hanford, George H. (1979, Fall). Controversies in college sports. Educational Record, 60 (4).

Hart-Nibbrig, Nand and Cottingham, Clement. (1986). The political economy of college sports. Lexington Books. D.C. Heath and Co. Lexington, Massachusetts.

Hughes, William L. and Williams, Jesse F. (1944). Sports their organization and administration. A.S. Barnes and Co. New York.

Husman, Burris F. (1973). The future of Athletics in higher education--can they survive. An ERIC document ED 099 378.

Jencks, Christopher and Riesman, David. (1977). The academic revolution. The University of Chicago Press.

Kidder, Louise. (1981). Research methods in social relations (4th edition). New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston.

Lapchick, Richard E. (1986). Fractured focus - sports as a reflection of society. Lexington Books.

Lederman, Douglas. (1991) . Knight Commission tells presidents to use their power to reform the 'fundamental premises' of college sports. The Chronicle of Higher Education, 37 (28)

Lewis, Guy M. (1969). Theodore Roosevelt's role in the 1905 football controversy. Research Quarterly, 40.

Lopiano, Donna A. (1979, Fall). Solving the financial crisis in intercollegiate athletics. Educational Record, 60 (4).

Lowell, Cym H. (1979, Fall). The law and collegiate athletics in public institutions. Educational Record, 60 (4).

Marmion, Harry A. (1979, Fall). Responsibilities in the conduct of collegiate athletics programs. American Council on Education Policy Statements. Educational , 60 (4).

McGuire, John. (1984, Summer). Francis Field. Washington University Magazine. Washington University in St. Louis.

Merriam, Sharan B. (1988). Case study research in education: a qualitative approach. Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Morokuma, Shinji. (1988, Fall). UAA: the unconference. Rochester Review.

Noverr, Douglas A. and Ziewacz, Lawrence E. (1983). The games they played - sports in American history. Nelson-Hall.

Nyquist, Ewald B. (1978, Fall). The future of college athletics. The College Board Review, 109.

Nyquist, Ewald B. (1979, Fall). Win. women. and money: collegiate athletics today and tomorrow. Educational Record, 60 (4).

O'Leary, Holly. (1993). The formative years of athletics and athletics administration. The centennial celebration of our profession. Natioanl Association of Collegiate Directors of Athletics.

Patton, Michael Quinn. (1987). How to use qualitative methods in evaluation. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA.

Rader, Ben. (1983). American sports from the age of folk games to the age of spectators. Prentice-Hall.

Raiborn, Mitchell H. (1982). Revenues and expenses of intercollegiate athletic programs -. analysis of financial trends and relationships 1978-1981. National Collegiate Athletic Association.

Roberts, Howard. (1948). The Big Nine—the story of football in the Western Conference. G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

Rozier, John. (1983). Out of the grandstand and onto the playing field. Emory University. Atlanta. Georgia.

Schael, John. (1981). Washington University and conference affiliation. An unpublished report. Washington University in St. Louis.

Shaffer, G. Wilson. (1977). Recreation and athletics at Johns Hopkins — a one-hundred-year history. The Johns Hopkins University. Baltimore. Maryland.

Shafritz, Jay M. and Ott, J. Steven. (1987). Classics of organization theory (2nd Edition). The Dorsey Press. Chicago, Illinois.

Simon, Herbert A. and March, James G. (1958). Organizations. John Wiley & Sons. Inc.

Skibinski, Thomas (ed.). (1988, November, 5). Yellowjackets have a proud grid history. Yellowjacket Journal. Shipman Publishing.

Smith, Ronald A. (1988). Sports and freedom — the rise of big-time college athletics. Oxford University Press. New York.

Stake, R.E. (1981). Case study methodology: an epistemological advocacy. in W.W. Welsh (ed.). Case study methodology in educational evaluation. Proceedings of the 1981 Minnesota Evaluation Conference. Minneapolis. Minnesota Research and Evaluation Center.

State, Larry. (1991, August). UAA football history. UAA football prospectus.

University of Chicago Swim Team. (1988, March 2). Experience at first UAA swimming and diving championship. Letter to Starkey Duncan, Chairman of Faculty Athletic Board, University of Chicago.

Wilson, Robin. (1990, October 3) Many institutions report sharp drop in freshman rolls. The Chronicle of Higher Education.

Yin, Robert K. (1989). Case study research design and methods (Revised edition). Sage Publications.



Appendix. Items Included in the Case Study Database

The following is a list of principal resources included in the case study database compiled in the conduct of this study. It includes major documents, sources, and archival data used in the conduct of the study. Additional items available for review as part of the case study database but not necessarily principal resources are not included in this listing. Such items include, among other things, correspondence, memos, unpublished institutional reports, and news clippings from various publications.

Eight major universities establish national athletic association. (1986, June 25). Press release issued by University Athletic Association at New York Hilton Hotel, NYC.

The UAA Press Conference. (1986, June 25). Video tape of press conference announcing formation of the University Athletic Association. New York University Public Affairs Office.

The University Athletic Association makes news.... (1986, Summer). A collection of journal, magazine, and newspaper accounts of the formation of the UAA. New York University Public Affairs Office.

UAA Manual. (1988-89 through 1996-97). University Athletic Association.

Anderson, John F. (1986, Fall/Winter) The days when Case was Ohio grid king. Case Alumnus. Case Alumni Association.

Broeg, Bob. (1990, October 5). A century on the gridiron. Washington University football centennial banquet program.

Castagnera, Jim. (1974, October). From varsity 11 to spartans: Case Reserve football 1891-1974. Images. Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.

Cohen, Jeffrey. (1988, Summer). Towers of learning and the University Athletic Association. Brandeis Review.

Crafts, Rod and Cohen, Jeffrey. (1994, October 11). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at Brandeis University. Taped Interview and Printed Transcript. [Dean of Student Affairs and Director of Athletics, respectively; Joint in-person interview conducted at Brandeis University].

Crecine, John P. (1996, April 2). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at Carnegie Mellon University. Taped Interview and Printed Transcript. [Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs; Interview conducted by phone].

Danforth, William H. (1994, December 16). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at Washington University. Taped Interview and Printed Transcript. [Chancellor; Interview conducted by phone].

Duncan, Starkey. (1994, November 21). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at the University of Chicago. Taped Interview and Printed Transcript. [Professor of Psychology and Chairman of the Faculty Athletic Board; In-person interview conducted at the University of Chicago].

Fox, William. (1996, March 4). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at Emory University. Taped Interview and Printed Transcript. [Vice President and Dean for Campus Life; Interview conducted by phone].

Gray, Hanna H. (1994, November 22). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at the University of Chicago. Taped Interview and Printed Transcript. [President; In-person interview conducted at the University of Chicago].

Hamberger, Barnett. (1995, May 8). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at New York University. Taped Interview and Printed

Transcript. [Assistant Chancellor and Director of Academic Program Review; In-person interview conducted at New York University].

Hutter, David. (1996, July 15). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at Case Western Reserve University. Taped Interview and Printed Transcript. [Director of Athletics; Interview conducted by phone].

Kisker, Harry. (1994, December 2). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at Washington University. Taped Interview and Printed Transcript. [Vice Provost and Dean of Student Affairs; Interview conducted at Washington University].

Leary, Arthur. (1996, October 19). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at Case Western Reserve University. Taped Interview and Printed Transcript. [Senior Vice President and Treasurer; In-person interview conducted in St. Louis, Missouri].

McGuire, John. (1984, Summer). Francis Field. Washington University Magazine. Washington University in St. Louis.

Morokuma, Shinji. (1988, Fall). UAA: the unconference. Rochester Review.

Mulvaney, Mary Jean. (1994, December 13). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at the University of Chicago. Taped Interview and Printed Transcript. [Chairman of the Department of Athletics and Director of Intercollegiate Athletics; Interview conducted by phone].

O'Connell, Charles. (1994, November 21). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at the University of Chicago. Taped Interview. [Dean of Students in the University; In-person interview conducted in Chicago, Illinois].

O'Leary, Holly, (ed.). (1993). The centennial celebration of our profession. Natioanl Association of Collegiate Directors of Athletics.

Quilty, Daniel. (1995, May 8). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at New York University. Taped Interview. [Director of Athletics; In-person interview conducted at New York University].

Rasmussen, Richard A. (1985, August). Conference on a university athletic association. UAA Questionnaire. Questionnaire used to collect information, concerns, and directions for initial meeting in Rochester.

Rasmussen, Richard A. (1985, October). A meeting to discuss a university athletic association. UAA Briefing Book. Institutional profiles, tables of comparisons, and financial projections prepared for the initial meeting in Rochester and follow-up meeting in St. Louis.

Rasmussen, Richard A. (1993). The role of intercollegiate athletics in the academy — a case study of the formation of the University Athletic Association. Unpublished doctoral dissertation proposal, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York.

Rasmussen, Richard A. (1994). Interview Guide and Background Material. A background summary of the study including central questions and propositions to be investigated and possible interview questions. Sent to all interview participants prior to interviews.

Reeves, John A. (1995, May 9). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at the University of Rochester. Taped Interview and Printed Transcript. [Director of Sports and Recreation; In-person interview conducted at Columbia University].

Schael, John. (1981). Washington University and conference affiliation. An unpublished report. Washington University in St. Louis.

Schael, John. (1994, December 3). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at Washington University. Taped Interview and Printed Transcript. [Director of Athletics; Interview conducted at Washington University].

Skibinski, Thomas (ed.). (1988, November, 5). Yellowjackets have a proud grid history. Yellowjacket Journal. Shipman Publishing.

UAA Athletic Administrators Committee. (1986-1997). Minutes of Meetings.

UAA Delegates Committee. (1986-1997). Minutes of Meetings.

UAA Executive Committee. (1986-1997). Minutes of Meetings.

UAA Meeting Delegations. (1986). Immediate, five-year, and ten-year plans for participation in the UAA. Documents and correspondence. [Provided by individual institutions following first meeting in Rochester and prior to St. Louis meeting].

UAA Presidents Council. (1986-1997). Minutes of Meetings.

UAA Rochester Meeting Participants. (1985, October). Court Recorder Transcript. Transcript of meeting proceedings.

UAA St. Louis Meeting Participants. (1986, February). Court Recorder Transcript. Transcript of meeting proceedings.

University of Chicago Swim Team. (1988, March 2). Experience at first UAA swimming and diving championship. Letter to Starkey Duncan, Chairman of Faculty Athletic Board, University of Chicago.

Welch, Robert. (1994, November 14). Interview regarding formation for the UAA and related events at Johns Hopkins University. Taped Interview and Printed Transcript. [Dean for Administration of Homewood Schools; In-person interview conducted in Baltimore, Maryland].

