Overview

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the creation of five newly independent states in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Each of these states had been conquered by imperial Russia and subsequently was tightly controlled by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The process of establishing themselves as truly autonomous states has been the central enterprise for these five countries in the last twenty-two years.

The demise of the USSR also led to dramatic changes in the global strategic environment: the Warsaw Pact unraveled, the Soviet Union itself splintered into numerous states, and the Cold War ended. Most of the Western commentary on these developments focused on the reduced military threat and the independence of Belarus, Ukraine, and the states in the Caucasus. Few Westerners knew much about Central Asia, and even fewer followed the halting steps of the Central Asian states toward greater economic and political autonomy.

Only after September 11, 2001, when the United States began to use Central Asia as a transit route to Afghanistan, did greater numbers of Americans learn about air bases and truck routes in Central Asia. Also, it was only then that Americans became more aware of Islamist networks spreading from the Middle East and Afghanistan into Central Asia.

Roughly simultaneously with the rise of Islamist groups came the rise of China. These two seemingly unrelated historical developments combined together and provided a new platform for the interplay of the United States and China in Central Asia.

Though the 1990s were relatively tranquil in military terms, the first decade of the twenty-first century was a veritable cauldron of turmoil, as the world adjusted to surging Islamist and Chinese capabilities.
So why is it useful to have a volume that links the United States and China and Central Asia?

First, China is the only *state* that has the potential to directly challenge American global leadership.

Second, militant Islamist movements are the only *nonstate groups* that are openly confronting American and Western institutions, and they thrive in Central Asia.

Finally, Central Asia is important in its own right because it is the vital fulcrum between the dynamism of East Asia and the wealth and technology in Western Europe.

What we do below is briefly survey the literature on bilateral relations between the United States and China, and then, by concentrating on Sino-American relations inside Central Asia, we will show what is distinctive about this volume.

The rise of China has led to a massive outpouring of commentary and analysis. In the past three years alone, there have been at least six major studies dealing with bilateral relations between the United States and China.¹

There are many useful perspectives in this literature. Some have emphasized the historical interaction between China and the West, noting that the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were periods when China was on the defensive and under pressure from outsiders.² Others, like earlier studies, have stressed the cultural aspects of the sparring between China and the West and the difficulties each side faced in coping with the other.³

Also, during the past two decades, as China’s growth stunned outside observers, much of the discussion between Beijing and Washington has been over trading regimes and how to adjust to China becoming the world’s largest manufactured-goods exporter.⁴

In addition, of course, the rapid growth of China’s military capability and Beijing’s new assertiveness on territorial and maritime claims issues with its neighbors have led to major debates about China’s intentions.⁵

Yet what is notable about Central Asia, in the past two decades, is that China and the United States, despite their problems elsewhere, have pursued different objectives in the region and not had any direct clash of interests.
Some of the most significant problems in Central Asia have been developmental ones for the five states. Moving away from centrally planned economies has been resisted by the political elites, who were all trained in Soviet-style management. Private sector business in Central Asia has been mostly small firms or an occasional quasi-public company where a well-connected person got control of a former state enterprise. Since the political elite has little incentive to privatize the remaining large companies, there has been an ongoing standoff between outside donors and advisors (who favor privatization) and most of the current elite. Also, it is clear that the political leaders can extract resources from these state enterprises on a predictable basis, whereas a truly independent private sector would resist side payments and even be an alternative source of power.

Creating real autonomy for the five Central Asian states has also faced serious obstacles. Russia has waxed and waned in its interest in Central Asia since 1991. President Yeltsin wanted to concentrate on internal Russian issues, but President Putin has consistently had a strong concern with the “near abroad.” When the Commonwealth of Independent States concept failed to gain support, Putin then suggested a series of organizations to cement political, economic, and security ties with Central Asia. Moscow proposed and successfully persuaded certain Central Asian states to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), and the Customs Union Commission (CUC).

Both the United States and China have made major overtures to Central Asia as well. The United States put effort into encouraging economic integration among the Central Asian countries, but when that foundered on friction between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Washington has stressed bilateral efforts at economic assistance and defense cooperation.

China’s programs in Central Asia have been predominantly economic, though its signature effort, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which includes four Central Asian states plus Russia as members) has recently begun to discuss security issues, notably Islamic militancy.

In addition, each of the Central Asian states has ethnic divisions that make creating a unified state difficult. These ethnic differences
are particularly prominent in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. These long-standing frictions are now exacerbated by the rise of militant Islam and have led to outbreaks of violence and government crackdowns in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{12}

**Major Themes of This Volume**

1. China and the United States are not currently in conflict or experiencing direct friction in Central Asia because they have different objectives and interests. Washington’s principal concerns are military and relate to supplying U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. The major concerns of the Chinese are economic and relate mostly to ensuring access to oil and gas supplies in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Beijing’s major military worry in Central Asia is Islamic protest and organization directed at Xinjiang. In this latter regard, America and China are aligned in the desire to limit the spread of militant Islam.

2. If there is any power that is competing with the United States for strategic influence in Central Asia, it is Russia. Key members of the Russian leadership want to reassert Moscow’s influence in Central Asia, and they see the post-2001 role of the United States in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan especially as inimical to Russian interests.

3. Since it is unclear whether the United States will try to maintain a presence in Central Asia after the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the less powerful states on the periphery of Central Asia are waiting for an opportunity to increase their influence. India, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey each have some ambitions in Central Asia and are maneuvering to test out what roles they can play.

4. Thus, we are in a waiting period, during which the Central Asian states themselves are pursuing their respective policies to ensure their autonomy, while the outside powers are calculating how to position themselves for the changing strategic environment in Central Asia.

We will return to each of these themes in the balance of this chapter and in the body of this volume as different authors examine Central Asian developments in depth.
Why Is Central Asia Significant by Itself?

In the nineteenth century, Central Asia was the region of the “Great Game”—the ongoing contest between the British, from their base in India, and imperial Russia, from its contiguous territory. This British-Russian competition was significant then not only because of the resources expended but because leaders in St. Petersburg and London saw this as part of a global balancing effort. Britain’s influence was rising, while Russia’s was gradually declining, and the contest was capped by Russia’s humiliating naval defeat by Japan in 1905.

Ironically, after World War I, although imperial Russia had collapsed, the Soviet Union was able to re-infuse itself into Central Asia and fully incorporate Central Asia as five provinces of the USSR. By the start of World War II, one of Germany’s central goals was to expand southeast into the Caucasus and east into Ukraine and Central Asia to gain control of the farmland and hydrocarbons there.

Thus, we see major strategic choices that were made between 1850 and 1945 playing themselves out in Central Asia or its periphery. Britain’s naval power was a key inspiration for A. T. Mahan’s book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, whereas Harold Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman stressed the importance of controlling land and the Eurasian heartland as a pivot point between Europe and Asia. Yet it was the combination of land and naval power in Britain’s favor that explained the shift in global balances of that period. Although the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 briefly gave Germany potential access to oil in the Caucasus, once Hitler and Stalin were at war, the Eurasian heartland became a key objective for German attacks.

The tenacity of the USSR during World War II meant that Germany never succeeded in controlling the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Moscow was able to preserve its dominance there until 1991. However, as Zbigniew Brzezinski notes, “two aspirants to global power, Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, explicitly agreed that America should be excluded from Eurasia. Each realized that the injection of American power into Eurasia would preclude his ambitions regarding global domination.”

We see a somewhat analogous situation today, where neither Russia nor China wants the United States to stay in Central Asia after NATO’s departure from Afghanistan.
Obviously Eurasia is a wider area than Central Asia, and it now includes China and Japan as well as Europe. Nevertheless, Central Asia is the linchpin between Asia and Europe. Thus, keeping Central Asia autonomous is vital to preventing any one power gaining dominance in Eurasia.

Thus, Central Asia’s first critical feature is its location.

Central Asia’s second vital asset is its hydrocarbon resources. Kazakhstan has 30 billion barrels of oil reserves. Although this is only one-eighth of the proven reserves in Saudi Arabia, it is worth roughly $2.5 trillion at current world prices, after expenses for extraction. This is, clearly, enough to create a sizable annual annuity for each Kazakh.

At a similar level of importance is Turkmenistan’s natural gas, estimated at 265 trillion cubic feet. Turkmenistan’s gas reserves put it in the world’s top five potential producers. It is also worth noting that Kazakhstan’s and Turkmenistan’s abundance of resources is in contrast to the relative paucity of hydrocarbons in the other three Central Asian states.

Central Asia’s third distinctive feature is not an asset. It is a dilemma: movements that seek to establish Islamist governments. These movements grow out of religious fervor and assorted grievances and have led to underground activities and violent protests in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In addition, Tajikistan had what amounted to a civil war in the early and mid-1990s.

So Central Asia has key advantages in its location and natural resources, but is a tinderbox where political instability could surface at any time. Also, because Central Asia borders on Afghanistan and Pakistan, there is no question that instability could stem from inside Central Asia leading out or the reverse.

The biggest uncertainty facing Central Asia is what will happen when Western forces leave Afghanistan. The major powers (the United States, China, and Russia) realize that they cannot control Central Asia as do the regional powers on its periphery. At present, the object of all these states is to gain influence and prevent any single other power from gaining a dominant position. Before turning to the roles of the outside powers, we will provide more background on the trends inside the Central Asian states.
Inside Central Asia: Four Major Processes Under Way

Since 1991, establishing autonomy and new identities separate from Russia has been the key objective of all the Central Asian states. Russian imperial and Soviet domination of Central Asia created a very complex interaction between the capital and its dependencies. Central Asian elites took Russian names, were educated in Moscow, and created a myriad of business and personal relationships.

Yet a strong desire to be independent and to chart its own course led each Central Asian state to choose a slightly different path. Kazakhstan, with its vast oil reserves, has been the most confident about its bargaining power with Moscow and thus often willing to collaborate closely with its former colonial ruler. At the other extreme is Turkmenistan, which has chosen a starkly isolationist path. Kyrgyzstan, with its small size and concerns about being coerced by its Central Asian neighbors and China, has often openly sided with Moscow. Tajikistan has been willing to tolerate Russian troops on its soil, due to its perilous internal security situation, while Uzbekistan has shifted back and forth between support for and vehement opposition to Russian influence.

Reconfiguring Their Economic Development Strategies

When they were part of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, the Central Asian states were essentially agricultural and raw material suppliers for their overlords. Kazakhstan was notable for its cotton and oil, while Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley was a fertile source of many fruits and grain crops. The situation today is now far more diverse. Kazakhstan has leveraged its hydrocarbon resources to launch a range of industries; Turkmenistan is in the process of developing gas-related projects; Tajikistan is broadening its agricultural base; Kyrgyzstan has become an entrepôt between China and Central Asia; and Uzbekistan is promoting itself as the central state for communications and transportation with the Central Asian region.

The Central Asian states question whether they can build steadily on their efforts toward greater economic diversity. As mentioned, most of the early leadership in post-1991 Central Asia had been trained in
Moscow and favored centrally led economies for a variety of reasons. Direction from the center made political control and patronage easier, facilitated the extraction of resources from enterprises, and kept opponents marginalized. The problem is that it is generally inefficient. Hence, Western economists have usually recommended partial or full privatization and linking states with the world trading system as a means for encouraging efficiency. Yet political control and gaining economic advantages for leaders have generally gotten top priority in Central Asia. This means that economic modernization has often been a secondary objective.

Dealing with Internal Unrest, Separatism, and Islamist Groups

As noted above, Islamist and separatist groups have become increasingly able to challenge established governments in Central Asia. Except for Kyrgyzstan, which has alternated between riots and voting as a means to change leadership, the Central Asian states have had authoritarian rulers throughout their post-1991 independence period. Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbaev and Uzbek president Islam Karimov ascended directly to power from their positions as Soviet party leaders and have brooked no opposition since. President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan represents a similar form of secular, authoritarian leader. Ironically, only in Turkmenistan, which is the most isolated of the Central Asian states, has there been a peaceful transition of power since 1991; when President Saparmurat Niyazov died in 2006, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov emerged, after private maneuvering, to claim the presidency. Berdimuhamedov has not been openly challenged since.

Thus, in four of the five states of Central Asia we have a general pattern: authoritarian, secular leaders run societies that are overwhelmingly Muslim. This creates an inherent tension between the values of the public and those of the leadership. In those cases where there is radical Islamic organizational ability that the governments cannot completely suppress, periodic uprisings occur. In the one democratic state, Kyrgyzstan, there is more freedom of expression but a deep ethnic split between the Kyrgyz majority and Uzbek minority.
Hence, it is reasonable to surmise that Central Asia has more political instability ahead. Presidents Nazarbaev and Karimov are in their seventies, so future aspirants to power will be positioning themselves; and throughout the region, the rise of militant Islam will challenge secular governments. There have not yet been general uprisings in Central Asia like the “Arab Spring” revolts of 2011–2012, but they cannot be ruled out as a possibility.

**Determining How to Deal with Regional Powers on Their Periphery**

Below we will analyze in greater detail how the Central Asian states deal with the major powers, but it is first worth noting that the “regional powers” on their periphery pose both risks and opportunities. At various times in the past two decades, both Iran and Turkey have made efforts to expand contacts and influence in Central Asia. Neither of these has been particularly successful recently, but there are strong cultural and ethnic ties as well. Many of the languages in Central Asia are Turkic in origin, whereas Tajik is based on Persian. This, plus the different models of Islam that Turkey and Iran represent, also provides inspiration for links to the region’s middle powers.

The regional power with the most intent and capability to affect Central Asia is India. Strategists in New Delhi have two major objectives in Central Asia: gaining access to the hydrocarbons and preventing Pakistan from forming a broad Islamic coalition against India.

Obtaining Central Asian oil and gas would reduce India’s dependence on Iran and the Middle East; thus the appeal of the proposed Turkmenistan—Afghan—Pakistan—India (TAPI) pipeline. The problem is that no company will build the TAPI line without a secure peace in Afghanistan and improved relations between Pakistan and India. However, even if the TAPI pipeline is not built, India would still like to have good relations with Central Asia so that it is not facing united northern Islamic antagonism. India has therefore put substantial resources into aid for Afghanistan, offers various aid programs to Central Asian states, and has achieved observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This has not yet yielded close ties in
Central Asia, but its minimum objective has been achieved as India does not find itself excluded from the region.

The Outside Major Powers: Russia, the United States, and China

Russia’s long-term involvement in Central Asia has created both opportunities and drawbacks for its current policies. As mentioned, the long-term involvement means that there are close personal contacts with most of the current leadership in Central Asia, ease of communication in Russian, and, in many cases, common approaches to issues.\(^{33}\) On the other hand, in those situations where the Central Asian decision maker has had negative experiences dealing with Moscow, the historical legacy can be a hindrance to current relations.

After the demise of the Soviet Union, President Yeltsin took little interest in Central Asia, and many of the leaders there felt abandoned. President Putin has reversed that stance and placed significant emphasis on “Russia’s near abroad,” which includes Eastern and Southern Europe as well as Central Asia.\(^{34}\)

The dilemma for the Central Asian states is that Putin’s embrace often comes with a price: increased dependence on Russia.\(^{35}\) Moscow has tried to prevent the Central Asian governments from signing pipeline deals that moved gas or oil without going through Russia. Moscow has also pressed the Central Asian states to cooperate in national security arrangements or in aligning with Russian positions on controversies that many in Central Asia found unacceptable. This has been particularly true regarding Russia’s stance on Georgia and North Ossetia.\(^{36}\)

Putin certainly recognizes that the United States will have trouble maintaining its influence in Central Asia after NATO’s fighting units depart from Afghanistan, so many see his efforts as directed toward picking up the pieces after the thirteen-year American interregnum ends.

The United States faces serious intervention fatigue after its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the start of these wars, few foreign affairs specialists and even fewer of the American public would have anticipated that U.S. troops would spend nine years in Iraq and almost a decade and a half in Afghanistan at a terrible human and financial cost. Thus, the public sentiment in the United States is strongly against further commitments of forces or aid in the Middle East and Central Asia. For example,
this experience is surely inhibiting President Obama from making any large-scale commitments to intervene in Syria.

Nevertheless, the question remains: What role will the United States assume in Central Asia “after Afghanistan”?37

First of all, there may be several Central Asian states that want the United States as a balancer against growing Russian and Chinese influence. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are both states that see their neighbors as problematic and may want an outside friend, if not ally.38 Tajikistan may fit in this category as well if Afghanistan devolves into a decentralized state with the Tajik “northern alliance” seeking protection from the Pushtun majority in the south.

Also, there may be purely pragmatic regimes that see financial benefits from allowing American use of their roads, rails, or airports.39 This may have already played a part in the cooperation with the U.S. Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which channels supplies through Central Asia to Afghanistan.

Moreover, even though Turkmenistan has been strictly neutral and isolationist, it has chosen to let China be a major developer of its gas reserves. This has been a source of irritation to Russia but an indication that policy makers in Ashgabat see merit in diversifying their potential supporters. The effort to counterbalance the influence of Russia with China might even motivate Turkmenistan to see the benefit of ties with the United States.40

Nevertheless, the current gridlock in Washington and inability to agree in the Congress on broad goals for foreign policy make it unlikely that there will be American support for an interventionist and broad-gauged role in Central Asia. That means that policy makers in Washington may end up focusing on narrower goals, such as countering Islamic militant groups and maintaining sufficiently good relations with some Central Asian states so that U.S. forces can gain access in critical situations. Yet the more ambitious objectives of promoting democracy and transparent government (which characterized American policy in the 1990s) seem unattainable and a relic of the past.

Clearly, the most enigmatic outside power today in Central Asia is China. Although official Chinese policy emphasizes the importance of Central Asia, Beijing is actually keeping a very limited profile. China has become the world’s second-largest oil importer at 5.5 million barrels
a day in 2011. Only about 5 percent of that oil comes from Central Asia (Kazakhstan), but once the Turkmenistan gas is flowing at full capacity, Central Asia may be supplying a sizable percentage of China’s hydrocarbon imports. This is critical to Beijing’s overall energy security plans because Central Asian imports come directly to China and are not subject to interdiction in the Persian Gulf, in the Indian Ocean, or in Southeast Asia. Thus, it is understandable that Beijing wants to pursue a low-keyed approach to energy acquisition that keeps China out of the limelight.

Yet China’s broader objectives, of shaping developments in neighboring states, limiting the spread of Islamic fundamentalism into Xinjiang Province, and balancing Russia’s influence in Central Asia, cannot be achieved with its current low-profile stance. There are ample indications that China is confident about balancing Russia and working with Moscow to limit the influence of the United States and Europe in Central Asia. The question of how to deal with Islamic fundamentalism poses a more complex challenge.

At present, China is content to have the United States take the lead in dealing with Muslim terrorists. China has enough problems with its own Uighurs (mostly in Xinjiang) that it does not want to antagonize Muslims in Central Asia who could be a source of training and financial support for dissidents inside China.

Also, China has worked diligently to keep good relations with both Sunnis and Shias in the Muslim world. Beijing needs Iranian oil, so has been unwilling to take a stance against the Assad regime in Syria, which is aligned with Tehran. Moreover, ties with Shia states give China acceptable relations with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Gaza as well.

Nevertheless, China’s most important relations in the Muslim world are with the Sunni regimes in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Saudi Arabia is China’s largest supplier of imported oil, as it provides almost twice the annual amount supplied by Iran. Also, given Saudi Arabia’s role in the Sunni community, China is careful not to antagonize Riyadh’s partners as well.

Yet Pakistan is even more critical to China because of Islamabad’s role in balancing India. Pakistan’s presence preoccupies India and keeps New Delhi facing northwest, not northeast toward China. Since 1998, when Pakistan successfully tested nuclear weapons, India has been
thwarted in its ability to coerce Pakistan, and that frees China to focus on its expanded relations with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, all littoral states on the Bay of Bengal. Although Beijing and New Delhi have cordial relations for public consumption, leaders in both states know that each represents the main regional rival to the other.

At the broadest strategic level, China’s principal foreign policy concern remains the United States. Beijing has not yet revealed to the world how active its long-term foreign policy will be. At present China is satisfied to play a relatively low-keyed role in Central Asia, to balance its relations between Sunni and Shia states in the Middle East, and to expand its ties with the states surrounding India. All of these moves will give Beijing options in the future, but China cannot please all of these states indefinitely. If there is greater turmoil in Central and South Asia when U.S. and NATO forces leave Afghanistan, China will need to decide whether it is willing to intervene to play a stabilizing role. Otherwise, China will need to cede the role of aspiring outside powers to Iran, India, Pakistan, and Russia, each of which has shown interest in greater influence in Central Asia.

In the subsequent chapters of this volume, each of the authors will examine aspects of Central Asia’s development from their particular perspective. Then, in the concluding chapter, the editor will summarize the basic findings and evaluate the extent to which common themes are found in all the chapters.

Organization of the Volume

The “Overview” section of the book provides the basic rationale for the volume and a survey of the principal economic and foreign policy issues facing Central Asia. The chapter by Nazgul Jenish highlights the very significant differences in resource endowment and levels of development within Central Asia. The chapter also demonstrates that Central Asian governments and their state-owned enterprises frequently misallocate funds and divert resources to private uses. This pattern of closely held, self-aggrandizing actions is evident, as well, in Marlene Laruelle’s analysis of the foreign policies of the Central Asian states.

In the section entitled “Outside Powers,” each of the authors comments on the notable success of the Central Asian states in establishing
their autonomy after independence in 1991. Although Russia is deeply ambivalent about this Central Asian autonomy, China, the United States, and the European Union each have their own reasons to encourage it. In addition, Japan, India, and Turkey would each like more influence in Central Asia, but do not yet have the right circumstances to move from being marginal to major players there.

In the “Regional Integration” section, the authors identify the reasons why Central Asian economic ties are more with outside states than within the region. As Richard Pomfret illustrates, all of the Central Asian states are natural resource or agricultural exporters, and manufacturing is still limited within the region. Also, since the major wealth in Central Asia is in oil in Kazakhstan and natural gas in Turkmenistan, there is no simple process to encourage enhanced intra-regional trade. Finally, as Pan Guang notes, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has the potential to encourage regional integration, but its efforts to date have been more political than economic.

The concluding chapter identifies areas of consensus and difference among the volume’s authors. In addition, it comments on the likely impact of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and growing efforts at cooperation between China and Russia.

NOTES


5. For an overview of this debate, see chapters 1–3 in A. Friedberg, *Contest for Supremacy* (New York: Norton, 2011).


10. For an overview of China’s program in Central Asia, see the chapters in this volume by Li Xin and Xin Daleng, Xing Guangcheng, and Pan Guang.


16. See Carolyn Kissane’s chapter in this volume, which covers the hydrocarbon issues in Central Asia in detail.


18. For a discussion of these movements and the efforts to suppress them, see D. Marty, “ Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States” (report prepared for the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, June 12, 2006).


20. To see the effect of this pattern on current Central Asian foreign policy, see Marlene Laruelle’s chapter in this volume. For the historical period, see P. Golden, *Central Asia in World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).


29. See the Joshua W. Walker’s chapter in this volume for a discussion of Turkey’s assorted efforts in Central Asia.


31. See Gulshan Sachdeva’s chapter in this volume for a detailed review of India’s interests and activities in Central Asia.


37. See Andrew Kuchins and Shalini Sharan’s chapter in this volume for a detailed assessment of this question.


40. C. Fitzpatrick, "Is the U.S. Violating Turkmenistan’s Neutrality with the NDN?,” EurasiaNet, August 1, 2010.

