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ABOUT NUCLEAR LEARNING

*Nuclear Learning* is an online initiative produced by the Stimson Center’s South Asia Program to sharpen strategic analysts’ understanding of nuclear programs, doctrines, and postures in South Asia and beyond. *Nuclear Learning* pursues this mission by making diverse viewpoints accessible via open online courses, nurturing vibrant communities of “nuclear learners” on social media, and providing opportunities for students to engage with experts in the field.

The first *Nuclear Learning* course—“Nuclear South Asia: A Guide to India, Pakistan, and the Bomb”—is available for free at www.nuclearlearning.org. “Nuclear South Asia” is the most comprehensive collection of perspectives on India and Pakistan’s nuclear trajectories available online. It includes 8.5 hours of video content and features lectures from more than 80 leading scholars and practitioners, including former senior diplomats and military officers. In addition to lectures, the course includes quizzes, recommended readings, and a pass/fail final exam.

Upon completing “Nuclear South Asia,” students will be able to:

- Understand the factors motivating India and Pakistan’s nuclear programs, doctrines, and postures;
- Assess the impact of emerging policies and capabilities on deterrence stability;
- Describe India and Pakistan’s positions vis-à-vis the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other elements of the global nuclear order;
- Analyze crisis episodes, management challenges, and confidence-building efforts on the Subcontinent; and
- Propose innovative solutions to reduce nuclear competition and dangers in South Asia.

Students have the option of earning a Stimson-issued certificate, an important credential for academic and professional advancement. To earn a certificate, students must watch the video lessons, complete the quizzes and surveys, and pass a final exam.

Due to high demand, a second *Nuclear Learning* course on conventional and nuclear deterrence in Southern Asia is under development for release in 2019.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

In this chapter, students will learn about the history of major political crises on the Subcontinent, focusing on five key incidents: the 1986-87 Brasstacks crisis, the 1990 Compound crisis, the 1999 Kargil conflict, the 2001-02 Twin Peaks crisis, and the 2008 Mumbai crisis. Students will gain insight into the escalation dangers present in South Asia, including inadvertent escalation, the role of leadership beliefs, signaling, and threat credibility in crises. For each incident, students will understand the chronology of events, the process of crisis management, and the role of nuclear weapons. In particular, students will examine the role of the United States as a third-party crisis manager and the takeaways for India, Pakistan, and the United States from each incident. Students will understand how the nuclearization of South Asia has changed the dynamics of India-Pakistan crises from this chapter.
Below is a list of definitions of the key terms from this chapter.

**Brasstacks Crisis:** A crisis between India and Pakistan in 1986-87 triggered by Operation Brasstacks, which was a multi-phase exercise conducted by the Indian military. The exercise’s final phase, which began in November 1986, took place in Rajasthan, which borders Pakistan’s Sindh province. The Pakistan Army was also engaged in military exercises at the time of the crisis. Since Indian intentions were uncertain, Pakistani commanders decided to keep their corps deployed in their exercise areas until the crisis subsided. The spiral to war was stopped when Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi became cognizant of rising dangers and intervened to re-impose civilian control over defense matters. India and Pakistan agreed in January 1987 to enter negotiations to de-escalate tensions at the border.

**Catalytic Nuclear Posture:** The posture assumed by a state when it has a limited or unassembled nuclear arsenal, but uses that arsenal to coerce a third party, instead of an adversary, to intervene on its behalf. Under this posture, nuclear use is considered “only as a last resort” when the state’s existence is threatened.

**Cold Start Doctrine:** The Indian Army’s limited war doctrine, which calls for the reorganization of its large strike corps into smaller integrated battle groups to facilitate the rapid mobilization of forces along the India-Pakistan border for a conventional retaliatory strike on Pakistan. Under Cold Start, the Indian Army would make shallow incursions into Pakistani territory and use captured territory as leverage to compel Pakistan to cease its support to anti-India militants. Proponents of Cold Start insist that it could be implemented without triggering Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds, though Pakistan vows to respond with the use of tactical nuclear weapons under its doctrine of full-spectrum deterrence.

**Compound Crisis:** A crisis between India and Pakistan that began in February 1990 and lasted until June 1990. A series of events precipitated this crisis, and many scholars have termed events in 1990 a “compound” crisis in recognition of the complex interplay of factors that contributed to its onset. Elements including unrest in the Kashmir Valley and Indian Punjab, Pakistani and Indian military exercises, and domestic politics contributed to the unraveling of the crisis. The United States served as a crisis manager and sought to dampen prospects for escalation.

**Crisis Management:** The attempt to defuse a crisis through communication, confidence-building measures, or other reassuring actions. This may take place on the initiative of the two potential combatants, or a third party may intervene to broker a solution and de-escalate the crisis.

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6 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process*.
Crisis Stability: States’ ability to contain hostilities and prevent escalation to full-scale military conflict during a crisis. If both sides have successfully demonstrated credible deterrence then the prospects for stable relations in a crisis may improve due to fear of retaliation from the other. If one side believes that it has an offensive advantage or that its adversary lacks a credible deterrent, then a crisis may provide cause for aggression, and war could start.

Deterrence Optimism: The belief that nuclear weapons can increase stability and peace between nuclear powers.

Deterrence Pessimism: The doubt of nuclear weapons’ ability to increase stability and peace between nuclear powers.

Escalation Control: A concept that imagines several levels of conflict, from the conventional to the nuclear level, wherein states can prevent hostilities from intensifying to higher levels of conflict. Controlling escalation “is an exercise in deterrence” in that it requires confining an adversary’s actions below its capabilities before the outbreak of war.

Kargil Conflict: A conflict, or limited war, between India and Pakistan that took place with intense fighting between May and July of 1999. It was triggered by the infiltration in the winter of 1998 of an estimated 1,500-2000 Pakistani troops of the Northern Light Infantry across the Line of Control into Kargil. Following involvement by the United States as a crisis manager, Pakistan ultimately withdrew from Kargil, resulting in a return to the status quo ante. The Kargil conflict is often cited as the only instance of direct warfare between nuclear-armed states, though the significance of the nuclear factor during the conflict is debated by scholars.

Mumbai Crisis: A crisis between India and Pakistan that was triggered by the terrorist attacks in India in November 2008. Several terrorists landed in Mumbai and scattered to soft targets across the city, launching simultaneous attacks that held India’s financial capital under siege for days and killing more than 170 individuals, including six American citizens. An escalatory spiral between India and Pakistan seemed imminent, as the militants were affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group alleged to have ties to Pakistan’s military and intelligence service. The Mumbai crisis entailed policy coordination among U.S. officials in multiple layers of government and diverse locales. It marked the latest in a procession of crises that continued despite the advent of overt nuclear weapon capabilities.

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10 Ibid.


**Tactical Nuclear Weapons:** Low-yield, short-range nuclear devices used on the battlefield rather than against a strategic target, such as a city.\(^{15}\)

**Twin Peaks Crisis:** A crisis between India and Pakistan that had two major peaks between December 2001 and October 2002.\(^{16}\) For those ten months, India and Pakistan kept approximately one million soldiers in a high state of readiness along their international border and the Line of Control dividing Kashmir, raising the specter of conflict. The immediate trigger for deployment was an attack by militants on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The attack set in motion an extended crisis with two distinct peaks during which tensions were extremely high.\(^{17}\) The first peak, immediately after the attack on Parliament, occurred from December 2001-January 2002. The second peak, in May-June 2002, followed another high-profile attack by militants, near the town of Kaluchak in Jammu. During both peaks, high-level U.S. officials were involved in crisis management, seeking the return of Indian and Pakistani forces to their cantonments.

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\(^{16}\) Nayak and Krepon, “U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis.”

CONTENT OVERVIEW

In this section, we provide an overview of all the lectures and supplemental materials in Chapter 2 of Nuclear South Asia on www.nuclearlearning.org.

5.1: “CRISSES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH ASIA”

Run Time: 9:16
Lecturers: Sameer Lalwani (Stimson Center) and Michael Krepon (Stimson Center)

Key Points:
- According to Sameer Lalwani, the main components of a crisis include: abnormal intensity of interactions between two parties, a perceived threat to a party’s national interest, a sense of a compressed timeframe for decision-making, a level of uncertainty regarding the unfolding of events, and the prospect of escalation to war.
  - In the late 1980s and early 1990s, military mobilizations and exercises often triggered crises in South Asia. In the post-2001 era, crises have been triggered more by violent non-state actors through terrorist attacks on important locations.
- According to Michael Krepon, one hypothesis for crisis in South Asia is that they tend occur after attempts to improve bilateral relations because some actors wish to short-circuit diplomacy.
  - For example, the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament occurred after India and Pakistan agreed to a memorandum of understanding to improve relations. The 2008 Mumbai attack occurred after backchannel talks between India and Pakistan. More recently, small-scale attacks against India occurred after the Modi government attempted to improve relations with Pakistan through Modi’s symbolic meetings and visits.
- According to Sameer Lalwani, crisis management is a general concept that includes the institutions, mechanisms, or templates that address a crisis. These could be bilateral mechanisms between the parties engaged in a crisis or efforts by a third party to help diffuse the crisis.
  - The only third party with a consistent role in managing crises in South Asia is the United States.
    - As a third party, it faces the “pivotal deterrence, pivotal assurance problem,” meaning that it needs to simultaneously send reassurances to both sides and to deter both sides from escalation. This strategy has largely been successful in deterring crises.
  - As part of its crisis management “diplomatic toolbox,” the United States has offered intelligence cooperation, legal support should prosecution be necessary, and pressure on parties that host militant groups.

5.2: “ESCALATION DANGERS IN SOUTH ASIA”

Run Time: 9:17
Lecturers: Naeem Salik (Centre for International Strategic Studies), Michael Krepon (Stimson Center), Scott Sagan (Stanford University), Toby Dalton (Carnegie Endowment), and Mansoor Ahmed (Harvard University)

Key Points:
- Naeem Salik argues that the uncertainties of war are so great that wartime preparation is often obsolete after the first bullet is fired. As such, escalation is a consistent danger during conflict.
There is no historical experience to look to demonstrating whether or not escalation at the nuclear level can be controlled, but it is hard to imagine that it could be.

According to Michael Krepon, the idea that once limited war between two countries who do not understand each other reaches the nuclear level, they will suddenly understand each other well enough to control escalation is unconvincing.

- The constraints that India and Pakistan have displayed so far are largely driven because of their leaders’ desire to not cross the nuclear threshold.
- There is no real answer in the literature as to what may happen after the first nuclear weapon is detonated in a war between nuclear powers. Thus, the most tried and true method of avoiding nuclear escalation is to avoid conflict altogether.

According to Scott Sagan, the good news is that history has not seen escalation to the nuclear level between two nuclear-armed states so far, but this might not be the case forever. The roots of security are better grounded in stronger conventional capabilities and reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

According to Toby Dalton, India and Pakistan have different beliefs about how nuclear weapons deter. As a result, misperception is a real possibility.

- In the United States, strategic thinkers lean more towards deterrence pessimism, whereas in India and Pakistan they lean more towards deterrence optimism.

Christopher Clary argues that the main driver of instability on the Subcontinent is Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to cease the operations of anti-India terrorist groups. When these groups attack, it generates tremendous pressure for Indian civilian politicians to react.

- India may not continue to respond in a restrained manner in the future.

According to Mansoor Ahmed, a situation of militant groups attacking India can be manipulated by a hawkish political elite in India to try to carry out punitive conventional action against Pakistan. Such a situation would inevitably lead to escalation due to the fluidity of the battlefield.

- At the same time, a conventional conflict is likely to stay conventional, unless one of two Pakistani thresholds is passed: losing a certain proportion of its conventional forces or a certain proportion of its territory.

5.3: "Leadership Beliefs, Signaling, and Threat Credibility"

Run Time: 3:51
Lecturer: Julia Macdonald (University of Pennsylvania)

Key Points:

- According to Julia Macdonald, a standard definition of a nuclear crisis is any crisis that occurs between two nuclear-armed states. This includes any situation even if nuclear weapons were not explicitly threatened or used because the mere presence of nuclear weapons shapes how states behave.

- Leadership beliefs are important to take into consideration during crises because they shape how leaders perceive their options and how their adversaries will react. While there is a significant disagreement about how important leadership beliefs are vis-a-vis other structural variables in international politics, they are ultimately important because they shape assessments of threat credibility during a crisis.

- In order to send signals and increase credibility during a crisis, states can issue public statements, mobilize their militaries, raise nuclear alert level, move nuclear forces, or relax their command and control.
An adversary’s assessment of threat credibility is a key explanation of conflict escalation. When one state believes that it has issued a clear and credible threat but its adversary does not believe it will carry through, there is a fundamental miscommunication that almost always results in the failure of coercive diplomacy.

A third party or crisis manager can influence the credibility of threats by facilitating information exchange and reducing uncertainty. It can, for example, clarify that one power will lose in a conflict, provide information about relative resolve and stakes, or information about domestic political constraints.

During the Kargil conflict, the United States conveyed to Pakistan that it was weaker than India and that the United States would not come to its aid.

5.4: “Inadvertent Escalation”
Run Time: 3:46
Lecturer: Barry Posen (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Key Points:
- According to Barry Posen, inadvertent nuclear escalation arises from a situation where non-nuclear military operations negatively affect the survivability the other side’s nuclear force in a way that is unintended by the attacker.
- In theory, the nature of the two sides’ nuclear forces matters just as much as the inadvertent operations. This means that if each side has nuclear forces that can survive a first strike, such as submarines, then they could fight a conventional war without escalating to the nuclear level. However, if nuclear forces are not survivable, then a conventional attack could trigger nuclear escalation. Moreover, this is against the backdrop that each side’s adversary might attack first.
- For a nuclear state to decrease the risk of inadvertent escalation, it could posture its nuclear forces to survive its adversaries’ best efforts to strike first, by hardening the weapons, making them mobile, having survivable command and control, and placing them on quiet submarines.
  - States might also consider their conventional operations and consider which targets to choose.
- Unfortunately, we have no idea whether nuclear powers can fight conventional wars and avoid nuclear use. It might be possible that if adversaries fight carefully, but this standard of conventional military practice that is seldom achieved.

Background: “The 1986-87 Brasstacks Crisis”
This course webpage provides a brief history of the 1986-87 Brasstacks crisis, along with how crisis management and nuclear developments played a role in the unfolding of events.

- Operation Brasstacks was a multi-phase exercise conducted by the Indian military in 1986 and 1987. Its main purpose remains a matter of debate.
- The exercise’s final phase, which began in November 1986, took place along a 100-mile front in Rajasthan, which borders Pakistan’s Sindh Province.
- Pakistan’s Army Reserve North (ARN) and Army Reserve South (ARS) were engaged in military exercises at the time of the crisis. Since Indian intentions were uncertain, Pakistani commanders decided to keep these corps deployed in their exercise areas until the crisis subsided.
- The spiral to war was stopped when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi became cognizant of rising dangers and intervened decisively to re-impose civilian control over defense matters. India and Pakistan agreed in late January 1987 to negotiate to de-escalate tensions at the border.
In terms of crisis management, India and Pakistan jointly undertook crisis management during the final phase of Brasstacks. Washington made modest crisis-management contributions by warning both sides of misperception dangers.

**BACKGROUNDER: “THE 1990 COMPOUND CRISIS”**

This course webpage provides a chronology of events of the 1990 Compound Crisis as well as a brief explanation of crisis management and nuclear developments during that time.

- The Compound crisis began in February 1990 and lasted until June 1990. A series of events precipitated the crisis, and many scholars have termed events in 1990 a “compound” crisis in recognition of the complex interplay of factors that contributed to its onset.
- Factors including unrest in the Kashmir Valley and Indian Punjab, Pakistani military exercise Zarb-e-Momin and Indian countermeasures, and domestic politics all played roles in the unraveling of the crisis.
- India and Pakistan attempted bilateral crisis diplomacy at two points, in January and April 1990.
  - The United States was involved as a crisis manager by sending senior officials to the region to encourage restraint.
- The role of nuclear weapons during the crisis is debate, as it is believed that India and Pakistan both possessed some nuclear capabilities at the time, but it is unclear how much they influenced decision-making processes.

**5.5: “THE NUCLEARIZATION OF CRISSES ON THE SUBCONTINENT”**

Run Time: 12:21

Lecturers: Vipin Narang (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Michael Krepon (Stimson Center), Ashley Tellis (Carnegie Endowment), Scott Sagan (Stanford University), Moeed Yusuf (U.S. Institute of Peace), and Rizwana Abbasi (National Defence University)

**Key Points:**

- According to Vipin Narang, a catalytic nuclear posture is when a state has a limited or unassembled arsenal, but uses that arsenal to coercive a third party, rather than deterring an adversary directly, to intervene on its behalf. It thus uses the threat of nuclear breakout as a way to coerce a third party into assisting in diffusing the crisis.
  - In the 1980s, Pakistan was not a formal ally of the United States. However, the United States was critically dependent on it to arm the mujahideen in Afghanistan and help resist the Soviet Union. This gave Pakistan leverage against the United States, allowing it to continue developing nuclear capabilities without being sanctioned by the U.S.

- On the Brasstacks crisis:
  - Michael Krepon explains that the Brasstacks crisis happened on the cusp of the advent of nuclear weapons in South Asia. India had an adventurous army chief who organized a massive military exercise near the Pakistani border. Pakistani took note and countermobilized, and this turned into a crisis that required the intervention of the Indian prime minister.
    - One consequence of the Brasstacks crisis was to accelerate India and Pakistan’s nuclear programs.
  - According to Ashley Tellis, Operation Brasstacks was a turning point in the history of nuclearization on the Subcontinent.
From the Indian perspective, it was the last time India attempted to use coercive diplomacy in the form of a major military exercise to signal to Pakistan that it was running out of patience with Pakistani-supported terrorism.

From the Pakistani perspective, it was the last determinant in developing a nuclear program designed to stop India from using war to change Pakistan’s policies.

- According to Scott Sagan, Brasstacks occurred when the Indian army chief convinced the political authorities that he could exercise a large-scale conventional operation to demonstrate to Pakistan that India had the potential to carry out a devastating conventional attack. The exercise was approved, and when Pakistan responded with its own large-scale exercise, Sundarji asked for authority to attack. He was denied this authority, but the crisis serves as demonstration that the Indian military has tried to take actions into their own hands in the past.
- Vipin Narang cites A.Q. Khan as saying that Pakistan could build a bomb whenever it wanted in 1987, around the time of the Brasstacks crisis. American authorities were concerned by the nuclear aspect of the crisis, so they took a larger role in crisis management.
  - This interview, combined with more evidence obtained in 1988, triggered Rajiv Gandhi to weaponize the Indian nuclear program.
- Moeed Yusuf believes that the nuclear aspect of the crisis has been overstated. Neither country was thinking in nuclear terms until after the Compound crisis of 1990.
- According to Rizwana Abbasi, the Brasstacks crisis played a role in transforming Pakistani strategic thinking and decision-making.

**On the 1990 Compound crisis:**

- According to Michael Krepon, it is called the “compound” crisis because many contributing factors were at play. These included unrest in Kashmir and Indian Punjab supported by Pakistan’s intelligence services.
- Vipin Narang states that the two main reasons why Pakistan can be thought of as having a catalytic nuclear posture then are:
  - The Pakistani army chief said that Pakistan intentionally signaled to the United States that it was considering crossing certain nuclear lines in order to mobilize the U.S. to diffuse the situation; and
  - The United States had intelligence showing that Pakistan was considering moving its nuclear weapons (or faking the movement of nuclear weapons) so the United States would take notice. This is the clearest example we have of Pakistan intentionally employing a catalytic strategy.
- Michael Krepon recounts how U.S. military attachés would look for signs of military mobilization and report back to the United States, which would then report to the two governments. This technique of “rumor chasing” provided reliable information of the status of forces and was used in subsequent crises.
- According to Vipin Narang, by the end of the Compound crisis, the United States could not certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear device.

**BACKGROUND: “THE 1999 KARGIL CONFLICT”**

This course webpage provides a chronology of the events of the 1999 Kargil conflict. Specifically, it discusses causes of the conflict, military operations during it, and crisis management during the conflict.
The 1999 Kargil conflict was instigated by the infiltration in the winter of 1998 of an estimated 1,500-2000 troops of the Pakistani Northern Light Infantry (NLI) across the Line of Control (LoC). They found no resistance and advanced all the way to the heights above Kargil.

- Once New Delhi understood the nature and extent of this advance, it mounted an effective counteroffensive.

- Intense fighting occurred along the LoC in May, June, and July, causing significant casualties on both sides and fanning fears that the conflict could escalate and end in a nuclear conflagration.

- India and Pakistan made diplomatic overtures in the early and middle phases of the crisis. Beijing refused Pakistani requests for support, but the United States played an active role in managing the crisis.

- The Kargil conflict began less than a year after India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices. The Subcontinent’s nuclearization, followed by the Kargil adventure, heightened international perceptions of Pakistan’s contention of Kashmir as a potential nuclear flashpoint.

5.6: “The 1999 Kargil Conflict and the Role of Nuclear Weapons”

Run Time: 13:27

Lecturers: Teresita Schaffer (U.S. Department of State), Manpreet Sethi (Centre for Air Power Studies), Shaukat Qadir (Pakistani Army), Jack Gill (U.S. Army), Mansoor Ahmed (Harvard University), S. Paul Kapur (U.S. Naval Postgraduate School), Stephen Cohen (Brookings Institution), Naeem Salik (Centre for International Strategic Studies), Gurmeet Kanwal (Indian Army), and Michael Krepon (Stimson Center)

Key Points:

- According to Teresita Schaffer, in the late spring of 1999, Pakistan sent military troops across the Line of Control in Kashmir, which has been the subject of a territorial dispute between the two countries. They were discovered by Indian patrols in early May, which resulted in what some people refer to a “half war.”
  - She adds that it was concerning because the two states do not have any geography separating them to think about their decisions before making them.
  - The Pakistanis made massive miscalculations by sending their troops across LoC. While they hoped to gain a tactical advantage in the territory that they consider to be their own, the Pakistanis did not expect India to react militarily.

- Manpreet Sethi states that the Indian army originally believed the troops were well-armed and well-trained terrorists, but developed a stricter response once they discovered they were actually Pakistani soldiers.

- According to Shaukat Qadir, Pakistan’s political objectives were to create a situation where India would be forced to the negotiating table and perhaps agree to a solution to Kashmir. Yet, the military carried out its actions without considering the international environment at the time.

- From a military perspective, Jack Gill describes how the Pakistani forces were in a condition of static defense where their forces could not be refreshed or reinforced, so India was able to take them apart.
  - Gill adds that the Kargil conflict was unfortunate because it spoiled the optimistic atmosphere created by the Indian prime minister’s visit to Lahore and the Lahore Declaration, which had had a favorable impact on regional relations.

- According to Mansoor Ahmed, the idea of Kargil was not to engage in a limited war with India, but to regain Kargil as it had been on the Pakistani side of the LoC pre-1971.
Since the LoC is a de facto quasi-boundary, not an international border, capturing vacant posts is a routine activity. In this case, it is likely that the Pakistani units overextended themselves in the areas they went to.

- S. Paul Kapur mentions that the Kargil war occurred less than one year after India and Pakistan openly acquired nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons emboldened the Pakistanis to push harder at the status quo than they had previously been able to because the weapons acted as a shield against retaliation.
- According to Stephen Cohen, nuclear weapons inhibited India from going across the LoC or attacking Pakistan elsewhere in the region.
  - Pakistan underestimated both the Indian and American responses.
- According to Naeem Salik, nuclear deterrence in Kargil was important since the conflict remained very confined to a portion of a LoC and did not even expand horizontally.
- Rizwana Abbasi argues that nuclear deterrence gave confidence to Pakistani planners to initiate the operation, which they did without a cost-benefit analysis.
- According to Gurmeet Kanwal, Indians believe that nuclear weapons did not play a large role in the Kargil crisis. It was reported that Pakistan had moved some ballistic missiles closer to the border, but the moves do not appear to have had a significant impact on Indian plans.
- According to Michael Krepon, Pakistan wanted help from the United States to de-escalate the crisis. It moved nuclear assets in a way that Indian intelligence could not see but that U.S. intelligence picked up, suggesting this move was more to signal the United States than India.

### 5.7: “Crisis Management During the 1999 Kargil Conflict”

Run Time: 6:31

Lecturers: Devin Haggerty (University of Maryland-Baltimore College), Lisa Curtis (U.S. Department of State), Marvin Weinbaum (U.S. Department of State), Teresita Schaffer (U.S. Department of State), and Michael Krepon (Stimson Center)

**Key Points:**

- According to Devin Haggerty, the United States plays a unique role in crisis management between India and Pakistan, being an honest broker between the two, being able to send senior diplomats quickly as the crisis unfolds, providing transparency, and acting as a communication bridge between the two sides.
- According to Lisa Curtis, it was at the point when Pakistan had possibly moved some of its nuclear capabilities and was contemplating the nuclear option that alarmed the United States. Looking back, it is unlikely that Pakistan was actually considering the nuclear option, but it was enough to raise alarm. The United States also worked with China, which played a role in convincing Pakistan to back down.
- Marvin Weinbaum argues that it was the combination of Nawaz Sharif’s visit to Beijing and then to Washington which convinced the civilian leadership in Pakistan that it could not continue to pursue its activities in Kargil.
- According to Teresita Schaffer, there is significant literature suggesting that countries that make a major surprise tactical move benefit in the short term but not in the long term, as observed in the Kargil crisis.
- Michael Krepon states that the United States was the principal crisis manager of the Kargil war.
  - The U.S. government conveyed to the Pakistani side that it needed to cease, desist, and go back to the status quo ante.
The U.S. government conveyed to the Indian side that it needed to act responsibly and avoid expanding the conflict horizontally (geographically) or vertically (in intensity).

5.8: “Lessons Learned from the 1999 Kargil Conflict”

Run Time: 10:57

Lecturers: Dave Smith (U.S. Army), Ashley Tellis (Carnegie Endowment), Michael Krepon (Stimson Center), Rizwana Abbasi (National Defence University), Sadia Tasleem (Quaid-i-Azam University), Moeed Yusuf (U.S. Institute of Peace), Manoj Joshi (Observer Research Foundation), Abhijit Iyer-Mitra (Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies), and Manpreet Sethi (Centre for Air Power Studies)

Key Points:

- According to Dave Smith, the nuclear dimension in Kargil did play a significant role in the lessons each side learned:
  - Pakistan drew the lesson that its nuclear capability might shield it from provocative Indian action in the wake of a relatively measured Indian response.
  - India drew the conclusion that there was space for limited conventional military operations in a nuclear environment.
  - However, it is not clear in the present day what the long-term implications of those conclusions might be.
- According to Ashley Tellis, India, Pakistan, and the United States drew different lessons from the crisis:
  - Pakistan learned that open war against India was likely to provoke the wrath of the international community.
  - India learned that a restrained response to Pakistani aggression earns international applause, provided the military’s operational tasks can be achieved.
  - The U.S. learned that it would have to maintain eternal vigilance with respect to escalation risks in South Asia.
- Michael Krepon believes that the Pakistani military learned that a blatant military move to change the situation in Kashmir would inevitably hurt Pakistan’s international standing and would reinforce the status quo.
  - On the other hand, India did not learn any conclusive lessons from the war, as the outcome was unsatisfying.
  - The United States learned that the Subcontinent would continue to be a dangerous place because of potential nuclear use.
- According to Rizwana Abbasi, both states realized the potential for a limited war under the nuclear umbrella, as per the stability-instability paradox.
- According to Sadia Tasleem, there was little conversation in Pakistan regarding whether or not it was actually nuclear deterrence at play in the Kargil conflict. In some ways, it reinforced belief in the idea of utility of nuclear weapons, but also spurred conversation on the operational aspect of deterrence.
- Moeed Yusuf argues that there was little emphasis on the naval dynamics of nuclear weapons during or after the Kargil crisis. During the crisis India did threaten a naval blockade, whereas Pakistan later suggested that would cross a nuclear red line.
- According to Manoj Joshi, the Kargil Review Committee in India was constituted as a result of the Kargil crisis. A group of ministers recommended reforms for creating new institutions, so there was some institutional learning from the event.
According to Abhijit Iyer-Mitra, the main lesson of the Kargil War (for India) was the limits of deterrence. It realized that nuclear weapons do not deter against terrorism or some conventional warfare, and that there is room for high-intensity localized conflict under the nuclear umbrella. As a result of this line of thinking, strategists’ so-called limited war scenarios began to resemble full-scale war scenarios.

Manpreet Sethi argues that India showed that you could use force in the presence of nuclear weapons. But, it learned that you could use force only with certain constraints. The presence of nuclear weapons makes one move towards more calculated moves.

Background: “The 2001-02 Twin Peaks Crisis”
This course webpage provides a brief history of the 2001-2002 Twin Peaks crisis.

- For ten months between late December 2001 and October 2002, India and Pakistan kept approximately one million soldiers in a high state of readiness along their international border and the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir, raising the specter of conflict.
- The immediate trigger for the deployment was a brazen attack by militants on the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi on December 13, 2001. The attack set in motion an extended crisis with two distinct peaks when tensions were extremely high and when war appeared imminent to many observers.
  - The first peak, immediately after the attack on Parliament, occurred in the December 2001-January 2002 timeframe.
  - The second peak, in May-June 2002, followed another high-profile attack by militants, this time near the town of Kaluchak in Jammu.
- During both peaks of the crisis, high-level U.S. officials were deeply involved in crisis management, seeking to avoid war and to secure the return of Indian and Pakistani forces to their cantonments.

5.9: “The 2001-02 Twin Peaks Crisis and the Role of Nuclear Weapons”
Run Time: 7:50
Lecturers: Dave Smith (U.S. Army), Michael Krepon (Stimson Center), Manoj Joshi (Observer Research Foundation), and Salma Malik (Quaid-i-Azam University)

Key Points:
- According to Dave Smith, the Twin Peaks Crisis began with a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. At this time, Pakistan had deployed troops into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) while the United States was involved in operations in Afghanistan. Thus, Pakistan was mostly focused on its troops in the west, instead of the east.
  - India deployed its army and moved it westward. This mobilization was at a historically unprecedented level, and Pakistan notified the United States that it would need to remove its western troops to move them east. However, the Indian mobilization took long enough that both sides dealt with the crisis on a conventional basis, despite threats and reports of nuclear escalation.
  - In May of the same year, there was another LeT attack on an Indian army encampment, provoking the second “peak” and greater fears of nuclear escalation.
  - U.S. officials were concerned that the Indian army might move across the international border and that if Pakistan could not defend itself conventionally it would be prepared to use nuclear weapons.
According to Michael Krepon, nuclear weapons were used for messaging purposes more than in previous crises. There were mobilizations of conventional capabilities and significant movements of nuclear assets, along with public statements threatening nuclear use.

Manoj Joshi states that nuclear weapons deterred further Indian action during the crisis.

According to Salma Malik, Pakistan felt that war was a legitimate possibility, and nuclear weapons afforded some sense of confidence to that end.

5.10: “CRISIS MANAGEMENT DURING THE 2001-02 TWIN PEAKS CRISIS”

Run Time: 10:26
Lecturers: Michael Krepon (Stimson Center), Marvin Weinbaum (U.S. Department of State), Lisa Curtis (U.S. Department of State), and Ashley Tellis (U.S. Department of State)

Key Points:

- According to Michael Krepon, Washington developed its “crisis management playbook” during the Twin Peaks crisis. This included interventions like leader-to-leader phone calls, high-level diplomats being sent to the region, and the employment of U.S. intelligence capabilities to assess facts on the ground. As such, the United States became the de-facto “rumor de-bunker” throughout the crisis.
  - Another effective crisis management tool developed when the U.S. ambassador to India instructed non-essential U.S. personnel in India to leave the country. As many businesspeople in India then did not conduct business, the damaging effect on the Indian economy influenced India’s decision-making.
- According to Marvin Weinbaum, U.S. diplomats capitalized on the assumption that neither India nor Pakistan genuinely wanted to escalate to war. As such, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was critical in traveling to and talking with both Indian and Pakistani leaders.
  - Since neither side trusted one another, the role of the United States was to convince both sides to trust it, and give each side a face-saving route to walk away from conflict.
- According to Lisa Curtis, the most critical role of the United States in the Twin Peaks crisis was sending senior U.S. diplomats to tamp down tensions during the crisis. In particular, Deputy Secretary Armitage’s personal diplomatic role was highly influential.
- According to Ashley Tellis, U.S. diplomats in India during the time had to balance maintaining a close relationship with the Indian government in order to shape its choices and advocate for and to the U.S. government.
- Michael Krepon recounts his personal experience of the Twin Peaks crisis while he was in India, crediting Deputy Secretary Armitage for making it clear to India that the fundamentals of the situation still had not changed despite the second attack.

5.11: “LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 2001-02 TWIN PEAKS CRISIS”

Run Time: 8:55
Lecturers: Michael Krepon (Stimson Center), Manoj Joshi (Observer Research Foundation), Abhijit Iyer-Mitra (Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies), Swaran Singh (Jawaharlal Nehru University), Moeed Yusuf (U.S. Institute of Peace), Sadia Tasleem (Quaid-i-Azam University) and, Mansoor Ahmed (Harvard University)

Key Points:

- According to Michael Krepon, a takeaway from the Twin Peaks crisis was that both sides wanted to develop conventional warfare options to use before the United States could intervene.
As a result, thinking about India’s Cold Start Doctrine developed (see Lesson 3.11), though other Indians questioned the wisdom of that option.

For some in the Pakistani army, the Twin Peaks crisis could be interpreted as a narrow victory (since India threatened war but eventually backed away). For others, it forced questioning about the start of the crisis: terrorist attacks on Indian soil.

- According to Manoj Joshi, the lesson learned from the Twin Peaks crisis was that traditional mass mobilization would not be successful in a dispute with Pakistan. Afterwards, India announced its nuclear doctrine and command authority, and it felt a stronger need to signal its nuclear capabilities and institutional mechanisms to employ such capabilities.
- Abhijit Iyer-Mitra states that the Twin Peaks crisis forced the Indian army to wards new kinds of thinking, such as Cold Start. However, Cold Start did not result in a “different” type of war – it used the same logistic chains and armor, but in smaller formations closer to the border.
- According to Swaran Singh, Operation Parakram and the Kargil conflict showed that escalation control could exist. However, it also emphasized the role of non-state actors in escalating conflict between India and Pakistan.
- Moeed Yusuf believes that the most important lesson from the Twin Peaks crisis was that war would not be an option without suicidal tendencies. Once nuclear weapons entered the calculation, an Indian full-scale mobilization to punish Pakistan for militant attacks on India seemed unfeasible. For Pakistan, the conclusion was that a continuation of terrorist activities could lead to mutual catastrophe.
- Sadia Tasleem explains that the Twin Peaks crisis is frequently cited as an episode which reinforced Pakistani thinking on the utility of maintaining nuclear deterrence.
- According to Mansoor Ahmed, the lessons learned from the Twin Peaks crisis were reinforced in the 2008 Mumbai crisis, when India was planning surgical air strikes on Pakistan in response to a non-state terrorist attack on India.
  - Another outcome was to encourage Pakistan to develop its short-range battlefield nuclear weapons, which on the one hand have caused debate and controversy, but on the other hand have complicated India’s plans for conducting a limited war under Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.

Background: “The 2008 Mumbai Crisis”
This course webpage provides a brief description of the 2008 Mumbai crisis.

- In late November of 2008, extremists, based, trained, and armed in Pakistan, carried out attacks in Mumbai for three days against two luxury hotels, the city’s central train station, a Jewish center, and other targets.
- On November 26, 2008, several men armed with hand grenades, automatic weapons, and satellite phones landed in a rubber raft on the shores of Mumbai. They scattered to soft targets across the city, launched simultaneous attacks that held India’s financial capital under siege for days, and killed more than 170 individuals, including six American citizens.
- Once again, an escalatory spiral between India and Pakistan seemed imminent. President George W. Bush’s outgoing administration faced the challenge of containing tensions between the two neighbors. The attacks in Mumbai were quickly linked to militants affiliated with the Lashkar-e-Taiba (“Army of the Pure,” or LeT), a group with a long record of terror assaults and ties to Pakistan’s military and intelligence services.
Like previous crises, the Mumbai crisis entailed policy coordination among U.S. officials in multiple layers of government and diverse locales. It marks the latest in a procession of crises that continued despite the advent of covert, and then overt, nuclear weapon capabilities.

5.12: “THE 2008 MUMBAI CRISIS”
Run Time: 11:49
Lecturers: Anish Goel (New America), Manoj Joshi (Observer Research Foundation), Ashley Tellis (Carnegie Endowment), and Moeed Yusuf (U.S. Institute of Peace)

Key Points:
- According to Anish Goel, for the United States, the main concerns during the 2008 Mumbai crisis included preventing an Indian-Pakistani war from erupting, finding out the truth on the ground of what events were unfolding, determining who exactly was responsible, and where the terrorists came from.
  - Moreover, the United States emphasized solidarity with India and communicated its willingness to send law enforcement assistance to help end attacks and support to develop systems for preventing another similar attack.
  - The U.S. message to Islamabad was that the attacks were incredibly serious and that the United States expected full cooperation from the government.
- Manoj Joshi explains how the Indian government tried to determine first, whether or not there was clear evidence of Pakistani complicity, and also whether or not the army could perform in an all-out war. Eventually, the military determined that there was a shortage of ammunition and other factors such that it could not afford a full war.
- Ashley Tellis argues that in any crisis, the role of leaders is pivotal, more so than bureaucratic systems.
  - The critical leaders in the 2008 crisis were the Indian prime minister, the Pakistani prime minister, the U.S. president, and in practical terms, the U.S. secretary of state.
  - Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice leaned heavily on Pakistan to ensure that the government curtailed LeT activities.
  - Manmohan Singh showed restraint despite many around him encouraging retaliation.
    - U.S. diplomacy in India was critical as there was immense public pressure for India to respond militarily.
- According to Michael Krepon, Pakistan’s lessons from the attacks were that a large-scale attack that was easily traceable to the Pakistani government could not continue in the future.
  - Since the 2008 attack, anti-India incidents have been small-scale.
  - India, on the other hand, has struggled to institutionalize lessons from the 2008 attack as it is still largely vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
  - For the United States, the 2008 crisis honed the U.S. crisis management playbook, in which sending senior-level, experienced diplomats is critical.
- According to Moeed Yusuf, the common definition of a nuclear crisis is not always applicable to South Asia, where any crisis between India and Pakistan is in reality a nuclear crisis.
  - This is because every crisis has a nuclear angle due to opaque nuclear doctrines and postures.
  - Thus, any crisis with the potential for escalation could be considered a nuclear crisis.
RECOMMENDED READINGS
For greater depth, we encourage students to peruse these recommended readings:


DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
Below is a sample list of discussion questions to get students thinking and talking about the issues from this chapter in class.

1. What are the common characteristics, or main components, of a nuclear crisis?
2. Considering the lessons in this chapter, what are the major South Asia-specific escalation dangers?
3. Why might the common definition of a “nuclear crisis” (a crisis involving nuclear weapons) need to be expanded in the case of South Asia?
4. To what extent can third parties intervene and help manage crises between two countries? Should they interfere?
5. Do leadership beliefs matter in a nuclear crisis? Why or why not?
6. How does a leader’s assessment of its adversary’s threat credibility contribute to crisis escalation?
7. How did bilateral dynamics between the United States and Pakistan play out during the 1986-87 Brasstacks crisis?
8. How extensive were the nuclear dynamics in the 1990 Compound crisis and the 1999 Kargil conflict?
9. Can the Kargil conflict truly be classified as a war between states with nuclear weapons? Why or why not?
10. What are some of the main lessons India and Pakistan have learned from the 2008 Mumbai crisis, 2001-02 Twin Peaks crisis, 1999 Kargil conflict, 1990 Compound crisis, and 1986-87 Brasstacks crisis?