Introduction

*Ethnic Heritage across the Generations: Racialization, Transnationalism, and Homeland*

Four Generations of Japanese Americans

Ruth Morita is a serious and soft-spoken second-generation Japanese American woman in her seventies. Although she can be quite engaging in conversation, she is not naturally talkative, and it took some coaxing during our interview to get her to elaborate on some of her experiences. Like other elderly *nisei* (second-generation Japanese Americans), she had been interned in a concentration camp during World War II. Because the internment is such an integral part of the Japanese American experience, Ruth assumed that I wanted to interview her about it. Although I had told her that I was mainly interested in the contemporary ethnic experiences of Japanese Americans, she brought a copy of a PBS documentary that had brief footage of her in an internment camp with other girls. “I couldn't believe it,” she said. “I was watching this documentary one day and I see this child running around in camp. I was like, wait a minute, that's me!”

Because it is such an important part of her past, I asked Ruth in some detail about her internment experience. I was surprised that she actually characterized it as “fun” and “like a long summer camp.” It was a safe environment, she was together with a lot of other Japanese American kids, and she was no longer under the control of her parents. She spent her days going to school and playing with the other girls and made some really good friends whom she continues to see today. She had no stories of misery and oppression to tell, which I had fully expected to hear. Nonetheless, Ruth spoke about how the internment had been a defining moment for Japanese American nisei:
Despite being American citizens, we were locked up just because of our Japanese ancestry. So the niseis had to show they were loyal Americans. That’s why the men went off and fought in the 442nd [the Japanese American Regimental Combat Team that fought very bravely during World War II in Europe]. We stressed being American and assimilation, and didn’t want the cultural baggage of our parents. It wasn’t until after the war that we were gradually accepted and finally given opportunities to get ahead.

I then asked Ruth about her parents and their internment experiences. “It wasn’t that bad for the kids, but it was really tough for my parents,” Ruth recalled. “They lost everything, their business, the house, their possessions . . .” Her voice started to crack with emotion. “It devastated them. After camp, they had to restart their lives again with nothing. I don’t think they ever completely recovered from it. I don’t think the emotional scars ever healed.”

Steve Okura was a board member of the Nikkei Student Union (NSU), the Japanese American student organization at the University of California at San Diego. The first time I encountered Steve was in the hallway of the student center before one of NSU’s meetings. He was speaking to a student from Japan in fluent Japanese. His Japanese sounded so native, I was not sure whether he was Japanese American since I had heard that some students from Japan are members of NSU. I asked Steve during the meeting, “Are you Japanese?”

“No,” Steve replied. “I’m shin-nisei” (a “new nisei,” whose parents emigrated to the United States from Japan after World War II).

“Oh really?” I was a bit surprised. “You know, I’m shin-nisei too!”

This was the first time during my fieldwork that I encountered another fellow shin-nisei. During my interview with Steve, I was repeatedly struck by how his experiences were very similar to mine. Our Japanese parents had immigrated to the United States as high-skilled professionals, we grew up speaking Japanese at home, we attended Japanese Saturday school with children from Japan for many years, and we were fully bilingual and bicultural. We had also lived transnational lives since our parents took us to Japan on numerous occasions to visit relatives and
travel through the country. And we had both briefly considered applying
to Japanese universities for our college education.

Another commonality we shared is that neither of us identified as
“Japanese American” growing up. “I never thought of myself as Japa-
nese American or even used that word,” Steve remarked. “I always
thought of myself as just Japanese, who was born in America.” Like
myself, Steve did not start identifying as Japanese American until col-
lege, when he became one of the large number of Asian American stu-
dents on campus.

Steve confided in me that even today, he does not feel like an “authen-
tic Japanese American.” “It’s because my family didn’t go through the
internment and all that,” he explained. “So I don’t share that history. In
fact, I’ve always felt much more connected to Japan and its culture my
entire life than to the Japanese American experience.”

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George Okamoto is a delightful person with an effusive personality. He
seems to always be in a good mood with a perpetual smile on his face,
and he loves to joke and tease, often releasing his big, engaging laugh. I
first met him at the annual meeting of the Japanese American Historical
Society of San Diego, where we had lunch together, and then encoun-
tered him again during a community event at the Buddhist Temple of
San Diego.

George was a sansei (third-generation) and very much fit previous
images I had of the “typical” Japanese American. Despite his Japanese
appearance, he was completely Americanized, had never been to Japan
and had no interest in the country, and did not speak a word of Japanese.
“I’m a good example of a ‘banana,’” he told me with a laugh when we first
met. “I look yellow and Japanese on the outside, but if you peel me, I’m
just like a white person inside.” Like other Japanese Americans of his
generation I interviewed, George felt he had lost touch with his Japanese
heritage, which he directly attributed to his nisei parents’ internment
experiences. “They had to prove that they were loyal Americans, so they
had to kind of push their cultural identity aside,” he explained. “So we
sanseis, we just weren’t exposed to our heritage as kids and were raised
just like whites. In fact, growing up, I thought of myself as white. It didn’t
always occur to me that I looked different from them!”
I finally had an opportunity to interview George and we agreed to meet at a local Starbucks. When George showed up, he greeted me warmly as always.

“So . . . you really want me to tell you everything about myself, huh?” he asked playfully.

“Yes, everything,” I replied.

“Are you sure? I’ve done some crazy things in my life!” George laughed.

When we walked up to the counter to order our coffees, the barista instantly recognized George’s Japanese last name on his credit card and decided to try out the Japanese he had learned, perhaps in college. “Anata nihonjin desu. Genki desuka?” (You are Japanese. How are you?). In contrast to his usual, jovial demeanor, George’s face suddenly took on a serious expression. He looked straight at the barista, his eyes almost confrontational. “I am not Japanese!” George said emphatically. The barista was taken aback.

“I’m American. I just look Japanese,” George’s expression suddenly eased, followed by his signature big laugh. We were all relieved. George was back to his normal self.

After we sat down at a table with our coffees to start the interview, George leaned over and asked, “So what the hell did he ask me in Japanese?”

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I was lucky enough to get tickets for a performance of “Camp Dance,” a play about the Japanese American internment experience during World War II. The play was a big hit among Japanese American communities across the United States, and the traveling theatrical troupe had given a series of sold-out performances. I attended the San Diego performance with Cathy, one of my very first sansei interviewees, and her sister. When we entered the auditorium, the place was already packed. I was a bit surprised to find that the stage was set with a row of colorful, traditional Japanese taiko drums instead of props for the play. Before the play began, a group of young taiko players marched onto the stage dressed in happi, traditional Japanese festival costumes with kanji (Japanese characters). They immediately took their positions alongside the drums and raised their bachi (drumsticks) into the air in an elegant ready pose.
With a coordinated shout (*kaii*), they suddenly began drumming in unison, the thunderous beating reverberating throughout the auditorium.

This was not a taiko ensemble from Japan. These were *fourth-generation* Japanese American youth, the *yonsei*. Nor was their performance unusual. Taiko has become popular among the yonsei, and many events in the Japanese American community now begin with a taiko performance from a local ensemble (Ahlgren 2011; Konagaya 2001). The drumming was quite good, and the audience showed their appreciation with loud applause after the brief performance.

“It’s kind of surreal to see Japanese American kids doing this today, wearing such old-fashioned Japanese costumes and playing such traditional drums,” Cathy remarked. “It’s like you are being transported back to old Japan. The yonsei have really gotten back in touch with their Japanese roots. It’s something we sanseis lost and makes us feel good.”

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This book explores the contemporary ethnic experiences of U.S.-born Japanese Americans from the second to the fourth generations and the extent to which they remain connected to their ancestral cultural heritage. As shown by the above vignettes, the strength of ethnic heritage among Japanese Americans varies considerably by generation. Therefore, my topical focus is not intended to imply that all (or even most) Japanese Americans are in search of their heritage and homeland. My interviews indicated that some of them, especially the third-generation *sansei*, clearly are not. However, many Japanese Americans continue to think of their ethnicity in terms of the relative importance of their Japanese ancestry and their ethnic homeland of Japan. Even the sansei continue to feel the impact of their Japanese ancestral culture on their personalities and ethnic identities. They also began the taiko movement, which has become the primary ethnic heritage activity among Japanese Americans today.

Therefore, ethnic heritage is a useful conceptual lens through which to understand the cultural experiences of Japanese Americans as well as differences among them in terms of generation, age, and history. The concept can also be used to interrogate issues related to assimilation, transnationalism, racialization, multiculturalism, and homeland, all of which influence how ancestral heritage has been experienced, constructed, and enacted by different generations of Japanese Americans.
Japanese Americans are one of the oldest Asian American groups in the United States. Although most Asian Americans are primarily the product of the mass immigration of Asians to the United States after 1965,1 Japanese immigration occurred mainly between the 1880s and 1924, when the United States prohibited further Asian immigration until after World War II.2 Because of the increasing postwar economic prosperity of Japan, Japanese immigration to the United States after World War II has been relatively limited. It initially consisted of war-brides,3 followed after 1965 by students, professionals, and businessmen, many of whom are sojourners who eventually return to Japan.

Although Japanese Americans were concentrated predominantly on the West Coast and in Hawaii before World War II, those living on the mainland dispersed across the country after the internment experience in order to avoid the discriminatory environment in California. There continues to be significant internal migration of Japanese Americans within the United States today, for instance for educational and occupational reasons. As a result, contemporary Japanese Americans are much more geographically dispersed, with significant populations scattered across the western United States, as well as the Midwest and the East Coast. However, Hawaii and the West Coast, especially Los Angeles and the Bay Area, continue to have the largest populations of Japanese Americans.

Surprisingly, there has been a lack of recent work on the contemporary ethnic status of Japanese Americans, despite the continued expansion of Asian American Studies. Books about Japanese Americans in the last few decades have been primarily historical and often centered on their World War II internment (Azuma 2005; Fugita and O’Brien 1991; Fugita and Fernandez 2004; Harden 2003; Hayashi 2008; Kitano 1993; Kurashige 2002; Matsumoto 2014; Morimoto 1997; Nakano Glenn 1986; O’Brien and Fugita 1991; Robinson 2010; Spickard 1996; Takahashi 1982; Takezawa 1995; Tamura 1994; Yoo 2000). There are very few books (and hardly any journal articles) about their contemporary ethnic experiences,4 although some of the historical studies do have brief overviews of their current status. Although Asian American Studies initially focused on the experiences of Japanese and Chinese Americans5 when it first emerged from the Asian American movement in the 1960s, the field seems to be currently dominated by studies of Americans of Chinese, Korean, and Southeast Asian descent.
Undoubtedly, Japanese Americans constitute an increasingly smaller proportion of the total Asian American population because of the lack of large-scale Japanese immigration to the United States since 1965. According to the United States Census, the population of monoracial Japanese descendants peaked in 1990 at 847,562 and has been gradually declining since then and was at 759,056 in 2014. Nonetheless, the neglect of Japanese Americans by scholars studying contemporary Asian American populations is quite puzzling, especially since Japanese Americans still remain among the largest groups of Asian Americans. When multiracial Japanese Americans are considered, the population of Japanese descendants in the United States was 1,374,825 in 2014, which was only 449,517 less than the Korean-descent population. Perhaps contemporary Japanese Americans are no longer being studied because they are an older Asian American group that is largely assimilated and well-to-do and does not face as much discrimination and marginalization as in the past. In addition, they are not as affected by current immigration nor are they as transnationally active or diasporic when compared to newer groups of Asian Americans. This does not mean, however, that their ethnic experiences have ceased to be interesting.

Generations: Immigration and History

Because peoples of Japanese descent have been in the United States since the end of the nineteenth century, they have become a diverse ethnic minority group, not only in terms of geographical residence, but also in terms of generation. Because most Japanese Americans are descendants of Japanese immigrants who arrived in the United States before 1924, they are primarily of the third and fourth generations (sansei and yonsei) with a declining population of elderly second-generation nisei and a growing, but still limited number of young shin-nisei whose Japanese parents immigrated after 1965. In contrast, other Asian descent communities are predominantly of the first and second generations, with a majority consisting of foreign-born immigrants (Min 2006b:42–43). Therefore, the ethnic experiences of Japanese Americans and their relationship to their cultural heritage and homeland are perhaps more varied than they are among some of the newer Asian American groups.
When scholars analyze the internal diversity of an ethnic minority group, they may examine social class, gender, or age differences. I have chosen generation as my unit of analysis because I found generational differences in ethnic heritage to be the most pronounced. Not only do Japanese Americans often think of themselves in terms of specific generations; I was also repeatedly struck by the clear differences among the generations in terms of ethnic identity, historical experiences, levels of assimilation, experiences of racialization and discrimination, transnational connections and identifications with Japan, and of course, relative strength of their ancestral cultural heritage. In this sense, my work follows previous scholarship on Japanese Americans, which has often analyzed them in terms of generation (Kitano 1993; Matsumoto 2014; Montero 1980; Nakano Glenn 1986; Spickard 1996; Takahashi 1982; Takezawa 1995; Tamura 1994; Yanagisako 1985; Yoo 2000).

Social class is generally not a salient variable within the Japanese American community today, which has become well-educated, socioeconomically mobile, and predominantly middle class. However, it is important in general for the ability of ethnic minorities to remain in touch with their ethnic heritage. As will be noted below (and discussed further in Chapters 2 and 5), socially integrated, middle-class minorities like Japanese Americans are encouraged by tolerant, multicultural ideologies to explore their positively regarded ethnic heritage and homeland. They also have the socioeconomic means to do so.

Although women are often regarded as embodying and reproducing cultural traditions, I did not detect any notable gendered differences between men and women in terms of attachment to ethnic heritage when I compared my coded ethnographic interview data from these two groups. Therefore, gender does not factor into my analysis as a significant variable, although I do note its importance when appropriate, such as in the gendered nature of racialization processes (Chapter 4) and the performance of ethnic heritage (Chapters 6 and 7).

Although the concept of generation may seem rather self-evident, it can actually be defined from both an immigration and historical perspective. For ethnic groups that are the product of immigration, generation is measured by distance from the country of ancestral origin based on genealogical birth order (Foner 2009:3; Kasinitz et al. 2008:400). The original immigrants, who are closest to their country of origin, are
the first immigrant generation, and their children who are born in the host country and are farther removed from the country of origin are the second generation. The second generation's children are then the third generation, and so on.

Research on different generations of Japanese Americans follows this immigration-based understanding of generation, employing Japanese generational terminology of *issei* (first generation), *nisei* (second generation), *sansei* (third generation), *yonsei* (fourth generation), and *gosei* (fifth generation). These terms referring to immigrant generation are also frequently used by Japanese Americans to identify and classify themselves (“I’m nisei,” “She’s sansei,” “Those children are yonsei,” and so on).

However, according to Karl Mannheim’s seminal work on the subject (1952: ch. 7), generations are not based solely on biology or genealogy, but are also age cohorts defined by common historical location. Therefore, generation can also refer to a specific age group that is a product of a certain historical period. Such “historical generations” were born and grew up around the same time and have similar historical experiences. Examples of generations that are historical age cohorts are the Greatest Generation, the Baby-Boomer Generation, Generation X, and the Millennial Generation.

In contrast to other Asian Americans, most Japanese Americans are descendants of immigrants who arrived in the United States during a limited historical period of about four decades, starting in the mid-1880s, when immigration of Japanese to Hawaii began, and ending in 1924, when the United States banned further Asian immigration. This means that the different immigrant generations of Japanese Americans correspond with distinctive historical cohorts (that is, historical generations) (Nakano Glenn 1986:8; O’Brien and Fugita 1991:14–15, Spickard 1996:68). As a result, the nisei of the second immigrant generation were born between 1915 and the 1940s (Spickard 1996:68) and correspond with either the Greatest Generation who fought in World War II or what is called the “Silent Generation” (born between 1925 to 1942). Most elderly nisei who are alive today are of this latter historical generation. The sansei of the third immigrant generation were generally born in the first few decades after World War II and are of the Baby-Boomer historical generation. The yonsei of the fourth immigrant generation,
born roughly between the 1970s and 1990s, are members of Generation X or of the Millennial Generation, which are the two historical generations that follow the Baby-Boomers.

Therefore, generation positions Japanese Americans not just in terms of immigration, but also in terms of history, since each immigrant generation is also a distinctive historical cohort that came of age during a specific period and experienced similar formative events. The second-generation nisei are not simply Japanese Americans whose parents are immigrants from Japan but a historical cohort of elderly who grew up during the World War II period and were incarcerated in internment camps. Third-generation sansei are not simply the grandchildren of immigrants; they came of age in the historical period after World War II when discrimination against Japanese Americans was declining and images of Japan were improving, but assimilationist ideologies were still prevalent and ethnic pluralism and multiculturalism had not yet fully taken hold. Likewise, the fourth-generation yonsei are the great-grandchildren of immigrants, but also youth who were raised in the contemporary ethnic diversity of an America that has fully embraced multiculturalism. Therefore, the concept of generation becomes an effective means of incorporating both immigration and history into the analysis of contemporary Japanese American ethnicity. In addition, because these three generations are still alive (the earlier historical cohort of nisei who were born well before World War II have now passed away), a contemporary ethnic analysis of different generations in the context of their historical experiences allows us to trace the development of Japanese Americans over time, in a kind of archeology of their ethnicity.

Most studies of immigrant-origin ethnic minorities in the United States do not go beyond the second immigrant generation (Espiritu 2003; Hurh 1998; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway 2008; Kibria 2002a; Levitt and Waters 2002; Smith 2006), mainly because these groups are primarily the result of post-1965 immigration and do not yet have substantial numbers of third-generation individuals. Therefore, Japanese Americans provide us with a unique opportunity to trace how an ethnic minority group was historically constituted over the longue durée.

Furthermore, even the members of one immigrant generation need to be properly historicized, especially if their immigrant ancestors arrived
in the host country during different historical periods and faced different host country receptions (Berg 2011; Eckstein and Barberia 2002). As mentioned earlier, although most Japanese Americans are descendants of Japanese immigrants who arrived before World War II, there has been some postwar Japanese immigration to the United States. This means there are currently two separate historical generations of the second immigrant generation. They are the prewar nisei (whose immigrant parents arrived before 1924) and the “new” postwar shin-nisei, whose Japanese parents arrived primarily after 1965.

Although the shin-nisei are of the same second immigrant generation as the prewar nisei, many of them are actually of the same historical generation as the fourth-generation yonsei and grew up in the contemporary era of increasing multiculturalism, ethnic diversity, and globalization. As will be discussed in Part I of this book, their bicultural and transnational experiences and identities are quite different from the nationalist and assimilationist orientations of the prewar nisei, who were imprisoned in internment camps during World War II because of their Japanese ancestry and had to demonstrate their loyalties as Americans.

Therefore, as indicated by the ethnographic vignettes at the beginning of this chapter, U.S.-born Japanese Americans actually consist of four, instead of three distinct generations: the prewar nisei, the postwar shin-nisei, the sansei, and the yonsei, all of whom belong to both immigrant and historical generations. However, because of the dearth of contemporary research on Japanese Americans, there are almost no studies of the yonsei or the shin-nisei. This book attempts to address this gap in the literature not only by historicizing contemporary Japanese American ethnicity, but also by bringing the story of their ethnic group up to date by closely examining the two most recent generations.

Because each generation of Japanese Americans corresponds with a specific historical age cohort, this also means that generation becomes a proxy for age differences as well, since those of the same generation are roughly of the same age group. Therefore, elderly Japanese Americans are predominantly prewar nisei (although some sansei are now elderly), middle-aged Japanese Americans are generally sansei, and young Japanese Americans are either yonsei or postwar shin-nisei.

In addition, the fact that the generations are also age cohorts means that most Japanese Americans (who have not intermarried) have mar-
ried co-ethnics of the same generation of about the same age, in a type of generational ethnic endogamy. Few prewar nisei have married sansei, for instance, who are usually much younger. This means that there are relatively few Japanese Americans of mixed generations (that is, 2.5 or 3.5 generation). For instance, only 9 percent of my interview sample consisted of individuals who are in between two generations and thus share some characteristics of both. Although it is conceivable for postwar shin-nisei to marry yonsei, since they are roughly around the same age, none of my interviewees had parents who were shin-nisei and yonsei. This type of generational ethnic endogamy in turn makes differences between the generations even more pronounced and significant among Japanese Americans.

As a result, the concept of generation has tremendous analytical power in the case of the Japanese Americans and other immigrant-descent groups whose ancestors immigrated during a limited historical period. To do a generational analysis of Japanese Americans therefore involves assessing their social distance or proximity to the original immigrants, while also encompassing varying historical experiences, age differences, and even marital status. This apparent alignment of immigration, history, and age is what has produced remarkable similarities among Japanese Americans of a specific generation and significant and consistent differences across the generations.

Because of the importance of generation to Japanese Americans, it is no surprise that the relative strength of ethnic heritage also varies considerably according to generation. In other words, each generation has responded to a confluence of varying historical and contemporary factors, leading to different experiences of ancestral heritage and relations with the ethnic homeland. Since this is the central focus of this book, we need to unpack what we mean by “ethnic heritage” and “ethnic homeland.”

Ethnic Heritage and Homeland

Heritage is a concept that is used mainly in the museum studies and cultural tourism literature (Chhabra, Healy, and Sills 2003; Dicks 2000; McIntosh and Prentice 1999; Smith 2006; Waitt 2000; Waterton and Watson 2011). Although some of this research is about attempts by states, museums, and local communities to preserve the cultural heritage of
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ethnic minorities, the concept has not been employed explicitly and extensively in the field of racial and ethnic studies. I am not aware of any research that has systematically analyzed immigrant-descent ethnic minorities in the United States from the standpoint of their ancestral heritage in the context of homeland.

In order to clarify my use of ethnic heritage, I must first address the multiple meanings and positionalities of “homeland.” “Homeland” can be defined as a place of origin to which an individual feels personally and emotionally attached (Tsuda 2009c:5–6). However, immigrant-descent ethnic minorities such as Japanese Americans often have multiple homelands. The ethnic (or ancestral) homeland refers to the country from which such minorities originated (that is, where their immigrant ancestors are from). In contrast, the natal homeland is simply the “host country” where they were born.

For immigrant-descent minority groups, ethnic heritage consists of their traditional culture, which originates in and is derived from their ethnic/ancestral homeland. This ancestral cultural heritage can of course include language, food, artistic and musical forms, festivals and ceremonies, belief and symbolic systems, and other types of popular and traditional culture. Although almost all immigrant-descent minorities trace their ethnic heritage to their country of ancestral origin, this does not mean it has been inherited unaltered from the ethnic homeland. Instead, ancestral cultural forms, languages, and traditions are constantly remade, modified, and even reinvented as they are practiced and appropriated by local ethnic communities, families, and individuals. Nonetheless, they continue to be an integral part of the experience of ethnic roots and ancestry. In contrast, cultural forms that are adopted from the natal homeland by ethnic minorities are usually understood to be part of the assimilative process and not part of their ethnic heritage per se.

Therefore, for minorities such as the Japanese Americans who have generally become culturally assimilated over the generations, ancestral heritage is what technically makes them “ethnic”—that is, positioned as culturally distinctive from the majority population. Moreover, this distinctiveness is an integral part of the experience and practice of ethnic identity for any minority group.

Ethnic heritage can be a product of two different types of social processes. Cultural traditions, practices, and languages that the original im-
migrants brought from the ethnic homeland to the host country can be passed down to subsequent generations of descendants through ethnic communities, institutions, and families. In addition to this type of transmitted or inherited ethnic heritage, minority individuals, especially those from the later generations, can also make active efforts to retain or reconnect directly with their ancestral culture by establishing transnational relations with the ethnic homeland. Such maintenance and revival of heritage cultures through transnational homeland connections are becoming more prevalent in an increasingly globalized world characterized by cross-border flows of peoples, commodities, mass media, information, and cultures.

As a result, ancestral ethnic heritage not only is a local phenomenon, but also has a significant transnational dimension. This is especially true because the ancestral culture of the ethnic homeland is often positioned as more “authentic” than the apparently derivative heritage culture that is found and practiced in the local ethnic community, as will be discussed in Part III of this book. As a result, ethnic minorities often turn to the ethnic homeland for their ancestral culture instead of simply relying on local ethnic community activities. The construction of cultural heritage can often involve what I call ethnic return migration, which refers to minority individuals who migrate to their countries of ancestral origin after living outside their ethnic homelands for generations (Tsuda 2009a). Although much ethnic return migration among Japanese Americans consists of tourism, some have stayed and even lived in Japan for more extended periods, and some have a long-term, transnational engagement with the country.

Most ethnic return migration is from poorer, developing countries to richer ethnic homelands in the developed world. Because these migrants are often ethnically marginalized as cultural foreigners in their countries of ancestral origin, experience prejudice and discrimination, and are forced to work in low-status, unskilled (and even despised) jobs, they can have quite negative and alienating experiences (Fox 2007; Tsuda 2003, 2009a). However, ethnic return migrants from developed countries such as the United States generally have much more positive experiences in their ancestral homelands. Not only are their countries of birth more respected by the co-ethnic host population; they tend to work in high-status, professional jobs or are students (Tsuda 2009b,
As a result, it is more likely that ethnic return migrants like Japanese Americans will have greater interest in exploring their ethnic roots and ancestry and develop an affinity for their heritage culture and a facility with the language during their sojourns in Japan. This book will thus also examine the ethnic return migration experiences of Japanese Americans in Japan. The impact that their sojourns in Japan have on their sense of ethnic heritage again varies considerably according to generation. However, the literature on ethnic return migrants has generally ignored the importance of generational distance from the ancestral homeland (Capo Zmegac, Vob, and Roth 2010; Fox 2007; Münz and Ohliger 2003; Silbereisen, Titzmann, and Shavit 2014; Tsuda 2003, 2009a; King and Christou 2010). Despite the importance of generation for all Japanese Americans, the two major studies about their experiences living in Japan surprisingly do not analyze the clear generational differences among prewar nisei, shin-nisei, sansei, and yonsei (Takamori 2011; Yamashiro 2008).

In addition to experiences in the ethnic homeland, a multitude of other cultural, racial, and historical factors account for the relative strength of ancestral ethnic heritage among different generations of Japanese Americans, as is true with other minority groups. Hence, we must outline the relevant variables that constitute Japanese American ethnicity and identity.

Nonlinear Ethnicities and the Production of Heritage

Historical events and the ethnic climate during certain time periods have also influenced the extent to which minorities emphasize their ethnic ancestry and identities. This book argues that it is not the historical experiences that individuals have as adults, but those they had during their formative years as youth that have the greatest and most lasting impact on their ethnic consciousness throughout their lives. My interviews indicate that the internment of the prewar nisei when they were young during World War II and the discrimination and prejudice they continued to suffer immediately after the war were certainly the primary historical factors that discouraged them from maintaining their ethnic heritage and language. In contrast, the much greater ethnic tolerance and the celebration of cultural diversity today along with positive images
of Japan and Japanese culture have encouraged shin-nisei and yonsei youth to retain and recover their heritage cultures.

In addition to history, the other important factors that have influenced the relative salience of ethnic heritage among Japanese Americans are assimilation and transnationalism as well as racialization and multiculturalism.

Assimilation and Ethnic Heritage

It may strike some readers as peculiar that ethnic heritage is the central theme of this book, since most Japanese Americans have been in the United States for many generations and their assimilation to mainstream American society is quite advanced. Studies that have examined them over the generations note their progressive social and cultural incorporation into mainstream American society (Kitano 1993; Montero 1980; Spickard 1996; Takahashi 1997; Tuan 2001: chs. 3, 5). Because Japanese Americans have been in the United States longer than other Asian American groups, they have generally shown higher rates of socioeconomic mobility and cultural assimilation (Akiba 2006:164–165; Jiobu 1988; Spickard 1996:143). Japanese Americans currently have higher educational levels on average than Caucasians, and a majority of them have become successful middle-class white-collar workers, professionals, or business owners who live in white suburban communities (Akiba 2006:163, 165). The integration of Japanese Americans into mainstream society has caused many of them to become disengaged from their ethnic communities and to interact mainly with whites in their daily lives (Fugita and O’Brien 1991:11; Spickard 1996:159). Because of the dismantling of Japanese American ethnic enclaves during World War II and the subsequent scattering of Japanese Americans across the country and then into the suburbs through upward mobility, the “Japan-towns” of the past have largely disappeared, and Japanese American ethnic organizations are suffering from declining membership and participation, especially among youth (see Chapter 5).

The cultural assimilation of Japanese Americans is also quite advanced. With the exception of the shin-nisei, most of them cannot speak Japanese nor have they retained any notable Japanese cultural customs or ties to their ancestral homeland (Spickard 1996:145–147, 159;
Tuan 2001:106). Since they lead daily lives that are not that different from those of white Americans, a number of them refer to themselves as “whitewashed” because of their loss of Japanese cultural heritage over the generations (Pyke and Dang 2003). As in the case of white ethnics, the only aspects of their everyday lives that remain ethnically distinct are cultural activities known as “symbolic ethnicity” (Gans 1979), such as eating Japanese food, collecting Japanese artwork, listening to Japanese music, or participating in ethnic activities and festivals in local communities (Okamura 2008:140–144; Tuan 2001: ch. 3). For Japanese Americans, the process of cultural assimilation appears to be accompanied by an apparent decline in ethnic identification over generations (Masuda, Matsumoto, and Meredith 1970; Newton et al. 1988).

However, the progressive cultural and social assimilation of Japanese Americans does not always mean that ethnic heritage no longer has any significance for them. In order to understand the continued relevance of ethnicity to their assimilated lives, this book resists the temptation to regard assimilation and ethnic heritage as irreconcilable opposites that are in constant tension. In fact, such assumptions have been implicitly embedded in the scholarly history of ethnicity. The assimilation perspective, which thrived into the 1960s and continues to have more recent proponents (Alba and Nee 1997), was initially countered by scholars who emphasized the persistence and continuation of ethnic cultures and differences, often under the banner of cultural or ethnic pluralism (Gans 1997; Kazal 1995; Omi and Winant 1986: ch. 1). Indeed, previous research about Japanese Americans has also considered how their ethnicity and communities have managed to persist and endure through the generations despite the inexorable forces of assimilation (Connor 1974; Fugita and O’Brien 1991; Hieshima and Schneider 1994; Kendis 1989; Kurashige 2002; Masuda, Matsumoto, and Meredith 1970:205–206; Matsuo 1992; O’Brien and Fugita 1991; Spickard 1996:151; Wooden, Leon, and Toshima 1988; Woodrum 1981).

The oft-cited segmented assimilation literature is also based on similar assumptions about the dichotomy between assimilation and ethnic heritage. This perspective posits three options for the children of immigrants: upward assimilation to the middle class, downward assimilation to the underclass, or (more preferably) selective acculturation, which enables them to retain their parent’s culture and language to a certain
extent because they are raised in cohesive ethnic communities and families that partly insulate them from the pressures of assimilation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Therefore, even when the second generation does not fully assimilate, they are able to retain their ethnic heritage only because they have the means to hold off the assimilation process.

Because assimilation and ethnic difference are often positioned in an oppositional manner, the increased assimilation of immigrants and their descendants is naturally assumed to lead to a progressive weakening of distinct ethnic heritage cultures and identities over the generations. Even the ethnic persistence/retention perspective regards assimilation and ethnic heritage as antithetical and assumes that ethnicity wanes over time due to the corrosive effects of assimilation. The only real difference from the assimilation perspective is that instead of claiming that ancestral cultures eventually disappear, it simply argues that the remnants of ethnicity continue to be relevant among later-generation immigrant descendants, albeit reduced to symbolic practices and identifications. This perspective also assumes that ethnic heritage is always the product of the native culture brought to the host country by the original immigrants, which is then passed down to subsequent generations in attenuated form because of eventual assimilation.

This book explicitly avoids such linear ethnic narratives and histories, where assimilation always erodes ancestral heritage and identity over the generations. Although ethnic heritage did weaken among prewar nisei and continues to do so for their even more assimilated sansei descendants, it has actually become stronger and more salient among the most recent generations of Japanese Americans, namely the shin-nisei and the fourth-generation yonsei. Japanese American history has followed a clearly *nonlinear* ethnic trajectory.

Tomás Jiménez (2010), in his path-breaking book on later-generation Mexican Americans, has suggested a more innovative way to think about assimilation and ethnicity among later generation, immigrant-descent minorities. This perspective, which can be called “ethnic replenishment theory,” argues that large-scale Mexican immigration to the United States in recent decades has allowed later-generation Mexican Americans to “replenish” their ethnicity. While this is a definite improvement over the ethnic persistence/retention perspective, it is still based on an understanding of assimilation and ethnic heritage as irreconcilable. Be-
cause later-generation ethnic minorities have lost their ethnic heritage due to assimilation, they must rely on a continuing infusion of new, still-unassimilated immigrants from the ancestral homeland to sustain their ethnicity. In addition, it again assumes that the ethnicity of later-generation minorities is always inherited from immigrants. Instead of arguing that their heritage cultures have been passed down from immigrant ancestors, it simply claims that they are acquired from current immigrants. In addition, this theory generally does not apply to ethnic minorities like Japanese Americans who have not experienced large-scale immigration from Japan since 1965.

Instead of regarding assimilation and ethnic heritage in mutually exclusive ways, I suggest we explore how they can also simultaneously coexist, as well as how the former can actually produce the latter. This is not to deny that they often pull minority individuals in opposite directions, as seen in the case of prewar nisei and sansei, whose progressive Americanization seems to have occurred at the expense of their ancestral culture, language, and identities. However, the postwar shin-nisei and yonsei are examples of how assimilation is not incompatible with the continued salience of heritage cultures. The shin-nisei have become quite culturally assimilated and are fully incorporated into mainstream American society but have *simultaneously* maintained their heritage culture and language through their immigrant parents and Japanese expatriate communities, thus becoming fully bilingual and bicultural. In the case of the fourth-generation yonsei, they have actively reclaimed their ancestral culture and language because of what they consider to be their overassimilation to American society and serious concerns about their loss of ethnic heritage in a multicultural America. For later-generation ethnic minorities, the assimilative condition can actually become the catalyst for the active production and revival of ethnic heritage. Assimilation therefore becomes *constitutive* of ethnic difference.

The maintenance of Japanese heritage among the shin-nisei is indeed a product of ethnic persistence, since the original homeland culture brought to the United States by their Japanese immigrant parents has been successfully passed down to the second generation. Their ethnicity is directly inherited from the previous immigrant generation. However, the situation for the yonsei is quite different and cannot be explained by simple ethnic retention or continuity since they have actively reclaimed
an ancestral culture that was mostly lost among previous generations of Japanese Americans. Therefore, we cannot assume that ethnic heritage is always the product of ancestral immigrants whose homeland culture has been transmitted to subsequent generations. Instead of simply inheriting their ethnicity from previous (or current) immigrants, yonsei Japanese Americans have actively recovered and revived it by reconnecting with Japan and remaking traditional Japanese culture in the United States. Again, ethnic histories can follow distinctly nonlinear trajectories.

Transnationalism and Ethnic Heritage

As noted earlier, the maintenance and production of ethnic heritage is also based on transnational movement and mobility, which allow ethnic minorities to develop cross-border connections with their ancestral homeland. In contrast to the apparently corrosive effects of assimilation, transnationalism is usually regarded as enabling immigrants and their descendants to maintain homeland cultures. In an era of globalization, an increasing number of ethnic minority individuals are “returning” to their ancestral homelands to visit and even to reside there for longer periods, allowing them to explore their ethnic roots and ancestry.

However, even if minority individuals do not travel to their ethnic homelands (or do so only briefly), they can still connect transnationally with their cultural heritage through what I call *non-contiguous globalization*, which refers to the flow of information and images across national boundaries such that the globalizing agent influences local societies over a geographical distance without being physically present (Tsuda 2003:356–358; Tsuda, Tapias, and Escandell 2014:127–129). Through digital media such as the Internet, as well as mass media, satellite TV, and other forms of telecommunication, later-generation ethnic minorities can remain transnationally linked to their homeland cultures and even recover their lost ethnic heritage without ever traveling to their country of ancestral origin. This is especially true for immigrant-descent minorities like Japanese Americans who live a considerable geographical distance from their ethnic homeland and therefore have mainly an emotionally transnational connection to it (Takeda 2012).

The transnationalism literature in immigration studies was also initially developed in opposition to assimilation theory. Researchers in-
terested in transnational processes have often offered their perspective as an alternative to the traditional immigrant assimilation paradigm, claiming that immigrants and their descendants do not simply assimilate to the host society and sever their transborder ties to the homeland, but that instead they continue to maintain them over time (Eckstein and Barberia 2002:799–800; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007:130; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999:227–229; see Tsuda 2012c:633–634 for further discussion).

However, it is quite apparent that assimilation does not preclude the development of active transnational social relations with the ethnic homeland. In fact, there has been a growing number of studies that document how the assimilation of immigrants in the host country and their transborder engagement with the country of origin are not incompatible (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2008; Levitt 2001; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2008; Smith 2006; Tsuda 2012c).

Nonetheless, there seems to be an inherent assumption in the literature that transnationalism, and the ethnic heritage that is partly constituted by it, gradually wanes over time among the descendants of immigrants, which makes it similar to the ethnic persistence/retention perspective. This assumption is reflected in debates about whether transnational ties to the parental homeland persist among second-generation children (Levitt and Waters 2002). Some argue that transnationalism naturally declines and becomes quite limited among assimilated members of the second generation (Kasinitz et al. 2002; Menjívar 2002; Portes and Rumbaut 2001: ch. 6; Rumbaut 2002), while others claim that it remains significant (Levitt 2002; Smith 2006).

In this manner, transnational connections to ethnic homelands are again understood to be inherited from immigrant parents or grandparents (Levitt and Waters 2002; Smith 2006) and then to progressively attenuate among members of each subsequent generation due to assimilation, likely disappearing by the third generation. Even those who suggest that transnationalism may persist into the third generation attribute it to the influence of immigrant grandparents, who may take their grandchildren to their country of origin for visits (Smith 2006:196–202). In addition to the assumption of ethnic linearity, we again have the notion that cultural heritage based on transnationalism is always dependent on the cross-border ties of immigrant ancestors.
As is the case with assimilation and ethnic heritage, such simple, linear transnational histories are challenged by an analysis of Japanese Americans across the generations. Transnational connections to the ethnic homeland of Japan did indeed attenuate among the prewar nisei and further weakened among third-generation sansei. However, the latest generations of Japanese Americans, the shin-nisei and the yonsei, have actively maintained or reactivated cross-border ties with Japan despite their assimilation, which has thus been instrumental to their ethnic heritage experiences.

Therefore, progressive assimilation does not prevent the active development of transnational relations with the ethnic homeland. Instead, assimilation and transnationalism can coexist simultaneously. In fact, in the case of the yonsei, it is precisely their overassimilation that has caused them to reach out transnationally to their ancestral homeland in an effort to reconnect with their ethnic roots and cultural heritage. Not only can assimilation and transnationalism occur together, but assimilation can actually increase transborder activity.

Finally, like ethnic heritage, transnational ties to the ancestral homeland among ethnic minorities are not based simply on the persistence of cross-border relations that the original immigrants developed with their country of origin. Although such inherited transnationalism can remain important to the second generation and its ability to maintain their parents’ heritage culture (as shown by the shin-nisei), it does indeed decline as a minority group ages. However, as is the case with fourth-generation yonsei, transnational ties to the ethnic homeland can also be reactivated and recreated for various reasons long after they have been lost by previous generations. Such forged transnationalism and its impact on ethnic heritage must also be analyzed.

**Racialization and Multiculturalism**

The relative strength of ethnic heritage for immigrant-descent ethnic minorities is not based simply on the dynamics of assimilation and transnationalism. Although Japanese American ethnicity is partly the result of the assimilative patterns or the transnational opportunities they have inherited from the previous generations, each new generation has also negotiated its own ethnic positionality in response to the pressures
of racialization and multiculturalism. Therefore, we must also take these additional factors into account in order to understand why ethnic ancestry is of paramount importance for certain generations of Japanese Americans while it has lost much of its significance for members of other generations. Again, the complex social dynamics that constitute the ethnicity of each generation of Japanese Americans ensure that their ethnic history does not unfold in a predictable manner, but remains inherently contingent and nonlinear.

Despite the cultural assimilation of Japanese Americans, they continue to be racialized as “Japanese” by mainstream Americans simply because of their physical appearance and last names, as shown in the opening ethnographic vignette about George Okamoto. Therefore, the experiences of later-generation racial minorities remains fundamentally different from that of white ethnics (such as those of southern and eastern European or even Jewish descent), who have disappeared into the majority white population to become ethnically unmarked “Americans.” Although assimilated third- and fourth-generation Japanese Americans have come to culturally resemble white Americans, they have never been able to escape their racialized ethnic minority status and are still not regarded as true Americans.

In fact, this type of racialized ethnicity continues to pervade the daily lives of all Japanese Americans, regardless of generation and level of assimilation. Therefore, any understanding of their ethnic heritage experiences must take such processes of racialization into account. However, despite its importance, few studies of Japanese Americans have analyzed their ethnicity explicitly from the perspective of race and racialization (Okamura 2014; Yoo 2000).

“Racialization” refers to the process through which specific cultural meanings are attached to perceived phenotypical differences. Such racial categories are embedded in and reinforce hierarchical systems of power relations, constituting what Michael Omi and Howard Winant (1986:61) call racial formations. Moreover, “racialization” is usually defined in the literature as involving the ascription of racial meanings to nonracial social relations, situations, or groups (Omi and Winant 1986:64; Bonacich, Alimahomed, and Wilson 2008:343; Silverstein 2005:364). In contrast, I argue that in complex, multietnic societies, there is indeed no previously nonracialized social group or relation, since racial identifications
and understandings permeate all social interactions regardless of gender, class, kinship, or generational status. All individuals and groups are judged by phenotypic appearance and the various racial meanings associated with it (as noted above, even whites are racialized as non-ethnic, mainstream Americans).

Therefore, racial categories and meanings are not simply historically created. Instead, preexisting racial categories are constantly contested and modified. Of course, this is not to deny that they are often naturalized either by reference to biological and hereditary processes or, more recently, by culturally essentialized understandings and stereotypes. Instead, the point is that the changing and contextual nature of racial categories is not always fully acknowledged in public discourse and is often subject to the historical amnesia of biological and cultural essentialization.16

While Omi and Winant (1986:71–72) certainly acknowledge that racialization processes are continuously subject to contestation and change, they focus on grassroots political struggles and social movements in relation to states, whose institutions structure and enforce a racially unequal order. Likewise, Lisa Lowe (1996:21–29) directly applies this perspective to the history of Asian Americans. In this book, however, I do not focus on the history of Japanese American political struggle, such as their crucial involvement in the Asian American movement of the 1960s and 1970s or their subsequent political efforts to obtain redress for their World War II incarceration. These were one-time events, despite their long-term impact, and their history has been well-documented. Instead, I am more interested in how racialization affects the contemporary lives and everyday interactions of Japanese Americans, how they respond to and contest their racialization, and how it impacts their ethnic heritage. It is also important to remember that racialization is not simply based on panethnic categories such as Asian, black, or Hispanic. Although Japanese Americans are racialized as generalized “Asians,” they are often categorized more specifically according to national origins as “Japanese.” This is what makes racialization processes so relevant to their particular ancestral heritage and identity.

Because racialization is structured by and reproduces racial inequalities and hierarchies, it is often seen as synonymous with racism and racist meanings (Murji and Solomos 2005) and associated with a host of
negative consequences, such as discrimination, exclusionary treatment, exploitation, and denial of citizenship rights (Bonacich 2008). Likewise, the literature on Asian Americans has emphasized how their racialization has led to social marginalization, racial stereotyping and scapegoating, experiences of prejudice and discrimination, and hate crimes (Kim 2008:14–19, 212–219; Tuan 2001:39–45, 79–86; Wu and Song 2000:xvi–xviii). This was definitely the case with the prewar nisei, who were incarcerated during World War II because they were racialized as “Japanese enemy aliens” and who continued to endure racism and discrimination after the war simply because of their ancestry. As a result, they emphasized their Americanness and cultural assimilation and distanced themselves from their ethnic heritage and identity.

While much racialization is negative and purely discriminatory, its effects are not necessarily detrimental. We must also acknowledge that racialization can be instrumental for constituting the ethnicity and identity of racial minorities, even among members of the later generations. In contrast to later-generation Italian or Irish Americans who are seen (that is, racialized) as part of majority white society and have mostly lost their ethnicity and communities, third- and fourth-generation Japanese Americans continue to maintain ethnic communities and identities, as well as a sense of ancestral heritage because they are forever racialized as ethnically different.

At the same time, Japanese Americans’ understanding of their ethnicity is conditioned not only by their racialization, but also by the shift from a previous assimilationist American ideology to one espousing multiculturalism and ethnic diversity. Although the prewar nisei came of age during an assimilationist era, the shin-nisei and the yonsei, who mainly grew up in the last few decades, have been very much affected by contemporary multicultural ideologies that encourage them to maintain their ethnic heritage and cultural differences. Multiculturalism is based on the notion that in a plural society such as the United States, different ethnic cultures can coexist and should be equally recognized and respected (Alba 1999:8; Glazer 1997:14; Turner 1993). In addition to being a general ideology, multiculturalism has actually been implemented through political and educational policies based on the right of minority groups to maintain and practice their different cultures and languages.
However, multiculturalism has also come under criticism for reifying, essentializing, and homogenizing cultures as well as promoting ethnic separatism, national disunity, and fragmentation. Others have noted that it overemphasizes cultural differences at the expense of class, gender, and race, which are the real basis for ethnic inequality and marginalization (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008:161; Glazer 1997:41–48; Joppke 2004:242–244; May and Sleeter 2010; Turner 1993:412). Nonetheless, ethnically diverse societies like the United States, which regard themselves as multicultural, continue to be positively perceived and are associated with ethnic tolerance, civil and minority rights, inclusivity, freedom, and equality. Even in public discourse, multiculturalism is seen more favorably than assimilation, which is often associated with the coercive eradication of minority cultures and differences.

However, very few scholars have examined the possibly coercive dimensions of multiculturalism particularly in relation to racialization, which in turn can have an impact on ethnic heritage. Like all ideologies, multiculturalism is embedded in systems of power that can produce ethnic essentialisms and exclusions, especially when they operate alongside racialization processes. In plural societies like the United States where multiculturalism is a pervasive ideology, the maintenance and practice of cultural differences for racial minorities ceases to be simply a voluntary and freely exercised right, but becomes somewhat obligatory and expected. I call this racialized multiculturalism.

Therefore, as will be discussed in Part II of this book, not only are Japanese Americans racialized as a “Japanese” ethnic minority, but in accordance with multicultural assumptions, they are also expected to be culturally different. In other words, they are often presumed to speak Japanese, know about Japan, practice traditional Japanese culture, and even think and act like Japanese from Japan. This expectation of multicultural difference is imposed even on third- and fourth-generation Japanese Americans simply because of their racial appearance, despite the fact that they are completely Americanized and generally have nothing to do with Japan or Japanese culture. Therefore, racial differences are assumed to correlate with different ethnic cultures and immigrant nationalities in a multicultural world. As a result, racialization can make multiculturalism somewhat compulsory, resulting in exclusionary ethnic practices where even later-generation Japanese Americans are seen...
as not real Americans, but are Orientalized as immigrant others who are forever tied to foreign cultures and ancestral homelands.

In general, Japanese Americans have responded to their multicultural racialization and ethnic exclusion in two divergent ways. Some have asserted what I call their racial citizenship by demanding that they be accepted as culturally assimilated Americans despite their racial differences, thereby claiming national belonging and rights. For others, racialized multiculturalism has provoked interest in either maintaining or recovering their ancestral culture. Generational differences are again quite clear in this regard. Whereas the postwar shin-nisei have maintained their parent’s native language, culture, and transnational ties to Japan in a racialized, multicultural world, the third-generation sansei and some fourth-generation yonsei have contested their racialization as “Japanese” by insisting on their national inclusion as Americans. Nonetheless, the yonsei have also responded to the pressures of racialized multiculturalism by actively exploring their lost ancestral cultural heritage and forging transnational connections to their ethnic homeland. Although some Japanese Americans have been able to successfully challenge and possibly reorder hierarchical racial formations and inequalities, others have reacted in ways that inadvertently reproduce and even reinforce racialized expectations and structures. Regardless, the combination of racialization and multiculturalism ensures that ethnic heritage and identities continue to be relevant to contemporary Japanese Americans.

Multiculturalism is in apparent conflict with another dominant contemporary ideology—namely, colorblindness, which claims that racial inequality and discrimination are no longer significant in a “post-racial” American society because minorities apparently no longer suffer from racism and lack of opportunity (Omi and Winant 2015:256–260; Bonilla-Silva 2013). By denying the continued significance of race, colorblind ideologies attempt to circumscribe race consciousness among ethnic minorities and discourage them from exploring and asserting their heritage cultures, in direct contrast to multiculturalism. This is manifested in anti-immigrant policies that prohibit the use of Spanish (and other languages) in the workplace, declare English to be America’s official language, and outlaw bilingual education, ethnic studies courses in high school, and other activities that apparently promote ethnic pride.
Whether multiculturalism or colorblindness is a more pervasive ideology in the United States remains open to debate. The relative strength of colorblind ideologies also very much depends on the ethnic minority group, since they are more relevant to some groups than others. Unlike other non-white racial minorities, Japanese Americans are not subject to colorblind ideologies because they tend to be socioeconomically successful and culturally assimilated and because their Japanese ethnic heritage and homeland evoke positive images and reactions. This situation contrasts with that of some poor and culturally unassimilated immigrant minorities, whose native cultures can provoke anti-immigrant backlashes under the guise of colorblind ideologies. Therefore, the social class status of racial minorities very much determines whether they benefit from an environment that valorizes ethnic difference or one that discourages and stigmatizes it.

Methodology and Fieldwork

I conducted fieldwork and participant observation with Japanese Americans for one and a half years in San Diego and Phoenix between 2006 and 2009. Fifty-five in-depth interviews were completed, which generally lasted from two to three hours and were recorded and transcribed. Initial contacts were made with the Japanese American Historical Society of San Diego (JAHSSD), the Nikkei Student Union (NSU) at the University of California at San Diego, and the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) in Phoenix, but through snowball sampling, I also interviewed many Japanese Americans who did not participate in these organizations. In addition, I conducted extensive participant observation by attending numerous organization meetings and community events, including those held at the Japanese American Buddhist Temple in San Diego. During my fieldwork, I was an active and participating member of JAHSSD, NSU, and JACL and also socialized with various Japanese Americans on many occasions.

My interview sample consists of roughly equal numbers of Japanese American men and women of all ages from the second to the fourth generation (the first generation was excluded). My interviewees are generally 100 percent Japanese descent with the exception of a limited number of biracial individuals (about 8 percent of my sample). In general, they are
well-educated professionals, business-owners, or college students and virtually all of them currently live in middle-class suburban communities. Over 60 percent of my interviewees are married, mainly to other Japanese Americans, and most intermarriages are with whites. Interview questions covered topics such as historical consciousness, family and cultural background and upbringing, ethnic identities and communities, and relations with other Americans and ethnic groups. I also asked about their experiences in Japan (for those who had visited or lived in the country) and their connections with and knowledge of Japanese descendants in other countries. Pseudonyms are used for all individuals described in this book.

Because most of my initial contacts were through Japanese American organizations, which consist mainly of middle-aged sansei and a diminishing number of elderly prewar nisei, I soon found myself interviewing many sansei and then being introduced to other potential sansei interviewees. As a result, I started to ask interviewees to introduce me to non-sansei and also actively searched for young shin-nisei at UC San Diego and for yonsei through the university’s Nikkei Student Union, where they are heavily represented. Therefore, I was able to effectively use snowball and purposive sampling to acquire more balanced generational samples, although the sansei still clearly outnumber interviewees of other generations. As noted earlier, only five out of my fifty-five interviewees were of mixed generation, which led to the issue of which generation they should be classified under. Instead of trying to determine whether a mixed-generation Japanese American resembled one generation more than another, I included them in the samples of both generations, highlighting the characteristics they shared with each generation.

When mixed-generation individuals are double-counted in this manner, my entire interview sample consists of seventeen prewar nisei, thirteen postwar shin-nisei, twenty-four sansei, and eleven yonsei. Because a number of my book chapters focus on only one of these four generations, this means that my sample sizes for these chapters are admittedly quite small, except for the sansei. However, a systematic study of purposive sampling found that “saturation” (the point at which no new information or themes are observed in the data) was reached with the first twelve interviewees (Guest, Bunce, and Johnson 2006). Although my sample of yonsei falls slightly below this threshold, I should note that all my extensive participant observations at NSU meetings and discussions were almost
exclusively with yonsei students. In addition, during the interview and qualitative data coding process, I was repeatedly struck by the remarkable similarities in experiences among members of one generation as well as stark and consistent generational differences. This suggests that even if I had conducted more in-depth interviews, they would simply have further reinforced the generational patterns I had already uncovered.

All interview data and fieldwork notes were coded using ATLAS.ti, which allowed me to directly compare the relative significance of specific themes (such as cultural heritage, assimilation, transnationalism, racialization, discrimination, and ethnic identity) according to gender and generational differences as well as place of residence (as noted earlier, there were no discernable class differences among my interviewees). Generational differences clearly outweighed all other social variables, including gender, as noted earlier. I was also somewhat surprised to find that residence in San Diego (with a relatively large population of Japanese and other Asian Americans) versus Phoenix (with a small Asian American population) did not have a significant impact on ethnic experiences, although Japanese Americans in Phoenix seemed to report slightly higher levels of ethnic discrimination and more cases of racialization. In addition, the fact that a number of my interviewees had moved to these cities relatively recently from various parts of the United States made cross-urban comparisons rather difficult.

Finally, I should note that my sample includes only a limited number of Japanese Americans living in a particular region of the United States (the American Southwest). As indicated in subsequent chapters, the generalizations I make refer specifically to Southwest Japanese Americans in my sample. I make no claims that my description and analysis pertain to all Japanese Americans, especially those living in the Midwest, on the East Coast, or in Hawaii, although I would suspect that some similar generational patterns would be found among them as well. Particular care must be taken to differentiate Japanese Americans living in the mainland United States from those in Hawaii. Hawaii Japanese Americans have a longer and different immigration history, have been a larger and much more dominant part of the local population, and have lived in a state characterized by different ethnic relations than the rest of the United States (Okamura 2008, 2014). In addition, they were not incarcerated during World War II.
Is “Native Anthropology” Really Possible?

As a Japanese American anthropologist, my research for this book has been a sort of ethnographic homecoming, a career trajectory that other anthropologists have also taken (Behar 1996; Motzafi-Haller 1997; Rosaldo 1989). I should also note that this project arose not out of personal interest in my own ethnic group, but because of my previous research. I began my anthropological career as a Japan specialist and conducted fieldwork among Japanese Brazilians who have “return migrated” from Brazil to Japan as unskilled immigrants who work in Japanese factories (Tsuda 2003).

During this research, I became interested in a future project comparing Japanese Brazilians in Brazil with Japanese Americans in the United States as part of the “diaspora” of Japanese descendants scattered throughout the Americas. It was a natural extension of my previous research and a great opportunity to study two ethnic minorities of the same ancestral origin who have been living for many generations in countries with different race relations and histories. As a result, I expected some similarities in their contemporary ethnic minority status, but also stark differences.

Initially, I did not think that fieldwork as a “native anthropologist” studying my own ethnic group in my own country would be that interesting. For me, Japanese Brazilians had been an exotic other from a foreign, Latin American country. In contrast, not only are Japanese Americans familiar to me, but they are well-educated middle-class Americans, no longer suffer from serious discrimination, and generally do not migrate. As a result, they seemed rather ordinary, if not somewhat dull. I kept telling myself that only the comparative dimension of this project would be interesting.

However, as I began my fieldwork, I was immediately drawn to, and eventually fascinated by, the experiences of Japanese Americans, who were not at all as familiar or ordinary as I initially expected. Although I had been acquainted with Japanese Americans my entire life, they somehow remained an anthropological “other” for me. In fact, I eventually found them to be so interesting that I decided they should be analyzed in their own right. I quickly decided to first write an independent book about them, before I eventually moved on to my comparative magnum opus about the “Japanese diaspora.”
In contrast to previous images of white (usually male) anthropologists studying the “natives” (usually darker peoples) in faraway lands, the apparent rise of “native anthropologists” has been a topic of considerable discussion in the last few decades. It has been repeatedly mentioned that in contrast to “non-native” anthropologists, native anthropologists’ cultural and linguistic familiarity with the people we are studying provides us with superior access, rapport, and empathy and ultimately leads to more emic, sensitive, and authentic ethnographic portrayals that are less subject to Westernized, colonizing, and objectifying perspectives (Anae 2010:230–232; Hayano 1979:101–102; Kanuha 2000:441–443; Ohnuki-Tierney 1984; see also Aguilar 1981 and Narayan 1993:676–677 for summaries of such claims). Because native anthropologists are members of the groups they study, their ethnographies are also described as more politically engaged and activist-oriented, thus uncovering social inequities, as well as systems of power and domination (Abu-Lughod 1991:142–143; Anae 2010:227–228; Hayano 1979:101–102; Motzafi-Haller 1997:215–217). Nonetheless, native anthropologists may take certain observations for granted as insiders and apparently have more difficulty maintaining “objective” detachment from the peoples they study (Hayano 1979:101–102; Kanuha 2000:441–443; Ohnuki-Tierney 1984).

I suggest that we question this simple dichotomy of native versus non-native anthropologist. Even insider anthropologists will still encounter educational, social class, gender, generational, urban/rural, or cultural differences with the peoples they study because all social groups (even the most homogeneous) are fragmented by internal differences (Aguilar 1981:25; Kuwayama 2003:9; Motzafi-Haller 1997:217–219; Narayan 1993:671, 675; Nelson 1996). As a result, there are plenty of examples of native anthropologists who are seen as outsiders and have difficulty being accepted by their own communities or who conversely become embroiled in internal conflicts (Aguilar 1981:21; Hayano 1979:100; Jacobs-Huey 2002:796–797; Tsuda 2003:32–33).

Therefore, even for those of us who study our own ethnic group, the distance between the anthropologist and the “natives” remains. Just like non-native anthropologists, we must constantly negotiate our positionality in the field as we move along a scale of relative distance from those we study, in terms of what Linda Williamson Nelson (1996) refers to as “gradations of endogeny.” All anthropologists are both partial outsiders
and partial insiders and experience various degrees of acceptance and cultural insight.

The distinction between native and non-native anthropologists is therefore not absolute; rather, the two exist on a relative continuum, with the former simply more likely to be culturally and socially closer to their research participants. Indeed, regardless of what type of anthropologist one may be (native, non-native, semi-native), the distance and differences between researcher and researched always persist and can never be completely eliminated. Nonetheless, I argue that such cultural differences are not detrimental, but productive for fieldwork. Ultimately, difference is essential to the generation of anthropological knowledge.

The Importance of “Othering” in Fieldwork

As mentioned at the beginning of this introductory chapter, I am a shin-nisei. My father immigrated to the United States in the 1960s as a biochemistry graduate student at the University of Chicago. I grew up partly in the Japanese expatriate business community in Chicago where I attended Japanese Saturday school from fourth grade to the end of high school primarily with children from Japan, although there were a few U.S.-born shin-nisei like myself in my classes. Our parents also forced my brother and me to speak only Japanese at home and took us to Japan a number of times. As a result, like other shin-nisei, I became bilingual, bicultural, and transnational.

As was the case with Steve Okura, the shin-nisei in one of the opening vignettes, I never identified as “Japanese American” or “nisei” when I was growing up. Neither my parents nor my Japanese classmates in Saturday school ever referred to me in such a manner. Instead, I saw myself as a “Japanese” (nihonjin) who just happened to be born and raised in the United States. I have felt much more connected to Japan throughout my entire life than to the experiences and history of Japanese Americans in the United States. In fact, even to this day, other Americans often mistake me for a Japanese from Japan (perhaps 1.5 generation who immigrated to the United States as a child?). This is probably because my English continues to have a Japanese inflection, and I have a very distinctive Japanese first name (in contrast to most Japanese Americans who have American first names).
Growing up in Chicago, I always regarded Japanese Americans as people who were quite different from our family. They were completely Americanized, had lost their connections to Japan, had a different history that included internment during World War II, and lived on the other side of the city. In fact, my mother had strong prejudices against Japanese Americans, to whom my parents referred only as “nisei” (of course, my brother and I were also nisei, albeit of the postwar historical generation). My mother regarded the “nisei” as descendants of low-class, uneducated, and poor rural Japanese who could not survive economically in prewar Japan and had no choice but to abandon their homeland for America.

I still remember my first encounter with a “nisei.” It was when my parents took me to a Japanese food store located in the near north side of Chicago. My mother pointed to an elderly customer near us and told me, “That person is a nisei.” I looked at the man. Although he looked completely Japanese, he was dressed very casually, spoke English without an accent, and appeared very Americanized to me. I was literally gazing at the ethnic other. Even without talking to him, I could sense the cultural, historical, and age differences between us.

Although I did become acquainted with a number of Japanese Americans growing up, virtually all of them were other shin-nisei with similar bilingual and transnational Japanese backgrounds like myself. Of course, I did not think of them as “shin-nisei” or even “Japanese American” back then. Like me, they were American-born “Japanese.” In fact, it was probably not until graduate school that I started to actively refer to myself as “Japanese American” in the ethnically diverse environment at the University of California at Berkeley.

Given my personal background, when I first started my research on Japanese Americans, I felt like a cultural outsider. Although I was technically studying my own ethnic group, I was familiar with only the shin-nisei, a small subpopulation that was detached from the broader Japanese American community. Like Steve Okura and other shin-nisei, I had never felt like an “authentic” Japanese American. Therefore, the cultural differences I experienced with most Japanese Americans were based not necessarily on educational level, professional status, social class background, or even gender, but on generation.
My first Japanese American contact in San Diego was an elderly sansei woman who ended up becoming one of my best informants and a good friend. After we got acquainted, the first question she asked me was: “Are you from Japan?” Great, I thought. Even when I am speaking in English, Japanese Americans think I am “Japanese” and cannot tell that I am actually a fellow Japanese American!

As I began actively attending local Japanese American community events in San Diego, I initially felt like an intruder who did not belong, although I was always openly welcomed when I met people. I had never had any contact or interest in the broader Japanese American community while growing up and was completely unfamiliar with their cultural activities, although some of them certainly resembled festivities I had seen in Japan. Almost everyone I encountered was either a prewar nisei or a sansei, and they were quite different from the shin-nisei Japanese Americans whom I had known my entire life. In fact, none of the dozens of people I met through Japanese American community organizations were shin-nisei, as far as I could tell.

Because of my strong Japanese cultural background and lingering accent, I always felt that the people I met would wonder whether I was a real Japanese American. I was struck (actually a bit distraught) when I noticed that a few elderly Japanese American women actually bowed when I spoke with them! Since a Japanese American would never bow to another Japanese American, I assumed this indicated they thought that I was a Japanese foreigner from Japan. Bowing is of course a polite gesture, but for me, it meant “We don't think you are one of us.” Apparently, the cultural and generational differences were palpable on both sides. On those occasions when Japanese Americans seemed confused about my ethnicity, I would actually say, “I’m also a Japanese American.”

Of course, once I identified myself as Japanese American, no one contested my ethnic claim, especially when I told them I am actually shin-nisei. Once it became clear to them that I was born in the United States, I felt accepted as a fellow Japanese American, even if I had initially appeared to them to be a Japanese from Japan. Therefore, shared nationality became a critical factor that helped overcome the differences between us.
Yet, the generational differences were still there. Ayako Takamori (2010:103–106), a shin-nisei anthropologist who conducted fieldwork among Japanese Americans living in Japan, recounts how she once introduced herself to a Japanese American gathering in Japan as a “nisei.” She wanted to immediately identify herself as Japanese American in order to facilitate fieldwork. However, an elderly man abruptly grabbed the microphone and clarified that she is *shin*-nisei, not a (prewar) nisei and did not suffer through the same historical experiences.

As my fieldwork progressed, I became acquainted with many Japanese Americans and eventually became a familiar face in the local San Diego and Phoenix Japanese American communities. In fact, when I showed up at community events, a number of people would be familiar to me, and some would come up to greet me. It is evident that because I am technically Japanese American, I was able to blend into the ethnic community much more than a non-Japanese American. My ethnicity also probably made Japanese Americans more willing to meet for an interview and talk freely about their experiences. I was even asked to deliver a keynote speech at the annual meeting of the Japanese American Historical Society of San Diego about my research. There were hundreds of attentive Japanese Americans in the audience, and the talk was very well received.

Despite my progressive immersion in the field, the cultural differences between my research participants and me were never erased; nor are they with any anthropologists. It was only when I was interviewing other shin-nisei and sharing our similar experiences that I felt I was truly with my “own people.” Yet, it was generational differences that made Japanese Americans so inherently fascinating to me, not ordinary and dull as I initially expected.

Indeed, I argue that difference is productive and essential for fieldwork and “good to think” for both anthropologist and research participant alike in the mutual creation of social knowledge. In contrast to those who have claimed that the insider similarities of “native anthropologists” endow them with privileged, emic insight, I actually found that it was the generational differences of most Japanese Americans that led to ethnographic and even theoretical insight. This was especially true with prewar nisei. Although we were both second-generation offspring of Japanese immigrants, I constantly felt how our cultural, ethnic,
and historical consciousness were very different, causing me to realize how different historical experiences can produce considerable variation within the same immigrant generation. As a result, in Part I of this book, I emphasize the importance of properly recognizing historical generational differences within specific immigrant generations.

Difference was actually productive for my interviewees as well. During our conversations, I would often talk about my own experiences as a Japanese American, allowing my interviewees to use me as a sounding board to reflect on how their ethnic background was different. Many of these were the obvious generational differences already mentioned. Some of the elderly prewar nisei reflected on how their internment experience had affected their ethnic consciousness and Americanization compared to postwar shin-nisei like myself who are more bicultural and transnational. Older sansei interviewees spoke about how their loss of heritage culture and language was caused by greater generational distance from their immigrant grandparents and because they were not
raised in a contemporary, multicultural environment. The sansei, as well
as yonsei youth, sometimes remarked how great it was that I spoke Japa-
nese fluently and had maintained my cultural background, something
they were not able to do.

Therefore, “Othering” is essential for fieldwork regardless of all the
existential and postmodernist angst the term now evokes among some
anthropologists. Indeed, cultural difference has been the intellectual jus-
tification and cornerstone on which anthropology has been built. One
of the hallmarks of our discipline has always been to bring the detailed,
emic experiences of different (and yes, exotic) others to our audiences in
a sympathetic, readable (and also unreadable) manner. No one wants to
peruse a fieldwork-based account of an exotic tribe living in the African
bush only to hear that they are “just like us.”

But more importantly, cultural difference is the foundation of knowl-
edge for both “native” and “non-native” anthropologists alike. If our
fieldwork and research simply elicit information about people with
whom we are already completely familiar, it is not producing new knowl-
dge, but simply confirming what we already know. If most Japanese
Americans had in fact been very similar or even identical to me, or if I
had studied only the shin-nisei, I would not have learned as much that
was new about them. Therefore, I acquired the greatest amount of new
anthropological knowledge from Japanese Americans who were from
other generations. In contrast to the standard postmodernist position
that the epistemological status of the “Other” makes them ultimately un-
knowable, I argue that it is precisely this “Otherness” that is the subject
of anthropological knowledge.

Apparently, some anthropologists have recently become wary of our
discipline’s constant emphasis on cultural difference. For instance, Matti
Bunzl (2004) argues in our flagship journal that we need to move be-

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Chapter Summaries

As is the case with all ethnographies, much of this book consists of narratives told from a specific point of view based on my ethnic and generational positionality as a Japanese American shin-nisei anthropologist. As always, I have attempted to maintain the integrity of the analysis by avoiding implicitly ethnocentric (or more specifically, generational-centric) value judgments that lead to more sympathetic portrayals of certain generations of Japanese Americans over others.

Part I, “History and the Second Generation,” is about Japanese American nisei in the American Southwest and emphasizes the importance of historical cohort differences among members of the second-immigrant generation. By examining the significant differences between prewar nisei and postwar shin-nisei, I show that there are actually two separate historical generations within the same second-immigrant generation. Chapter 1 focuses on the prewar nisei, whose Japanese parents emigrated from rural Japan before 1924. They grew up during a period of increasing American hostility toward their ethnic homeland and were eventually interned in concentration camps during World War II because of their Japanese ancestry. As a result of being subject to discriminatory racialization as well as to the assimilationist pressures of the immediate postwar period, many of them developed nationalist identities as loyal Americans, distanced themselves from their Japanese heritage, and demanded racial citizenship in the nation.

Chapter 2 then looks at the postwar shin-nisei, who are the children of wealthier, post-1965 Japanese immigrants who came to the United States as students, professionals, and elite business expatriates. In contrast to the prewar nisei, they have come of age in a multicultural and increasingly globalized America in which Japan’s image had considerably improved because of its postwar rise in the international order as an ally of the United States. As a result, the shin-nisei have not experienced much ethnic discrimination and have had many more opportunities to become transnationally engaged with their ethnic homeland. In response to their multicultural racialization, many have become fully bilingual and bicultural and have developed transnational identifications with both America and Japan. Despite being culturally assimilated, they have simultaneously maintained their ethnic heritage and have success-
fully inherited both the culture and the transnationalism of their immigrant parents.

Part II, “Racialization, Citizenship, and Heritage,” moves on to later-generation Japanese Americans in the American Southwest. In Chapter 3, I focus on the sansei, who have followed the assimilative trajectory of their prewar nisei parents. They were generally raised in white, middle-class suburbs, experienced further upward mobility (as well as increasing intermarriage mainly with whites), and have become well-integrated into mainstream American society. Although they have generally lost their ancestral heritage, they have also experienced the ethnic activism of the Asian American movement in the 1960s and 1970s, the gradual turn toward multiculturalism, and the emergence of Japan as a respected global economic power. Therefore, despite their assimilation, the sansei claim to have inherited aspects of the ancestral Japanese culture, and they express greater pride in their ethnic identities as Japanese Americans compared to the prewar nisei.

Before moving on to the yonsei, Chapter 4 deals specifically with the persistent racialization of Japanese Americans, which affects later-generation sansei and yonsei the most. Although their families have been in the United States for generations, they are still racialized as foreigners simply because of their Asian appearance. Because of large-scale immigration from Asia and an American national identity that is racially defined as “white,” their Asian phenotype continues to have a foreigner connotation. I analyze how later-generation Japanese Americans are racially marginalized as outsiders in their daily interaction with other Americans, which is often accompanied by essentialized assumptions that they are also culturally “Japanese.” In response to such racialized multiculturalism, the sansei, as well as the yonsei to a lesser degree, engage in everyday struggles for racial citizenship by demanding inclusion in the national community as Americans despite their racial differences. It is still uncertain whether such attempts to contest their racialization will cause currently monoracial notions of American identity to be reconsidered in more inclusive and multiracial ways.

Chapter 5 examines how fourth-generation yonsei youth are attempting to recover their lost ethnic heritage and reconnect with their ancestral homeland. Although some of them have responded to their continued racialization by demanding racial citizenship like the san-
sei, they have also become concerned about their overassimilation to American society in an era of multiculturalism where ethnic heritage and homeland have come to be positively valued. As a result, they have reclaimed their ethnic ancestry by studying Japanese and majoring in Asian Studies and have actively forged transnational homeland ties by living in Japan as college exchange students. Therefore, instead of assimilation obliterating cultural heritage, it has instigated an ethnic revival among the yonsei under conditions of racialized multiculturalism. Although this return to ethnic roots involves a more serious commitment than the superficial symbolic ethnicity observed among white ethics in the past, it indicates that ethnicity remains involuntary for racialized minorities, even after four generations.

Ethnic heritage is not simply experienced, but also performed. The first two chapters of Part III, “Ethnic Heritage, Performance, and Diasporicity,” analyze how later-generation Japanese Americans have enthusiastically embraced taiko (traditional Japanese drumming) in an attempt to recover their cultural heritage and ancestry. Chapter 6 illustrates how the search for ethnic roots through taiko involves not just the persistence and reiteration of ancient cultural traditions but their active recreation in the present to reflect the contemporary social conditions under which Japanese Americans live.

Although the ethnic homeland of Japan is often positioned as the source of cultural authenticity, Chapter 7 argues that the remaking of traditional taiko by Japanese Americans also produces a type of performative authenticity that causes it to resonate with their current lives and feel more real. This is quite empowering on a personal level, allowing them to display ethnic and gender identities through performances that challenge demeaning stereotypes of Asian Americans. However, despite its subversive potential, taiko’s reception by American audiences ironically reinscribes Orientalizing discourses that racially essentialize Japanese Americans as the exotic Other and is rather disempowering at the collective level.

Chapter 8, “Diasporicity and Japanese Americans,” analyzes the extent to which Japanese Americans can be considered part of a larger, transnational diasporic community of Japanese descendants dispersed throughout the Americas (collectively referred to as nikkei, or the Japanese diaspora). Instead of engaging in intellectually fruitless debates
about the definition of “diaspora” and whether peoples like the nikkei are diasporic, I argue that we should examine *diasporicity*, which refers to the relative strength of a geographically dispersed ethnic group’s transnational connections and identifications with both the ancestral homeland and co-ethnics residing in other countries. Although Japanese Americans are members of the Japanese-descent nikkei diaspora, they do not manifest a high level of diasporicity in their transnational ethnic relations. However, like other diasporic groups, they have much stronger social connections to their ethnic homeland than they do to other Japanese-descent communities in the Americas.

The conclusion reassesses the various factors that cause some generations of Japanese Americans to emphasize ethnic heritage more than others and the extent to which their diverse reactions to racialization may reorder hierarchical racial formations. It ends with some thoughts about the future of the Japanese American community, including biracial individuals of half-Japanese descent whose numbers will continue to increase in the coming decades.