In Drawdown, the contributors explain how and why America, despite repeated lessons, failed to sustain ready military forces in sufficient scale to secure the nation. Jason Warren has pulled together well-researched and accessible essays that shed light and understanding on the cultural, political, strategic, and financial causes of unpreparedness. Breaking the cycle of unpreparedness in an era of increasing security risk requires historical understanding. Making the most out of the resources available to secure our nation and vital interests requires imaginative military and civilian leadership. Drawdown delivers the former and helps cultivate the latter.

—General H.R. McMaster, author of Dereliction of Duty

“Positioned to provoke thought on the present U.S. military force reductions. . . . Coming on the heels of the so-called conclusion of the United States’ wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, this work will, I hope, provoke serious thought, discussion, and a greater maturity in considering the current environment.”

—Ricardo Herrera, author of For Liberty and the Republic
General Summary

While traditionally, Americans view expensive military structure as a poor investment and a threat to liberty, they also require a guarantee of that very freedom, necessitating the employment of armed forces. Beginning with the seventeenth-century wars of the English colonies, Americans typically increased their military capabilities at the beginning of conflicts only to decrease them at the apparent conclusion of hostilities. In *Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar*, a stellar team of military historians argue that the United States sometimes managed effective drawdowns, sowing the seeds of future victory that Americans eventually reaped. Yet at other times, the drawing down of military capabilities undermined our readiness and flexibility, leading to more costly wars and perhaps defeat. The political choice to reduce military capabilities is influenced by Anglo-American pecuniary decisions and traditional fears of government oppression, and it has been haphazard at best throughout American history. These two factors form the basic American “liberty dilemma,” the vexed relationship between the nation and its military apparatuses from the founding of the first colonies through to present times.

With the termination of large-scale operations in Iraq and the winnowing of forces in Afghanistan, the United States military once again faces a significant drawdown in standing force structure and capabilities. The political and military debate currently raging around how best to affect this force reduction continues to lack a proper historical perspective. This volume aspires to inform this dialogue. Not a traditional military history, *Drawdown* analyzes cultural attitudes, political decisions, and institutions surrounding the maintenance of armed forces.
INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY
The introduction synthesizes the book’s arguments as presented in the chapters that follow. The need for a strong military balanced against deeply-ingrained cultural mores presents a liberty dilemma that often affects readiness. Fears of a standing army and fiscal concerns have often driven postwar drawdowns, which often coincided with a national strategy that focused on reducing involvement of ground troops. During these periods of austere budgets and reduced personnel, the Army worked to preserve its combat effectiveness through education.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
- What are the various “liberty dilemmas” the nation faces with regard to the military?
- How has the fear of large standing armies guided defense policy? In what ways has it affected that policy, positively or negatively?
- How did 17th century defense concepts in the North American colonies establish patterns for future defense policies?
- How did political connections affect the Army in the years of the Early Republic? How did the Army begin to professionalize?
- What effect did “short-sightedness” have on technology, concepts, and doctrinal development during the 19th century?
- How does the desire for a “Return to Normalcy” affect defense policy?
- How did the Army continue to prepare for its potential mission during times of reduced resources and personnel?
- How does U.S. foreign policy often drive defense policy? How are those two policies sometimes in conflict?
- How can a strong defense policy result in a weakened U.S. Army as part of the defense establishment?
- How does the character of a particular war, such as Vietnam, affect the readiness of the Army?
- How has the nature of particular conflicts, such as the Small Scale Contingencies (SSC) of the 1990s, affected defense policy and Army readiness?
- What role did the end of the draft play in the readiness of the Army? How did it affect defense policy?
- How did the end of the Cold War and other paradigm shifts affect defense policy, planning, and readiness?
Chapter 1: The Art of War: Early Anglo-American Translation, 1607–1643
Kevin McBride and Ashley Bissonnette
pages 27-51

SUMMARY
The chapter questions two paradigms that dominate the historiography of the Pequot War (1636-1637), the earliest war fought between English colonists and Native Americans in northeastern North America. The first is that indigenous warfare in southern New England was kin-based and ritual in nature, with limited goals and objectives that were primarily related to revenge, prestige, and captive-taking and resulted in relatively few casualties. The second paradigm is that New England colonists were, with the exception of a few experienced officers, ill-trained and inexperienced men drawn from trainbands and provided with weapons they barely knew how to use. However, an analysis of the Mystic Campaign integrating information gleaned from Pequot War battle narratives and recent battlefield archaeological surveys provides important new insights into the campaign and questions long-held assumptions about the nature, organization, and experience of Connecticut’s militia and the capabilities of the soldiers. The victory over the Pequot in the Battle of the English Withdrawal was not won solely through a carefully planned and executed battle plan, but through the training and experience of a core of combat veterans who made the necessary tactical adjustments in an unfamiliar terrain.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
- In what ways do the dominant paradigms no longer apply in light of current research?
- How did Colonial forces apply their experiences from the Thirty Years War to New England engagements, and how did they change to accommodate Native warfare strategies?
- How did Natives change to accommodate English warfare strategies?
- What lasting implications did the Pequot War have on Native peoples of southern New England?
Chapter 2: Liberty Paradox: The Failure of the Military System in Mid-Seventeenth-Century New England
Jason W. Warren

SUMMARY
The Anti-English coalition of Indian forces from southern New England destroyed column upon column of colonial forces in the wilderness. Military disaster shocked the colonists, who had bested the Pequot Confederacy, the most fearsome native group of the region, less than 40 years before. The degeneration of New England’s militia system after victory in 1637 reflected the complex and fraught relationship of the Anglosphere population with its own standing military structure. Fears of military oppression, stoked in the numerous political and military controversies between royalists and Parliamentarians in the British Isles, dominated the military prerogatives of early New Englanders. This mentality and cultural viewpoint determined New England’s inefficient and ineffective military posture that presaged initial setback in 1675 and pyrrhic victory in 1676. This feast and famine military fluctuation—the former only occurring when faced with defeat—established a cultural military paradigm in American history.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
- Why did English political controversies influence early Americans’ view of standing military structure?
- How did colonial New Englanders’ experiences prior to the Great Narragansett War of 1675-76 influence events in that conflict?
- What force structure did colonial legislatures rely on for defense? How were non-military arrangements meant to offset militia weaknesses?
- How did physical military structures reflect New Englander’s martial attitudes? How did cultural factors, such as religious and racial beliefs, affect ideas about military structure?
- How did southern New England’s Native Americans evolve since 1637? Why?
- Why did the colonists eventually emerge victorious in the Great Narragansett War, albeit in a weakened state?
- Why was Connecticut colony the military exception to the other Puritan colonies? Given the similarities in Puritan cultural underpinnings between colonies, what does Connecticut’s different experience reveal about the limits of cultural analysis?
- Why did the mid-seventeenth century set the stage for future American military attitudes?
Chapter 3: Surprisingly Professional: Trajectories in Army Officer Corps Drawdowns, 1783-1848
Samuel Watson
pages 73-108

SUMMARY
Contrary to most of the historiography, between 1802 and 1848 the selection and retention of U.S. Army officers was based primarily on military capability, rather than partisan or sectional politics. Apart from the demobilization of the Continental Army in 1783, only the 1815 drawdown involved more than 20 percent of the officer corps, so most officers were able to continue army careers if they wished to do so. In 1802 President Jefferson chose officers for separation with little military advice, but statistics show that he made most of these decisions based on assessments of military capability, and dismissed few Federalists. The drawdowns in 1815 and 1821 were overseen by senior military officers rather than civilian policymakers, using efficiency reports (the first in Army history) from regimental commanders that focused primarily on combat experience (in 1815) and military education and gentility (in 1821). The army officer corps became more capable and stable in its personnel, and in the procedures by which they were evaluated and separated or retained. These procedures helped produce a national standing army insulated from partisan politics, with growing professional autonomy and capability.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
- How much and how often was the national standing army reduced during the early republic?
- Why was the national standing army reduced during the early republic?
- How were officers chosen for retention or disbandment? Did the criteria change? How? Why?
- How influential were partisan politics? How influential was geographic sectionalism?
- What role did military leaders themselves play in these processes? Did their roles change?
- What was the long-term outcome and significance of the reductions, for the army, for civil-military relations, and for American society?
Chapter 4: Challenged Competency: U.S. Cavalry before, during, and after the U.S. Civil War
John A. Bonin
pages 109-136

SUMMARY

Figures:

Prior to the American Civil War, American political and military leaders viewed regular Army cavalry as too expensive and logistically difficult to maintain. While mounted units had been used in all of our conflicts since the American Revolution, congressional leaders only approved regular cavalry units after 1831 for duty in the West, where covering vast territories and matching the speed of mounted Indian tribes proved a necessity. Many senior U.S. Army leaders also believed that the technological advancements of the mid-nineteenth century had supplanted cavalry and that the U.S. Army need not invest time, energy, and funds into fully developing it—this idea, despite the recommendations of the Delafield Commission, was based on observations during the Crimean War.

The Union Army’s misuse of cavalry was cause for greater concern. Even after prewar belief in a “short war” proved unfounded, Union Army leaders chose not to invest in this critical capability. At the beginning of the Civil War, cavalry was seen as being useful only in the West, with regular units in the eastern armies being relegated primarily to picket duty. The cavalry provided by militia from the states was poorly equipped, undertrained, and provided with broken-down horses inappropriate for cavalry. Effective cavalry horses were considered specialized equipment and were consistently less plentiful than horses for wagons or artillery caissons. In addition, senior U.S. Army commanders tended to use cavalry in ways that failed to take full advantage of its potential. Despite General George McClellan’s alleged expertise, he proved to be deficient in his use of cavalry in the Army of the Potomac. However, the Confederate Army did take full advantage of cavalry’s potential, and therefore gained cavalry superiority, out-fighting completely federal cavalry for the first two years of the war.

By 1863, after a series of reforms, the U.S. Army obtained an effective mounted arm capable of decisive results. The U.S. Army created the Cavalry Bureau to oversee and drastically improve weapons procurement, horse acquisition, and basic training for cavalrymen that effectively provided modern management to a traditional arm. In addition, aggressive commanders such as Generals Phil Sheridan, George Custer, and James Wilson provided the necessary leadership in the East as well as the West. With improved cavalry units and capable commanders, Union forces obtained strategically decisive results in the
Chapter 4: Challenged Competency: U.S. Cavalry before, during, and after the U.S. Civil War

John A. Bonin

pages 109-136

Shenandoah Valley, at Appomattox, and during Wilson’s 1865 invasion of the Deep South.

Even after the surrender of General Lee’s forces, Union cavalry under Sheridan and Custer proved instrumental in occupying Texas and coercing the French out of Mexico. But as quickly as this effective mounted force came into being, the nation equally disbanded it. So much so that George Custer would be outnumbered and out-gunned at the Little Big Horn in 1876. Consequently, short-sightedness prevented Union cavalry from becoming the decisive arm it could have been earlier in the war and equally prevented the nation from having an effective mounted arm when entering the Spanish-American War.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

- Why didn’t the United States Army develop a European style mounted force prior to 1860?

- In what ways was the U.S. Army unprepared to suppress the secession of the South in 1861? Why did this matter?

- How did the Union cavalry gain superiority over Confederate cavalry by 1865? What strategic results were achieved by Union cavalry in 1865 in both east and western theaters?

- How did General Sheridan’s Union forces in Texas in 1865 contribute to a successful political resolution of the French occupation of Mexico?

- What happened to the large and effective Union mounted arm after 1865? Why?

- What is the importance of historical context in any discussion of U.S. military growth and reduction before and after the Civil War?
Chapter 5: The Elusive Lesson: U.S. Army Unpreparedness from 1898-1938
Edward A. Gutiérrez with Michael S. Neiberg
pages 137-154

SUMMARY
This chapter traces the experiences and unpreparedness of the U.S. Army from the Spanish-American War to the dawn of World War II outlining the weaknesses of military capabilities due to government underfunding, declining size, lack of supplies, and slipshod training, the authors catalog the determination of the U.S. Army’s leaders to maintain America’s military effectiveness. Relevant as well to the U.S. victories during these four decades is the depleted condition of enemy forces both in overall capability and strategic doctrine. The strength of the U.S. Army on the eve of America’s entrance into the First World War, lack of materiel, and poor training of volunteers and conscripted soldiers led to high casualties on the Western Front. Without Congressional financial support and a population adverse to peacetime preparedness, the U.S. entered World War I with a woefully unprepared force. A massive effort to recruit, train, and supply the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) enabled the U.S. to send two million men to face the battle-hardened German Army. The AEF achieved victory at a dreadful cost. After Armistice Day on 11 November 1918, American troops began returning home, but the country collapsed back into complacency. Despite the resolute efforts by a few staff officers, the U.S. Army’s numbers and competence once again dwindled. Two decades later, the emaciated Army faced the formidable Axis Powers during World War II. Although the modern Army has greater resources than its early twentieth century counterpart, several issues faced in both eras remain static: America’s geopolitical position, Army, National Guard, and Reserve differences, and the debate on America’s best defense: land or sea. Learning from the conflicts of this forty year span illustrates the crucial need for U.S. Army preparedness in order to maintain effectiveness and malleability for future unforeseen conflicts.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
- What problems does Army unpreparedness create when a crisis arrives?
- How does political influence affect the readiness of the Army to engage in war?
- What problems did the Army experience upon entering World War I?
- Discuss the “Return to Normalcy” after conflicts and its implications on military structure.
- What are the drawbacks of federal control over the states’ National Guard units?
- What lessons did the Army learn from their participation in the Spanish-American War and the Mexican Punitive Expedition?
- Which force is better able to defend America – Army or Navy?
Chapter 6: When the Smoke Clears: The Interwar Years as an Unlikely Success Story
Michael R. Matheny
pages 155-174

SUMMARY
Following World War I, the United States Army entered an extended period of drawdown characterized by extreme fiscal constraint that resulted in vastly reduced manpower, force structure, equipment, and readiness. Well before the Great Depression in 1929, the Army felt the effects of the federal government’s rush to economize and return to “normalcy” in an era with few perceived security threats. The challenge faced by Army leadership in the interwar years was how to make the most of the few resources allocated to the Army.

Many historians view the interwar years as a time of stagnation that left the Army unprepared for the immense challenges of World War II. In fact, given the circumstances, Army leadership did well by choosing to invest in officer education and the study of war. Returning from World War I, General John J. Pershing reinvigorated the professional military education system, specifically the Command and Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, and the National War College located in Washington, D.C. With few troops to train and armed with increasingly antiquated equipment, the only realistic preparation for modern war could only occur in the class room. Officers were routinely sent to Army schools, and education was a priority for promotion. In the school system, the Army was able to cultivate talent and study the challenges of modern war. Specifically, the Command and Staff School and the War College prepared the future leaders of World War II in national mobilization and large unit operations. Virtually all the U.S. corps, army, army group, and theater commanders in World War II were graduates of this school system, which focused on how to project, maneuver, and sustain large unit operations. It was not enough that America had the industrial potential to overmatch its enemies; it had to develop a talented pool of officers capable of projecting, maneuvering and sustaining this military power on a global scale in order to win World War II.

Postconflict drawdowns are an inevitable part of the operational cycle and institutional life of the Army. The Army leadership in the interwar years understood that the investment in human intellectual capital provided a hedge against the unknown future. As summed up by Lieutenant General “Lightning Joe” Collings when reflecting on the interwar period, “It was our schools that saved the Army.”
Chapter 6: When the Smoke Clears: The Interwar Years as an Unlikely Success Story
Michael R. Matheny
pages 155-174

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

➤ How can the U.S. Army maintain readiness and preparation for war during periods of fiscal constraint and postwar drawdowns?

➤ What realistic options did the U.S. Army have during the interwar years to maintain readiness and training?

➤ How do you decide or balance investments in technology, equipment, training, or education? Is a balanced approach the best way to prepare for an unknown or unknowable future security threats?

➤ How do you hedge against future risk in structuring, equipping, or manning Army forces? What are the risks? The consequences?
Chapter 7: Searching for the Greatest Generation’s Army in 1950
Scott Bertinetti and John A. Bonin

pages 175-189

SUMMARY

“Searching for the Greatest Generation’s Army” explores some of the challenges the U.S. Army faced at the end of World War II with mass demobilization. The end of the largest war in the nation’s history reintroduced the age-old liberty dilemma: the loss of the existential threat also removed the need for a large army. This chapter reveals an added economic component to the dilemma, as the large wartime army required tremendous resources. Moreover, the burgeoning postwar economy needed the manpower of returning GIs to help convert war industries back to civilian uses. The United States seemed, yet again, unready for the world leadership role thrust upon it, but the growing menace from its erstwhile Soviet ally forced it to accept that role. The overseas occupation forces occupations of Germany and Japan became bulwarks against the spread of communism but required many more troops than had the post–World War I occupations. Bertinetti and Bonin contend that the U.S. monopoly on the atomic bomb seemed to obviate the need for a large standing military. While President Harry S. Truman favored Universal Military Training (UNT) to mitigate the problems incurred in mass mobilization, Congress disagreed.

President Truman extended the liberty dilemma in a speech announcing military support of Greece and Turkey in 1947. In a strategy to be termed the “Truman Doctrine,” committed the United States to a pattern of international engagement that extends to the present. This engagement became all the more important after the Soviet Union developed its own atomic bomb. The State Department’s National Security Council Report–68 identified the probable failure of the U.S. atomic bombs to deter Soviet expansionism. Despite this, the Army suffered in comparison to the other services. The Army appeared less technologically advanced than the Navy and the new Air Force in a world that seemed to require such attributes. Moreover, the Army had lost both end strength and infrastructure to the Air Force under the National Security Act of 1947, which created the Department of Defense and the Air Force.

Bertinetti and Bonin identify Korea as a flashpoint in the Cold War to contain worldwide communism. The events there in June 1950 demonstrated just how damaging the post–World War II drawdown and concomitant development of the nuclear deterrent had been. The U.S. Army had withdrawn from Korea in 1949, so when the North Korean Army attacked South Korea, only a small group of advisors remained. The U.S. Army of 1950 faced a new war well short of its authorizations while most of the soldiers in Japan belonged to badly understrength divisions scattered throughout the country on occupation duty. Bertinetti and Bonin conclude that the Korean attack exposed the main flaw in Truman’s nuclear strategy: The supposed nuclear deterrent failed to prevent the attack, as it also failed to deter the widening of the war with China. In addition, the U.S. now needed to redeploy significant ground forces into Western Europe to deter the Soviet Union.
Chapter 7: Searching for the Greatest Generation’s Army in 1950
Scott Bertinetti and John A. Bonin
pages 175-189

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

- What is the “liberty dilemma?” How does this chapter illustrate this?
- Why didn’t the United States Army adopt Universal Military Training after 1945? What impact did technology have on US military policy?
- What was the Truman Doctrine? How did it impact U. S. Policy?
- In what ways was the U.S. Army unprepared for the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950? Why did this matter?
- What was NSC 68? What impact did it have on US national security policy after June 1950?
- How did the U.S. respond to the possibility of Soviet aggression in Europe during the Korean War?
- What is the importance of historical context in any discussion of US military reduction and growth before and during the Korean War?
Chapter 8: The Post-Korean War Drawdown under the Eisenhower Administration
Raymond Millen
pages 190-207

SUMMARY
The post-Korean War military drawdown was unique because it was aligned with the Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration’s Basic National Security Policy (BNSP), informally known as the New Look. As the Eisenhower National Security Council (NSC) conducted an appraisal of the Cold War strategic environment in 1953, it had to reconcile two competing grand strategies developed during the Harry S. Truman Administration. The mobilization strategy as articulated by NSC-68 viewed the Soviet Union as bent on expansion through military aggression and recommended industrial and military preparations for such an eventuality. NSC 20/4, on the other hand, viewed Soviet behavior as a continuation of traditional Russian foreign policy, seeking expansion by means short of a general war. Hence, containment of the Soviet Union would yield success in the long term. Because the strategies were so politically divisive, the Eisenhower NSC elected to conduct an exercise, called Solarium, composed of national security experts organized into three teams. Over a period of six weeks, each team studied different strategy alternatives: revised containment, a circumscribed line around the Soviet bloc, and the rollback of the Soviet empire. In his decision and guidance to the NSC, President Eisenhower adopted the best features of each strategy option, explaining that the strategy development process was just beginning. Of significance, the NSC deliberated over the draft strategy papers for three months before approving the BNSP (NSC 162/2), which essentially adopted a containment strategy based on nuclear deterrence. Accordingly, the essential elements of the BNSP were continental defense, conventional land forces, nuclear weapons, reserve forces and strategic airpower. In his public references to the New Look, Eisenhower stressed the need for a balanced military tied to a formal grand strategy in order to safeguard and nurture the American economy, democratic institutions, and spiritual strength. In contrast to other post-war periods, Eisenhower’s military drawdown was prudent, occurring over a period of years, and modified as the NSC revised the BNSP.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

- What were the national security shortcomings of NSC-68 in terms of U.S. economic health, democratic institutions, and foreign relations?
- Was NSC 20/4’s containment strategy too passive for the dynamic competition of the Cold War?
- In what ways could future administrations employ the design of the Solarium exercise to formulate grand strategy?
- What were the essential elements of the BNSP and how did they mutually interact to buttress deterrence?
- Explain how changes in the strategic environment prompted modifications of the BNSP?
- Although the Kennedy Administration abandoned the BNSP and subsequent administrations never developed a formal grand strategy, did the basic premises of the New Look hold true regarding the fall of the Soviet Union?
Martin G. Clemis
pages 208-240

SUMMARY
This chapter examines the impact of defense cuts enacted under the Eisenhower administration on U.S. Army combat proficiency during the Vietnam War. It argues that despite considerable reduction in funding, numbers, and prestige under Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy, the Army retained enough of its core competencies to be quickly rehabilitated and brought back to fighting trim by the mid-1960s. Under the defense buildup of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, known as “Flexible Response,” the Army rapidly regained the manpower and force structure necessary to conduct non-nuclear combat operations in support of U.S. national policy objectives in the Far East. By 1965, the year American combat troops were first introduced into South Vietnam, the Army had been refashioned into what was arguably one of the most well-trained and effective combat forces ever fielded by the United States. When examining the American military experience in Vietnam within the historical context of military drawdowns, it is obvious that cuts in the national defense budget and force structure can and have been reversed within a relatively short period of time. Although Vietnam has shown to be the historical exception rather than the rule in this matter, America’s combat record in Southeast Asia – regardless of the war’s failed outcome – demonstrates that the Army has at times been able to quickly rehabilitate itself when called upon and when given the resources it needs to address current and emerging national security threats.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
- What were the underlying principles behind Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy and what impact did austerity measures have on the U.S. Army during the 1950s?
- What were the underlying principles behind “Flexible Response” and how did the Kennedy and Johnson administration’s defense buildup influence U.S. Army doctrine during the early 1960s?
- What was the U.S. Army’s purpose in South Vietnam and how did the Kennedy / Johnson buildup affect this mission?
- What metrics were used to assess U.S. Army combat proficiency in the Vietnam War? Do these seem reasonable?
- What does the American combat experience in Vietnam tell us about military drawdowns?
Chapter 10: Post-Vietnam Drawdown: The Myths of the Abrams Doctrine
Conrad C. Crane

SUMMARY
More than a decade after the end of the Vietnam War, writers began to mention the “Abrams Doctrine,” a restructuring of the U.S. Army supposedly motivated by the desire of Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams to avoid another conflict like that in Southeast Asia by forcing the president to mobilize the reserves for any military contingency. Such an interpretation seems a questionable usurping of the president’s constitutional prerogatives. If that was the actual intent of Abrams’ policy then it also failed miserably to limit innumerable Army deployments in the 1990s and beyond. However, the actual historical record shows that the Army’s reorientation of the reserve component started many years before Abrams became chief of staff of the Army, so it was not really his initiative. In addition, his further adjustments to the force structure were more a product of his astute assessment about what he could maintain for the active component of an Army dealing with the new “Total Force” policy, fiscal realities connected to a significant drawdown, perceived mission requirements, and the completion of the shift to an all-volunteer armed force. His force structure did indeed perform well in meeting Cold War missions and successfully executing Operation Desert Storm, but it proved inadequate to meet the expanding number of stability operations required during the 1990s.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

- What motivated the Army to concentrate more combat support and combat service support assets in the reserve component in the years after the conclusion of the Vietnam War?
- How was Creighton Abrams able to get his reforms implemented?
- What was the impact of those changes on future operations?
- Should the Army have some control over the ability of political leaders to use it?
- Despite evidence to the contrary, why has the “myth of the Abrams Doctrine” persisted?
Chapter 11: The “Good” Drawdown: The Post-Vietnam Alignment of Resources
Antulio J. Echevarria II
Pages 253-266

SUMMARY
Military personnel often think of “drawdowns” in a negative sense. However, that does not always have to be the case. After the Vietnam conflict, the US Army underwent a drawdown that was not just a reduction in numbers, but part of a major reform effort. The Army (and the other services) received new equipment, recruited better quality personnel, and rededicated itself to a mission—deterrence—that was at once new and traditional. The Persian Gulf conflict of 1990-91 provided proof of the success of those reforms.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
- What was different about the US Army’s drawdown in the post-Vietnam era compared to its previous drawdowns?
- How did the US Army improve its quality of personnel?
- What improvements did it make in operational doctrine?
- How effective was that doctrine with regard to the so-called “lesser-included” missions?
- How does the “operational level of war” differ from “operational art”?
- How significant were weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to NATO’s deterrence mission?
- How critical was the Reagan administration’s defense policy to the US Army’s rebirth?
- Could the Army’s rebirth have succeeded without the “Big Five”?
- How did the Army’s senior leaders influence NATO’s deterrence mission?
- How did the Army rebuild the American public’s trust after Vietnam?
Chapter 12: Preaching after the Devil’s Death: U.S. Post-Cold War Drawdown
Richard A. Lacquement Jr.

SUMMARY
The post-Cold War drawdown of U.S. armed forces between the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) is a fascinating story with rich material for analyzing Americans’ understanding of their nation’s place on the world stage and the appropriate role for their armed forces. Over more than a decade, American national security leaders, both civilian and military, sought to adjust U.S. defense posture in light of the new context. Through the course of several reviews—Base Force, Bottom Up Review, Commission on Roles and Missions, and the first two Quadrennial Defense Reviews—leaders sought to set the framework for the armed forces’ role and structure. The overall result was a one third reduction of the armed forces without significant restructuring. The outcome built on consensus for maintaining a strong US leadership role in the world and, commensurately, a large military establishment. This conceptual continuity was the dominant impetus that accounts for the limited scope of the drawdown in overall budgetary and personnel terms. More puzzling, however, were the limited changes to force structure and vision for the Armed Forces given the changing security threats and opportunities. The subsequent performance of U.S. armed forces after 9/11 raise questions about how well civilian and military leaders managed the post-Cold War drawdown to anticipate future security needs.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
- In what ways did the post Cold War drawdown differ from other drawdowns?
- What were the major elements in US strategy and policy that affected the envisioned role and size of the armed forces in the wake of the Cold War?
- What are some of the key elements of civil military relations relevant to the post-Cold War drawdown?
- Who are the key actors and constituencies in the debates about the role and size of American Armed Forces?
- What were the main differences between Republicans and Democrats as the affected defense in the post-Cold War era?
- What accounts for the tremendous continuity in US force structure and doctrine after the Cold War?
- How well or poorly did US decisions about force structure and doctrine during the post-Cold War drawdown served the United States in subsequent conflicts?