
NUCLEAR SOUTH ASIA

A GUIDE TO INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND THE BOMB

**CHAPTER 6 GUIDE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND NUCLEAR
RISK-REDUCTION MEASURES**

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ABOUT NUCLEAR LEARNING

Nuclear Learning is an online initiative produced by the [Stimson Center's South Asia Program](#) to sharpen strategic analysts' understanding of nuclear programs, doctrines, and postures in South Asia and beyond. *Nuclear Learning* pursues this mission by making diverse viewpoints accessible via open online courses, nurturing vibrant communities of “nuclear learners” on social media, and providing opportunities for students to engage with experts in the field.

The first *Nuclear Learning* course—“[Nuclear South Asia: A Guide to India, Pakistan, and the Bomb](#)”—is available for free at www.nuclearlearning.org. “Nuclear South Asia” is the most comprehensive collection of perspectives on India and Pakistan’s nuclear trajectories available online. It includes 8.5 hours of video content and features lectures from more than 80 leading scholars and practitioners, including former senior diplomats and military officers. In addition to lectures, the course includes quizzes, recommended readings, and a pass/fail final exam.

Upon completing “Nuclear South Asia,” students will be able to:

- Understand the factors motivating India and Pakistan’s nuclear programs, doctrines, and postures;
- Assess the impact of emerging policies and capabilities on deterrence stability;
- Describe India and Pakistan’s positions vis-à-vis the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other elements of the global nuclear order;
- Analyze crisis episodes, management challenges, and confidence-building efforts on the Subcontinent; and
- Propose innovative solutions to reduce nuclear competition and dangers in South Asia.

Students have the option of earning a Stimson-issued certificate, an important credential for academic and professional advancement. To earn a certificate, students must watch the video lessons, complete the quizzes and surveys, and pass a final exam.

Due to high demand, a second *Nuclear Learning* course on conventional and nuclear deterrence in Southern Asia is under development for release in 2019.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

In this chapter, students start by learning the definitions and goals of confidence-building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk-reduction measures (NRRMs). Lessons from U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War will be drawn and applied to South Asia. Students will understand why CBMs have been important to improving relations between India and Pakistan in the past, what CBMs and NRRMs already exist in South Asia, and what obstacles prevent more CBMs from developing. Finally, students will examine how Cold War-era CBMs could set examples for future CBMs in South Asia, and what the trajectory of India-Pakistan CBMs might look like.

KEY TERMS

Below is a list of definitions of the key terms from this chapter.

Agreement on Non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities: An agreement signed by India and Pakistan in December 1988 that banned attacks on “[w]orks or installations containing dangerous forces,” such as dams and nuclear power reactors, that could pose a threat to civilian populations.¹ It was implemented in 1991 and requires an annual exchange of lists identifying the location of nuclear-related facilities.

Agreement on Prior Notification of Military Exercises: An agreement between India and Pakistan finalized in April 1991 requiring each side to notify the other when carrying out exercises comprising two or more divisions in specified locations and those near the Line of Control involving division level or above.² Troop maneuvers directed toward the international border are proscribed and no military activity is permitted within five kilometers of the border.

Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons: An agreement between India and Pakistan that was finalized in February 2007, reaffirmed in February 2012, and extended once again for a five-year term in February 2017. Both sides pledged to notify each other in the event of an accident involving nuclear weapons.³

Ballistic Missile Flight-Test Pre-Notification Agreement: An agreement signed by India and Pakistan in October 2005 to notify each other prior to testing “any land or sea launched, surface-to-surface ballistic missiles.”⁴ One limitation of the pre-notification agreement is that it covers only surface-to-surface ballistic missile flight-tests, not those of cruise missiles.

Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs): Diverse arrangements—such as hotlines, people-to-people exchanges, and prior notifications of military exercises—that can help reduce tensions and promote good relations.⁵

Deterrence Stability: A stable environment in relations between states where the prospect of mutually assured destruction deters conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries.⁶ The mutual attainment of

¹ “India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 26, 2011, <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/india-pakistan-non-attack-agreement/>.

² “India and Pakistan: Agreement on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements” (United Nations Treaty Collection, April 6, 1991), <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201843/volume-1843-i-31420-english.pdf>.

³ “Agreement On Reducing The Risk From Accidents Relating To Nuclear Weapons” (Stimson Center, February 21, 2007), <https://www.stimson.org/agreement-on-reducing-the-risk-from-accidents-relating-to-nuclear-weap>.

⁴ “Agreement Between India And Pakistan On Pre-Notification Of Flight Testing Of Ballistic Missiles,” Stimson Center, October 24, 2012, <https://www.stimson.org/agreement-between-india-and-pakistan-on-pre-notification-of-flight-tes>.

⁵ P. R. Chari, “CBMs in Post-Cold War South Asia,” Stimson Center, June 14, 2012, <https://www.stimson.org/cbms-in-post-cold-war-south-asia>. Also see: Michael Krepon, “South Asia Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) Timeline,” Stimson Center, April 14, 2017, <https://www.stimson.org/content/south-asia-confidence-building-measures-cbm-timeline>.

⁶ Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, eds., *Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia* (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2013), http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Deterrence_Stability_Dec_2013_web.pdf.

secure second-strike capabilities between adversaries has arguably had a revolutionary effect on international relations, reducing the likelihood of highly destructive, direct war.⁷

Lahore Process: A summit between Indian and Pakistan leaders in 1999 in Lahore that resulted in the Lahore Declaration.⁸ The resulting memorandum of understanding affirmed a commitment to increasing an atmosphere of peace and security.

Nuclear Policy: How leaders in states that possess nuclear weapons view the utility of these weapons and the plausible conditions under which their use might be envisioned.⁹

Nuclear Proliferation: The spread of nuclear weapons, fissile material, and/or technology to countries besides the five recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear-weapon states, or the increase in an existing nuclear-weapon state's arsenal size or technological standard.¹⁰

Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures (NRRMs): Confidence-building measures that are specific to reducing nuclear dangers.¹¹

⁷ Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

⁸ P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009).

⁹ "Backgrounder: Nuclear Policy and Posture," *Nuclear South Asia: A Guide to India, Pakistan, and the Bomb*, accessed May 7, 2018, <https://www.nuclearlearning.org/courses/take/nuclear-south-asia/texts/1245471-backgrounder-nuclear-policy-and-posture>.

¹⁰ "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," Nuclear Threat Initiative, April 15, 2018, <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/>.

¹¹ W.P.S. Sidhu et al., "Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures in Southern Asia" (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, November 1998), <https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Report%20No.%2026%20November%201998.pdf>.

CONTENT OVERVIEW

In this section, we provide an overview of all the lectures and supplemental materials in Chapter 6 of *Nuclear South Asia* on www.nuclearlearning.org.

BACKGROUNDER: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBMs) AND NUCLEAR RISK-REDUCTION MEASURES (NRRMs) IN SOUTH ASIA

This course webpage provides definitions and descriptions of the CBMs and NRRMs that exist between India and Pakistan in South Asia. Students will learn:

- Confidence-building measures, or CBMs, are diverse arrangements—such as hotlines, people-to-people exchanges, and prior notifications of military exercises—that can help reduce tensions and promote good relations.
 - Communication, constraint, transparency, and verification measures are the primary CBM tools.
- Nuclear risk-reduction measures, or NRRMs, are CBMs that are specific to reducing nuclear dangers.
- In South Asia, India and Pakistan have established a hotline between the directors general of military operations (DGMOs), and signed the Agreement on Non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities, Agreement on Prior Notification of Military Exercises, Ballistic Missile Flight-Test Pre-Notification Agreement, and Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Nuclear Accidents.
- The track record of CBM implementation in South Asia is spotty. Both India and Pakistan assert that trust is lacking and is the key ingredient to improved relations, but neither country has chosen to generate trust through CBMs.

6.1: “CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBMs) AND NUCLEAR RISK-REDUCTION MEASURES (NRRMs)”

Run Time: 4:50

Lecturers: Michael Krepon (Stimson Center), Toby Dalton (Carnegie Endowment), Mushahid Hussain Syed (Pakistani Senate Committee on National Defence), and Swaran Singh (Jawaharlal Nehru University)

Key Points:

- According to Michael Krepon, there are two main ways for countries to build confidence: an incremental approach that starts with small steps and then builds into larger steps, or one that involves directly starting off a major symbolic act to clarify leadership intentions.
- According to Toby Dalton, the difference between the incremental and symbolic approaches to CBMs is the path through which countries try to build confidence. While incremental approaches are easier for building political space, they tend to be easier to break.
 - CBMs between India and Pakistan tend fall in the latter category, as they have been less risky and have not changed the situation greatly.
 - The symbolic approach requires leaders to take a greater degree of political and security risks, which is rare.
- Mushahid Hussain Syed states that the purpose of CBMs is to avoid war, tension, and mistrust and to strengthen peace, security, and stability.
 - Ratification of agreements shows that both sides do not want to escalate, and exchanging lists builds confidence for doing business together.
- According to Swaran Singh, CBMs and NRRMs were developed in the East-West context of the Cold War relationship.

6.2: “COLD WAR AND POST-COLD WAR CBMs”

Run Time: 13:00

Lecturers: Michael Krepon (Stimson Center), Amy Woolf (Congressional Research Service), Steven Pifer (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State), Deborah Schneider (U.S. Department of State), Siegfried Hecker (Los Alamos National Laboratory), Linton Brooks (Chief U.S. Negotiator of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), and Charles Glaser (George Washington University)

Key Points:

- Michael Krepon asserts that CBMs during the Cold War were important for establishing codes of conduct. These included conduct on the field and norms of information exchange.
- According to Amy Woolf, many analysts believe the Cold War did not turn “hot” because of luck (i.e. signals that both sides were preparing for war were assumed to be false and thus did not trigger escalation). However, as CBMs grew, instances of misperception decreased and allowed both sides to resolve misunderstandings without war.
- Steven Pifer explains that the major CBMs during the Cold War included:
 - Diplomatic communication;
 - The formalization of arms control; and
 - Agreements between the U.S. and Soviet Union that included measures like data exchanges and notifications.
- According to Deborah Schneider, the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center was founded in 1987 as a risk-reduction measure between Gorbachev and Reagan. The center is paired with a sister center in Moscow, and the two regularly exchange information.
- According to Siegfried Hecker, an important element of Cold War CBMs was scientific communication designed to reduce ambiguities about each side’s nuclear program.
 - During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union exchanged scientists to visit each other’s sites, leading to “lab-to-lab” cooperation dealing with issues associated with the breakup of the Soviet Union.
- Michael Krepon describes how the notion of a “hotline,” which became a symbol of crisis behavior, came from the Cuban Missile Crisis, when there was no direct D.C.-Moscow communication.
- According to Linton Brooks, the most important CBM during the Cold War was the series of arms control measures. These capped and reversed the arms race and developed incident-avoidance measures.
- Charles Glaser believes that the most dangerous dimension of the Cold War arms race was that the U.S. and Soviet Union invested too much in trying to destroy each other’s forces, creating incentives to launch an attack in a crisis.
 - Yet, the arms race did have stabilizing aspects, including how U.S. air, sea, and ground forces were hard to destroy.
- According to Amy Woolf, arms control negotiations and treaty implementation led to frequent U.S. and Soviet/Russian officials. As a result, both sides built trust and understanding which allowed the maintenance of arms control relations regardless of the status of relations in other realms.
- Linton Brooks states that arms control agreements reflect the belief of each side that they are better off with an agreement than without one. They therefore rely on political willingness to compromise and on the belief that each side accepts the existence of the other.
 - Arms control cannot be divorced from overall relations, but states do not have to wait till overall relations improve to try arms control.

6.3: “THE LAHORE PROCESS”

Run Time: 7:49

Lecturers: Teresita Schaffer (U.S. Department of State), Michael Krepon (Stimson Center), Lisa Curtis (U.S. Department of State), Manpreet Sethi (Centre for Air Power Studies), and Rizwana Abbasi (National Defence University)

Key Points:

- Teresita Schaffer explains how the Lahore Summit between Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif occurred in the backdrop of India and Pakistan testing nuclear devices in 1998.
 - Significant elements of the summit included that Vajpayee physically traveled to Pakistan, visited the Minar-e-Pakistan, and signed documents with Sharif that set a map for some sort of reconciliation through CBMs.
- According to Michael Krepon, the most important thing about the Lahore Process was that it occurred after India and Pakistan announced to the world that they had nuclear weapons, when there was a great deal of global concern. As a result of the conference, both sides signed a declaration, joint statement, and memorandum of understanding.
- Lisa Curtis believes that the most important CBMs regarding nuclear issues occurred during the 1999 Lahore Summit, some of which are still in place today. It can serve as a good model for the future.
- According to Manpreet Sethi, Vajpayee’s trip to Pakistan was seen as an Indian acceptance of the existence of Pakistan. However, the Kargil conflict occurred shortly after (see Lesson 5.6), which broke down many of the positive developments.
- Rizwana Abbasi states that the Lahore Process failed because of the Kargil War, in which India felt as if it had been betrayed by Pakistan. To the Pakistanis, the level of mistrust developed in the wake of Kargil severely undermined the Lahore Declaration.

6.4: “KEY CBMs AND NRRMs IN SOUTH ASIA”

Run Time: 11:01

Lecturers: Michael Krepon (Stimson Center), Swaran Singh (Jawaharlal Nehru University), Naeem Salik (Centre for International Strategic Studies), Toby Dalton (Carnegie Endowment), Sitakanta Mishra (Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University), Abhijit Iyer-Mitra (Institute for Peace & Conflict Studies), Manpreet Sethi (Centre for Air Power Studies), and Hasan Askari Rizvi (Punjab University)

Key Points:

- According to Michael Krepon, Cold War CBMs were viewed skeptically by both India and Pakistan, but eventually, both sides believed that adapting those types of CBMs (missile flight tests, prior notifications, military exercises, keeping missiles away from borders, etc.) could be adapted to local circumstances.
- Swaran Singh states that South Asian countries did learn from the East-West relationship in terms of CBMs and NRRMs.
 - Both India and Pakistan agreed on non-attack of each other’s nuclear installations almost a decade before they announced their nuclear weapons. Current CBMs and NRRMs open up channels of understanding and channels for access during a crisis.
- According to Naeem Salik, both India and Pakistan understand misperceptions can be created by missile tests and therefore have been careful to inform one another before testing. Both sides notified each other before tests in 2002, preceding a formal agreement in August 2005.

- Toby Dalton describes the Missile Test Pre-Notification and the Non-Attack on Nuclear Facilities Agreements, which represent different types of CBMs. One is functional (missile test agreement) and designed to avoid misperception during a crisis. The other (nuclear facility agreement) is symbolic, showing transparency and building trust.
 - Both agreements are important as CBMs, but the significance is different. The missile test agreement came about after the Lahore Summit to deal with the reality of India and Pakistan being nuclear states. The nuclear facilities agreement is from an earlier era, when attacks on facilities were more of a threat.
- According to Sitakanta Mishra, both countries signed a landmark CBM in 2007 stipulating each country to provide communication in the event of a nuclear-related accident in the country. This CBM is important because it takes into account the complexity of nuclear weapons and the geographical proximity to one another.
- Abhijit Iyer-Mitra believes that the main benefits of the nuclear CBMs between India and Pakistan are that despite the level of tension, the Nuclear Non-Attack Agreement requires both countries to communicate each year. In this way, it demonstrates the willingness of both countries to, irrespective of tension, exchange a list of sensitive facilities and improve communication.
 - With respect to to the benefits of the nuclear accident agreement, there has not yet been an accident, but if one were to occur, it would involve a more sporadic exchange of information. It therefore does not contribute as much to step-by-step consistency.
 - The negative side of these agreements is that there is no verification, inspection, or other steps further than the exchange of paperwork.
- According to Manpreet Sethi, the agreements on missile test pre-notification and non-attack on nuclear facilities have held during periods of tension, which can be considered an accomplishment.
 - India and Pakistan also have a number of general (non-nuclear related) CBMs in place to improve trust, including troop movement along the Line of Control and international border, over-flight issues, etc. Political mistrust in their bilateral relationship often overshadows the fact that they have existing CBMs.
- Hasan Askari Rizvi asserts that new CBMs will only be possible if India and Pakistan agree to certain measures through which the probability of misinformation or misunderstanding of signals in the nuclear domain is accounted for.
- According to Michael Krepon, there are only very limited agreements between India and Pakistan having to do with avoiding dangerous military practices. For example, there are agreements to notify ballistic missile flight tests, but not cruise missile flight tests.

6.5: “OBSTACLES TO CBMs IN SOUTH ASIA”

Run Time: 11:30

Lecturers: Michael Krepon (Stimson Center), Toby Dalton (Carnegie Endowment), Sadia Tasleem (Quaid-i-Azam University), Manpreet Sethi (Centre for Air Power Studies), Rizwana Abbasi (National Defence University), Gurmeet Kanwal (Indian Army), and Sitakanta Mishra (Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University)

Key Points:

- According to Michael Krepon, the “small step” CBM approach has not worked in South Asia because the small steps are few and far between and have not led towards bigger steps.

- Big steps have not worked either, though. While there have been two major gestures by Indian prime ministers (Vajpayee and Modi), they have largely been symbolic and not led to substantial improvements. Often times, progress is interrupted by acts of violence against India by anti-Indian groups.
- According to Toby Dalton, the primary obstacles to additional confidence-building measures are that both governments cannot find political space for agreements and that it is difficult for the security bureaucracies in each country to be responsive to political leadership.
- Sadia Tasleem states that the fundamental inhibition to further CBMs is the trust deficit between both sides and a lack of clarity on what exactly each side wants. As a result, CBMs, including existing measures, have not been extremely helpful.
- According to Manpreet Sethi, the main obstacles to additional CBMs in South Asia are a lack of common desire for strategic stability, a lack of common risk perception, an asymmetry in decision-making authorities on both sides, and political mistrust.
- According to Rizwana Abbasi, the issues of Kashmir and terrorism are major obstacles in instituting new CBMs. The aggressive political rhetoric that comes out of incidents leads to greater mistrust.
- Gurmeet Kanwal believes that deep distrust exists on both sides. The Indian side feels that it should be talking to a civilian administration, but in circumstances of army-to-army communication, CBMs have generally held.
- According to Sitakanta Mishra, current CBMs face challenges because when there are tensions and weapons on the border, discussing CBMs and peace seems futile. Therefore, political will is important when discussing CBMs.
 - Do the mechanisms exist to implement preexisting CBMs? Implementation of CBMs is the most important factor, and both sides, Mishra adds, should be doing more to work on this aspect.
- According to Michael Krepon, most of the trouble between India and Pakistan comes from Kashmir and anti-India groups based in Pakistan. Therefore, for meaningful progress to take place, India needs to do better in Kashmir, and Pakistan needs to do better in stopping acts of terror that originate in Pakistani soil.

6.6: “SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE CBMs”

Run Time: 13:52

Lecturers: Sameer Lalwani (Stimson Center), Toby Dalton (Carnegie Endowment), Linton Brooks (Chief U.S. Negotiator, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), Riaz Khan (former Pakistani Foreign Secretary), Gurmeet Kanwal (Indian Army), Robert Einhorn (U.S. Department of State), Deborah Schneider (U.S. Department of State), Swaran Singh (Jawaharlal Nehru University), Seigfried Hecker (Los Alamos National Laboratory), Rizwana Abbasi (National Defence University), Ashley Tellis (Carnegie Endowment), Mushahid Hussain Syed (Pakistani Senate Committee on National Defence), and Michael Krepon (Stimson Center)

Key Points:

- Sameer Lalwani explains that confidence-building measures can be institutionalized to reduce the probability of crisis through: information sharing, enhancing, setting up institutions to reduce temporal pressures and increase decision-making time, collaboratively managing risks, facilitating arms control reductions, and developing changes in state policies that drive rivalry.
- According to Toby Dalton, future CBMs could fall into different categories. Functional CBMs would be measures such as the extension of missile test notifications to include other types of

missiles; but the more important ones would be transparency CBMs to increase the transparency of intentions and capabilities in ways that hasn't happened yet.

- If India and Pakistan get to the point of discussing nuclear doctrine, that could forge an opening to additional agreements focused on reducing the risk of escalation.
- Additionally, a helpful step for arms control would be for India and Pakistan to develop mutual inspection regimes.
- Linton Brooks believes that South Asia would benefit most from the analog of Cold War doctrinal discussions. Not enough is being done to combat the extreme risk of escalation.
- According to Riaz Khan, Pakistan and India should have an arrangement for bilateral summits at least every 2-3 years. These would improve the environment for discussion.
- Gurmeet Kanwal proposes that India and Pakistan need permanent, year-round, nuclear risk-reduction centers to put sites in contact with one another. Moreover, an effective CBM could be doing away with short-range ballistic missiles.
- According to Robert Einhorn, during the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union established channels of communication like the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. This type of mechanism could be adopted in South Asia to reduce the prospects of unintended conflict.
- Deborah Schneider mentions that understanding the culture and geopolitics of each country is essential to nuclear risk-reduction measures. Routinizing communication within a specific cultural context is the best way to build trust and increase predictability.
- According to Swaran Singh, traditional CBMs were focused on interstate challenges and threats. Now, there is greater importance of non-state actors, which includes factors like terrorism, corporate spying, misinformation, pandemics, etc. New CBMs need to address these new issues that focus on information sharing.
- Siegfried Hecker explains that for the scientific community to become involved in reducing dangers in South Asia, there needs to be a common interest. One of those interests is nuclear energy, which both India and Pakistan have substantial interest in.
 - Hecker adds that nuclear security is a more sensitive area, but tends to follow after collaboration on nuclear weapons safety, materials safety, etc.
- According to Rizwana Abbasi, India and Pakistan can initiate CBMs concerning the declaration of a bilateral moratorium on non-testing, which would be the first step of signing the CTBT. They could also work on arms control mechanisms.
- Ashley Tellis argues that India and Pakistan should focus on political over technical CBMs. The most important step would be to reach an understanding on how force is to be employed in the management of bilateral relations.
- Mushahid Hussain Syed believes that there must be a political and strategic environment conducive for future CBMs to be made. These measures can start by discussing nuclear issues across the table on the basis of equality and reciprocity, a cap on production of fissile material, and ensuring no nuclear arms race.
- According to Linton Brooks, the first step of future CBMs is to avoid a regional arms race, both qualitatively and quantitatively. An arms control agreement freezing some sort of equality could be a first step. Thus far, arms control has not been an effective instrument of stability.
- Michael Krepon asserts that the process of CBMs cannot be divorced from the state of India-Pakistan relations. Unless the Indian government places a high priority on improving India-Pakistan relations, and unless the Pakistani military and intelligence services place a high priority on stopping terrorist attacks, the countries will be stuck. CBMs and NNRMs are high-commitment processes, and there is currently insufficient evidence that the two countries are committed enough for such efforts to succeed.

RECOMMENDED READINGS

For greater depth, we encourage students to peruse these recommended readings:

- "18 Years On: Examining State of India-Pakistan Nuclear CBMs," *South Asian Voices Series*.
<http://savoices.wpengine.com/18-years-on-examining-state-of-india-pakistan-nuclear-cbms/>.
- Agreement Between India and Pakistan on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities, 1988. http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/aptindpak.pdf?_=1316555923.
- Agreement Between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles, 2005.
<http://mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/PA05B0591.pdf>.
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<http://mea.gov.in/Portal/LegalTreatiesDoc/PA07B0425.pdf>.
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- Toby Dalton, "Beyond Incrementalism: Rethinking Approaches to CBMs and Stability in South Asia," in Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson (eds.), *Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia* (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2013). https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Dalton_-_Beyond_Incrementalism_1.pdf.
- Toby Dalton, "What's the Future of CBMs in South Asia?" *South Asian Voices*, May 26, 2016.
<https://southasianvoices.org/whats-the-future-of-cbms-in-south-asia/>.
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- Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction, "De-Alerting and Stabilizing the World's Nuclear Force Postures," April 2015.
http://www.globalzero.org/files/global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report.pdf.
- Siegfried Hecker, *Doomed to Cooperate: How American and Russian Scientists Joined Forces to Avert Some of the Greatest Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers* (Los Alamos: Bathtub Row Press, 2016).
https://books.google.com/books?id=u_NYDQEACAAJ.
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- Michael Krepon, *Global Confidence Building: New Tools for Troubled Regions* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). <https://books.google.com/books?id=eb7rlhizoFQC>.
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- Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak, *Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in South Asia* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996). <https://books.google.com/books?id=ULYrJdRu6W4C>.
- Dennis Kux, *India-Pakistan Negotiations: Is Past Still Prologue?* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2006). <https://books.google.com/books?id=fObCESFwomAC>.
- "Lahore Summit," Stimson Center Research Pages, February 20, 1999. <https://www.stimson.org/lahore-summit>.
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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

Below is a sample list of discussion questions to get students thinking and talking about the issues from this chapter in class.

1. What is the difference between a confidence-building measure and a nuclear risk-reduction measure? What are some examples of each?
2. What CBMs currently exist between India and Pakistan? Have they been effective in reducing tensions?
3. What are the goals of a confidence-building measure, and what different categories of CBMs achieve different goals?
4. How could CBMs utilized during the Cold War set an example for South Asia?
5. Why is the Lahore Process significant to current India-Pakistan CBMs?
6. What obstacles prevent India and Pakistan from developing more thorough CBMs?
7. Can you think of any creative CBMs or NNRM that might be useful for reducing tensions between India and Pakistan?