Introduction

During the last three decades, dramatic social and political changes in Turkey have introduced historical shifts in national, religious, and gender and sexual identities. The transformation from state-controlled capitalism to a privatized and liberalized market economy within the context of Islamization, neoliberal globalization, and Turkey’s bid to join the European Union has altered the ways in which personal and collective identities are defined. These changes are perhaps most pronounced among young people. New Desires, New Selves examines the constitution of gender and sexual identities among upwardly mobile young adults born amid the societal changes of the 1980s. It links individual biographies with the “biography” of a nation, elaborating their interconnections in the creation of new selves in a country that has existed uneasily between West and East, modern and traditional, secular and Islamic.

At present, the driving force behind most projects of neoliberal globalization in virtually every country, including Europe and the United States, is the production of the presupposed neoliberal subject centered on the ideals of entrepreneurial freedom, self-invention, autonomy, and self-realization (Bourdieu 1998; Harvey 2005). The complex social, psychological, and material processes that collectively help form the neoliberal subject now occupy the research agendas of a growing number of scholars. In that framework, this book offers the voices of eighty-seven young Turks who represent diverse paths of social mobility and identity making. More than any prior generation in Turkish society, these educationally advantaged youth (between eighteen and twenty-four years old) see themselves as individuals with the ability to create and enact their own identities and relationships. They are not only intensely subjected to neoliberal images, ideologies, and institutions but also have the ability to appropriate, reject, or reshape the ethos of neoliberalism in many contexts. However, New Desires, New Selves also complicates the chal-
lenges of this theoretical moment. By shedding light on the intimate and complex—and at times contradictory—processes by which the neoliberal subject is produced, this book suggests that the apparent inevitability of neoliberal subjectivity, and indeed its global ubiquity, should not blind us to historicity and cultural specificity and its roots in social as well as gender and sexual relations.

Over the last two decades, virtually every debate on neoliberal globalization has centered on the same core question: Is neoliberal globalization, with its power to breach culturally specific sources of identity boundaries, securing global homogeneity or creating a world of hybridized/fused identities? The most recent literature on globalization has acknowledged and used rich empirical research to evidence how, in many different cultural contexts, globalization is actively constructed rather than passively received. As Carla Freeman (2010) has suggested, because “globalization itself is imbricated within cultural forms and meanings,” we should examine how the global operates “in and through the stickiness and particularities of culture” rather than viewing globalization as a singular and homogenizing force that “operates outside the fabric of culture” (578). Conceptualizations such as Freeman’s also invite us to historicize our studies of the local while paying attention to both the continuities of cultural ideas and the ruptures caused by globalization, urging us to see the deep structures of culture as capable of containing and exhibiting contradictions.

A pivotal cultural particularity in the production of the self in Turkey can be found in the notion of connectivity. Building on Suad Joseph’s (1993, 1994, 1999) notion of connectivity—a model of selfhood rooted in fluidity that serves as an alternative to the (Western) model of the autonomous, bounded self—I argue that this cultural specificity assumes a special potency in Turkey. This setting supports the production of selves “who invite, require and initiate involvement with others in the shaping of the self” (Joseph 1993, 468). This paradigm of identity formation suggests that connective persons “[come] to see [themselves] as part of another” so concretely that their sense of completion and “security, identity, integrity, dignity, and self-worth . . . [are] tied to the actions of [that person]” (Joseph 1994, 55).

While connectivity does not exclude the possibility that individuals understand themselves through the language of autonomy, it is the con-
nective self that is most desired. In societies such as Turkey, the key component of selfhood is a relational experience with members of one’s family. How can we understand the formation of the neoliberal subject, who understands himself or herself on individual terms and as capable of and responsible for self-invention, in relation to this paradigm of the production of relational selves? Examination of this fundamental question through the critical lenses of gender and sexuality lies at the heart of *New Desires, New Selves*. I historicize my study of the national while paying attention to the specific social structural conditions and psychodynamic processes that continue to (re)cultivate connectivity, especially in view of the ruptures caused by Islamization and neoliberal globalization in Turkey. *New Desires, New Selves* thus invites unique readings of the production of neoliberal selves in a deeply patriarchal and paternalistic society.

At the center of this book lies an exploration of a “fractured desire.” Young Turks on the path toward upward mobility embody and hold profound tension—a fractured desire. On the one hand, there is the desire to surrender to the seduction of sexual modernity, to renounce the normative model of selfless femininity and protective masculinity, and to reject power and authority located external to the individual. On the other hand, there is the longing to remain loyal and organically connected to social relations, identities, and histories that underwrite the construction of identity through connectivity. The young men and women of this book experience these contradictions in different ways, depending on gender- and class-based affiliations of privilege and vulnerability as well as provincial and urban origins. This book foregrounds this central tension in the particular biographies of young women and men with different class, religious, and sexual-orientation identifications. Through their narratives, I examine the specific ways this tension is expressed, escaped, problematized, and resolved.

Positioned within the backdrop of larger national and global transformations, the narratives of these young women and men constitute a uniquely rich site for complicating our theorization of the self and its relations to others and society. Narratives of romance and sex serve as the primary source for this book. I view this realm as a primary context within which new ideals of love and management of emotion, affect, and sexual desire are negotiated and tested. Young men and women making
a place and identity for themselves participate in sexual communication and the market of “free emotions” (Luhmann 1986), where they orient, form, and manage their emotions, bodies, and desires and relate to others and themselves.

It is within the physical and discursive spaces of romance and sex that neoliberal subjectivity is actively cultivated, advanced, validated, or rejected. But it is not sexual selves alone that are in the process of being made, for the domain of romance and sexuality is also a space in which class aspirations are disciplined and regulated. These are the grounds upon which new gendered class aspirations operate, as a means of measuring, monitoring, and signaling one's social position to others and of differentiating and marking masculine and feminine identities. This domain and the relationships within it, often experienced as a realm of uncertainty and a source of anxiety, paradoxically offer a clear lens through which we can understand the forging of neoliberal selfhood and its intimate connections to gender, sexuality, and class. Within a societal context of rising neoliberal demands of self-regulation and realization, we see a shift in emphasis from external social controls to self-control.

I explore these theoretical questions empirically through the narratives of eighty-seven upwardly mobile young adults interviewed between 2002 and 2006 in Istanbul. Although they all share a strong sense of distinction through educational success, the young women and men in this book represent the most salient differences among this generation of upwardly mobile youth. They include those with provincial backgrounds who were raised in the sexually repressive rural communities of Anatolia as well as those who grew up in Istanbul and other metropolitan cities. They are also a diverse group along class lines. Class origin—along with religious devotion and sexual orientation—is a critical lens on gender and sexual transformation. In this book, I highlight both differences and commonality in order to escape the confines of a universalized understanding of neoliberal personhood.

I recruited my study’s participants from Boğaziçi University in Istanbul. Established in 1863 as an American college, Boğaziçi University is one of the most prestigious public universities in Turkey, with the most rigorous admissions requirements. An elite institution, it offers its students an avenue for upward social and economic mobility but also
brings together students with vastly different biographies. In addition to in-depth interviews, three other sources of field data—a representative survey, participant observation, and focus group research—form the empirical foundation of this study. Between September 2002 and June 2003, I surveyed a representative sample of 360 students and conducted five focus group discussions.

This book is about multiple façades in the pursuit of new desires, the way façades enter the process of self-making at crucial moments of liminality, and the moments of their creation and assembly. The concept of façades suggests convergences: they can be a form of deception, a barrier, a form of protection, and a liberating means by which to claim a new/different self/identity. The conjuncture of façades occurs in different domains: when secular young women forsake virgin identities but put on ambiguous identities; when pious women are compelled to enter the university with secular appearances, masquerading as secularly Muslim; when gay men’s same-sex desires become “open secrets” but they remain “secret subjects”; and when young heterosexual men carry the outward signs of escape from patriarchal constructions of masculinity as controlling and dominant while exercising gender domination.

One of the key arguments of this book is that investing in façades is a collaborative and collective act; not only the subjects of this book but also previous generations and institutions are invested in it. As a theoretical construct, the façade’s capacity to elucidate lies in its illumination of the lived contradictions at the intersections/breaches that are opened between long-term cultural legacies and demands and individual desires in a complex and increasingly pluralistic society. This conception of façades is thus a common thread across the different chapters. In each chapter, façade articulates the challenges of constructing new selves. Façades provide resistance, and repudiation, and can offer access to feelings, identities, and experiences whose pursuits give individuals agency. They also permit enactments of rituals of conformity, connectivity, and continuity. Through façades, denied and prohibited desires are brought within the realm of the knowable and may be realized. Individuals are allowed to find pleasures even as the collective fiction of a prohibitive gender and sexual order is preserved, and the boundaries of permitted and prohibited are reiterated while simultaneously redrawn in the creation of a new gender and sexual order.
The four subgroups (heterosexually identified women, heterosexually identified men, pious women, and gay-identified men) who are subjects of the substantive chapters are embedded in a range of personal and familial histories and are located in—and speak from—different and overlapping experiences, each bringing different analytical dimensions to the book as well as serving as interacting frames. I should note that two other important subgroups are not covered in this book: pious young men (who refused to be interviewed due to my topic) and lesbians, except Alev, whose story forms one of the vignettes. (I interviewed six lesbians, but my interview tapes with four of them were damaged beyond repair while going through airport security.) A unique feature of *New Desires, New Selves* is the presentation of four vignettes offering biographical particularities, accompanying and enhancing the four chapters of the book. These short sections feature a young lesbian feminist who voices her self-transformation from an adolescent self “carrying a man’s soul stranded in a woman’s body” to a lesbian self as well as a key shift in her object of same-sex desire from a figure of the flamboyant femme to a figure of androgyny; a young man from a rural background who expresses an underrepresented class subjectivity by rejecting the exclusivity of urban middle-classness; a pious woman who possesses double cultural capital through her Islamic and secular education and contests the sanctioned boundary between private religion and public secularism; and a group interview with three gay men who transgress both the mainstream and the Western ways of imagining homosexual identity. In presenting these biographies, my aim is to reemphasize the emergence of a plurality of assertive self-definitions and their contradictory meanings and effects in a Muslim country as it continues to struggle to recraft its national identity.

Transformations: Turkish Identity in Question

Modern Turkish national identity has always been characterized by an uneasy in-betweenness of West and East, modern and traditional, secular and Islamic. But over the last twenty years, Turkey has reached a critical crossroads, and as Kasaba and Bozdogan (2000) succinctly note, “it is no longer possible to detect a consensus regarding modern Turkish identity” (12). A convergence of several forces has given rise to
major transformations in Turkish society: the declining power of the paternalistic Turkish state and its institutions in organizing and regulating economic and cultural life; the growing power of Islamic politics in defining the Turkish Republic and the increasing Islamization of the public sphere; the country’s relatively late but growing and intense participation in the neoglobal economic order that has created a vastly liberalized economy and culture in Turkey; and Turkey’s bid to join the European Union (EU). (Turkey became an EU candidate country in 1999, and the EU accession process involves bringing the country’s legal, political, and economic structures into alignment with EU standards.)

Within this general context of transformations, important societal shifts have taken place. These multilayered social and economic changes have opened new paths of social differentiation and diversity in Turkish society. In the following pages I trace key societal changes that have brought about many uncertainties in social and political life and fractured Turkish society along secular and Muslim lines. There is an overwhelming sense that the ground has shifted. The historical background of dynamic destabilization during the formative years of the subjects of this book is crucial for understanding the contestation of the monolithic, secularly Muslim Turkish identity and, particularly, for understanding the specific conditions for, and operations of, self-making in Turkey today.

De-Islamization

Secularism was the most important component of the founding of the modern Turkish state in 1923, a process that strove to create a modern, Westernized nation-state in a predominantly Muslim, rural country. The early Republicans implemented a series of secularizing measures that went beyond mere separation of religion and the state with the aim of controlling and regulating religion in the private realm. These reforms were meant to undermine the basic Islamic way of life that formed the legal basis of the Ottoman state (Tekeli 1981). The new regime annulled the religious legal framework that was based on the Shariat (Islamic law), and all religious schools were closed. Religious institutions and Islamic education were linked to the state bureaucracy through a Directorate of Religious Affairs. Later, the state opened vocational schools,
called “İmam-Hatip,” in order to train religious personnel (İmams, prayer leaders). Thus, the state controlled the training of all religious officers and personnel, regulated the dissemination of religious norms, and controlled the production of theological knowledge. Religion was made subservient to the state.

Characterized by the state’s active role in excluding religion from public areas and cultivating private religiosity, this form of secularism is referred to as “laicism” (national secularism) (White 2002) or “assertive secularism” (Kuru 2009). It is important to note that this form of radical secularism is quite different from the American form (Adrian 2006). Jefferson’s “Wall of Separation between Church and State,” which exemplifies “passive secularism” (Kuru 2009), was designed to protect the state from religious intrusion and to protect religion from government interference. In contrast, scholars note that Turkey’s form of secularism is about “the sign of power and the authority” of the state (Yerginar 2000, 36) and “a particular production of religion that justifies the existence of secularism” (Cinar 2008, 896; also see Asad 2003). This concept of secularism in Turkey (and France) generates problems in the public expression of religiosity: it runs against state-sanctioned religious practice.

This understanding of the public sphere as secular and modern is critical to understanding the relationship between gender constructions and the nation-building process, allowing us to comprehend why the headscarves worn by university students are today considered a threat to Turkish notions of modernity and secularism. As a focus of the radical secularist and Westernist program, the new Turkish woman represented the ideals of the West and the rejection of an Ottoman past and Islam. It has been noted that in Turkey, “women’s corporal visibility and citizenship rights constitute the political stakes around which the public sphere is defined” (Göle 1997a, 6). During the nation-building process in Turkey, the contours of the public sphere were drawn “in relation to norms of secularism and modernity by the forging and display of new gender identities, especially through regulations on clothing and the appearance of women” (Cinar 2008, 891). In particular, women participating in the public sphere by shedding their veils became symbolic of their liberation from the restrictive traditional religion and the backwardness of the private sphere. Public representations of new Turkish women as
representing the nation-state’s modernity as well as secular identities through their modern, Westernized attire achieved the overriding goal of obliterating Islamic visibility.

However, this radical secularization of the public sphere was complex because “women are included in public if only as a subordinate to the state’s rationale” (Kandiyoti 1991, 430) in a country where the overwhelming majority of women were rural. Indeed, the sweeping reforms of the early twentieth century generated a public sphere marked by a hegemonic secular trajectory and identity. Turkish interpretations of Western modernity were produced by a binary opposition to Islamic practices, which were deemed uncivilized, backward, rural, uneducated, obstructionist, and indicative of the lower classes. The Western definition of modernity was officially disseminated through state, educational, political, and economic institutions. It materialized in new civil laws and the adaptation of modern marriages, Western time and metric measurements, Western clothing, and the Western alphabet. The modernist elites imposed a regimen that would ideally result in “civilization,” defined as the emulation of Western (superior) practices and the elimination of their own “barbarians” (Muslims) (Göle 1997b). The infiltration of modernity superimposed a hierarchy in which European practices, like dancing, shaking hands, and writing left to right, were deemed superior to Turkish-Islamic practices.

Until the mid-1980s, the popular conception of the modern Turkish state as an authoritarian protector of the populace made this secularism and modernity a success. It also produced a form of religious identity among secularized Turks who defined themselves as sincere and good Muslims, even though they didn’t adhere rigidly to the rituals of Islam. After the military coup of 1980 and the inauguration of neoliberal market liberalization and global integration starting in 1984, Turkey came to a new opening, creating an active space for renegotiating the relationship among Islam, secularism, and modernity.

Islamization

The 1980 military coup was aimed at stopping the increasing violence between the Left and Right and curtailing the growing leftist movement of the 1970s. Defining its main objective as the creation of a new
national culture, the military regime (1980–1983) “utilized Islam not only as antidote to communist movements, but also a resource to mould a more obedient generation” (Yavuz and Esposito 2003, xxv; see also Atasoy 2005). For the first time in modern Turkish history, the military, the guardian of secularism in Turkey, actively encouraged religious education (Mardin 2006). The new 1982 constitution made religious courses compulsory in primary schools, middle-level high schools, and high schools (lise), except in military schools. A later law allowed graduates of religious high schools—the İmam-Hatip schools—to take the centralized university entrance examinations. This transformed vocational İmam-Hatip schools, originally established to train religious personnel, into alternative high schools and opened the path for their graduates to attend universities. Although the state continued to control the curriculum of these schools, their numbers increased tremendously. According to Atasoy (2005), “the ratio of İmam-Hatip school students to official general high school students increased from a ratio of one to 37 in the 1965–1966 academic year to one to ten in the 1985–1986 academic year” (144). This shift has resulted in an increased number of religiously educated students, often with rural and lower-class backgrounds, entering universities and studying to become professionals. Although there is no concept of female clergy in Islam, one-sixth of students in these schools were girls in that time period. The number of Koran Schools, another important source of Islamic education, also started mushrooming in the mid-1980s. The beginning of the expansion of Islamic activism and the resurfacing of Islam in public life also included the resurfacing of religious Sufi lodges and orders that had been outlawed during the early years of the Republic, some of which started financing the educations of underprivileged youngsters.

All of these developments in education, including the increased privatization of educational provisions at all levels, contributed centrally to the emergence of a new religiously conscious group within the professional middle classes (Arat 2001; Ozdalga 1998). The new educational system has changed class structures, particularly the trajectory of social mobility and the class reproduction of the religiously conscious segment of the population. During the 1990s, a strong Islamist movement among university students marked the political landscape, including female students protesting for the right to wear headcoverings. Sit-ins, demonstra-
tions, and hunger strikes placed covered women in the spotlight (Keskin 2002).

The reconfiguration of “national culture” and the new 1982 constitution under the military dictatorship were followed by other transformations. Turkey started its integration with the global economy and began the mass privatization of the state-centered economy, education, and media. Although the new constitution restricted civil liberties, the vast liberalization of the economy within the context of globalization and European integration and the subsequent market-generated cultural forms increased freedom of expression. New and old identity-based groups and organizations, such as feminists, LGBT groups, ethnic rights groups (chief among them the Kurdish), and human rights groups emerged and diversified, constituting a vibrant civil society (Neyzi 2001; Seckinelgin 2006). Pro-Islamic parties were established and won elections, giving the force of legitimacy to Islamic lifestyles, although the secularist courts closed these parties several times. A variety of other complex social and political dynamics contributed to this expansion of Islamic visibility, including the mass migration of rural dwellers to major cities, where they became the targets of pro-Islamic grass-roots efforts. These efforts, in turn, “became the locus of the struggle between political Islam and secular Kemalism” (Kadioglu 1998, 13).

The Islamic media has greatly contributed to this increasing Islamization of the public sphere. The relaxation of controls on the media and publishing has permitted the proliferation of Islamic TV stations, newspapers, journals, and publishing houses. Extensive access to Islamic media has constituted the main public discursive framework within which women and men have identified their own Islamic identities. The amount of Islamic youth-oriented literature has vastly increased, helping to integrate and authenticate young people’s religious identity. This, together with youth-oriented music and other forms of cultural expressions, has triggered the evolution of the modern Islamic youth: intellectual, well read, ambitious, and socially conscious, these young people are no longer burdened by an inferiority complex in relationship to the West and their secular peers (Saktanber 2002c).

In the late 1980s, the public sphere expanded to accommodate Islamic consumption and leisure and became a major locus of Islamic identities. Members of the rapidly growing Islamic middle class emerged as
modern consumers, and an Islamic service sector emerged to cater specifically to them. For example, “Islamicized” leisure time is characterized by segregated beaches, nonalcoholic bars, and respect for prayer hours (Göle 2000). An Islamic fashion culture has flourished, and the wardrobes of urban Islamic women are now full of variety (Kilicbay and Mutlu 2002). Islamic firms manufacture clothing (Navaro-Yashin 2002; Gökariksel and Secor 2010) on a continuum from the flamboyant styles adopted by well-to-do Islamic women, dubbed by some as “Islamic chic” (White 1999), to the restrained, simple (sade) styles adopted by pious women engaged in a critique of capitalist consumerism.

Consumer culture and class-based hierarchies among pious women have problematized Islamic self-expression as women manipulate their external appearance in their struggle with the paradox of being “new Muslim women.” Access to communication, media, fashion, and technologies allows the new middle-class, pious Islamist woman to “circulate among different publics with ease” (Göle 2003, 822). By integrating two cultural codes—Islam and modernity—these women occupy a very conspicuous position in public life. Furthermore, these covered women’s adoption of the symbols of modernity reduces the social distance between them and the secular elites (Göle 2003).

The increasing commodification of the Islamic way of life has given rise to a new Islamic individualism embodied by educated, headscarved women in the big cities. In contrast to the localized, confined, isolated Islamic identities of the 1970s and 1980s, this new Islamic individualism is blurring the distinction between religious/traditional and secular/modern. It breaks the headscarf’s association with ignorance and tradition while signaling its own distance from Islamic fundamentalism and anticonsumerism. Some scholars conclude that “being modern in Turkey is no longer associated with being ‘secular.’” And neither is it “restricted to the narrow definition of western” (Genel and Karaosmanoglu 2006, 478).

Post-Islamism?

Since the 1990s, Islamism in Turkey has proven to be divergent, multifaceted, and ever changing. Support for the establishment of an Islamic state in Turkey has declined. Indeed, it has been estimated that “the ratio
of people who said they want an Islamic state decreased from around 20 percent throughout the 1990s to 9 percent in 2009” (Carkoglu and Toprak 2006, qtd. in Tugal 2009).

While scholarship produced on Islamic revivalism and visibility during the 1990s was marked by the term “Islamist” (İslamcı) to denote connection to political and revolutionary Islamic identities, the post-2000 literature has been devoid of such vocabulary. Instead, the term “post-Islamism” received significant scholarly and political attention. Cihan Tugal (2009) conceptualizes this transition from Islamism to post-Islamism in terms of Gramsci as a passive revolution “as a result of which erstwhile radicals and their followers are brought into the fold of neoliberalism, secularism, and Western domination” (4). Since they came to power with a landslide victory in the 2002 election and repeated similar victories in 2007 and 2011, the AKP (the Justice and Development Party, with links to a banned Islamist movement and political party) has pursued a liberal agenda with a pro–European Union and pro–human rights discourse. As the AKP consolidated its power, it drastically reduced the power of the military, seen in Turkey as the champion and guardian of secularism against religious fundamentalism, and a bulwark against Kurdish separatism.

Turkey today has one of the fastest-growing economies in the world (with an annualized growth rate of 12 percent in the first quarter of 2010), even in the face of global financial crises, as well as a growing regional influence. The last two decades have seen a dramatic turn from a state-centered economy to a neoliberal order. The massive privatization of key sectors has changed class structure and mobility; created new forms of employment demanding less fixed, more mobile, and more adaptable work; created new sources of wealth; expanded suburbanization; and opened up new public spaces for leisure consumption. The discrepancies in access to the material benefits of neoliberal globalization have given rise to “unprecedented fragmentation and polarization within the middle classes” (Kandiyoti 2002, 7). This fragmentation has created a new poor among the salaried classes, while members of multinational firms, the private sector, and corporate elites have become increasingly affluent.

A recent edited volume (Dedeoğlu and Elveren 2012) presents an empirical assessment of the effects on women and gender relations of the
intersections of neoliberal economic and social policies, the conservative agenda of political Islam, and the EU accession process. The emerging broader picture is bleak: the effects of the AKP’s reform of the welfare system, social security, health insurance, and the pension system, which entailed a high degree of marketization and privatization, have created new vulnerabilities and disadvantages for women. The dismantling of the paternalistic welfare state theoretically results in the recognition of women as independent individuals and citizens, yet the patriarchal constructions of women as dependents are reproduced on the ground in complex ways with different implications for different classes of women.

Historically, the Turkish welfare system has been structured around a patriarchal male-breadwinner family norm in which women’s dependence on male protection formed a vital source of security for them. For instance, most women benefited from social security on the basis of their dependent relationship with men, as fathers or husbands. This has traditionally created a system of social transfers positively discriminatory to women without male protection: widowed women had access to lifelong social security benefits through deceased husbands, and unmarried daughters had this access as orphans. Similarly, women were entitled to lifelong health benefits through their insured fathers and husbands. Such access structurally discourages women’s formal labor force participation as well as reinforces traditional gender roles, particularly the valorization of motherhood and caregiving as women’s central roles and identities in society. It is striking that today the vast majority (62.5 percent) of working-age women in Turkey do not have any personal income as opposed to only a minority (5.4 percent) of men (Dayıoğlu and Başlevent 2012).

The AKP’s reform of the welfare system was instigated by gender-neutral neoliberal policies, with an emphasis on the privatization of the benefits systems. The reforms eliminated women’s privileged access to social transfers. However, the care provision for children and the elderly has not been addressed, leaving care arrangements in the private sphere as women’s responsibility. This dismantling is increasing women’s vulnerability to economic and social risks precisely because there is another dynamic at play: women’s decreasing participation in the formal sector of the labor force and their growing concentration in the informal sector, which more than ever is making women dependent on their fathers’
or husbands’ social security. Furthermore, neoliberal policies replaced state-based modes of social aid and services with Islamic traditions of charity (Buğra 2012), “making religious communities key actors at the grass-roots level in the provision of poverty relief and new forms of social solidarity” (Kandiyoti 2011; also see Buğra 2012).

The specific macroeconomic policies of neoliberalism in Turkey are characterized by economists as “growth without employment” and male predominance in new jobs. Between 1988 and 2007, “the number of people of working age increased by 19 million while the increase in employment remained at 5 million. Of this total figure, 4.5 million are males” (Toksoz 2012, 55). These figures alone powerfully testify to the gendered implications of the Turkish brand of neoliberalism and its inability (by design) to pull women into the formal labor market. Not only does a substantial sex gap remain between men’s and women’s labor force participation, but women’s labor force participation has declined between 1988 and 2007 from 34.3 percent to 24.4 percent. Furthermore, the employment rate of women fell from 30.6 percent to 21.7 percent in the same period (Töksoz 2012, 55). While the number of women employed in manufacturing showed a meager increase, their employment in the rapidly growing service sector (wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels) grew about threefold in the last two decades. Researchers point out a key structuring force in these trends: the absence of direct foreign capital investment in industry in Turkey, which has translated into limited demand for female labor in labor-intensive manufacturing.

In Turkey, rather than foreign capital being used in direct, new investments, a considerable part of foreign capital has gone to the purchase of newly privatized public enterprises and banks. This is accompanied by the government’s mass construction projects aimed at creating and renovating the country’s infrastructure and converting previously public land for the purpose of building shopping malls that sell international brand names. This injection of foreign capital into the economy has created job opportunities for the well-educated middle classes in finance and business services, product design, retail management, the professions, and creative industries. A growing service economy with less well-paid and less secure jobs supports this emerging well-paid middle class. Informal economic activities in Turkey, the lower echelons of which are dominated by women, have gained further importance as the public
sector has withdrawn from the economy and subcontracting and outsourcing have become the norm in both public and private enterprises. Employment in the informal sector means work without social security and a lack of protective legislation for working conditions. Governmental support for the further feminization of the informal sector can be also found in the most recent plan for the 2007–2013 period, designed by the present AKP government. This plan aims to promote and encourage flexible forms of employment for women, including part-time and temporary work and female entrepreneurship, types of work accorded the least protection, remuneration, and stability, but supposedly also enabling women to attend to their duties as mothers and wives at home.

Turkish Feminism

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey was the first Islamic country to transition to a secular state and was one of the first countries in the world where the political rights of women as citizens were recognized. During the early years of the Republic, as I explained above, women represented the crux of modernity as a focus of the radical Westernist and secularizing program of reform. The most important social reforms centered on women, sexuality, and family (Göle 1997a; Kandiyoti 1987). The new ideal woman embodied gender in a dual manner: as an “enlightened” mother in the private sphere and as a “masculinized” public actor (Kandiyoti 1995). The envisioned modern woman was joined with traditional essentialist conceptualizations of womanhood to create a virtuous, asexual, nationalistic mother. Turkish modernization did not eliminate the transcription of traditional virtues onto female bodies; it merely transfigured these bodies as both modern and chaste—the paradoxical performance of modern yet modest, publicly visible yet virtuous. Patriarchy, strongly fused with state and individual forms of paternalism, helped to solidify this gender consensus, despite its many lived contradictions. The emerging strong feminist movement in the 1980s, however, when the country was under the military dictatorship, questioned this normative gender and sexual order.

Modern Turkish feminism is characterized by a complex and complicated engagement with state feminism. Until the 1980s, the Republican consensus that the reforms of the founding fathers had emancipated
women and that there was no need for an independent women's movement remained uncontested. While attempting to carve out an independent political space vis-à-vis leftist political movements, the feminist activists of the 1980s based their politics on a rejection of the conceptualization of women as objects of paternalistic Republican reforms that “granted them their rights” and instead claimed subjecthood in their own lives (Sirman 1989; Arat 1997). The feminist movement initiated important changes in the civil and penal codes.

During the early 2000s, a strong feminist campaign within the context of the EU accession process resulted in gender-egalitarian legal and policy reforms that have granted women equal citizenship rights. The new civil code of 2001 equalized the status of husband and wife in the conjugal union by abolishing the concept of the head of family, establishing full equality with respect to rights over the family abode, marital property, divorce, child custody, and rights to work and travel. By dividing property acquired during marriage equally, the new divorce law now recognizes women’s unpaid labor contributions at home. The new penal code of 2005 recognized a woman’s right to be the sole controller of her body. It reclassifies sexual crimes like rape as crimes against the individual rather than crimes against “public morality” or “community order.” And the discrimination between virgins and nonvirgins, married and unmarried women in sexual crimes was abolished. The new labor law of 2003 prohibited discriminatory practices based on a woman’s marital status or family responsibilities, such as prohibiting dismissal on grounds of pregnancy, and included provisions prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace. The equalization of retirement ages at sixty-five (implementation planned for 2048) was another policy aimed at gender equality. These feminist legal victories are based on a particular alignment of external and internal factors, chiefly EU conditions and women’s groups. However, the disconnect between Turkey’s progressive legislation and realities on the ground is glaringly enormous. Turkey ranked 124th among 135 countries in the Global Gender Gap index generated by the World Economic Forum in 2009. Only Saudi Arabia, Benin, Pakistan, Chad, and Yemen ranked lower.

In Turkey, feminists have opened women’s shelters and established significant institutions such as women’s research centers, introduced women’s/gender studies into university curricula, and called for a quota
system in Parliament. Building these institutions has allowed feminists to articulate and disseminate feminist discourses and enabled them to reach beyond their immediate circles. Issues such as virginity, honor killings, and domestic violence have been the main focus of feminist discourses and activism. In addition to mass demonstrations and public marches, the proliferation of feminist journals and magazines in the post-1980 period has not only ushered feminist issues, including women’s sexuality, into the public realm and consciousness but has also helped to develop multiple feminist lenses through which to interpret and interrogate popular culture and divisions among feminists on Islam (Arat 2004). However, feminists also have separated along two sharply defined principles: the reconciliation of feminism with Islam to promote a civil society that strengthens liberal democracy and the defense of secularism against Islamists (Arat 2001), an issue that I will discuss in detail in chapter 4.

A New Twist

Turkey’s profound transformation continues to unfold. The secularist section of Turkish society continues to be highly skeptical of the AKP’s post-Islamism. They strongly believe that the AKP’s hidden goal is the eradication of secularism and ultimately the imposition of Islamic law. Feminists meanwhile underscore the irony that post-Islamist men might have discarded the idea of creating an Islamic social order in Turkey but still have an undeclared Islamist agenda for women (Saktanber 2006). Given the AKP’s current determination to overhaul the constitution and the deterioration of the desire for EU membership within the Turkish public, the reconfiguration of Turkey will be affected by multiple forces.

Indeed, in recent years, with the power conferred by its electoral mandate, the AKP has begun a more concerted, aggressive program of Islamization. The AKP’s decade-long, uncontested rule has cemented its control over state institutions and brought the infiltration of Islamist perspectives and personnel with religious identities into the state’s actions and decision-making processes, as well as the expansion of the capital accumulation power of religious businessmen (Narlı 1999; Göle 1997b; Öniş 1997).

The AKP’s radical revisioning of Turkey pivots around a central desire and mission expressed by Tayyip Erdoğan as “raising a pious genera-
This vision centers unblinkingly on gender and sexuality: “I do not believe in equal opportunities. Men and women are different and complementary.” As noted by Kandiyoti, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s view of the nature of gender expresses fitrat, “a tenet of Islam that attributes distinct and divinely ordained natures to men and women” (Kandiyoti 2011). Framed in distinctly gendered terms, the prime minister’s key emphasis is on the significance of maternal roles for women and the strengthening of traditional family structures and roles. The specific policy aspirations highlighted in his speeches are pro-natalist policies and schemes: restricting abortion rights; stress on the importance of mothers breast-feeding their babies for one and a half years; and women giving birth to at least three children. The project of injecting piousness into the public sphere targets girls’ and women’s bodies and includes some recent legislative attempts such as changing the dress code in schools to replace school uniforms with individually chosen outfits, thus allowing religiously conservative families to send their daughters to school in conservative outfits, including head coverings.

The prime minister considers drinking alcohol to be the mark of a “sick society,” and very recently the AKP government reregulated the distribution and sale of alcohol with the aim of limiting alcohol consumption in the public sphere. Regarded as a powerful leader with authoritarian tendencies by his foreign and local commentators, Tayyip Erdoğan has been canonized as a hero of the Turkish conservative classes—his name has been given to a newly opened university and stadium. The liberal opposition, with its pluralistic vision of Turkey, has condemned particular instances of the AKP’s policies of replacing the old “authoritarian” Republican order—which produced monolithic secular identities and suppressed (with force and integration) differences based on religious, linguistic, and ethnic identities—with another order, which is socially and culturally Islamic, economically neoliberal.

As I was engaged with the final revisions of this book at the end of May 2013, a massive resistance movement started. The initial protest was organized to save one of the last green areas in Istanbul, a public park, from demolition to make space for yet another shopping mall complex modeled after Ottoman barracks. This protest quickly morphed into a country-wide protest against the AKP’s rule and the ravages of neoliberal capitalism. What is unique about this political upheaval,
which set in motion resistance and defiance amidst police brutality and violence, was the way it has been embraced by the different sectors of society: old and young, men and women, straight and LGBT, feminists, nationalists, staunch Kemalists, anticapitalist Muslims, trade and professional unions, and Kurdish groups—a unity of loosely defined purpose and action demanding a liberal democracy that has never been seen in Turkish history. Now responding to the immensely changing circumstances of their lives within the context of a rapidly Islamicized Turkey and economic neoliberalization, different sectors of society, it seems, will engage in struggle and contestation that will parallel the continuing reshaping of Turkey. This resistance movement features a creative combative nature amidst state violence and the unlawful detention of protesters and a commitment to intervene in any attempt to control their lives. The backlash against the neoliberal policies and the curtailment of individual liberties by the Islamic government provides the latest twist in the remaking of the nation.

Theoretical and Empirical Foundations: Key Concepts and Analytical Perspective

The young women and men in this book came of age in the midst of changes that are transforming notions of the self and collective identity. Not only are they subjects of these profound changes, but they are situated at this strategic crossroads as upwardly mobile members of the future elite classes who will inhabit positions of power. They articulate and give substance to the changing gender and sexual order of Turkish society and will shape and inhabit the new forms of gender identities and sexualities.

In focusing my study on young Turks, I am following the theoretical lead of researchers who emphasize the importance of one’s formative years (youth) to the project of self-making. Karl Mannheim (1972) privileged the formative years in the development of a person’s identity because he believed that individuals carry their identity with them as they grow older. Because of their potential to become “generative of the conditions of thinking and action of subsequent cohorts” (Turner 2002, 19), Turner also stresses the importance of studying young adults. Similarly, feminist sociologist Gerson (2009) emphasizes young adults’
“fulcrum” role in forging social change, especially in an era of unprecedented social-economic transformations: “Poised between the dependency of childhood and the irrevocable investments of later adulthood, this life stage represents both a time of individual transition and a potential engine for social change” (737).

In order to analyze the new desires pursued and produced by the young Turks I studied, I draw upon concepts developed in several distinct theoretical analyses of gender, sexuality, love, social class, mobility, and self-making. In the narratives of these young Turks, a key expression of desire takes the form of an escape from the normative patriarchal conceptions of gender—the selfless feminine and protective masculine. The deep aspiration towards building individualized selves is related to another significant desire for sexual modernity and rejection of dominant virginity norms as traditional and backward. My investigation of the paradoxes and contradictions of these new desires particularly highlights several concepts within my analytical and interpretive frame. Below I juxtapose two broad models of self-making—autonomous self-formation and connective selving—and introduce a feminist psychoanalytical formulation of the intersubjective construction of gender and the intertwined relationship among love, recognition, and domination. I also elaborate my approach to class as a cultural practice rather than purely an economic designation.

Two Approaches to Self-Making

*The Detraditionalized Self and “Choice Biographies”*

Theorizing large-scale social and historical trends, a number of contemporary thinkers across different disciplines have highlighted self-making in reflexive modernity (or late modernity, postmodernity, the neoliberal age) as a key field for research to investigate its genealogy, constitution, and transformations. Embodied in a host of investigations of subjectivity, self, the body, desire, and identity, such scholars indicate that our present ways of perceiving the formation of selfhood have moved from fixity to uncertainty and contingency, from habit to reflexivity across all domains of existence and experience as individuals have become increasingly disembedded from local, place-based orientations and released from traditional bonds and status relations that integrated them
in groups, including family, class, and the nation. The pivotal concept for such a reflexive modernity is “the self as a project in the making” (McLeod 2002, 211). This project is identified and underscored as the detraditionalization of the self, the formation of the self as a reflexive and self-conscious biography (Beck 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995; Giddens 1991). Giddens, the most prominent sociologist of modernity and detraditionalization, for example, claims that “self-identity has to be created” rather than being “given” and “discovered” (1991, 186). Replacing once inherited and prescribed roles and futures, the “enterprising self” (Freeman 2014) or “choice biographies”—constructed, worked upon, and resulting from choices—increase self-monitoring, internal regulation, and reflexivity (Beck 1992, 135; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995). Writing within the paradigm of neoliberal subject formation, Nikolas Rose (1991) suggests that an individual bears the burden of “render[ing] his or her life meaningful as if it were the outcome of individual choices made in furtherance of a biographical project of self-realization” (240).

How does this broad, universalizing theory of modernity and the self translate to the particular settings of upwardly mobile young Turks? Is detraditionalized selfhood culturally significant in a deeply patriarchal and paternalistic society at once modern and traditional and at once Western and non-Western? Do young Turks pursue detraditionalized pathways? In order to understand how young Turks negotiate relationships with others and themselves in an era marked by neoliberalism, we need to bring into focus another theory of self-making that more centrally integrates patriarchy into the analysis.

Connective Selving

Suad Joseph offers connectivity as an alternative to the (Western) model of the bounded self (i.e., the self who is completely autonomous and separate from others). Although Joseph theorizes connectivity as a non-culturally specific concept, writing about Arab families in Lebanon, she applies it directly to societies in which the key component of selfhood is not autonomy or individuality, as it is in many Western contexts, but rather a relational experience with members of one’s family. Western models of selfhood traditionally emphasize the role of liberal,
market-based economies in creating a subject whose preparedness for a career path has pushed him or her toward complete autonomy. In other words, according to Joseph, such models take the flexibility of the modern worker as the greatest factor influencing self-construction and perfect individuation as the most important component of that self. But Joseph suggests that this model fails to explain how people understand themselves in cultures in which the family is valued over society and the individual. In such contexts, she argues, individuals “are open to and require the involvement of others in shaping their emotions, desires, attitudes and identities” (Joseph 1993, 468). The actions and opinions of family members do not simply influence an individual’s selfhood—they are instrumental to its completion. Their “security, identity, integrity, dignity, and self-worth . . . [are] tied to the actions of [that person]” (Joseph 1993, 467).

Joseph also challenges the Western-centeredness of feminist object relations theory on sexual difference—the idea that feminine personality is defined relationally and masculine personality is defined as a denial of relation. She expands the concept of object relations and connectivity beyond the strictly gendered, arguing that relationality is a masculine as well as a feminine prerogative. However, patriarchal structures prioritize the needs and desires of the men, producing different feminine and masculine experiences of connectivity. Joseph argues that the merging of connectivity with patriarchy shapes “relationality into a system of domination” (468). In Joseph’s model, familial relationships become significant forces in socializing individuals and (re)producing patriarchal systems.

I suggest that Joseph’s overall conceptualization of connectivity applies to the Turkish case, in which connectivity is produced and pursued in interrelated institutional, affective, and psychological domains. Connectivity also functions as an important site for constructions of sexual selves. I use this notion of connectivity to explore upwardly mobile young Turks’ negotiations of tensions and ambivalences in gender dynamics and enactments of their sexual selves. The widespread Turkish recognition and reification of mother-daughter connectivity (and identification) is nowhere more strongly portrayed than in the proverb “anasma bak kızını al.” The English equivalent of this idiom, “like mother, like daughter,” does not do justice to the deeper meaning at-
tached to this proverb, which expresses the view that a young girl (or a bride) will eventually look and behave exactly like her mother. Mother-daughter connectivity in Turkey plays a crucial role in the formation of young women’s sexual selves. Particularly, as we will see in the next chapter, deviance from the virginity norm is often experienced as a rupture and denial of connectivity with the mother. Connectivity also forms an important analytical category in elucidating the meanings and practices attached to coming out in the gay men’s narratives.

In contemporary Turkey, patriarchal kinship continues to link sex and age groups in patterns of hierarchy and dependence, conferring particular statuses and identities. Kinship is thus deeply implicated in the process of self-production. Turkish legal institutions are key to maintaining patriarchal kinship networks. In addition to traditional marriage, which remains central to Turkish individuals’ social identities (White 1994), kinship in Turkey also operates institutionally through a civil and penal code that is organized “to protect the social and familial order rather than the rights of the individual” (Sirman 2004, 51). It was only recently that the penal code was changed to prioritize the rights of victims as individuals in cases of rape and female abduction over the preservation of family honor and public decency. Despite amendments to the code brought about by feminist and human rights organizations and an effort by the Turkish government to align the code with EU standards, it continues to preserve the family “as the foundation of Turkish society” while defining marriage as an entity “based on equality between spouses” (WWHR 2005).

The domain of kinship also overlaps with the public sphere, where relationships and social interaction are couched in elaborate kinship language, morality, and imagery. As Joseph argues, connectivity is particularly enacted and crystallized through bodily and linguistic practices. As Joseph observed among the Arab families in Lebanon she studied, the use of idioms that merge body imagery with phrases of love and affection, such as “you are my heart,” “you are my soul,” and “you are my eyes” in kin and significant non-kin relations evidences how the imaginary continuity between individuals is also expressed through the symbolic realm of language. Enactment of kinship morality in the public sphere is achieved through deployment of kinship terms when unrelated men and women address each other as “aunt,” “brother,” “sister,” and “uncle” (for example, in a store), thereby desexualizing the encounter.
Within middle-class and upwardly mobile households, connectivity and relatedness are also built through mothers’ cultivation of their children’s potential, particularly with regard to education. Because academic excellence facilitates individuals’ successful placement in the nation’s elite universities and provides social connections for their adult lives, education is seen as the most important vehicle to upper-middle-class status. Within Turkey’s competitive educational system, mothers play a pivotal role in fostering their children’s high performance by offering their children “a measure of emotional security and intimacy with which to survive these demands” (Allison 2000, 108). As mothers merge practices of monitoring and overseeing the educational regimens of their children with practices of maternal nurturance, indulgence, ego boosting, and love, a high degree of practical and emotional dependency is built in the construction of both masculinity and femininity. These long-term emotional and physical investments and sacrifices cultivate a strong sense of loyalty and emotional indebtedness to one’s parents, producing significant psychological obstacles for the formation of sexually liberated selves.

Since the 1980s, the consolidation of neoliberal social and economic reforms and global consumer culture has brought about important changes in Turkish society and introduced new modes of social integration that have created alternative notions of self and new social ties. For example, the liberalized market economy and extensive access to the media and Internet have granted Turkish youth more freedom in self-expression, sociability, and sexual communication. Increased suburbanization has led to increased privatization of the nuclear family and ruptured some connective tissues embedded in the domain of extended family and kinship (Ayata 2002). Yet some of the traditional forms of connectivity have not been profoundly displaced. Moreover, because they frame individuals by their wider social networks, these new integrative social practices also have a collective orientation, albeit differently produced and realized. Maintenance of connectedness and sociability are clearly reflected, for example, in the modern summer vacationing patterns of the middle classes, in which nuclear families connected with one another own summer houses next to or near one another, creating fluid and permeable boundaries between households and each other’s lives. Thus, despite large-scale changes to Turkey’s cultural and political
landscape, the middle-class families continue to promote personal enrichment and maturity through connection with members of different generations, kin and non-kin alike.

The generic story of the neoliberal subject centered on self-invention, autonomy, and self-realization under neoliberal globalization diminishes the importance of traditional frames of reference for identity development, thus missing this strong presence of connectedness. Further, autonomy or connectivity in self-making does not interpolate in all young Turks in the same way. Such orientations are mediated by class, gender differences, and religious identity. I make this point not to suggest that we ignore evidence of individualizing forces or ideologies of the autonomous self emerging in Turkey. Rather, I make it to refocus our attention on the negotiations and tensions between the desire for relatedness and the desire for untied autonomy.

The upwardly mobile young Turks I studied, whose new desires for autonomy in self-making and sexuality threaten familial identification, bring out the conundrums of emancipation from connective selving. Their rejection of selfless-femininity and protective-masculinity constructions imply a denial of connection, a decoupling of connectivity and patriarchy. In their eyes, the affirmation of connectivity can cost one the knowledge and appreciation of one’s own desires. They would like to stop seeing themselves through the eyes of the other. Thus, they suggest that the focus of moral and sexual agency should be relocated to the individual and separated from the individual’s roles and status as daughter and son—roles that cast their actions as representative of the respectability, reputation, and honor of the group, the family, and the nation.

However, for women and men inhabiting new sexual and gender terrains, attempting to escape from patriarchal masculinity and the constraints of normative femininity and exploring new sexual subjectivities are sources of both opportunity and anxiety and guilt. And in order to understand and analyze these inner struggles, we need additional conceptual tools to accompany Joseph’s notion of connective selving. This entails making fuller use of Benjamin’s psychoanalytical feminist perspective, which has long been concerned with the “unconscious structure of patriarchy.”
Gender, the Bonds of Love, Recognition, and Domination

Although integration of psychoanalysis with feminist theory has been challenged on many fronts, feminist revisions of psychoanalytically informed theories remain a significant method and theory. As Madelon Sprengnether (1990) succinctly puts it, psychoanalysis “offers a means of comprehending the unconscious structure of patriarchy” (8). Joseph’s deconstruction of the binary personality development of femininity and masculinity challenges the unilateral alignment of femininity with relationality and of masculinity with containment and individuality. Jessica Benjamin (1988) further advances our understanding of the patriarchal constructions of gender with her argument about the deep intertwining of love, recognition, and domination. She problematizes and revises the gendered division between sex = masculine and love = feminine. As this book will attempt to show, the desire for recognition is much more important than the desire for sex in some male narratives of romance and sex. Desire for recognition is a powerful formative force in structuring masculinities in a cultural context that steeps desire in a patriarchal tradition, a tradition of motherly devotion and of the privileging and adulation of sons’ desires and needs. Benjamin’s notion of recognition also becomes essential for understanding male domination, particularly from the perspective of those who attempt to escape the patriarchal construction of masculinity as dominant, controlling, and protective. Finally, Benjamin’s construction of intersubjectivity is relevant to research on intimate relationships that highlight the dialogical construction of gender. I emphasize the intersubjective articulation of gender by the subjects of this book: young women are not passive recipients of masculine ideals, but coproducers and active participants in its construction, and, equally, young men emerge as significant co-creators of feminine ideals.

Although Benjamin agrees with Freud that patriarchal relations are supported by deep psychological mechanisms and that these mechanisms are shaped by anatomy, she denies the genital primacy for which Freud argued. Instead she suggests that because “the psychological integration of biological reality is largely the work of culture,” the psychic roots of patriarchy and female submission are “social arrangements that we can change or direct” (1988, 90). For Benjamin, unwriting the patri-
archal script requires uncovering the unconscious processes by which desire comes to ratify male power.

Benjamin suggests that to better understand the unconscious roots of female desire, or lack of desire, we should look not at the oedipal stage, as Freud does, but at preoedipal life. For Freud, the key to a young girl’s sexual development was her realization that like her mother she lacked a penis and her subsequent identification with her father, the bearer of power she could only achieve vicariously. But in Benjamin’s account, the father achieves his symbolic power “because he (with his phallus) represents freedom from dependency on the powerful mother of early infancy” (95). In this formulation, the penis becomes a symbol of separation not from maternal lack, but instead from an engulfing maternal presence. In Benjamin’s estimation, this model of maternal power and paternal freedom is rooted in the different ways in which mothers and fathers interact with their children.

The problem of female desire, then, is rooted in the problem of paternal identification for the young girl. While little boys are able to be like the father, the symbol of the outside world, little girls can only wish to have him. Little girls’ early attempts to identify with their fathers are often thwarted, either by his unwillingness to recognize her sameness to him or by her own perception of anatomical difference. Ultimately, it is this inability to fully identify with the outside that prevents women from making desire and agency their own and leads them into relationships of submission and passivity.

If the root of female submission is the girl’s failed identification with her father, then any vision of female desire and agency must begin with the dismantling of the symbolic structures that join power and desire to fatherhood exclusively. For Benjamin, the key to disrupting the patriarchal script lies in the potential for intersubjectivity, the experience of one’s selfhood as something that exists both within oneself and between that self and others. An intersubjective construction of selfhood would not only grant women desire and subjectivity, in Benjamin’s account, but would also lead to a fuller experience of the erotic, one in which two subjects meet in mutual recognition and get pleasure both in and with the other. However, according to Benjamin, this mutual recognition can only be achieved when children of either sex receive full recognition
from both parents and when mothers and fathers equally share as figures of independence and agency.

The narratives I collected call for a complex understanding of masculinity/femininity and power—one that would account, for example, for some young men's strong desire not to be dominant, controlling, and protective. Gender scholars often approach this question with various theoretical tools gleaned from Raewyn Connell (1987, 2002), particularly her concepts of hegemonic masculinity and emphasized femininity. But, as her critics point out (Demetriou 2001; Hearn 2004; Moller 2007; Coles 2009), her model encourages a kind of disciplinary tunnel vision that overdetermines and oversimplifies male behavior. Connell’s paradigm directs us to see masculine power in domination, subordination, and oppression, but often to overlook the more mundane ways in which power and privilege are exercised and felt. Furthermore, she encourages us to see power as only domination and tells us to read every such practice as an attempt to increase male power. One of the central projects of Benjamin’s Bonds of Love (1988) is to account for the way or ways in which “domination [is] anchored in the hearts of those who submit to it” (52). For Freud, all manifestations of domination were rooted in the child’s initial dependency on his mother and his attempt to deny that dependency and differentiate himself as an independent subject. Benjamin suggests that the desire to dominate is born out of the infantile fantasy of omnipotence, the desire to be recognized as an individual subject but not to return that recognition—that is, the desire to assert one’s selfhood without acknowledging the selfhood of others. Benjamin suggests that domination is configured as masculine because the original differentiation of the infant from the mother is more extreme for boys than it is for girls, who can retain some continuity with the mother because of their shared gender. However, because separation from the mother can never be complete, omnipotence never gained, and tension never relieved, “the repudiated maternal body persists as the object to be done to and violated” (77). Likewise, female submission can be traced to the unique relationship between girls and their mothers, which, according to Benjamin, “emphasiz[es] merging and continuity at the expense of individuality and independence” and thus “provides fertile ground for submission” (78–79). Ultimately, Benjamin argues that erotic domi-
nation, like other practices of love, should be understood primarily as the desire for recognition. Although this desire might manifest itself in relations of power, control, and submission, they are in their essence “desires for freedom and communion,” the very desires from which, she concludes, “the bonds of love are forged” (84). Thus it is that love, romance, and courtship figure significantly in the crystallization of new masculine and feminine subjectivities.

Varieties of Love: Passion, Romantic Love, and Pure Love

In the last decade of the twentieth century, two influential books, *The Transformation of Intimacy* (1992) by Anthony Giddens and *Consuming the Romantic Utopia* (1997) by Eva Illouz, provoked new insights into conceptualizations of love, intimacy, and romance. Giddens’s historical account of changes in intimate relationships forms a narrative that begins with a premodern understanding of love as passion, an all-encompassing sexual attraction for another regarded by premodern people as “disruptive” and “dangerous” due to its power in “generating a break with routine and duty” (38); moves through a modern conception in the second half of the twentieth century of the ideal of romantic love as a basis for heterosexual marriage; and concludes with a shift, in the latter half of the twentieth century, to a postmodern, gender-egalitarian confluent or pure love entered into for its own sake and defined by the ideal of intimacy—the sharing of emotional selves through mutual disclosure. Illouz’s work explores the intimate link forged between romance and capitalism. Although like Giddens, Illouz emphasizes the potential of postmodern love in producing a genderless ideal, her analysis highlights the centrality of a romantic utopia enacted through practices of consumption and leisure.

Giddens’s historical account identifies an important transformation in intimate sexual relationships, a shift from the ideal of “romantic” love to that of “pure” or “confluent” love. Under the ideal of romantic love, individuals who strive to embody the idealized qualities of their genders find another who “by being who he or she is, answers a lack which the individual does not even necessarily recognise” (45). Through romantic love, “the flawed individual is made whole” (45). Its accomplishment has been based on a projective identification; the desire for the other has
been the desire for what one is missing (61). According to Giddens, this view of love generates a particular life trajectory for individuals by interconnecting mutual responsibilities and duties with desire—a lifelong heterosexual marriage and parenthood (41). Historically, romantic love and lifelong heterosexual marriage seeped into religious and moral traditions as well as legal and institutional spheres, powerfully constraining different and alternative life trajectories.

In the second half of the twentieth century, however, the romantic love ideal began to be displaced by what Giddens calls “pure” or “confluent” love. While in the past, kinship groups and communities had the capacity to ground intimate relationships—to provide the framework of moral obligation and trust—in the pure relationship contexts, the connection between romantic partners as two individuals takes precedence in the absence of a deep embeddedness of the relationship within familial structures. Giddens defines a “pure” relationship as one in which “a social relation is entered into for its own sake, for what can be derived by each person from a sustained association with another, and which is continued only insofar as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfactions for each individual to stay within it” (58). Whereas romantic love relationships revolved around idealized visions of masculinity and femininity, the pure relationship is an effort to achieve, through constant communication, an intimate knowledge of the other’s unique and authentic self. Intimacy is sought as a means to self-development; if the relationship loses its reason for being, it becomes subject to dissolution. An individual committed to a pure love relationship—even through marriage—is therefore committed only contingently. Confluent love “introduces the ars erotica into the core of the conjugal relationship” (629). In this model, “a person’s sexuality is but one factor that has to be negotiated as part of a relationship” (63).

Giddens proposes that pure love relationships are more egalitarian because romantic love rested on essentialist conceptions about natural gender differences. Women’s subscription to romantic love often was translated into obligations and dependencies and “domestic subjection” (62). Embedded in the values of autonomy and equality, pure relationships, Giddens believes, are fundamentally democratic. Therefore, a shift to a society full of pure relationships would represent nothing less than the democratization of private life. He also suggests a connection
between the diffusion of pure love relationships and the solidification of democratic ideals in the larger society. For this reason, he suggests, “the transformation of intimacy might be a subversive influence upon modern institutions as a whole” (3).

Although Giddens’s thesis of the detraditionalization of gender under the ideal of pure love is considered by many scholars to be optimistic, utopian, and overstated,6 the narratives of young Turks, especially the young women’s narratives of relationship and marriage ideals (both pious and secular) accentuate the desire for Giddens’s confluent or pure love. Those narratives reflect these women’s identities as high achievers whose aspirations for their futures are not centrally tied to marriage and motherhood. Their ideal of romantic love and marriage is not about longing for unity with a different person who “can make one’s life . . . complete” (Giddens 1992, 61) but about relating to and melding together two autonomous and equal life projects, hers and his.

Giddens sees variations in the transformation of intimate spheres “according to context and differential socioeconomic position.” Illouz (1997) explains this variation by examining the incorporation of romantic love into the culture of capitalism. Indeed, according to Illouz, “the inequalities constitutive of the market have been transferred to the romantic bond itself” (22). Illouz argues that love is a privileged site for the experience of utopia. With secularization in Western societies, “love began to be represented not only as a value in itself but as an important motive in the pursuit of happiness, now defined increasingly in individualistic and private terms” (29–30). For Illouz, “Utopias make us dream a better world, about alternative arrangements, and even if those dreams often degenerate into control and manipulation, we still must account for the hope and creativity they contain and often generate. Utopias inspire change” (197). These utopian meanings (and yearnings) are experienced through the “cyclical performance of rituals of consumption” (8) of such commodities as travel, dining out, the exchange of gifts, cultural events, and the use of special artifacts.

In Illouz’s account, the merging of capitalism and romance registers at other levels as well. The promotion and dissemination of a “therapeutic discourse” about romance (especially in women’s magazines), in which it is presented as an emotional sphere subject to analytical examination, description, and, ultimately, rational management, also reg-
isters romance as a product of work and calculation. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Illouz’s account concerns the relationship between gender and the ideal of intimacy. Pointing out a paradox, she argues that the romantic utopia “reproduces ideals of masculinity and femininity, yet is simultaneously a genderless ideal” (197). By drawing men inside the domain of private selves and emotions, “the sole repository of authenticity, meaning and commitment” (196), and by offering to “merge men and women in a genderless model of intimacy” (197), the romantic utopia “feminizes” men. In other words, the ideal of intimacy enjoins women and men to create selves that are similar. Illouz’s argument about the relationship between men and romantic utopia both points to and is part of a new body of research addressing intimacy and the affective dimensions of masculinity. Romance is no longer anathema to masculine selfhood, but is increasingly becoming an important component of masculinity (Allen 2003; Korobov 2009; Maxwell 2007; Redman 2001).

Rituals of romance are much affected by socioeconomic class. The romantic utopia is more readily available to members of the privileged and upwardly mobile classes, because they possess the economic resources necessary for more frequent and varied access to its self-renewing liminal space. The effects of class on young Turks’ aspirations and practices of romance and sex are complex and multiple. Illuminating the links among class, gender, romance, and sex is central to my interpretive frame, and these linkages require me to widen the framework of analysis beyond the relationship between consumption practices and romance.

Class, Habitus, and Upward Mobility

Both as an economic location and as an (embodied) identity of individuals, class figures as a prominent category of analysis in this book. My analysis demonstrates the processes by which class is experienced in and through gender and sexuality in complex and specific ways. As Bourdieu (1984) wrote in his oft-quoted passage, “sexual properties are as inseparable from class properties as the yellowness of a lemon from its acidity: a class is defined in an essential respect by the place and value it gives to the sexes and to their socially constituted dispositions” (107). I want to outline broadly what I see as Bourdieu’s two main concerns relevant to the construction of my interpretive frame: his notion of habitus
and its link to class structure, and his conceptualization of exclusion and inclusion as boundary making in the romantic and sexual landscape. A multidimensional approach to class enables us to take account of the contradictions and complexities in relation to other intersectional categories that tend to disappear in less nuanced accounts.

The complexity and ambivalences of class identification in contemporary Turkey reflect the way class-based distinctions are thought of in Turkish society. Multiple and layered distinctions—such as whether one is from Istanbul or Anatolia; whether one’s income derives from trade, commerce, agriculture, or professions; what types of schooling (private or public) one receives; and whether one grows up in a modern or traditional patriarchal family—enter into people’s calculations and inform the way they judge and are judged in class terms. Class distinctions and differences are always articulated with reference to the powerful binaries of rural-urban, modern-traditional, civilized-uncivilized. Historically, the process of urbanization, which since the early 1970s has been drawing the rural population into the big cities in massive waves, has underlined these intersections. These rural-to-urban migrants’ integration and their aspirations for economic and social mobility have been important sources of anxiety about the threat of “mixing” among the established urban, educated, and modern middle classes (Öncü 2002; Ozyegin 2001). Even though some people with rural origins achieve economic mobility and become well-do-to over time, they are still not considered people “with class” (as in “he/she doesn’t have class,” referencing a lack of modern, middle-class dispositions and manners). In short, there is no easy and close correspondence between one’s economic status and one’s claim to middle-class status and identity.7

I suggest that the way people in Turkey—especially young Turks in between different class identifications—view and understand “class” can be conceptualized as a folk understanding using Bourdieu’s notion of habitus. Bourdieu (1977) argues that “the structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g.: the material conditions of existence characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, i.e., a system of lasting transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks” (83). That is, one’s socioeconomic position determines one’s
tastes, predispositions, and values affiliated with that structural position. Thus Bourdieu’s habitus defines a set of “structuring dispositions” that the individual brings to day-to-day life and that orient the individual to act and react in certain taken-for-granted ways. While an individual’s habitus is not governed by strict rules, it nevertheless conforms to general social boundaries. Thus, individuals take for granted most dispositions and practices that they enact, despite the profound significance these strategies have for the way individuals acquire capital and position themselves within a given field.

By reconceptualizing “the socialized self” through his concept of habitus, Bourdieu positions the body at the center of the negotiation of structure and agency, the society and the individual. He claims that “to speak of habitus is to assert that the individual, even the person, the subjective, is social, collective. Habitus is socialized subjectivity” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 126). Bourdieu conceptualizes the key resources in this development of the “socialized self” in the social field as “capitals”: economic, social, and cultural. A social field is a domain of social life, like gender or the family, in which individuals struggle over and are positioned according to their relative economic, social, and cultural capital. The child is socialized in the capital holdings of the family, which determine the child’s initial capital holdings as his/her habitus is formed. For Bourdieu, the social in the habitus, the structured and structuring dispositions, frame bodily conduct, skills and competence, speech habits, vocabulary, accent, and so on. This implies that the means of emotional competencies, masculine or feminine, and their expressive displays are acquired and internalized through the techniques of the body learned in childhood in the context of communication and identification within class-specific family and either homosocial or mixed-gender communities.

Although some of Bourdieu’s feminist critics point out a systematic exclusion of gender in his theory,8 I think his concept of “structured” and “structuring dispositions” lends itself to a gendered analysis. Some feminist scholars are utilizing Bourdieu. To take one example, Beverley Skeggs’s (1997) study of working-class women’s experiences and negotiation of this intersection has powerfully illustrated performative gender and embodied notions of class. The women Skeggs studied lacked the economic and social capital to inhabit the norms of middle-class
femininity, but they invested heavily in their bodies and consumption practices to create “respectful femininity” while simultaneously identifying and dis-identifying with their structural class position. Similarly, Tony Coles (2009) urges that studies of hegemonic masculinity should be informed by Bourdieu’s theoretical models in order to illuminate “the more subtle interplay of masculinities that exists in men’s lives” (30).

Bourdieu’s theory is especially relevant for understanding class as an embodied identity and subjectivity, not just an economic location in a class hierarchy. This understanding is particularly trenchant in the stories of young Turks from nonurban family backgrounds who are in a dialogical relationship with both their parental class culture and their middle-class culture/class destination, who experience the dynamic interconnection between identification and distanciation. Using a Bourdeusian account to focus on the dispositions and emotional competencies that young Turks bring to their intimate and sexual relationships is essential in studying societies such as Turkey, where the practices of boundary making are accentuated by the threat of blurring class/urban-rural/Muslim-secular boundaries. Bourdieu’s habitus comes sharply into view in considerations of how the young men and women in this book mobilized habitus-based qualities and dispositions in constructing the ideal, desirable femininity/masculinity.

As we will see in the chapters to come, habitus is embodied and exemplified partly through durable ways of standing, speaking, walking, and other other aspects of deportment, what Bourdieu calls “hexis.” Taste in things and people plays a crucial signaling role in conveying either affinity or difference—the absence or presence of confidence and familiarity with class-based resources, relationships, and practices. Locating young Turks’ constructions of desirable femininity and masculinity within the wider class habitus, configured as instances of boundary making, also helps to explain young Turks’ contributions to and investments in the maintenance of existing class boundaries and other divisions. The notion of habitus is also pertinent for understanding the inclusion and exclusion that occur when people belonging to different habituses share the same social space, like the pious young woman in this book who carries her Muslim habitus to the secular public environment of the university.
The economics of class—“the haves and the have-nots”—are also present in the way romantic and sexual relationships are lived. Romance and sex are important sites for exercising class privileges and disadvantages. Glaring differences in young Turks’ financial situations are reflected in their on-/off-campus housing patterns and consumption choices as well as their leisure and entertainment activities. Affluent students spend hundreds of dollars for a pair of designer shoes, while their poorer counterparts try to get by with the same amount of money for a month. In the absence of places of their own, those with class disadvantages experience intimate moments of sexual expression literally in public places. The street, parks, vacated, unlit campus offices and hallways, and other public places become vital sites for exploring sexual intimacy for those who have no personal space that is not controlled by parents and/or live in crowded single-sex dorm rooms, producing distinctions such as “clothed” and “naked” sex. Those with class advantages draw strong boundaries and evaluate their class-disadvantaged peers by referring to their sexual behavior on the basis of how they conduct themselves in intimate, sexual relations. As perceived by the privileged classes, the Anatolians (lower classes), because they come from repressive family backgrounds, are unable to exercise control over the new freedom and liberty at their disposal now. Therefore they transgress boundaries by engaging in “sex”/sexual behavior in public places, indulging in sexual displays (see also Erdur 2002).

For Bourdieu, the embodied dispositions formed during childhood as part of one’s primary socialization are further developed throughout life. But as many critics point out, Bourdieu’s “social actor” is overly social or overly determined: “lasting transposable dispositions” are obstinate and rigid (though he posits that “there exist dispositions to resist”) and may be so intractable precisely because Bourdieu links habitus to the reproduction of class structure (81). How does one’s habitus change as one subsequently moves across the “social field,” as is the case for people who experience mobility? What happens when, in upward mobility, an individual becomes dislocated from his/her habitus’s moorings that once carried his/her capital holdings? Does the movement from class origins to new class destinations mean complete escape from the original habitus?
Valerie Walkerdine (2003) suggests that upward mobility has to be analyzed in terms of the deep ambivalence and emotional turmoil produced by individuals’ relationships to their upwardly mobile identities. Her central thesis is that upward mobility must be understood as invested with both desire and defense. Lived through a constant psychic and material reinvention, upward mobility becomes a site of fantasy and invested with desire. Yet this mobility also represents a threat—the threat of inevitable failure, but also the threat of losing all material and emotional connections to one’s past or, conversely, of not being able to distance oneself enough from that past. For Walkerdine, the process of fully embodying a new class identity and “the complete displacement of what one was” (247), cutting all psychic and material ties with one’s other self, can never be seamless. Rather, it necessarily becomes a site of contradiction, what Zygmunt Bauman calls “ambivalence”—as Walkerdine explains it, “the discursive place where there [is] a slipping or sliding, an ambiguity between classifications.” Ultimately this ambivalence, according to Walkerdine, is “experienced as great pain and anxiety for the subject,” a pain that is balanced by the promise of eventual pleasure from a self-realized identity that will never be achieved (247).

In considering how young Turks produce their upward mobility in the cultural context of connective selving, I find Walkerdine’s notion of upward mobility as a site of ambivalence evocative precisely because of her attention to psychic struggles. As we shall see, one of the key benefits of drawing from Walkerdine’s formulation is that it illuminates the tension and liminality between identification and dis-identification. Some young Turks negotiate discrepancies and dis-identification between the dispositions, values, and lifestyles rooted in their class and habitus origins and competing efforts to define themselves in relation to upward mobility. Their efforts foreground a complex terrain of intimate transformations predicated upon gender relations and sex.

Research Setting and Empirical Foundation

Established in 1863 as the oldest American college outside of the United States, Boğaziçi (Bosphorus) University became a public university in 1971 as a successor to the Robert College. Considered one of the most beautiful campuses in the world, the university is located on the
European side of the Bosphorus Strait in Istanbul with a view of the strait and the fortress Rumelihisari, dating back to 1453. Boğaziçi is one of the most prestigious and coveted universities in Turkey. It requires the highest scores on the competitive centralized entrance examinations (taken by nearly 1.5 million students each year) and accepts students from among the top-ranking high school graduates (the upper 5 percent) (Baslanti and McCoach 2006). Because of its selectivity, students at the university have a strong sense of distinction as gifted and high achievers and identify themselves as a select crowd. The teaching medium throughout the university is English, and there is a vibrant cultural and intellectual student life. Extracurricular activities are organized around more than fifty different student clubs, ranging from dance and theater to mountain climbing and scuba diving to chess and engineering. There are several culturally well-defined cliques and groups as well as politically based student organizations. Student profiles exhibit social-class and regional diversity: children from affluent families, modestly salaried classes, and poor backgrounds are almost equally represented in the student body. The gender composition of the student body was 43 percent women and 55 percent men in 2001, when I surveyed the Boğaziçi students’ experiences and ideologies of gender and sexuality.

I chose this university as my research setting because it reflects, articulates, and actively constructs the culture of globalization, urbanism, and modernity, countering regional, local, or rural specificity with the cosmopolitanism and sophistication of the city. As an elite institution, it offers its students one of the major avenues for upward social and economic mobility but also brings together students with vastly different biographies, shaped by family backgrounds and regional and urban-rural distinctions, thereby providing me with a rich site for developing culturally specific examples of gender, sexuality, and self-making among upwardly mobile young Turks. Three sources of field data—a survey, in-depth interviews, and focus group research—provide the foundation of this book.
Surveying Sexual and Gender Ideologies of Boğaziçi Women and Men

Boğaziçi students (n = 360) who responded to the written survey were likely to express general views on sexuality that reflected both sexually inhibitive mores and the effect of sexual modernity, and the conflict between old and new values was apparent in their responses. A sizable majority, 74 percent of women and 63 percent of men, disagreed with the statement that “premarital sexuality is not acceptable because it is against our traditions” (appendix 1, table 1.1), although roughly 45 percent of men and women claimed that they didn’t express/experience their sexuality at all (table 1.2). The majority of both women and men endorsed the idea that “it is important to establish emotional intimacy before engaging in sex”—88 percent and 62 percent of women and men, respectively (table 1.2). Thirty percent of men and 7 percent of women responded that they didn’t need intimacy in order to have sexual relations, while 60 percent of men and 18 percent of women—double the number in each case—said they would consider having sex with an attractive person despite a lack of an intimate relationship.

There was a gender divergence in the way these young Turks believed sexuality should be expressed by men and by women, as well as in the actual level of sexual activity they reported (table 1.1). Men showed a stronger preference for sexual purity than women, though they were essentially divided on its importance. Forty-two percent of men placed significant import on marrying a virgin, and 51 percent agreed with the statement, “I want to marry a virgin,” while a third of men wanted a sexually experienced partner. Slightly more than half of the women wanted their future partner to have had some sexual experience but not to have had sexual intercourse (table 1.2). Only a small minority (15 percent) preferred a spouse who was a virgin. Women’s and men’s virginity status did not show a great divergence: 64 percent of women and 49 percent of men claimed that they were virgins.

Between 80 percent and 90 percent of all Boğaziçi students believed that young Turkish men were “sexually hungry” (table 1.2). This belief may be behind most respondents’ assertion that masturbation is normal for men (83 percent of men and 74 percent of women). Only a very tiny
minority of women disapproved of female masturbation, and this disapproval was higher in men’s responses (11 percent).

Notable was the large number of Boğaziçi men and women who responded with “no opinion” to questions about specific sex acts (table 1.2). Nearly 25 percent of women claimed they had no opinion about whether or not women should masturbate or whether their future spouse should have sexual experience outside of intercourse. Nearly 34 percent of women responded “no opinion” on whether it was acceptable for them to perform or receive oral sex. On the same topics, roughly one in five men also had no opinion. Whether these topics are an afterthought to most students, are truly neutral, or are taboo to the point of causing survey respondents to withhold their true feelings is difficult to ascertain.

When asked about their relationships, eight in ten students reported having had a boyfriend or girlfriend, and roughly half were in a relationship at the time of the survey (table 1.3). About half of those students in relationships said that they were having intercourse with their current partner. The number of men reporting sex was slightly higher than the number of women, at 53 percent of male versus 47 percent of female respondents.

The survey also addressed the experience of “hookups,” or casual encounters of a sexual nature, among students (table 1.4). Women and men reported similar rates of hook-ups, with 26 percent of women and 32 percent of men stating that they had had such an experience; those who had had hook-ups claimed roughly two experiences within the previous year. Just over a third of students said their hook-up partner was already a friend, and another third met their hook-up at a party, at a bar, or on the Internet. (Only men, and rather few, at 4 percent, met their hook-up partner on the Internet. Presumably, women met men on the Internet, but none of these were surveyed.) Eighteen percent of women and 34 percent of men said they met their hook-up partner in some other location, indicating a creative dating culture. Most were sober or relatively sober at the time of the experience.

After the basics of frequency and fact, men and women’s accounts of hook-ups diverged wildly. Only 7 percent of women thought they had initiated the encounter, while 22 percent of men reported that the
woman had initiated their hookups. Roughly half of each gender said it “just happened.” Women mainly claimed that the experience extended only to sex above the waist (44 percent), while only 15 percent of men claimed such an encounter. Twice as many men as women (60 percent versus 30 percent) reported having had sexual intercourse. The survey did ask if birth control had been used, and roughly half of respondents reported that they had not used any method of birth control. Still, if half or more of the women did not engage in intercourse, then it seems the other half were taking some sort of precaution. Across the board, more men than women seemed to believe that birth control had been used. Twice as many men reported believing their partner was on hormonal birth control (6 percent) as women reported being on birth control (3 percent). Men were far more satisfied with their hook-ups, with two-thirds claiming sexual and/or emotional satisfaction. Only one-third of women expressed such satisfaction, and only one in five thought the event, which was ostensibly caused by sexual drive, was actually sexually satisfying.

Boğaziçi men and women expressed similar views on gender roles as they relate to career, children, and domestic duties, with most men and women leaning toward an egalitarian approach (table 1.5). Women were more inclined than men to support progressive roles for women in the home and workforce, but the college men surveyed were also overwhelmingly in favor of women having roles outside of the domestic sphere. In a full divergence from the domestic lives of their mothers, Boğaziçi men and women expected that men would contribute to the household maintenance and that women would contribute financially. Although twice as many men as women thought that being a housewife was as satisfying as having a career, only 16 percent of men and 8 percent of women expressed that view. When asked about the statement, “what women really want is a home and children,” only 7 percent of women and 14 percent of men agreed. Three-quarters of the women and two-thirds of the men thought that men were able and willing to do household chores, and nearly all women and three-quarters of men agreed that a man could raise children as well as a woman could.

As upwardly mobile college students, the respondents were focused on their future careers. Nearly all women (97 percent) and 85 percent
of men expected that the female partner in a marriage would contribute financially to the family income. Most women and over half of men agreed that a working woman could properly care for her children, but when presented with the question in another light (“preschool children can be negatively affected from a working mother”), women were half as confident, and about half of men and women agreed.

In-Depth Interviews

What lies behind all these figures and regularities showing both gender divergences and convergences? A survey based on a representative sample (for the sampling procedures, see appendix 2) provides a significant amount of reliable information about the people we study and is an efficient tool for discovering and accounting for certain patterns and trends, but it cannot account easily for the processes and feelings behind stated opinions, and, by imposing preconceived categories that may have no meaning to the individual, it disregards the individual’s definition of a situation. For instance, the survey results indicated that the level of educational attainment of the respondents’ mothers directly and consistently affected their sexual views (table 1.6). The more education a mother had, the more likely her child was to hold liberated ideas about his or her sexuality and sexual expectations. Sixty-one percent of students whose mothers had only an elementary-level education reported that they wanted to marry a virgin, while only 18 percent of those whose mothers had gone to college held such a preference. One in two children of lower-education mothers also claimed that premarital sex was unacceptable because it went against their traditions. Only 15 percent of respondents whose mothers had a high-school-level education or higher agreed with the same statement. Children of high school– and college-educated women were also more likely to act on these views, with roughly one in two reporting having had intercourse. Only about one in four students of lower-education mothers reported having had sex. How should we understand and theorize this seemingly intimate interaction and intersection between social class, indexed by mothers’ education, and sexuality? Why is there such a connection? What happens to those who transgress the maternal boundaries of sexual prohibition? How is the virginity norm negotiated between men and women in intimate
relationships? These and similar important questions and goals of the study required collecting intimate accounts of young Turks through in-depth interviews.

Although I employed a uniform interview guide, my interview design enabled me to do extensive probing on questions that revealed self-reflections on conflicts and contradictions: How do young Turks position themselves within dominant cultural norms (coexisting and contradictory) that guide them in their emotional and sexual lives? How do they negotiate competing global and local cultural constructions of their roles, identities, and sexual selves? How and in what manner do they perceive, evaluate, and import the various models of gender identities and relations into their biographies? How do they balance their own individuality against the interests of their families and social class? Moreover, my interview design allowed for the incorporation of participants’ own understandings of these processes into the analysis. This strategy proved to be successful in bringing into focus their points of view and their active participation in constructing their worlds.

In the interviews, I asked these young women and men to tell me about their families and the values of the people around them (family, school, neighbors, friends) during their childhoods and in the present. I asked how their upbringing may have played out in their romantic and sexual lives—whether it was enabling or inhibiting. I asked them how their romantic and sexual lives developed over time and how each significant relationship they engaged in evolved and was experienced emotionally and sexually. There were also specific questions regarding virginity and what the social/collective investment in the hymen signifies to them. My questions about their parents elicited descriptions of the ways in which they are similar to and different from their mothers and fathers, as well as how they viewed their parents’ marriages. I wanted to know how they saw their futures professionally and with regard to building marriages and families. I asked them to describe how they imagined the kinds of mothers and fathers they would become. Some specific questions also elicited their views of feminism and whether they were involved in feminist activism. In addition to these and similar general questions, the interviews diverged in accordance with the participants’ unique biographies and identities. For instance, in the interviews with the gay men, I asked questions about coming out,
and when I interviewed the pious women, there were questions about exploring religiosity in their families of origin as well as questions relating to how they conceptualized their identity and about the social distance and difference as well as closeness and interaction they felt in relation to secular Muslim peers and older generations.

The interpretation of in-depth narrative-based interviews involves a number of difficult methodological and epistemological questions. We cannot simply treat “the complex architecture of narration about oneself” (Passerini 1989, 196–97) as documenting facts and events. We must ask: What are the rules and “routines” governing their interpretation? “All autobiographic memory is true. It is up to the interpreter to discover in which sense, where, for which purpose,” writes Luisa Passerini (1989, 197).

I aimed to understand the narratives I collected as “a way of selectively organizing experience to produce and explain one’s self” (Scott 1996, xii), and in my interpretations, I sought to understand my participants’ purposes for telling me their biographies and about their romantic and sexual lives, the dialogical conditions that generated or undermined particular narratives, and the narrative resources (cognitive and emotional) that guided their vocabulary. For instance, in relation to the interviews I conducted with the pious young women, I was very aware that some of the narrative resources and vocabularies informed by their Islamic knowledge were constrained because they, correctly, assumed that they were explaining themselves to someone who was not steeped in Islamic knowledge. In situations when these women appropriated a narrative resource or a quotation from an Islamic text, their vocabulary was restrained in that it involved a “secular translation” for me.

In “Lost in Translation” A. Ka Tat Tsang and P. Sik Ying Ho (2007) brilliantly examine how academic language and the “everyday language” of people “interact and affect” each other (624). Although the authors believe that academic language and theories can enrich our understanding of people’s experiences and behaviors, they “caution against its unquestioned privileging” (640). They remind us that all narratives, those related directly in everyday language by the people who lived them and those related indirectly by academics, are mere representations (626). However, the authors are particularly critical of theoretical discourses that seek totality at the expense of “elements that might threaten their cohesiveness or unity” (629). People can provide more subtle or nuanced
understandings of their own experiences than theoretical systems often admit because “fragmentation, incoherence, and even contradiction are better tolerated in everyday speech” than in theoretical discourses (638). In such instances, they write, referring to research about sexuality, the “ambivalent nature of desire” defies categorization (636). This, they suggest, helps everyday language remain “inclusive and embracing” while “professional discourse . . . seeks to define and defend its discrete territory” (638). Yet they are careful to clarify that everyday language by itself is neither a superior nor an entirely sufficient form of representation and that theoretical discourse has a place in unraveling and illuminating people’s lived experiences.

Throughout the book, I attempt in different ways to render my interpretative lenses visible to the reader. In analyzing the narratives, I focus on the deeply felt tensions and disjunctures my respondents face between self and other, sex and love, societal responsibility and autonomy, and identification and dis-identification. Also central to my analytical strategy is to probe whether individual meanings attached to tensions and contradictions are internally consistent and whether they are shared by others. Equally important, I have tried to analyze the narratives with the goal of empowering the reader by making clear not only how the theoretical/analytical perspectives I adopted or developed actually relate to the words and vocabularies participants chose and mobilized themselves but also how my theoretical interpretations of their lives as a feminist social scientist relates to my subjects’ personal understandings and assertions about their behaviors, experiences, and aspirations. I hope this method, as an attempt “to ‘represent’ the ‘voices’ of the participants and let them interact with the theoretical articulations of professional discourse” (Tsang and Ho 2007, 630), enables alternative readings of the narratives for the reader.