




UNITED STATES ARMY



LAW ENFORCEMENT REPORT

DOCUMENT COVER SHEET

(AR 190-45/AR 195-2)

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U.S. ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND

Command Intelligence Operations Center

(U//FOUO//LES) Fiscal Year 2019 (FY19) Gang Activity Threat Assessment (GATA) 31 March 2020

A collage of images on a black background. On the left is a photograph of a man in a military uniform with his arms crossed. On the right is a photograph of a person on a motorcycle with a skull and crossbones on the back. In the center, the text "STREET AND OUTLAW MOTORCYCLE GANGS" is written in large, white, bold letters. At the bottom left is a logo for "Support Your Local Outlaws" featuring a skull and two pistols. At the bottom right is a red flyer for a "Red and Gold pool tournament, 50/50 raffle and auction" on September 28th at 4pm. The flyer is for the "SIPPIANS R C" (Red and Gold) chapter, located at 11995 Hwy 45 N, Columbus, MS. Contact information for Sesson Polite (662-352-1931) is provided. The flyer also states "\$10 entry, Double elimination. Monies from proceeds will go to Bandido Hettie Meridian Chapter."

This document is intended for U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) personnel with a need to know. Further dissemination of this report should be limited to a minimum, consistent with the purpose for which the record has been furnished, i.e., effective enforcement of civil and criminal law. Additional release requires prior approval from the CG, CID (CICG-ZA), 27130 Telegraph Road, Quantico, VA 22134.

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
1. (U) Purpose:

(U) This assessment provides findings and recommendations for gang activity affecting U.S. Army assets. This assessment is based on criminal investigations, intelligence collection, and analysis. The data and information contained within covers events occurring between 1 November 2018 and 31 October 2019. This report includes relevant, updated and detailed information on several key aspects of gang activity observed in FY19.

2. (U//FOUO) Facts:


a. (U//FOUO) Threat Level. The overall threat posed by gangs is assessed by calculating the percentage of gang related criminal investigations on an installation. The following rating scale was utilized in determining the threat levels for this assessment: NEGLIGIBLE - 0%; LOW - 0.1% - 3.0%; MODERATE - 3.1% - 6.0%; HIGH - 6.1% - higher.

(U//FOUO) The overall threat posed by gangs on Army installations is assessed as **LOW**. Of the 12,516 felony Law Enforcement Reports (LERs) initiated in FY19, there were 64 (0.51%) LERs with known or suspected gang member involvement. Of the 64 LERs, 51 were street gang and 13 were Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMG) related.



(U//FOUO) LERs and CRIMINT reporting

(U//FOUO) During FY19, 245 individuals with an Army nexus were identified through either an LER or a criminal intelligence report (CRIMINT) as belonging to or associating with either a street gang or OMG. Of these 245 individuals, 101 (41%) belonged to or were associated with street gangs and 144 (58%) belonged to or were associated with an OMG.



(U//FOUO) LERs by LE Entity

(U//FOUO) The 64 LERs generated during FY19 is a decrease of 20% from FY18 wherein 80 LERs were produced. During FY18, street gangs accounted for 64 LERs and OMG accounted for 16 LERs.

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b. (U//FOUO) Findings.

(1) (U//FOUO) Street Gangs.

(U//FOUO) The threat from street gangs against the U.S. Army is assessed as LOW (.40%). Of the 12,516 LERs initiated by CID in FY19, 51 involved street gangs. The crimes committed are indicative of known street gang behavior for obtaining territory, earning money, or maintaining respect. Of the 51 LER involving street gangs, 39 (76 %) were related to activities occurring on an Army installation. Analysis of the 39 LERs revealed 11 drug charges, such as positive urinalysis or possession of a controlled substance; 12 traffic violations, such as driving under the influence (DUI) and driving with suspended licenses; and 16 other varied offenses, to include assault on a child, communicating a threat and sexual assault. There were 12 (23%) LERs documenting off post incidents, with 2 of those pertaining to collateral murder investigations involving Soldier subjects.

(U//FOUO) The 51 investigations involving street gang members identified 25 active duty Soldiers subjects and 26 civilian subjects. Analysis of the 25 active duty Soldier subjects revealed 22 (88%) were African American and 3 (12%) were Caucasian. Twenty two (88%) of the Soldier subjects were male and 14 (56%) were single. Of the 25 active duty subjects, 17 (68%) were 20-24 years of age and 8 (32%) were 25-29 years of age. All 25 active duty Soldiers were junior enlisted (E1-E5), with 23 (92%) having an education no higher than a GED or high school diploma. Of those 25 active duty Soldiers, 11 (44%) held secret clearances, 1 (4%) held a top secret and 13 (52%) held no clearance.

(U//FOUO) In addition to the 51 investigations involving street gangs, there were 50 unique CRIMINT reports associated with street gangs, which is a 43% decrease from FY18 CRIMINT reporting of 116. Out of those 50 individuals, 28 (56%) were active duty Soldiers, 3 (6%) were Army Reserve Soldiers, 2 (4%) were National Guard Soldiers, 2 (4%) DoD Contractors, and 15 (30%) were civilians. Of those civilians, 13 had no DOD affiliation, 1 was a dependent and 1 was a foreign civilian.

(U//FOUO) A review of the 50 CRIMINT reports revealed the ranks of the Soldiers involved ranged from PV2 to SSG, along with 1 MAJ.

(U) Examples of street gang incidents:

(U//LES) On 16 January 2019, CID conducted a joint investigation with a local civilian police department after an active duty SGT was accused of an off post murder. The investigation revealed the SGT drove a non-DoD civilian to a residence off post

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(U//LES) Soldier identified as a Gangster Disciple

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wherein the civilian shot and killed another non-DoD civilian following a gang related altercation at a local night club.

(U//LES) On 12 April 2019, Military Police discovered a vehicle parked in the wood-line of a training area on post. Upon inspection of the vehicle, an unresponsive civilian was discovered. A search of the vehicle revealed a small baggie containing a brownish white powdery substance. The civilian eventually regained consciousness and admitted the bag contained an illicit drug and that he was a previous member of the Texas Syndicate.



(U//LES) Soldier wearing riding vest

(2) (U//FOUO) OMG.

(U//FOUO) The threat from OMGs and their support clubs against the Army is assessed as LOW (.10%). Of the 12,516 CID LERs initiated in FY19, 13 involved OMGs. The reporting associated with OMGs is indicative of known OMG behavior of obtaining territory, earning money and maintaining respect. Out of the 13 LERs pertaining to OMG, 6 (46%) involved off post incidents and 7 (53%) occurred on an Army installation. Of the seven LERs on an Army installation, one involved a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon discovered during a traffic stop, one was an unlawful entry on a military installation and possession of a firearm, three were wrongful possession of illegal drugs, one was destruction of government property, and one involved a traffic violation.



(U//LES) Picture of retired Soldier wearing Mongols riding vest at a VA medical Center.

(U//FOUO) Of the 13 investigations involving OMGs and their support clubs and having an Army nexus, 4 (30%) involved active duty Soldiers, 1 (7%) was an Army Reserve Soldier, 1 (7%) was a retired Soldier, 3 (23%) involved former Soldiers, and 4 (30%) involved civilians. Analysis of the active duty and reserve component Soldiers revealed one (20%) was African American, four (80%) were Caucasian and all were male. Of the five active and reserve component Soldiers, three (60%) were 24-27 years of age and two (40%) were 50-51 years of age. Three (60%) of the Soldiers were junior enlisted (E2-E5), one (20%) was senior enlisted (E7), and one (20%) was a field grade

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officer (O5). Of the five Soldiers, two had Secret security clearance and three had no clearance.

(U//FOUO) In addition to the 13 investigations involving OMGs there were 131 unique CRIMINT reports associated with OMGs, which is a 39% decrease from FY 18 which had 289. Out of the 131 individuals identified, 29 (25%) were active duty, 5 (4%) were Army Reserves, 6 (5%) were National Guard, 16 (14%) were retired Soldiers, 18 (15%) were former Soldiers, 7 (6%) were DoD Contractors and 50 (38%) were civilians. Of those 50 civilians, 45 were non-DoD affiliated and 5 were dependent spouses.

(U//FOUO) A review of the 131 CRIMINT reports revealed the ranks of the Soldiers involved ranged from PVT to LTC, with a significant number of higher ranked Soldiers. There were 14 SFC, 3 MSG, 1 SGM, 1 CW2, 1 1LT, 2 MAJ, and 1 LTC identified in CRIMINT reports.

(U) Examples of OMG incidents:

(U//FOUO) On 1 March 2019, CRIMINT reporting revealed that an active duty SSG was stopped by LE and was identified as wearing a Mongols OMG riding vest. An interview of the SSG was conducted wherein the SSG admitted to being a member of the Mongols OMG for the last three to four years.

(U//FOUO) On 3 February 2019, a Soldier notified the MP that she had received threatening phone calls from a civilian off post who threaten to travel to her residence on post. Upon arrival, the MPs contacted the Soldier who explained the situation. While at the scene, the civilian who threatened the Soldier arrived at which point the MPs apprehended him after they saw a pistol in his waistband. During the course of the investigation, it was determined, through self-admittance, that the civilian was a member of the Hells Egos MC, a support club for Hell's Lovers OMG.

3. (U//FOUO) Observations:

(U//FOUO) Serious gang related crime events are most likely to occur in off-post locations. The MP and CID leaders must maintain active liaison with local law enforcement officials. Gangs are a regional threat. Local law enforcement authorities have the area specific expertise to inform crime prevention efforts, to include "off-limits" decisions by the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board.

(U//FOUO) The Army should expect inquiries from Congress and media interest reference Soldier participation in criminal gangs and extremist groups. The House Armed Services Committee has held recent hearings on Extremist Activity in the Military.

(U//FOUO) The Army has an image problem with law enforcement agencies reference Soldier participation in OMG. The original OMG were formed by former Soldiers following WWII. There was a resurgence in OMG activity during the Vietnam Conflict.

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Currently, veterans are well-represented in named OMG. Additionally, there are non-OMG clubs with Soldier members that wear 3-piece patches and outwardly portray the OMG lifestyle without the organized criminal activity. It is difficult to reconcile the “protect America” image during duty hours with the “scare the public” image on weekends.

(U//FOUO) Current Army LE response to allegations of gang participation (short of a criminal act) is notification of the chain of command for action IAW AR 600-20 and notification of DoDCAF/INSCOM for personnel security/suitability adjudication. Commander notification of Soldier participation in alleged gang activity is made via an information report, rather than issuance of a Law Enforcement Report.

4. (U//FOUO) Recommendations for Commanders:

(U//FOUO) Commanders should continue to ensure Soldiers comply with Army Regulation (AR) 600-20 (Army Command Policy) and DoDI 1325.06 (Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces). Penalties for violations of these prohibitions include the full range of statutory and regulatory sanctions, both criminal and administrative. In accordance with AR 600-20, military personnel must reject active participation in criminal gangs and other organizations that advocate supremacist, extremist, or criminal gang doctrine, ideology or causes. Examples of active participation include fundraising, recruiting, wearing colors or clothing, or having tattoos or body markings associated with gangs. This would also apply to OMG support clubs. Commanders should provide information discovered about this type of activity to Army law enforcement to aid in crime prevention efforts.

(U//FOUO) Commanders should continue to pursue and identify Soldiers engaged in gang activities and report suspected gang members to military law enforcement.

(U//FOUO) Commanders, MP and CID should continue to report gang members that are confirmed by other law enforcement agencies to the Soldier's security officer in accordance with AR 380-67 (Personnel Security Program), 24 January 2014. Commanders are required to report criminal activity, drug use, and affiliation with, or membership in, a gang.

5. (U//FOUO) Additional Information:

(U//FOUO) The CID has partnered with Army Corrections Command to incorporate prison-intelligence into the total Army CRIMINT effort. This initiative will ensure prison-derived information is shared with CID and other law enforcement agencies for further analysis and investigation. Additionally, both agencies have partnered with the FBI's Correction Intelligence Initiative.

(U//FOUO) The CID has also partnered with the FBI National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC) to incorporate national gang intelligence into the Army CRIMINT effort. This initiative integrates gang intelligence from across federal, state, and local law

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enforcement and provides critical information on the growth, migration, criminal activity, and association of gangs that pose a significant threat to the U.S., as well as Army installations. The NGIC is manned by analysts from multiple federal agencies and provides a plethora of knowledge and assistance to Army CID. Agencies include the ATF, U.S. Marshals, Drug Enforcement Agency, Bureau of Prisons, and Department of Homeland Security. The databases of each component agency provide valuable information to the CID, permitting centralized access to information. In addition, CID's relationship with the NGIC provides operational and analytical support for investigations.

6. (U) Intelligence Gaps: There are many challenges in measuring and assessing the gang threats within the U.S. Army. Quantitative information regarding gang activity is limited and the data available is not necessarily comprehensive. This limitation is due to the variations in state and local gang reporting and regulations. Many states, including California, stopped entering individuals in gang databases due to lawsuits. Additionally, not all Army law enforcement entities are properly documenting their encounters with a gang. Furthermore, the ability of law enforcement agencies to collect and report detailed gang information electronically varies. Lastly, not all gang members are known to law enforcement, resulting in the underreporting of gang-involved criminal activity. Also contributing to this gap, the number of gang members in the Army is dynamic; new members enter undetected, gangs regularly seek new recruits, and existing members move through permanent change of station (PCS) and deployments.

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APPROVED BY COL (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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(U//FOUO) Appendix A

Gangs and Groups Identified in Investigations and CRIMINT in FY19

Street Gangs involved in LER

2X Crew, 3D, All Mighty Conservative Vice Lords, Black P Stone Nation, Bloods, Chuco Tango, Crips, Gangster Disciples, Husker, Juggalo, Knock Out Kings, Mexican Mafia, Norteno, Rolling 60's Crip, Sureno, Swaggers, Tango Blast, Team Krooked, Texas Syndicate, and Treyside Bloods.

Street Gangs involved in CRIMINT

107 Hoover, 4 Corner Hustlers, 8-Trey Gangsters, All Mighty Conservative Vice Lords, Black Gangster Disciples, Bloods, Cream 2K, Crip, Folk/Gangster Disciples, Gangster Disciples, MS-13, Vatos Locos, My Brothers Keepers, Northerner, Polo Dwon, Rolling 60's Crip, Rosemont Imperial Gangster, Treyway Bloods, United Bloods Nation, West Coast Crips.

OMG or Support Clubs involved in LER

Banshees, Blackhawks, Durdy Boyz, Hells Ego, Iron Order, Northern Riders, Outcast, Unforgiven Renegades, Wheels of Soul.

OMG or Support Clubs involved in CRIMINT

Bad Seven, Bandidos, Banshee, Black Queens, Black Reign, Blackhawks, Brass Knuckle, Brotherhood, Cossacks, Crown Jewel, Dem Boyz, Guardian of Solace, Hells Angels, Infidels, Iron Horseman, Iron Order, Kingz, Knights of Sin, Los Commandantes, Mongols, Outcast, Pagans, Red Devils, Risen Dead, Satan Disciples, Raiders, Sin City Disciples, Sippians, Smoke, Thunderguards, Unforgiven Renegades, United Heathens, Vagos, Warlocks, Wheels of Soul.

*** This only represents reporting for FY19 and is not intended to be an all-inclusive listing of all gangs and DEs in the U.S. For assistance regarding gang and DE matters, please contact your local police or sheriff's department for groups operating in your AOR. Additional assistance can be provided by CID gang and DE analyst, Mr. (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

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(U) Appendix B Definitions

1. (U) Army Nexus: Credible information the person, group, or organization about which information is collected, has been, is, or may become involved in a crime that impacts or has an Army/DoD interest (See AR 195-2 (Criminal Investigation - Criminal Investigation Activities), 9 September 2011, para 4-3d (2), and AR 190-45 (Military Police- Law Enforcement Reporting), 30 March 2007, para 2-5, for further guidance).

2. (U) Criminal Activity: Activity that breaches the rules or laws for which some governing authority (via mechanisms such as legal systems) can ultimately prescribe a conviction. Criminal activity could include misdemeanor or felony crimes.

3. (U) Criminal Intelligence (CRIMINT): Complaints, allegations, raw data, or other pertinent information that was collected, evaluated, retained, and/or appropriately disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor criminal activity. The documentation of this type of reporting is neither a validation nor confirmation that a gang-related incident or crime occurred, but is used to help identify criminals and known or suspected criminal groups. This type of reporting is primarily used to document suspect gang affiliation or crimes or incidents for which there is no suspect.

4. (U) Gang: There is no uniform definition of “Gang.” In FY12, CID adopted the following standardized definition derived from the Department of Justice. An association of three or more individuals whose members collectively identify themselves by adopting a group identity that they use to create an atmosphere of fear or intimidation frequently by employing one or more of the following: a common name, slogan, identifying sign, symbol, tattoo or other physical marking, style or color of clothing, hairstyle, hand sign, or graffiti. The association's purpose, in part, is to engage in criminal activity and the association uses violence or intimidation to further its criminal objectives. Its members engage in criminal activity or acts of juvenile delinquency, that if committed by an adult, would be crimes, with the intent to enhance or preserve the association's power, reputation, or economic resources. This definition is not intended to include traditional organized crime groups, such as La Cosa Nostra, or groups that fall within the department's definition of “international organized crime,” drug-trafficking organizations or terrorist organizations. The association may also possess some of the following characteristics:

- a. (U) The members employ rules for joining and operating within the association;
- b. (U) The members meet on a recurring basis;
- c. (U) The association provides physical protection to its members from other criminals and gangs;
- d. (U) The association seeks to exercise control over a particular location or region, or it may simply defend its perceived interests against rivals; or

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e. (U) The association has an identifiable structure.

5. (U) Gang Member: There is no uniform definition of a “*gang member*.” In FY06, CID adopted the following standardized definition derived from the National Crime Information Center. The following criteria must exist with respect to any individual suspected or identified as a gang member:

a. (U) Self-reported member of a gang, through verbal or written communication; or

b. (U) Meets any two of the following:

i. (U) Has been identified as a gang member by an individual of proven reliability;

ii. (U) Identified as a gang member by an individual of unknown reliability, but information has been corroborated in significant respects;

iii. (U) Observed by law enforcement members to frequent a known gang’s area;

iv. (U) Associates with known gang members;

v. (U) Displays a gang’s known style of dress, tattoos, hand signals, or symbols;

vi. (U) Arrested on more than one occasion with known gang members,

vii. (U) Admitted membership in gang at any time other than at the time of current arrest/incarceration.

6. (U) Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMG): OMGs are organizations whose members use their motorcycle clubs as conduits for criminal enterprises. The OMGs are highly structured criminal organizations whose members engage in criminal activities such as violent crime, weapons trafficking, and drug-trafficking. There are more than 300 active OMGs within the U.S., ranging in size from single chapters with 5 or 6 members to hundreds of chapters with thousands of members worldwide. The Hells Angels, Mongols, Bandidos, Outlaws, and Sons of Silence, pose a serious national domestic threat and conduct the majority of criminal activity linked to OMGs, especially activity relating to drug-trafficking and, more specifically, to cross-border drug smuggling. Because of their transnational scope, these OMGs are able to coordinate drug smuggling operations in partnership with major international drug-trafficking organizations.