PART I

Introduction
In 1996, the average monthly sewer bill for a family of four in Birmingham was only $14.71—but that was before the county decided to build an elaborate new sewer system with the help of out-of-state financial wizards with names like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Chase. . . . [The banks used] a blizzard of incomprehensible swaps and refinance schemes—schemes that only served to postpone the repayment date a year or two while sinking the county deeper into debt. . . . The original cost estimates for the new sewer system were as low as $250 million. But in a wondrous demonstration of the possibilities of small-town graft and contract-padding, the price tag quickly swelled to more than $3 billion. . . . Every time the county refinanced its sewer debt, JP Morgan made millions of dollars in fees. . . . In the mortgage business, this process is known as churning: You keep coming back over and over to refinance, and they keep "churning" you for more and more fees. . . . Birmingham became the poster child for a new kind of giant-scale financial fraud, one that would threaten the financial stability not only of cities and counties all across America, but even those of entire countries like Greece. . . . You can see a trail that leads directly from a billion-dollar predatory swap deal cooked up at the highest levels of America’s biggest banks, across a vast fruited plane of bribes and felonies—"the price of doing business," as one JP Morgan banker says on tape. . . . In Birmingham, lots of people have gone to jail for the crime: More than 20 local officials and businessmen have been convicted of corruption in federal court. . . . But those who greenlighted the bribes and profited most from the scam remain largely untouched. "It never gets back to JP Morgan."

—Taibbi, 2010

In a review of literature on crime and the workplace in 1999, we noted that “Neither crime at the workplace nor crime generated by workplace experiences has received much attention in criminology” (Jensen & Hodson, 1999). Assessments since that time have yielded similar conclusions. Based on a citation analysis, David Shichor (2009, 175) reports an “absence of scholars
who study white-collar crime and corporate crime in criminology and criminal justice journals and textbooks."

To some degree this neglect reflects the opinion of prominent criminologists who have argued that (1) the public is most concerned with street crime (see Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985) or that (2) the causes of crime rest with characteristics of offenders established at an early age (see Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Although not strongly represented in mainstream criminology and criminal justice journals and textbooks, issues involving workplace crime, white-collar crime, and occupational crime are growing in prominence in new journals and journals dealing with business, business ethics, personnel psychology, occupational health, leadership, and management, among others. An inspection of references for the chapters in this book reveals the sizeable range of outlets for research on workplace crime and related issues.

This expansion of interests and outlets has been quite eclectic and specialized, with little attention devoted to developing a general framework to encompass such a wide range of specific issues. In this chapter we propose that (1) further development of widely shared concepts in the chapters in this volume promises to move the study of white-collar crime toward a vision shared with much of sociology—the study of injustice and the abuse of power—and (2) general theories of crime can provide general frameworks for organizing the study of crime and the workplace.

White-Collar Crime and the Sociology of Work

Since some version of the concept of injustice, and explicitly or implicitly the abuse of power, is found in all but one chapter in this volume, we suggest that these concepts have promise as linking themes between specialists in the study of workplace and the study of organizational crime. Jensen (2011) notes that the concept of justice is intimately tied to conceptions of rights and that “rights refer to that set of normative standards defining the just allocation of positive and negative experiences among people (justice norms).” Injustice refers to the violation of justice norms or rights. Power is what allows the rights of some to be violated by others.

The concepts of injustice and the abuse of power can apply at all levels of analysis from societal to institutional to individual relations. Legal systems and organizational characteristics can be judged in terms of justice. The content of courses on contemporary social problems, as well as the specific sociological specialties dealing with issues such as inequality and racism, are based on conceptions of rights and their violation. It would be safe to propose that the concepts of justice and the abuse of power are widely enough
used to be considered basic building blocks of the social sciences across their specific disciplines.

In research on sources of crime or deviance in the workplace, the most common use is “perceived” injustice, which can generate worker anger and potentially underwrite workplace deviance. However, the concepts of injustice and the abuse of power can be applied at the corporate or organizational level, as well as at the individual level. At the corporate level the focus is less on crime as a response to injustice than on unconstrained power as a source of immoral and even criminal corporate behavior. Historically, the thirty years since the ascension of Reagan’s and Thatcher’s conservative revolution with its attendant neo-liberal ideology and its commitment to deregulation have brought into full fruition an era of rampant corporate malfeasance and criminality. The history of corporate scandals of the 2000s has expanded in number and size at an exponential rate. Enron’s “creative accounting” practices were quickly eclipsed by those of WorldCom. For those who thought these were isolated cases with isolated consequences, the worldwide “great recession” starting in 2008 brought about by a systematic pattern of fraudulent banking practices involving the largest banks in the world has clarified the fact that when the largest corporations bilk customers, competitors, and the government out of billions of dollars, the consequences are anything but localized. The rewriting of regulations for offshore oil-drilling practices under the Bush-Cheney presidency that allowed the massive Gulf of Mexico oil spill by British Petroleum in 2010 highlights the fact that the consequences of unconstrained corporate power leading to malfeasance and illegality influence every aspect of our lives from our jobs and pensions to the environment in which we work and live.

It is essential at this moment that students of white-collar and corporate crime step forward and make themselves heard regarding the nature, causes, and consequences of the current era of unrestrained corruption, pillage, and criminality emanating from the largest private-sector institutions. Societies that do not confront rampant white-collar crime are likely to end up in the backwaters as “previous great powers.” Less industrialized nations that do not confront corporate criminality will stay poor and underdeveloped. Capitalism has tremendous potential for spurring economic activity and development, but not when capitalists are allowed unrestrained access to pillage, profiteering, corruption, externalization of the costs of production (such as through environmental pollution), and other easier—though nonsustainable—routes to profits. It is part of the historic mandate of students of white-collar and corporate crime to provide the intellectual tools to forge appropriate controls and constraints on large corporations so that they
Randy Hodson and Gary F. Jensen are forced down the laborious road of creative innovation in order to make profits rather than the quicker and easier road of profiteering. In this task, those who study white-collar crime are not without allies. Increasing education and information access make citizens of many countries aware of white-collar and corporate crime and deeply concerned about the consequences for their lives. Witness, for example, the emergence and rapid spread of the “Occupy Wall Street” movement of 2011 (wearethe99percent.tumblr.com).

The world of white-collar and corporate crime is different today than it was fifty years ago because of advances in electronic technology and the growth of large transnational corporations with expansive operations across both developed and less developed nations (Dodge & Geis, 2009; Rothe, 2010). It is thus a significant ongoing intellectual challenge to develop the concepts and theories needed to adequately depict new forms of white-collar and corporate crime and identify effective remedies to constrain them. In this important way, white-collar and corporate crimes are significantly different, and increasingly different, from street crime. Although the prevalence and causes of street crimes may change somewhat with time, many of the causes remain in play across time and across different settings, and change is significantly slower—murder, rape, and burglary are not dramatically different in nature or causes today than in the past. This pattern of rapid historic change in the nature of white-collar and corporate crime poses special challenges to its study.

The sociology of work is an area that similarly faces the challenge of constant change in the nature of its object of study (Hodson & Sullivan, 2011). In response, it has developed a large arsenal of both broad and mid-range concepts that are useful for organizing our understanding of the rapidly changing world of corporate behavior, including malfeasance and illegality. Most central among these concepts is that of social power—the ability to bend resources and people to one’s objectives. Large corporations, and more broadly those in privileged positions, have the power to ensure the reproduction of their privileges and to garner an ever larger share of resources. To understand how power is deployed toward the preservation and enlargement of privilege, it is essential to understand white-collar and corporate crime at three distinct levels: (1) the macro-level of government policy and political economy, (2) the meso-level of organizational behavior, and (3) the micro-level of individual and small group actions.

Macro-Level Concepts about Political Economy. One of the most serious issues confronting the study of white-collar and corporate crime is the prevailing, socially constructed definition of legality itself. Through campaign contributions and hired lobbyists, corporations and powerful actors in
society play a decisive role in writing the legislation that defines what is legal and illegal. The capture of regulatory agencies by those they are intended to regulate has received renewed interest with the coming to fruition of the neo-liberal era of deregulation in which admissions such as “the oil industry writes the government’s energy regulatory rules” have become commonplace (Lipton & Broder, 2010). The resulting laws are extremely generous in allowing harmful behavior under the guise of encouraging economic development. And if nothing else, lobbyists at least succeed in making sure the regulations are sufficiently vague so that prosecution can be avoided or tied up indefinitely in the courts. It is thus important that students of white-collar and corporate crime not accept too quickly the bright red line of the existing laws as the definition of corporate criminality and instead look to the more theoretically defensible concepts of justice or of “harm to others” (Friedrichs, 2009). Indeed, the latter concept—harm to others—is closer to the definition more typically used in definitions of street crime. And where the criminals write the laws, as is often the case in white-collar crime, it is essential that this more realistic marker of “harm to others” be used. The greatest part of corporate criminality occurs in this opaque regulatory terrain between what the law specifically disallows and what is actually harmful to others. Much confusion can be avoided if we start with the commonsense definition of criminality as harm to others rather than limit consideration to the specifics of politically brokered (dis)regulations.

Corporate crime thus typically involves some collusion between governments and corporations (Braithwaite, 2008). Only the tip of the iceberg in such cases is ever detected and prosecuted. Indeed, the bulk of the behavior is so commonplace and accepted that its most typical manifestations are considered routine practice. Only extraordinary cases that threaten to unmask the widespread nature of corporate criminality are brought to light and prosecuted. And, interestingly, it is almost always only the politicians who are brought to law. The corporation is seen as only trying to pursue its self-interest, and we have come to accept that the buying of government officials is a failing of the officials, but not of those who attempt to buy them.

An important potential area of rich theoretical insight about the political economy of white-collar and corporate crime lies in international comparative work. Many less developed nations have extraordinarily lax laws and enforcement against white-collar and corporate crime. In these situations, graft and corruption are commonplace and are required for securing many services in society. Many analysts believe that the U.S. war in Afghanistan against Islamic extremists is being prolonged and may be lost because of pervasive corruption in the pro-Western government there that has brought
economic development virtually to a standstill. Make no mistake, national
development, world events, and world history itself frequently hinge on
white-collar and corporate crime. Similar examples of the retarding effects of
white-collar and corporate crime from Asia, Africa, and Latin America indi-
cate that such corruption is one of the chief impediments to economic devel-
opment and prosperity for the poorer people of the world (Evans & Rauch,
1999). Many lessons are to be learned from comparative work, including
the potential for corruption to pervade society at every level of economic
transaction.

Meso-Level Concepts about Organizational Behavior. The most serious
corporate malfeasance arises not from rogue employees, but from repeated
systematic actions that have acquired the status of “normal operating pro-
cedures.” The payment of outrageous salaries in the hundreds of millions
of dollars to CEOs is among the most obvious of these practices. Corporate
boards that set top salaries are staffed by other CEOs and their willingness to
pay exorbitant salaries to fellow CEOs rests on undisguised self-interest. The
absence of a connection between these salaries and economic performance
is evidenced by the steep rise in CEO salaries in the last fifteen years during
a time of faltering growth and declining performance. The criminal nature
of these salaries is further evidenced by the discrepancy between American
CEO salaries and those of their competitors in Europe and Asia—whose
companies often perform better.

The injustice and indefensibility of CEO salaries is, however, only the
most obvious corporate criminality (meaning “harm to others”). A more
profound contemporary example is the pattern established by banks of
fraudulently misrepresenting risky derivatives while simultaneously bet-
ing against the success of their own financial instruments by aggressively
buying insurance against their predestined decline in value (Partnoy, 2003).
Similarly, the classic situations of stockbrokers churning their customers’
accounts for sales commissions or selling poor quality financial instruments
because of kickbacks are prime examples of criminality among professionals.
Note that these practices, except in extreme cases, are not typically illegal
and even extreme cases are difficult to prove. Myriad retirement accounts,
however, have mysteriously dwindled through such practices. The amount
of money involved in such white-collar criminality far exceeds the combined
total for all types of street crime (Coleman, 1994).

For much corporate and white-collar criminality, the prevalence of
bureaucratic rules governing the organizational context in which these activ-
ities occur provides an effective façade to hide the activities. People believe
that there must be rules preventing such practices and that, surely, such
practices could not occur within large organizations. The problem is that the bureaucratic rules are written by people who benefit from such criminality. The result is rules that either allow such practices or are so intentionally vague that the practices are allowed by omission.

Professionals working in large organizations are often complicit in such corporate criminality. For example, in the Enron scandal, the accounting firm Arthur Andersen was found to be criminally culpable for fraudulently over-representing the value of Enron assets. Similarly, doctors who receive salaries many times the average for American workers are unlikely to report overcharges and unnecessary procedures since they get fees based on these procedures, as well as kickbacks from drug companies for prescribing their most popular drugs.

Why are such practices not prohibited by regulators? There are two main reasons. First, as already mentioned, regulatory bodies are often captured by the industry they are intended to regulate. Second, the complexity and rapidly changing nature of many work practices means that there would need to be many regulators for adequate enforcement, which would be economically unfeasible. Regulatory bodies are thus chronically understaffed.

The solution to organizational criminality, both corporate and professional, instead lies in empowering all the stakeholders involved to negotiate, bargain, and make transparent ongoing practices. Thus, employees, the community, and customers all need to have a say at the corporate table if corporate criminality is to be effectively curtailed (Braithwaite, 2008). This solution may seem unlikely in the American context of corporate secrecy and the purity of neo-liberal ideologies arguing that the only path to economic efficiency is the unregulated and unconstrained pursuit of profit. However, many European nations have longstanding Works Councils and other avenues of involvement by employees, unions, and communities. The long-term consequences of involving these additional stakeholders have not been a decline in profits. Rather it has been a decline in criminal approaches to achieving profits and the highlighting of creative innovation as a necessary strategy for corporate survival (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). The criminology literature, in fact, already utilizes a similar concept acknowledging the pivotal role of stakeholder involvement in deterring street crime—in the routine activities model of criminal behavior the concept is known as a “responsible guardian” who preempts criminality. Similar responsible guardians are needed throughout corporations as empowered stakeholders if corporate malfeasance and criminality are to be checked. Regrettably, the reliance on “whistle-blowers” for internal checks on organizational practices testifies to the paucity of more routinized stakeholder involvement in organizational settings.
Micro-Level Concepts about Work Group Behavior. As with macro- and meso-level changes in the nature of work, so too are more micro-level changes in the workplace influencing white-collar and corporate criminality. One of the most profound changes is the intrusion of microchip technology into all aspects of human life. Instantaneous information flow has created new opportunities for criminal behavior not only in such obvious areas as financial theft and identity theft, but also in such areas as child pornography and child predatory activity facilitated through social network sites. Thus, computers are allowing individuals to prey on organizations and on each other in new ways. But computers also create new ways for organizations to prey on individuals as well. For example, the possibilities for government surveillance have been greatly increased by opportunities for electronic eavesdropping. In addition, corporations are able to monitor their employees on the job in ways that many feel violate basic human rights of privacy (Marx, 1990).

Some micro-level white-collar criminal behavior is isolated and secretive in nature. Padding of expense accounts or working on personal projects on company time are good examples of what are typically individual-level criminal workplace behaviors. Many seemingly individual criminal actions, however, rely on a supportive work group, or at least a work group that allows the behavior to go unchecked. Work groups are often complicit in practices such as pilferage, for example (Mars, 1982). Work group norms are also involved in allowing patterns of bullying and sexual harassment to become ingrained and taken for granted (Chamberlain et al., 2008; Roscigno, Lopez & Hodson, 2009; see also Elias, Gibson, and Barney in the current volume).

Individual and group malfeasance and criminality in the workplace are heavily dependent on the prevailing meanings that employees give to the situation and to their actions. Issues of equity and justice are particularly important in this regard. Where individuals feel aggrieved and dishonored, retribution through various forms of resistance and deviance is much more likely—perhaps even inevitable (Foucault, 1988; Hodson, 2001). These individual-level meanings are often heavily influenced by practices emanating from the macro- and meso-levels of societal and organizational behavior, again suggesting the intertwined nature of behavior across organizational levels and the necessity of understanding action at any one level as embedded in meanings and power relations involving other levels of organization and action.

Categorizing Theories of Crime

Based on numerous theoretical developments in the study of criminal behavior, psychology (see Hess and Hess in this volume) and management
scholars (see Bennett & Robinson, 2000) have developed specific typologies pertaining to workplace deviance. Integrating contemporary theory and research in the sociology of crime with concepts from workplace and organizational analysis also depends on a systematic application of concepts from the sociology of crime. Some categorization of distinct theories of crime (or, more generally, deviance) is an essential step in this integration. Most of the research on crimes involving the workplace, occupations, and corporations focuses on one theory or one specific research issue, involving one theory at a time. In contrast, there is an enduring emphasis in criminological theories on testing competing theories. Jensen (Jensen & Rojek, 2009, 196) has attempted to simplify the location of specific instances of theory testing in terms of answers to basic questions:

Does the theory incorporate or require some form of imbalance, strain, stress, or frustrated pursuit of conventional or widely shared goals? If so, it is classified as falling within the strain/frustration tradition. Many such extensions are classified as “integrated” theories because they incorporate ideas and concepts from other perspectives. But, the fact that they introduce specific forms of motivational pressure generated by some form of imbalance or discrepancy in the achievement of widely shared goals distinguishes them as strain/frustration theories.

Does the theory focus on normal learning processes, including socially structured schedules of reward and punishment, variable values, norms, and beliefs, and associations with people who both encourage and discourage crime and delinquency? If so, the theory fits better with the cultural deviance/differential association/social learning category than the other two systems of ideas.

Does the theory assume that it is the absence of constraints or limits on opportunity for crime that are key to the explanation of crime and delinquency? If “motivation” refers to characteristics of humans considered to be quite natural when social, cultural, or opportunity constraints are absent (such that no special pressure is required), then it falls in the social disorganization-social control tradition.

A recent work sets the stage for a more theoretically organized approach to crime and workplace topics. Encompassing much of the research under the general rubric of “white-collar crime,” Benson and Simpson (2009) focus on anomie theory (which falls under the first theme stated here), differential association-social learning theory (which falls under the second theme) and “social control” theory (which falls under the third theme). They
also distinguish “rational choice” theory, a theory that Jensen classifies as a subtype of social learning theory because it focuses on normal learning processes.

Several chapters in this book can be identified as falling in a specific criminological theory. For example, the focus on “occupational stress” as a motivational force leading to workplace violence locates the chapter by Grant in the strain-anomie tradition. She proposes that occupational stress may lead to counterproductive behavior in the form of workplace deviance: voluntary behavior that is in conflict with the interests of the organization and its members. For example, employees may engage in deviant or criminal behavior to compensate for feelings or anger or frustration associated with stress.

Strain theories are motivational theories with some form of deviance or crime explained as a response to stress or strain of some form. In some instances such theories assume that the behavior functions to alleviate the stress. On the other hand, the behavior may be a response to stress without necessarily alleviating the problem.

Griffin and Lopez argue that “organizational culture” is a key to understanding workplace crime:

Organizational culture is the set of values, norms, assumptions, and beliefs that exists among organizational members which influence employee attitudes, thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. An organization’s culture can control the way employees interpret or perceive situations and how they respond to situations. Several studies have examined the value system of organizations which helps create an organization’s culture to determine influences on employee deviant behavior.

This type of perspective would seem to fall in the cultural deviance/differential association/social learning category of criminological theories for two reasons. Griffin and Lopez discuss reward systems and normal social learning processes. If the behavior stems from normal learning processes and requires no special pressure, the theory fits best in the social learning category. When they state that “given the influence of group norms on individual behavior, it is presumed that social cues that communicate tolerance for deviant behavior are more likely to create an organizational culture with a high propensity to elicit employee deviant behavior,” their argument falls in the cultural deviance/differential association category. If cultural or group
norms encourage deviance, the theory is best categorized as a cultural deviance/differential association argument.

Griffin and Lopez also discuss ways in which group norms and organizational culture can inhibit workplace deviance. It is important to note that such a feature of organizational culture would fit with the third type of theory, social control theory. Social control theory focuses on variables that inhibit deviance. In its original form as expressed by Hirschi (1969), the sole emphasis was on why people do not break laws or rules and theories requiring special problems or criminogenic norms were rejected. Cultural deviance/differential association theorists argue that it is the balance of crime-facilitating and crime-inhibiting forces that is key to the explanation of crime. There is no “differential” in social control theory.

Several chapters in this volume include dimensions of personality among the variables thought to explain workplace crime. In mainstream criminology one specific psychological trait has come to dominate the research literature—self-control. Self-control was introduced as the key to explaining crime by Gottfredson and Hirschi in 1990 in their award winning book, *A General Theory of Crime*. Their basic thesis is that the absence of self-control explains individual crime and, because it is established at an early age, it explains continuity in crime over the life-course. In addition, age-graded opportunities explained the type of crime that low self-control generated. They proposed that “people who lack self-control will tend to be impulsive, insensitive, physical risk-taking, short-sighted and non-verbal” (1990, 90). Self-control and opportunity are presented as key to understanding all forms of crime, including white-collar, occupational, and workplace crime.

Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argue that their theory predicts that white-collar crime is less common than other forms of crime because people low in self-control are not likely to reach positions where there is opportunity to commit such crimes. Moreover, they propose that among those who do have such an opportunity, the same personality trait explains variation in white-collar crime.

The theory has generated considerable debate and has drawn criticism for presumptions about white-collar crime. Numerous scholars argue that there is little evidence that white-collar, occupational, and/or workplace crime is less common than other types of crime (see Benson & Simpson, 2009 for a summary). Moreover, when the concept is defined, only some characteristics would seem to inhibit entry into such occupations (nonverbal and short-sighted). Risk-taking and insensitivity might be considered as assets for movement into some types of professional and managerial positions. In addition, the view of self-control as invariant after being set at an early age is controversial as well, and no one has actually shown that it helps explain white-collar crime.
Although the terminology used differs from criminological theory, theories of unethical behavior in organizations can be classified in terms of answers to the basic questions previously outlined. Consider, for example, the theory of unethical behavior proposed by Kulic, O’Fallon, and Salimath (2008) in the *Journal of Business Ethics*. Among other arguments, they propose that the reward and punishment system characterizing corporations such as Enron encourage unethical behavior by exerting unusual pressure to perform. The corporate “stacking practice,” where average performance as determined by supervisors means termination, encouraged unethical behavior. When a theory introduces unusual pressure to perform, coupled with a guarantee that a certain proportion of employees will be fired, it embodies the logic of strain theories. The central argument in strain theory is that pressure to achieve coupled with structural guarantees of failure generates a high rate of crime in the streets. The same logic can apply to behavior within organizations.

Some scholars studying unethical behavior are drawing on classic criminological theories. In *Business Ethics and Moral Motivation: A Criminological Perspective*, Joseph Heath (2008) applies Sykes and Matza’s “techniques of neutralization” theory to unethical behavior. He argues that it is specific excuses for unethical behavior learned in interaction within organizations that are crucial for understanding such behavior rather than flaws in basic moral character. Henle and Gross state in this volume that “employees low in conscientiousness, agreeableness, and emotional stability are more likely to commit workplace deviance.” Gottfredson and Hirschi would include these dimensions of personality under the rubric of “self-control.” They argue that “the dimensions of self-control are, in our view, factors affecting calculation of the consequences of one’s acts. The impulsive or shortsighted person fails to consider the negative or painful consequences of his acts; the insensitive person has fewer negative consequences to consider; the less intelligent person also has fewer negative consequences to consider” (1990, 95). Their “General Theory of Crime” has been applied to a wide range of “deviant” activities and has generated a sizeable body of research in criminology. Because it focuses on a trait that inhibits deviance, it falls under the social control-social disorganization tradition in criminology.

As noted previously, the most common shared concept used in the chapters of this volume is some version of injustice or related concepts such as fairness or the violation of justice norms or perceived rights. Injustice is a type of imbalance or discrepancy between shared definitions of “rights” and organizational realities. It is introduced as a source of occupational stress by Grant and as a feature of organizational climate relevant to workplace deviance by Griffin and Lopez. Griffin and Lopez note that “research indicates
that regardless of the form of injustice, when employees are treated in an unjust manner they are more likely to engage in deviant behavior. Some version of this proposition can be found in nearly every chapter in this volume, ranging from the individual to the organizational level.

Among the major criminological theories, the shared focus on injustice fits best with contemporary versions of strain theory, especially Agnew’s (1985, 1992, 2005) “generalized strain theory.” Strain theories assume that some form of disparity between expectations and perceived reality provides motivation for crime or deviance. Such perspectives fit well with the focus on emotion in several of the chapters in this volume in that injustice is presumed to generate anger or frustration which can result in forms of crime involving some form of emotion.

In sum, whether it be the field of management, psychology, or sociology, there are numerous possible bridges between criminological theories and the study of crime and the workplace. Most (if not all) of the variables introduced in the study of crime in the workplace have precedents in the sociology of crime and in the study of the workplace, but those connections are rarely acknowledged or developed for their potential broadening insights. Our hope is that greater attention to criminological theories, and to the linking concepts of injustice and power from the sociology of work, will build stronger bridges between criminology and the study of organizational life.

REFERENCES


