

# Part 3

## Countries' Support for UN-Based Multilateralism

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# Part 3

## Countries' Support for UN-Based Multilateralism

In September 2027, world leaders will gather for the final SDG Summit before the Agenda 2030 deadline – an event that the 2024 Pact for the Future explicitly frames as an opportunity to “advance sustainable development by 2030 and beyond” (Action 12.b). The period leading up to the Summit is therefore pivotal for rethinking global cooperation for sustainable development, and for advancing the reforms needed to equip the UN system with the vision, methods, tools and financing required to address twenty-first-century global challenges, including climate change, collective security and the impact of new technologies.


Nation-states remain at the heart of the UN system. They vote at the General Assembly, ratify international treaties, participate in UN organizations and, more broadly, either uphold or depart from the principles established in the UN Charter. SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals) emphasizes the importance of global cooperation for achieving the SDGs. It is therefore critical to track countries' commitment to supporting UN-based multilateralism systematically and regularly.

This chapter presents an updated and expanded version of the Index of countries' support for UN-based multilateralism (UN-Mi), including aggregate results as well as detailed results by indicator. The Index covers all 193 UN member states. The UN-Mi has benefited from several rounds of comments collected since 2022 on pilot versions and was presented in detail in a 2024 peer-reviewed paper (Lafortune and Sachs, 2024). The Index is now used as an indicator in UNDP's 2025 Global Knowledge Index (UNDP and MBRF, 2025).

**Figure 3.1**

SDSN's Index of Countries' Support for UN-Based Multilateralism (UN-Mi): conceptual framework

### TRACKING COUNTRIES' SUPPORT FOR UN-BASED MULTILATERALISM THROUGH SIX HEADLINE INDICATORS



Source: Authors, based on Lafortune and Sachs, 2024

The UN-Mi draws on six indicators to gauge countries' commitment to UN-based multilateralism (Figure 3.1). This chapter presents each indicator in detail, outlining its methodology, data sources and results. For clarity, most charts in this chapter focus on G20 and large countries, which collectively account for almost three-quarters of the world's population. We also include in each chart the global median as a measure of central tendency across the 193 UN member states, because the median is less affected by outliers than the average.

Detailed data for all countries is accessible at: <https://sdgtransformationcenter.org/>.

## The 2026 UN-Mi: rankings and scores

Overall, as of 2026, a majority of countries continue to adhere to the basic principles established in the UN Charter. The average UN-Mi score is 65 out of 100, while the median is 66. The UN-Mi country scores and rankings are broadly robust to statistical and methodological adjustments, especially at the top and bottom of the distribution.

Using statistical methods, we group countries into the following five categories:

- Category 1 corresponds to countries that demonstrate **very strong support** for UN-based multilateralism, with scores above the global mean plus 0.5 standard deviation. The countries in this category tend to perform well on all six indicators of the UN-Mi. Barbados tops this year's UN-Mi, followed by Antigua and Barbuda, then Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago, the Maldives, Jamaica, Mauritius, Chile, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Among the G20 and large countries, Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines and South Africa fall in this category.
- Category 2 corresponds to countries that demonstrate **strong support** for UN-based multilateralism and perform above the global average, with scores within 0.5 standard deviations above the mean. These countries typically score well on most indicators, although their performance may be weaker on one of the six. Countries such as Argentina, Bangladesh, Germany, Indonesia, Japan and Nigeria fall in this category.

- Category 3 corresponds to countries that demonstrate **moderate support** for UN-based multilateralism, performing only slightly below the global average, with scores within 0.5 standard deviations below the mean. Australia, Canada, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Italy and the Republic of Korea fall in this category.
- Category 4 corresponds to countries that demonstrate **inconsistent support** for UN-based multilateralism, with scores below the mean minus 0.5 standard deviations. Some countries in this category tend to perform poorly on the indicator related to participation in conflicts and militarization. China, France, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and the United Kingdom fall into this category.
- Finally, category 5 corresponds to countries that exhibit **weak support** for UN-based multilateralism or to statistical outliers (countries that perform below the lower-fence threshold, defined using Tukey's fence<sup>1</sup> as a reference point). There are only four countries in this category: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Israel, South Sudan and the United States. The United States ranks last among the 193 UN member states, with very low performance across all six headline indicators.

The 2026 UN-Mi rankings and scores are presented in Figure 3.2. Arrows indicate whether each country's support for UN-based multilateralism has improved substantially or moderately, declined, or remained broadly stable over the period 2015–2025. These trends are measured using the same indicator set as the UN-Mi scores, apart from the ratification of UN treaties and membership in UN organizations, both of which are currently more difficult to track systematically for all countries over time. Overall, support for UN-based multilateralism has declined in many countries, driven mostly by increased military expenditure and participation in conflicts. For European countries, this decline has also been driven by an increase in the use of Unilateral Coercive Measures (UCMs) compared with the baseline.

1. Tukey's fences are mathematical boundaries used in statistics and data analysis to detect and identify outliers. Developed by John Tukey (1977), this nonparametric method calculates bounds based on the data's Interquartile Range (IQR), making it highly robust for skewed datasets.

**Figure 3.2**  
2026 UN-Mi Rankings and Scores

Rank	Country	Score	Trend	Rank	Country	Score	Trend	Rank	Country	Score	Trend
1	Barbados	90.7	↑	44	Lao PDR	74.5	↑	86	Netherlands	67.6	→
2	Antigua and Barbuda	88.3	→	45	Austria	74.5	→	87	Comoros	67.4	↑
3	Uruguay	87.4	↑	46	New Zealand	73.8	↑	88	Albania	67.4	→
4	Trinidad and Tobago	86.6	↑	47	Kuwait	73.8	↓	89	San Marino	67.3	↑
5	Maldives	86.4	↑	48	Vietnam	73.3	↑	90	Armenia	67.2	↗
6	Jamaica	85.5	↑	49	Morocco	73.3	→	91	North Macedonia	66.6	↗
7	Mauritius	85.3	↑	50	South Africa	72.7	↓	92	Mauritania	66.4	↓
8	Chile	85.0	→	51	Sri Lanka	72.5	→	93	Samoa	66.2	→
9	Philippines	84.9	↑	52	Algeria	72.4	→	94	Madagascar	66.2	↓
10	Malaysia	83.3	↑	53	Côte d'Ivoire	72.4	↓	95	Azerbaijan	66.0	↑
11	Belize	83.0	→	54	Ireland	72.3	↗	96	Angola	65.9	↗
12	Costa Rica	82.1	↑	55	Malawi	72.0	↓	97	Hungary	65.9	↓
13	Guatemala	82.0	→	56	Iceland	71.6	↑	98	Timor-Leste	65.9	↑
14	Brazil	81.6	→	57	Cambodia	71.6	→	99	Qatar	65.8	→
15	Seychelles	81.2	↑	58	Vanuatu	71.6	↑	100	Spain	65.8	↓
16	Senegal	81.1	↑	59	Uganda	71.3	→	101	Georgia	65.7	→
17	Mongolia	81.1	↑	60	Guyana	70.9	→	102	Grenada	65.5	→
18	The Bahamas	80.4	→	61	Bangladesh	70.5	↓	103	Portugal	65.4	→
19	Paraguay	80.2	↑	62	Nigeria	70.5	↓	104	India	65.1	→
20	Fiji	80.1	→	63	Jordan	70.4	↓	105	Congo, Rep.	64.9	↓
21	Peru	80.1	↑	64	Argentina	70.3	↓	106	Mali	64.8	↓
22	Tunisia	79.8	↓	65	Nicaragua	69.9	↓	107	Haiti	64.8	↓
23	Colombia	79.8	↑	66	Brunei Darussalam	69.9	↑	108	Solomon Islands	64.6	→
24	Thailand	79.2	↑	67	St. Kitts and Nevis	69.9	↑	109	Tanzania	64.4	↓
25	Namibia	78.8	↑	68	Ghana	69.8	↓	110	Bolivia	64.2	↓
26	Cabo Verde	78.6	→	69	Gabon	69.8	→	111	Bahrain	64.2	↓
27	Honduras	78.4	↑	70	Kyrgyz Republic	69.6	→	112	Kenya	64.1	↓
28	St. Lucia	78.1	↑	71	Nepal	69.4	→	113	United Arab Emirates	64.1	↓
29	Switzerland	77.7	↑	72	Indonesia	69.2	→	114	Egypt, Arab Rep.	64.0	↓
30	Panama	77.6	↑	73	Bosnia and Herzegovina	69.0	→	115	Croatia	63.9	→
31	Kazakhstan	77.4	→	74	Moldova	68.8	→	116	Italy	63.7	↓
32	Sierra Leone	77.2	↑	75	Zimbabwe	68.8	↓	117	Guinea-Bissau	63.6	→
33	Dominican Republic	77.1	→	76	Lesotho	68.5	↓	118	Monaco	63.3	↑
34	Mozambique	76.8	↑	77	Liechtenstein	68.4	↑	119	Slovenia	63.1	→
35	Suriname	76.6	↑	78	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	68.3	↓	120	Benin	63.0	↓
36	Zambia	76.4	↓	79	Singapore	68.3	↑	121	Papua New Guinea	62.7	↓
37	Ecuador	76.2	↓	80	The Gambia	68.1	↑	122	Togo	62.7	↓
38	Montenegro	75.9	↗	81	Germany	68.1	→	123	Belgium	62.6	↓
39	Botswana	75.6	→	82	Cuba	67.9	↑	124	Tajikistan	62.3	↓
40	Malta	75.5	→	83	Oman	67.9	↑	125	Tonga	61.9	↑
41	El Salvador	75.0	↓	84	Japan	67.8	→	126	Djibouti	61.6	↓
42	Mexico	74.9	↓	85	Guinea	67.6	↓	127	Ethiopia	61.2	↓
43	Luxembourg	74.8	→								

3. Countries' Support

Figure 3.2  
(continued)

Rank	Country	Score	Trend	Rank	Country	Score	Trend
128	Iraq	61.2	↓	165	Myanmar	54.5	↓
129	Norway	61.1	↓	166	Eswatini	54.3	↓
130	Liberia	61.0	↓	167	Central African Republic	54.2	↗
131	Kiribati	60.9	↑	168	Greece	54.1	↓
132	Dominica	60.8	↓	169	Eritrea	54.0	→
133	Denmark	60.6	↓	170	Belarus	54.0	↓
134	Cyprus	60.5	↓	171	Romania	53.5	↓
135	Marshall Islands	60.2	↑	172	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	50.9	↑
136	Libya	60.1	→	173	Nauru	50.8	↑
137	Bulgaria	60.1	↓	174	Ukraine	50.8	↓
138	Korea, Rep.	59.9	→	175	Congo, Dem. Rep.	49.9	↓
139	Australia	59.8	↓	176	Equatorial Guinea	49.3	↗
140	Finland	59.7	↓	177	Lithuania	49.0	↓
141	Canada	59.5	→	178	France	48.5	↓
142	Czechia	59.4	↓	179	Türkiye	48.3	↓
143	Niger	59.3	↓	180	Sudan	48.0	↓
144	Andorra	59.0	↑	181	Latvia	47.5	↓
145	Bhutan	59.0	→	182	Burundi	45.9	↓
146	Tuvalu	59.0	→	183	Estonia	45.7	↓
147	Burkina Faso	58.9	↓	184	Venezuela, RB	44.8	↓
148	Serbia	58.1	↓	185	Russian Federation	43.1	↓
149	Uzbekistan	57.8	↗	186	Syrian Arab Republic	41.3	↓
150	Turkmenistan	57.7	↓	187	Somalia	41.0	→
151	Sweden	57.5	↓	188	Iran, Islamic Rep.	38.2	↓
152	Rwanda	57.4	→	189	Afghanistan	37.7	↓
153	Palau	57.2	↑	190	Israel	26.5	↓
154	Poland	56.5	↓	191	Korea, Dem. Rep.	24.6	↓
155	Lebanon	56.4	→	192	South Sudan	22.3	→
156	China	56.0	↓	193	United States	1.7	↓
157	Cameroon	55.9	↓				
158	Saudi Arabia	55.7	↓				
159	Pakistan	55.4	↓				
160	Chad	55.4	↗				
161	São Tomé and Príncipe	55.2	↓				
162	United Kingdom	54.9	→				
163	Slovak Republic	54.6	↓				
164	Yemen, Rep.	54.6	↓				

Support Level	Score Range	Number of Countries
<b>VERY STRONG SUPPORT</b>	Score $\geq 71.5$	58 countries
	Mean +0.5 SD	
<b>STRONG SUPPORT</b>	Score 65.2–71.5	45 countries
	Mean to Mean +0.5 SD	
<b>MODERATE SUPPORT</b>	Score 58.8–65.2	44 countries
	Mean -0.5 SD to Mean	
<b>INCONSISTENT SUPPORT</b>	Score 37.5–58.8	42 countries
	Tukey fence to Mean -0.5 SD	
<b>WEAK SUPPORT (STATISTICAL OUTLIERS)</b>	Score < 37.5 (Tukey fence Q1–1.5×IQR)	4 countries
	Below Tukey lower fence (Q1–1.5×IQR)	

- ↓ Decreasing
- Stagnating
- ↗ Moderately improving
- ↑ On track or maintaining very high performance

Note: See statistical annex for details on clustering.  
Source: Authors

## Detailed UN-Mi results by indicator

### UN-Mi Indicator 1: Ratification of major UN treaties


The first indicator measures the percentage of major UN treaties that each country has ratified. It covers 60 international conventions and agreements adopted by the United Nations between 1946 and 2025, as well as instruments adopted before 1946 and later incorporated into the UN treaty system. The indicator includes UN instruments ratified by more than 50 percent of the international community, while excluding protocols, optional protocols, amendments, and conventions that were later terminated or applied only to a small number of countries. Treaties adopted outside the United Nations system or deposited by parties other than the UN Secretary-General, such as the Geneva Conventions, adopted under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), were

also excluded. For each treaty, we recorded in our database (accessible online) whether each member state had signed or ratified it. Signature of a treaty is not legally binding, however ratification (or acceptance, accession, definitive signature or succession) is. The data were extracted from the UN treaty collection on 29 January 2026.

The global median is 85 percent (Figure 3.3), suggesting that an overwhelming majority of countries generally ratify important UN treaties. Among G20 and large countries, Italy, Nigeria, Australia, Germany, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and France have ratified more than 95 percent of major UN treaties. By contrast, the United States is one of the ten countries in the world that have ratified fewer than 60 percent of major UN treaties. In early 2026, the US withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement.

**Figure 3.3**

Ratification of major UN treaties by G20 and large countries, 1945–2025 (%)



*Note:* Using a basket of treaties ratified by more than 50 percent of UN member states (N=60) as of 2024. Global median (85 percent) corresponds to the median percentage of major UN treaties ratified across all 193 UN member states. African Union (AU) and European Union (EU) not included – only G20 countries.  
*Source:* Authors' calculations based on UN treaty database.


### UN-Mi Indicator 2: Percentage of votes aligned with the international majority at the UN General Assembly

The second indicator concerns the percentage of a country’s votes at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) that align with the international majority. Chapter IV of the UN Charter describes the role and functions of the General Assembly, the main decision-making body of the United Nations. This indicator measures the percentage of times that each member state has voted with the simple international majority (not weighted by population), out of 550 recorded votes over the period 2021–2025. Overall, since 1945, votes on more than 5,000 UNGA resolutions have been reported in the UN digital library (data were obtained via a Python web scraping pipeline). For each resolution, UN member states can vote yes or no, abstain, or be absent. In the vast majority of cases, 98 percent of the time, the majority vote is “Yes”.

The global median for alignment with the majority vote is 76 percent. Bangladesh, Brazil, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia aligned with the majority vote at least 80 percent of the time (Figure 3.4), whereas Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom aligned with the majority around two-thirds of the time. The United States, however, aligned with the international majority vote only 23 percent of the time on average from 2021 to 2025. Focusing only on 2025, the US vote aligned with the international majority in only around 5 percent of recorded UNGA votes, across 192 resolutions, and notably opposed important resolutions related to sustainable development and climate action.

Yet support for sustainable development remained strong at the UNGA in 2025, with related resolutions

**Figure 3.4**  
Percentage of votes aligned with the majority at the UN General Assembly, G20 and large countries, 2021–2025



Note: Simple majority (not population weighted). Votes recorded between 2021 and 2025 (N=550). Global median (76%).  
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on UN Digital Library voting data.

receiving sizeable majority votes. Table 3.1 presents detailed 2025 voting results for all UNGA resolutions that included the term “sustainable” or “2030 Agenda” – including resolutions on financing, energy connectivity, education, biodiversity preservation, consumption and production, and digital technologies for sustainable development. Most were adopted with a very large majority, often exceeding 170 countries, with only a very small minority voting against them – often only two or three countries – while several abstained or were absent. The two countries that opposed these resolutions almost systematically were Argentina and the United States.

Compared with the early years of the United Nations, the share of countries’ votes at UNGA that align with the United States has declined notably in all regions, a trend that accelerated in several regions during the 1980s. In 2025, this decline reached a turning point: voting alignment with the United States fell to 20 percent or less across all world regions (Figure 3.5). Despite this broad pattern, there remains significant variation in UNGA voting patterns within regions, with Israel being by far the country voting most often in alignment with the United States over the past five years.

**Table 3.1**

Results of 2025 UNGA votes on resolutions containing “sustainable” or “2030 Agenda”

#	Date	Title	Resolution	Size of the majority	Opposing countries
1	4/16/25	United Nations Decade for Afforestation and Reforestation in line with Sustainable Forest Management (2027-2036): resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/79/283	Yes: 155(No: 1)	United States
2	4/29/25	Global health and foreign policy: rethinking health promotion as a transformative path towards improved and more sustainable well-being for all: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/79/287	Yes: 139(No: 1)	United States
3	8/25/25	Sevilla Commitment: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/79/323	Yes: 158(No: 2)	Israel, United States
4	9/5/25	Impact of rapid technological change on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals and targets: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/79/334	Yes: 157(No: 2)	Argentina, United States
5	12/9/25	Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/107	Yes: 168(No: 1)	Russian Federation
6	12/9/25	2028 United Nations Conference to Support the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/108	Yes: 169(No: 2)	Argentina, United States
7	12/15/25	United Nations Decade of Sustainable Transport 2026-2035: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/132	Yes: 177(No: 2)	Argentina, United States
8	12/15/25	Agricultural technology for sustainable development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/133	Yes: 138(No: 27)	Multiple
9	12/15/25	Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity and its contribution to sustainable development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/140	Yes: 180(No: 1)	United States

**Table 3.1**  
(continued)

#	Date	Title	Resolution	Size of the majority	Opposing countries
10	12/15/25	Education for sustainable development in the framework of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/141	Yes: 179(No: 3)	Argentina, Paraguay, United States
11	12/15/25	Ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/142	Yes: 180(No: 2)	Argentina, United States
12	12/15/25	Sustainable mountain development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/144	Yes: 178(No: 1)	United States
13	12/15/25	Strengthening cooperation for integrated coastal zone management for achieving sustainable development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/145	Yes: 174(No: 1)	United States
14	12/15/25	Science, technology and innovation for sustainable development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/147	Yes: 180(No: 2)	Argentina, United States
15	12/15/25	Culture and sustainable development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/148	Yes: 180(No: 2)	Argentina, United States
16	12/15/25	Contribution of the care economy to sustainable development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/152	Yes: 160(No: 2)	Argentina, United States
17	12/15/25	Eradicating rural poverty to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/154	Yes: 125(No: 52)	Multiple
18	12/15/25	Promoting sustainable consumption and production patterns for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, building on Agenda 21: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/135	Yes: 180(No: 3)	Argentina, Paraguay, United States
19	12/15/25	Sustainable and resilient tourism and sustainable development in Central America and the Dominican Republic: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/134	Yes: 152(No: 4)	China, Nicaragua, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and United States
20	12/15/25	The pivotal role of reliable and stable energy connectivity in driving sustainable development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/131	Yes: 179(No: 1)	United States
21	12/15/25	Promoting investments for sustainable development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/127	Yes: 181(No: 2)	Argentina, United States
22	12/15/25	Promotion of international cooperation to combat illicit financial flows and strengthen good practices on assets return to foster sustainable development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/126	Yes: 176(No: 1)	United States
23	12/15/25	Financial inclusion for sustainable development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/125	Yes: 181(No: 2)	Argentina, United States
24	12/15/25	Information and communications technologies for sustainable development: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly	A/RES/80/118	Yes: 181(No: 2)	Argentina, United States

Note: The Sevilla Commitment – resolution A/RES/79/323, adopted by the General Assembly – was retained because it is strongly related to financing sustainable development.

Source: Authors, based on UN voting database

**Figure 3.5**

Share of UNGA votes aligned with the United States over time: decadal averages and 2025 standalone value



Note: Afghanistan and Pakistan were included in the South Asia grouping.

Source: Authors, based on UN voting database


### UN-Mi Indicator 3: Participation in selected UN organizations and agencies

The third indicator measures membership and participation in a select group of UN organizations. Chapter IX of the UN Charter describes the role of the specialized agencies<sup>2</sup> in fostering international economic and social cooperation. The indicator captures membership in 24 organizations as of March 2025: all 15 specialized agencies, the 6 funds and programmes (UNDP, UNEP, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNICEF and WFP), the Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These were selected to include all the specialized agencies and to represent a broad range of sustainable development issues, including education, health, finance, trade, telecommunication and industrial policy.

Most of the 193 UN member states participate in all 24 selected organizations: the global median is 24, the maximum is 24, and the minimum is 12. Most G20 and large countries are members of all 24 organizations (Figure 3.6) – however Argentina announced in February 2025 that it would leave the WHO; Australia is not a member of UNIDO, UNWTO or IFAD; Canada and the United Kingdom are not members of UNIDO or UNWTO; France left UNIDO in 2014; Ethiopia is not a member of the WTO; and the Russian Federation is not a member of UNWTO.

The United States is both an outlier among G20 and large countries and a global outlier in terms of participation in UN organizations. In January 2025, the US federal administration withdrew from 66 UN organizations.

**Figure 3.6**  
Membership in selected group of 24 UN organizations, G20 and large countries, 2026



Note: Global median and maximum = 24.

Source: Authors, data compiled via desk research on individual organizations and agencies’ web portals.

2. UN Specialized Agencies: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); International Labour Organization (ILO); International Monetary Fund (IMF); International Maritime Organization (IMO); International Telecommunication Union (ITU); United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO); World Tourism Organization (UNWTO); Universal Postal Union (UPU); World Health Organization (WHO); World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); World Meteorological Organization (WMO); and the World Bank Group – including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). United Nations funds and programmes: UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP).

### UN-Mi Indicator 4: Participation in conflicts and militarization

The fourth indicator concerns countries' participation in conflicts and their degree of militarization. The Preamble to the 1945 UN Charter states that all UN member states must “practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and “unite our strength to maintain international peace and security” (United Nations, 2025). Several UN resolutions and reports highlight the link between disarmament and development.

In 2025, the UN Secretary-General published a report titled *The Security We Need: Rebalancing Military Spending for a Sustainable and Peaceful Future* (United Nations, 2025), which argues that:

“Growing military expenditure today is crowding out resources essential for social investment, poverty reduction, education, health, environmental protection and infrastructure – undermining progress on nearly all the Sustainable Development Goals” (p. 6).


The report later warns that:

“Based on possible projected scenarios of military spending levels, by 2030, the world could allocate between \$840 billion and \$2.5 trillion more to military spending than what was spent in 2024. This represents an enormous amount of financial resources that, if invested in sustainable development, would contribute significantly to achieving the 2030 Agenda.” (p. 32)

Our “Participation in conflicts and militarization” indicator relies on data from the 2025 Global Peace Index (GPI), compiled by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP 2025). It is calculated as the average of a country's score on the GPI's “Militarisation” domain and on the two external dimensions of the “Ongoing Conflict” domain: “relations with neighboring countries” and external conflicts (number and resulting mortality). The Militarization pillar includes comparable data on military expenditure

**Figure 3.7**

Global Peace Index: militarization and external conflicts, G20 and large countries, 2025



Note: from 1 (best, less militarized) to (5, worst, more militarized). Global median (1.86).

Source: Authors' calculations based on IEP, 2025.

as a percentage of GDP, the number of armed service personnel per capita, and financial contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Among G20 and large countries, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, and the Philippines perform best on this indicator, with scores below the global median (Figure 3.7). By contrast, the Russian Federation performs the worst globally, while Türkiye and the United States also score well above the global median.

### UN-Mi Indicator 5: Use of unilateral coercive measures

The fifth indicator relates to the use of unilateral coercive measures (UCMs). This indicator examines the adoption by UN member states of unilateral sanctions against other countries. Several UN resolutions stress that unilateral coercive measures and practices “are contrary to international law, international humanitarian law, the UN Charter and the norms and principles governing peaceful relations among States” (OHCHR, 2023). They also underline that, in the long term, such measures may create social problems and raise humanitarian concerns in targeted states. Reflecting these concerns, the Human Rights Council in 2014 created the mandate of the “Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights”.

The 2030 Agenda stipulates that:

“States are strongly urged to refrain from promulgating and applying any unilateral economic, financial or trade measures not in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations that impede the full achievement of economic and social development, particularly in developing countries.”  
(United Nations, 2015), para 30)

The data on UCMs presented in this report are sourced from the Global Sanctions Database, version 4, 2024, which provides information on sanctions imposed against countries, including data from the start and the final year of each sanction imposition (Felbermayr et al., 2020; Drexel University, HTWG Konstanz and WIFO, 2024). Here, we present sanctions adopted unilaterally between

1950 and 2023 that remained in place as of 2023 or later. For our purposes, a sanction is classified as unilateral if it has not been authorized by the UN Security Council, even when imposed by multiple countries. Sanction regimes adopted unilaterally by regional organizations, such as the European Union or the League of Arab States, have been attributed to their individual member states.


Only a small number of countries make frequent use of UCMs as a policy tool; the global median number of UCM uses over the period 1950–2023 is four. The United States is by far the most significant user of UCMs, particularly since the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by European countries.

### UN-Mi Indicator 6: Contribution to the UN budget and international solidarity

The sixth indicator relates to each country's contribution to the UN budget and to international solidarity. Articles 17 and 19 of the UN Charter set out the organization's financial and budgetary arrangements, while the UN Fifth Committee addresses administrative and budgetary matters. The capacity to pay remains the core principle for determining each member state's contribution to the United Nations' regular and peacekeeping budgets. On this basis, the United Nations establishes a scale of assessments to apportion expenses for its regular budget and for peacekeeping operations. The UN core budget in 2025 was equivalent to 3.7 billion USD. For the period 2025–2027, the United States and China are the largest contributors, each accounting for more than 20 percent of both the regular UN budget and peacekeeping operations.


The UN Fifth Committee keeps a record of countries that pay their dues on time, those with delayed payments, and those in extreme arrears. Countries in significant arrears are subject to the provisions of Article 19: “a Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years.”

**Figure 3.8**  
Use of unilateral coercive measures, G20 and large countries (1950–2023)



Note: UCMs adopted between 1950 and 2023 that continued into 2023. The global median is four.  
Source: Authors, based on Global Sanctions Database, V4, 2024.

**Figure 3.9**  
Timeliness of payment of dues to the United Nations, G20 and large countries, 2021–2025



Note: Scores range from 100 (systematically paid on time), to 66 (small delays in payment), 33 (large delays in payment), and 0 (for countries subject to Article 19 because of extreme arrears). The global median score is 66, corresponding to small delays in payment. Scores are computed as the simple average across the years 2021–2025.  
Source: Authors, based on UN Committee on Contributions.

Since contributions to the UN budget are determined by the principle of capacity to pay, we do not rate countries on the total amount they pay. However, no matter the level of their contribution, every country can be expected to pay their dues on time, to ensure the effective functioning of the UN system.


This indicator focuses on delays in payment of UN dues over the period 2021–2025. A member state receives a perfect score of 100 for each year in which it appears on List I of the UNGA Committee on Contributions’ “honour roll”, indicating that it has paid its dues in full and on time (*paid on time*). Members appearing on List II, which indicates that dues have been paid, but after the 30-day due period, receive a score of 66 (*small delay in payment*). Those absent from the honour roll receive a score of 33 (*large delay in payment*). Countries still in arrears in their financial contributions in January of the subsequent year receive a score of 0, based on the list published on the UN General Assembly’s dedicated Article 19 page (*extreme arrears in payment*). Final scores correspond to each country’s average across 2021–2025.

From 2021 to 2025, 23 countries systematically paid their dues to the United Nations on time, within the 30-day due period. Some countries, however, such as Afghanistan, São Tomé and Príncipe, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, were in extreme arrears in payment in 2023, 2024 and 2025. As largely documented, delays in payment by some of the largest contributors to the regular UN regular budget and peacekeeping operations in recent years represent a significant operational challenge for the effective functioning of the UN system.

For HICs with available data, total scores are adjusted based on their contribution to international solidarity, measured by the percentage of their 2025 gross national income (GNI) that is devoted to official development assistance (ODA). In 2015, as part of SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals), developed countries recommitted to the target of devoting 0.7 percent of their GNI to ODA (SDG target 17.2). This is an official SDG indicator. Yet preliminary data published by the OECD suggest that not only do most developed

**Figure 3.10**

Official Development Assistance (ODA), as a percentage of GNI, OECD/DAC countries (aggregate), 1960–2024



Note: ODA on flows and grant equivalent measure by DAC member countries as percent of GNI. 2020–2025 in grant equivalent.

Source: OECD 2026

countries remain far from meeting this target, but 2025 marked the largest annual contraction in ODA on record, with a decline of 23.1 percent compared with 2024, and representing a second consecutive year of decline (OECD, 2026). In 2025, average ODA as a share of GNI was below its level in 2015 – when the SDGs were adopted. Only four OECD/DAC member countries – Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden – have achieved the international target. Three-quarters of the decline in ODA can be attributed to cuts to USAID. Forecasting models have estimated that the cuts to USAID humanitarian and development programmes may result in more than 14 million additional deaths across all age groups, including 4.5 million deaths of children younger than five, by 2030 (Cavalcanti et al., 2025).

## Outlook

The United Nations, founded in 1945 by just 51 member states, now faces a world of far greater complexity than its architects could have anticipated. The challenges of the 21st century – from climate change and environmental degradation to emerging security threats and rapid technological transformation – demand a multilateral system fit for purpose in a fundamentally different era.

From February to April 2026, the SDSN organized a four-part webinar series, “**Global Governance for Peace and the SDGs**”, designed to make sense of today’s rapidly evolving global challenges, share best practices, and identify solutions for sustainable development beyond 2030. From these global exchanges, several interconnected reforms emerged that could help revitalize UN-based multilateralism.

First, it was highlighted that regional bodies such as the European Union, the African Union, and ASEAN, as well as subnational entities including cities and municipalities, have become significant actors in global governance. The UN must find better ways to incorporate regional realities and subnational perspectives into its frameworks.

Second, the question of representation has never been more pressing. The UN has grown from 51 to 193 member states – Africa alone has gone from 4 members in 1945 to 54 in 2025 – yet its core structures still reflect a post-war balance of power that no longer exists. Meaningful reform must ensure that this diversity of voices is genuinely heard, with some advocating for the creation of a UN Parliament to give fuller institutional expression to the principle of “We the People”.

Third, the UN must sharpen its focus on moving from aspiration to action, prioritizing the development of concrete long-term pathways to sustainable development and stronger implementation mechanisms. Fourth, and closely related: adequately financing the UN and global public goods remains a critical priority. The UN currently operates with a core annual budget roughly equivalent to 45 cents per person globally, which is highly inadequate for addressing the growing shared challenges of our time. On top of this, many countries are paying their dues late. Innovative financing mechanisms, such as levies on international shipping, aviation, financial transactions or carbon emissions, could generate the revenues needed to fund the UN and global public goods properly and to strengthen the institutions that deliver them. Addressing duplications in mandates across UN agencies is important, as emphasized in the UN80 initiative, but the UN also needs to be properly financed.

Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the UN’s effectiveness depends on countries’ adherence to the norms and principles they have collectively endorsed. This means embracing both collective security, in which the majority stands firmly against aggression and bullying behaviour by any state, and the principle of indivisible security, which recognizes that lasting peace and stability cannot be built on arrangements that undermine the security of others. Without this shared commitment, even the best-designed institutions will fall short. Tracking countries’ commitment to basic UN principles and norms is precisely the aim of SDSN’s annual Index of Countries’ Support for UN-Based Multilateralism (UN-Mi).

*The recordings of SDSN’s four-part webinar series, “Global Governance for Peace and the SDGs” are accessible here: <https://www.unsdsn.org/news/beyond-2030-governing-for-a-sustainable-global-future/>*

## Annex: Statistical appendix: UN-Mi groupings

**Score interpretation:** Scores range from 0 to 100. A higher score indicates stronger commitment to UN-based multilateralism, assessed across six headline indicators: treaty ratification, UNGA voting alignment, participation in UN organizations, participation in conflict and militarization, use of unilateral coercive measures, and financial contributions to the United Nations. See the online codebook and the peer-reviewed paper by Lafortune and Sachs (2024) for details on normalization and aggregation methods.

**Groups 1–4, mean ± 0.5 standard deviation:** The distribution is divided into four groups using the global mean, 65.2, and the standard deviation, 12.6, as anchors. Each group spans 0.5 standard deviations above or below the mean, a standard approach for identifying meaningful performance bands in index rankings.

**Group 5, Tukey lower-fence threshold:** The lower-fence threshold defined by Tukey’s criterion ( $Q1 - 1.5 \times IQR = 59 - 21.4 = 37.6$ ) identifies extremely low outliers. The four countries below this threshold (Israel, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, South Sudan and the United States) have z-scores ranging from -3.1 to -5.0, confirming their extreme statistical separation from the rest of the distribution.

**Figure 3.A**  
UN Multilateralism Index 2026, statistical basis for five-group country classification

1. Global descriptive statistics							
	Mean	Std Dev	Median	Q1 (25th pct)	Q3 (75th pct)	IQR	Min – Max
All countries (n=193)	65.2	12.6	65.9	59.0	73.3	14.3	1.7-90.7

2. Group classification — thresholds and statistics							
Group	Threshold	Basis / method	# Countries	Group avg	vs. global mean	Score range	Rank range
Very strong support	≥ 71.5	mean + 0.5 SD	58	78.4	+13.2	71.6–90.7	1–58
Strong support	65.2–71.5	mean to mean + 0.5 SD	45	68.1	+2.9	65.4–71.3	59–103
Moderate support	58.8–65.2	mean - 0.5 SD to mean	44	61.9	-3.2	58.9–65.1	104–147
Inconsistent support	37.5–58.8	Tukey fence to mean - 0.5 SD	42	51.6	-13.6	37.7–58.1	148–189
Weak support (outliers)	< 37.5 (Tukey fence Q1 - 1.5×IQR)	Below Tukey lower fence (Q1 - 1.5×IQR)	4	18.8	-46.4	1.7–26.5	190–193

3. Statistical outliers — Group 5 detail (below Tukey lower fence)					
	Rank	Score	Z-score	Dist. below fence	Fence value
Israel	190	26.5	-3.1	-11.0 pts	37.5
Korea, Dem. Rep.	191	24.6	-3.2	-12.9 pts	37.5
South Sudan	192	22.3	-3.4	-15.2 pts	37.5
United States	193	1.7	-5.0	-35.9 pts	37.5

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