About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.


The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

*Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government en-
gaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate
with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete
access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and
by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted
in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are avail-
able for review at the National Archives and Records Administration
(Archives II) in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to
all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central
files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the
Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the De-
partment’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of interna-
tional conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with
foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memo-
randa of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State
and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. The
records that constitute the Department’s central files for 1981–1989,
which were stored in electronic and microfilm formats, will eventually
be transferred to the National Archives. Once these files are declassi-
fied and processed, they will be accessible. All of the Department’s de-
centralized office files from this period that the National Archives
deems worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be trans-
ferred to the National Archives where they will be available for use
after declassification and processing.

Research for Foreign Relations volumes is undertaken through spe-
cial access to restricted documents at the Ronald Reagan Presidential
Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this vol-
ume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified
documents. The staff of the Reagan Library is processing and declassifying
many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be
available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers
maintained and preserved at the Reagan Library include some of the
most significant foreign affairs related documentation from White
House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies in-
cluding the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in
Reagan Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive
Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the Na-
tional Archives and Records Administration’s Office of Presidential Li-
braries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still classified
records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way
in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the Foreign
Relations series were not always able to determine whether attachments
to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Reagan Library file. In such cases, some editors of the Foreign Relations series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were “Not found attached.”

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type.

Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type).

The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important docu-
ments and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

_Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation_

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the _Foreign Relations_ statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records.

The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

_Declassification Review_

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2014 and was completed in 2015, resulted in the decision to withhold no documents in full, and to make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 12 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.  
General Editor

Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.  
The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs
March, 2016
Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series


This volume tracks the Reagan administration’s efforts to construct a new framework for U.S. relations with the Soviet Union after the collapse of détente. It commences with Ronald Reagan’s election on November 4, 1980, and concludes with his approval of National Security Decision Directive 75, “U.S. Relations With the USSR,” on January 17, 1983. The main principles guiding the selection of documents were whether they shed light on high-level diplomacy between Washington and Moscow or the formulation of U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union.

At the outset of the Reagan administration, Secretary of State Alexander Haig sought to be the “vicar” of foreign policy. He took the lead on Soviet matters, flanked by State Department officials Walter Stoessel, Lawrence Eagleburger, and Richard Burt. Haig clashed with White House officials, jostled with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and refused to send copies of his memoranda of conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Richard Pipes, the chief Soviet adviser on the National Security Council staff.

President Reagan decided to restore the status of the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs which he had previously diminished to avoid the internal conflicts that plagued three previous administrations. Reagan appointed William Clark on January 4, 1982 to
succeed Richard Allen. On June 25, he accepted Haig’s resignation and asked former Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz to be the next Secretary of State.

With his new team in place that summer, Reagan signed off on the terms of reference for a comprehensive strategic review of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, National Security Study Directive 11–82, “U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union.” The result, National Security Decision Directive 75, which Pipes drafted, begins: “U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity, outstanding disagreements.”


Additionally, there were three cases of Soviet human rights abuses that drew and sustained President Reagan’s attention: refusenik and activist Anatoly Shcharanskiy, imprisoned on charges of treason; nuclear physicist-turned-dissident Andrei Sakharov, sentenced to in-

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to thank officials at the Ronald Reagan Library, especially Cate Sewell and Lisa Jones, and the Library of Congress, especially Ernest Emrich. Thanks are also due to the Central Intelligence Agency for arranging access to the Reagan Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project. The History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency was accommodating in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency; Sandy Meagher was helpful in providing access to Department of Defense materials. The editor also thanks the staff at the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland, for their valuable assistance. The editor wishes to extend a special thanks to Sherwood “Woody” Goldberg.

James Graham Wilson collected, selected, and edited the documentation for this volume under the supervision of David Geyer, Chief of the Europe Division, who reviewed the volume. Stephen Randolph, The Historian, and Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Chief of the Global Issues and General Division, also reviewed the volume. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division. Erin F. Cozens performed the technical and copy editing. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.
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Sources


The White House Staff and Office Files at the Reagan Library illuminate high-level decision making toward the Soviet Union during the period January 1981–January 1983. Therein are files of the Executive Secretariat, which include key collections such as the USSR Country File, the Head of State File, National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), National Security Council (NSC) Meeting Files, and the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) files; in some instances, the original versions of NSDDs and minutes of NSC and NSPG meetings and their preparatory material remain at the National Security Council in Washington. Key collections of individuals are the files of National Security Advisors Robert “Bud” McFarlane and William Clark as well as those of Director of East European and Soviet Affairs Richard Pipes, some of whose files are included in the collection of his successor, Jack Matlock. Also at the Reagan Library is a set of the George Shultz papers housed at the Hoover Institution in Palo Alto.

The Central Foreign Policy File of the Department of State includes the cable traffic between Washington and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Key lot files include: Lot 83D288, Alexander Haig’s Correspondence with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, DCI Casey, and Meetings with the President, 1981–1982; Lot 84D204, Department of State, Executive Secretary, S/S—I Records: Lawrence Eagleburger Files; Lot 85D308; Files of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam; and Lot 93D188, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990 Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188. The National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland will eventually include these collections as part of Record Group 59 (RG 59); at printing, they are in various stages of accession.

Key documents pertaining to U.S. strategy and policies toward the Soviet Union are in the 1981 and 1982 DAY FILE in the personal papers of Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. at the Library of Congress. Special access was granted to Department of State historians with the kind permission of the Estate of Secretary Haig.
XVI  Sources

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Foreign Policy File
Lot Files
Lot 82D127; Files of Deputy Secretary William P. Clark, January 1981–1982
Lot 82D128; Official Papers of Counselor McFarlane, 1981–1982
Lot 82D307; Files of Walter Stoessel
Lot 82D370; Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Secretary of State, 1981–1982: Very Sensitive Documents
Lot 83D288; Alexander Haig’s Correspondence with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, DCI Casey, and Meetings with the President, 1981–1982
Lot 83D229; Files of the Special Assistant to the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, June 1981–June 1983.
Lot 84D204, Executive Secretary, S/S-I Records: Lawrence Eagleburger Files
Lot 85D308; Files of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam
Lot 87D327; Secretary Haig Memcons, January–December 1981, Secretary Shultz Memcons, August–December 1982, October–Dec 1985, January–November 1986
Lot 88D99; Exdis Memoranda of the Secretariat, 1981; Nodis Memoranda, 1981
Lot 89D149; Memoranda/Correspondence From the Director of Policy Planning to the Secretary and Other Principals, January 1981–January 1989
Lot 92D252; 1 January 1984–21 January 1988 Executive Secretariat Sensitive (ES) and Super Sensitive Documents
Lot 92D630; Not For the System Documents, 1979–1989; Evening Reading, 1980–1989
Lot 93D562; Secto and Tosec Telegrams, 1982.
Lot 96D262; Executive Secretariat, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California

National Security Council Intelligence Files

White House Staff and Office Files

Executive Secretariat, National Security Council
Agency File
Cable File
Country File: USSR
Head of State File
Subject File
National Security Decision Directives
National Security Council Meeting File
National Security Planning Group
Weekly Reports
Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Files
Dennis Blair Files
William Clark Files
Timothy Deal Files
European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC, 1983-89
Jack Matlock Files
Robert “Bud” McFarlane Files
Edwin Meese Files
James “Bud” Nance Files
Richard Pipes Files
John Poindexter Files
President’s Daily Diary

Personal Papers
Charles Hill Papers
George Shultz Papers

Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

Manuscript Division
Papers of Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Papers of Caspar W. Weinberger

National Security Council

National Security Council Institutional Files
National Security Council meetings
National Security Planning Group meetings
Special Situations Group meetings
Crisis Pre-Planning Group meetings
National Security Decision Directive meetings

Central Intelligence Agency

Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
Job 83M00914R: Executive Director and Executive Registry Files (1982)
Job 84B00049R: Subject Files (1981–1982)

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland


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XVIII Sources


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Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Library. www.reaganfoundation.org
Abbreviations and Terms

ABM, anti-ballistic missile
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AD, Anatoly Dobrynin
AFL–CIO, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
ALCM, air-launched cruise missile
Alpha, handling restriction
AMH, Alexander M. Haig
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/CCA, Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AWACS, Airborne Warning and Control System

BW, biological weapons
BWC, Biological Weapons Convention

C, Carter; Office of the Counselor of the Department of State; Confidential
C3I, command, control, communications, intelligence
CAT, conventional arms transfers
CBMs, confidence-building measures
CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CCD, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CD, Committee on Disarmament (U.N.)
CDE, Conference on Disarmament in Europe
CEA, Council of Economic Advisers
CEMA, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CG, Contact Group
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
COCOM, Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
COMEX, Commodity Exchange, Inc.
COS, Chief of Staff; Chief of Station
CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban
CV, Cyrus Vance
CW, chemical weapons
CWW, Caspar W. Weinberger

D, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State
DA, David Aaron
DAS, Deputy Assistant Secretary
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD, Department of Defense
DOE, Department of Energy
XX  Abbreviations and Terms

DRA, Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EDT, Eastern Daylight Time.
EC 10, the 10 nations of the European Community as of 1983
EEC, European Economic Community
EM, Edmund Muskie
EmbOff, Embassy officer
EPA, Environmental Protection Agency
ERW, enhanced radiation weapon
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Exdis, Exclusive Distribution
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FonOff, Foreign Office
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FYI, for your information
G–7, Group of Seven industrialized nations: Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GE, General Electric Company
GLCM, ground-launched cruise missile
GNP, Gross National Product
Gosbank, State Bank of the USSR
GRU, Soviet foreign military intelligence directorate
GS, George Shultz
HHS, Department of Health and Human Services
HUD, Department of Housing and Urban Development
IA, Interim Agreement
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
ICA, International Communication Agency
ICCUSA, Interagency Coordinating Committee on U.S.-Soviet Affairs
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
IG, Inspector General
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/AA, Office of Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/CA, Office of Consular Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/PMA, Office of Politico-Military Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/SEE, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
KGB, Soviet Committee for State Security
KOR, Komitet Obrony Robotnikow (Workers Defense Committee) (Poland)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDX</td>
<td>Long Distance Xerography</td>
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<tr>
<td>L/PM</td>
<td>Politico-Military Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRTNF</td>
<td>Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTA</td>
<td>Long-Term Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBFR</td>
<td>Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDS</td>
<td>Marshall D. Shulman</td>
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<tr>
<td>memcon</td>
<td>memorandum of conversation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHD</td>
<td>magnetohydrodynamics</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOLINK</td>
<td>Moscow Link (Moscow-Washington Direct Communication Link or Hot Line)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
</tr>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAS</td>
<td>National Academy of Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEA</td>
<td>Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State</td>
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<td>NF</td>
<td>No Foreign Dissemination</td>
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<td>Niact</td>
<td>Night Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nocontract</td>
<td>Not Releasable to Contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nodis</td>
<td>No Distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noform</td>
<td>Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOAA</td>
<td>National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSDD</td>
<td>National Security Decision Directive</td>
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<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Science Foundation</td>
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<td>NSPG</td>
<td>National Security Planning Group</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSSD</td>
<td>National Security Study Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTM</td>
<td>National Technical Means</td>
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<td>NYT</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMB</td>
<td>Office of Management and Budget</td>
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<td>OPD</td>
<td>Office of Policy Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orcon</td>
<td>Originator Controlled (handling restriction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSTP</td>
<td>Office of Science and Technology Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pak</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBS</td>
<td>Public Broadcasting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDRY</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>PermRep</td>
<td>Permanent Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>PL–480</td>
<td>Public Law 480, also known as Food for Peace</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNE</td>
<td>peaceful nuclear explosion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNEN</td>
<td>Peace Nuclear Explosion Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>PolCouns</td>
<td>Political Counselor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China; Policy Review Committee</td>
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<td>PRM</td>
<td>Presidential Review Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>PZPR</td>
<td>Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United Workers Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>research and development</td>
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<td>RCM</td>
<td>Robert C. McFarlane</td>
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<td>ref tel</td>
<td>reference telegram</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFE/RL</td>
<td>Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roger Channel</td>
<td>channel for communications between the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the Chief of Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>rpt</td>
<td>repeat</td>
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<tr>
<td>RR</td>
<td>Ronald Reagan</td>
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<tr>
<td>RV</td>
<td>re-entry vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State; Secret</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAG</td>
<td>Saudi Arabian Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAWG</td>
<td>Special Actions Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Special Consultative Group (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>septel</td>
<td>separate telegram</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFRC</td>
<td>Senate Foreign Relations Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIG</td>
<td>Senior Interdepartmental Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCM</td>
<td>surface-launched cruise missile; submarine-launched cruise missile; sea-launched cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/M</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of State, Marshall Shulman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNIE</td>
<td>Special National Intelligence Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/P</td>
<td>Policy Planning Staff, Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specat</td>
<td>Special Category message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/S</td>
<td>Executive Secretariat, Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Special Situations Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/S-I</td>
<td>Information Management Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/S-O</td>
<td>Duty Officer, Operations Center, Department of State</td>
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<td>SSOD</td>
<td>Special Session on Disarmament (U.N.)</td>
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UNITA, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNSYG, UN Secretary General
USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USDA, United States Department of Agriculture
USG, United States Government
USN, United States Navy
USNATO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTR, United States Trade Representative
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VOA, Voice of America

WH, White House
WHCA, White House Communications Agency
Wnintel, Warning Notice: Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved (handling restriction)
WPC, William P. Clark; World Peace Conference

Z, Zulu Time (Greenwich Mean Time)
Persons

Abrams, Elliott, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from December 1981 until July 1985
Alkhimov, V.S., Chairman of the Board of Gosbank
Allen, Lew, Jr., General, USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, until June 30, 1982
Allen, Richard V., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 21, 1981, until January 4, 1982
Anderson, Martin, Assistant to the President for Policy Development from January 1981 until February 1982
Andropov, Yuri, Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB) until May 1982; General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from November 12, 1982, until February 9, 1984
Arbatov, Georgii, Director, Soviet Institute for U.S.A. and Canada Studies
al-Assad, Hafez, President of Syria
Azrael, Jeremy, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Bailey, Norman, Director, International Economic Affairs, National Security Council staff
Baker, James A., III, White House Chief of Staff
Baker, Howard H., Senator (R-Tennessee), Senate Majority Leader
Baldrige, Malcolm H., “Mac,” Secretary of Commerce
Baltimore, Richard, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Barry, Michael, member, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Begin, Menachem, Israeli Prime Minister
Bessmertnykh, Alexander, Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington
Blackwill, Robert D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from May 1982 until June 1983
Blair, Dennis C., Commander, USN, Director, Western Europe, Political Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff
Block, John R., Secretary of Agriculture
Bogdanov, Radomir, Deputy Director, Soviet Institute for U.S.A. and Canada Studies
Boverie, Richard T., Major General, USAF, Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Brandt, Willy, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Bremer, L. Paul, III, Executive Secretary of the Department of State from February 2, 1981, until March 27, 1983
Brezhnev, Leonid, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until his death on November 10, 1982
Brock, William E., III, U.S. Trade Representative from January 1981
Buckley, James L., Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology from February 28, 1981, until August 20, 1982; Counselor of the Department of State from September 9, 1982, until September 26, 1982
Bundy, McGeorge, President Lyndon Johnson’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs until February 28, 1966
Burt, Richard R., Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from January 23, 1981, until February 17, 1982; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Bush, George H.W., Vice President of the United States
Carlucci, Frank C., III, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until February 4, 1981; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense until December 31, 1982

Carrington, Lord Peter, U.K. Foreign Minister until April 1982; Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from June 1984

Carter, Jimmy, President of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981

Casey, William J., Director of Central Intelligence from January 28, 1981

Chernenko, Konstantin U., member of the Soviet Politburo

Cheysson, Claude, French Foreign Minister

Clark, William P., Jr., Deputy Secretary of State from February 25, 1981, until February 9, 1982; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 4, 1982, until October 17, 1983; Secretary of the Interior from November 18, 1983 until February 7, 1985

Colson, Janet, Executive Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until April 1981; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from May 1981

Combs, Richard, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Cranston, Alan, Senator (D-California), Senate Minority Whip

Crocker, Chester A., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Dam, Kenneth W., Deputy Secretary of State from September 23, 1982

D’Amato, Al, Senator (R-New York)

Darbyshire, Allen, member, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Darman, Richard G., Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy to the White House Chief of Staff from January 1981 until August 1981; Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff from September 1981


Deaver, Michael K., Deputy White House Chief of Staff from January 1981

Dobriansky, Paula, member, National Security Council Staff

Dobrynin, Anatoly, Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Dyess, William, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Department of State Spokesman until July 30, 1981

Dyke, Nancy Bearg, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

Eagleburger, Lawrence S., Assistant Secretary of State-designate for European Affairs until May 14, 1981; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until January 26, 1982; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 12, 1982

Edwards, James B., Secretary of Energy

Enders, Thomas O., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from June 23, 1981, until June 27, 1983

Fontaine, Roger, member, National Security Council Staff

Friedt, Anita, member, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Gates, Robert, National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe until January 1982; Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from January 1982

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, German Foreign Minister

German, Robert, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Goldberg, Sherwood, “Woody,” Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State until June 1982

Gompert, David, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1981 until 1982; Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1982

Gorman, Paul F., Lieutenant General, USA, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Gregg, Donald, member, National Security Council Staff until July 1982; thereafter Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

Gromyko, Andrei, Soviet Foreign Minister

Haass, Richard N., Director, Office of Regional Security Affairs, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

Habib, Philip C., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until April 1978; Presidential envoy to the Middle East, 1981

Haig, Alexander M., General, USA (ret.), Secretary of State from January 22, 1981, until July 5, 1982

Harper, Edwin, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget


Hassan II, King of Morocco

Hayward, Thomas B., Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations until June 30, 1982

Holdridge, John, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

Holmes, H. Allen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs until September 1982

Hopper, Robert, member, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Hormats, Robert D., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from May 21, 1981, until August 25, 1982

Howe, Geoffrey, U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer until June 1983

Howe, Jonathan T., Rear Admiral, USN, Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1981 until 1982; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from May 10, 1982, until July 1, 1984

Hyland, William C., President Gerald Ford’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs; editor of Foreign Affairs magazine from 1983

Iklé, Fred C., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from April 2, 1981

Inman, Bobby R., Admiral, USN, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from February 1981 until June 1982

Jackson, Henry, Senator (D-Washington)

Jaruzelski, Wojciech, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party

Johnston, Ernest, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs

Jones, David C., General, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until June 1982

Kaplan, Philip, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Karpov, Victor P., Chief Soviet Negotiator, START negotiations

Kassebaum, Nancy, Senator (R-Kansas)

Kemp, Geoffrey, member, National Security Council Staff from 1982 until 1985

Kennedy, Richard T., Under Secretary of State for Management until December 15, 1982; thereafter Ambassador at Large and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on non-proliferation and nuclear energy policy

Kintner, George, member, Office of the Secretary of State

Kirilenko, Andrei P., Member of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Kissinger, Henry A., Secretary of State until January 1977
Korniyenko, Georgii, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister
Kraemer, Sven, member, National Security Council Staff

Lenz, Allen, Staff Director, National Security Council Staff from January 1981
Linhard, Robert, member, National Security Council Staff from February 1982
Lord, Carnes, member, National Security Council Staff from February 1981
Luns, Joseph, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization until June 1984

Macdonald, David, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative
Matlock, Jack F., Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in the Soviet Union; Charge d’Affaires from January 1981 until July 1981
Matthews, Gary, member, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
McMahon, John N., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from June 1982
McManaway, Clayton E., Jr., Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, from 1981 to 1981
Meese, Edwin, III, Counselor to the President from January 1981
Michel, Robert H., Congressman (R-Illinois), House Minority Leader
Montgomery, William, Special Assistant, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Montgomery, Hugh, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from October 19, 1981
Murphy, Daniel J., Admiral, USN, Chief of Staff to Vice President Bush
Myer, Allan, member, National Security Council Staff from 1981 until 1984

Napper, Larry, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Niles, Thomas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Nunn, Sam, Senator (D-Georgia)

Olmer, Laurence H., Under Secretary of Commerce
Palmer, Robie Marcus Hooker, “Mark,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Parris, Mark, member, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Percy, Charles H., Senator (R-Illinois), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 1981 until January 1983
Perle, Richard, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs from 1981 until 1987
Pipes, Richard, Director, East European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council Staff from January 1981 until December 1982
Poindexter, John M., Rear Admiral, USN, Military Assistant to the President
Qadhafi, Muammar, President of Libya

Rashish, Myer, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from June 1981 until January 1982

Reagan, Ronald W., President of the United States

Reed, Thomas C., former Secretary of the Air Force; Consultant to the National Security Council Staff from January 1982 until December 1982

Regan, Donald, Secretary of Treasury from January 1981

Rentschler, James M., member, National Security Council Staff

Rixie, Jay, Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense

Robinson, Roger, member, National Security Council Staff from 1982 until 1985

Robinson, Davis R., Legal Adviser of the Department of State from July 30, 1981, until February 27, 1985

Rostow, Eugene V., Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from July 1981 until January 1983

Rowen, Henry S., Chairman, National Intelligence Council from 1981 to 1983

Rowny, Edward, General, USA, Head U.S. Negotiator, START negotiations

Rueckert, George, member, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Sakharov, Andrei, Soviet dissident

Savinbi, Jonas M., leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

Scanlan, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, until October 1982

Schuette, Keith, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until July 1982

Schumaker, James, member, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Scowcroft, Brent, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from November 1975 until January 1977

Seitz, Raymond, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State from 1982 until 1984

Semler, Political Counselor, Moscow Embassy

Sestanovich, Steven, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Shcharanskiy, Anatoly, Soviet dissident denied a visa to emigrate to Israel

Shoemaker, Christopher, Major, USA, member, Defense Policy Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Shultz, George P., Secretary of State from July 16, 1982, to January 20, 1989

Simons, Thomas W., Jr., Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Smith, William French, Attorney General


Sparkman, John, Senator (D-Alabama)

Spiers, Ronald I., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until October 4, 1981

Stearman, William, member, National Security Council Staff from February 1981

Stockman, David, Director of the Office of Management and Budget from January 1981

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1981 until January 1982; Deputy Secretary of State from February 11, 1982, until September 22, 1982

Streator, Edward J., Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Suslov, Mikhail A., Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; also Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee

Thatcher, Margaret, U.K. Prime Minister
XXX Persons

Thompson, Llewellyn E., former Ambassador to the Soviet Union; former member, U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Ustinov, Dmitri F., Soviet Defense Minister

Van Laningham, James, member, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Veliotes, Nicholas A., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until October 1983; Ambassador to Egypt from November 1983

Vershbow, Alexander, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Vessey, John W., Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of State from June 1982

Vest, George S., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until April 14, 1981; U.S. Representative to the European Union from September 20, 1981

Wallis, W. Allen, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from September 23, 1982

Waldheim, Kurt, Secretary General of the United Nations until December 31, 1981

Walters, Vernon A., General, USA (ret.), Ambassador at Large from July 22, 1981

Watson, Thomas, Ambassador to the Soviet Union until January 15, 1981

Wayne, E. Anthony, member, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State


Weiss, Seymour, Ambassador and advisor to the Secretary of Defense

West, Francis J., Jr., “Bing,” Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense until April 1981; thereafter Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Wheeler, Michael O., Staff Secretary, National Security Council Staff

Wick, Charles Z, Director of the International Communication Agency; Director of the United States Information Agency after August 24, 1982

Wolfowitiz, Paul D., Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from February 13, 1981 until December 22, 1982; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Zhou Enlai, Premier of the People’s Republic of China until his death in January 1976

Zia-ul-Haq, Muhammad, President of Pakistan

Zimmermann, Warren, Deputy Chief of Mission, Moscow Embassy

1. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 7, 1980, 1217Z

17743. Subject: (C) Initial Moscow Views on the U.S. Election. Ref: Moscow 17719 (NOTAL).

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary: After initial surprise over the Reagan landslide victory, Soviet officials are venting their frustrations over Soviet relations with the Carter administration and intensely watching personalities in the new administration for clues to future behavior. They are saying that a workable relationship can be developed but they emphasize the importance of negotiating at least a modified version of SALT II. They hope for early contact with members of the Reagan foreign policy team as part of the process in deciding how to deal with it. Our refusenik and dissident contacts are unhappy over the election’s outcome, fearing the new administration will lessen the U.S. commitment to human rights. End summary.

3. After an early TASS report explaining the President’s defeat at the polls in terms of the state of the U.S. economy and U.S. foreign policy, the Soviet press has settled on the line that the primary cause was the President’s foreign policy and the decline of detente. This has the convenience of allowing Soviet propagandists to recycle all of their criticisms already made about the Carter administration as well as validating those criticisms for the Soviet public. We have not seen any
public assessment of future relations with the Reagan administration other than bland comments to the effect that a person often speaks differently as President than as a candidate and that a country’s foreign policy depends on “objective conditions” not personalities.

4. The public criticism of President Carter’s foreign policy are the iceberg tip of much stronger private expressions of displeasure. Soviets who some weeks ago said they hoped Carter would win now feel free—in classic Soviet style—to express in full their frustrations over the past four years. Comments that the administration’s foreign policy was “erratic,” that “Carter betrayed us,” etc., have been repeatedly made to us and other foreigners in Moscow by Soviet officials.

5. At the same time, Soviets who deal with U.S. matters are intensely studying and probing for the implications of the election. While most concentrate on possible personalities in the future executive branch—who will Reagan choose as Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor and where will other foreign policy appointees fit in the republican ideological spectrum—others are beginning to ask quite sophisticated questions about the new Senate, committee changes in the House, and how the conservative American mood demonstrated by the election will affect relations with the Soviet Union, the U.S. posture abroad, and military expenditures.

6. For at least a partial answer, the Soviets will be looking intensely at the President-elect’s early appointments. The implications of those appointments as interpreted here may do much to set the initial Soviet approach to the new administration. The Soviets also hope to make contact soon with the new group. The importance of Governor Harriman’s trip to the Soviet Union four years ago as an emissary of then President-elect Carter has been pointed to. Some here are wondering if Mr. Reagan will use a similar device to establish early contact. In contrast to the generally optimistic “wait and see” approach, we have one report, from an American journalist, that Arbatov has said it may be necessary to give Mr. Reagan “some black eyes” to teach him realities.

7. The Soviets we or our friends have talked with have expressed most interest in the new administration’s approach to arms control. Some are already thinking outloud about modifications in SALT II that could meet Mr. Reagan’s oft-stated intention to renegotiate SALT II. They naturally emphasize that new talks would require concessions on both sides, but they repeat their standard formula that they are

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3 On December 11, Reagan nominated Caspar Weinberger to be Secretary of Defense; on December 16, he nominated Alexander Haig to be Secretary of State; and, on December 23, he appointed Richard Allen as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

4 Reference is to Averell Harriman’s September 1976 trip to Moscow on behalf of Carter to meet Brezhnev.
willing to meet the new administration half-way and respond to any initiatives. We have heard nothing thus far about possible implications for the Afghanistan issue and U.S. sanctions.

8. Two groups which seem unhappy with the outcome of the election are the refuseniks and dissidents. Those we have talked with retain a great deal of good feeling toward President Carter because of his strong stand on human rights. They are concerned that Mr. Reagan will not pursue with equal tenacity that policy which they feel has benefited them.

9. The interest of the man on the street in Moscow about the U.S. election continues to be intense. The ICA display in front of the Embassy on the President and Vice-President-elect continues to draw impressive crowds.

Watson

2. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest) to Secretary of State Haig

Washington, January 22, 1981

SUBJECT

Whether to Receive Ambassador Dobrynin for Delivery of a Message from Gromyko

SUMMARY: Ambassador Dobrynin has requested a short protocol appointment for Thursday, January 22 to deliver a congratulatory message from Gromyko. We recommend that you receive him, but for 5 or 10 minutes only. We also recommend that he be told to use the C Street Entrance, rather than your private elevator.

DISCUSSION

Ambassador Dobrynin has requested an appointment for January 22 to deliver an “urgent” message from Gromyko. We have queried Soviet Minister-Counselor Bessmertnykh, who tells us that the message is basically a congratulatory one and that Dobrynin only needs 5 or

1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P810013–0964. Confidential. Drafted by German on January 21; cleared by Holmes. Barry wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “Request w/drawn by Soviet Embassy on 1/22, RB.” An unknown hand initialed below it: “ALA.”
10 minutes. He also tells us that Dobrynin mentioned his desire to call on you when he saw you at one of the Inaugural events. Dobrynin would not wish to give the message to anyone else, and Bessmertnykh pressed for Thursday on grounds that it was customary, and important, that you receive the message from your “most important counterpart” without delay.

Dobrynin is obviously anxious to be among the first ambassadors to call on you, both for prestige reasons and to take soundings on your attitude toward dealing with the Soviets. One option would be to refuse to receive him until sometime next week, in order to reflect our attitude toward the despicable way in which Soviet propaganda has handled the hostage release question. One disadvantage of that, however, is that the longer you wait to receive Dobrynin the more difficult it will be to limit the first meeting to a courtesy call and the greater the danger of having him try to open up a substantive dialogue. You will no doubt wish to have a substantive conversation with him at some point, in order to outline the general approach which the Administration intends to take toward US-Soviet relations. But as you presumably would not wish to have that meeting for some time yet, there would be an advantage to getting the courtesy call out of the way quickly. There is the additional factor that, in good times and bad, our Ambassador in Moscow has generally been able to see Gromyko promptly when he has instructions, and Dobrynin normally is received promptly here if he is bearing a message from Moscow. We believe it is in our interest to continue that practice whenever practical. On balance, therefore, we believe it desirable for you to receive Dobrynin on Thursday, or possibly Friday. The meeting could be very brief and very formal, limited to your receiving and reading the Gromyko letter.

If you do receive Dobrynin, we recommend that he be told to use the C Street Diplomatic Entrance, as all other ambassadors do. During a period of sensitive negotiations some years ago, Secretary Kissinger permitted Dobrynin to drive into the basement and use his private elevator, and this practice has been continued ever since. As there is no sensitivity to your receiving him, and as our Ambassador in Moscow has never enjoyed any comparable privilege, this would seem to be an appropriate time to terminate the practice.

OPTIONS

1. That you agree to receive Dobrynin on January 22 or 23, specifying that it will be for 5 minutes only and that there will be no substantive discussion.

2. That you not receive him until sometime next week. We could inform the Soviet Embassy that you would wish to spend a few minutes in conversation with Dobrynin and that your schedule would not permit it before then.
3. That you not receive Dobrynin in the near future and ask that the letter be delivered to another officer of the Department.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. That you authorize us to inform Dobrynin that you will receive him for 5 minutes on January 22 or 23 (Option 1—favored by EUR).

B. That you authorize us to inform the Soviet Embassy that Dobrynin should use the C Street Diplomatic Entrance.

There is no indication that Haig approved any of the three options.

There is no indication that Haig approved or disapproved. However, when Dobrynin arrived at the Department of State to call upon Haig on January 29, Diplomatic Security directed the Ambassador’s car to the C Street entrance. “I wish that I could claim credit for this inspired gesture, which conveyed so aptly the change in American attitudes toward Moscow,” Haig wrote in his memoir. “The chief of the [Soviet] desk, Robert German, applied to Assistant Secretary George Vest for permission to take away Dobrynin’s parking privileges as a means of getting the Russians’ attention,” Haig went on to say. “Vest quite properly approved without consulting me.” (Haig, Caveat, p.101)

3. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, January 22, 1981, 1814Z

1004. Subject: Charge’s Courtesy Call on Korniyenko.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: During Charge’s courtesy call January 20 on First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, latter commented “unofficially” (but entirely predictably) on Soviet attitude toward strategic arms control and complained that Secretary Muskie’s January 17 protest of Soviet media reports that US was planning military intervention in Iran was an example of the Carter administration efforts to inflame US public opinion by publicizing “artificial” issues. Charge made clear that he was not empowered to speak for the Reagan administration, but countered Korniyenko’s contentions. Charge stressed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan remains a major issue in US-Soviet relations

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810033–0452. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

A record of Muskie’s conversation with Dobrynin was transmitted in telegram 13001 to Moscow, January 17. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810076–1089)
and that unfounded and pernicious charges against the US in the Soviet press are a real issue and raise serious questions regarding Soviet intentions. He also pointed out that the Soviet Government cannot avoid responsibility for such articles on the specious ground that Soviet press is not under its control. Despite the contentious issues discussed and frank words exchanged, the meeting took place in a calm and, indeed, cordial atmosphere. End summary.

3. First Deputy Foreign Minister received the Charge January 20 for a courtesy call. Following initial pleasantries, when Charge made it clear that he was not authorized to speak for the Reagan administration and Korniyenko suggested that entire conversation be considered unofficial, Korniyenko asked how Charge viewed prospects for US-Soviet relations. Charge replied that he believed Reagan administration would pursue a businesslike approach in dealing with the Soviet Union and would be seriously interested in effective and reciprocal measures to control strategic weapons. If agreements can be reached in the future, the strong political position of the President and the new composition of the Senate suggests that ratification should not be a serious problem. However, Charge added, we must recognize that very serious problems exist in our relationship which can only be alleviated by a change in Soviet policies and practices. Noting the frequent Soviet criticism of US policy as lacking steadiness and consistency, Charge remarked that without passing judgment on these criticisms, he was confident that the Soviets would have no basis for them under the incoming administration.

4. Korniyenko responded by saying that he took note of comment that if President Reagan signs an agreement it will be ratified, but asked does that mean that the one already signed does not exist. Can a new President ignore what has already been signed, what has been worked out between the US and the USSR? What was signed between Carter and Brezhnev was not in the personal interests of the two men, but reflected the national interests of both countries. These interests do not change on November 4, indeed they do not change every three or four years. We can not seriously consider new agreements if the past is any precedent.

5. Charge commented that the Soviets must clearly understand—that it is a principle of international law and of the laws of both our countries—that a treaty is not binding unless it is ratified. In Charge’s personal view the final funeral of SALT II was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This remains a great problem in our relations and prospects for an improvement in US-Soviet relations will be limited until this problem is resolved. There are many people who attach a great deal of importance to Afghanistan and it is difficult to exaggerate its influence not only on American policies but on the American people
as a whole. Soviets must take into account US point of view on this issue if they want to improve our bilateral relations.

6. Korniyenko noted use of the word invasion but did not make a major issue of it. He repeated that our conversation was not official and proceeded to make the following comments:

Let us look at the situation when SALT I was signed. Over one-half million U.S. soldiers were in Vietnam, bombs were being dropped over North Vietnam. At that time we received in Moscow the President of the U.S.A. and signed the SALT I Treaty. What was that? Foolishness on our part? No, we looked into the future. The U.S. administration was also farsighted. The documents are there. We also had a problem among our own people and the question arose as to how we could receive Nixon when the events in Vietnam were in the forefront of world attention. Public opinion must be considered, but it also must be led. We speak now of Afghanistan, but what do you think? Is SALT II in the best interest of both the U.S. and the USSR? Do you really think we need it more than you? After all, Carter said he wanted the treaty ratified, but that does not seem to be the opinion of the new people and the new President’s closest advisors. Everybody that has looked at that treaty closely has recognized that it is in the interest of the U.S.

7. Charge told Korniyenko that in his opinion the situation in Vietnam in 1972 and the situation in Afghanistan are not analogous. Korniyenko interjected that he agreed fully that there was no comparison, but obviously for different reasons than ours. Charge said that the Soviets must understand the atmosphere in the U.S. as we on our part try to understand the situation in the Soviet Union. As the Soviets say, facts remain facts—namely, that the U.S. Senate will not ratify the SALT II Treaty as it stands. Furthermore, the Soviet action in Afghanistan is considered an issue relevant to the question of whether major US-Soviet agreements are desirable. That is a reality. Also, in 1972 we signed the Declaration of Principles for US-Soviet relations. In the years following, Soviet actions in places such as Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and, of course, Afghanistan were inconsistent with obligations assumed in this declaration.

8. Korniyenko repeated that the Carter administration publicly stated that SALT II responded to U.S. national interests and should be ratified despite Afghanistan. In the Soviet view, the first blow to SALT II was the “Cuban brigade” story. It was recognized in Washington

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that this was an artificial issue. We said that it was a training center, you said it was a brigade. For 17 years there was no change in this situation. Clark Clifford\(^5\) knew this. The U.S. administration knew this, but public opinion was influenced.

9. Charge pointed out to Korniyenko that President Reagan’s public statements make clear that his view of the merits of SALT II is not identical with that of the Carter administration.\(^6\) He added that in his view this is not a rejection of the goal of arms control. It is clear, however, that ratification of this agreement is simply not possible. The Soviets must think of the future, not in terms of discarding everything in SALT II but of negotiating a better treaty. Charge then took the opportunity to ask Korniyenko for his interpretation of Foreign Minister Gromyko’s recent comments on SALT II in the latest issue of “

Korniyenko claimed that he had not read the article, not even the excerpts that appeared in “TASS.” However, he said that the Soviet leadership will not “recarve” (perekraivat’) SALT II. It is better to hold on to whatever you have in your hand. The SALT II Treaty was carefully negotiated by two U.S. administrations and after all these years we still don’t have an agreement in force. We go around in circles. It seems that every time a new group comes into power, you throw everything away. I am not optimistic that something better awaits us, he concluded.

10. Korniyenko then picked up the theme of American public opinion and complained about Secretary Muskie’s strong protest to Dobrynin on Soviet media treatment of the U.S. hostages negotiations. He commented that public opinion is not as objective a factor as the U.S. claims it is. In fact public opinion is formed. For example, Muskie told Dobrynin the other day that the USSR was trying to impede the hostage negotiations and of the serious consequences of this. American public opinion was not aware of this issue until the American leadership decided to push its “imaginary” version of events to the forefront of public attention. The American Embassy in Moscow and American journalists here seized on the opportunity to highlight items in the Soviet media and press on this subject. The Soviet side did not publicize the Dobrynin/Muskie exchange and the Soviet press was silent on this. The Soviet Embassy in Washington sent in its telegram on the subject

\(^5\) Reference is to former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, whom Carter appointed to lead a committee of “wise men” to look into the matter of the Soviet brigade in Cuba.

\(^6\) Reference is to Reagan’s statements during the 1980 Presidential campaign that SALT II was a “flawed treaty.” (“Reagan Urges Bar on Arms Pact Unless Soviet Withdraws Troops,” New York Times, January 26, 1980, p. 10)

\(^7\) In telegram 837 from Moscow, January 20, the Embassy sent a summary of Gromyko’s article in Kommunist. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810029–0647)
and that was that. However, Brzezinski seized the opportunity to defame the USSR as playing with the fate of the American hostages. What purpose does it serve to incite hostile feelings toward the Soviet Union on the part of the American public?

11. Charge responded that the issue was not fabricated by US but created by Soviets. The allegations appearing in the Soviet press and media that the US was preparing for a military attack or intervention in Iran were completely baseless. Giving publicity to such reports when everyone knew that we were at the final stages of negotiations on the hostage issue was particularly serious. In Charge’s view, the Soviet action could only serve to elicit negative and emotional reactions from the American public, since we know that such allegations do not appear in the Soviet press by chance. It is difficult to understand the purpose of these charges, unless they were aimed at affecting our negotiations. Why did the Soviet Government go to such an extreme? The U.S., the Soviet Union and all governments have a deep interest in upholding the principle of diplomatic immunity, and this makes the Soviet action all the more incomprehensible.

12. There followed a protracted exchange on the role of the Soviet press and media with Korniyenko reiterating the Soviet line that we were making a very serious error in assuming that a Soviet journalist represents official Soviet Government views and that any commentary has the approval of the Soviet authorities on high. Charge rebutted Korniyenko’s argument in categoric terms pointing out that Pravda is the official organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU, that Izvestiya is the official organ of the Soviet Government, that the state controls the electronic media. Naturally, in following Soviet policy we pay close attention to what information the Soviet media select to highlight—as in this case concerning the hostages. Korniyenko referred to the initiative the Soviet Government had taken vis-a-vis Iran on behalf of the hostages and asked how we could reconcile the Soviet Union’s official position on this issue with recent U.S. accusations that the Soviet Government sought to hinder the negotiations for the release of the hostages. Charge repeated that we had to take seriously what the Soviets write and say in their media, and that he was distressed that, even after Secretary Muskie’s demarche to Dobrynin, the Soviet media continued to peddle absurd and potently unfounded allegations such as the charge that the U.S. somehow instigated the Iraq-Iran conflict. Such actions place a heavy burden on U.S.-Soviet relations. Korniyenko brought the subject to a close by repeating lamely that we really make a mistake in confusing Soviet journalism with official policy.

13. Comment: The conversation, which lasted 75 minutes and was conducted in Russian, took place in an amicable personal atmosphere despite the sharp content of the exchanges. We find nothing surprising
in the positions Korniyenko took, all of which are standard fare, and all of which we are likely to hear repeated in the future.

Matlock

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4. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**¹

Washington, January 24, 1981, 0251Z

19053. Subject: Secretary’s Letter to Gromyko.

1. (Secret—Entire text).

2. Following message from the Secretary to Gromyko should be delivered to MFA ASAP: Begin text: Dear Mr. Minister: I would like to thank you for your message of congratulations on my appointment as Secretary of State. I can assure you that I share your hopes for strengthening the peace and that as Secretary I will work for the development of relations between our two countries on the basis of restraint and reciprocity.

If these goals are to be realized, I believe it is essential from the start that our two governments fully comprehend each other’s concerns and intentions. For this reason I would like in this initial correspondence to address two issues which I consider of immediate importance.

The first deeply affects American opinion and thus the entire climate of our relations. I refer to the treatment by the official Soviet media of events surrounding the release by Iran of the 52 American diplomatic personnel illegally held captive in Tehran for over a year. The attitude of the USSR throughout our efforts to deal with the hostage crisis has already contributed to strains in our relations. Continued distortion of the facts concerning the hostages and of our policy toward

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¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number], Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Parris; cleared by Newsom, Vest, Ridgway, Wolfowitz, and Burt; approved by Bremer. On the same day, Haig informed Reagan that he had sent a letter to Gromyko “stating that I would work for development of US-Soviet relations on the basis of restraint and reciprocity,” and focusing “on the irresponsible Soviet treatment of the hostage situation and our concern over the Polish situation.” Haig also reported that “Gromyko is on vacation, but in receiving the letter Acting Foreign Minister Korniyenko expressed his ‘personal’ view to our Charge that it was unfortunate that the initial communication from the new Administration dealt with such issues.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, The Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption Documents, Lot 92D630, Evening Reading: Jan–June 1981)
Iran can only raise further doubts in this country concerning Soviet intentions.

The second is a matter of utmost potential seriousness—the situation in Poland. I wish to make clear at the outset that there will be no change in the US position of noninterference in Poland’s internal affairs. We are prepared to do what we can to help Poland resolve its serious economic difficulties. And we are convinced that, if left to themselves, the Poles are fully capable of solving their problems themselves. Nor do I wish to leave any doubt as to the seriousness with which the US would view efforts by the Soviet Union to influence developments in Poland through military pressure or direct intervention. This administration fully supports the conclusions of the December 12 North Atlantic Council communique. Any intervention in Poland would fundamentally alter the entire international situation, and the US with its allies would be compelled to act in a manner which the gravity of the situation would require.

Mr. Minister, I cannot in this initial letter address all of the issues between us. At an appropriate time I would hope it would be possible to exchange views on a wider range of subjects, particularly the problem of Afghanistan, and the need for an early and complete Soviet withdrawal from that country. The points I have raised are those which I believe deserve immediate attention.

I would hope you would be prepared to address them in that spirit. Sincerely, Alexander Haig. End text.

Haig

5. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, January 26, 1981

SUBJECT

Analysis of the 1962 US–USSR Understanding on Cuba

Background

The US–USSR Understanding resulting from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis consists of a Soviet undertaking not to introduce “offensive weapons” into Cuba and a US pledge not to invade Cuba. The Understanding applies to nuclear weapons and to missiles, bombers, and other delivery systems capable of launching a strategic nuclear attack. In a 1970 clarification, the Soviets further agreed not to establish a naval base or military/naval facility in Cuba. This applies principally to the servicing in or from Cuba of submarines and surface combatants capable of carrying nuclear weapons that can be used for strategic attack and to facilities in Cuba for servicing such vessels.

The 1962 Understanding is subject to varying interpretations, because it was never formalized in a single document subscribed to by both sides. Over the years, the Soviets have persistently tested its limits. They have carried out visits to Cuba of varying duration and using varying combinations of naval task forces. They are assisting Cuba in constructing a naval facility at Cienfuegos, the specific purpose of which is unclear, and have delivered to Cuba increasingly sophisticated, but apparently non-nuclear weaponry, most recently MIG–23 aircraft. The Carter Administration conducted a vigorous round of diplomatic exchanges with the Soviets in the fall of 1979 on the issue of the MIG–23’s. The Soviets asserted that the aircraft represented...
only a modernization of earlier MIG versions, denied that they were “offensive weapons,” and reaffirmed the Soviet adherence to the 1962 Understanding.

The Brigade

In August 1979, US intelligence confirmed the existence of a 2,600–3,000 man combat unit in Cuba. Archival searches indicate that the unit, or precursor elements, have been in Cuba since the early 1970’s and possibly as far back as 1962. However, in recent years, our intelligence indicated, the Soviets had upgraded the training and equipment of the brigade.

President Carter publicly called the unit’s presence “a matter of serious concern” and said that the United States would not accept the maintenance of the “status quo” with respect to the brigade. The Administration raised the matter privately with the Soviets, who told the USG that the brigade was “a training center,” assured us that the unit would not be enlarged or given additional capabilities, and did not pose any threat to Cuba’s neighbors.

President Carter then informed the American public of these Soviet assurances, and announced five measures to firm up our posture in the region (increased surveillance of Cuba, assurance that no Soviet unit in Cuba will be used to threaten US or Hemispheric security, establishment of a Caribbean Task Force Headquarters in Key West, expanded military maneuvers in the Caribbean, and increased economic assistance for the region). The matter was then closed. The net effect was that the US has, in fact, accepted the status quo with regard to the brigade.

Assessment of the Understandings

The US–USSR Understandings do not specifically address the presence or level of Soviet ground forces in Cuba, although some unilateral statements could be cited as relevant to Soviet ground troops.

Nevertheless, we have basic reasons for putting down markers about the limits of US tolerance over Soviet/Cuban activities staged in and from Cuba. The intent of the 1962 Understanding was to prevent Cuba from becoming a threat to the security of the US—and to countries friendly to us in the Hemisphere. It is this basic intent which needs to be reasserted in light of Cuba’s military and subversive actions in recent years, and Cuba’s increasingly close military collaboration with the Soviet Union. The weakness of the Carter Administration’s policy was that the US allowed the Soviets to exploit the ambiguities in the Understandings, while not doing the same thing ourselves.

Our Options

We could unilaterally, and without reference to any specific new Soviet or Cuban activity, renounce the Understandings. Renunciation
would certainly lay down a clear marker to the Soviets, Cubans and others, but we should weigh carefully both the advantages and disadvantages of the terms of the Understandings. Also, absent a clear Soviet or Cuban provocation, this action would give away an important element of leverage in our overall relations with the Soviets.

I recommend instead a new approach which seeks to use the Understandings to advance US interests. The basic strategy would be to insist on a strict and consistent interpretation of the Understandings, formulated and presented very clearly to the Soviets and Cubans and leaving no doubt about the US reaction to any further testing of these specific limits. Elements of this approach could include the following:

(1) A clear and firm presentation to the Soviets of the US intention, beginning immediately, to oppose any Soviet actions in Cuba which we deem inconsistent with our strict interpretation of the Understandings.

(2) An equally clear and frank presentation to the Soviets of the limits of US tolerance over the growing Cuban and Soviet military/subversive activities in this Hemisphere as well as in other regions, both within and apart from the context of the Understandings.

(3) A clear message to the Soviets that breach of the above considerations will prompt US denunciation of the Understandings and the taking of other measures.

(4) An equally clear message to the Cubans about the limits of tolerance of their adventurist activities in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.

In terms of US-Soviet relations, maintenance of the Understandings on a new basis of strict interpretation has the chief advantage of sending a clear signal that the years of unresisted Soviet probing are over; henceforth Soviet moves will incur prompt and demonstrable costs.

In terms of US-Allied/Hemispheric relations, the US would be perceived by some as once again insisting on strict and fair observance of international obligations incurred by other states, particularly on the part of our adversary, the Soviet Union. Others would see it as an effort by the new Administration to pick a fight.

In terms of US-Cuban relations, Castro would be fully aware that Cuban actions prejudicial to US security interests, in this Hemisphere and elsewhere, will no longer go unpunished.

Finally, an approach based on maintenance of the Understandings based on our strict interpretation provides us a form of leverage over and linkage to Soviet behavior elsewhere, including those strategic areas where Cubans are also acting as Soviet surrogates. In the final analysis, a Soviet/Cuban breach of (a) our strict interpretation or the Understandings and/or (b) Soviet actions elsewhere (e.g., Soviet intervention in Poland), would then permit us to move at that point toward actual denunciation of the Understandings.
Conclusion

On balance, my current view is that maintaining the Understandings with strict interpretation offers at least the possibility of giving the Soviets pause before they exceed our limits and, equally, gives us a “hanging sword” countermeasure to take when and as these limits are exceeded, in the Caribbean or elsewhere. In any event, renunciation of the Understandings should not be undertaken lightly since we would have to weigh all of the consequences, including the absence of the present Understandings’ prohibition of the introduction of “offensive weapons”. This would require careful attention in order not to recreate conditions similar to those of the 1962 crisis.

In view of the importance of this matter, I would suggest that Cap Weinberger and I review the matter and all of its implications on a close-hold basis.4

4 No record was found that Haig and Weinberger followed up on this suggestion.

6. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan1

Washington, January 27, 1981

SUBJECT

Important Information Items

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

—Moscow “Relaxed” About Relations with U.S.: [1 line not declassified] Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, minister-counselor at the Soviet embassy in Washington, told a [less than 1 line not declassified] source that Moscow is “in a very relaxed mood over the new U.S. administration,” and though the Kremlin expects there to be “some period of drift” in Washington’s policy toward the USSR, the situation is not “totally bad” for the time being. He added that within six months Moscow expects the U.S. to take steps to improve relations. Bessmertnykh also commented that it will be “extremely important” for the U.S. to overcome the

1 Source: Reagan Library, Nance Files, Nance Chron January 1981 (2 of 3). Secret. A copy was sent to the Vice President. Printed from an unsigned copy.
tendency of “paying too much attention to perceptions of what is happening in Moscow . . . in contrast to the realities of the situation,” and that “what is going on behind the scenes is more important to Moscow than what is seen to be happening or is being said.” In introducing the subject of SALT II negotiations, the counselor mentioned that they could be a hindrance to normalization of relations unless the administration adopts a position of equality between the superpowers, in which case Moscow would be willing to re-negotiate. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

7. Editorial Note

On January 28, 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig held his first news conference since his confirmation. “I think it’s clear that we have been witnessing an unprecedented—at least character and scope—risk-taking mode on the part of the Soviet Union, not just in this hemisphere but in Africa as well,” he stated. “We have seen in that process the exploitation of the Cuban proxy, and I can assure you that this is the subject of utmost concern to this Administration, it is a subject which will be high on the priority of our national security and foreign policy agenda. I would suggest also that an additional subject related intimately to this, in the conduct of Soviet activity and in terms of training, funding, and equipping, is international terrorism.” (Department of State Bulletin, February 1981, page J)

On January 29, President Ronald Reagan held his first Presidential news conference. Sam Donaldson of American Broadcasting Company News asked: “Mr. President, what do you see as the long-range intentions of the Soviet Union? Do you think, for instance, the Kremlin is bent on world domination that might lead to a continuation of the cold war, or do you think that under other circumstances détente is possible?” Reagan responded: “Well, so far détente’s been a one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its own aims. I don’t have to think of an answer as to what I think their intentions are; they have repeated it. I know of no leader of the Soviet Union since the revolution, and including the present leadership, that has not more than once repeated in the various Communist congresses they hold their determination that their goal must be the promotion of world revolution and a one-world Socialist or Communist state, whichever word you want to use. Now, as long as they do that and as long as they, at the same time, have openly and publicly declared that the only
morality they recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat, in order to attain that, and that is moral, not immoral, and we operate on a different set of standards, I think when you do business with them, even at a détente, you keep that in mind.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, page 57)

8. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs (Burt) and the Director-Designate of Policy Planning (Wolfowitz) to Secretary of State Haig

WASHINGTON, JANUARY 29, 1981

SUBJECT

Relations with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

Your 1730 meeting today with Ambassador Dobrynin raises the more general point of how this Administration will conduct relations with the Soviet Union. We would like to share some brief thoughts with you:

—As you know, their man in Washington has become a, if not the, key conduit for our communications with Moscow.
—Not only does it tend to undermine the position of our embassy and officials stationed in Moscow, but it allows the USSR to control the circuit.
—This tends as well to give them more access to us than vice-versa, a pattern which only exacerbates an imbalance already there owing to the fact that our society is so much more open than theirs.

Given this background, we would suggest that you make it clear from the outset that under your tenure US-Soviet relations will be conducted on the basis of strict reciprocity in form as well as substance. The Soviets should be made to understand not only that Dobrynin will no longer enjoy special status, but also that whatever status he does enjoy will depend upon equal treatment for his opposite number in Moscow. Such a point could be underlined by your declining any future meetings

1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Lot 89D149, S/SP Records: Memoranda and Correspondence From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary, PW Jan. 21–31, ’81. Confidential; Sensitive. Drafted by Haass.
with Dobrynin until our Ambassador has had his first session of comparable duration and seriousness.  

There is another consideration as well. We question whether, over the long-term, it is wise to have Dobrynin remain in Washington. His position as dean of the diplomatic corps affords him a status which is unfortunate from our perspective. His contacts are all too broad and well-established.

In short, it is difficult to see how we benefit from having this often devious and always dangerous diplomat accredited to Washington. Getting him replaced in the next year or two should be a serious goal for us. By demonstrating to his masters that he no longer will enjoy special treatment or status, we may be taking an important first step to bring about his removal.

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2 NOTE: It should be made clear to Dobrynin that we do not expect reciprocity until we have an Ambassador of our own in Moscow. The caveat on future meetings with Dobrynin might therefore not arise for a little while. But this is the right occasion to make the point. [Footnote is in the original.]

3 In telegram 602 from Moscow, January 15, Matlock reported that a source at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Academy, based on conversations with senior Soviet officials, had informed a U.S. Embassy officer that Dobrynin intended to retire that month. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810024-0330) Dobrynin remained Soviet Ambassador to the United States until his recall in April 1986.

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9. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, January 29, 1981

1. Response to Gromyko Letter: Ambassador Dobrynin came in this afternoon to deliver Gromyko’s reply to my January 23 letter. In his reply, Gromyko expressed his readiness to exchange views on high priority issues but complained that those I had raised—the hostages

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2 Haig’s message to Gromyko was sent on January 24; see Document 4. For a fuller account of the January 29 meeting between Haig and Dobrynin, see Document 12.
in Iran, Poland, and Afghanistan—did not fall within that category.\(^3\) On Iran, he justified the Soviet record by pointing to Moscow’s support for international law—for which, he complained, we had never said a “kind word.” His remarks on Poland were rather sharp. He accused the US and other Western powers of attempting to influence the Polish situation; he declared that VOA and other American radio broadcasts constituted open interference in Polish internal affairs; he implied that Western interference was not limited only to radio broadcasts. Gromyko’s remarks on Afghanistan followed the familiar Soviet line. The US, he said, could contribute to a political settlement by facilitating the opening of a dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Dobrynin was told that the letter would be studied and that I would confer with you before responding. Furthermore, he was told that events since the early ’70’s—in Africa, Cuba, Afghanistan—have caused great difficulties for us and that you were elected by the American people to speak out on these matters. It will be necessary for us to move toward greater reciprocity in our relations. I referred specifically to today’s disturbing news from Poland,\(^4\) mentioned your concern over developments, and reiterated that the situation must be worked out by the Polish people themselves. Dobrynin professed not to be aware of any late developments that should cause concern. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

\(^3\) See Document 11.

\(^4\) In telegram 875 from Warsaw, January 29, Meehan reported that amidst ongoing strikes the Polish Council of Ministers issued a statement suggesting “emergency measures such as an attempt to ban strikes are being weighed.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810043–1047) Documentation on the U.S. response to the crisis in Poland is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VII, Poland, 1977–1981.
Washington, January 30, 1981

To What Extent Will Soviet Policies and Activities in Central America and the Caribbean Affect US Interests?

Moscow is aware of US sensitivities, and of the President-elect’s stated views in particular, on the Soviet presence and activities in the Caribbean and Central America. Pending an assessment of the new Administration and of the opportunities for establishing a working relationship with it, Moscow probably will not gratuitously undertake provocative actions there that would prejudice the bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, the Soviets will continue to probe the parameters of US tolerance of their political-military initiatives in the region.

Moscow claims that the Caribbean Basin is no longer a US sphere of influence and has taken actions, both overt and covert, whose aim seems to be to challenge the US position in this strategic zone. So far, however, the Soviets have attempted to broaden their own role and influence in ways that would avoid provoking an open confrontation with the US.

Cuba as a Factor in the US-Soviet Regional Relationship

Cuba has been a sore spot in the US-Soviet relationship since the 1962 missile crisis, which delineated Soviet military frontiers there and laid the foundations for a future Soviet Caribbean presence. Soviet relations with Cuba in the interim have become something of an anomaly. Moscow is committed to keeping a communist regime in Cuba, and to this end it broadly underwrites Castro economically and militarily, but it remains ambiguous about the nature and extent of its commitment to Cuba’s military security. In this ambiguity, and the ways in which

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Day File, Box CL 25, Jan. 30, 1981. Confidential. Drafted by Kulski (INR/SEE) on December 19, 1980; approved by Stoddard (INR/CA); cleared by Misback (INR/IAA) and Williams (INR/PMA). Spiers sent the paper to Haig under cover of a January 30 memorandum, in which he wrote: “Earlier I forwarded you a list of 37 issues papers prepared for you by INR. Attached are those dealing with Central America and the Caribbean, which you asked to see first. I will send you papers on other areas/issues in small batches in coming weeks.” (Ibid.)

2 Haig wrote to the right of this sentence: “Not so are now doing this.”

3 Haig placed a check beside the end of this sentence.

4 Haig placed a check beside the end of this sentence.

5 Haig wrote to the right of this sentence: “What would these [cause]? [illegible] even you have not shown such a point!”
which the Soviets maintain it, lies the source of greatest ongoing concern to US policy.

Upwards of 6,000 Soviet military personnel may now be in Cuba: military advisors, technical personnel, and a Soviet brigade. With the resolution of the 1962 missile crisis, in which the Soviets agreed to dismantle offensive (i.e., nuclear) weapons bases and systems in return for a conditional assurance by the US not to invade, the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba temporarily subsided. But the issue of the use of Cuba to enhance Soviet strategic capabilities repeatedly has arisen since then: e.g., in 1970, with the start of construction of a facility that appeared to support Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines; in 1978, with the delivery to Cuba of MiG–23 aircraft that are potentially nuclear-capable; and in 1979, with the identification of the Soviet brigade.

The Soviets have also projected their military presence into the region in other ways: there have been 20 deployments of Soviet naval vessels to the Caribbean since 1969, 19 of them stopping in Cuba; TU–95 reconnaissance aircraft have been deployed to Cuba to collect intelligence on US naval operations along the Atlantic coast.6

With the souring of US-Soviet relations in recent years, Moscow no longer saw prospects for a normalization of US-Cuban relations, as it did in the mid-1970s. If the outlook should become more favorable, it would undoubtedly back Cuban demands for the end of the economic blockade and of US air surveillance of Cuba and a return of Guantanamo. The Soviets are interested in US-Cuban normalization partly as a means of lessening, however slightly, their economic burden in Cuba and also of enhancing Cuba’s international image, but they might also fear the consequences for their political ties with Havana of an increased US presence. Furthermore, the Soviets may believe they have some leverage in Cuba that could be usefully exploited against the US: Brezhnev implied last summer that the USSR could retaliate in the Caribbean for US actions against the USSR on Afghanistan.

Soviet Role in the Central American Insurgencies

Apart from Cuba itself, no Soviet military personnel7 are known to be in any of the countries in the Central America/Caribbean area, nor is there confirmation of direct Soviet military aid. Through Cuba, however, and possibly through other channels, the Soviets in the last several years have given aid8 to the Nicaraguans and possibly other

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6 Haig placed a check beside the end of this sentence.
7 Haig underlined “no Soviet military personnel.”
8 Haig placed a check next to “aid.”
Central American insurgencies. Both Cuba and the USSR want to foster revolutionary change in the region, and it is likely that the Soviets at least acquiesce in Cuban inputs of materiel. At the same time, the USSR is careful to avoid open identification with Cuban military assistance efforts.

Moscow’s general line toward guerrilla movements in Central America, which it sees as the wave of the future, is one of encouraging leftist groups in each country to unite as a means of mounting effective opposition to existing rightist regimes. In backing local communists and other leftists, it has implicitly endorsed the belief of these groups that violence is their only road to power. Moscow may anticipate that some of the communist parties eventually will play key roles, but at this stage, it does not insist that communists be at the forefront of these coalition movements. In some instances—Nicaragua, for example—it has avoided identification with local communists and has fully backed the new leadership in the expectation that its political course will veer steadily leftward.

Meanwhile, the Soviets have expanded the web of official relationships established with Nicaragua’s ruling FSLN junta last spring when several cooperation agreements (economic, planning, agricultural, cultural/educational, party ties, etc.) were signed in Moscow. They have established contacts with Nicaraguan trade unions, signed a radio/TV agreement and begun to explore the feasibility of a major hydroelectric project. They have also established a direct air link with Managua.

In El Salvador, the Soviets may well have supported the formation of the United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), the umbrella organization that directs the insurgency. If the ruling junta were to decide to accommodate the left, however, Moscow probably would encourage the DRU to cooperate in the expectation that the left would emerge as the main political force.

Moscow rates the leftist configuration in Guatemala as in a politically immature stage, but it may in the future see exploitable opportunities if the leftist groups are able to rally behind a single leadership as they have in El Salvador. Moscow probably has similar, though more distant, hopes for the leftists in Honduras.

Setbacks in the Caribbean

If Moscow believed it was riding the crest of a wave last year, when Marxist influence in the Caribbean seemed on the rise, it probably...
now realizes that the tide is receding.\textsuperscript{11} Manley’s defeat in Jamaica probably came as no surprise to the Soviets. As it was, they did not want to underwrite a regime which, however friendly, had been unable to attract enough economic assistance from noncommunist sources to sustain itself. (The Soviets had made clear that they would not take on the Jamaican burden even to further the Marxist cause.) In Grenada, the East Europeans have joined the Soviets in supplying a modicum of economic and other forms of assistance to bolster the Marxists, but the Soviets are likely to doubt the viability of the regime.

Moscow has made overtures to the government-controlled labor movement in Guyana, and it tries to cultivate the Burnham regime even at the expense of the local communists whenever the prospects look promising. Its main avenue of penetration in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, given the lack of an official Soviet presence, is to work covertly with local communist parties against the pro-US regimes. Moscow limits itself to financial subsidies and tactical advice, but these activities include supporting the resort to violence by the local parties.

\textit{Extension of Soviet Influence by Other Means}

Moscow is actively pursuing cooperation in the economic, technical, cultural, and other spheres. With the exception of Cuba, however, it generally has been unwilling to make long-term, costly commitments of economic aid to underwrite new clients. Its economic and technical assistance has been limited to a few countries (Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and to some extent, Guyana and earlier, Jamaica). Domestic Soviet economic stringencies and the traditional reluctance of most countries of the region to become closely associated with the USSR have been restraining factors.

Soviet aid might be more attractive in the future as these countries attempt to assert greater independence vis-a-vis the US and their other traditional Western suppliers of arms and economic assistance, but whether the Soviets will become more generous is questionable. In other spheres, such as educational and cultural cooperation, the Soviets prefer a slow but steady expansion which is intended to lay the basis for closer political ties.

\textit{Implications for US Interests}

The growth of Soviet ties with these countries tends to complicate US relations with them. Some states, for example, may have second thoughts about supporting the US on political issues of marginal or secondary interest to them (e.g., denial measures on Afghanistan) if they believe trade and aid opportunities with the Soviet Union would

\textsuperscript{11} Haig underlined “that the tide is receding” and placed a check next to it.
be jeopardized. Substantial Soviet economic and technical assistance, linked to political and military objectives, could thus create new challenges to US interests in the region.

Moscow is well aware of US sensitivities, but it will not abandon the gradual buildup and intensification of its own activities in the region. Still it probably will continue to avoid provocative initiatives that could complicate its dealings with Washington, especially when it is attempting to shape a relationship with the new Administration.

In extending military assistance to Central American insurgencies, the Soviets will use indirect channels to minimize the risk of provoking the US. While this assistance apparently is on a small scale, it could eventually go beyond the transfer of light arms and involve military advisors and more sophisticated equipment. In Nicaragua, for example, the Soviets might be tempted to send military advisors, perhaps in return for access privileges for Soviet naval forces, but they would test each step carefully for the US reaction before proceeding to the next. 12

12 Haig initialed and wrote at the end of the report: “Excellent paper realistic & analytical. Only one problem. Why isn’t this info used in our policy?”

11. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1

Washington, January 31, 1981, 0406Z

24743. Subject: Gromyko Response to Secretary’s Letter. Refs: A. Moscow 1088.2 B. State 19053.3

1. Secret—Entire text.
2. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on January 294 delivered to the Secretary a reply from Gromyko to the Secretary’s January 23 letter (ref B). The text follows.

2 Telegram not found.
3 See Document 4.
4 A report on this meeting is printed as Document 12.
3. Begin text:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have carefully studied your letter of January 24 transmitted through the US Embassy in Moscow and take note of the wish expressed therein to work for development of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. This corresponds to our intentions too.

Indeed, there exists quite a number of questions in Soviet-American relations, including the ones which deserve priority attention and on which it would be advisable to exchange views. It can only be regretted that such questions, judging by your letter, have not yet fallen within the field of vision of the new administration.

As to certain specific questions touched upon in your letter I would like to say the following. Right after the incident when the US Embassy personnel were seized in Tehran, the Soviet Union in clear and unambiguous terms came out against actions of that type, in favor of the strict observance of the Vienna Convention provisions concerning respect for diplomatic immunity and, accordingly, in favor of the immediate release of the detainees. This was also the position we adhered to during the discussion of this question in the U.N. Security Council at the end of 1979 as well as in the following period. The U.S. Government is also fully aware of the fact that it was from these same positions that we addressed ourselves directly to the Iranian leadership.

This, however, is now passed over in silence. Neither your letter nor the public statements of representatives of the administration contain a single kind word addressed to the Soviet Union in connection with the position it adopted. Instead, clearly tendentious assessments are being given to what was reported in the Soviet news media in connection with the release of the American diplomats. Moreover, this is being done in such a way as to entirely distort in the eyes of public opinion the position held by the Soviet state on this matter. One cannot help asking the question of why all this is being done and whether any thought is being given as to how we should regard such distorted interpretations.

Now about Poland. First of all I must say in a totally definite way that the internal affairs of this sovereign socialist state cannot be a subject of discussion between third countries, including between the USSR and the USA. If one is to speak, however, of outside attempts to exert influence on the internal situation in Poland, then it is necessary to state that such attempts do in fact take place and that they are being undertaken precisely on the part of the USA and other Western powers. In this regard it is sufficient to mention at least the provocative and instigatory transmissions of the “Voice of America” and other US Government controlled radio stations broadcasting to Poland. Constituting open interference in the internal affairs of Poland, those broadcasts are,
in addition, aimed at arousing among the Polish population unfriendly sentiments with regard to the Soviet Union. There are also facts which indicate that the interference of Western powers in Polish affairs is not limited to radio broadcasts alone.

Here again a question arises: What purpose then is being served by the attempts of the American side to introduce the “Polish theme” into the Soviet-American dialogue and to make at the same time inappropriate “warnings” addressed to the Soviet Union?

As far as Poland is concerned we, for our part, are guided by the provisions of the joint statement—which, I believe, you are familiar with—adopted at the beginning of last December in Moscow at the meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty states. This document spells out the collective position of the Warsaw Treaty countries, including the Polish People’s Republic itself, whose leaders participated in that meeting.

Since you, Mr. Secretary, did not bypass in your letter the Afghanistan aspect either, I would like to present briefly our position in this respect. Its essence is that there must be a cessation of the armed incursions into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and of all other interference in its internal affairs, and firm guarantees must be given that this will not be resumed. Doing so would also eliminate the reasons that brought forth the necessity of introducing into Afghanistan a limited contingent of Soviet troops at the request of the DRA Government in accordance with the existing norms of international law.

Concrete paths leading to the achievement of a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan were set forth in the DRA Government statement of May 14, 1980. Later, on more than one occasion, including quite recently, the DRA Government has confirmed its readiness to start working on the appropriate agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as between Afghanistan and Iran. The United States for its part could, no doubt, contribute to the cause of a political settlement if it were to facilitate the beginning of a dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan and did not attempt, as is the case now, to raise obstacles thereto.

5 Reference is to the closing statement of a Warsaw Pact summit held in Moscow that concluded on December 5, 1980. In telegram 19286 from Moscow, December 5, 1980, Watson reported to Washington that “judging from the communique issued this evening the Warsaw Pact summit was called to pressure the Kania regime into a firmer stand and to make clear that ‘fraternal assistance’ is standing in the wings. Thus the threat of outside military intervention seems abated for the moment.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D800581–0422)
In conclusion I would like once more to confirm our readiness for an exchange of views on a wide range of issues. I hope that subsequently in our exchange of views a proper place will be accorded to the questions on the resolution of which depend, in the first instance, the prospects for the development both of Soviet-American relations and of the international situation as a whole.

Sincerely, A. Gromyko.

Moscow, January 28, 1981.

End text.

Haig

12. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

Washington, February 3, 1981, 0038Z

26874. Subject: Haig-Dobrynin Meeting, January 29. References: A. Moscow 1088; B. State 19053.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Begin summary. In his response to the Secretary’s January 23 letter (ref B), delivered by Ambassador Dobrynin on January 29, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko expressed readiness to exchange views on matters deserving priority attention but complained that those the Secretary had raised—Soviet treatment of the hostage situation, Poland, and Afghanistan—did not fall within that category. On Iran, he sought to justify the Soviet record on support for international law—for which we had never said a “kind word.” He accused the US and other Western powers of attempting to influence the Polish situation, specifically referring to broadcasts by VOA and other USG-controlled radios as constituting open interference in Polish internal affairs and implying that Western interference was not limited to radio broadcasts alone. His remarks on Afghanistan followed the standard Soviet position.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by German; cleared by Vest and in S; approved by Bremer.

2 Telegram not found.

3 See Document 4.

4 Haig’s letter to Gromyko was sent to Moscow on January 24 in telegram 19053.
The US, he said, could contribute to a political settlement by facilitating the beginning of a dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

—The Secretary told Dobrynin he would study the letter before commenting on it. In responding to complaints by Dobrynin on the tone being set by the new administration, the Secretary pointed out that the President was reflecting the mood of the American people and addressing the issues which greatly concerned them. He emphasized our insistence on reciprocity in US-Soviet relations and on change in the pattern of Soviet conduct which was at the root of the difficulties in our relationship. The Secretary also expressed great concern over the most recent developments in Poland and stressed that the situation was one the Polish people must resolve for themselves. End summary.

3. Before handing over the Gromyko letter, Dobrynin initiated a general discussion on the state of US-Soviet relations, noting that there was a “new beginning” for him (conceivably an allusion to the fact that he had been asked to enter the Department by the front door rather than through the basement garage). From events of the first week, Dobrynin continued, it appeared that the new administration was starting down the same road as the Carter administration, at least on two matters. The last administration had begun by emphasizing human rights—“and you know where we ended up on that”—and by setting aside work on a SALT Treaty which had practically been completed. Four years later, we were back almost at the same place, with references to human rights and, again, with questioning of all that had been done on SALT. He sincerely hoped that the way this week had gone was not indicative of the future course of events. The President’s statements in his just-concluded press conference would cause puzzlement in Moscow, and he wondered how he should explain them.

4. The Secretary responded that we had experienced a long period of difficulty in our relations. Perhaps in the early ’70s we were beginning a process of understanding, with potential benefit for world stability. Events since then—in Africa; Cuban activity—which could only be described as basic interventionism with no other purpose than to destabilize regimes and affect the free choice of peoples were responsible for the difficulties we were experiencing. As for Dobrynin’s comparison with the beginning of the previous administration, the Secretary noted that one basic difference was the feeling of the American people, of which administration policy was a reflection. Among other things, feelings engendered by the Vietnam era had passed. It was clear that

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5 See Document 2.
6 See Document 7.
it would be necessary for us to establish greater reciprocity in our relations. The Secretary noted that we had been disturbed by the outpourings of the Soviet press in recent weeks. We were profoundly disturbed by Cuban actions in this hemisphere and elsewhere. Our attitudes were going to be different from now on—and this would serve the interest of world peace.

5. Turning to the Polish situation, the Secretary said that both he and the President were greatly concerned by the news that afternoon from Poland. While he recognized that what was happening in Poland might create anguish for the Soviet Union, he emphasized that the situation was one which must be worked out by the Polish people alone. Dobrynin said he was unaware of anything special that had happened in Poland that day and thought the news in the American press that there were to be discussions in Warsaw on Friday represented a hopeful sign. The Secretary said he hoped that was the case but considered the most recent pronouncements by the Polish regime very threatening.

6. Dobrynin returned to his criticism of the tack taken by the new administration, particularly by the Secretary and the President in their first press conferences. He personally had not expected them to issue very “unfriendly” statements concerning his country and felt that they were not helpful. Responses from Moscow would be inevitable. A quiet dialogue aimed at determining the respective positions of the two sides and deciding what was to be done would be much more helpful than an exchange of press conference statements.

7. The Secretary responded that mature states understood that we should not enter into mutually escalated public relations wars. While he wished it were unnecessary to indulge in statements of the sort to which Dobrynin had referred, the American people were profoundly disturbed by events and had put Pres. Reagan in the White House to deal with the issues he had discussed in his press conference.

8. Dobrynin then gave the Secretary the Gromyko letter (text reported septel). After reading it, the Secretary said he would study it before responding.

9. Dobrynin asked how the Secretary thought we should proceed in developing a dialogue. Should we continue to engage in an exchange of public statements? The Secretary responded that the Department would be undertaking a review of number of issues, and that upon completion of this review he would discuss with the President how he wished to proceed. He thought it likely that he would be communicating with Gromyko, regularly, and frankly. We would be getting

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7 January 30.
a new Ambassador in place in Moscow and the senior staff in the Department. And while he was not interested in getting into an exchange of public statements he had been, as Dobrynin knew, outspoken on these matters for many years because he had seen a growing danger. He was not a harbinger of devil theories and took a very pragmatic approach. But he had witnessed Ethiopia, Afghanistan and recent events in our own hemisphere. There simply had to be a reversal, a shift, a change, because issues of international stability were involved. It was not acceptable just to talk peace while acting differently. To Dobrynin’s comment that this was a two-sided story, the Secretary observed that over the past four years it had been very one-sided from his point of view.

10. Dobrynin stated there was no lack of desire on the Soviet side to have very frank and blunt discussions. One point on which we would never be able to agree, the Secretary interjected, was the remark which Brezhnev had made to President Carter at Vienna concerning wars of liberation—which as reported to him was that the Soviet Union would continue to support such wars even in spheres of interest to the U.S. Dobrynin said that he did not recall such a remark, though he was present during the Vienna discussions.

11. The Secretary told Dobrynin he should know that the President entered office very concerned about the state of our relations. Dobrynin would learn that the President said what he meant—and he hoped Dobrynin would find what he said constructive. Asked whether the President’s press conference remarks should be considered constructive, the Secretary said that they should be considered an objective assessment of recent events. In refuting Soviet rationalization of their press play on Iran at a time when the lives of our hostages were at stake, the Secretary said he knew enough about the Soviet press to know that few things which appeared in it were accidental.

12. Dobrynin asked the Secretary to put himself in the shoes of the Soviets and consider how the Politburo would see the new administration on the basis of the statements made thus far by the Secretary and the President. Those statements, the Secretary rejoined, would give the Soviet leadership a wonderful agenda for factual denial. Dobrynin argued that there was a danger that both sides would come to wrong conclusions; without elaborating, he also suggested that this was a particularly difficult time, when the Soviet leadership was preparing for the Party Congress.

13. When the Secretary referred once more to our insistence on reciprocity, Dobrynin commented that the Secretary had also earlier mentioned “restraint,” and that part of his statement he had liked. In an aside, which he asked not be put on the record, Dobrynin said that the task for the Secretary was relatively easy, for he only had one leader to persuade—the President—whereas in the Soviet case the whole Politburo had to be convinced. It was difficult to convince them of anything in the first place, but once their minds were made up, it was even harder to change them. It would be unfortunate if their initial impression was that the U.S. now had a hostile administration, for that might be a lasting impression.

14. The Secretary responded that “hostile” was the worst label that might be applied. More appropriate might be offended, confident, determined, prepared to do what was necessary. The Soviet leadership must know that there must be change in the areas that he had cited, for the future good of both sides.

15. Present with Secretary were EUR Assistant Secretary Vest, Exec. Assistant Goldberg, and EUR/SOV Director German (notetaker). Dobrynin, as usual, came alone and took no notes.

Haig

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13. Memorandum From the Counselor-Designate of the Department of State (McFarlane) to the Director-Designate of Policy Planning (Wolfowitz)  

Washington, February 6, 1981

SUBJECT  
Study of East-West Relations

I believe your draft includes all of the regional and functional components essential to a comprehensive study of East-West relations. My only reservation concerns what I believe to be a need to establish the philosophical contextual setting in which the study will take place.

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2 Printed as an attachment.
As you know, military studies always begin by defining “the threat.” I believe we should use another term but that (the threat) is what I’m trying to get at in calling for a contextual setting.

Specifically, what is our assessment of the Soviet Union’s goals—its geopolitical objectives and long-term game plan? In other words, what do we believe are the dimensions of the problem we must deal with in the near-midterm period? This section need not be terribly long but I believe that in some study at the outset of this Administration we must say what we believe about the enduring purposes and objectives of the Soviet Union. I recall Sam Huntington’s piece in connection with PRM–10 which did (whether one agrees with it or not) provide one man’s contextual setting.

From that broad overview, each of your component pieces flows logically; that is, after we state our fundamental beliefs about their long-term intentions, we can consider how their ability to carry out those intentions are affected by the “Soviet internal scene” today, “US-Soviet bilateral relations” and other dimensions of our relationship world-wide.

Again, with apologies for my military methodology, I would tend to follow this threat section with an overview of our present resources for coping with it in a very broad sense. For example, what is the state of our alliances? Do we all hold a common perception of the threat? What is the state of the military balance across the force spectrum? What is the state of the economic balance? This amounts to a “net assessment.” Once you have done that, you will have identified political, economic, and military shortfalls (or surpluses). This leads to an identification of your vulnerabilities. For example, I believe we would both focus on our vulnerability to economic disruption arising from Soviet capabilities to exercise prevailing influence over Persian Gulf resources. If that is true, the study would need to treat—as you propose in paragraph 3—how we restore effective deterrence in the Persian Gulf area. Related analysis would also focus on how we restore free world political strength in that area.

All of the above need not alter your fundamental approach. I express it only to confirm that we both view the scope of the study along the same lines, generally.

3 Reference is to the comprehensive net assessment led by Samuel Huntington, a consultant to the National Security Council, during the first several months of the Carter administration. Documentation pertaining to PRM–10 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. IV, National Security Policy.
Attachment

Draft Study Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff

Washington, undated

*East-West Relations*

Terms of Reference

1—*Soviet Internal Scene.* Examine current Soviet political dynamics, prospects for Brezhnev succession and impact on US/Soviet relations. Assess state of Soviet economy, including dependencies that could be exploited or could lead Moscow toward foreign adventures. Discuss Soviet nationalities problem and dissident movement.

2—*US/Soviet Bilateral Relations.* How can we exploit Soviet belief that they will be able “to do business” with tougher but more consistent US Administration. How do questions of style and rhetoric play into substance of our relations? Discuss the status of established bilateral cooperative arrangements and describe those that are advantageous to us and of real interest to Moscow. What policies can we follow now that will lead to more moderate Soviet foreign/security policy in the future.

3—*Priority Problems.*

(a)—*Military Security/Arms Control.* Identify US conventional and theatre nuclear force posture weaknesses which undercut our capacity to compete effectively with the USSR in Europe and in other parts of the world. Suggest what in broad terms needs to be done to correct conventional and TNF deficiencies, and, taking account of general Administration budgetary projections, assess regional priorities. Identify potential new deployments (eg—ERW, CW) which require allied assent. This section also should discuss how arms control could, in tandem with force posture adjustments, serve the goals described above. In this connection identify current broad US/allied negotiating goals for MBFR, CDE and LRTNF talks, assess prospects for their achievement and discuss possible alternative objectives. (Strategic forces and SALT will be considered in separate studies.)

(b)—*Poland.* Summarize present internal political situation in Poland, likely developments through June 1, potential effects on Polish political structure and fall-out effect in other East European states. Consider possible Soviet reactions, identify potential “trigger points” and indicate interaction of Soviet Polish policy with broader US/Soviet
relationship. Review possible US reprisals for Soviet invasion, likely allied reactions and Soviet responses. Analyze Polish economic prospects and broad US/Western options, including possible multilateral (or multiple-bilateral) debt rescheduling.

(c)—Afghanistan/Southwest Asia. Discuss state of Soviet control in Afghanistan, internal political equation and prospects for negotiated solution. Assess effectiveness of current sanctions, their viability and how they could be made more effective. Review options for supporting Afghan rebels, in cooperation with other countries, and steps needed to strengthen Pakistan and deter further Soviet intervention in Southwest Asia.

4—Economic Issues. Summarize the state of US/Soviet trade, joint ventures and technology transfers and the effects of Afghanistan related sanctions. Assess merits of tightening up/easing off on sanctions and what could be achieved in short and medium terms. On the East-West economic front, review Soviet/European gas pipeline, CSCE energy conference, COCOM rules and allied cooperation on common export credit policies toward USSR. Assess in broad terms how we can use economic and security assistance to support US competition with USSR.

5—US/Soviet Competition in Developing World. Discuss how we can counter the political-military influence of Moscow and Soviet client regimes (including Cuba, Libya, PDRY, Ethiopia, Angola and Syria) and how we can exploit their vulnerabilities. Identify potential Soviet “targets of opportunity” in next year and how to cope with such dangers. Consider what can be done to undercut Vietnamese control of Kampuchea and support Thailand and ASEAN states. Identify possible US surrogates with which we can cooperate in Third Countries (eg, Morocco in Africa). This analysis should take account of indigenous forces of nationalism.

6—Core Alliance Partners. Discuss how we can generate European and Japanese cooperation in containing Soviet expansionism in developing world. Identify particular problems/vulnerability of key allies (eg—FRG) and how to gain their support. In this connection, analyze the “division of labor” concept and how it might be applied to political, economic and security areas, taking account of distinctive roles of Europeans and Japan. How can we ensure that allies blame USSR rather than US if East-West relations turn colder.

7—China. Analyze US interests in the Sino-Soviet-American triangular relationship and how to manage these relationships to our advantage. Discuss how Sino-American cooperation can limit Soviet expansion, including diplomatic and military consultations, intelligence sharing and parallel approaches toward Kampuchea and other international issues. How does arms supply issue fit into this picture. Indicate how Chinese relationships with Japan and Europeans might serve these goals.
8—Eastern Europe. Review the degrees of internal liberalization and external independence of the East European states and discuss options for promoting the gradual development of those two trends in cooperation with our key allies. Analyze how we can exploit endemic East European economic problems to enhance our influence and their freedom of action vis-a-vis Moscow, especially as the USSR is increasingly unable to bail them out. Discuss how these goals can be furthered in the short-term and longer-term without provoking internal political convulsions and Soviet interventions.

9—Political Competition. Discuss strategy for combating Soviet subversive activities, in Europe and Japan, as well as in developing world. Describe options for public affairs diplomacy (including ICA/VOA), ways to counter Soviet “peace offensive” in allied countries and methods for highlighting Soviet interventions and the weak Soviet foreign assistance record in LDCs. Discuss possibilities for cooperation with allied and friendly countries.

14. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 6, 1981

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Haig
Secretary Weinberger
William P. Clark, Deputy Sec. of State
Frank Carlucci, Deputy Sec. of Defense
Robert C. McFarlane, Counselor
Richard Burt, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Francis West, Special Asst., Dept. of Defense

SUBJECT
Summary of Meeting

The meeting began with a discussion of the New York Times story in which Secretary Haig was reported to have differed with Secretary

Weinberger on the latter’s statement concerning the ERW question. Both thought that the story was distorted and that the State cable sent out following Secretary Weinberger’s remarks earlier this week only represented his statements in full. It was agreed that the State Department would deny the story (this was done by Bill Dyess at the noon briefing today) and that Secretary Weinberger would be given a copy of the cable that was sent out. Bing West subsequently received a copy of the cable.

Secretary Haig then discussed his dinner meeting last night with Ambassador Dobrynin and Senator Percy. Secretary Haig said that he told Dobrynin that the Soviets were not living up to the “code of international conduct” laid down in earlier agreements between Moscow and Washington. Secretary Haig also put Dobrynin on alert about the Administration’s concerns over Soviet arms shipments and the use of proxies in Latin America, Africa, and other regions. Dobrynin, in turn, complained about the President’s and Secretary Haig’s remarks concerning the Soviet Union in their recent press conferences. Senator Percy, meanwhile who wanted to raise the issue of a quick start on SALT III negotiations, was unable to make much headway in the conversation.

Secretary Weinberger then said that it would be a mistake for the Administration to open talks with the Soviets on SALT, CTB, and other arms control negotiations. Deputy Secretary Carlucci raised the issue of the MX and noted that the State Department would soon have to decide on whether it was a good idea to build the system to ease the verification problem, a step that could add an additional $1.5 billion to the cost of the system.

Secretary Haig, returning to his discussion with Dobrynin, said that the Soviet Ambassador told him that Moscow wants a “non-aligned” Afghanistan. On Poland, Secretary Haig said that Dobrynin’s remarks indicated that the Russians are ready to move at any time. Dobrynin indicated that from the Russian perspective, the situation is getting worse. “We are going to do what we have to do,” Dobrynin told Secretary Haig while Senator Percy was out of the room. Secretary Haig added that the State Department was in the process of putting together a detailed checklist on Western responses to a Soviet invasion of Poland.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

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3 Reference is to telegram 28412 to all NATO capitals, February 4. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810052-0680)

4 See Document 7.
15. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, February 6, 1981, 1:30–2:40 p.m.

SUBJECT
Caribbean Basin; Poland (C)

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
State
Secretary Alexander A. Haig, Jr.
Defense
Caspar T. Weinberger
Treasury
Secretary Donald T. Regan
Justice
Attorney General William French Smith
DCI
Mr. William J. Casey
JSC
General David Jones
White House
Mr. Edwin Meese, III, Counsellor to the President
Mr. James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff to the President
Mr. Richard Allen, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Adm. James Nance, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Vice President’s Office
Adm. Daniel J. Murphy, Chief of Staff
National Security Council
Janet Colson
Timothy E. Deal
Charles Tyson

MINUTES

The President: Interagency groups are reviewing the items on today’s agenda. Their work is not complete, but they will have issues for decision shortly. The NSC should meet frequently and help to formulate our policies. I urge cooperation at all levels. No one should stand on ceremony. During the campaign, I pledged to implement a

1 Source: Reagan Library, Deal Files, Chron February 1981. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.
new foreign policy and restore the margin of safety. I look to this group
to help me. The Intelligence Community has a vital role. I intend to
restore the vigor and effectiveness of our intelligence services. (C)

I will use the NSC structure to obtain your guidance, but I will
make the decisions. Once made, I expect the Departments to implement
them. Subcabinet appointments will play a vital role in effective imple-
mentation. The NSC is not just another cabinet agency. Although the
decisions will be mine, you are the obvious source for good ideas. I
want good advice. The NSC staff functions as an integral part of the
White House, and Dick Allen places a premium on good manage-
ment. (C)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

[Secretary Haig:] I saw Amb. Dobrynin last night. Senator Percy
had apparently arranged for me and Dobrynin to have a discussion
on arms control. Percy and Dobrynin had obviously been concerting
beforehand. I told Dobrynin that the first order of business was to
establish an acceptable code of international behavior. The first order
of the day was Soviet activity in Afghanistan and the use of Cuban
proxies in troubled areas. The US would not stand by and permit the
Cubans to draw us into another Vietnam. We would get to the source
of the problem. The Soviets have other ideas: they want to provide
some formula for a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan, say, over
two years in return for arms control talks. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: We should make no promises on timing that
we could not accept at a later date. That is why I had said that six
months were needed before any resumption of arms talks. We don’t
want to appear too eager since this weakens our position. (S)

Secretary Haig: Secretary Weinberger and I have work underway
on Caribbean contingencies. We will have to deal with Nicaragua, El
Salvador, and, most especially, with Cuba. The worst thing would be to
have the US dragged into another draining experience like Vietnam. (S)

In the case of El Salvador, former Ambassador White was totally
wrong. He claimed that the government’s recent success in repelling
the guerrilla offensive was a victory due to our policy of not arming
the Salvadorans. The guerrillas did have a setback; they did not get
the popular support for which they hoped. Now they have adopted
a classic guerrilla stance. But there are only about 200 professional
Salvadoran military officers left. The military ranks are thin; a collapse
could come suddenly. The situation was so bad in San Salvador under
Ambassador White that Duarte couldn’t tell our Defense Attaché what
was happening. Only now is the truth beginning to trickle out. (S)

Our interagency group is active. We are sending down a qualified,
interim replacement for White. DOD will also send a senior adviser.
In the meantime, highly sensitive contingency planning continues. (S)
The President: My own feeling—and one about which I have talked at length—is that we are way behind, perhaps decades, in establishing good relations with the two Americas. We must change the attitude of our diplomatic corps so that we don’t bring down governments in the name of human rights. None of them is as guilty of human rights violations as are Cuba and the USSR. We don’t throw out our friends just because they can’t pass the “saliva test” on human rights. I want to see that stopped. We need people who recognize that philosophy. In Angola, for example, Savimbi holds a large chunk of Angolan territory. With some aid, he could reverse the situation. We should also reestablish relations with countries like Chile who have made substantial progress—and stop worrying about Allende’s fate. (S)

Secretary Haig: One important case is Bolivia. We withdrew our Ambassador and cut off aid. When countries like this have tough things to do, we should help them. If you beat them up, it works against us. We need to send a good person there and open the lines of communication. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: There is no doubt that we face a tough situation in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The problem stems from Cuba. With some covert aid, we could disrupt Cuban activities. I am not sure that most Americans understand the situation there. The majority probably believes that these governments are repressive and that we should not do anything provocative. We need to explain to people that this is a dangerous situation for the US and that we may have to move strongly. (S)

The President: El Salvador is a good starting point. A victory there could set an example. (S)

General Jones: We welcome the change in policy. American influence has declined. In 1970, we had 500 advisers in Latin America. That number has now fallen to 65. The Soviets have more military advisers in Peru than we have in all of Latin America. We used to bring young officers to the US for training. Our training program is now down to $4 million. (S)

Only 2% of our security assistance budget goes to Latin America. The Soviets provide substantially more military aid to the region. We cannot send more than six advisers into a country without Congressional approval. The law ties our hands. (C)

We need to let the Latin Americans know that we can be helpful. In 1975, President Ford agreed we needed to put the Cubans on notice for their activities in Angola. The Clark Amendment stopped us. Even if we can’t always stop the Cubans it is important that we make them pay the price of admission. In the Caribbean Basin what happens in one country influences the others. To stop the Cubans and help others
stop them, we need better intelligence, a psychological warfare program, and an ability to impede guerrilla activities. (S)

In El Salvador, we probably bought about two months’ time. We have provided $25 million in military equipment over the last few weeks. Another $30 million is in the pipeline. The Salvadoreans need training. We also need to work with the Honduran and Guatemalan governments. Socialist International is causing us problems with political support for El Salvador. (S)

General Haig: We will wrap up our interagency work on options for El Salvador in about two weeks. We need to turn the situation around. The Socialist International is indeed a problem. A public communications effort about our policy is essential. (S)

The President: How can we intercept these weapons? How can we help? (S)

Mr. Casey: I recently met with [less than 1 line not declassified]. They gave me an informative report on sources of support for the Salvadoran guerrillas. The Cubans have a covert effort underway directed toward all of Central America. They have trained 100 Guatemalans in the last 90 days. Each of them returns to Guatemala with ten rifles. Radio Havana broadcasts one hour daily to Guatemala in five Indian languages. The Mexicans give sanctuary to Guatemalan insurgents much as the Costa Ricans did for Nicaragua. (S)

The drug business through Miami is being used to finance the purchase of weapons for insurgents. ICA and other agencies need to pull all this together. In addition, covert action to train and help local militia and police to intercept the weapons traffic from Cuba would help. The Argentines are deeply involved in Central America. [1 line not declassified] (S)

Mr. Allen: This probably could not be done within existing guidelines. New findings would be needed. (S)

Mr. Meese: What are we talking about in the way of covert activity? Only teaching and training? (S)

Mr. Casey: Yes. (U)

Mr. Allen: But that would still require new findings. (S)

Mr. Casey: The most effective way to put pressure on Cuba would be through Angola. We should seek a repeal of the Clark Amendment and consider aid to Savimbi. (S)

Secretary Haig: We are considering tactics to obtain repeal of the Clark Amendment, but we don’t want to lose. (C)

Attorney General Smith: After Afghanistan the President proposed a blockade of Cuba. Even George Kennan supported that notion. If the Soviets invade Poland, we might find a blockade desirable. (S)
Mr. Casey: The developments in Central America have implications outside the continent, especially if the British pull out of Belize. The Guatemalans will face a guerrilla war on two fronts. The guerrillas will create problems for them in the upcoming elections. (S)

Mr. Allen: We need a positive policy for the region that provides justification for everything we do. (S)

Mr. Meese: We should have options for dealing with these situations. (S)

Secretary Haig: We are working on that now. (S)

The President: We can’t afford a defeat. El Salvador is the place for a victory. (S)

Secretary Haig: Regarding Poland, the Soviets view the situation there as more critical now than last November. We have a list of contingency actions ready. (S)

Mr. Meese: We must have agreement on how to deal with the press. We should not make available the agenda or content of these meetings—with no ifs, ands, or buts. (S)

The President: There can be no room for argument on that point. For too many years, we have been telling adversaries what we can’t do. It’s time we make them start wondering what we will do. (S)

16. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, February 6, 1981

1. Discussion With Ambassador Dobrynin: As I mentioned during Friday’s NSC meeting, I attended a small dinner party hosted by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Percy. Ambassador Dobrynin and our wives also attended. During the dinner, Senator Percy attempted to elicit from me Executive Branch commitments on future talks with the Soviet Union. Ambassador Dobrynin noted that his government was very concerned that your Administration would enter office with invective rather than pursuing quiet talks to explore and correct differences. Dobrynin made a strong pitch for SALT II and

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2 See Document 15.
the desirability of saving resources on both sides for more urgent social needs. He stated that our logic was flawed in that SALT II would provide a cap on numbers of weapons and would enable us at the end of the five-year period to do whatever was necessary. I told Dobrynin that we had not entered with a predisposition towards invective but merely with a clear recognition of the character of Soviet international activity.

Your view was emphasized that the first order of business between us was the clear need to reach an understanding on standards of international conduct citing Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Yemens, Africa, and most recently stepped-up Cuban activity in this hemisphere. Dobrynin’s response was uncharacteristically reasonable. He insisted that the Soviet Union was ready to discuss a phased withdrawal of Russian forces from Afghanistan in perhaps a year or two and a future non-aligned status for that country. Dobrynin was clearly pressing for a commitment to begin talks on almost any subject. He was rather defensive on Poland when I raised the grave consequences of Soviet intervention there. Dobrynin speculated that the situation was worse and stated solemnly that the Soviets would do whatever was necessary in Poland.

In sum, I informed Dobrynin that we were not seeking a return to the cold war per se, but that I personally felt it would be necessary for us to witness some evidence of restraint and with this in hand, the first order of business would be the need to establish criteria for standards of international conduct. Only then would functionally oriented dialogues such as arms control, trade credits, and technology be possible.3

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

3 On February 9, Stoessel met with Dobrynin, who was about to leave for Moscow, and reported back to Haig. “Dobrynin repeated the litany of Soviet complaints and probed for US attitudes and policies that he could convey to the Soviet leadership,” Haig wrote Reagan the next day, “Stoessel pressed Dobrynin hard on Soviet support of terrorism, our view of their lack of restraint, and Cuban subversive activities. On Poland, Stoessel stressed the serious consequences of Soviet intervention and our hope that the Poles could solve their problems themselves. On Afghanistan, he made clear to Dobrynin that the Soviet occupation there was totally incompatible with Brezhnev’s proposals of last December about guarantees of security in the Persian Gulf area. Throughout the conversation, Dobrynin suggested that some form of US-Soviet contact would soon be desirable, although he understood there would be a pause before formal discussions of particular problems could be undertaken. Stoessel took note but did not comment.” (Memorandum from Haig to Reagan, February 10; Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, The Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption Documents, Lot 92D630, “Evening Reading: Jan–June 1981”)
17. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State-Designate for Political Affairs (Stoessel) to Secretary of State Haig

Washington, February 11, 1981

SUBJECT
Discussion with Senator Kassebaum on Grain Embargo

Senator Kassebaum called this evening from Kansas and wished to talk with you about the various factors involved in the grain embargo problem. In your absence, I talked with her.

She said she understood many of the foreign policy aspects militating against lifting the embargo but said she is obviously getting many questions from farmers in her state about this subject, with many of them underlining the point about the unfairness of the grain embargo since it applies only to one sector of the economy. She also said that the market has been depressed for two weeks and that the continuing uncertainty about a decision on the embargo may be contributing to this.

She said she was tending herself to think that it might be preferable to continue the grain embargo but accompany this with a total embargo on all trade with the USSR. I told her that such a step probably would not be supported by our allies and would not be effective in cutting off Soviet imports from the West; moreover, it might be seen as a move which would further inflame tensions at a time when they are already high. The Senator said she understood these points and that she would hold off making a public recommendation for a total embargo.

Another alternative, she felt, would be to lift the embargo with the understanding that we would then enter into negotiations with the Soviets for a long term agreement and would make clear that we would be tough in our negotiating stance. I told her I thought lifting the embargo and agreeing to go into negotiations—no matter how tough we would be—risked giving the wrong signal to the Soviets and to the allies, particularly in view of Soviet pressures on Poland.

We also discussed the possibility of simply delaying a decision for a certain period. The Senator felt that this might be feasible, although she said the farmers—while not “up in arms”—will be pressing for a decision one way or the other before too long.

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1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretary, S/S-I Records: Walter Stoessel Files, Lot 82D307, P—Stoessel Classified Chron 1981 Jan–June. Confidential. A stamped notation indicates Haig saw the memorandum. Haig wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “Item to discuss w/Pres,” and initialed the memorandum.
The Senator noted that she would be meeting with the President February 17 together with other Senators on the embargo. She said many of her contacts expect a decision to come from this meeting, but she will advise them that this may not be the case.\textsuperscript{2}

I gathered from our talk that the Senator is understanding of all of the complications involving the embargo and desires to be as helpful as possible. She has not made up her own mind as to the best course of action and indicated that she might be back in touch with you or with me to discuss the situation further.

\textsuperscript{2} An unknown hand drew a vertical line to the right of this paragraph. Reagan met with a bipartisan group of members of Congress on February 17 from 2 to 2:45 p.m. in the Indian Treaty Room in the Old Executive Office Building to discuss the grain embargo. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation for the meeting was found. “Those from farm states want it lifted,” he wrote in his diary. “I explained we’d made no decision but while I was against the embargo we had to worry about making a concession to the Soviets without some Quid Pro Quo. It might send a wrong message.” (Brinkley, ed., \textit{The Reagan Diaries}, Vol. I, p. 20)

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18. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, February 13, 1981

SUBJECT
Weekly Report: Soviet Union and Communist Bloc

General Impressions

Confusion and disarray in Moscow over the harsh tones emanating from Washington and the confounding events in Poland; inability to decide whether to pursue a hard or a soft line with resultant policy vacillation. (S)

Soviet Union and the United States

The Soviet Government seems to have decided to treat the anti-Soviet statements of President Reagan and Secretary Haig as political

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Weekly Reports, 02/06/1981–02/21/1981. Secret.
rhetoric which will soon give way to a “realistic” recognition of the need for superpower cooperation. This attitude accounts for the relatively conciliatory tone of Gromyko’s response to Secretary Haig. However, Moscow seems in a tizzy over the relaxed approach taken by the Reagan Administration toward negotiations with it:

—Absence of negotiations means that Moscow lacks knowledge of the personalities of the new Administration and of their thinking, a lack which Soviet policy planners find exasperating.
—Continued nonchalance on our part toward negotiations is likely to have the effect of making Moscow much more amenable to serious talks when the time for them comes. It should therefore be pursued in the weeks to come.²

All indications are that the strong statements emanating from Washington and Moscow’s inability to “probe” the new Administration has thrown confusion into the Kremlin and induced it to act with circumspection in Poland. (S)

**Poland**

The likelihood of a Soviet military intervention in Poland seems to be receding. Soviet policy is to continue to rely on the Polish Government to straighten out the situation there to its satisfaction. Large-scale Soviet financial aid to Poland [less than 1 line not declassified] suggests a desire to stabilize the situation for the time being. Should the situation in Poland nevertheless continue to deteriorate from Moscow’s point of view, the most likely response would be the declaration in Poland of a state of emergency. This measure would give the Polish authorities wide latitude in dealing with worker unrest and most importantly enable it to isolate the intellectuals from the workers by arresting the leaders of such dissident organizations as KOR.³ Beyond this, there looms the possibility that during the Polish Party Congress scheduled for April Kania will be replaced either by Moczar or Olszowski,⁴ two hard-liners, the second of whom is reported to have close connections to a member of the Soviet Politburo, G.V. Romanov. In this manner the Soviet Union would hope to bring Poland back into the Communist straightjacket. It is worth noting that the organ of the Soviet Trade Union organization Trud has given its readers surprisingly “neutral” accounts of the events in Poland which confirms intelligence indications that there are individuals high in the Soviet Government who believe

² Allen wrote in the margin: “I certainly concur with this.”
³ Reference is to the Komitet Obrony Robotnikow (Workers’ Defense Committee).
⁴ References are to Mieczyslaw Moczar and Stefan Olszowski.
that worker unrest in Poland is a foretaste of what awaits the Soviet Union, requiring solution rather than brutal repression. (S)

Cuba

Attention should be called to a recent visit by the Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Marshal Ogarkov, who arrived in Havana on February 6 accompanied by a senior Soviet military delegation. (S)

19. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)¹

Washington, February 17, 1981

SUBJECT

Thoughts on Linkage (U)

I agree, in principle, with Carnes Lord’s memorandum of February 13 (attached): it is difficult to see how U.S.-Soviet accords of 1972–1973 could provide viable ground rules for superpower relations. They may certainly be used to embarrass the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union is in a position to exploit much more effectively this particular propaganda weapon by telling the Allies that such a declaratory policy is merely camouflage to conceal American unwillingness to engage in negotiations and fresh proof of U.S. lack of constancy and serious purpose. That is, while we, by pursuing this line, could tarnish the Soviet image, they could turn it into an effective means of further splitting the Western alliance. (C)

One might more usefully divide general U.S. policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union along the following lines:

1. Declare that a significant improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations requires Soviet adherence to the accepted norms of international behavior of the kind that the Soviet Government itself has formally subscribed to on numerous occasions, including in the Helsinki Accords; but that

2. Specific agreements with the Soviet Union are possible in any event provided that they are based on genuine reciprocity and are capable of being implemented and verified. (C)

I do not agree with Carnes Lord that we must not condemn Soviet imperialism in the Third World out of concern that we may be charged with “hypocrisy and double standards” in El Salvador. In El Salvador we have neither troops nor secret services, as the Russians do in South Yemen, Angola or Ethiopia: we are merely trying to prevent the imposition, from the outside, of yet another dictatorial regime. This, in my vocabulary, is anti-imperialism. (C)

Attachment

Memorandum From Carnes Lord of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)²

Washington, February 13, 1981

SUBJECT

Thoughts on Linkage (U)

Secretary Haig’s reported remarks to Ambassador Dobrynin on linkage of arms control and other agreements and Soviet international behavior involve some fundamental policy issues and problems which require attention. Unless the Secretary’s position is suitably qualified and moderated, it could cause avoidable damage to important U.S. interests. (C)

The Secretary’s position seems to be to hold the Soviets to a strict interpretation of the Basic Principles of Relations statement of 1972 and the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War of 1973, and make any kind of agreement in arms control or trade contingent on compliance with them. Apparently, he would consider Soviet activities in Africa as well as Afghanistan in violation of these agreements. There are several issues here:

—Is it not desirable to distinguish between kinds of Soviet intervention in the Third World? The invasion of Afghanistan is qualitatively more serious than Soviet actions in Africa both by its magnitude and its illegitimacy (ill-disguised invasion as distinct from assistance to real governments). (C)

² Confidential. Sent for information. Copied to Schweitzer and Kramer. Nance forwarded the memorandum to Pipes under an undated handwritten note: “Dr. Pipes—Before this paper goes in to Dick, request you give us your thoughts.” An unknown hand wrote “2/17/81” beneath Nance’s signature. (Ibid.)

³ See Document 16.
—Is it not desirable to distinguish between kinds of agreements? Some arms control agreements (particularly SALT but also MBFR) have a large political dimension and are of necessity linked with the international behavior of the parties; others are largely technical in character, can be useful to the U.S. under almost any international circumstances and have very low political salience (for example, the nuclear accidents agreement of 1971 or a prospective anti-satellite warfare agreement). (C)

—Is it not desirable to avoid reviving expectations that the Soviets will ever agree to a code of international conduct forbidding all assistance to “national liberation movements,” or that if they did agree (as in the early 1970s) it would be worth anything? There may be some political mileage to be gained from redefining “detente” in this way and using it against the Soviets, but they have been much more adept than we in that game, and it is arguably better simply to bury the idea. (C)

—A blanket rejection of negotiation with the Soviets unless they renounce all activity in the Third World will cause considerable turmoil among the West Europeans, and could accelerate the split between the U.S. and its allies on defense, arms control and other East-West issues. (C)

—A blanket condemnation of Soviet intervention/interference in the Third World is double-edged: it can be used to condemn U.S. involvement in El Salvador, for example, and in general exposes the U.S. to charges of hypocrisy and double standards. (C)

In general, undiscriminating opposition to Soviet imperial activities is liable to weaken the U.S. case against any particular move by the Russians. It seems especially important to stress the uniqueness of the Afghan intervention: it is not business as usual for the Soviets—or for the U.S. (the Vietnam analogy obscures the fact that we were invited in by a real government). This suggests the thought that further arms control negotiations (at any rate in the major areas) should be linked to a resolution of the Afghan situation, but not to Soviet withdrawal from Africa. The larger point is that the U.S. should concentrate its fire on those cases where the Russians are in flagrant violation of international law and custom, while opposing other Soviet activities in their own terms (i.e. counter-intervention in Africa, Latin America, etc.). This course should be both more effective with third countries and more difficult for the Soviets. (C)
20. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, February 17, 1981, 1628Z


1. (S—Entire text)

2. I doubt that I have any evidence not available to the intelligence community on Soviet support for terrorism. My statement in ref B was based on the assumption that we do not concede to the Soviets the right to determine when a group is a “national-liberation” movement (and thus in their eyes entitled to use terrorism) and when it is not (and thus presumably does not have that right, at least in theory). I consider it unwise to accept either the Soviet definition of “national liberation” movements or the right the Soviets have arrogated to themselves to determine whether a particular group fits the definition or not. I believe we are on sounder ground if we consider any group which espouses the use of terrorism to achieve its political ends as a terrorist group and aid to such as aid to terrorism. In this sense, the Soviets are clearly guilty of aiding terrorism, and they know it.

3. The issue, however, does not stop there, in my view. While the Soviets have most often (and most overtly) dealt directly with groups they have dubbed “national liberation” movements, they have also maintained an active arms supply relationship with regimes they know are arms suppliers to terrorist groups which are not so classified. Qaddafi’s Libya is a case in point. I recall that, in the early 1970’s, I made a demarche on instructions to the Soviet Embassy in Washington requesting that both of us refrain from introducing “Redeye-type” missiles into the Middle East because of the particular danger this weapon would pose if it fell into the hands of terrorists. The Soviets gave us a waffling reply and shortly thereafter the Italian police arrested individuals in Rome in possession of Soviet “Strela” missiles. As I recall, reports at the time indicated that they had been brought into...

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1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, Vol. 17, Box 5 [Moscow, 1980–83]. Secret, Roger Channel.
2 Telegram 37581 to Moscow, February 13, begins: “Intelligence community wishes to elicit all information we can on subject of Soviet support for terrorism (by which we mean terrorist groups like Red Brigades and Bader-Meinhoff rather than insurgent or ‘national liberation’ groups).” (Ibid.)
3 Telegram 2106 from Moscow, February 12, in which the Embassy described the reaction of Soviet state media to Haig’s charge in his Senate confirmation hearing that Moscow was supporting international terrorism. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810067–0838)
Italy in the Libyan diplomatic pouch. In supplying such weapons to Qaddafi, the Soviets must have been aware that he could well pass them on to terrorist groups. The same, of course, can be said for their arms supply relationships with South Yemen and Palestinian groups.

4. Although the intelligence community is obviously in a better position to judge than I am, I believe that there is considerable evidence that the Soviets have tolerated, and at times provided passive support to, training of terrorists by countries such as North Korea, allowing—for example—transit of “students” and instructors through the USSR. Given the very tight controls on entry and exit here, such tolerance in my view should definitely be construed as support for terrorism.

5. Finally, support for terrorism can also involve covert propaganda. In this area—as in others—the intelligence community is in an infinitely better position than I to know the facts. However, I would classify the clandestine broadcasts to Iran following the seizure of the U.S. Embassy there as a form of support to a particularly flagrant act of terrorism.

6. Your question seems to imply that there is less evidence of Soviet support for groups they do not classify as “national liberation” movements than I had supposed. Is the intelligence community really having trouble substantiating that the Soviets have indulged in indirect or covert support for such groups? If so, this is important to know.

Matlock

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21. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)¹

Washington, February 24, 1981

SUBJECT

Weekly Report as of February 21

Soviet Union. Soviet news was dominated by preparations for the forthcoming Party Congress scheduled to open on February 23. Elections of personnel to the Central Committee at the local and republican

levels, just completed, were striking in having produced very few changes: the overwhelming number of Party functionaries have been “reelected” to their posts. This continuity attests to the unchallenged hold on the apparatus enjoyed by Brezhnev. The only significant changes to have occurred recently in the Soviet leadership have taken place in the Council of Ministers where advantage was taken of Kosygin’s resignation\(^2\) to remove some dead wood, and in the armed forces where there has been some reshuffling of top personnel. Indications are that Marshal Ogarkov, the Chief of Staff, is moving upward and may replace the ailing Minister of Defense Ustinov.\(^3\)

In a belligerent speech delivered on February 21, Ustinov accused the United States and its Allies of seeking to revive the cold war and subvert the “socialist” community, and, indeed, making active preparations for war, including a preemptive attack on the Warsaw Pact. This address was mistakenly interpreted by foreign opinion as paving the way for a hard-line Congress speech by Brezhnev. As it turned out, the Soviet leadership seems to have decided to travel simultaneously on two roads: the aggressive “low road” given to Ustinov and the conciliatory “high road” assigned to Brezhnev. Such a dual strategy gives the Soviet Union greater flexibility in meeting the challenges of the new American Administration. (S)

The Soviet leadership continues to reveal extraordinary sensitivity to the charge that it sponsors worldwide terrorism. Apparently it fears that this accusation by Secretary Haig may pave the way for identifying so-called “national liberation movements”, which enjoy considerable European and Third World sympathy, with terrorism, which is almost universally condemned, and in this manner discredit its main vehicle for Third World expansion. (S)

In reaction to the Polish events, there has been a conscientious effort by the Soviet authorities to forestall potential worker unrest from breaking out in their own countries. Thus, Politburo member Chernenko has recently published an article in an authoritative theoretical journal urging the broader involvement of workers in “monitoring” Soviet management. In some of the Soviet republics unusual initiatives have been taken to enroll manual workers as party executives. Apparently, more intelligent communists in the Soviet Union have concluded that worker antagonism to the party in Poland had genuine roots and should be treated by timely concessions now rather than by brute force later. (S)

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\(^2\) Reference is to Alexei Kosygin, who resigned as Chairman of the Council of Ministers in October 1978.

\(^3\) Ustinov remained Minister of Defense until his death in December 1984.
Poland. On the surface the situation in Poland has quieted down remarkably. The new Prime Minister, Jaruzelski, seems to enjoy the confidence of the Soviet Government as well as Solidarity. The Soviet Union has helped to stabilize the situation by financial aid. Nevertheless, underneath the surface the situation is troubling from Moscow’s point of view. Intelligence information indicates that reserve officers and even policemen in Poland are talking of forming unions. The attached intelligence report reflecting the opinions of the Italian Communist Party on Poland seems very trustworthy.4

Afghanistan. The news from Afghanistan is not good for Moscow. There is growing evidence of large-scale drug and alcohol abuse among Soviet troops as well as of the spread of communicable diseases. Dysentery and typhoid are common and infectious hepatitis is said to have reached “epidemic” proportions (over 8,000 cases in 1980). Senior Soviet officers have been overheard to say that it may take them up to five years to gain full control of the country. (S)

Zimbabwe. The decision of Mugabe to open diplomatic relations with Moscow after repeated refusals to do so apparently stems from the agreement of Moscow to stop supporting his main rival, Nkomo. It is of considerable value to the Soviet Union in its concerted drive against South Africa. (S)

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4 Not found attached.
22. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, February 25, 1981

SUBJECT

Brezhnev’s Speech

Brezhnev’s speech Monday contains no major changes in basic Soviet positions and little evidence of flexibility on key issues. But it includes elements which could cause us problems with the Allies. We will therefore want to discuss the speech thoroughly in NATO to steady the Allies and prevent uncoordinated responses. The speech’s most prominent points, and my plans for dealing with them, are as follows:

—US-Soviet Dialogue and Summitry: Given what we have said publicly on these issues it seems unlikely Moscow expected us to take them up on Brezhnev’s summit proposal. I believe we should make clear that a meeting would have to have a clear purpose, be well prepared, and hold promise of a successful outcome.

—Confidence Building Measures: Brezhnev accepted the French idea that confidence building measures (CBM’s) extend from the Atlantic to the Urals, but with the proviso that the West also extend the area “appropriately”. This presumably means applying CBM’s to parts of the US and Canada, which we and the Allies have agreed is unacceptable. Brezhnev did not deal with other Allied preconditions for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). We will welcome the Soviet “concession” on the CBM area, but will hold the line on extensions beyond Western Europe. We will also point out that other criteria must be met if there is to be a CDE.

—Afghanistan: The Soviets restated their conditions for a troop withdrawal and for a political settlement of the dispute. But they offered to discuss Afghanistan as part of a conference on the security of the Persian Gulf region—an idea Brezhnev has been peddling for some time. We will reiterate our support for a political settlement based on complete Soviet withdrawal and point out that the Soviet proposal is


not responsive to the UN resolutions or the views of the Islamic or key non-aligned states.

—SALT and TNF: Brezhnev’s statement of readiness to continue “appropriate” talks with the US on limiting strategic arms—with no reference to ratifying SALT II—is a slightly more nuanced statement of the Soviet position than that previously articulated by Soviet spokesmen. He also reiterated his proposal for a moratorium on the deployment of long range TNF systems in Europe, which would freeze the current imbalance in Moscow’s favor.

On SALT, we will continue to comment positively on resuming strategic arms limitation efforts, without yielding on linkage or committing ourselves to a specific date. On TNF, we will continue to reaffirm our commitment to the two-track NATO approach to modernization of NATO LRTNF and negotiations for limiting LRTNF deployments.

—Security Council Member Summit: Brezhnev’s proposal for a summit-level Security Council meeting is a straw man. They put forward a similar idea last year, which died quietly for lack of international interest. Such proposals need not become problems for us if we let them sink quietly.

23. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan

Washington, February 27, 1981

SUBJECT
Brezhnev’s Speech (U)

The NSC concurs with Secretary Haig’s assessment (Tab A) of Brezhnev’s speech, namely that “it contains no major changes in basic Soviet positions and little evidence of flexibility on key issues” but “includes elements which could cause us problems with the allies.” His estimate of the individual aspects of the speech is also in line with NSC Staff thinking. (C)

Three points call for additional comment:

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2 Not found attached. See Document 22.
—The very moderate tone Brezhnev assumed in discussing Central American affairs, especially his significant omission of any promises of aid to Cuba from “imperialist threats”. This apparently is intended to avoid adding fuel to the fire in view of determined U.S. moves.
—Omission of reference to “world revolution” as an objective of Soviet policy—another element in the “moderate”, “realistic” self-image.
—The overall effort to depict the Soviet Union as a reasonable, accommodating power is in vivid contrast to the Reagan Administration’s alleged belligerency and non-cooperation—a ploy designed to influence foreign public opinion, especially in Western Europe. (C)

24. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan

Washington, March 2, 1981

SUBJECT

Analysis of Brezhnev Proposal for a Summit

Richard Pipes and William Stearman of the NSC Staff have provided a short analysis of the Brezhnev proposal for a summit, and conclude that it is not advisable.

While I concur, I thought you would benefit from the interesting historical framework which these two experts use to evaluate the matter.

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OBSERVATIONS ON A SUMMIT—WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

Brezhnev wants a summit meeting in order to resurrect detente and to slow down US and NATO defense improvements. If the President wants a summit, he might follow President Eisenhower’s example and put a price tag on it.

Early in Eisenhower’s Administration, he was faced with the issue of meeting with the post-Stalin leaders of the USSR. Churchill, for one, was pushing for a Four Power summit at this time. On April 16, 1953, Eisenhower made public a list of specific actions the USSR would have to take before the US would agree to a summit. These included arms control measures, a German Peace Treaty, and an Austrian State Treaty, any one of which would pay the price of admission. After eight years of stalling, the Soviets agreed to the Austrian Treaty, which was signed in May 1955 and resulted in the Geneva Summit that summer.

Actually, the record of US-Soviet summit meetings would indicate that they should be avoided altogether. With one exception, Camp David in 1959, these summits have ranged from being unnecessary to nearly disastrous. For example, I have long believed that the 1961 Vienna summit (in which I was involved) was largely responsible for both the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crisis. Camp David turned out to be useful in stalling off Soviet action on Berlin until U-2 coverage revealed there was no “missile gap” which encouraged us to take a tougher stand on Berlin.

The Soviet leaders have looked upon summits as an essential element of their “detente” campaigns. The “Spirit of Geneva,” the “Spirit of Camp David,” the “Spirit of Glassboro” were touted as evidence of a “relaxation of tensions” (i.e. detente) and were designed, among other things, to lull the West into a false sense of security. A principal goal of Soviet detente moves has been to encourage NATO to decrease arms expenditures. They have usually followed periods of Soviet-induced tension which have resulted in increased Western defense efforts: 1949, after the airlift defeat of the Berlin Blockage and after the first SAC deployment to Europe; 1955 (actually beginning in 1953), after our huge Korean War buildup; 1963, after the failed Cuban missile caper.

2 Confidential.
and in recognition of the enormous US strategic advantage; 1971–72 to control US MIRV and ABM advantages and to gain increased access to Western technology and financing (among other things). Brezhnev’s opening speech at the 26th CPSU Congress\(^3\) makes it quite clear that the Soviets want badly to resurrect detente in order to delay or fend off the announced US military buildup and concomitant strengthening of Western European defenses through TNF modernization, etc. Brezhnev’s avowed eagerness to parley with us is the clear result of a tougher US stance vis-a-vis the USSR and an increased US defense budget.

Apart from providing the Soviet leadership with a convenient propaganda platform, summits present other intrinsic problems. They are perforce short and rendered even shorter by the necessity of translation; therefore the serious and complicated subjects, which are usually on the agenda, can be only superficially discussed. This, in turn, can lead (and has led) to misunderstandings and miscalculations.

Despite the pitfalls of summit meetings with the Soviets, it is probably unrealistic to expect the President to avoid them altogether. Since we established relations with the USSR, every US President has met with his Soviet counterpart (bilaterally beginning with Camp David). Presidents can scarcely resist the urge to size up their main opponent. In addition, I would imagine that our European allies, who live under the shadow of Soviet power, would not want us to reject Brezhnev’s summit proposal out of hand.

If Eisenhower’s example is followed, a number of summit price tags could be announced, for example:

—Withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan (if we wanted to avoid a summit altogether);
—Withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban forces from Angola and Ethiopia;
—No Soviet assistance, direct or indirect, to revolutionaries in this Hemisphere;
—No direct Soviet military intervention in Poland;
—Conclusion of a satisfactory SALT III Treaty.

It goes without saying that any approach to the Soviets on a summit should be carefully worked out on an interagency basis here and then with our allies. For the time being, our public position on Brezhnev’s proposal should remain strictly noncommittal.

\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 22.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS—RICHARD PIPES

I concur in general with Bill Stearman’s assessment of Brezhnev’s initiatives and his options. The Soviet leaders have shown every sign of exasperation with the Reagan Administration’s casual attitude toward negotiations with them: in part, because such behavior deflates their global image as a “superpower” which the USA is required to take into account in all its foreign policy initiatives, and in part because it deprives Moscow of an opportunity to size up the new U.S. Government.

However, because the “negotiating process” is popular among left-of-center groups in Western Europe, it would not be prudent to dismiss Brezhnev’s summit suggestion out of hand. “Interesting,” “worthy of consideration” should be the U.S. reactions. In practice, the proposal should be shelved. There is no need for a summit, at any rate now or in the foreseeable future. Should the President nevertheless find a purely negative stance politically ill-advised, he may want to pose very high preconditions: sufficiently high ones to preclude a cosmetic concession on the part of Moscow which would look like a genuine peaceful gesture and make us look bad if we did not wind it up with a summit.

25. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to All Agency Heads


SUBJECT

Reciprocity in Bilateral Relations with the Soviet Union

It is this Administration’s policy to ensure strict reciprocity in our dealings with the Soviet Union. In order to implement such a policy, it is important that there be close coordination among all Government agencies which engage in bilateral dealings with the Soviets.

It is also our intention to bring the access of the Soviet Ambassador and other Soviet officials to U.S. Government offices in Washington

more nearly into balance with the access which we have to Soviet officials in the USSR.

I have asked that the Interagency Coordinating Committee on U.S.-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA) coordinate questions of reciprocity. I also would appreciate your designating an official of your agency to coordinate your agency’s Soviet contacts with the Department of State’s Office of Soviet Union Affairs. Our purpose is not to cut off these contacts but to monitor them to ensure that access is reciprocal.


Thank you for your cooperation.

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26. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan

Moscow, March 6, 1981

Dear Mr. President:

I consider it necessary to turn to you concerning the most vital problems that are raised by the present international situation. I suppose you are aware that the Congress of our Party, which recently took place in Moscow, devoted paramount attention to analysis and evaluation of the international situation; as well as to the practical conclusions stemming from this. The question was, what should be done in order to preserve peace and to ensure for present and future generations the most basic right of each person—the right to life. This is the essence of the decisions that were taken, which will determine the foreign policy course of the Soviet Union in the years ahead.

We are realists, and of course we take due account of the fact that improvement of the international situation, the lessening and liquidation of the threat of war depend not only upon us but also upon the will of other governments, upon the success of establishing more

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Blair Files, Brezhnev Correspondence 1981, 03/11/1981–03/24/1981. Secret. Printed from an unofficial translation. In a covering memorandum to Allen, March 7, Bremer wrote that Bessmertnykh handed the letter to Acting Secretary Stoessel on the afternoon of March 6, and that the Department of State translated it “during the night.” He went on to say: “The Secretary believes we should conduct a thorough analysis and consult with key allies prior to transmission of a response. We further recommend against publicly acknowledging receipt of the letter, unless the Soviets make the fact public.”
appropriate mutual understanding and effective cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, in resolving the vital problems of present times.

We are convinced that one’s attitude toward the strategic military balance that has taken shape between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact states and those of NATO, is of fundamental significance here. The Soviet Union has not sought, and does not seek military superiority. But neither will we permit such superiority to be established over us. Such attempts, as well as attempts to talk to us from a position of strength, are absolutely futile.

The existing strategic military equilibrium is objectively serving the cause of preserving world peace. We are for consistently bringing matters to the lowering of level of the equilibrium, without violating its balance. To attempt to win in an arms race, to count on victory in an atomic war—would be dangerous madness. It must be recognized that endless competition and accumulation of ever newer weapons, while keeping the world under tension, is the real source of the military threat that hangs over all countries. We are prepared to act, hand in hand with all countries and above all with the United States, in decisive struggle against this threat. It is clear the great extent to which success here depends upon the joint actions precisely of our two countries.

We are in general for normal, good relations with the USA, for the development of these relations in the interests of the peoples of our two countries, in the interests of peace.

The present state of Soviet-American relations, the sharpness of the problems demanding solution, create the imperative need for the conduct and development of dialogue that is active and at all levels. The Soviet Union favors such a dialogue and is prepared to come to agreement regarding mutually acceptable decisions, with account for the lawful interests of the sides.

Soviet-American summit meetings have special significance in all this, and at the Congress we considered it feasible and advisable to speak out directly in favor of such a meeting.

As is known, in recent years the Soviet Union has put forward numerous proposals for reducing the threat of war and for strengthening international security. Many of these have been approved by the UN and other impressive fora. All of our proposals remain in force and we will work toward their realization.

However, the current situation is such that it is necessary to intensify efforts still more in order to improve the international situation radically, to give people confidence in a safe, peaceful future. Guided by this vital necessity, the Soviet Union has come forward with new, large initiatives permeated with deep concern to restrain the arms race, deepen detente, strengthen peace.
I found it necessary to call your personal attention, Mr. President, to these proposals, put forward, as you know, at the Congress of our Party. Apart from the scale and the far-reaching character of these initiatives, I wish in particular to underscore their realism, the account they take of both our own interests as well as the interests of our partners.

Experience shows how complicated and difficult it is to liquidate, to extinguish hotbeds of military conflict. It is therefore important to conduct preventative work to prevent such hotbeds from occurring.

In this context, measures to strengthen trust in the military sphere, carried out at the decision of the all-European conference, play a positive role. The Soviet Union has made proposals for widening significantly the volume of these measures.

We are now proposing to widening substantially the zone of applicability of such measures. We are prepared to extend them to the entire European part of the USSR, on the condition, of course, of a corresponding widening of the zone of measures of trust by the Western states. I would like in this connection once again to emphasize that the Soviet Union favors the successful conclusion of the Madrid meeting. Adoption at it of a decision to call an all-European conference for discussion and solution of problems of military detente and disarmament in Europe would have a particularly important significance.

We also consider that the working out and adoption of measures of trust could also be useful in the area of the Far East. The Soviet Union would be prepared to conduct concrete negotiations on this account with all interested countries. Without predetermining now all problems relating to such negotiations, attention nonetheless should be called to the fact that in this region not only the USSR, China and Japan are neighbors. As is known, there is also a U.S. military presence. This and other specifics of the region would have to be considered, so that measures of trust would in fact be effective.

In some countries the opinion is expressed that our recent proposals concerning the Persian Gulf cannot be separated from the question of the presence of a Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan. Our position consists of the following: while prepared to reach agreement on the Persian Gulf as an independent problem, and to participate in a separate settlement of the situation around Afghanistan, we also do not object to the questions connected with Afghanistan being discussed in conjunction with the questions of the security of the Persian Gulf. Such discussions naturally can concern only the international aspects of the Afghan problem, and not the internal affairs of that country. The sovereignty of Afghanistan must be fully-protected, as must its status as a nonaligned state.

Proceeding from the exceptional importance—not only for the USSR and the U.S.A., but also for other countries—of the problem of
limiting and reducing strategic weapons, we for our part are prepared to continue without delay appropriate talks with the United States while preserving everything positive that has been achieved thus far in this field. It is understandable that such negotiations can be conducted only on the basis of equality and equal security of the sides.

As one of the practical measures in this area, we are prepared to reach agreement on limiting the deployment of new submarines—in the U.S.A., the Ohio class, and submarines of a similar type in the USSR. We could also enter into accord on banning modernization of existing ballistic missiles and the creation of new ones for deployment on these submarines.

Attempting to avert the dangerous accumulation of nuclear missiles in Europe and to facilitate the speediest possible attainment of a decision regarding such weapons, we propose that agreement be reached on establishing a moratorium now on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missile facilities in the USSR and the countries of NATO—that is, to freeze both quantitatively and qualitatively the existing level of such means, including, of course, the forward-based nuclear facilities of the U.S.A. in this region. Such a moratorium could come into force as soon as negotiations on this question commence, and would be effective until a treaty is concluded on limiting, or even better, on reducing such nuclear facilities in Europe. In this we proceed from the position that both sides would cease all preparations for deployment of corresponding additional means, including the American Pershing II missiles and ground-based strategic cruise missiles.

Judging from reports we have received, in certain places attempts are being made to represent the situation as if there were nothing new in this Soviet proposal. Nothing could be further from the truth. Assertions of this sort can only indicate an effort to evade a decision of the matter, a lack of desire to take account of the vital interests of the European peoples.

We consider that informing the general public, indeed all people, of the consequences with which atomic war is fought would have great significance, and would in particular bring additional influence on governments for attainment of agreements directed in a practical way toward averting such a war. With this aim in mind, we propose the creation of an authoritative international committee that would demonstrate the vital necessity of averting a nuclear catastrophe. The committee might include the most prominent scientists from various countries. Very likely the General Secretary of the U.N. could play a role in the realization of this aim. The conclusions reached by the committee should be made known to the entire world.

Further, for solution of many current international problems a farsighted approach, political will and courage, authority and influence
are required. This is why we believe it would be useful to convene a special session of the Security Council, with the participation of the top leaders of the permanent and non-permanent member states of the Council, in order to seek the key to improving the international atmosphere and preventing war. Leaders of other states obviously could take part in the session, if they wished. Naturally, thorough preparation for such a session would be required to ensure positive results.

Returning to the theme of hotbeds of tension and the task of liquidating them, I would like particularly to single out the question of the situation in the Middle East. No matter how one regards that which has thus far been done in this region, it is clear that political settlement there has been set back. The present situation urgently demands a return to a collective search for an all-embracing settlement on a just and realistic basis, which could be done, say within the framework of a specially convened international conference.

The Soviet Union is prepared to take part in a constructive spirit in such work jointly with other interested Liberation Front, and with Israel. We are prepared for such a joint search with the U.S.A., with which we have had in the past certain experience. We are prepared to cooperate with European states, with all who sincerely desire securing a just and stable peace in the Middle East. The U.N. clearly can continue to play a useful role here.

These are the questions that I wanted to touch upon in this message. We expect, Mr. President, that you will regard our proposals with appropriate attention. As you see, they embrace a wide circle of problems and foresee measures of a political and military character; they concern various types of weapons and military forces; they touch upon the situation in various regions of the world.

We of course understand that time is required for study and consideration. Probably the necessity for some sort of consultations, exchange of views—in short, for various forms of dialogue—will arise. We are prepared for this.

Respectfully,

L. Brezhnev

2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
27. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, March 7, 1981

SUBJECT

Brezhnev’s Letter

SUMMARY: Brezhnev’s letter to you deviates only slightly from the text of his opening speech to the 26th CPSU Congress. We presume our allies have received similar messages, and we plan to consult with them on replies which say that Soviet restraint is essential to an improvement of East/West relations.

DISCUSSION

The tone of Brezhnev’s letter accentuates the positive and attempts to underline the “serious” nature of his proposals. The few minor differences between the letter and Brezhnev’s Congress speech (e.g., addition of a reference to a role for the UN Secretary General in creation of an international committee on nuclear war, and reference to U.S. and Allied skepticism concerning Brezhnev’s proposal for a moratorium on TNF deployments) do not signal any modifications in the substance of the Soviet proposals. The letter is another step in the ongoing Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaign to portray the speech as a positive initiative to improve East/West relations while contrasting it with our alleged “footdragging”. We believe that similar letters will be delivered in NATO capitals and probably in other countries as the Soviets pursue time-honored wedge driving tactics.

NEXT STEPS

We should consult with our NATO allies to determine whether they have received similar letters and, if so, to agree on the substance of replies. Consultations on the substance of Brezhnev’s speech are already well advanced, and we expect Secretary General Luns to give a general reaction to the speech based on agreed Alliance views sometime next week. This should enable us to agree rapidly on coordinated replies to Brezhnev’s letters.

Our replies should emphasize that the Alliance will pursue a consistent and constructive approach to all East/West issues, but that we

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) (1 of 2) Jan.-June 1981. Secret.

intend to judge Soviet intentions on the basis of actions and willingness to observe restraint.

In order to counter the expanding Soviet “peace offensive” we are providing all our diplomatic posts with analysis of Brezhnev’s speech and guidance on our own policy.

The West German press has reported delivery of a Brezhnev letter to Schmidt. We have submitted proposed press guidance for use here to the NSC. If pressed by the media, we suggest acknowledging receipt of a letter to you, while maintaining confidentiality of its content unless the Soviets themselves publicize it.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the course of action outlined above.3

3 Reagan checked and initialed: “Approve.” In a memorandum to Haig, March 17, Allen wrote: “Your memorandum of March 7 recommending that the President approve the course of action outlined has been seen by the President and approved.” (Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US–USSR) (1 of 2) Jan.–June 1981)

28. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs (Eagleburger) and the Director of the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Haig1

Washington, March 16, 1981

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations Over the Near-Term

We need a game plan to manage our relations with the Soviets over the next six months. It will take that much time before we have Administration positions on such core issues as US strategic nuclear
programs and SALT. Even our comprehensive review of East-West relations will take several months to complete.\(^2\)

In the meantime, we can’t be simply reacting to Soviet initiatives, or acting without a clear perception of where we want to be with the Soviets, our Allies, and others by the end of this year and beyond.

In sum, we need:

1. A political program to guide our specific actions, and to rival the Soviet peace offensive; and
2. A concrete work program geared to key events and benchmarks over the next six-nine months to turn that program into reality.\(^3\)

This memorandum provides an approach to both.

The Problem

Our basic goals are clear. We must correct the growing imbalance in US-Soviet military power, and restrain increasingly aggressive Soviet behavior, particularly in regions of vital interest to the United States. We want to establish a relationship based on much greater Soviet acceptance of reciprocity and restraint.

But we face this dilemma:

—Building such a relationship will take time and persistent pressure. We need the kind of major, long-term expenditure of resources for defense which cannot be sustained if we return to a climate of business-as-usual in the near to mid-term. We must maintain pressure on the Soviets for an extended period to convince them of the need to change their behavior.

—But we cannot get the Allies on board this long-term effort if they believe we are embarked on a path of unending, unnecessary, and dangerous confrontation. The Soviets already are having a certain success in Europe with their peace offensive.

To the extent the Soviets can separate us from the Allies, major elements of our plans for redressing the military imbalance and constraining Soviet international behavior will be hamstrung. Thus, preserving Alliance solidarity is of equal importance—and in a real sense is a precondition—to the attainment of our security objectives.

Facing this dilemma, we must fight against the temptation to force decisions on others, or to try to do everything ourselves. Unilateralism simply won’t work—whether passive a la Carter, or aggressive as there are some pressures for now (ERW, SLCMs). We must bring others with us through strong leadership and close cooperation.

\(^{2}\) Haig underlined “will take several months to complete.”

\(^{3}\) Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this sentence.
Therefore what we need is a policy of aggressive multilateralism. In order to elicit Allied confidence in and support for our approach to East-West relations, we must work intensively with them and be willing to take into account their sensitivities—while pushing for our basic objectives. To a much greater extent than in the past, we must weigh Allied concerns into our specific decisions vis-a-vis the Soviets and critical problems outside Europe.

At the same time we cannot allow the initiatives we must take in the military sphere and elsewhere to be paralyzed by our concern over European sensitivities. Looking to the longer term, we must start now to shape European attitudes.

General Framework for the Political Program

To convey the right signals to the Soviets and to get the Allies on board, we need to enunciate and pursue a political program which is:

—hard-headed about our present situation and the need for fundamental change and

—realistic but confident about the future if fundamental change occurs.

Our proclaimed objective would be to bring greater order and civility to international affairs. We would proceed from the fact that the East-West competition will continue and that the West must act to further its own interests. But we also would seek to keep the competition within safe limits and to permit the pursuit of some mutual interests. But we would stress that this requires above all the establishment of a greater degree of Soviet restraint.

We would emphasize that old restraints have weakened: because Soviet power has grown enormously, because new and more lucrative targets of opportunity have emerged (viz. the Persian Gulf), and because Western resolve has been called into question. And we can stress that the Soviet temptation to act aggressively increases as Soviet power increases, and increases further whenever the Soviets project power successfully.

We would stress that actions need to be taken in three areas to build new restraint:

1. Restoring military capabilities which are adequate to protect Western interests.4

2. Promoting stability in key regions through diplomatic and other efforts.5

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4 Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this sentence.

5 Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this sentence.
3. Designing direct relations with the Soviet Union (trade, arms control) to encourage restraint and penalize aggression.6

We need to make clear the relationship between these three:
— the development of adequate military capabilities is essential to induce greater Soviet restraint in key areas and to provide them incentive for serious, equitable arms control.7
— the active promotion of regional stability is essential to our security and to more constructive East-West relations.
— cooperation in arms control, trade and other areas will always be vulnerable unless the Soviets exercise greater restraint in their military programs and international conduct. Therefore linkage is a fact of life and must be an important tool of policy.

Our objective by the end of this year should be **first, to get as much Allied consensus as possible on this general approach and; second, to convince the Soviets that it will endure and that they must begin to operate within its constraints.** We must firmly establish that this Administration will have this and only this approach, and that the US-Soviet and East-West relationship will be determined by it. We need to make clear that a fundamentally negative course for our relationship will be set for years to come if the Soviets ignore it (i.e., occupy Poland). A more positive direction is possible if they are prepared to begin to act with restraint.

*Benchmarks for the Political Program*

We need a work program to give each of the three elements of this political program (military restoration, regional stability, contingent cooperation) specific content. But first we must relate it to specific benchmarks over the next six-nine months. The two most important are:
— The NATO Ministerial in May9
— Your meeting with Gromyko in September during the UNGA10

Our basic aim should be to lay a solid foundation for your first high-level meeting with the Soviets.11

The **May Ministerial will be critical to our success.** We need to demonstrate overall Western resolve in the face of Soviet efforts to encourage Allied disunity and to foster reluctance to increase Western defense efforts.12

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6 Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this sentence.
7 Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this point.
8 Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this point.
9 Haig underlined “The NATO Ministerial in May.”
10 Haig underlined “You meeting with Gromyko in September during the UNGA.”
11 Haig placed three checkmarks at the end of this sentence.
12 Haig placed a checkmark beside this paragraph.
Our central objectives for the Ministerial should be to get: 1) a statement of solidarity on East-West relations; 2) a commitment to increased defense efforts. Realistically we will not get as strong a statement and commitment as we want. We should not push so hard that attention focuses more on West-West than East-West problems. But we should begin the process leading to greater Allied efforts. (I will be sending you a strategy for the Ministerial shortly.)

We should not hold a high-level meeting with the Soviets before September because: 1) we won’t have meaningful positions on key issues like SALT, and 2) An earlier, specially-called meeting would look like we were responding to Soviet pressure—whereas the UNGA session is a tradition. We have already succeeded in placing the Soviets in a demandeur position on a summit—a welcome reversal of roles from the previous Administration and one which shows the impact of a hard-nosed approach.

On the other hand, not to hold the traditional UNGA meeting would raise serious concerns among the Allies and others about the course we were on and be counterproductive. Therefore we recommend planning to hold the September UNGA meeting and beginning now to lay the foundation for it. Of course events in the interim could change these plans, e.g. invasion of Poland. (We do not envisage a US-Soviet Summit during the 6–9 month framework of this paper.)

In the period before September, we can continue the dialogue through your discussions with Dobrynin, as well as (increasingly) through our Embassy in Moscow—ensuring that our new policy of reciprocity is being observed. This summer we should devote special discussions with the Soviets to preparations designed to make your meeting more substantive and wide-ranging than many past UNGA
exchanges. Thorough briefings of the Allies on our preparations and discussions with the Soviets will continue to neutralize Soviet allegations that we have cut off communication, and give the Allies a sense of a process underway leading to high-level meetings.25

Work Program

We will need individual decisions on specific issues. We have or will prepare separate memoranda for you on them. But it is important that we look at the entire political program to ensure that:

—bureaucratically, we are moving at the right pace on each of them to be ready for the May and September meetings, and;26

—substantively, we are taking steps to provide sufficient content, to begin to build leverage, and to strike the right balance between pressure and promise.

The three elements are:

1. Restoring Adequate Military Forces. The basic requirement for near-term (and long-term) success with the Soviets is to convince them that we are serious about a substantial and sustained increase in our military power. It is equally clear that one of their top foreign policy priorities over the next year will be to forestall, minimize or delay US and Allied defense programs.27

—By the May Ministerial we need a strategy for dealing with NATO defense programs.28 This will be critical to our success in September. We are working on an overall strategy for both the DPC and NAC Ministerials, an important element of which is some new ideas on force planning. We will be back to you after initial interagency discussions.29

—By September, we should make US decisions on strategic programs. We should have no illusions about major early results in SALT, and it will be important to give the Soviets a clear, timely signal that we have decided to strengthen our strategic forces in a comprehensive manner. We already have the substantial FY 81 and FY 82 defense budget supplementals to pass the right signal about our resolve to strengthen U.S. forces overall.30

25 Haig underlined “cut off communication” and “Allies a sense of a process underway leading to high-level meetings.”
26 Haig placed a checkmark beside this point.
27 Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this sentence.
28 Haig underlined this sentence.
29 Haig underlined “back to you after initial interagency discussions” and wrote: “EW vs WW! Right on!”
30 Haig underlined this sentence and the phrase “strengthen our strategic forces in a comprehensive manner” at the end of the previous sentence and wrote: “Must be done 1st!”
2. Soviet Restraint. The essential elements of our strategy for obtaining this objective are clear:

—Improve our capabilities for projecting US and Allied power into regions (particularly the Persian Gulf) where the Soviets threaten our interests.\(^31\)

—Encourage the Allies and concerned states in key regions to play a more active role in promoting regional stability, and in focusing international attention on unacceptable Soviet behavior.\(^32\)

—Link functional aspects of the East-West relationship (e.g., trade, arms control) to Soviet international behavior.\(^33\)

(We will need policies geared to each specific region and the relevant regional and functional bureaus are working on them. Obviously there is much that the U.S. must do on its own and with key regional states. But this paper focuses on the Soviet and Allied dimensions.)

We should use the May NATO Ministerial and other meetings with the Allies in coming months to build support for this approach.

We also should engage the Soviets in a discussion of their international behavior, particularly during your meeting with Gromyko. We have made a start in your discussions with Dobrynin—making clear our view that their behavior over the past decade has been inconsistent with the 1972 Basic Principle Agreement.\(^34\) Our purpose is to convince the Soviets that the alternative to their observance of what we view as basic norms of international behavior is a high state of tension and danger in their relations with the US.

We need to convey to the Soviets that we are concerned about their behavior across the board, and that new adventures will create serious responses from the United States. We face three current test cases for Soviet restraint in El Salvador, Afghanistan, and Poland.\(^35\) The essence of our approach to each should be as follows:

—Soviet and Cuban restraint on El Salvador should be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a general improvement in our relations.

—We should continue to hold out for concrete Soviet steps to get out of Afghanistan before lifting the grain embargo, particularly because existing sanctions are so thin.\(^36\) But we should have no illusions that

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\(^31\) Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this point.

\(^32\) Haig placed a checkmark beside this sentence.

\(^33\) Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this sentence.


\(^35\) Haig placed checkmarks next to El Salvador, Afghanistan, and Poland, and wrote: “& Libya [sic] & Africa!”

\(^36\) Haig underlined this sentence.
withdrawal is imminent, and continued occupation should remain an explicit burden on our relations.

—We should continue to make clear that intervention in Poland would set in concrete a negative East-West relationship for years to come.

Our specific approach to these issues for the May and September meetings will depend on the situation of each as these meetings near. But it will be important that our handling of the situation neither unduly raise Allied concerns nor make Moscow’s job easier. 37

—We will want to reassure the Allies that we 38 appreciate that military force alone cannot circumscribe Soviet behavior, while trying to convince them to join us in fully utilizing non-military Western assets such as trade, technology and cultural affinity. It is essential that we work with key regional states using a broad set of tools to counter Soviet adventurism. 39

—In addition, given Moscow’s penchant for a “spheres of influence approach,” we should take actions which make clear that the Soviets do not have a free hand in Afghanistan and Poland. And in our dialogue with the Soviets we should avoid falling into the trap of discussing spheres of influence. 40

Our specific approach to the three current cases should be guided by the following considerations:

A. El Salvador

Our effort to educate the Europeans and others on the realities of the Salvadoran situation has been marginally 41 successful. Although they are not convinced we have the answer, the Allies seem willing to watch us proceed without major objection at this stage. Moscow’s continuing low profile in El Salvador, moreover, indicates the Kremlin does not want this to become a major East-West issue at a time when it is courting Europe on other matters. But if our support for the Duarte regime is perceived as part of a broader pattern of expanding US relations with authoritarian regimes in Latin America, it could undermine Allied willingness to work with us there and also in other areas where we need their active support. Obviously, by itself, this does not mean we can not improve relations with such countries as Argentina or Chile, but we must keep the Allied dimension in mind as we determine our specific policies toward them. In addition we will have to

37 Haig underlined “concerns nor make Moscow’s job easier.”
38 Haig underlined “reassure the Allies that we.”
39 Haig underlined “counter Soviet adventurism.”
40 Haig underlined “spheres of influence” and wrote at the end of this paragraph: “MONROE Doctrine!!!”
41 Haig underlined “marginally.”
take into account Allied and Latin American sensitivities in deciding how much more aggressive we want to be toward Cuba. Whatever we decide to do specifically about El Salvador, we must succeed; be perceived in Moscow and Europe to have succeeded; and do so as quickly as possible.42

B. Afghanistan and Sanctions Policy

As long as Poland is threatened, and Pakistan and other moderate Moslems continue to oppose the Soviet occupation, our Afghanistan policy will not be a major issue between us and the Allies. At this stage there is no foreign policy reason to lift the grain embargo,43 thereby, in effect, eviscerating our sanctions policy and sending wrong signals to Allies as we seek to develop contingency Polish sanctions. Our best course is to leave the package of post-Afghanistan sanctions in place. Any decision to lift the sanctions should remain conditioned on Soviet withdrawal. We should also examine ways to increase pressure on the Soviets in Afghanistan—helping Pakistan, keeping attention in appropriate fora on the Soviet occupation, and reviewing aid to the Afghan nationalists.

C. Poland

As noted above, Poland will be seen as a test case for the viability of our policy of differentiating between the Soviets and the governments of East Europe. While the Allies will expect us to join them in economic and political efforts to stabilize Poland’s economy, the effort could fail and the Soviets intervene—or the Soviets could intervene anyway. It will be difficult to get the Allies to do much more to lay the foundation for a strong, coherent Western response in the present context. But should the Soviets invade we must be prepared to exploit a new climate of opinion in Western Europe to move ahead with the Allies on several fronts, e.g. military and trade. We also should do what we can in the months ahead to help lay the foundations for Poland’s economic and financial recovery as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. We should keep in mind that as long as Polish events continue in a positive direction, so does the potential affect they have on the internal situation in neighboring countries including the Soviet Union.

3. Areas for Contingent and Reciprocal Cooperation

A. Arms control. We need to strike a careful balance between not going back to business-as-usual, testing the Soviets’ bona fides in arms control and demonstrating to our Allies that we are willing to do so. The specific objective for arms control should be to constrain Soviet military capabilities, but it is unlikely we will have significant success in the near-term and should plan our own forces accordingly.

42 Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this sentence, drew a line from the end of the penultimate sentence, and wrote “need to handle at N/S summit.”

43 Haig placed a checkmark after “embargo.”
—Showing Movement. We need to devise a package of limited steps in arms control. We already have moved on CDE, and should hold firmly to our criteria there. By the May Ministerial we will have restarted the TNF process with an SCG meeting. We also plan to hold a SALT SCC meeting this spring. As the Administration’s first SALT-related meeting with the Soviets, it will signal to our Allies our interest in continuing a balanced SALT process. But it is unclear at this stage precisely when and how we want to proceed with the Soviets on TNF and SALT.\textsuperscript{44} In general we think there will be a need for some sort of meeting with the Soviets on TNF this year. But how closely this would be linked to SALT and whether we want to move to seize the initiative on SALT this year are subjects for further study in the PM-chaired IG.\textsuperscript{45} But particularly on CDE and TNF where we already have agreed Alliance positions, and on such compliance issues as BW and CW use we should go on the offensive publicly and diplomatically.

—Not Moving Across the Board. We should not feel compelled to make other moves before September unless it is clearly in our interest. We have major decisions to make before we enter into even an informal dialogue with the Soviets on SALT. Our policy on nuclear testing and other arms control issues also requires major review.

We also should prepare for and launch \textit{two basic dialogues about the role and future course of arms control}.

—First, we need a serious dialogue with our Allies. There are major differences about the political purposes and security significance of arms control, with some of our Allies seeing it as an essential part of preserving political detente in Europe regardless of Soviet behavior elsewhere, and as an alternative to increased defense spending. Once our own policies are sufficiently developed, we need to strive for a new consensus with our Allies about what arms control realistically can accomplish.

—Second, beginning with your meeting with Gromyko, we need a US-Soviet dialogue on a more realistic approach to arms control and how it relates to larger objectives (e.g., Soviet behavior in the Third World).

Our stance in the meantime should be that: we already are moving in key areas like CDE and TNF, we are prepared to consider any serious, balanced arms control measures the Soviets want to propose before our first high-level meeting, and we expect them to exercise restraint with their programs in the interim.

\textsuperscript{44} Haig drew a line from the end of this sentence to the upper right-hand corner and wrote: "Want this addressed ASAP—Burt & Wolfowitz w/ACDA & [illegible]."

\textsuperscript{45} Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this sentence.
B. East-West Trade. Afghanistan and the prospect of Soviet intervention in Poland have raised Allied consciousness on the issue of unrestricted trade with the USSR, particularly in sensitive areas. But we are a long way from having even a US policy, much less an Allied consensus on such matters as: the use of economic leverage to moderate Soviet foreign policy, the implications of increased European dependence on Soviet energy resources, and restrictions on transfer of sensitive technology. Much more needs to be done and we will need good working relations with the Allies to do it.

The interagency study on East-West economic relations must proceed in a timely fashion. By mid-May, we should be ready for Rashish to discuss the general problems we see in this area with the G–6 on the fringe of the OECD’s Executive Committee in Special Session (XCSS). At the Ottawa Summit in July, we should set out more concrete East-West economic concerns and formally launch our effort to build a new Western consensus. Thus, by your September meeting with Gromyko, we will have begun the process of developing greater Alliance cohesion. Ultimately, it will be important to be able to argue credibly that Western trade will be affected by Soviet behavior—in both a positive and negative direction.

Countering Soviet Pressure

The work program described above will provide adequate substantive content to enable us and the Allies to deal with Moscow’s “peace offensive”, but only if our framework and its individual elements are given sufficient visibility and we communicate a clear sense of direction and a process underway.

In terms of substance, we will be:

—Moving in a prudent and responsible manner ourselves to right the military imbalance, and beginning the effort to build a greater Allied contribution;

—Launching a serious discussion with the Soviets about their international conduct, while acting in El Salvador, Afghanistan, Poland and elsewhere to influence Soviet behavior in concrete ways which are consistent, serve broader Western interests and show prospects of success.

—Addressing European concerns on arms control matters through such steps as spring TNF SCG and SALT SCC meetings, while not returning to business-as-usual across the board. At the same time we will be making a start at developing a new consensus on East-West trade.

In terms of process and visibility, we need to communicate to and consult with our Allies about our overall approach and particularly the logic of the steps leading to your meeting in September with Gromyko. It will be important that the Allies believe we see the Gromyko bilateral as a genuine opportunity to move the relationship in a con-
structive direction, and that there is no need for them to take initiatives in the interim which would be counter-productive, e.g. French proposal for a multilateral summit. We set forth below the specific agenda of consultations with the Allies and Soviets leading to September.

We also need public visibility.

We are working with ICA on a strategy for countering the Brezhnev peace offensive. I will send you a memorandum on this.\footnote{Haig drew two vertical lines in the margin of this paragraph and wrote a large question mark to the right of the lines.}

A central ingredient in countering the Soviet public and diplomatic campaign would be a major policy statement setting forth the philosophy and program on East West relations of this memorandum. I have therefore recommended in a separate memorandum that you give such an address on June 15th in London (at a conference sponsored by Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations on Challenges to the West in the 1980’s). Having a European audience would be a major asset for a speech on U.S.-Allied cooperation in managing East-West relations.

The groundwork for such a speech, and for your September meeting with Gromyko, would have to be carefully prepared with the Allies and the Soviets. We recommend the following schedule:

—On April 1, a meeting of the Quadripartite Political Directors where we would outline the political framework for our approach and our work program through September;

—In mid-April, a scene-setting address by you on global issues to establish publicly the broad context for our foreign policy approach including to East-West relations;

—At the May NAC Ministerial, an effort to achieve Allied endorsement in the communique of our general approach to Moscow;

—In mid May, on the margins of the OECD’s Executive Committee in Special Session, restricted discussion of East-West economic issues;

—On June 15th, your speech in London devoted just to U.S.-Soviet and East-West relations.

—At the Ottawa Summit in July, launch effort to build a new Western consensus on East-West economic problems; possibly also Summit-level support for our approach to the political/security dimension of East-West relations.

—During June-August, preparatory U.S.-Soviet bilateral exchanges designed to set the stage for a serious, substantive meeting with Gromyko in September. Such exchanges could be handled by our new Ambassador in Moscow as a means of reestablishing him as a primary
channel of high-level bilateral communications. Alternatively they could be conducted by you here with Dobrynin, and supplemented by our Embassy in Moscow.

Recommendation

That you approve the game plan set forth above as:

1) A *general policy framework* for our approach to U.S.-Soviet relations over the next six-nine months, and

2) A *work program* for preparations for the May Ministerial and September Gromyko meetings, which will include separate memoranda on key issues for your decision.47

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47 Haig initialed his approval of the recommendation.

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29. Minutes of an Interagency Coordinating Committee for U.S.-Soviet Affairs Meeting1

Washington, March 17, 1981

Ambassador Eagleburger said Secretary Haig had asked him to raise several points with the group. This Administration’s approach to the Soviets will not be business as usual; there will be changes. Both the President and Secretary were particularly concerned with the matter of reciprocity which was now being studied to determine where we have leverage which can be employed to achieve a more balanced treatment. He noted that a one-for-one basis is not possible. In some areas the Soviets have more flexibility than we do. In some cases, we are already in a more advantageous position (i.e., parking). The Ambassador stressed the importance of coordinating contacts with the Soviets. Referring to the new requirement that all U.S.G. officials notify the Office of Soviet Affairs prior to any contact with Soviet officials, Eagleburger noted that the intent of the policy is to establish a data base on the scope and frequency of Soviet access. We may later decide to cut back on Soviet access.

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Eagleburger noted that the notification requirement doesn’t hold for contacts with Soviets in the context of multilateral meetings.

Eagleburger noted that if other agencies wished to propose new initiatives vis-a-vis the Soviets, we might need to engage the Secretary.

In any event, we need to know in advance of anything involving new areas. Coordination is essential to make sure we all sing from the same sheet of music.

Turning to exchanges, Eagleburger stated he didn’t know in the fullness of time what the Administration’s view would be. While the review was being conducted, however, we should avoid foreclosing our options. Agencies should seek to prevent budget cuts from killing off the administrative machinery of the various exchanges.

Pillsbury (ACDA) raised issues of private U.S. citizen contacts with Soviet officials. He suggested that we might wish to monitor such contacts. Private individuals having frequent contacts could form (on a voluntary basis) an association analogous to Arbatov’s USA Institute, whose reciprocal access the USG could attempt to ensure.

Eagleburger responded that although we would consider the idea we would be treading on dangerous ground here and that there didn’t appear to be a legal possibility of exercising such control.

Turning to the Foreign Missions Act, Eagleburger noted that it would grant us more authority in dealing with the Soviets on the whole range of reciprocity concerns. The Ambassador then excused himself and turned the meeting over to Deputy Assistant Secretary Barry.

Barry stated that a review was now in progress of the whole range of East-West relations. The review could consume several months. However, certain elements were clear. The codewords current during the Carter Administration, cooperation and competition, had given way to the Reagan formulation of restraint and reciprocity.

The key element in ensuring Soviet restraint was to restore a worldwide military balance. We will also strive to achieve stability in key areas which the Soviets would be otherwise tempted to exploit. Our relations will be conducted on the basis of linkage. We will make sure the Soviets understand that no aspect of our relations will be carried out in a vacuum.

We do not plan to negotiate a new code of conduct to replace that embodied in the 1972 Agreement of Principles, but we do intend to gain implicit adherence by the Soviets to its provisions; e.g., not to exacerbate tensions. We are not prepared to tolerate Soviet-supported efforts by the Cubans to undermine the stability of El Salvador. On Afghanistan, the Reagan Administration took a no more relaxed attitude than the previous Administration. A political settlement including Soviet withdrawal is an essential element of a more positive climate.
in U.S.-Soviet relations. Our sanctions should stay in place, leaving aside the grain embargo which was still under review. The situation in Poland remains uncertain and unstable with a continuing tug of war between Solidarity, the Government, the Party and the Church. While we do not regard Soviet intervention in Poland as inevitable, we have closely consulted with our Allies on our response which would be far more unified and cut far deeper than was the case after Afghanistan.

We are now in the midst of a Soviet peace offensive designed to separate us from our Allies. The new impetus provided by Brezhnev’s speech to the Party Congress was more tactical than substantive. We are working with our Allies, however, to turn the Soviets’ new stand on CBM’s into a meaningful step in CSCE.

The U.S. is now comparing notes with other recipients of Brezhnev letters.² Luns’ statement today on behalf of the Alliance will make clear that the Soviets haven’t succeeded in derailing NATO arms modernization.

Barry concluded by noting that Soviet actions are more important than words. A Summit Meeting would not be useful without a demonstration of Soviet restraint. Summits must be carefully prepared with the expectation of concrete results. A dialogue with the Soviets is being carried on.

Bader (DOD) asked what was the vehicle for this dialogue. Barry responded it was normal diplomatic channels in Moscow and in Washington. Bader then noted that no one had reaffirmed since January 20 that our goal in Afghanistan was Soviet withdrawal. Barry responded that while there was obviously no near term prospect, Soviet withdrawal and deterrence remained the goals of our sanctions policy.

A great deal more emphasis was now placed on reciprocity. While there was no intent to focus ICCUSA solely on reciprocity concerns, it provided a good vehicle for exchange of information and coordination since all agencies with regular Soviet contacts were represented.

Barry reiterated Eagleburger’s comments on the contacts policy set out in Secretary Haig’s interagency memo.³ In response to a question from Baldyga (ICA), Barry noted that a separate exercise was being conducted with regard to Eastern Europe. He added that purely social contacts with Soviets were still out in line with our post-Afghanistan policy.

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² On March 13, Allen wrote Reagan that Brezhnev had sent “almost identical letters to all heads of state in the NATO Alliance.” (Reagan Library, Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1981 System I Case Files, 8100286–8100299)

³ See Document 25.
Starbird (EPA) asked whether each agency should set up a parallel body to coordinate this policy. Barry said it was up to each agency; the important factor was that we be notified. German (EUR/SOV) noted that Secretary Haig’s interagency memo had asked agencies to designate an official to coordinate such contacts with the Office of Soviet Affairs.

After noting that the State Department was instituting a more strictly enforced escort policy for visiting Soviets, Barry urged other agencies to tighten their policies in a similar fashion. Several representatives noted that their agencies lacked the security necessary to enforce such a policy and that Soviets routinely showed up unannounced. Linn (HHS) suggested that the State Department was the appropriate body to notify the Soviet Embassy that their staff must call in advance to any office they wished to visit. It was decided to study further this issue.

German then referred to a range of other areas which we would be reviewing, stressing that this list was illustrative rather than comprehensive. Working groups might be established for some issues whereas no immediate action might be required for others (e.g., staffing levels). The Soviets are now at their ceiling and we might face retaliation if we denied visas for any officials over the limit. He also noted that we might consider cutting our staff in response to Soviet intervention in Poland.

German noted that we have tightened up on our travel controls which apply to diplomats, correspondents and businessmen. Closed area exceptions are granted only on a one-for-one basis. Several recent cases of denials were mentioned. Barry mentioned that Haig had approved a recent memo which informed him that we would get complaints on travel turndowns and expected support for our position. We’re prepared to take the heat.

German noted that the McGovern amendment\(^4\) constrained our ability to deny visas solely on reciprocity grounds. There has been a rash of Soviet turndowns of U.S. visa requests for governesses and personal guests for which there is no Soviet equivalent to retaliate against.

German concluded by referring to the issue of Soviet attendance at U.S. scientific and commercial conferences and exhibits. He noted the difficulty of urging hosts not to invite Soviets. COMEX is also involved in this area. Export control regulations could be invoked in some cases.

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\(^4\) A reference to the McGovern amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provided an automatic waiver recommendation for Soviets who were inadmissible to the United States solely because of Communist Party membership.
Hal Burman (State–L) described the intent of the proposed Foreign Missions Act to ensure reciprocity in all our respective bilateral relationships by controlling foreign diplomats’ access to U.S. goods and services if necessary. The legislation is expected to be introduced by the House and possibly the Senate as well in 2 to 3 weeks. A draft bill may be available in a week and State may contact representatives to check whether their agencies had any conflicting regulations and to solicit their support. Last year’s bill had enjoyed substantial foreign affairs community support.

Barry noted again that social contacts with Soviets were still strongly discouraged. Obviously, this may touch on gray areas. There should be no reason to attend a reception for a visiting Soviet if it did not involve official business.

Herspring (DOD) reported that DOD’s foreign military liaison had extensive routine contacts with the Soviets and asked whether each contact had to be reported individually. Barry replied that some form of blanket notification might be able to be worked out.

Linn (HHS) asked for a written expression of support for exchanges, given the severe budgetary threat. Barry stated that Eagleburger was sending such a letter to all the U.S. Co-Chairmen and Executive Secretaries of the bilateral agreements asking for continued exchange funding so as not to foreclose options while broad review was in progress.

Britton (HUD) reported that his agency’s budget authorization excluded funding for contacts with Soviets.

Bradley (DOE) reported that his agency’s MHD program would not be continued for technical reasons. The recovery of the program’s super-conducting magnet was not yet determined. A delegation scheduled to visit the USSR in mid-April would formally notify them of the program’s termination.

Barry concluded the meeting by reminding representatives to coordinate new contacts policy with all constituent parts of their respective agencies.
30. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the Counselor to the President (Meese)\(^1\)

Washington, March 17, 1981

I attended the 60th birthday party dinner of Don Kendall near Greenwich, Connecticut last night, having accepted the invitation at the last meeting of the PepsiCo Board that I attended as a Director, prior to the Inauguration.

At the dinner, it turned out that one of the guests was Anatoly Dobrynin, the USSR Ambassador. During the pre-dinner reception, Dobrynin asked if he could have a word with me and I replied noncommittally and continued talking with a number of other guests. Eventually, Kendall brought me over to Dobrynin and the following conversation ensued:

Dobrynin: In what direction do you see our two countries moving? Why is there so much rhetoric in the air now?

CWW: I think that part of it is because people in Washington feel it important that the Soviets and the world know that the U.S. has changed, and that we have, and will acquire, much greater strength as well as firmness and resolve during this Administration, and that there is also great concern about the Soviet actions in Afghanistan and around Poland.

Dobrynin: I assure you that my country knows very well how much the U.S. has changed. I tell them. I am a good reporter. But don’t you think it important that our two countries talk to each other and not just exchange statements?

CWW: Yes, if the atmosphere and circumstances are such that there is some prospect of effective talks, and some possibility of a successful conclusion to such talks. If the Soviets went into Poland, it would be a clear signal that such talks would be useless.

Dobrynin: Poland! It is essential in Poland that we not have aggressive actions on our own border. You would not allow it.

CWW: But many of our allies do things we do not like, but we do not maneuver on their borders or threaten their independence.

Dobrynin: But the Warsaw Pact is different. We cannot have hostile governments on our borders. In any event, we should talk.

At this point, various other people drifted by and I did not encourage continuance of any further one-on-one discussion.

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Also guests at the dinner were Henry Kissinger, who expressed to me strong support for use of the neutron missiles as a means of strengthening theatre nuclear forces, and former President Nixon, who did not say anything substantive to me.

The principal conclusion I drew from the conversation with Dobrynin is that he and the Soviets urgently want talks to begin, and are really quite concerned at the perceived strength of anti-Soviet position.

31. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 19, 1981

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Haig
Secretary Weinberger
William P. Clark, Deputy Sec. of State
Frank Carlucci, Deputy Sec. of Defense
Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary-Designate, Department of Defense
Robert C. McFarland, Counselor
Richard Burt, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Brig. General Carl Smith, Office of Secretary of Defense
Jay Rixse, Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Summary of Meeting

The breakfast began with discussion of a Cabinet Council meeting concerning East/West trade. Secretary Haig said that he would not attend the meeting, because no detailed agenda had been circulated.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Weinberger then asked what the Saudis thought about the Sinai issue. Secretary Haig said that they were still opposed to the Camp David Agreements. Weinberger then noted that Fahd Abdullah, in talks at the Pentagon, was pushing for all five F–15 items. Secretary Haig said that this was unacceptable, and that he had been told the Saudis were not going to receive bomb racks for the aircraft.

1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Haig and Shultz Memcons, Lot 87D327, SEC/Memcons, March 1981. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place at the Department of State.
Secretary Haig then asked Weinberger if he had seen recent intelligence reports\(^2\) about the shipment of Soviet guns and tanks to Nicaragua. Weinberger said that he wished the United States had the capability to blow up some of it. Secretary Haig agreed and, changing the subject, said that he was unhappy about the way Japanese auto import issues were being handled. He said that the two cabinet officials involved in the issue were doing too much talking with the press. Weinberger said that the problem, in part, stemmed from the new system of Cabinet Councils, which were being run by Ed Meese in the White House. Secretary Haig noted that nobody had elected Ed Meese and that he was not going to send anyone from the State Department to this morning’s Council meeting.

Secretary Haig then said that there was an “NSC” meeting every day in the form of the President’s security briefing. He said this was more than a briefing and that Allen, Meese, and Baker were using it to make policy. Secretary Haig said that he was going to have a “showdown” with the White House on lines of responsibility and over leaks which had come from the White House. Weinberger agreed that leaks were a problem and noted that in nearly every Evans/Novak article the third paragraph said what a “great guy” Dick Allen was.

Weinberger then asked what, if anything, the Administration should be telling the Russians. Secretary Haig said that it would be a mistake to talk with Dobrynin until the Administration had an action plan. Weinberger agreed, saying that Dobrynin was extremely clever and that he did not want to talk with him until the Administration had a policy.

Secretary Haig went further and said that the Administration needed a game plan for Cuba. Carlucci agreed that more work was necessary on Cuba. Haig asked whether the Administration was ready to do some “meaningful” things. Carlucci said there was little the Administration could do, because it possessed no economic leverage [\textit{less than 1 line not declassified}], only military power. Haig agreed and added that a military response was probably necessary. Weinberger said that the Administration should consider a blockade of Cuba. Secretary Haig agreed, and said that the President had to consider this option. Carlucci added that the Administration’s covert action capability [\textit{less than 1 line not declassified}]. Secretary Haig then sketched out a scenario:

The Russians are distracted, he said, and the military balance in some respects was still favorable. He said that, if Reagan continued to conduct business as usual, the Administration would be “nibbled” to

\(^2\) Not further identified.
death. The President, he added, is going to be the “President or he isn’t.” Carlucci then asked whether Secretary Haig was suggesting a blockade of Cuba? Secretary Haig answered by saying that he wanted to consider a full range of actions, including air strikes. He said that in conversations with Dobrynin, he had concluded that the Russians were not prepared to defend Cuba against strong American action. Carlucci said that this sounded like a Soviet invitation to get tough with Cuba. Secretary Haig agreed and said the United States had to play “two balancing games”—dealing with Cuba and helping the Egyptians against Libya. Secretary Haig then said that Richard Pipe’s interview in the press had made the Administration’s task more difficult. It had created problems with General Zia in Pakistan and had also embarrassed FRG Foreign Minister Genscher.

Secretary Haig then said that he was going to raise this with the President, adding that either the President agreed to a disciplined system of decision-making or that he would retire to Connecticut. Carlucci then asked how Secretary Haig was going to approach Cuba, was he going to ask Bud McFarlane to produce a new paper? Secretary Haig said he would see the President and then get a small group working on the issue. Weinberger expressed doubts over whether the President would want to meet with Secretary Haig on the Cuban question.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

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3 In an interview with Reuters, Pipes made disparaging comments about Genscher, and declared: “Soviet leaders would have to choose between peacefully changing their Communist system in the direction followed by the West or going to war. There is no other alternative and it could go either way.” ("U.S. Repudiates a Hard-Line Aide," New York Times, March 19, 1981, p. A8)
32. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs (Eagleburger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Dyess) to Secretary of State Haig

Washington, March 20, 1981

SUBJECT

Whether to Prevent Soviet Spokesmen from Appearing on T.V. Show

SUMMARY: Georgiy Arbatov, Moscow’s leading expert on the U.S., and two Soviet colleagues are scheduled to appear on the “Bill Moyers’ Journal” PBS television show on April 10. The show will be a debate on U.S.-Soviet relations, with Senator Sam Nunn, Bill Hyland, and either McGeorge Bundy or Mac Toon representing the U.S. side. We recommend that we permit the other two Soviets to enter the U.S. to appear on the show, but do not extend Arbatov’s current stay in the U.S. for this purpose.

ANALYSIS OF ISSUES

“Bill Moyers’ Journal” will be running a four-part series on U.S.-Soviet relations beginning on March 27. The third part is to take the form of a debate, with Arbatov, Vitaly Kobysh of the Central Committee staff and Mikhail Milshteyn of the USA Institute representing the Soviet side. The show is to be presented live in a hall at UN headquarters.

Arbatov is currently in the U.S. to address a conference of the International Physicians to Prevent Nuclear War to be held at Airlie House March 21–25. He has a 16-day visa which expires on April 2. He is certain to apply for an extension to appear on the April 10 show and to make appearances elsewhere. (We understand he is scheduled to speak to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on April 2, and has tentative plans to speak at Harvard, Berkeley, and Minnesota.) The other two Soviets have not yet applied for their visas, but we expect them to do so soon.

The T.V. appearance and Arbatov’s other activities are a part of the continuing Soviet media blitz in the U.S. Americans, meanwhile, continue to be deprived of any access to Soviet media. In view of this total lack of reciprocity, we should consider whether to take any steps to interfere with the Soviets’ April 10 T.V. show.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Day File, Box CL 31, March 20, 1981. Confidential. Drafted by Hurwitz (EUR/SOV); cleared by German and Barry. Sent through Stoessel. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum indicates Haig saw it.
Whatever decision we make on this issue, we should begin now to examine how we might change the visa laws or their current interpretation so as to enable us more easily to deny entry to Soviet visitors. At present, the McGovern Amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act puts difficult obstacles in the way of such denials. (We are preparing a separate memorandum on this issue.)

EVALUATION OF OPTIONS

1. Extend Arbatov’s visa and issue visas to the other Soviets for their appearance on the April 10 show. This would be consistent with our tradition of not interfering with the media. Given the solid credentials of the U.S. panel, it also might be in our interest to have the Soviets subjected to their questioning.

Permitting Soviet participation, however, would run counter to our efforts to introduce greater reciprocity into our relationship with Moscow. We might also draw some criticism for seeming to give Arbatov and other Soviets free rein here. (We understand that the NSC has already expressed interest in preventing Arbatov from getting a visa extension.)

2. Refuse to extend Arbatov’s visa and prevent the entry of the other two Soviets. (Normally the McGovern Amendment would make it difficult to deny visas to such visitors, but given the short lead time in this case, the visas could be denied through a “pocket veto.”) This would underline for the Soviets our concern for reciprocity and put them on notice that they cannot count on playing our system for their own purposes. It will, however, undoubtedly cause an outcry from PBS and possibly other segments of the public. Moreover, we note that even without visas Arbatov and other Soviets can continue to appear on U.S. T.V., via satellite from Moscow, while in this instance, PBS could substitute Soviet newsmen or officials already here for Arbatov and company.

3. Refuse to extend Arbatov’s visa, but permit the entry of the other two. We could suggest to Bill Moyers that we would not interfere with any taping of the show prior to Arbatov’s April 2 visa expiration date should he prefer this, and not prevent earlier arrival of the other Soviets for this
purpose. We could point out to Arbatov that we were rejecting his extension request because of the lack of reciprocal U.S. access to Soviet audiences.

This step would restrict Arbatov’s plans for a coast-to-coast media tour and underline our concern for greater reciprocity without necessarily scuttling the Bill Moyers show.\(^8\)

This move would probably generate criticism from PBS and other organizations which Arbatov is scheduled to address.\(^9\)

**RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that we refuse to extend Arbatov’s visa but not interfere with the entry of the other two Soviets to appear on the T.V. show. (Option 3)\(^{10}\)

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\(^8\) Haig placed a checkmark beside this paragraph and wrote: “Absolutely.”

\(^9\) Haig underlined the word “address” and wrote at the end of this sentence: “Sure—”

\(^{10}\) Haig initialed his approval of option 3 on March 30 and wrote below it: “Superb memo. Well done; concise in language & analytical in substance. AMH.”

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33. **Minutes of the Principals of the Department of State Staff Meeting**\(^1\)


[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

*Grain Embargo:* AMH spoke to Sen. Baker yesterday on the embargo issue. Baker’s comments (according to AMH came from Nunn) is that there are issues that come up to politicians from the people, and there are those that go down from the politicians. The embargo reflects the type of issue that needs to go down to the people from the political leadership. AMH is concerned that the President will not take the tough line on this. Last time this was discussed at the Cabinet level, the President listened for awhile, and then walked out with no decision. AMH will “staunchly resist” removing the embargo. Cites “incredible consequences” on the Soviet side. Will need to coordinate this with the allies and will also discuss with Dobrynin tomorrow at lunch.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) See Document 35.
White House: AMH said that there is a “no hold barred” effort against State and AMH coming from the White House. The Allen speech on Saturday\(^3\) was a disaster coming on the heels of the Pipes mess last week. AMH said that there is an attitude in the White House that we have to take the Europeans to the top of the mountain and watch them bleed. The “better red than dead” attitudes of European pacifists were a function of flawed US leadership, and instead of carping at Europe, we should correct that leadership. This bitching and bullshitting in Europe is killing us (and mobilizing the Left), and the Social Democrats are really gunning for us now. We have to realize that there are West-West tensions too, not just East-West problems. AMH will speak “very frankly” to the President about this today.

Bush to Geneva: AMH chastised the group for having him do the “bullshit” work. He had made the original call to the VP to get the ball rolling, and now it was time for staff work. The point is that when issues get more involved beyond the original high-level contact the new matters should be taken care of at the Exec. Assistant level, and not at the top.

Nicaragua: AMH is quite concerned that the President will not take the tough road here. Noted that if he goes soft, the polls will rise, and that is a great temptation.

Poland: Stoessel reviewed the Polish situation, and AMH said “we all know where that is going.”

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Dobrynin lunch: AMH told Dyess he could respond on the lunch, and also asked that we inform Doby of the goings on. AMH did not know from last time that Doby did know in advance, and that he simply chose to ignore clear instructions to go to C Street. Apparently AMH did not even know that Doby was coming in the front.

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\(^3\) Reference is to a March 21 speech Allen delivered to the Conservative Political Action Committee. (“Reagan Aide Assails Pacifism in Europe,” *New York Times*, March 22, 1981, p. 1)
34. Minutes of the Principals of the Department of State Staff Meeting

Washington, March 24, 1981

The meeting was opened by Clark in the Secretary’s absence. AMH was busy preparing for today’s Congressional testimony. Clark had just returned from California where he had completed the last of his judicial responsibilities.

INR gave a summary of Polish activity. Walessa (Solidarity leader) had twice walked out of union councils on the strike issue. Spiers noted that this was like a Greek tragedy with each actor playing out his own role, and slowly rolling toward disaster. The Soyuz ‘81 military exercises are scheduled to end tomorrow, and Spiers noted that they no longer pose the real threat. In his view, the danger lies in the enactment of martial law by the Polish authorities, a possibility which Spiers thinks is very likely. He sees the crisis as going to the brink and back too many times.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Wolfowitz: Raised the issue of the SNIE (Special National Intelligence Estimate) on Soviet Terrorism Support. (Note: this was requested in January by AMH after he read INR’s piece on same.) Paul says that it is disastrous—typical double-fisted CIA analysis. He noted that it uses the Soviet “terms of discourse”. That is, it distinguishes between support for wars of national liberation, and support for terrorism. It is couched in the CIA’s usual “yes, but” approach, and the only thing that media will pick up on is the “buts”. Even though it is classified “codeword” all expect it to get out.

Spiers noted that the facts are ok (though there are not many of them), it is the conclusions that spoil the work. Paul asked why the agency did not produce just facts, why did they have to fog it up with analysis.

Clark suggested that more State people take a look at it, and try to change it. Spiers cautioned that changing an SNIE to reflect policy preferences is very risky, and he doubted that other agencies would go along with that.

Bud asked if Casey had seen it—he couldn’t imagine that DCI would sell a bad piece. Clark noted that Casey is not always with it, and is almost asleep at many NSC meetings. Clark then convened a round table on the piece for this afternoon, to include Stoessel, Wolf-

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owitz, McFarlane, Spiers, and himself. They will review the piece with an eye towards attaching a dissent, or delaying production, since we asked for the SNIE in the first place.

_Burt:_ Talked about the DIA briefing on Soviet threat to the Gulf, and said he was disappointed with it. Spiers had taken the same data and put together his own brief, and it was much better. Rich suggested that we get this up to the Hill. Clark mentioned that Gen. Jones has asked him about the Gulf briefing in Europe.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

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35. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

**Washington, March 28, 1981, 2218Z**

79809. Subject: Briefing Allies on Haig/Dobrynin Meeting.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. The Secretary met with Dobrynin on March 24. This cable provides a summary of the meeting for addressees’ information and talking points for permreps’ lunch on Tuesday. Embassy Moscow may also draw upon talking points in briefing Quad Ambassadors in Moscow, but not before Tuesday.

3. Summary of discussion: Dobrynin asserted that some of the Soviet leaders are nervous and unhappy over recent US rhetoric. He tried to portray Brezhnev as good and experienced leader who has urged his colleagues to remain calm and has thus-far prevented a harsh Soviet response. Dobrynin emphasized the importance of maintaining a dialogue and asked whether the Secretary intended to hold the customary meeting with Gromyko at the UNGA in September. The Secretary said that he did not know why the bilateral should not take place but made no firm commitment. The Secretary suggested that he and Dobrynin continue the dialogue possibly through another meeting as

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also sent Immediate to the U.S. Mission to NATO, Bonn, London, and Paris. Drafted by Hopper and Napper; cleared by Stoessel, Seitz, and Eagleburger; approved by Haig. A memorandum of conversation of Haig’s meeting with Dobrynin has not been found.

2 March 31.
early as next week. These meetings should be seen as regular, recurring diplomatic contacts.

4. Dobrynin tried to place the Brezhnev “concession” on extension of the geographic scope of European CBMS to the Urals in the context of seeking ways to reach understanding with the US. The Secretary suggested that the Brezhnev statement could be judged positively if it was meant to apply to the continent of Europe. Dobrynin replied that it also must pertain in some way to the US and hinted that the Soviets would seek some way to cover US reinforcements to Europe as the quid pro quo for their Atlantic to the Urals “concession.”

5. During a discussion of Afghanistan, Dobrynin indicated in very vague terms that the Soviets were ready to commit themselves to withdrawing their forces from Afghanistan but offered no time frame. (There was nothing in Dobrynin’s comments on Afghanistan to indicate a shift in the Soviet position that their troops will be withdrawn when the reasons for their presence have been resolved, e.g. cessation of “external interference,” and there has been normalization of relations between DRA and its neighbors in Iran and Pakistan, and international guarantees that “interference” will not be resumed.

6. Dobrynin indicated that the Soviets are eager to get back into the Middle East negotiation process, citing proximity of the area to the USSR’s Southern border. He stressed that USSR must be involved but had no specific recommendations for an appropriate Soviet role. Dobrynin referred to reports that the Secretary would seek to promote a Middle East/Southwest Asia security consensus during his upcoming trip to the area. Dobrynin took issue with this alleged US objective on the ground that it put regional events into an East/West focus and seemed to involve exclusion of the USSR from a role in the area.

7. The Secretary stressed our concern about the continuing Cuban military presence in Africa and the Libyan intervention in Chad. Dobrynin replied that the Cubans remain in Africa because their African hosts continue to want them. He acknowledged that the USSR sells arms to Libya, but he claimed that Moscow has no control over Libyan use of the hardware. In response to the Secretary’s expression of concern about signs of Soviet support for the Libyan effort in Chad, Dobrynin denied any Soviet involvement.

8. The Secretary gave Dobrynin our views on the Polish debt situation, emphasizing that the Soviets must do their fair share in helping Poland meet its debt burden and other economic problems. Dobrynin had no reaction.

3 A reference to Brezhnev’s proposal to extend confidence-building measures to include all of the Soviet Union west of the Urals.
9. Dobrynin asked the Secretary for his opinion of the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on LRTNF deployments in Europe. The Secretary replied that he thought the idea was “outrageous”.

10. The Secretary told Dobrynin that the US is consulting with its allies and we expected to be able to send a reply to Brezhnev/Reagan letter soon. In this connection, the Secretary told Dobrynin that we intend to keep talking, but that Soviet actions will speak louder than words. Dobrynin said that the Soviets were not pressing for an early summit and agreed that such a meeting should be carefully prepared.

11. Talking points
—The Secretary met with Dobrynin March 24 for a discussion on a number of matters. We expect that such meetings will continue in the future as a means of maintaining the US–USSR dialogue to which we are committed.

—Because there will be regular, recurring diplomatic contacts it may not be productive or necessary to provide a formal read-out of each meeting. This in no way diminishes our commitment to close consultations with our allies on East/West matters.

—The Secretary and Dobrynin discussed the possibility of a Haig/Gromyko bilateral at the UNGA. Dobrynin did not press for a summit and agreed that such a meeting should be carefully prepared.

—The Secretary rejected Soviet proposal for a moratorium on LRTNF deployments and told Dobrynin that the Brezhnev statement on CBMS was positive development if it was meant to apply to the continent of Europe. Dobrynin implied that Soviets expected extension of geographic scope to apply in some way to the US. (With Quad allies only, addressees may explain that Dobrynin referred to coverage of US reinforcement of Europe in context of CBMS discussion.

—Dobrynin referred to Soviet willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan but offered no time frame and indicated no flexibility in Soviet position on conditions that would make withdrawal possible.

—Dobrynin indicated that Soviets are anxious to become involved in Middle East peace process but had no specific recommendation for a Soviet negotiating role.

—The Secretary made clear our concern over continuing Cuban military role in Africa and Libyan intervention in Chad. Dobrynin claimed that African hosts continue to desire Cuban presence and claimed that Moscow has no control over Libyan use of Soviet arms. He denied that Soviets are supporting Libyan effort in Chad.

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4 See Document 26.
—The Secretary raised our concerns about current situation in Poland and need for Soviets to do their fair share to help Poland with its economic and debt problems. Dobrynin did not respond.

—Dobrynin expressed interest in reply to Brezhnev’s letter to President Reagan, and the Secretary responded that reply would be sent after we concluded consultations with our allies. He told Dobrynin that the US wanted dialogue to continue, and progress in US-Soviet relations, but reminded him that we intend to judge Soviet intentions by their actions, not just words.

Haig

36. Memorandum for the Record\(^1\)

Washington, March 26, 1981

SUBJECT
Haig Breakfast, 26 March 1981

PARTICIPANTS
State
Secretary Haig
Deputy Secretary Clark
Bud McFarlane
Richard Burt

Defense
Secretary Weinberger
Deputy Secretary Carlucci
Fred Ikle
Jay Rixse
Carl Smith

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

7. (S/NF) Secretary Haig then raised the issue of TNF. He said he had two major issues in this regard that he wanted to address: linkage of TNF with SALT; and the pace of any such talks with the Soviets.

Regarding the former point, he said that, especially in light of the upcoming SCG,\(^2\) if we were to give any indication that we were going


to pull away from negotiations with the Soviets, we would lose any TNF modernization plans we had. In this regard he felt that it would be important to link SALT with TNF. Richard Burt commented that NATO long ago had agreed that TNF should be handled in the SALT context. Secretary Weinberger raised the question of whether we had to link SALT and TNF since we have told people that we have no objections to negotiations on both—it was just a matter of when and what the agenda was going to be. Ikle then commented that, in his discussions with Apel, he (Apel) had indicated that the Germans wanted a good TNF agreement within the SALT context and that this was part of the German theology regarding “decoupling.” Haig suggested that there was no reason to challenge TNF within the framework of SALT, especially if we are loose regarding the specific linkage. Secretary Weinberger indicated that we still have the problem of what to do in the event the Soviets invaded Poland. If we are talking about the linkage of SALT and TNF as just a formulation, fine; but he did not want to do anything that would delay deployment. Haig responded that what he saw as the problem was the need to manage and control TNF. There seemed to be a general agreement that whereas TNF would not be taken up as part of a SALT discussion, TNF would be “linked” to SALT in that it would be handled in a bilateral forum between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we would purposely keep vague the relationship between the two.

Haig then mentioned the second issue, that of the pace of such talks with the Soviets. He said that there were essentially two schools of thought: one indicated we should hold back on pursuing such a dialogue until much more had been done in the modernization field; the other indicated we should move as rapidly as possible in order to engage the Soviets in a dialogue. Burt interjected that after the 31 March SCG we would need to tell the Allies whether and when we were going to be talking with the Soviets. Secretary Weinberger indicated that he had some confusion with regard to this; specifically, he was concerned about what the agenda would be in any dialogue with the Soviets. He restated his position that we should not really sit down to talk just for talk’s sake; we should not talk unless we had a clear idea of what it was we wanted to talk about and it was clear we were not going to be giving something up just to engage in a dialogue. Haig indicated his concern was that we might get too heroic in dealing with our Allies on this matter and we might lose them on the TNF modernization issue.

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3 Reference is to West German Minister of Defense Hans Apel.
8. (S/NF) Related to this TNF issue, Secretary Haig mentioned the results of some of his recent discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin.\(^4\) Dobrynin told him he felt they had made a major new constructive proposal on the TNF issue by offering to include the Urals in the area for discussion (noting that this would also be stretched all the way to the United States). Haig said he had replied that if they were talking about confidence-building measures for anything west of the shoreline of Europe, the Soviets could forget it. Haig then made reference to the draft letter of response to Brezhnev which was in the White House—Secretary Weinberger indicated that Defense was totally unaware of any draft response.\(^5\) Haig then said he would ensure that a copy was provided to us after the breakfast.

Secretary Weinberger then asked what more was learned from Haig’s meeting with Dobrynin. Haig responded that the Soviets were very paranoid regarding our policy in the Middle East, especially the President’s statement that we might consider helping the Afghan insurgents. Dobrynin had also reacted rather negatively toward our discussion about increasing the U.S. presence in the region (he even implied that the Soviets would be forced to react, making clear the reference to Iran). As additional indication of his concern, Dobrynin even suggested that the Soviets were interested in talking about these issues. Regarding this latter point Dobrynin made reference to Vance’s offer of 1977 that we should open up the Middle East talks to the Soviets in Geneva. Haig made a general comment that obviously the policy being stated by the President was causing them concern; therefore, we were making the right moves. Haig also indicated that Dobrynin was generally concerned with our own push for the TNF modernization. (At this point Haig suggested that Defense should undertake to provide a good analysis of all long-range theater nuclear force systems, comparing ours with the Soviets, etc.)

Secretary Weinberger then asked Haig if he planned to have continued discussions with Dobrynin. Haig said that he did, but that these were to be just talks, nothing more. He said that he had told Dobrynin that there was no prospect for a summit until the Soviets had demonstrated better behavior. He further said that he had advised Dobrynin that we had great concern with Qadhafi and with Castro. On Qadhafi, in response to Haig’s expressed concern and indication we were going to have to do something about it, Dobrynin did not blink at all. Haig took this as an indication that the Soviets would not attempt to interfere in anything that we felt was necessary to do. Haig did say, however,

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\(^4\) See Document 35.
\(^5\) See Document 37.
that Dobrynin seemed less comfortable with any suggestion that we might do something with regard to Cuba.

Secretary Weinberger asked if Haig and Dobrynin had talked about El Salvador. Haig responded that they had and that things were a little bit better for us since the recent Colombian actions with regard to Cuba (i.e., the withdrawal of the Ambassador).

9. (S/NF) Mr. Carlucci, referring to the remarks Haig had made on Libya, said that he had some worry regarding Sadat and what he was likely to do. He said that any action undertaken by Sadat against Qadhafi would face us with some rather major decisions. Haig agreed and said that if anything was undertaken, we will need a very firm U.S.-UK-French response that we would not let the Soviets intervene. Mr. Carlucci indicated this would be a major decision and something that would need addressing by the NSC.

Haig said that there still existed the problem of dealing with Dobrynin. He said that he would be meeting with Gromyko next fall and he suggested (to Dobrynin) that the U.S. would probably go ahead with this meeting, but it would be dependent on the international scene and Soviet behavior. Haig further indicated the Soviets are very concerned that such a meeting might not take place.

10. (C/NF) Haig indicated that there was also a problem related to the grain embargo. He said people at the White House were coming more into agreement with William Brock at Agriculture and that the people putting the pressure on the President to lift the grain embargo had no sense of foreign affairs. He indicated he believed what we are seeing is a case of politicians driving the people rather than the other way around, that there really was not much pressure within the body politic to lift the embargo. He said that he had suggested to the President check with the Congressional leadership on this, especially Howard Baker. His sense was that the leadership would indicate we had much more to lose than to gain by lifting the grain embargo. Mr. Carlucci suggested that the IG on East-West trade really needed to get going in order to establish the policy and the importance of the grain embargo.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

J.H. Rixse
The Special Assistant
37. Editorial Note

President Reagan convened a meeting of the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room of the White House on March 26, 1981. The meeting lasted from 2:05 to 3:05 p.m. and covered Poland, Nicaragua, and Central America. Secretary of State Haig noted that “the State Department had reached the independent judgment that we were witnessing the most serious crisis in Poland” since the coal miners’ strike of the previous summer. Citing a “confidential source who is a former White House official,” Haig declared there was a “strong possibility” of “an internal takeover by the Polish militia.” He informed the group that the Polish Central Committee was scheduled to meet on Sunday, March 29, and that the Polish Parliament was scheduled to meet in an emergency session on Monday, March 30. A “major move by Polish, and possibly Soviet forces, could occur on Monday,” according to Haig. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 0006 03/26/1981) The minutes of the meeting are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume VII, Poland, 1977–1981.

Following the meeting of the National Security Council on March 26, Haig met with Executive Secretary Bremer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Crocker, and Special Assistant Baltimore. According to Baltimore’s memorandum to the files, they agreed that Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs Hormats would draft a statement regarding the grain embargo and work with Senate Majority Leader Baker. “The statement should mention that the decision to lift the grain embargo and negotiate a new contract with the USSR depends upon Soviet international behavior.” Haig added that “the statement must not be released without conferring with the Allies and giving them a full explanation of what it is about,” and that the administration should wait until April 4, when the Soviet “Soyuz” exercise was scheduled to conclude. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Day File Box CL 31, Day File, March 26, 1981)

On March 30, at approximately 2:30 p.m., President Reagan was shot in the chest by John Hinckley, Jr., on his way out of the Washington Hilton Hotel, where he had delivered a speech to the AFL–CIO. Later that day, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Allen sent Secretary of State Haig’s March 25 draft of a Presidential letter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to Counselor to the President Meese and White House Chief of Staff Baker. “Given present circumstances,” Allen wrote, “I have no interest in locking horns with State over this issue, but I do not believe that the President should response [sic] to Brezhnev in the manner suggested by Al Haig.” (Reagan Library,
38. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, April 3, 1981

SUBJECT
Meeting with Dobrynin

I met again with Dobrynin Wednesday. We covered much of the same material as before although he made some interesting comments on arms control and on Cuba.

Poland: I told Dobrynin that the Poles were asking us for considerable economic help. This would be more difficult for us because the Soviets did not appear to be doing as much as they could on the economic front. Dobrynin agreed with my estimate that in the short term the situation there was perhaps somewhat improved although the longer-term outlook was more serious. Dobrynin repeated that if the Soviets felt they had to move into Poland, they would move.

Arms Control: In response to his question, I confirmed that we will put negotiations on European Theater Nuclear Forces ahead of renewed discussions on SALT, which was a complicated subject and needed considerable study. The Ambassador suggested we might seek to negotiate selective arms control measures instead of trying for a comprehensive SALT agreement. He referred specifically to the possibility of mutual agreements on submarine construction and missile modifica-

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Pipes Files, CHRON 04/06/1981–04/08/1981. Secret; Sensitive. In an unsigned and undated covering memorandum to Reagan, Allen wrote: “Dobrynin strikes me as more amenable than in his previous conversation with the Secretary of State. His idea of approaching arms control agreements in a limited, ‘functional’ manner (not necessarily involving subs and missile modifications) may be worth exploring.”

2 April 1. A memorandum of conversation for the meeting and the “non-paper” that Haig gave Dobrynin are in Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Lot 96D262, S/S Special Handling Restriction Memos, 1979–1983. A memorandum of conversation, drafted by Bremer, the meeting took place on April 2 in Haig’s office from 4:30 to 5:30 p.m. According to telegram 85971/TOSEC 20042 to Haig en route to the Middle East, April 4, the meeting was held on the afternoon of April 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
tions, holding that this “step-by-step” approach in specific functional areas might have a better chance of success. He repeated that the Soviets are not pressing for summitry but added that perhaps a functional arms control accord could be signed at a summit. I told him we would want to reflect carefully on what he had said but that progress even on selective arms control issues will be difficult without concrete evidence of Soviet worldwide restraint.

**Middle East:** Dobrynin again seemed anxious to reinsert the Soviet Union into the Middle East peace process, referring to the Carter Administration’s joint statement with the USSR of October 1977. He asserted that the PLO was ready to give the necessary assurances on Israel to join the process. But the PLO could not play that card at the start of the game without concrete assurances of an active role. I told Dobrynin that the Middle East was a particularly sensitive area where major progress seemed unlikely absent substantial changes in East-West relations, in Afghanistan and in the use of proxy forces. Dobrynin reiterated Soviet willingness to set a timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan.

**Cuba:** I reminded Dobrynin that we were determined to change Cuban behavior, in this hemisphere and elsewhere, and to work with others to change Libyan policies. Dobrynin again seemed unconcerned about Libya. (He called Qadafi a “mad man.”) With respect to Cuba, the Ambassador asserted this was a matter between Washington and Havana “and it should be kept that way.” He added that when US actions involved the US-Soviet understandings, it became an entirely different matter.

**Arbatov Visa:** I told Dobrynin that our intention in not extending Arbatov’s visa had nothing to do with what he had or had not done here but rather reflected the lack of reciprocity in our access to Soviet press. I noted that Soviet officials have appeared on US TV eleven times in this Administration while our Charge in Moscow has been repeatedly denied his request to appear on Soviet television.

**Indian Nuclear Intentions:** I gave Dobrynin a note urging the Soviets to restrain the Indians from conducting a nuclear test, stressing that we are working quietly to influence the Paks away from their nuclear

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5 Not found.
program. If the Indians tested a nuclear device, it would make restraint more difficult for the Paks.

Pentecostalists: I noted that this seemed to me to be a needless irritant in our relations and suggested the issue should be resolved quickly if there was the necessary will by both parties to do so. Dobrynin seemed to agree. We will follow up on this.

I will want to discuss with you how we proceed with the Soviets on these and other issues when I return from my trip.

39. Message From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Washington, undated

Mr. President,

Information available to me indicates a growing possibility that the Soviet Union is preparing to intervene militarily in Poland. I wish to make clear to you the seriousness with which the United States would view such an action, to which we would be compelled to respond. I take this step not to threaten the Soviet Union, but to ensure that there is no possibility of your misunderstanding our position or our intentions.

It should be clear that the consequences of Soviet military intervention in Poland on U.S.-Soviet relations would be very serious. Our ties to the Polish people are strong and long-standing. A move against Poland would call into question those elements of the U.S.-Soviet relations left intact following your invasion of Afghanistan. Prospects for renewed progress to reduce strategic and other arms would be dealt a serious and lasting blow.

The impact in the broader international arena would be no less serious. East-West relations are already strained by Afghanistan. As

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8190199, 8190200, 819201). No classification marking. A handwritten note at the top of the letter reads: “Sent April 3, 1981 EST.” According to Allen presided over a Molink transmission of the message that evening, and Moscow acknowledged receipt at 8:30 p.m. EST, or 4:30 a.m., April 4, Moscow time. (Ibid.) Allen briefed Reagan that morning, as the President was recovering in the George Washington University Hospital from the March 30 attempt on his life. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)

last December's NATO Foreign Ministers meeting made clear, Soviet intervention in Poland would mean the end of the process of detente in Europe as it has developed over the past decade. More generally the unprecedented tension which would accompany a move against Poland would complicate efforts to deal with sensitive international issues in ways which avoid direct confrontation and preserve the peace.

Our policy toward Poland is one of noninterference. We have pursued such a policy in word and deed. There is no threat to Soviet interests arising from Western activities in that country.

Poland’s internal economic and political difficulties are real. We stand prepared with the rest of the world community to help appropriately in resolving them. With patience and a willingness on both sides to avoid confrontation, we believe it remains possible to reach a solution acceptable to all parties. But such a solution can only emerge if the Poles remain free to address their difficulties without external pressures.

Mr. President, our two nations share a unique responsibility to refrain from actions which might threaten world peace. It is our hope that the Soviet Union will recognize the importance of continuing to deal with the situation in Poland in a manner consistent with its international responsibilities.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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3 See Document 37.

40. Message From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan

Moscow, undated

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with your communication of April 4, I am bound to state at the outset, that in our opinion, its content and its form serve

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, Box 38, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8190199, 8190200, 819201). Top Secret. The original Russian version of the message was sent via Molink on April 7. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 39.
no useful purpose either at the level of Soviet-American relations or from the point of view of the normalization of the situation in Poland.

In fact, it repeats again the motif of imaginary “threats” to Poland on the part of the Soviet Union which already for an extended time have been tossed from one American announcement to another.

The more frequently such statements are made the more apparent becomes their true character. It is doubtful that anyone can be deceived by them. Already for a long time—practically from the beginning of the well-known internal events in Poland—it was precisely the United States, and the Administration itself, that has applied crude pressure on the situation in Poland and, in essence, interfered in the internal affairs of that country.

When in Washington, at the very highest official levels, there are issued public “warnings” to the Polish People’s Republic against the adoption of measures to stop the actions of those who strive to throw the country into anarchy and at the same time, in no unmistakable terms, there are threats of some kinds of punishments, we are faced not just with interference but with open incitement to the continuation of disorders and disobedience of legitimate authority. By virtue of what right is this done?

And is it necessary to recall what is being done for the support of anti-government elements in Poland by way of American secret services and other organizations, particularly through the radio broadcasts to that country by stations which are controlled by the U.S. government? It is no secret that the same purposes are served also by the pseudo-humanitarian assistance to particular groups in Poland on the part of certain American trade unions.

Actions of this kind are impermissible in relations between sovereign states. The USA, after all, has also signed the United Nations Charter which gives no one the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. And in how many authoritative international documents since the UN Charter have the governments of the world decisively expressed themselves in favor of this principle, hallowed by centuries, which no one is allowed to trample?

We wish directly to warn the United States of America: do not interfere in the internal affairs of Poland. If Washington genuinely desires that life in Poland return as soon as possible to normal—as is declared there, from time to time—then one should act accordingly.

As concerns the happenings in Poland, we have proceeded and continue to proceed from the collective position of the states of the Warsaw Pact, which, we assume, is known to you.

It should be clear that socialist Poland which, together with its allies, is a member of the organization of the Warsaw Pact, is going to
be protected from all assaults from the outside on its prevailing system, from all claims of external powers to intervene in the solution of its internal affairs.

And one more thing. In your communication you make an attempt to link the internal events in Poland with international problems and to issue some kind of warnings on that subject. In this connection one can only express regret that in Washington, apparently, there is inadequate awareness of the truth that any positive achievement can be only the result of the mutual wish of the parties. In the solution of international problems, whether these be questions of European security or arms limitation, all states must be equally interested, including the US, and no one may assume that here one can punish someone else without first punishing himself.

Of course, I am decidedly not in agreement with the manner in which in your communication you interpret the Afghanistan question. Our point of view on this question, we have expressed more than once (word garbled) is scarcely necessary to do this again.

If one is to touch on the American position in regard to Afghanistan then it is clearly reflected in such facts as the recent public announcement of the intention of USA to provide weapons to the interventionists and terrorists who are sent into Afghanistan, as well as the pressure exerted by the US on Pakistan for the purpose of preventing the opening of an Afghanistan-Pakistan dialogue with which we sympathize and which would open the way to a political solution of the problem.

Mr. President, I have frankly given you our position on the questions which you have raised. We are indeed ready to discuss any problems which may arise. It seems, however, that it would be counterproductive and not in the interests of our two countries to reduce everything to mutual recriminations and accusations. The situation in the world is such that there is a pressing necessity for a constructive dialogue for the purpose of locating mutually acceptable solutions of the world’s unresolved problems. This also applies to Soviet-American relations.

Respectively

L. Brezhnev
41. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs (Eagleburger), the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research (Spiers), and the Director of Policy Planning (Wolfowitz) to Secretary of State Haig

Washington, April 13, 1981

SUBJECT

Countering Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda

As part of the Administration’s effort to focus attention on Soviet international conduct and to bring about Soviet restraint, there is a particular need to collect and disseminate information on Soviet subversive activities around the world. And we need to urge other governments to counter Soviet operations. This memo sets forth a precis of our current planning to structure an action program to expose the extent of KGB and other Soviet Bloc subversion. We request your approval for the general thrust of our efforts.

A broad effort might include the following elements:

1. Information: We need a better fix on the dimensions of the problem in order to provide case-study evidence of the potential consequences for nations tolerating Soviet intelligence and subversive activities within their borders. Particular attention could be paid to Soviet penetration of intellectual movements, trade unions, peace and church groups in Europe and elsewhere.

The first step is to establish the facts. INR can take the lead in working with other members of the intelligence community to produce a basic estimate on Soviet activities designed to foment and support subversion and revolution abroad. Soundings at the staff level indicate that an NIE-type product could be done in six weeks time.

We then can develop classified and unclassified materials, and communicate our intelligence through a variety of channels. CIA is doing some of this already, but they could use encouragement from us to do more. Examples of our work which might find an overseas audience:

—Size, organization and scope of Soviet and Bloc intelligence operations.

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—Case studies of how the Soviets have worked over the years to achieve influence sufficient to manipulate the internal affairs of certain nations on key issues. Afghanistan would be one example. Examples of the Soviet campaign of combined propaganda/covert action directed against the modernization of theater nuclear weapons in NATO and the previous campaign against the ERW might be appropriate. Examples of KGB activities in Mexico, Central America, Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia and India would also be timely.

—A detailed statistical study of official Soviet and Bloc personnel levels in particular countries along with our estimate of the number of intelligence operatives.

—Development of books and informational materials on KGB/GRU methods of operation.

—Special attention to the Soviet use of the UN for its propaganda efforts and certain covert action operations designed to reinforce overt propaganda lines.

2. Diplomatic: We should also launch a carefully targeted effort to encourage potentially receptive governments: (1) to monitor more closely Soviet intelligence activities, (2) to place greater constraints on their activities, and (3) to trim them back numerically where possible. In this effort, any informational materials we had developed could be used to demonstrate first to government leaders and to key decision makers and opinion groups the risks of an uncontrolled Soviet presence in their country. Intelligence channels, Ambassadorial approaches, as well as special ICA-type programs and activities could be employed as appropriate. The global nature of the Soviet threat would be important; e.g., Pakistan’s recent action limiting Soviet intelligence activities might be having an effect on Bangladesh President Zia, whom we have long been urging to take similar actions in his own country. Furthermore, a coordinated worldwide effort would tend to give credibility to assurances many governments would seek from us that they would not be alone if the Soviets reacted punitively.

3. Domestic: The U.S. will need to demonstrate seriousness about the Soviet threat inside the U.S. if we are to be credible in urging other nations to take action. We are vulnerable to criticism given the scale of Soviet intelligence activities permitted in the U.S. Passage of the Foreign Missions Act would give us one specific action to cite. Through the ICCUSA mechanism, a range of measures are being taken or are under study to ensure strict reciprocity in our bilateral relations with the Soviets. Many of these measures have direct relevance to Soviet intelligence activities in the U.S.—such as stricter limitation of travel by Soviet diplomats, UN Missions officers, and visitors; and monitoring of Soviet contacts and access in the U.S. In the event of Soviet intervention in Poland we and our allies would consider major reductions of Soviet diplomatic and commercial personnel in our countries.
RECOMMENDATION

We are in the process of developing these and other ideas into a strategy which would combine State, CIA and ICA resources (diplomatic, intelligence and public) to place the spotlight on Soviet activities and launch mutually-reinforcing efforts by a number of nations to restrain them. We will be talking to CIA and ICA about them but seek your approval for the general thrust of the effort as outlined above.²

² Haig initialed his approval and wrote: “Good.”

42. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 14, 1981

SUBJECT
Analysis of Brezhnev’s Message

We have analyzed Brezhnev’s message² and discussed an appropriate response. The meeting was deliberately small, and all written materials stayed in the Situation Room. We intend to prevent leaks on this one. The participants in the meeting were: Deputy Secretary Clark; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Ambassador Stoessel; Robert Gates, Bill Casey’s special assistant on the Soviet Union; Mose Harvey and Sy Weiss from the campaign foreign affairs advisory group; Bud Nance, Janet Colson, Richard Pipes and Dennis Blair from the NSC staff.

There was consensus among the participants on the important points.

• The text appears to have been drafted by staffers in the Kremlin, with Brezhnev himself adding several personal themes. It is, therefore, both an institutional and a personal response to your message of April 3, 1981.³

• The tone of the letter is deliberately tough, but Brezhnev has sent tougher letters to your predecessors. The letter does not contain

² See Document 40.
³ See Document 39.
any personal attacks on your actions, such as there have been in past similar messages.

- The purpose of Brezhnev’s message seems to be two-fold: First, to make a direct appeal to you for the resumption of a US–USSR dialogue, which the Soviets badly want. Second, to establish a rationale for Soviet intervention in Poland by blaming it on the United States.

The Soviets want talks with your Administration to legitimize their status as the other, equal superpower, and because when they talk with the U.S. on important issues such as SALT, they can pursue aggressive initiatives elsewhere in the world with less chance of adverse publicity and public censure. The Soviets feel that in a few months they will be able to engage this Administration in dialogue as they have its predecessors, with the same success in improving their position in the world.

In replying, you will want to consider carefully the impression you will leave with Brezhnev and his colleagues. Indeed, as Ambassador Weiss put it, “the impression may be more important than the substantive content” of your reply. I believe that your response will, in fact, set the tone of U.S.-Soviet relations for a year or more, or at least until you agree to a face-to-face meeting with Brezhnev.

Two major elements should be included in the reply, which it was agreed, should be short and dignified. First, the tone of Brezhnev’s message was “unworthy” of a statesman; was uncalled for, in view of the measured tone of your message to Brezhnev; and hurt rather than helped prospects for constructive Soviet-American discussions. Second, the United States should reject the contention in Brezhnev’s message that the Soviet Union, with its Warsaw Pact allies, has a right to intervene in Polish affairs, whether on the basis of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” or on any other basis.

Concerning the method of response, two alternatives were discussed. Either a reply could be conveyed by Secretary Haig to Ambassador Dobrynin, including a written text (in order to ensure that the message makes it to Moscow without Dobrynin’s reinterpretation), or a letter could be signed by you, but sent through normal diplomatic channels, rather than on the “hot line.” We do not wish to get into an extended exchange of messages via this hot line channel.

We should share the gist of the messages with at least the four major allies (Britain, France, Germany and Japan). We are pledged to consultation on important matters, and it is the allies that are pressuring us for dialogue with the Soviets. It may be useful for them to experience the tough, insulting and uncompromising tone of the Soviet leader with whom we are expected to converse.
43. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)\(^1\)

Washington, April 20, 1981

SUBJECT

Grain Embargo (U)

I have no way of verifying newspaper reports that we are about to lift the grain embargo imposed on the Soviet Union.\(^2\) If true, this would be bad news in every respect, except perhaps for the agrarian interests directly affected. (S)

The grain embargo has had some economic impact in that it has forced the USSR to purchase grain at inflated prices, to go through elaborate and costly circumventing operations, and to slaughter excess cattle. The Soviet Union wants to buy grain here because we alone can assure it of adequate quantities and the shipping suited to handling by Soviet ports. (S)

The economic dimension, however, is not the most important one. What really matters are the political-psychological aspects. (C)

1. The embargo had been imposed as penalty for the invasion of Afghanistan. The Russians have not only failed to withdraw from Afghanistan, but they have refused even to discuss the matter. How seriously will the world take our threats in the future if the Russians get away with this? (S)

2. How can we pressure our Allies to maintain embargoes now or later if we lift the grain embargo? We will merely confirm their suspicion that we are not serious or reliable, that if they hold out long enough we will fall in line. The lifting of the grain embargo certainly will improve the chances of the gas-pipe deal, now in trouble. (S)

3. As for the Russians, this will be the first indication to them that their hunch had been right: the Republicans are a party of businessmen who may be more anti-Communist than the Democrats but who, in the end, will always be swayed by commercial considerations. The great ideological capital gained by the Reagan Administration in Moscow will be largely dissipated as a result of this decision. (S)

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The grain embargo is not a domestic issue: it is part of global strategy and should be treated as such. (S)

I feel I had to get this off my chest. (U)

44. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 21, 1981, 7:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Secretary Haig’s Conversation with Amb. Dobrynin

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Amb. Anatoliy Dobrynin

Middle East Trip: The Secretary began the meeting by giving Amb. Dobrynin a briefing on his recent trip to the Middle East and Europe. At the conclusion of his briefing the Secretary turned to Lebanon and noted that he thought the situation there was vitally important to the peace of the region. He told Dobrynin that we are urging restraint on the Israelis and suggested that the Soviets were obliged to do the same with respect to Syria. The situation was extremely volatile, and in our view if the Israelis were provoked they could take severe action. Dobrynin responded that the Syrians were prepared and would in that case react. The Secretary said that we had seen what happened in the past when the Syrians reacted.

TNF: The Secretary said he hoped that we would be prepared to move on discussions on TNF after the NATO Ministerial meeting. He thought we might perhaps be able to set up a firm schedule for talks in New York when the Secretary meets with Gromyko this fall. He noted that these were simply his ideas which had yet to be discussed with the President, but he knew they were generally in line with the President’s thinking.

1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat S/S-I Records, Lot 96D262. Super Sensitive April 1981. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bremer. The meeting was held in Haig’s office. In his memoir, Haig recalled being summoned to the White House at 6:50 p.m. and informed by Meese that Reagan wanted Haig to tell Dobrynin that evening that the grain embargo would be lifted on April 24. (Caveat, pp. 113–114)

Brezhnev Letter: The Secretary told Amb. Dobrynin that Brezhnev would soon receive a reply to his March 6 letter to President Reagan.³ He noted that the delay in the response was due to the assassination attempt. The Secretary then referred to the brief exchange between the two Presidents on Poland and said that in light of the tone of the Soviet response, he felt it was best that the Soviet letter not be answered since it would only lead to escalated rhetoric.⁴

The Secretary stated that our Government remained somewhat encouraged but nonetheless wary about the Polish situation.

Embargo

Based on that analysis and the President’s own long-standing opposition to the embargo, which he considered to be less than effective and counter to what he would do in the future if faced with a similar situation, the President had decided to announce that he would lift the embargo in the very near future. He wanted the Soviets to be aware of this. Also, we would be prepared to be responsive if the Soviets wished to purchase more than the 8 million tons allowed under the current long-term agreement. Amb. Dobrynin asked how much we had in mind, and the Secretary responded certainly 2 million tons, perhaps more.

The Secretary stated that once the embargo is lifted we would be prepared to negotiate a new long-term agreement to replace the one that expires in September. He told the Ambassador that it would be helpful to hear from him by noon on Friday, April 24, on the amount of additional grain the Soviets might want to buy this year, and he stated that although it was perhaps not realistic to expect an answer on the long-term agreement by Friday, it would also be helpful to know about that. Amb. Dobrynin asked if there were any conditions attached to this decision. The Secretary stated that we were making this decision on our own and there were no conditions.

⁴ See Documents 39 and 40.
45. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, April 23, 1981

SUBJECT
Haig Breakfast, 23 April 1981

PARTICIPANTS
           Defense
Secretary Haig        Secretary Weinberger
Deputy Secretary Clark Deputy Secretary Carlucci
Bud McFarlane\(^2\) Fred Ikle
Rick Burt            Jay Rixse
Carl Smith

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

4. (C/NF) The Secretary [Weinberger] then raised a short item having to do with licenses for pipelaying in the Soviet Union. He mentioned he had received a letter recently from Congressman Michel\(^3\) requesting assistance in expediting licenses for a company in his constituency so that they could continue their business with the Soviets. The Secretary noted that there was an IG currently on-going on the issue of export controls and he indicated that his opinion was that we should not permit such licenses to go forward and sought the support of Secretary Haig. Haig indicated that he, too, agreed that we should work to cut back on such export licenses but indicated that he felt there would be a lot of problems domestically.

5. (S/NF) This discussion on export controls and domestic problems led to the issue of the Soviet grain embargo. Haig said the embargo was going to be lifted. Mr. Carlucci asked whether it could not be done in phases. Haig then described the following sequence of events which had led up to the decision to cancel the grain embargo: (1) There was a Lou Cannon story in the paper the preceding Friday which indicated that the grain embargo was likely to be lifted\(^4\) (Haig understood that this story derived from Ed Meese); (2) Upon reading this story, Haig

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\(^2\) (Bud McFarlane arrived late and was present for approximately the final ten minutes of the meeting.) [Footnote is in the original.]

\(^3\) Reference is to House Minority Leader Bob Michel (R-Illinois). The letter was not found.

\(^4\) See footnote 2, Document 43.
called Meese and registered a complaint; (3) Malcolm Baldrige, the next day, was en route to a Cable News Network interview when he read the story in the paper—believing this to be true (when questioned on the subject during the Cable News interview), he said we were going to be lifting the grain embargo; (4) Upon hearing the interview, Haig called Baldrige and asked him why he had made the statement and learned that it was simply because he had assumed that what he had read in the paper had been the decision; (5) On the preceding Tuesday, Haig had met with Meese and Baker and a decision was arrived at that the embargo would in fact be lifted; (6) Haig then met with Ambassador Dobrynin and advised him that the grain embargo would be lifted since it was no longer in the U.S. interest to maintain it and that Dobrynin should advise him by tomorrow at noon if the Soviets were going to want more grain during the coming year—he also informed Dobrynin that the next time any situation arose wherein Soviet behavior was outside acceptable norms, the U.S. would hit them with everything we had.

Secretary Weinberger indicated that it was his impression the embargo was just really beginning to hurt the USSR. He said it was unfortunate that there had been a campaign promise made to lift the embargo and suggested that it was even more unfortunate that there was an office devoted to ensure that all campaign promises were kept. He then asked whether Dobrynin appeared grateful for lifting the embargo to which Haig responded in the affirmative. Mr. Carlucci then asked whether the decision was in fact a fait accompli. Haig responded that it was and that it would be announced on Friday but the timing would be such so as not to affect the commodity markets.

All agreed that it was too bad the decision had progressed the way it did on the grain embargo. Mr. Carlucci indicated that it was going to be sending a bad signal to everyone around the world and the fact that the DCI had indicated the Soviets were no longer being hurt by the grain embargo did not help the situation at all.

6. (S/NF) The Secretary then asked how the meeting with Dobrynin went in general. Haig responded that Dobrynin really wants to sit and talk a lot, especially on arms control. He further noted that Dobrynin was very anxious in two areas: he is interested in seeking ways that he can get us to reverse our defense spending efforts; and he is interested in splitting us from our European allies, especially on the arms control issues.

5 April 14.
6 See Document 44.
The discussion then turned to a general elaboration of how things stood regarding the TNF issue. Haig indicated that while Dobrynin was very anxious to get the talks going, he was less so than our European allies. With regard to the allies, Haig felt that he had to go ahead and set some sort of a schedule. His (Haig’s) scenario was to talk all summer regarding the data (presumably with the Soviets). The Secretary indicated that we ought to take as much time as necessary in order to talk with our allies. (At this point Mr. Carlucci asked if the Schmidt visit was still on and Haig replied that it was.)

Haig indicated that, with regard to the Schmidt visit, his pipeline was the German political leader Nau who was here on a visit. Mr. Carlucci responded that he had just seen Nau, who had attempted to claim that we (i.e., Secretary Weinberger) had said that the Germans could not have their social programs. The Secretary indicated what he had told Schmidt was that the United States had made some rather significant sacrifices in order to beef up its defenses and he hoped the allies would be able to do the same. Mr. Carlucci indicated he attempted to explain this to Nau, but in many cases the Germans chose to interpret things differently.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

The Secretary indicated his basic concurrence with this division of labor and then asked whether the SIG was making good progress. Haig indicated that Rick Burt and Larry Eagleburger were working on this with our people. Burt indicated that he was working closely with Richard Perle and that Richard had participated in the SIG which had met yesterday on this issue and that there would be an IG meeting on Friday which was going to develop a paper for NSC consideration next week.

Burt went on to explain that the basic position of the SIG was that arms control talks might begin by late this year if there was Alliance agreement or consensus on two matters: (1) TNF and linkage (both to SALT and with respect to Soviet behavior); and (2) the nature and extent of the Soviet threat. The Secretary indicated he hoped our position would include some sort of a termination clause if the Soviets

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8 Presumably a reference to Johannes Rau, Minister President of North Rhine-Westphalia and a prominent figure in the SPD.

9 Reference is to Haig’s proposal that he would stress the importance of arms control, in conversations with U.S. allies, while Weinberger should accentuate strategic modernization.

10 April 24.
went into Poland or undertook some other form of unacceptable behavior. Burt said that this was their intent in developing a consensus on the linkage.

Haig indicated that we had to work together on this arms control problem. The Secretary concurred but indicated his concern about being hit by the allies for a specific date when these things were going to be undertaken. He was additionally concerned that the allies might continue to postpone actions or deployments if they got too wrapped up in arms control—when it would start, etc. Haig indicated he wanted to have things pretty well set up so that during his normal meeting with Gromyko next fall, coincident with the opening of the UNGA, he would be able to discuss when such talks might begin.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Haig then commented that Dick Allen (derived from Richard Pipes) was putting out a line that the Soviets had changed the Brezhnev doctrine to include Cuba. He said that he had talked to Dobrynin about this and Dobrynin had indicated that the ’62 understandings were still valid and there was no change to the Brezhnev doctrine. (He further indicated that the Brezhnev doctrine was a U.S.-manufactured idea and the only protection that extended to Cuba was in the event of an invasion by the U.S.)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

J.H. Rixse
The Special Assistant
My Dear Mr. President

In writing the attached letter I am reminded of our meeting in San Clemente a decade or so ago. I was Governor of California at the time and you were concluding a series of meetings with President Nixon. Those meetings had captured the imagination of all the world. Never had peace and good will among men seemed closer at hand.

When we met I asked if you were aware that the hopes and aspirations of millions and millions of people throughout the world were dependent on the decisions that would be reached in your meetings.

You took my hand in both of yours and assured me that you were aware of that and that you were dedicated with all your heart and mind to fulfilling those hopes and dreams.

The people of the world still share that hope. Indeed the peoples of the world, despite differences in racial and ethnic origin, have very much in common. They want the dignity of having some control over their individual destiny. They want to work at the craft or trade of their own choosing and to be fairly rewarded. They want to raise their families in peace without harming anyone or suffering harm themselves. Government exists for their convenience, not the other way around.

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8190202, 8190203). No classification marking. In his memoir, Reagan described the drafting of this letter on lifting the grain embargo the Carter administration imposed on Moscow after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. “The State Department took my draft of the letter and rewrote it, diluting some of my personal thoughts with stiff diplomatic language that made it more impersonal than I’d wanted,” the President recalled. “I didn’t like what they’d done to it, so I revised their revisions and sent the letter largely as I had originally written it; on April 24, 1981, two letters went out to Brezhnev from me.” (An American Life, p. 271) In his diary entry for April 23, Reagan included a version of his handwritten letter that raised the plight of Anatoly Scharansky as well as the Pentecostal Christians living in the basement of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Vol. I, pp. 33–34) The drafts of Reagan’s handwritten letter to Brezhnev do not include reference to these matters. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8190202, 8190203)) A copy of the handwritten final version that went to Brezhnev is ibid. The copy printed here is the text of Reagan’s handwritten message to Brezhnev.

2 Printed as Document 47.

If they are incapable, as some would have us believe, of self govern-
ment, then where among them do we find any who are capable of
governing others?

Is it possible that we have permitted ideology, political and eco-
nomic philosophies, and governmental policies to keep us from consid-
ering the very real, everyday problems of our peoples? Will the average
Soviet family be better off or even aware that the Soviet Union has
imposed a government of its own choice on the people of Afghanistan?
Is life better for the people of Cuba because the Cuban military dictate
who shall govern the people of Angola?

It is often implied that such things have been made necessary
because of territorial ambitions of the United States; that we have
imperialistic designs and thus constitute a threat to your own security
and that of the newly emerging nations. There not only is no evidence
to support such a charge, there is solid evidence that the United States,
when it could have dominated the world with no risk to itself, made
no effort whatsoever to do so.

When World War II ended, the United States had the only undam-
aged industrial power in the world. Our military might was at its
peak—and we alone had the ultimate weapon, the nuclear weapon,
with the unquestioned ability to deliver it anywhere in the world. If
we had sought world domination then, who could have opposed us?

But the United States followed a different course—one unique in
all the history of mankind. We used our power and wealth to rebuild
the war-ravaged economies of the world, including those nations who
had been our enemies. May I say there is absolutely no substance to
charges that the United States is guilty of imperialism or attempts to
impose its will on other countries by use of force.

Mr. President, should we not be concerned with eliminating the
obstacles which prevent our people—those we represent—from achiev-
ing their most cherished goals? And isn’t it possible some of those
obstacles are born of government objectives which have little to do
with the real needs and desires of our people?

It is in this spirit, in the spirit of helping the people of both our
nations, that I have lifted the grain embargo. Perhaps this decision

4 In an April 24 memorandum to Baldridge, Reagan wrote: “I hereby direct that
you, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture and other appropriate officials,
immediately terminate the current restrictions on the export of agricultural commodities
and products to the Soviet Union imposed under authority of the Export Administration
Act pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum to the Secretary of Commerce of January
7, 1980. I also direct that you terminate restrictions imposed on the export of phosphate
rock and related commodities by virtue of the regulations of the Department of Commerce
published on February 7, 1980.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Rec-
ords: Files of Deputy Secretary of State William Clark, Lot 82D127, Official Chrons,
Grain Embargo)
will contribute to creating the circumstances which will lead to the meaningful and constructive dialogue which will assist us in fulfilling our joint obligation to find lasting peace.

Sincerely

Ronald Reagan

47. **Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev**¹

Washington, April 24, 1981

Dear President Brezhnev:

Thank you for your letter of March 6.²

Your letter raises many complex issues which obviously cannot be dealt with in an exchange of correspondence, except in general terms. Please be assured that our country is vitally interested in the peaceful resolution of international tensions. This Administration is prepared to settle disagreements by negotiations. We are also prepared to observe scrupulously our international commitments.

At the same time I must be frank in stating my view that a great deal of the tension in the world today is due to Soviet actions. As we and our allies have repeatedly stated, two aspects of Soviet behavior are of particular concern to us:

—First, the USSR’s unremitting and comprehensive military buildup over the past 15 years, a buildup which in our view far exceeds purely defensive requirements and carries disturbing implications of a search for military superiority.

—Second, the Soviet Union’s pursuit of unilateral advantage in various parts of the globe and its repeated resort to the direct and indirect use of force.

These activities raise serious questions about the Soviet Union’s commitment to the peaceful resolution of outstanding issues in accord with international law, the “Basic Principles of Relations” concluded

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¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8190202, 8190203). No classification marking.

between our two countries in Moscow in 1972, and the Helsinki
Final Act.³

I believe that real progress in relations between our two countries
is possible and necessary. But my Administration is determined to
judge Soviet intentions on the basis of actions and demonstrated
restraint.

This does not diminish our commitment to constructive dialogue.
Effective and meaningful communication between our two countries
is absolutely essential. I welcome your assurance that the USSR also
believes in such a dialogue. We should work together to avoid misun-
derstanding or miscalculation.

A personal meeting and a direct exchange of views would certainly
be a useful way of pursuing this dialogue at the appropriate time.
Clearly, however, the success of such a meeting would depend in large
measure on careful preparation and a propitious international climate.
I do not believe that these conditions exist at present, and so my
preference would be for postponing a meeting of such importance to
a later date.

All Americans share your concern over the threat to mankind in
the age of nuclear weapons. I welcome your statement that the USSR
is prepared for discussions with the United States on limiting strategic
weapons. I have stated publicly that the United States is ready to
undertake discussions with the USSR that would lead to genuine arms
reductions. We are presently engaged in a review of arms control and
as soon as this review is completed we will be in touch with your
Government.

Your acceptance of the principle that confidence-building measures
should apply throughout Europe, including all of the European por-
tions of the USSR, strikes me as encouraging. As our delegation at
the Madrid Review Conference has made clear, we support France’s
proposal for a meeting to negotiate a coherent system of measures on
European security: obligatory, verifiable and of military significance.⁴
Soviet acceptance of these criteria would eliminate important obstacles
to the holding of a security meeting within the CSCE framework as
part of a balanced outcome from the Madrid conference.

I am afraid, however, that I cannot be sanguine about your treat-
ment of other arms control issues, especially your proposal for a mora-
torium on deployments of theatre nuclear forces in Europe.

³ Reference is to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.
⁴ See James M. Markham, “U.S. Endorses Proposal by France For an Arms Parley
At the time it took its December 1979 decision, NATO rejected the concept of a moratorium because it would perpetuate existing Soviet superiority in long-range theatre nuclear forces. The continuing deployment since then of Soviet SS–20 launchers targeted against NATO has worsened the situation. NATO deploys no land-based missiles in Europe that could reach territory of the Soviet Union. The reasoning that prompted the Alliance to reject a moratorium in December 1979 is thus even more persuasive today.

Further to our exchanges on Poland, I must reject charges that the United States is intervening in that country’s affairs. This is simply not true. As we have repeatedly made clear, our concern is that the Polish Government and people be allowed to resolve their problems peacefully and free from any outside interference. In our view, recent Soviet military behavior and tendentious propaganda amount to a threat of the use of force which represents interference in Poland’s internal affairs.

In this connection I have noted with concern repeated statements by responsible Soviet officials suggesting that the form of a country’s political, social and economic system bestows upon the Soviet Union special rights and, indeed, duties, to preserve a particular form of government in other countries. I must inform you frankly and emphatically that the United States rejects any such declaration as contrary to the charter of the United Nations and other international instruments, including the Helsinki Final Act. Claims of special “rights,” however defined, cannot be used to justify the threat of force to infringe upon the sovereign rights of any country to determine its own political, economic and social institutions.

I was disappointed that in your treatment of Afghanistan, the most important element in the situation was not mentioned—the prompt withdrawal of Soviet forces from that country. There is wide international agreement that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan is a major source of tension in the area. Proposals for dealing with this by initiating a dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been firmly rejected by the Pakistanis themselves and by virtually all concerned nations since they fail to deal with the central issue of Soviet withdrawal. Evidence that the Soviet Union is prepared to move toward an acceptable resolution of the Afghanistan problem on the basis of her prompt withdrawal would go far toward restoring international confidence and trust necessary for the improvement of East-West relations.

I have spoken frankly in order to convey to you my views and feelings, and give you a clear sense of the basic foreign policies of

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5 See Documents 39 and 40.
The discussion initiated in this exchange should continue through the full range of diplomatic channels. If you agree, Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko might meet for further exchanges on these and related matters. The traditional meeting at the United Nations in September may be an appropriate forum. Perhaps by that time a basis will exist not only for deepening our bilateral dialogue, but for considering how and at what pace we may begin to build a better and happier relationship.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

48. Editorial Note

On April 30, 1981, President Ronald Reagan held a meeting of the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 11:10 a.m. to 12:40 p.m. In attendance were Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Deputy Secretary of State William Clark, Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle, Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, General Lew Allen and Lt. General John Pustay of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counselor to the President Edwin Meese, White House Chief of Staff James Baker, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Richard Allen, the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs James Nance, Janet Colson of the National Security Council Staff, Admiral Daniel Murphy of the Office of the Vice President, as well as Major General Robert Schweitzer and Major Christopher Shoemaker of the National Security Council Staff. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File, Records, 1981–88, NSC 0008 30 Apr 31 (2/3))

Allen opened the meeting by summarizing the issues for discussion: “The position the US should take on TNF negotiations with the Soviet Union; a brief word on Libya; U.S.-Japanese relations and the submarine and grain embargo issues; and the East-West trade paper which the Secretary of State will discuss while in Europe.” On the first issue, the Theater Nuclear Forces negotiations, Allen reviewed “the capabilities of the Backfire bomber in its intra-theater role, the SS–20, the SS–4, and the SS–5 missiles. He made the point that the SS–20, the basic Soviet IRBM, has three warheads and will be deployed in warhead numbers over 1,400 by 1985.” He then went over the capabilities of
U.S. Pershing-II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), which, once deployed to North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, had the potential to strike well within Soviet territory. The question at hand, as Allen put it, was whether to set a date for TNF negotiations with the Soviets.

Following Allen’s remarks, Haig summarized his discussions with NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, after which it “became apparent that European leaders cannot maintain domestic consensus behind TNF modernization without a specific date for the start of TNF negotiations.” There was a sense among Europeans “that our modernization process has not been based upon an honest threat assessment or military requirements study.” The position of the Department of State was to “lay out a timetable to meet with Gromyko by the Fall and to negotiate with the Soviets on TNF by the end of the year.”

Carlucci responded that the Department of Defense “was not opposed in principle to negotiations or discussion of timetables but felt that any negotiations with the Soviet Union must be preceded by a common assessment of the threat and of our requirements.” After some debate over the merits of setting a date to begin negotiations, President Reagan “said that he did not see much difference between State and DOD positions. We will conduct the studies; we will continue to deploy modern systems; we believe the study can be done by the end of the year, and look forward to negotiations in that time frame. We will discuss with Gromyko in the Fall; if the studies are not ready by the end of the year, we will take that into consideration.” Meese summarized the position: “(1) Tell the Allies that we hope to start the talks by the end of the year; (2) We will talk to Gromyko in the Fall; (3) We need to start studies now; (4) These studies will be the basis for our talks; (5) We must proceed with modernization on schedule.”

The participants then briefly discussed the process for drafting an East-West trade paper and the situation in Lebanon. The minutes of this conversation are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume V, European Security, 1977–1983.

On May 1, Allen signed a Presidential Directive stating: “1) The U.S. intends to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on TNF by the end of the year. 2) These negotiations will be based on an up-to-date threat assessment and a requirements study by the Allies. These actions will be undertaken within the framework of the High Level Group and the Special Consultative Group as matters of immediate priority. 3) The negotiations will be conducted within the SALT framework. This should not be understood as being in the previous SALT context. 4) Secretary Haig will discuss the timing and procedure of
these negotiations with Gromyko in September at the U.N. 5) The TNF modernization process must continue on schedule.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting File, NSC 00022, 13 Oct 81)

49. **Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig’s Delegation**

Washington, May 5, 1981, 0148Z

Tosec 030096. Following repeat sent action SecState May 4. Quote: Secret Moscow 06096. Subject: Meeting With Korniyenko. Refs: (A) State 112406, (B) State 114116.

1. (S—Entire text).
2. Summary
   During Charge’s call on Korniyenko May 4 latter:
   —Confirmed Soviet interest in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue, took exception to our point that a Haig-Gromyko meeting at the fall UNGA will depend on international events, and said response to President Reagan’s letter to Brezhnev, including reference to summitry, will be forthcoming.
   —Repeated the standard Soviet position on Afghanistan, reiterated the charge that USG pressured Pakistan not to engage in discussions with the Afghan authorities, and rejected the UNGA resolution on Afghanistan as the basis for UNSYG efforts to find an acceptable solution.
   —Said Soviet economic assistance to Poland was a bilateral matter and the scale of that assistance was well known to USG; took exception to our statement that the Soviet Union “must” bear a much larger

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Box CL 38, Day File, May 5, 1981. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The telegram repeated telegram 6096, sent from Moscow to Haig on May 4. Haig’s stamped initials indicate he saw the telegram. Haig wrote at the top of the telegram: “5/4/81 file.” On May 5, Haig traveled from Rome, where he had attended a NATO Ministerial meeting, to Brussels.

2 In telegram 112406 to Moscow, May 1, the Department requested that Matlock seek an early appointment with Korniyenko to enumerate the instances of U.S. dialogue since the start of the Reagan administration. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N810004–0247)

3 In telegram 114116 to Moscow, May 3, the Department reiterated Stoessel’s May 1 discussion with Dobrynin regarding Israel’s strong concerns over Syrian troops on Mt. Sannin. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
scale of the burden in helping Poland and to our reference to Soviet intervention in Poland and its consequences.

—Gave no assurances that the Soviet Union would urge restraint on Syria in Lebanon and would not admit any Syrian responsibility for the present crisis.

—Emphasized Soviet interest in nuclear non-proliferation and asked what Indian response was to our approach on Indian preparation for an underground nuclear test explosion.

—Had nothing to add to Soviet position on the Pentecostalists.

—Said (dishonesty) that Charge’s appearance on Soviet TV would depend on whether Soviet media are interested in extending an invitation. End summary.

3. Charge called on First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko morning of May 4 for discussion in accord with reftel. Discussion of talking points supplied by Department is summarized below.

U.S.-Soviet Dialogue

4. Korniyenko commented that the Soviet Union’s views on a dialogue do not need any special comment in that there can be no doubt that the Soviet Union is “for a dialogue” which would be effective and deal with concrete questions. The Soviet Union, he said, is not for a dialogue merely for the sake of a dialogue, but is interested in one which will take both sides forward on the questions under discussion. Concerning our statement that a meeting between Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko might take place in the UNGA in the fall, Korniyenko said that such meetings have become traditional. However, he took exception to the “reservation” that such a meeting would depend upon events between now and the UNGA and the international atmosphere which prevails at that time. This was not a constructive approach, in his view, for such a meeting. Charge observed that U.S. interest in a dialogue is serious and that our statement simply reflects the fact that any meeting at that level is obviously subject to international developments.

5. Concerning a summit meeting, Korniyenko said that a Soviet response to President Reagan’s letter will be forthcoming in due course, and will deal with that part of the letter which addresses a summit meeting. He added that it would be inappropriate for him to anticipate the Soviet reaction at this time.

Afghanistan

6. Korniyenko commented that our statement on Afghanistan was “not very understandable.” He reiterated the standard Soviet position that Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Afghanistan when the Government of Afghanistan requests the Soviet Union to do so and when armed attacks against Afghan territory cease. “Until that happens it is
not possible to withdraw Soviet troops.” He said that of course Dobrynin had not excluded the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal, since the Soviet position had long been that it would withdraw when “foreign intervention” in Afghanistan ceased and sufficient guarantees were in place to preclude a resumption. The U.S., he said, can facilitate this but is evidently doing the opposite. He then referred to what he characterized as the President’s statement that the U.S. “will arm and continue to arm Afghan counter revolutionaries.”

7. Charge pointed out that Korniyenko had misquoted the President, since he had actually said that if Afghan patriots asked us for assistance we would consider such a request. Charge added that he felt the Soviets had no grounds for objecting to the President’s statement since Soviet leaders make clear that they reserve the right to aid “liberation movements” of their definition and choosing. Our approach to the Soviet Union on this question, however, is not aimed at winning debating points. The Soviet Union must understand that the situation in Afghanistan plays a key role in U.S. public opinion and is a major factor in our current difficulties. A solution must be found which addresses the root issues—the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Without progress on this issue it will be very difficult to make substantial progress in resolving other difficult issues on the U.S.-Soviet agenda.4

8. Picking up on this, Korniyenko asked why the U.S. was obstructing any step which can effectively settle the problem “around Afghanistan.” Pakistan, he said, had been ready to approach negotiations with Afghanistan in the presence of UNSYG or his representative, and Soviets know very well that the U.S. put pressure on Pakistan not to enter into talks which could lead to closing the Pakistan border to anti-Afghan activities. Charge made clear that we are not opposed to negotiations directed at solving the root problem and which are based on the UNGA resolution of November 1980. The problem is that the Soviet Union has shown no readiness to take this course, which has the approval of a majority of UN members.

9. Korniyenko said that UN resolutions are not always appropriate bases for negotiations, and the U.S. implicitly recognized this when it refused to implement the UNGA resolution on the recognition of the PLO as the exclusive representative of the Palestinian people. He then reiterated his contention that the U.S. had obstructed bilateral talks between Islamabad and Kabul, and observed that the Soviets had con-

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4 Haig underlined much of this paragraph, drew a checkmark at the end, and wrote in the right-hand margin: “Brilliant! this fellow I like!!”
cluded from this that the U.S. has no interest in solving the problem, but wishes to drag it out.5

10. Charge pointed out that this conclusion was utterly false, since U.S. has absolutely no interest in a perpetuation of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan—which is the real issue. The U.S. clearly will support steps designed to resolve this problem, but they obviously must center on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Poland

11. Korniyenko commented as follows on our talking points:

—Soviet economic assistance to Poland will be decided on a bilateral basis. These decisions will be made much more expeditiously than they have been by the West. Soviet assistance and the scale of Soviet assistance concerns only the Polish leadership. Polish Deputy Prime Minister Jagielski informed the U.S. officials during his trip to Washington of the scope of Soviet assistance, therefore U.S. is aware of the volume of Soviet aid and knows that it is substantial.6

—Concerning the U.S. reference that the Soviet Union “must bear a much larger share of the burden in helping Poland,” Soviets cannot accept the implications and tone of this reference. This applies equally to the U.S. reference to “Soviet intervention in Poland.” The Soviets have made their position clear on this matter. If U.S. is talking about outside intervention in Poland’s affairs, it is evident that it comes from the Western powers, especially the U.S. The U.S. is trying to dictate to the Polish Government what to do and not to do and to use economic assistance in a threatening way. This is intervention.

12. Charge pointed out that it is not unreasonable to expect the Soviet Union, as an ally of Poland, to carry its share of the burden of economic assistance. Also, in no way can Western aid to Poland be construed as interference. We are not forcing Poland to accept our aid. On the contrary. The U.S. has a sovereign right to determine the conditions under which it will extend aid, but wishes to make clear to all concerned the considerations which will enter into our decisions.

India

13. Charge referred to the non-paper given Dobrynin by the Secretary on April 1 concerning the Indian underground nuclear explosion and added the additional points per reftel A. Korniyenko stated that the Soviet Union’s basic position on nonproliferation was well known.

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5 Haig wrote in the right-hand margin next to paragraph 9: “Clearly a weak response to a strong U.S. stance!”

6 Haig drew three vertical lines to the right of this sentence and wrote: “not really!! their man didn’t perform.”
and commented that it has been a subject upon which both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have been in substantial agreement. He asked what the Indian response was when we raised this matter with them, and Charge said he had no information on this point. Korniyenko repeated that this is an area in which we have a coincidence of views, and added, “we will return to this question.”

Lebanon

14. Regarding Lebanon, Korniyenko referred to Dobrynin’s response to Undersecretary Stoessel and added that what bothers the Soviet Union is the U.S. action in trying to “dictate” to Syria how it should deploy its forces when it is acting under a mandate by the Arab states. He then asked pointedly what right the U.S. has to issue ultimatums in such a situation.

15. Charge replied that he was surprised by Korniyenko’s questioning of U.S. right to convey its views to the parties involved and by his characterization of this as an ultimatum. It is clear that the U.S. is trying to defuse a dangerous situation, and using its influence to this end in those quarters where it has influence. Speaking personally, he found Korniyenko’s question quite incomprehensible in view of the provisions of the U.S.–U.S.S.R. 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. The Soviet Union must recognize that the situation in Lebanon remains dangerous and could spiral out of control if the Syrians do not restore the status quo ante April 25.

16. Korniyenko acknowledged that the situation in Lebanon is dangerous and even explosive and then went into a lengthy monologue accusing the phalange, Haddad’s militia forces in the south and Israeli aggressive acts into Lebanese territory as the major causes for the sharpening crisis. Syrian acts in Lebanon, he concluded, are in reaction to the acts of these other forces. Charge responded that U.S. cannot accept the assertion that most of the responsibility rests with Israel and the Christian forces in Lebanon and emphasized that what is important now is not arguing over who is to blame but undertaking steps to prevent a deterioration of the current situation.

Iran

17. On Iran, Korniyenko adopted a quizzical posture, saying that he did not understand why we were bringing the subject up in this way. He added that the Soviet Union, “of course,” is against interference in the affairs of other countries and that this applies to Iran as much as Mexico. But they do not find it necessary to point this out without

7 Haig underlined “as much as Mexico” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “Tom Enders—See me—we are making headway at last!”
cause. Charge pointed out that, given the turmoil in Iran and the strained relations the U.S. now has with Iran, it is quite appropriate to restate our position in this matter, lest there be any misunderstanding. He then took the opportunity to ask, for the Embassy’s information, what the Soviet position is on the Iranian abrogation of Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty. Korniyenko replied that there had been no Soviet response to the Iranian “declaration” on this subject.

18. Korniyenko said that the Soviets had noted the President’s interest in this matter, but could add nothing to what Dobrynin had already provided on the subject.\(^8\)

Access to Soviet Media by Charge

19. In conclusion, Charge mentioned that we continue to hope that Soviets will arrange for a TV appearance to answer questions regarding U.S. policy. He pointed out that the frequent appearances of Soviet representatives on U.S. media and failure to arrange for a single U.S. appearance here left the unfortunate impression that Soviets desired a monologue rather than a dialogue. Korniyenko replied that Soviet diplomats in U.S. merely responded to invitations from the media, and if Soviet media desired to invite the Charge for a similar appearance, MFA would not object. Charge observed that he was sure that MFA could encourage such an invitation if it wished.

Matlock.\(^9\) Unquote.

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\(^8\) Haig drew a line from the end of this sentence to the right-hand margin and wrote: “nothing at all!”

\(^9\) Haig circled Matlock’s name, drew a line to the right-hand margin, and wrote: “Superb job here & there!”
50. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)\(^1\)

Washington, May 7, 1981

**SUBJECT**

Derek Leebaert’s Meeting with Arbatov

Derek Leebaert dropped by this afternoon and left this fuller version of his talk with Arbatov.\(^2\) It reinforces my feeling that Arbatov is deeply frustrated by his inability to communicate with U.S. Government officials, which is his stock in trade, while his arch-rival Dobrynin has contacts. He pretends to speak for the Soviet Government whereas he really speaks on his own behalf. His advice to Leebaert to use KGB channels in the Soviet Embassy rather than Dobrynin’s is amusing. So is his uncertainty whether you are quite as hard-line as I. (C)

**Attachment**

Report Prepared by Derek Leebaert\(^3\)

Undated

This is a rough draft report of specific conversation in Moscow with G. Arbatov. A detailed essay that covers the entire trip is now being prepared.

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\(^1\) Source: Reagan Library, Meese Files, Box CFOA 160, USSR—1981 (General). Confidential. Sent for information. Telegram 12 from the FBI Director to the White House Situation Room, May 5, relayed Leebaert’s report on his meeting with Arbatov to the FBI. At the time of the Arbatov encounter, Leebaert was serving as managing editor of *International Security*. (Ibid.)

\(^2\) On May 6, Pipes sent Leebaert’s FBI report (see footnote 1) to Allen under cover of a memorandum in which he wrote: “That Arbatov should have felt it necessary to use as a conduit a young man without official connections with the Reagan Administration suggests the degree of nervousness in Moscow over the refusal of this Administration to negotiate for the sake of negotiating. Arbatov’s downgrading of Dobrynin’s talks with Haig is indicative of his long-standing dislike for the Soviet Ambassador in Washington and his frustration at having been cut off from his usual channels of communications in the United States to Dobrynin’s advantage. Noteworthy too is Arbatov’s focusing on Meese. I believe he (and others in Moscow) are desperately trying to arrange an end-run around you and the NSC Staff to get directly at the President. This bears watching.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (05/01/1981–05/06/1981)

\(^3\) No classification marking.
This is a report of a two hour talk with Georgy Arbatov on Friday 17 April, 12:00 through 2:00 had originally been set aside for a second one-on-one conversation with Bogdanov. We had spent approximately four and half hours the preceding Wednesday talking together.

After delivering a morning lecture at the USA Institute on the 17th, I was told by Bogdanov that something “extremely important” would take place instead. He and I then went into Arbatov’s office. I had been told on my arrival (Tuesday 14th April) that I “might” meet the Institute director later in my eight day visit. By 17 April I was told that Arbatov had been back for 3 days.

The details of the conversation with Arbatov are related below. There were no more than six one-sentence interjections by Bogdanov during these two hours; he was nervous and fidgety throughout. Arbatov stressed from the beginning that I was the first visitor with Administration contacts and a Republican identification to visit the Soviet Union since the inauguration. He said that he knew that I was visiting the Institute in a private capacity and that I was not a part of the Administration. Nevertheless, he emphasized strongly this part of “being the first” and of being representative of both a new sort of policy-maker in Washington and of a new foreign policy perspective. He said that he understood that I knew his son from the United States and that I would be seeing him in Moscow.

The discussion followed with only one interruption for tea to be delivered. After Bogdanov and I left the office together, he took me aside in the hallway and again said how “extremely important” the conversation with Arbatov had been. He said that he would explain why in his office in an hour and forty-five minutes later when I returned from my lunch with Sergey Plekhanov (head of general studies of U.S. domestic politics).

Arbatov’s themes concerned the potential consequences of what the highest Soviet officials see as undiluted personal insults, irresponsible new U.S. political actors, and the termination of all channels of communication. The Soviet leadership, he argued, cannot bear this indefinitely. What many of them perceive is entirely new U.S. political/military direction of which intemperate statements from Washington are only a small part. Major Soviet foreign policy decisions have to be made, and their formulations cannot help but be affected by this nearly unprecedented U.S.-Soviet environment.

He emphasized that this was not time to quarrel over the bureaucratic politics of how influential his Institute may be or what personal policy influence he has on the highest leadership. The problem is that the leadership is under great pressure to reply forcefully. It is not simply that the leadership is running out of patience (there are reserves left), but rather that Moscow is far less unitary than Washington thinks.
and that the pressures are increasing. They need a signal—any at all—that there are possibilities of working with the new Administration. They need some light.

A signal is needed because of those already conveyed by Moscow. Does Washington not understand the Percy visit or the 26th Party Congress speech, he asked. It would have been far easier for Brezhnev to make a strident “tighten the belt” speech in February. The Secretary could have been more popular had he done this because such a speech would have both addressed foreign policy and would have helped explain the domestic problems that were acknowledged frankly. Arbatov apparently advised him not to reply in kind because Brezhnev would be playing into the hands of those people in Washington with whom the Soviet Union cannot do business. There are some people who one cannot deal with and will stab you in the back. Allen, Weinberger, Pipes, Perle (responsible for the worst of the Jackson policies), and Lehman were cited as examples although Arbatov acknowledged that he was uncertain whether the first two were as close-minded as the others.

He said that the leadership obviously recognizes that there have been U.S. officials with whom it could deal. Kissinger and Hyland were mentioned and he asked about the influence of Sonnenfeldt. But the criticism of the new U.S. security policy officials continued. He said that he told the leadership that he had never seen such a low intellectual level in Washington. There is an obvious understanding that U.S. leaders have to pay off political debts by giving people positions but this was going too far (although some extremists had admittedly been excluded). But how long can the current situation continue, and what will be the results? What would happen if the Yom Kippur War occurred today? He said that he had a real fear of the consequences at this moment of any confrontation in the third world.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union like all states is made in day to day decisions which this environment is affecting. Moreover, he repeated, there are pressures for less restraint. (When asked to be specific he spoke of replies in kind, that SALT could not just lie, and that decisions would have to be made.) At what he called the most basic level, Arbatov showed a file of supposedly indignant letters he had received from readers because of his moderate writings in Pravda. He still says that he believes that the Administration has not yet reached any policy, although this is an optimistic view. But what will happen in the meantime? There are people in the Soviet Union who are talking about fascist influences in Washington.

The lack of U.S.-Soviet communication resulting from the current climate arose throughout. He spoke of an obvious recognition of new political actors “such as you” as opposed to the others that the Soviet
Union had been dealing with. He had chosen not to communicate with them until recently (the Kintner discussion in December had some positive results) and now there are no formal or informal contacts with the Administration. They were surprised by comments from Weinberger, but hope that Meese and Bush who do not yet seem to have such views will be influential. All channels have been cut off, and this includes not even going to Geneva. The absence of a U.S. Ambassador was noted and that, after all, it is the United States that chooses to deal with Dobrynin because he is so competent. With some few exceptions, the U.S. Ambassadors have not been valuable or very bright. What is happening with Scowcroft?

Random points were included in the conversation either as illustrations or as asides. They included: The U.S. is going to lift the grain embargo anyway (although Arbatov would tell the leadership to make it clear that they could get along without it); the Soviet Union got along well for sixteen years without U.S. diplomatic relations and could do without them now; the stridency of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were noted, and he said that Voice of America is important; Arbatov would like to advise the Soviet leaders to let the U.S. proceed with TNF because it will tear the Alliance apart; any recent stridency from Tass is blamed on inadequate night editing of the wire reports; and the danger of combining U.S. weapon developments with the existing rhetoric. And the cheap public diplomacy of the parking garage space and of the visa extension are minor events that were seen as public humiliations of the Soviet Union.

Arbatov presented the common view of an encircled Soviet Union facing not only the U.S. but two of its nuclear allies as well as another ally with an army that is better than that of the U.S. TNF was addressed briefly and reference was made to the moratorium proposal. It was implied that once talks started and Soviet deployments had halted, the U.S. could then begin introducing some of its own weaponry without Soviet resumption. But it was reemphasized that they could do more with defense, by pleas for national sacrifice as they have done in the past.

There is considerable anxiety that Soviet signals and the difficulties of restraint are not seen in Washington because people are preoccupied with other concerns, are simply too inexperienced, or already have closed minds on how to proceed.

Arbatov asked that the contents of this discussion be relayed to the highest U.S. officials (Meese and Bush were implied) and not just turned over to Allen and Pipes. (Haig was not stressed, and it seemed that Arbatov was uncertain about his influence and tenure.) Arbatov said that “we do not want to use Dobrynin for this” and that there are no ways to communicate. I was asked to reply through Soviet diplo-
matic pouch about the response to this discussion. I was asked to do this as soon as possible and that no one would need to know of such a communication.

Two hours later I met with Bogdanov in his office. He said that Arbatov had met with Secretary Brezhnev that morning and that Brezhnev had been personally reading Arbatov’s cables from the U.S. Bogdanov reemphasized the “extreme importance of what just happened” (e.g., the talk with Arbatov), saying that it was by far the most important point of the visit. He said that official channels with the U.S. cannot be used for this.

Bogdanov said that after the lunch he and I had two days previously, he had spoken with several important people in the government. He said that it is the highest level of the Soviet government that knows of this first quasi-official visit and of presumed contacts with the Administration. He made it explicit that the highest level wanted to establish a channel of communication, and that this is more important than ever. He said that they cannot use the Soviet embassy for this and that a reply is hoped for through pouch.

51. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State-Designate for European Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Haig

Washington, May 11, 1981

SUBJECT

Apparent Official Approach to Charge Matlock by Soviets for establishing an Unofficial Channel to Us

Charge Jack Matlock called today from Moscow on the secure phone to report what appears to have been an official approach to him in Moscow May 10 at a small Soviet dinner party on the Soviet desire to establish an unofficial channel from us to them which would bypass Dobrynin. The approach was made by a man named Sitnikov, ostensibly an official of a Soviet agency which arranges foreign copyrights,

but whom we have identified in the past as a KGB agent. Sitnikov told Matlock that the Soviets now are very eager to start talking to us about major issues and that everything is negotiable, including all of the items which we have considered major sticking points in the past in SALT negotiations. Sitnikov said that in order to make progress, however, it would be necessary to establish an unofficial channel because Dobrynin is so senior that everything he transmits goes straight to the Politburo which then settles into inflexible positions and it takes months to budge them.

The thrust of the approach was that this new channel would lead from us directly to Brezhnev via Arbatov or possibly Sitnikov.

Matlock said that the dinner party was set up openly and Soviet officialdom obviously knew he was there. For this and other reasons, he believes the approach is at least a legitimate probe. He is writing up a complete report of his meeting which we will receive tomorrow in a telegram classified NODIS ALPHA, STADIS, FOR SECRETARY HAIG AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER ONLY.  

2 Haig underlined “via Arbatov.”
3 Matlock reported on this conversation in telegram 6492 from Moscow, May 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N810004–0407)

52. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, May 12, 1981

SUBJECT
Meeting with Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister

Comments which Gromyko’s First Deputy, Korniyenko, made to our Charge d’Affaires in Moscow last week indicate that the Soviets are still interested in a dialogue with us, but that they have little or nothing of substance to say on the issues of primary concern to us. We

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (05/20/1981–05/20/1981). Secret. In telegram 6096 from Moscow, May 4, the Embassy reported on Matlock’s conversation with Korniyenko. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
had instructed Matlock to see Korniyenko to make certain that Dobrynin is reporting our views accurately to Moscow, and also to probe for any additional indications of Soviet thinking.

On the subject of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue itself, Korniyenko acted as though our meeting with Gromyko at the UN in September should be considered firm regardless of what might happen between now and then. Matlock disabused him of that notion. As for a summit meeting, Korniyenko said only that Brezhnev’s response to your letter would address the matter. Given Brezhnev’s recent remarks to Waldheim, we assume the reply will reiterate his interest in meeting with you.

Dobrynin has been telling us that the Soviets might be prepared to set a time-table for withdrawal from Afghanistan, and we had instructed Matlock to probe for any elucidation of that point. What came through from Korniyenko was a hard-line reiteration of the long-standing Soviet position, leaving no room for us to expect any movement in the near future.

Korniyenko made it clear that the Soviets are still unwilling to discuss Poland with us. Despite what should be an obvious Soviet interest in having the West continue its economic assistance to Poland, Korniyenko refused to provide any information on what the Soviets are doing from their side, claiming that it was a bilateral matter and that the Poles had in any case fully informed us of the scope of Soviet assistance (which they have not done).

Similarly, Korniyenko continued the Soviet stance of refusing to indicate what, if anything, they might be doing to try to dampen the crisis in Lebanon. He admitted that the situation is “dangerous and even explosive,” but he sought to exonerate the Syrians of all blame. Matlock’s reiteration of our strong views was nevertheless timely, as the meeting came on the eve of Korniyenko’s departure for Damascus.

In the process of reiterating our position on Iran—something we had instructed Matlock to do because some Soviets have been questioning whether our recent silence on the point indicated a change in U.S. policy—Matlock did elicit a reaffirmation that the Soviet Union is “of course” against interference in the affairs of other countries, including Iran. Nevertheless, Korniyenko acknowledged that the Soviets have not responded to the unilateral Iranian abrogation of the articles of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty which give the Soviet Union a right to intervene.

Korniyenko expressed awareness of your personal interest in resolving the problem of the Soviet Pentecostalists residing in our Embassy in Moscow—the only bilateral issue on which this Administra-

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2 Reference is to Waldheim’s trip to Moscow in May 1981.
tion at a high level has sought Soviet cooperation. Nevertheless, he had absolutely nothing to offer.

Our impression is that, while we have gotten the Soviets’ attention on a range of troublesome issues, we have not yet persuaded them of the necessity of movement toward a more conciliatory attitude.

53. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, May 13, 1981

1. Meeting with Wife of Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. Mrs. Avital Shcharanskiy, wife of imprisoned Soviet dissident Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, called on me today to appeal for Administration efforts to obtain the release of her husband. She pointed out that he was convicted on false charges of spying for the U.S. European leaders with whom she had spoken, including Mrs. Thatcher, told her that only U.S. influence would be great enough to effect his release.

Senators D’Amato and Spector accompanied Mrs. Shcharanskiy and gave me a copy of last night’s Senate resolution concerning her husband. The Department is announcing to the press that I have agreed to give Dobrynin a copy of the resolution for transmittal to the Soviet leadership. (C)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Dissidents (2/23). Confidential. Allen sent the memorandum to Reagan under cover a May 14 memorandum, on which the President wrote: “Let us do all we can to help get her husband freed RR.” Allen conveyed this message in a memorandum to Haig. (Ibid.)

2 A memorandum of conversation of this meeting is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-1 Records: Haig and Shultz Memcons, Lot 87D327, SEC/Memcons, May 1981.
54. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to
President Reagan

Washington, May 18, 1981

SUBJECT
Message from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on the Lebanon Crisis

Ambassador Dobrynin has just delivered to me Gromyko’s reply to my Friday message to the Foreign Minister on Lebanon (Soviet-provided English translation attached).

The first page and a half is devoted to a rather restrained diatribe against Israel and those who support her, and need not concern you. The final two paragraphs, however, are of interest. Gromyko says:

—The Soviets have taken note of our intention not to become involved militarily in the event of an armed conflict, but believe the real task is to prevent a conflict.
—The Soviet Union is working to avoid a confrontation including during “recent days.”
—The U.S. should restrain Israeli leaders.
—The United States and the Soviet Union should be able to reach “mutual understanding” that would prevent the outbreak of war in the Middle East.

During my talk with Dobrynin after I had read the letter, the Soviet Ambassador described it as “constructive,” meaning that Moscow is “restraining” Assad. Dobrynin said, in a clear reference to his Friday night remark about the possibility of a moratorium on Israeli reconnaissance flights over the Bekaa Valley, that he had expected that we would already have put forward such a compromise formula. He was, he said, surprised that we had not yet done so. “After all, what would be in it for Assad?”, he asked, pointing out that the Israelis would not be losing much by detouring their reconnaissance flights some 20 or 30 kilometers off their normal route.

Thus, despite the polemics in the letter, the last two paragraphs of the Gromyko letter, plus Dobrynin’s comments, seem to indicate that the Soviets remain in contact with Assad, and that hope remains that a compromise formula acceptable to Syria and Israel can yet be found. We can anticipate that the proposal that the Israelis forego

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2 Haig’s May 15 message is Tab B.
reconnaissance flights over the Bekaa Valley in return for Syrian withdrawal will surface at some point in the not too distant future.

Tab A

Letter From Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary of State Haig

Moscow, May 18, 1981

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I have carefully studied your letter of May 15, 1981 and must regretfully state that the interpretation given there to what is going in and around Lebanon is one-sided and non-reflective of the real state of affairs. As a result Israel—the true source of the dangerous exacerbation of the situation—is being whitewashed whereas totally unsubstantiated charges and demands are being addressed to Syria.

However, you have no smaller knowledge than ourselves of the actual sequence of the events. You, of course, know, for instance, that the Syrian anti-aircraft missile weapons did not emerge in Lebanon until Israeli fighters had shot down two unarmed Syrian transport helicopters used to carry supplies to the Syrian contingent lawfully deployed in Lebanon as part of the Arab peace keeping force in that country. On the part of Israel this was an act of aggression.

So, why is the question raised of having Syria withdraw from Lebanon those weapons as a “sine qua non for any settlement” when, at the same time, there is complete silence on the question of having Israel cease the aggressive actions which made it necessary for Syria to take counter-measures in self-defence?

If not for elementary fairness, is this a realistic way to pose the question and how, then, can one be surprised at Syria rejecting such an approach? After all, what right has Israel to carry out air strikes or other military actions in Lebanon? To follow this kind of logic, it turns out that Israel may continue its brigandage in Lebanon and interfere in the internal affairs of that country while defensive steps against those Israeli actions are barred.

If what you call the US efforts to “restrain” Israel in fact amounts to such an approach to this matter, then there is no wonder that Israel goes on with putting forward its demands.

3 Secret; Sensitive. Printed from the unofficial translation Dobrynin handed to Haig.
This is the reason why the responsibility for further serious exacer-
bation of the situation around Lebanon and in the entire Middle East
as well as, possibly, beyond that area, and the danger thereof is men-
tioned in your letter, will rest not only on Israel but also on those who
could exert influence on Israel and do not wish to do so.

We, of course, take note of the fact that in case of an armed conflict
the USA does not intend to be involved in it militarily. We are deeply
convinced, however, that the task is to actually prevent the current
situation from growing into an armed conflict.

A new military confrontation in that area would serve nobody’s
interests and it can and must be prevented. It is in this direction that
the Soviet Union is applying its efforts, including in the most recent
days. We would like to count on the US side also acting with broader
interests of peace in mind and on its exerting really restraining influence
on the Israeli leaders. No reasonable man will believe that the United
States of America and the Soviet Union, being the kind of powers they
are, cannot reach an elementary mutual understanding in order to
prevent the outbreak of military conflict in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

A. Gromyko

Tab B

Letter From Secretary of State Haig to Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko

Washington, May 15, 1981

Dear Mr. Minister:

As you know, for the past week Mr. Philip Habib has at the request
of President Reagan, been conducting urgent consultations in Lebanon,
Syria, and Israel with the aim of promoting a peaceful solution to the
current dangerous situation in Lebanon. We have recently received a
report from Mr. Habib concerning his latest conversation with President
Assad. That report indicates that the Syrians are not prepared to accept
any compromise on removal of Syrian Surface to Air Missiles in the
Bikka Valley, a sine qua non for any settlement. They were also less
than forthcoming with respect to reasonable proposals approved by
the Government of Lebanon to replace the Syrian forces on the Sannine

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4 Printed from a copy bearing this typed signature.
5 No classification marking.
Ridge and in Zahle. In sum, the Syrians are unwilling to return to the status quo ante in Lebanon. These developments, in the view of the United States Government, indicate that events in and around Lebanon have reached an extremely dangerous impasse.

Mr. Habib was instructed to inform Prime Minister Begin of the outcome of his latest discussion with President Assad. We have also told him to proceed from Jerusalem to Saudi Arabia for further consultations, and to go, thereafter, to Damascus for a further conversation with President Assad. If the Syrian President indicates at that time that there has been no change in his position, it will be difficult for us to avoid concluding that we have done all we can to assist the parties to find a compromise solution.

It should be clear to all that the United States has effectively restrained Israel from a resort to military action throughout the past difficult weeks. Further, the Israelis have shown considerable flexibility in the search for an acceptable compromise. Unfortunately, Syria has demonstrated neither restraint nor flexibility. Thus, should Mr. Habib’s mission end without positive results, despite our best efforts, our ability effectively to influence the Israelis further will be greatly diminished.

As we have for some weeks been indicating to your government, we consider the situation in and around Lebanon extremely dangerous—one which certainly contains the seeds of war in the Middle East, and possibly beyond. It is to avert that danger that we have taken every possible step to urge restraint on Israel, while seeking to assist the other parties to the dispute toward a mutually acceptable solution. Unfortunately, we have seen no evidence that others who might be in a position to influence events have worked with equal diligence to do so.

The situation is now at a critical stage. Should the current crisis escalate into armed conflict, it will be our intention to remain militarily uninvolved; we will insist upon the same restraint from others.

Mr. Foreign Minister, it now remains for those nations which have influence in Damascus, such as the Soviet Union, to make one last effort to avert what could become a human tragedy for Lebanese, Syrians, and Israelis alike.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Haig

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*Printed from a copy bearing this typed signature.*
55. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Haig

Washington, May 19, 1981

SUBJECT

Soviet “Special Channel” Proposal

Here are our thoughts on Soviet motivation for the “Special Channel” proposal made to our Charge in Moscow, and recommendations on how to proceed.

A. Soviet Motives

1. The major operational Soviet motivation is probably to get SALT talks going (no other specific issue mentioned). This is obviously for broad political and security reasons—not out of love for arms control. They may still hope to bring back one-sided detente and to derail our defense programs.

2. Thus they may be using this tactical device to bait/manipulate us into what their public pressuring has failed to accomplish for two years.

3. They may also be concerned that our initial SALT position will be “extreme” a la 1977, that they don’t want Rowny as the only SALT interlocutor and that therefore they need an informal channel to get to us before we are locked in and to influence us over time.

4. On Dobrynin, they may feel that he is not getting through to this Administration and perhaps that they don’t understand what it is we expect of them. It’s possible that his messages do go to the entire Politburo (Suslov) and importantly to the Defense Minister and Ministry. An American interlocutor in Moscow would avoid Soviet reporting cables for all to read. He may be leaving, and they are positioning Arbatov or someone else to take over.


2 See Document 51.

3 Haig placed a checkmark beside “get SALT talks going.”

4 Haig placed a checkmark beside this sentence.

5 Haig underlined “interlocutor and that therefore they need an informal channel to get to us before we are locked in and to influence us over time” and placed a checkmark beside the paragraph.

6 Haig underlined “positioning Arbatov or someone else to take over,” and wrote a question mark to the right of it.
B. From U.S. View Point

1. It would be a serious mistake for us to allow SALT again to become the centerpiece of US-Soviet relations through this back door or otherwise. In any case, we won’t have anything concrete to say on SALT for months.7

2. We also want to keep our options open about channels. Even if Dobrynin is leaving, you may want to use his successor as the main channel. And we will want some role for our new Ambassador in Moscow—who might be too senior to play the “informal” role envisioned in the special channel.8

3. By the same token, we might be able to use a special channel for our own purposes in the months and years ahead. We could use it to reinforce what is said in official channels and to make clear we are serious. Such an informal channel has been useful in past crises—if one is in place we can avoid initial uncertainties. Therefore we may not want to foreclose it. And we don’t want to pass the wrong signal about our willingness to hold a dialogue to whatever senior Soviets approved this approach.

4. Finally, the Soviets could try another channel if the Department rejects this one. They could approach some private American with contacts in the White House and try to bypass us.9

C. Recommendations

I recommend that we authorize Matlock to encourage in low-key another “social” contact with his interlocutor. At such a meeting he would make the following points:10

—We don’t preclude using a special channel, as we have found it useful in the past. We want to be able to conduct serious and confidential discussions.11

—The US-Soviet dialogue should cover a number of major issues. SALT is important, but it is only one of the issues in our relationship.12

—What we really need to discuss is the central necessity of restraint in military programs and international conduct. We are deeply con-

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7 Haig wrote to the right of this paragraph: “Amen! Why should we?”
8 Haig wrote to the right of this paragraph: “agree!”
9 Haig wrote over this paragraph: “Right!!” An unknown hand wrote below it: “Remember the Meese connection with Lt. Col Ty Cobb who Woody advises has an invitation recently communicated to visit the USSR this summer.”
10 Haig underlined “social” contact with his interlocutor” and “such a meeting he would make the following points:” and placed a checkmark beside it.
11 Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this sentence.
12 Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this sentence.
concerned by the\textsuperscript{13} unrestrained buildup in Soviet military forces, and by the growing tendency to use force directly and through proxies.

—We are prepared to have a dialogue now on a host of specific issues. For example we would like to know whether the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in finding a way to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan\textsuperscript{14} in return for guarantees that Afghanistan would not become a threat to Soviet security. If so, we would welcome suggestions about how this might be arranged.\textsuperscript{15}

—We are preparing for talks on SALT issues. But Soviet international conduct will have a major impact\textsuperscript{16} on our ability to achieve progress in SALT. In this regard, the most pressing matter is the Lebanon situation. We also would like to discuss Soviet-supported activities by Cuba, Libya and Vietnam. In our view these issues are at the heart of the US-Soviet relationship.

—We have been making these points to Ambassador Dobrynin, and will continue to do so. We look forward to The Secretary’s meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko this fall.

—We want to maintain the dialogue, through whatever channel. But we are most interested in concrete actions which demonstrate Soviet awareness of the necessity for greater restraint than has been shown in recent years.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{13} Haig placed a checkmark beside “concerned by the.”

\textsuperscript{14} Haig placed a checkmark beside “Afghanistan.”

\textsuperscript{15} Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this sentence.

\textsuperscript{16} Haig placed a checkmark beside “impact.”

\textsuperscript{17} Haig initialed his approval. In an August 11, 1983, memorandum to Shultz on the topic of separate channels in U.S.-Soviet relations from 1969 to that point, Burt wrote that Matlock “was given instructions, but the Soviet did not follow up.” (Reagan Library, Personal Papers, Shultz Papers, Box 1a (2 of 2), Folder 1a, 1983 Soviet Union August)
56. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting


SUBJECT

PARTICIPANTS
President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush
ACDA
Director-Designee Eugene Rostow
White House
State
Secretary Alexander Haig
Edwin Meese III
Deputy Secretary William F. Clark
James Baker
Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger
Michael Deaver
Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci
Richard V. Allen
Office of the Vice President
ADM Daniel J. Murphy
CIA
Director William Casey
Frank Hodsoll
OMB
Associate Director William Schneider
USUN
Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick
NSC
JCS
General David Jones
Mr. Donald Greg
Lt General John Pustay
Mr. Geoffrey Kemp
Michael Deaver
Mr. Sven Kraemer

MINUTES OF MEETING

Mr. Allen: We have a fairly tight agenda today. The issues for discussion are: (1) next week’s meeting of the US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC); (2) US policy towards Sudan; (3) US policy towards Libya; and (4) a new Central American policy framework.


Mr. Allen: The SCC is a body created by the signatories to the SALT I agreement to oversee compliance issues. At issue today, is what approach the US will take at the May 27 meeting of the SCC, the first during this Administration. Guidelines for such an approach and for instructions to the US Delegation have been worked out in a series of Interagency Group meetings and at the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) level. An outline of the State Department’s discussion
paper on this approach is attached at Tab A. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and others will speak on the proposed approach.

Secretary Haig: The discussion paper reflects sound interagency consensus. Let us review its basic points. The SCC is essentially a technical body reviewing SALT compliance issues. At this forum, we will express some general concerns about non-SALT arms control compliance issues, but we see more detailed expressions of such non-SALT concerns as one to be delivered through our Embassy in Moscow by our Chargé, Jack Matlock. On the ABM Treaty, we will provide the routine notifications, state our adherence, and raise compliance concerns involving concurrent Soviet testing of SAMs and radars. On the Interim Agreement (IA) and SALT II, we will be noncommittal about our observance, using only the general formula that while our policy review is underway, we will take no actions to undercut existing agreements as long as the Soviet Union exercises the same restraints. At the SCC, we will not raise compliance issues in terms of specific provisions of the Interim and SALT II agreements but, in the general context of compliance concerns, would raise the three issues of: (1) telemetry encryption; (2) reconstitution/reload capability; and (3) ICBM launcher dismantling. Internally, we would agree not to seek ratification of SALT II, and would agree that we are prepared to take actions inconsistent with SALT II and the Interim Agreement, if required by national security considerations.

Our next steps in developing our SALT policy should be to ask the SALT IG, which has done an outstanding job so far, to undertake three further analyses. First, the IG should consider steps by which we would implement our internal policy concerning SALT II and the Interim Agreement, including the modalities of withdrawing the SALT II Treaty from the Senate, how we should officially inform the Soviets, what to say to our Congress and public, and what, if any, planned or proposed US defense programs might be inconsistent with the Interim Agreement or SALT II. Second, the IG should undertake a formal interagency review of the ABM Treaty and of US ABM options in the arms control context. Third, the IG should initiate a study of long-term US SALT approaches designed to support our strategic force modernization programs and including our policy towards the Soviets and towards our Allies.

Mr. Meese: Who is heading our Delegation to the SCC?

2 Not found attached. The undated Department of State paper on the SCC is in the Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Secretary Haig’s Meetings with the NSC, Lot 84D068, NSC Meetings—May–June 1981.
Mr. Allen: [Brigadier] General John Lasater. Secretary Weinberger, do you wish to say something?

Secretary Weinberger: This will be our first time in the same room with the Soviets discussing SALT. We see this SCC as a technical-level discussion, but the Soviets will surely want to use it for much wider purposes, including probes of our positions on the Interim Agreement and SALT II. We should emphasize that this is a lower-level technical forum, and we should stay away from larger arms control issues. On the internal policy review issue, I do not think we should say that we will take actions inconsistent with SALT II. After all, SALT II is not in effect. President Carter urged that the Senate not vote on it, and it is in no sense pending. Earlier, the Armed Services Committee rejected it by vote of 10–0, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favored it by only one vote. SALT II is not alive. Our defense budget does not involve any violation of the SALT II agreement, but that was by chance, and we should retain flexibility.

Mr. Rostow: In preparing the back-up policy papers for today, over 30 suspected Soviet arms control violations were carefully examined. The proposed instructions to our SCC Commissioner would raise five SALT compliance issues as follows: (1) SAM and ABM concurrent testing; (2) large phased-array radars; (3) telemetry encryption; (4) reconstitution/reload capability; and (5) ICBM launcher dismantling. In instructions to our Embassy in Moscow, we would have them raise four non-SALT compliance issues as matters of US concern, to include: (1) chemical warfare in Afghanistan and elsewhere; (2) biological incidents at Sverdlovsk; (3) the floating of radioactive materials; and (4) nuclear testing.

Looking ahead, I would like our arms control policy to accentuate the positive. We should not be talking just about withdrawal but what to do next. In my calls on Senator Percy and other Senators, we agreed that the best way to handle the SALT II Treaty issue would be via a Senate resolution, unanimous if possible, sending it back to the White House, while at about the same time, the Administration would announce its policy of where we want to go in arms control and what we wish to achieve.

General Jones: We have found past SCC meetings with the Soviets very useful. It is a rare forum for military-to-military contact. On the SCC approach proposed before us today, we have no fundamental differences. However, we see a problem in the proposed distinction between our internal and external policy on our observance of SALT II and the Interim Agreement. Publicly, it is proposed that we would

3 Brackets are in the original.
say we will take no actions inconsistent with SALT II, while internally we would agree to take actions inconsistent with SALT II and the Interim Agreement, if required by national security considerations. We should recognize that the Soviets can do many things in the near term if they cease to observe current SALT restrictions, such as increasing their SS–18 Reentry Vehicles (RVs) from 10 to 20 or 30. In the short run, we cannot match them. We would, therefore, prefer to see us stay with the language that we will not take actions that would undercut existing agreements as long as the Soviet Union exercises the same restraints. A further consideration is that we probably cannot keep the knowledge of any sensitive internal US Government decision within the confines of this room.

Mr. Meese: We can keep it in this room. Our internal decision would not be communicated to the Commissioner.

General Jones: We have not been too successful so far.

Secretary Haig: General Jones has a point—that this formulation may be too negative. I am quite comfortable with the language here in our discussion paper, but I would like to have the old language in any public areas.

Secretary Weinberger: Several practical issues are involved here. For example, if our 4,600 M–X holes have to be opened up under SALT II verification, this adds three to four billion dollars in cost. As for jeopardizing current SALT II restrictions on the Soviets, there are things the Soviets could choose to do, of course, but I suspect they are doing these things anyway, and I am against restraining our own programs. That’s why I opposed SALT II. Also, our Trident program is affected, and a whole host of other programs.

Mr. Meese: Our public posture should be that of taking no actions that would undercut existing agreements as long as the Soviets exercise the same restraints. On the other hand, none of our programs should be inhibited by SALT II.

Secretary Haig: That’s right. And we should be saying that we are reviewing the whole SALT process.

The President: What can the Soviets really do that prevents us from telling them now that we cannot go along with SALT II?

Mr. Allen: It would indicate to the rest of the world that we are against the SALT process. We’ve all been imprisoned by the SALT language. We need some new categories, e.g., Strategic Arms Reductions Talks. They would be known as START.

Secretary Weinberger: We should also be looking at ABM defense as arms control. Let’s keep our options open on ABM. On the distinction between real arms reductions, as distinguished from arms limitations, the public does not realize the important differences. For example,
SALT, the Soviets could deploy an unlimited number of missiles and their intercontinental Backfire bombers.

_The President:_ Why should we preserve the illusion of SALT, if we are going to slide around and do what we accuse the Soviets of doing, i.e., violating it?

_Mr. Meese:_ The SCC Commissioner will focus on technical matters and will not be addressing these larger issues.

_General Jones:_ With SALT restrictions lifted, the Soviets could rapidly deploy more missiles, warheads, and Backfire bombers, and there is little, if anything, we can do to prevent or to match it. There is no SALT impact on our M–X now because we will not begin deployment until 1986. You can forget about the M–X verification port holes until 1984. On Trident, we can make a decision a year from now. Let’s stick with the public statement.

_Secretary Haig:_ We have to avoid creating a negative stalemate in the public’s mind. We need to express our objectives and clarify our approach on issues like the ABM.

_The President:_ But the Soviets are not being restrained by SALT II, are they?

_General Jones:_ So far, they have taken no actions inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty, except, perhaps, in the area of verification. On the SS–18, they could go rapidly from 10 to 20 RVs.

_Secretary Weinberger:_ However, there are some real concerns about Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement.

_General Jones:_ Yes, there are.

_Mr. Casey:_ On a number of these compliance issues we get our information through telemetry. In raising such issues, we must be careful not to jeopardize our sources and methods.

_Mr. Rostow:_ That dimension is fully taken care of in these papers.

_Mr. Schneider:_ As a footnote to what Secretary Weinberger said about SALT restrictions on US programs, I recall that the SIG also referred to the Protocol restrictions on our sea-based cruise missile and other programs.

_General Jones:_ The Protocol expires on December 31, 1981. Then it has no programmatic impact.

_Mr. Allen:_ The issue before us today is approval of this guidance for the SCC meeting. We will be continuing our review of the larger issues and will be bringing up these issues here at another time. Do you approve?

_The President:_ Okay.

**Issue 2: US Policy Toward Sudan**

At the request of Mr. Casey, the second item on the agenda—Sudan—was referred to the NSPG for consideration.
Issue 4: US Policy Toward the Caribbean Basin

Mr. Allen: The agenda will be US policy toward the Caribbean Basin. Secretary Haig will outline the policy guidelines that have been developed in the interagency paper on this area.

Secretary Haig: Before reviewing the major conclusions of the Caribbean study, it should first be noted that one of the most critical questions in the Caribbean area has to do with Cuban troublemaking, and that we need to develop a strategy to deal with Cuba. This will be done separately and will be presented to the NSC at a later date. However, we need to come up with a broader strategy to work on some of the underlying causes that have permitted Cuba to undermine US interests in the Caribbean Basin. The proposed Caribbean Basin plan will be very popular within the region and the country. It would certainly set the stamp for the Reagan Administration’s policy in the Caribbean, and would help to offset some of the criticisms that have been leveled against us over the El Salvador problem. It would also help us get away from the idea that we are solely interested in military options.

The State-drafted paper addresses the problem of preventing future Cuban successes in the region by dealing with the underlying conditions that make Cuban-style subversion possible. The paper outlines a Caribbean Basin proposal that focuses on improving economic conditions in the region. It also indicates further measures to improve internal security by providing effective security assistance to friendly governments. It addresses the question of how best to keep Nicaragua from becoming entirely a creature of the Soviet Union and Cuba. In addition, these steps will be implemented by measures to alter Cuban and Soviet policy in the area. Finally, the proposal includes initiatives to generate support for our policies in the US, our Allies, and world opinion generally.

The President: More time is required to read and digest the essence of the proposal.

Mr. Meese: This item should go on the agenda of the next NSC meeting.

This being agreed upon, Secretary Weinberger, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and OMB Deputy Director Schneider all indicated that they would like to submit written critiques and comments on the Caribbean Basin proposal. These will be prepared within the next few days and coordinated by the NSC before being forwarded to the President.

Issue 3: US Policy Toward Libya

This agenda item was not discussed.

The meeting concluded at 10:00 a.m.
Washington, May 23, 1981

PARTICIPANTS

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Senator Charles Percy, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SUBJECT

Senator Percy’s Luncheon with Ambassador Dobrynin on Saturday, May 23

Senator Percy called to fill me in on his luncheon at the Soviet Embassy with Ambassador Dobrynin May 23. I had previously given Percy some suggested themes and questions for the occasion, which he said he had used, adding a few points of his own. Percy and Dobrynin were accompanied by their wives.

Percy said he had begun the substantive conversation by expressing concern about Soviet rhetoric, particularly the personal charges made by the Soviets against the President and the Secretary. Percy expressed his hope that these Soviet charges could be stopped, adding that they could lead to no good. Dobrynin became emotional on this issue, remarking that the Reagan Administration itself had taken the initiative in launching personal attacks against the Soviet leaders; he particularly objected to charges that the Soviets supported international terrorism. Both Percy and Dobrynin agreed that it would be better to tone down the rhetoric on both sides, and both would do all they could to reduce verbal attacks.

Dobrynin remarked that most press accounts of the Brezhnev speech were inaccurate. No conference specifically about Lebanon was mentioned by Brezhnev. The Soviets would like to participate in a conference on a number of issues, including the Middle East. Dobrynin added that U.S. policy towards the present Middle East situation is too heavily influenced by Israel, which makes things extraordinarily difficult. He said Begin’s bid for re-election has caused him to take rash actions.

Percy complained about Soviet media criticism of the Habib mission and asked why the Soviets had not been more helpful. Dobrynin

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seemed unsure of himself on this and had no good answer to this question. Percy felt that in reality Dobrynin understood the importance of Habib’s mission and wished him well.

With regard to an international conference, Percy asked why the Soviets did not concentrate more on Afghanistan. Afghanistan, Percy said, had so poisoned the atmosphere and harmed Moscow. Dobrynin answered by saying that the huge military build-up in the Persian Gulf area has hindered concentration on Afghanistan. He then said that after all, the Soviets had not yet built a long reaching airbase in Afghanistan that could reach throughout the Middle East. (Percy commented to me that he had seen the airbase built in Afghanistan at Kandahar with AID money years ago. There is no question, he said, but that it is susceptible to expansion.) Dobrynin said any international conference could begin with Afghanistan and the Gulf area. He repeated standard Soviet references to the need for stopping interference against Afghanistan from Pakistan.

Dobrynin said the West’s advantage over the Soviets in TNF was already 1½ to 1. Percy responded by saying that the proximity of the Soviet Union to Europe must be taken into account when speaking of any numbers. The U.S. and its allies must have a deterrent force in being, since reinforcements would be slow in coming compared with what the Soviets could bring in. Dobrynin remarked that TNF talks were desirable. He only wished more could be done between now and September and couldn’t see why we had to wait so long. The U.S., Dobrynin said, constantly hides behind the excuse that its position is still under review, but the problem has been there for years and the U.S. should be prepared to move now.

When Percy brought up the subject of a Brezhnev succession, Dobrynin became very guarded. Dobrynin did say that a successor might well not be as interested in arms limitation talks as Brezhnev. This is why Brezhnev constantly alludes to resumption of talks. He is personally devoted to and dedicated to arms limitation.

Dobrynin added that part of the problem of resumption of talks is that every time a problem comes up—like the Middle East situation—it is converted by the U.S. into a Soviet problem. This has hindered our sitting down to discuss matters seriously.

Dobrynin displayed uncertainty and frustration about the direction of the Reagan Administration. He was quite skeptical, adding that things will get worse before they get any better.

When asked by Percy whether the Brezhnev speech in Tbilisi included any new positions, Dobrynin said it was a further development of the 26th Party Congress. The most important point to remember is that it is crucial to take up matters relating to arms control now—time is of the essence.
Percy inquired about the proposal for a step-by-step withdrawal in Afghanistan, but Dobrynin had no specifics to add.

Percy stated that our desire for build-up in the Persian Gulf area would not be as great if there had been no Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and stepped-up Soviet loans and military aid to India. This has frightened the Pakistanis. We are doing all we can to restrain the Pakistanis from going ahead with their plans for nuclear development, but the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the refugee problem makes Pakistan nervous about its own security. Percy urged that the Soviets try to restrain the Indians from further nuclear testing. Another Indian nuclear explosion would be disastrous, leading the Pakistanis to take matters into their own hands. This problem between India and Pakistan is one of the things we should be talking about, he said.

While discussing the reciprocal extension of CBMs, Dobrynin said the Soviets made the proposal and are now waiting for the U.S. to come back with counter proposals. Percy got the impression that the Soviets are waiting for the actual CDE conference and don’t expect the U.S. to say much until then.

Dobrynin was very interested in the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR. When Percy asked what names Dobrynin had heard, Dobrynin mentioned Scowcroft, Kendall and Hartman. Dobrynin added that if the U.S. were looking for a professional, Hartman would be an “extremely good man.”

Dobrynin questioned Percy about General Rowny’s role in ACDA. Will he be part of ACDA or act independently? Percy said his own feeling was that Rowny would be part of a team and that this seemed to be working out. Percy further added that during the course of the confirmation hearings he would urge that the U.S. move soon to serious arms limitation discussions.

Dobrynin doubted the commitment of the Reagan Administration to arms control agreements, noting in particular the failure to push for ratification of the threshold treaties and the PNE treaty.

Reverting to U.S. plans for TNF modernization, Dobrynin reminded Percy that Europe was only four minutes from the Soviet Union. If the Soviets see a missile coming, Dobrynin remarked, they have only four minutes to decide what to do. He could not emphasize more strongly how the Soviet people felt about this. Irina Dobrynin joined in at this point, asking Percy whether he had any idea of the average Soviet perception of the American role. The Soviet people feel that the U.S. is bearing in on them and feel encircled by enemies. They also are concerned by the level of criticism of the Soviet Union in the U.S.

Dobrynin was vague about his long-range plans but said he planned to spend the summer in Moscow. His wife is leaving for
Moscow next week. Dobrynin invited Percy to join him at the Soviet eastern shore estate for further discussions after Dobrynin’s return this fall, which led Percy to the conclusion that Dobrynin plans to be around for a while longer.

58. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Brezhnev Reply to Your Handwritten Letter of April 24

This afternoon Ambassador Dobrynin gave me the attached Brezhnev reply to your April 24 handwritten letter. Brezhnev tries—and to some degree succeeds—to match the constructive tone of your own letter. The first three pages are devoted to a review of history from 1945 to the advent of the Carter Administration. It is not a history that any of us would recognize, but it attempts to show that in fact the deterioration of relations between the USSR and the U.S. was a consequence of American actions ranging from the imposition of a pax Americana, through the creation of NATO (“a closed military bloc”), to granting of economic assistance only to those who would knuckle under to our diktat.

Nor does President Carter escape, since he is blamed for the “lion’s share” of the responsibility for the deterioration in U.S.-Soviet relations after the era of detente. You, too, are held responsible for the poor state of relations, since you have decided to continue the Carter path.

Despite the above, however, the major impression I get from the letter is a sense of substantial Soviet nervousness and concern. Brezhnev asks almost plaintively why we continue to supply arms to Afghanistan insurgents and then reassures you that the Soviets do not seek confrontation and do not wish to “infringe on American legitimate interests.” The Soviet concern is for “honest and constructive negotiations” with

1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Lawrence Eagleburger Files, Lot 84D204, USSR 1981. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
2 See Document 46.
the West that will remove outstanding issues. He ends with an almost open appeal for a face-to-face meeting with you.

In sum, while the letter offers nothing new or startling, it is markedly different in tone from earlier Brezhnev communications and, to me at least, demonstrates a substantial lack of Soviet confidence.

In my conversation with Dobrynin following his delivery of the letter, I was again struck by the evident nervousness, confusion, and lack of confidence Dobrynin himself displayed. He began by emphasizing that the Soviets have deliberately not responded to serious U.S. “provocations.” Specifically, despite attacks by the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, Moscow has refrained from replying in kind and has acted with “restraint.” Dobrynin showed particular sensitivity with regard to our charges that the Soviets are aiding and abetting terrorism, and added that the Soviet Union has done “nothing since January 20” to aggravate our bilateral relationship or threaten U.S. interests.

Returning to an old theme, Dobrynin asked plaintively why we cannot talk about the Middle East; we might even be happy to learn about Soviet views on issues such as the PLO. He said that our talks could be bilateral if we wish, rather than multilateral, but that it was important that the two countries get into discussions on the whole range of Middle East issues. He added that he is “sure” the Syrians would do nothing in Lebanon and hoped that the Israelis would act with equal restraint. “No one,” he said, “wants a conflict there.”

I replied that it was important to understand that there are limits to Israeli patience, particularly when they watch the build-up of Syrian forces in Syria itself.

On TNF, Dobrynin asked why we were waiting so long to begin discussions with the Soviets, and suggested that we ought to begin soon (“Why not next week?”).

Moving on to the more general question of negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR, Dobrynin said that Moscow was prepared to negotiate on specific issues such as Cuba, Africa, Afghanistan, arms control, and trade whenever the U.S. wishes, but that Moscow could not accept the concept of linkage. It is unacceptable to the USSR to be told that the U.S. is unwilling to begin discussions with the Soviets in one area until they correct their conduct in some other, unrelated, area. I replied that linkage was a fact of life, and that we could not sit by while the Soviets and Cubans continued to pump arms into Nicaragua as if these Russian activities were of no importance to us. The Soviets must expect that such activities would inevitably affect our attitude toward negotiations.
Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan

Moscow, May 25, 1981

Dear Mr. President,

I gave a careful thought to your personal letter to me and want to respond to it in the same personal and frank manner.

Just as you do, I recall our brief conversation at the reception given by President R. Nixon at “Casa Pacifica” in June 1973. Today, as we did at that time, all Soviet leadership and I commit our hearts and minds to realization of hopes and aspirations of all the peoples of the world for peace, quiet life and confidence in their future.

At the recent congress of our Party it was with all due emphasis stressed once again that not war preparations that doom the peoples to a senseless squandering of their material and spiritual wealth, but preservation and consolidation of peace, and, thereby, implementation of the foremost right of every man—a right to live that is the clue to the future.

I noted that, recalling the year of 1973 you indicated that peace and good will among men never had seemed closer at hand.

And, indeed, precisely in those years our two countries took the path of reaching agreements which marked a radical turn for the better not only in Soviet-American relations but in the international situation as a whole. Those were the years when the USSR and the USA actively and not without success set about to solve the task of limiting arms, first of all strategic arms, when they started seeking in common solutions to acute international problems, when mutually beneficial bilateral ties and cooperation between our countries in a variety of fields were developing fruitfully.

Why then did hitches begin to appear in that process, why did it pause and even find itself set back? To answer this question correctly one thing is necessary—to take an objective, non-biased look at the course of events.

And then, Mr. President, we shall recall, that even at that time when Soviet-American relations were developing upward voices resounded in the United States of those who did not like such a development and who stubbornly tried to slow down and disrupt this process. And further on, their efforts became ever more active. Those were the

3 Secret. The letter is the unofficial translation that Dobrynin gave Haig.
efforts that were pulling back to confrontation, efforts embodied in quite a number of concrete steps directly aimed against the improvement of relations between the USSR and the USA, against the relaxation of international tension. On the contrary, nothing of the sort was taking place in the Soviet Union.

We have differences of opinion between us of philosophical and ideological nature, and it could not be otherwise. But when it comes to the events of international life—whether pertaining to the present day, to the recent or more distant past—then an objective approach is not only possible, but necessary. Otherwise it is easy to misstep and to plunge into serious errors.

Here, for example, it is said in your letter that after the Second World War the USA had a capability to dominate the world, but, deliberately, as it were, made no use of that capability. Let me say it straight away, it is hard to find many people among those who are familiar with that time through their own experience or who have seriously studied it, that would share such an affirmation.

Actually, the USA did the maximum it could using a wide array of military, political, and economic means to achieve what American leaders themselves called “Pax Americana”, in other words, to restructure the world the way the United States wanted it to be. But this proved to be beyond its possibilities—and this is the way it was. Even the possession during a certain period of time of what you call “the ultimate weapon” didn’t make the USA omnipotent.

To follow your logic, we, in our turn, could have said that after the defeat of the Hitler Germany and, incidentally, even before the American atomic bomb emerged, the Soviet Union was in a position to do much of what it didn’t do being guided by its principled convictions, true to its word and respecting its allied commitments. However I wouldn’t like to go deeper into this subject now and to discuss events that didn’t take place.

You are saying that the policy of the USA has never constituted a threat to anyone else’s security. Let us go back to the facts again. Hardly three years passed after the end of the war when the USA set about to create the NATO—a closed military block. One would wonder what the need for it was. After all, facist Germany had been routed and militarist Japan—destroyed. The keys to peace were in the hands of the allied powers of the Anti-Hitler coalition. Who was the target of the military block of NATO and the numerous overseas American bases? No secret was ever made in the USA who all that was directed against.

You made mention of the post-war American economic assistance programs. The USA did really give assistance. But who was the recipient? It was only those countries which chose to submit their policy to
foreign interests. On the contrary, the states belonging to a different social system, and, indeed, generally the peoples which did not agree to submit their policy to outside diktat did not receive the American assistance. That is how the matters stood. In essence that is precisely how they stand at the present time.

If we are to take the most recent years, when after a period of ascent the relations between our countries began to deteriorate and deteriorate sharply, it is known that the lion’s share was contributed to that by the Carter administration. That was done consciously and purposefully, but in the final analysis, let us be frank, it brought no laurels to Carter. Isn’t it so, Mr. President?

However, for some reason or other, the new US administration too has decided to continue on the same path. Try, Mr. President, to see what is going on through our eyes. Attempts are being made to revitalize the USA-made military and political alliances, new bases are being added to those which already exist thousands of kilometers away from the USA and aimed against our country, the American military presence abroad in general is being increased and expanded, large areas of the world are being declared spheres of “vital interests” of the USA. Nobody even asks if the peoples inhabiting those areas wish to be under the patronage of other countries. Attempts are made to tell some other peoples what to do with their natural resources, threatening them otherwise with all kinds of punitive actions.

For all their differences, however, the peoples have the same right to be masters of their own destiny. There should be no double standards in this respect. One must not believe that if something is good for the USA then it has also to be good for others. After all, is it good, for instance, for the average American family, not to mention the family of a peaceful Afghan peasant, when the intention is openly announced in Washington to go on with supplying arms to the bands carrying out incursions into the Afghanistan territory from the outside?

It is not for the sake of polemics that I am sharing my thoughts with you, Mr. President. I would like them, on the one hand, to give you a better understanding of what actually constitutes the policy of the Soviet Union, and, on the other hand, to help clarify how we and indeed, others as well, perceive certain actions of the USA, especially those of recent time.

The main idea, though, that I would like to convey through my letter is that we do not seek confrontation with the USA or infringe upon American legitimate interests. What we seek is different—we wish peace, cooperation, a sense of mutual trust, and benevolence between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Guided by this sincere desire we propose now to the USA and other Western countries honest and constructive negotiations, as well as a search for
mutually acceptable solutions of practically all major questions existing
between us—be it restraining of the arms race, elimination of most
dangerous sources of tension in various areas of the world, or measures
for confidence building and developing a mutually beneficial coopera-
tion. These proposals of ours contain no ruse or any ulterior motives.
And I would like you to accept them precisely in this way and with
no bias.

Thus our policy is a policy of peace. We will never set up the fire
of war. You know very well, as we do, what such a fire would lead
to. I would want to believe in the wisdom of your people, in your
personal wisdom also not to allow anything that would push the world
towards a catastrophe.

These are some of the general considerations which I wanted to
convey to you, Mr. President, in connection with your letter. Maybe
it was not possible to express everything in sufficient detail. An
exchange of correspondence has its limitations, and in this sense a
private conversation is better. In this regard, concerning the possible
meeting between us, I would like to say that it is also my view that
such a meeting should be well prepared. We could yet return to the
question of its timing, I believe, at a moment acceptable to both of us.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

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\(^4\) Printed from a copy bearing this typed signature.
SUBJECT

Brezhnev Reply to Your Formal Letter of April 24

Ambassador Dobrynin came back to see me this afternoon to give me the attached reply from Brezhnev to your formal letter of April 24. Brezhnev makes the following points:

—There is no Soviet military threat, nor does the USSR seek military superiority or unilateral advantage; impetus for the arms race comes from the US side;

—CDE is treated in standard form, although the compromise Brezhnev suggested in his Tbilisi speech (that the West can defer its response on the Soviet “to the Urals” concession until the CDE itself) curiously is not mentioned;

—TNF is also treated in predictable terms, and the Brezhnev moratorium proposal is again plugged;

—Poland and Afghanistan are briefly mentioned but nothing significant is said about either situation.

On balance there is nothing new in the substance of the letter, which is noteworthy only for its relatively non-polemical tone. Brezhnev could have opted to come back hard. He clearly chose not to.

While Brezhnev’s letter essentially repeats standard positions, I see merit in an eventual reply which maintains the constructive tone of the exchange but firmly rebuts the major distortions in Brezhnev’s letter and reasserts our substantive concerns. If, as seems likely, we get back more standard language we will have good ammunition to shoot at the Soviet charge about our alleged unwillingness to engage in meaningful dialogue. And, in the meantime, we can of course tell our allies that we are doing our best to continue the dialogue.

After receiving Brezhnev’s letter from Dobrynin, I introduced the subject of the Middle East and told him that Habib is back in town to consult with you. I noted that the Arab Group will meet on Sunday.

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2 See Document 47.
and expressed my concern about the current situation, saying that I believe we may be running out of time.

I also told Dobrynin that I was concerned about the infusion of Libyan arms into Palestinian areas. I said that such actions can only cause the Israelis to react as they did today with a resulting increase in danger to stability in the region.

I told Dobrynin that we had received stronger reports from other sources suggesting the presence of a Soviet adviser in Lebanon. When Dobrynin challenged this again, I said we had evidence that the advisers had been sheep-dipped to give them cover.

On Nicaragua, I told Dobrynin that we continue to see shipments of arms into Nicaragua manufactured in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

On TNF Dobrynin stated that the Soviets were very anxious to get on with the talks. I told him that the talks we will conduct between now and when Gromyko and I meet in September will be restricted to the modalities. I explained that the US had to engage in extensive consultations with its allies and prepare threat and requirements assessments so that when we begin negotiations we will know which systems will be involved. The TNF talks are not like the SALT talks where the US could act largely unilaterally. I argued that both we and the Soviets will be well served by these intensive preparations so that my discussions with Gromyko in September can be productive and businesslike.

Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan

Moscow, May 27, 1981

Dear Mr. President,

I carefully studied your letter of April 24. And I will tell you right away of my appreciation of the frank expression of your views and feelings as well as the principle directions of your Administration’s foreign policy. It is in the same spirit of frankness that I want to give you my reply believing that clarifying mutually the positions of each other has an important significance in developing a dialogue between us. This, as I understand, corresponds to your intentions too.

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3 No classification. The letter is the unofficial translation that Dobrynin gave Haig.
Your letter, regrettably, is based upon a general premise of the Soviet Union being responsible for the tensions existing in the world. Such a premise not only is at variance with the factual state of affairs, but leads away from the real causes behind the current situation, and, thus, can only make it more difficult to find ways to eliminate those causes in order to remove the tensions.

All assertions concerning a Soviet military threat or our alleged search for military superiority do not become any more convincing through having them repeated. Aims and intentions which are not ours must not be ascribed to us. After all, we set our goals ourselves. And we, for our part, say in no uncertain terms: the Soviet Union did not have and has no intentions to achieve military superiority. We have no need for it.

Our actions in the field of assuring our country’s defense capability—and we are doing nothing beyond that—have always been only a forced reaction in response to the military programs carried out in the West. Indeed, it is a generally recognized fact that every new spiral in the arms race has been initiated by the United States. And what is typical is that each time such thrusts were accompanied by vociferous outcries about the “Soviet military threat”, about the US “lagging behind” on a particular kind of weapon. True, it would be admitted later on in a whisper that no “lagging behind” had in fact taken place, that someone, as it were, had made a “wrong calculation”. But, by then, what was done was done, new weapon systems had been deployed and the quantity of arms amassed had been significantly increased. This is what the facts testify to, and, indeed, they are accessible to everyone.

We are witnessing today an active propagation of the thesis that the alleged “imbalance of forces” has occurred and that the USSR entertains some “sinister intentions”. Your predecessors, however, including the President whom you succeeded, recognized that there was a parity in the military area between the USSR and the USA, between the East and the West. Does it mean that all depends on who does the counting?

It is not in the Soviet Union at all that huge military budgets are being adopted and programs are being started on an unprecedented scale to produce new weapon systems, which does not only exceed the defense requirements but reasonable limits in general. Again, it is not in the USSR that demands are being made to rescind agreements reached earlier on arms limitation, that the intention is loudly proclaimed to surpass militarily all other states, that a definite status is being given to doctrines envisaging the possibility of delivering the first strike and waging “limited” wars with the use of nuclear weapons. And that is precisely the way it is.

Therefore, it is not our side that should be urged to exercise restraint. The Soviet Union is not for the competition in armaments,
nor is it for their endless build-up. We stand for the preservation of the existing parity in the military-strategic area, which is the most important guarantee of peace and stability of all peoples, as well as for a gradual reduction of the arms level on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security of either side.

Nor is there any ground, Mr. President, to charge us with having the intention to obtain some unilateral advantages anywhere in the world, to call into doubt our commitment to the principles embodied in the UN Charter, in the Helsinki Final Act or in the Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and the USA. This simply does not square with the facts.

The Soviet Union is resolutely against interference in the affairs of other peoples, against imposing someone else’s will on them. But we are also against anybody arrogating to himself such a right, and when attempts to this effect take place we are invariably on the side of the peoples who stand up for their own independence.

I will address myself briefly to certain specific questions raised in your letter.

You speak positively of our consent to have the zone of application of confidence-building measures in the military area substantially expanded, to include also all of the European part of the USSR. However, the Western participants of the Madrid meeting, including the USA, have up to now been evading the answer to the question what they, for their part, are ready to do in this connection on the basis of reciprocity.

It is to be hoped that the USA will take a more constructive position at the Madrid meeting both on the question of convening a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe and on the other questions being discussed there, and that it will, thereby, demonstrate its intention to reckon with the hopes of peoples for the continuation and development of the process of strengthening security and cooperation in Europe in accordance with the Final Act.

It is a matter of regret that the USA reacted negatively to our proposal to place a moratorium on deployments of new medium-range nuclear missile systems in Europe by the countries of the NATO and by the USSR. References made in this respect to the necessity of deploying new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe in order to off-set some sort of “superiority” of the Soviet Union simply are not borne out by the actual state of affairs. One might believe that there exist no numerous American forward-based nuclear systems in Europe and near it which are capable of reaching the territory of the USSR or that the nuclear weapons of the US NATO allies have suddenly disappeared. But all that is there, indeed, and we can in no way close our eyes to it.
The objective approach, the principle of equality and equal security require that in making an analysis of the situation one should not limit himself to any single type of weapon, but should see the nuclear potentials in a comprehensive way. A true reflection of the factual state of affairs can be found only in that approach. And this state of affairs is such that the Soviet nuclear weapons in Europe do not exceed the aggregate level of the nuclear systems of the NATO group and, therefore, there exists now in Europe an approximate parity in the respective types of weapons. The replacement by the Soviet Union of the old missiles by the modernized ones has not changed the situation. Accordingly, the moratorium that we propose would merely freeze the existing approximate parity, making it easier to reach agreement on the ways to reduce the level of that parity. We noted that on more than one occasion you expressed yourself in favor of such a reduction.

We cannot view the US desire to station in any case its new missiles in Western Europe as anything but the intention to disrupt the strategic parity and to achieve superiority. It goes without saying that we will have to react to it in a proper way. But wouldn’t it be worthwhile giving a thought whether such a turn of events will reinforce anybody’s security, including that of the USA? We are convinced it will not.

This is the reason why we call upon the US Administration and you personally to weigh up again, realistically and with all factors in mind, the developing situation and to take steps in order to open the way toward achieving through negotiations an effective limitation and reduction of nuclear arms in Europe. Given the will on both sides, it is possible, I believe, to reach this goal.

A few words on Poland. It appears that some sinister plans on the part of the USSR are perceived by Washington in everything, and sometimes there is even talk on the possibility of some “internal aggression” in Poland. A question is in order—what at all is meant by the “internal aggression”? Is it possible, for example, that the USA can commit an aggression against itself?

Earlier I already expressed to you our position as well as our assessment of the US behaviour with regard to Poland. It remains the same. The United States must in no way interfere in the Polish domestic affairs.

The United States stated on more than one occasion that it would not like to see the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. It is, in fact, this idea with regard to Afghanistan that is present in your letter too. But the Soviet troops are there not just because we want it to be so. We repeated many times that we would withdraw our limited military contingent, provided the aggression against Afghanistan was ceased and a political settlement of the international aspects of the Afghan problem was found. Should the United States be really willing to facilitate such a
development, it could certainly do much in this direction. Mentioning
the negative position of the Pakistan leadership doesn’t change a thing.
It is well known why Islamabad under various artificial pretexts is
now avoiding negotiations with Kabul.

Mr. President, in a detailed manner and in the spirit of frankness
I have laid down the thoughts which came to me in connection with
your letter. I believe this will be useful both for additional clarification
of the proposals that had been put forward in my letter of March 6
and for your better understanding of the Soviet position on certain
pressing international issues, as well as on questions concerning the
relations between our countries.

I hope that our exchange of views as well as the discussions at
other levels will help find mutually acceptable solutions which would
constitute our common contribution to the strengthening of peace. In
this regard I take note of the assurances contained in your letter that
the United States is vitally interested in the peaceful resolution of
international tensions and that your Administration is prepared to
settle disagreements by negotiations.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

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4 Printed from a copy bearing this typed signature.
Washington, May 28, 1981

SUBJECT
Leonid Brezhnev’s Letter of May 25, 1981

Secretary Haig has sent you a memorandum (TAB A) forwarding and commenting on Brezhnev’s reply (TAB B) to your personal, handwritten message (TAB C). Secretary Haig says that Brezhnev tries to match the constructive tone of your letter and has the impression that Brezhnev’s letter conveys a sense of substantial nervousness and concern. The Secretary’s memorandum also describes his conversation with Dobrynin, who delivered the Brezhnev reply, which touched upon U.S.-Soviet relations, Lebanon and issues for U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

The following is an analysis of the Brezhnev reply prepared by the Soviet specialists on the NSC staff:

Brezhnev’s response to your personal, handwritten letter is conciliatory in tone and unbending in substance. It ignores a number of specific points made in your handwritten note, including your assertion that governments must serve the people and not the other way around. He makes no reference to your allusion to Cuban actions in Angola, nor to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (except to blame the United States for offering help to those resisting it). He does not even mention your lifting the grain embargo, which in your letter was presented as an act of good will.

Instead, he gives the standard litany of Soviet objections to “aggressive” U.S. policies since 1945, such as the founding of NATO (apparently without any cause), trying to dominate other countries through economic aid, and perpetuating the arms race. All these are arguments drawn from the classical Stalinist repertoire of anti-American accusations presented here for the ostensible reason of making you understand that Moscow has a legitimate “different” point of view.

Three items in the letter and in the remarks Dobrynin made when delivering it deserve emphasis:

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8190204, 8190205). Secret; Outside the System. Copied to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “Returned w.o. Brezhnev ltr.—F is holding it. [illegible]”
2 Attached but not printed. See Document 59.
3 Attached but not printed. See the attachment to Document 59.
4 Attached but not printed. See Document 46.
1. Once again Brezhnev calls for a summit as a vehicle for resolving outstanding differences.

2. Dobrynin firmly rejects the principle of “linkage” in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

3. Dobrynin seems to link the recent events in Lebanon to the need to have the Soviet Union involved in a general Middle Eastern peace settlement.

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61. **Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, June 3, 1981, 1515Z

7643. Subject: Reply to Arbatov’s Message From Brezhnev. Ref: State 135636.¹

1. (C— Entire text)

2. I delivered the message contained in para 4 ref tel to Arbatov during a private meeting the afternoon of June 2. After I went over the points with him orally (I gave him nothing in writing), he seized upon the final one (that additional official or semi-official channels are neither necessary nor desirable and feigned perplexity about what this means. “Is it a suggestion that I not express my views to American friends?” He inquired. I assured him that it meant nothing more than it said, whereupon he claimed never to have made such a suggestion—indeed, he added, he was quite opposed to the idea of doing official business through other than official channels, and wondered aloud how such a suggestion could have been attributed to him. I told him that I could only infer that some of his American interlocutors had interpreted something he said as constituting such a suggestion, but that in any case there should now be no misunderstanding on either side regarding the matter.

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¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, Box 43, June 10, 1981. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Haig initialed the top of the telegram and wrote on the bottom of the page: “Larry, Arbatov is a phony—he’s not plugged in—we do better w/real people! AMH.”

² In telegram 135636 to Moscow, May 23, the Department requested that the Embassy convey to Arbatov the message: “Official channels of U.S.-Soviet communication have been and remain open, both in Washington and Moscow. Additional official or semi-official channels are neither necessary nor desirable.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810244–1022)
3. He then proceeded to comment on other points in the message as follows:

—To the comment that the Reagan administration is still elaborating the details of its policy, he observed that these may be details from the U.S. point of view, but some are quite basic for the Soviets. For example, the administration’s attitude toward strategic arms limitation is still not clear to the Soviet leadership, but the conviction is growing that there is no genuine interest.3

—Regarding the principles of reciprocity and restraint, he said that his concern centered on the way these concepts were being used: Reciprocity could be employed as a pretext to dismantle the remaining ties between the two countries; as for restraint, this seemed to mean only that Soviet defense of its interests should be restrained.

—On linkage, he expressed doubt that it would result in practice in anything other than a rationalization for not making progress in any area, since a pretext for doing nothing can always be found somewhere.

—With some irony in his voice, he expressed pleasure at hearing that U.S. policy is not based on “anti-Sovietism,” but added that he was quite convinced that some senior members of the Reagan administration based their advice precisely on anti-Sovietism.

4. I replied to each of these observations in turn, pointing out, for example, that the President and Secretary had made clear their deep interest in genuine arms reduction, that neither reciprocity nor restraint were pretexts for something else but necessary in a relationship where benefits had been one-sided and restraint notable by its absence in such instances as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that “linkage” reflects recognition of the basic political reality that Soviet behavior will have an impact on all elements of the relationship, and that he was making a serious mistake if he confused legitimate U.S. concern over Soviet actions and policies with doctrinaire “anti-Sovietism.”

5. Arbatov then dropped further discussion of these points and expressed great anxiety over the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations, saying that there is no real communication and that we are not in a good position to manage crises which could arise unexpectedly. “If a Yom Kippur war occurred today, I’m not sure a serious confrontation could be avoided,” he observed, and added that there is potential for such crises developing suddenly at many points, such as Lebanon and Pakistan.

6. I told him that I was confident that communication was quite adequate so long as there is a genuine Soviet desire to defuse problems,

3 Haig underlined “there is no genuine interest” and wrote in the margin: “speech!”
but it is the latter that I often found lacking. The conversation continued along predictable lines, with Arbatov trotting out his now familiar arguments that the policies of the Reagan administration run the risk of convincing the Soviet leaders that there is no U.S. intent to deal “constructively” with the USSR on any issue, but that there is a calculated U.S. policy of stirring up fear of the Soviet Union to justify massive military spending. I suggested to him that he would serve his profession and his government better if he made a more serious effort to understand why the American Government, and the American people, feel as they do about U.S.-Soviet relations, and how Americans attitudes had been formed by Soviet actions and policies—which now must be changed if improved relations are to be possible.

7. Comment: Despite Arbatov’s disingenuousness (to apply the kindest term possible) in denying having suggested a special channel of communication, he could not have missed message. I doubt, however, that this will put an end to his efforts to establish himself as a key interlocutor in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue. His other comments were largely identical with those he has served up to visiting Americans over the past couple of months. His visitors are likely to hear more of the same over the coming months.

Matlock
62. Action Memorandum From the Director of Policy Planning (Wolfowitz), the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Eagleburger), and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Haig

Washington, June 4, 1981

SUBJECT
East-West Policy Study

ISSUE FOR DECISION

We seek your approval of the attached Executive Summary of the East-West Policy study, your decision on the one remaining disagreement within the Department, and your authorization to circulate the full study so that we can move ahead promptly to the SIG and the NSC.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Having passed the 4-month mark, the Administration now needs to pull together the various strands of its East-West policy into one coherent strategic approach. This is important for sustaining a consistent posture toward East-West relations over the next few years. It is also necessary for building allied consensus and in generating support at home for our policy. We believe that the attached study contributes to filling these needs and also provides the basis for a major East-West speech by you or the President.

This study incorporates comments from throughout the Department and already reflects considerable interagency work. We anticipate support from the NSC staff and the Pentagon, although some specific points of difference may still surface. With your approval, Larry will convene an IG meeting to complete the work in preparation for the SIG, and then we will move this project rapidly to the NSC.

We now need your general approval of the direction of the study as summarized in the attached Executive Summary. (The full study is 50 pages)

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1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Records: Memoranda From the Director of the Policy Planning to the Secretary and Other Principals, January 1981–December 1988. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kaplan; cleared in substance by Harry Kopp in EB and Peter Constable in NEA. Sent through Stoessel and McFarlane. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Haig saw it. Sent through Stoessel and McFarlane. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Haig saw it. An unknown hand wrote in the right-hand margin: “The Secretary commented—tell the boys to move out. I want a speech ASAP. S” Beneath this comment, a second unknown hand wrote: “Phil Kaplan is making sure Nathan is [illegible].” A third unknown hand added the date “6/10/81.” On June 4, McFarlane sent the memorandum to Haig under cover of a note in which he wrote: “This is one of the finest pieces of analysis I have ever seen. In my judgment it warrants a careful reading. Further it can form the basis for an early speech by yourself or the President. Bud.” (Ibid.)
long and is also available if you want to see it.) We also need you to resolve the one remaining difference within the Department, which concerns East-West Economic Relations. EB has cleared on this section but believes Western trade and economic policies will have only marginal effects on Soviet behavior, might push the Soviets into a more autarkic position, and could engender some discord with allies reluctant to support a program of tough new controls which are not directly related to security concerns. EUR, S/P and PM recognize these potential problems but believe the nature of the Soviet threat requires improved US and Allied efforts to reduce Soviet access to militarily relevant products and technologies as well as subsidized credits. The study acknowledges that improved allied behavior in this area will be evolutionary and must be managed in such a way as to avoid serious allied discord.

The attached study provides the essential elements of a strategy to guide our East-West relations. But the future is uncertain, and we will have to adapt to events as well as to Soviet and Allied reactions. Therefore, we recommend that a Standing IG on East-West relations, chaired by EUR, be established to monitor the implementation of our strategy and to adjust particular elements of it over time.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you approve the attached Executive Summary and authorize us to move the study promptly to the IG and SIG.
2. That you approve the study’s approach to East-West Economic Policy.
3. That you approve the preparation of a draft speech, based on this study, for delivery by you or the President following NSC approval of the final study.
4. That we establish a Standing IG on East-West relations.

2 Haig initialed his approval. In a June 9 note to Wolfowitz Kaplan wrote: “Paul—Now that the Secretary has approved the East-West study, we should move promptly to the IG. If you agree, I will suggest that Eagleburger send the Executive Summary and full text to IG Members at the Assistant Secretary level and call an IG to be held perhaps Friday [June 12] or Monday [June 15] in order to get final comments on the paper, which then would be referred to an early SIG meeting.” Wolfowitz checked his approval. (Ibid.)
3 Haig checked his approval.
4 Haig checked his approval.
5 Haig checked his approval.
Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State\textsuperscript{6}

Washington, undated

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EAST-WEST POLICY STUDY

1. Overview: The Present Situation and Future Prospects

The Soviet-American relationship will be entering a new and dangerous phase during the coming decade, independent of any major US policy changes. Increased Soviet power threatens the free and open international order the US has sought to maintain throughout the postwar period. The most urgent dangers are: (1) Soviet use of its own and proxy forces to acquire new strategic advantages, particularly in politically unstable but vital regions; and (2) Soviet efforts to divide the US from its major allies through a combination of threats and inducements.

In this setting, our East-West policy will be based on the following premises: (1) that the East-West competition reflects fundamental and enduring conflicts of interests, purpose and outlook; (2) that the US should move beyond its passive post-Vietnam foreign policy and provide greater leadership to enable the West to compete more effectively; (3) that over the near term, given the legacy we have inherited, we often will have to compete with the USSR under unfavorable circumstance; and (4) some degree of cooperation with Moscow is possible and desirable and can help to sustain a consensus both at home and abroad in favor of a more competitive posture.

Our ability to meet this challenge will have to be based on a long-term effort to rebuild American and Western power and willingness to assume higher risks in defending our interests. We cannot reverse trends favoring the Soviet Union overnight; to do so at all will require considerable patience and resourcefulness. In the short term, we must make use of our existing assets more efficiently by taking advantage of special areas of American and Western strength, while exploiting Soviet weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

US global strategy must improve our position by joining American strength to that of allied and friendly countries. We should draw on an

\textsuperscript{6} Secret.
informal but interlocking coalition of European and Asian allies, our strategic association with China, and our partnerships with key “Third World” countries. The US must be the fulcrum of this structure, providing the leadership needed to integrate Western assets and defend vital Western interests. On this basis we can ensure a sustainable internationalist US foreign policy for the 1980s.

Naturally the Soviet Union will act vigorously to protect and expand its position against a newly assertive American foreign policy; it has a great many instruments for doing so. We should avoid mindless confrontations and take account of vital Soviet interests in devising means for countering aggressive Soviet behavior. But this should not keep us from competing forcefully with the USSR in defense of our own interests. We cannot buy time by accommodation; such a course also would mislead our public and our allies as to our purposes and steadfastness. Moscow is likely in any case to take actions that challenge our interests and the costs of accepting the aggressive Soviet posture are simply too high.

The long-term weaknesses of the Soviet Union, the economic and political strengths of the West and the mandate embodied in the November elections encourage us to believe that an effective policy toward the Soviet Union is within our reach as long as we make full use of our strengths. Yet the material costs and political difficulties must not be understated. Large and continuing economic burdens for defense must be patiently and skillfully defended before the Congress and the public. We will have to create and enlarge relationships with states that are critical Soviet targets or strategically decisive. Finally, regaining the initiative will sometimes require that we accept immediate risks in order to avoid greater albeit more long-term ones. For example, security assistance to Pakistan at this time can avoid more serious problems later.

A strong consensus both at home and abroad will be crucial to sustaining these policies. We also will have to take the lead on issues of critical importance, without letting uncertainty over the extent of domestic or allied support deprive us of essential freedom of action. Success will depend on a strong sense of priorities and on effective leadership.

II. Soviet Strengths and Weaknesses

Management of the East-West relationship requires a dispassionate tallying of Moscow’s strengths and weaknesses. Over the near term, the Soviet Union possesses several distinct advantages in its competition with the United States: First, it enjoys, and in the short term will increase its significant military advantages in key regions, accompanied by a greatly improved nuclear balance; second, it is in a position to exploit instability in many areas of the developing world crucial to Western interests, particularly the Persian Gulf; third, it has built up a network of allies, clients and proxies throughout the Third World; fourth, from their recent use,
armed forces and those of its allies and proxies are gaining operational self-confidence and an enhanced capacity for intimidation; fifth, it can play upon a residual Western attachment to detente to separate the US from its allies; and sixth, Moscow can pursue its objectives in relative freedom from domestic political constraints and dependence on foreign resources.

At the same time the Soviets must contend with a number of liabilities: First, Soviet economic growth will continue to stagnate in this decade for reasons inherent in the system itself; second, the USSR is on the verge of a wholesale leadership change that could hamper the conduct of foreign policy; third, the Soviets face the hostility of all the industrial democracies and China; fourth, the Soviets will increasingly suffer from imperial overextension, as reflected by the weaknesses of Soviet proxies and dependents and by the instability of Eastern Europe; and finally, Marxism-Leninism is a bankrupt ideology which fails to answer the needs either of the working class it is meant to serve or of the developing nations in the Third World.

Unfortunately, these long-term liabilities do not lessen the dangers that we now face or permit a more passive US attitude towards Moscow. Indeed, the combination of short-term strengths and long-term weakness may prompt the Soviets to capitalize on their advantage now. The Soviets may regard the energy vulnerability of the West and their own ability to exploit military power for political purposes in the Persian Gulf area as an opportunity of historic proportions to cripple the Western alliance once and for all. Moscow’s long-term problems will be of little benefit to us unless we can defend our interests over the short-run and establish trends favorable to us.

III. U.S. Policy Toward East-West Relations

This Administration will pursue the following goals with regard to the Soviet Union:

A. Restoring a satisfactory military balance.

Because military power is a necessary basis for competing with the Soviets effectively, US forces will have to be increased across the board. The Soviets have widened their existing superiority in conventional forces in Europe, Asia and the broad Persian Gulf/Middle East region, supplementing them with a network of proxies in the Third World. This has occurred against the backdrop of a shift in the strategic and theater nuclear balances, which weakens deterrence and the US strategic commitments on which it is based.

Military modernization must emphasize the procurement of systems which take advantage of American strengths and exploit Soviet vulnerabilities, including those of Soviet proxies.
• Nuclear Forces. The overall nuclear balance is not satisfactory, and our programs of strategic and theater modernization are not yet, even in combination, adequate to redress the balance. At a minimum we need to restore the nuclear balance and to improve the ability of these forces to support US deterrent commitments. Nuclear force improvements should be gauged not simply by static quantitative measures, but also by qualitative factors, such as C3I, that have a practical military significance, i.e., that provide enduring capability to destroy targets of military significance.

• Regional Forces. The forces of the US and its allies are insufficient to meet common security needs. Accordingly, the US must modernize and expand its conventional force structure with emphasis on four areas. First, in cooperation with our allies and regional nations, we must work to create capabilities adequate to meet the full array of Soviet and regional threats, above all in the Persian Gulf area. We must improve our own capability to utilize access to local facilities already obtained, working steadily for gradual increases as regional nations gain more confidence in us. Second, we must reverse the deterioration of regional balances in Europe and Asia. Third, the US must establish an improved margin of maritime superiority to put at risk the global Soviet navy and to strengthen our capacity to manage the regional crises. Finally, the US should improve its arms transfer capability by making additional resources available on a timely basis to meet the needs of regional allies threatened by the Soviets or their proxies.

The US should pursue a realistic arms control policy aimed at verifiable agreements that can enhance national security by limiting those Soviet systems which are most threatening to us and by reducing the risk of war or reducing its destructiveness if war occurs. Disarmament or restrictions on new technologies for their own sake should be eschewed, as well as agreements negotiated simply to improve the atmosphere of superpower relations. Instead, we need to set tougher substantive standards that challenge the Soviets to accept true parity at reduced levels and prepare both US and European public opinion to accept no agreements at all if these are not met. The US needs to establish the primacy of our own military programs as the basis for assuring security; indeed, this is the only way we can expect to achieve meaningful limits on Soviet weaponry. We should recognize that this arms control strategy may make it unlikely that negotiated agreements will be achieved in the short run.

B. Defending Western interests in areas of instability.

The greatest danger of Soviet use of military force, either directly or by proxy, arises in the Third World. The US must break out of its post-Vietnam passivity and adopt a counter-offensive strategy that seizes the initiative from the Soviets by opposing them and their proxies, where possible at times and places of our own choosing. Such a strategy would seek
to discourage the further use and growth of the proxy network by driving up both risks and costs of Moscow’s Third World involvements, by exploiting the vulnerabilities of Soviet proxies and by weakening their Soviet connection through appropriate use of incentives and disincentives. Many of these regimes are narrowly based with severe ethnic, social, sectarian and economic problems. Afghanistan, Cuba, South Yemen, Libya, and Ethiopia represent particularly important points of Soviet exposure. On an ideological plane, the US should put the spotlight on the aggressive activities and internal shortcomings of Soviet proxies and keep them on the defensive. This counter-offensive strategy must be carefully tailored in light of regional political and cultural realities.

*We also should seek to preempt Soviet opportunism through timely political action and constructive economic policies to prevent instability, promote prosperity and resolve disputes.* Our concerns for security and peaceful progress are mutually reinforcing. It is essential that the United States continue to present a positive alternative to the arms and repression that the Soviet Union offers to the Third World, while understanding that our support for some types of political and economic reform can generate instability which can be exploited by Moscow.

*Given our present constraints, we need to set priorities among US interests. Above all, the US and its allies must be able to defend Western interests in the strategic Persian Gulf and Near East area.* We, together with our allies and regional friends, need capabilities adequate to protect Western access to oil against direct challenge and to respond to the politically disruptive shadow cast by Soviet power. *Horizontal escalation may be a useful stop-gap but cannot itself be counted on to deal with the threat as the Soviets have such options of their own. We must expand cooperation with allies outside of the region and with regional friends that are capable of countering Soviet proxies.* But our experience in Iran indicates that there is no substitute for direct US power projection and such cooperation is likely to be achieved only if the US can demonstrate its own increased capability and commitment to help its friends.

*Our counter-offensive strategy should be applied at once to Afghanistan.* We should with other states combine intense political pressure for a total Soviet withdrawal, appropriate encouragement to Afghan freedom fighters, major security assistance to Pakistan and a concerted political program to illuminate Soviet aggressive behavior in the Third World.

*Finally, our emphasis on the Persian Gulf should not obscure our enduring interest in other parts of the developing world, particularly the current volatile Central American area, the ASEAN states and southern Africa.*

**C. Improving Cooperation with our European Allies.**

The US must forge a new alliance consensus for its strategy towards the Soviet Union, against the background of European doubts about
American leadership, extensive economic links with the Soviet bloc, energy dependence on the Middle East and fear of Soviet power. We should avoid West-West quarrels of the sort that plagued the last administration; if there are hard times ahead with Moscow, they should benefit, not harm the alliance. We must urge European leaders to work actively toward reducing the political constraints on their defense policies and to join us in countering Moscow.

Our key goals in Europe are:

- To improve and enlarge consultation and coordination with our allies, particularly on issues outside Europe.
- To increase our allies’ commitment of resources to the common defense, both in Europe and in areas vital to the alliance. The US must provide defense leadership and a nuclear umbrella, but the allies must do more in strengthening conventional forces and sustaining LRTNF modernization. We will have to seek a redefinition of the “division of labor.”
- To meet the allied need for a visible arms control process, and to use that process to demonstrate Soviet opposition to parity, arms reduction and effective, verifiable arms control, while ensuring that negotiations do not interfere with NATO modernization. In particular, while maintaining a deliberate track for negotiating LRTNF arms control, we must resist delays in modernization and deployment.
- To arrest growing European economic dependence, particularly energy, on the Soviet bloc, to take collective action to prevent the emergence of future vulnerabilities and to reinforce Western ties. The proposed European/Soviet gas pipeline is not in our interest and should be handled to avoid further European vulnerability. Common OECD policies are needed on export credits and technology transfer. The coverage and effectiveness of COCOM rules should be improved. These policies also will require a consistent US policy of denying the Soviets important economic support.
- To achieve greater understanding of US political, economic and defense policies by European public and parliamentary opinion, especially among the “successor generation” of Europeans.

D. Developing the Potential of East Asian Allies and Friends.

East Asia has enormous economic capability, but is militarily weak. Both Japan and China will face major difficulties in realizing their very large growth potential as counter-weights to Soviet power. As they do so, US policy will aim to increase the security of the region against outside pressures and interference and to preserve balance among the East Asian powers. We can reach this goal by encouraging the strengthening of friendly regional states, while recognizing that their power cannot become a substitute for that of the US. We will need to continue to play a crucial balancing and integrating role.
Japan and China have the greatest potential.

- While reaffirming our commitment to Japanese security, we will encourage the acquisition of a military capability by Japan to provide for its defense, within its constitutional constraints, in such critical areas as air defense, anti-submarine warfare, and protection of sea lanes in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Japan can also play a greater role in areas of common alliance concern outside East Asia through supportive diplomacy and economic assistance.

- China’s hostility to the USSR is of enormous political and strategic importance; our goal is to solidify our developing relationship with China and to strengthen China’s ability to resist Soviet intimidation. But the Sino-American strategic association must be handled with care, as Chinese interests and ambitions do not fully coincide with our own. We should strengthen Chinese defensive capabilities selectively while maintaining our commitment to the security of Taiwan.

Beyond China and Japan, we will strengthen security cooperation with our Korean, Australian, and New Zealand allies. We will also want to bolster support for the ASEAN states to promote their Western orientation and to strengthen their ability to stand up to Vietnamese and Soviet expansionism.

E. Refashioning East-West economic relations so that the Soviet Union is helped neither to strengthen itself militarily nor to escape the full costs of its internal problems.

Far from moderating Soviet political-military behavior, the extensive East-West economic ties of the past decade have created constituencies among our allies, some of whom are vulnerable to Soviet pressure. We need to define the guidelines for permissible East-West trade. Future Western economic policy must meet three major criteria:

- It must not increase the Soviet capacity to wage war. US policy will seek significantly improved controls over the transfer of technology important to military production and to industrial sectors that indirectly support military capability.

- It must narrow opportunities for Soviet economic leverage over the West. While recognizing the greater stake of our allies in commercial ties with the East, we must try to cap and ultimately reverse political vulnerabilities arising from the growth of East-West economic and energy interdependence.

- It must not ease Soviet resource constraints or associated political difficulties by relieving Moscow of the burdens of its own economic problems or of responsibility for those of Eastern Europe.

F. Promoting Positive Trends in Eastern Europe.

Eastern Europe probably will have a more volatile and dynamic character in the 1980s, posing major political management choices for Moscow.
The current Polish crisis forms an historic watershed for Soviet imperial policy. While Moscow doubtless will use force where necessary to keep its bloc in order, the Polish experiment is testing—and perhaps stretching—the limits of Soviet tolerance.

US policy objectives in Eastern Europe are to work with our allies to support greater internal liberalization, foreign policy autonomy and contacts with the West, while seeking to discourage Soviet intervention to block indigenous reform movements.

—In the short term, assuming no Soviet intervention in Poland, we should confirm our differentiated approach to East European states, seeking to improve relations and be forthcoming with countries that are relatively liberal or independent, while dealing with other East Europeans on the basis of strict reciprocity. A Soviet invasion of Poland involving East European troops obviously would freeze relations for a protracted period and present major strategic questions for our East European policy. Whether there is an invasion or not, we must keep the pressure on Moscow to bear a large share of the economic burden.

In the longer-term, we seek to foster liberalization and autonomy by intensifying contacts. Endemic East European debt and economic problems should permit us to build increased economic ties with appropriate East European countries, thereby enhancing both our influence and their internal freedom of action. In doing so, we should employ established multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and Western creditor clubs, to avoid perpetuating chronic economic weaknesses. This strategy must be coordinated with our allies, banks, unions and private groups.

G. Recovering the ideological initiative by spotlighting the deficiencies of the Soviet system.

The long-term weaknesses of the Soviet system can be encouraged in part simply by telling the truth about the USSR. The Soviet Union faces nascent problems among its nationalities (particularly in the Baltic states and among Muslim groups in Central Asia) and from its own working class. The United States should provide ICA with increased resources to step up broadcasting activities to the Soviet Union, the satellites and Soviet Third World clients, highlighting the economic and moral failings of Moscow and its allies.

The expansionist international behavior of the Soviet Union and its repressive, stagnant internal system make it vulnerable to a moral counter-attack. Yet the US must also offer a positive vision of the future. By promoting peaceful democratic change, US policy will be able to give substance to this positive view and prevent the emergence of Soviet opportunities.

H. Maintaining effective communication with the Soviet Union.

A regular US/Soviet dialogue is not incompatible with a more competitive US East-West policy. Indeed, effective communication is essential to prevent
dangerous misunderstandings of our intentions and resolve, particularly at moments of high tension. We must ensure that the USSR neither exaggerates nor underestimates our purpose, and we should demonstrate our openness to constructive Soviet approaches.

Visible US/Soviet contacts—and appropriate negotiations—can be used in seeking to sustain political support at home and in allied countries for a competitive Western policy toward the USSR. But such contacts must not prevent us from using the rhetoric needed in defending our policies. Nor can they be allowed to divert us from necessary tough and costly measures by falsely suggesting that fundamental differences have been resolved. The Soviets can be expected to exploit such contacts and seek to convince our allies and our own public that negotiations should become a substitute for forceful political, economic and military measures. Moscow also will make major efforts to divide us from our allies on these issues. We must firmly resist these Soviet efforts.

We need to subject all proposals for negotiations to rigorous USG and allied review and ensure that our participation and negotiating strategy are consistent with clearly defined Western interests. Certain negotiating forums can be useful for either arms control or political purposes; we should know the difference. In European arms control discussions, for example, we can challenge the Soviets to accept true parity at reduced levels; in other East-West forums, such as CSCE, we can challenge them to honor commitments made and to build East-West relations on the basis of strict reciprocity.

We must recognize that US/Soviet bilateral diplomacy can sometimes undermine our larger purposes. In Third World crisis areas, in particular, where we aim to work closely with our friends in building barriers to Soviet influence, the Soviet Union generally will not be helpful. We should recognize the limitations—and disadvantages—of seeking to involve Moscow in the peaceful resolution of regional disputes and should not expand or legitimize the Soviet role. Instead, the West should exploit its singular capacity to work with the key parties to such disputes. Finally, if in the longer term the Soviet Union seeks to deal with its internal or international liabilities through genuine cooperation with the West, we should be prepared to conduct meaningful negotiations, ensuring that our overall interests are protected.
Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State
Haig

Washington, June 18, 1981, 0042Z

TO SEC 040284. For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary. Subject: Soviet Demarche on US Policy on Arms Transfers to PRC. For Clark Todep 1164.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Dobrynin called on me morning of June 17 to present an oral statement concerning possible US transfers of arms and arms technology to China. Referring to the explanation of our policy which Eagleburger had given Soviet DCM Bessmertnykh on June 10, the Soviet statement recalled earlier assurances given the Soviets by the US side, including at the highest level, and said that the USG should be aware that to proceed to arm the Chinese despite such assurances would be regarded as "outright hostile" toward the USSR.

3. I told Dobrynin I would inform you of the Soviet statement and that, if after careful study we had any further comment, we would be in touch with him.

4. Text of the Soviet "oral statement," which Dobrynin left as a non paper, follows:

Begin text:

—Careful study has been given in Moscow to the explanation furnished by the US side concerning its position on the sales of military equipment to China. Although the formulations used is (sic) of a deliberately vague nature, the sense of the explanation amounts to the fact that the USA allows for the possibility of transferring arms and arms technology to China.

—We assume that the current American leadership is familiar with the exchanges that took place between our countries on the subject of China and of the assurances in this regard given to us by the US side at various levels including the highest one.

—Therefore, the US Government should be aware of the kind of responsibility the United States of America would incur by taking, in spite of the said assurances, the path of arming China—a path which

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N810005-0531. Secret; NiaC; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by German; cleared by Scanlan, Bremer; approved by Stoessel. Also sent Immediate to the Mission to NATO. Sent Immediate for information to Moscow and Brussels. From June 17 to 20, Haig led the U.S. Delegation at a meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Manila.
is fraught with the most serious consequences for the peace and international stability.

—Such behavior of the US side would be regarded in no other way but as being outright hostile toward the USSR. It should be clear to the US Government that its practical steps in providing China with arms, military equipment and technology will be properly taken into account by us in the overall context of Soviet-American relations, and that in this case the Soviet Union would be free to take such measures as would be dictated by the emerging situation. End text.

Stoessel

64. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)¹

Washington, June 18, 1981

SUBJECT
Comments on Soviet Note

The note² handed to Walter Stoessel by the Soviet Embassy is couched in the most somber language of Soviet diplomacy. It is devoid of the vituperative elements present in many Soviet notes when they have an essentially propagandistic purpose. This is a serious warning and I would be inclined to take it very seriously. It would seem to me to call for a high-level meeting with Soviet representatives either here or in Moscow to clarify both U.S. policies in China and the implications of the Soviet response. In particular, one would want to know what is meant by the concluding phrase that the Soviet Government would “be free to take such measures as would be dictated by the emerging situation”. It would be dangerous, in my opinion, to handle this note in a routine manner, let alone ignore it. (S)

² Attached but not printed is the Soviet non-paper transmitted in Document 63.
65. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, June 23, 1981

SUBJECT
Luncheon with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin June 23, 1981

Summary:
Dobrynin invited me to lunch at the Soviet residence June 23. He expressed great concern about the state of our relations, saying U.S. policy seemed to be completely anti-Soviet, aimed at confrontation and at encirclement of the Soviet Union. He claimed that Brezhnev genuinely desires a better relationship and wants to discuss all problems, but that we consistently rebuff him. Dobrynin was also perturbed about our decision concerning arms sales to China. I reviewed our positions about Soviet behavior and military build-up, saying we desire a more stable relationship but emphasizing that this can only be achieved if the Soviets demonstrate moderation and restraint. Details of our conversation are set forth below: (Dobrynin said he would depart for the Soviet Union on leave July 14.)

Salaries:
Dobrynin began our conversation on a personal and rather curious note. He said his DCM, Bessmertnykh, had been complaining about the low level of his salary, and Dobrynin was trying to check out what other countries paid officials in that position. He said that Bessmertnykh earned about $10,000 a year. I said that this was low by our standards and that we would pay a senior officer five times that much. Dobrynin claimed that his own salary as Ambassador was only $12,000 and that, even though housing and everything else was taken care of and that a certain amount of rubles was deposited in his account in Moscow, he was finding it rather hard to get along on such a salary.

Central Committee Plenum?
When Dobrynin referred to the meeting that day of the Supreme Soviet, I mentioned that there apparently has not been a meeting of the Central Committee Plenum before the Supreme Soviet and that this seemed unprecedented. Dobrynin said that this was not unprecedented and that there had been previous cases when a Plenum had not been called before a Supreme Soviet meeting. So far as his own participation

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in a Plenum meeting is concerned, he said that he does not attend all meetings on a regular basis, but only those of an important nature dealing with foreign affairs.

Outlook for Relations:

Dobrynin asked for my “professional evaluation” of the situation between the U.S. and USSR and the prospects for further development. He said he personally was very gloomy about the situation; the U.S. seemed to be on a course of seeking confrontation with the Soviet Union, of encircling the Soviet Union, and Secretary Haig’s statements seemed increasingly and persistently anti-Soviet in content. He also mentioned critical statements by the President concerning the Soviet Union.

In response, I said the situation was obviously not an easy one. The Reagan Administration is deeply concerned about the Soviet military build-up and a pattern of Soviet interventionism, noting in particular Afghanistan, Central America, support of Vietnam in Kampuchea, and threats against Poland. I said we were determined to do something about this situation, to be more active in defending our own interests and those of our allies, to reassert our leadership role and to demonstrate that the “Vietnam syndrome” was behind us. However, I stressed that we did not seek a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

I noted that the overall thrust of this policy has the strong backing of the American people as shown in the elections.

Arms Control:

Dobrynin made special reference to arms control matters, saying he was also disturbed by prospects in this regard. He said the Soviets know Mr. Rostow and General Rowny and their negative views on arms control—the fact that they will be in charge of negotiations is not promising. Dobrynin contrasted Rostow’s statement that we would not be prepared to talk SALT before nine months with Brezhnev’s appeal at the Supreme Soviet for immediate and urgent talks on disarmament without pre-conditions.

I drew attention to the preparations already under way for holding US-Soviet negotiations on TNF before the end of the year. I stressed that we were serious in our approach to these negotiations. On SALT, I referred to the statement by the President of sincere interest in negotiations aimed at significant reductions in strategic arms, but said that there was much work to be done in preparing for such negotiations and that we did not wish to rush into them prematurely.

Dobrynin then embarked on a long dissertation about the military balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He said that he had talked with Soviet experts on this subject, including General Ogarkov,
and they all felt that there was approximate parity between the two sides. The same situation was true in Europe, where Soviet missiles, including the SS–20s, were balanced off by a wide range of Western armament and forward based systems capable of hitting the Soviet Union. In Europe, Dobrynin claimed that the balance between East and West is 1.5 to 1 in favor of the West in terms of nuclear war heads. He mentioned that the Soviets must include weapons based in the UK and in France in their calculations.

In my comments, I stressed in particular the build-up of SS–20s by the Soviet side as representing a new element in the military situation in Europe which resulted in a serious imbalance. I also noted that Soviet S–4s and S–5s were still in place and targeted against Western Europe rather than being reduced in numbers as had been anticipated. Dobrynin contested this vigorously and said that S–4s and S–5s are in the process of being reduced. I also mentioned the Backfire as another item of concern for us; Dobrynin countered with a reference to the F–111s stationed in the UK. Entirely apart from the argument over whether or not there is now a situation of approximate parity, I said the trends were clearly against the U.S. in view of the continuing high level of Soviet investment in military programs and, in particular, the Soviet emphasis on more accurate, land based intercontinental missiles. Dobrynin again countered this line of argument, saying that the view was entirely different from Moscow, from where the U.S. still looked superior in many respects to the Soviet Union.

Dobrynin mentioned the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on TNF systems, saying that this concept had resulted from a “brain storming” session held at Brezhnev’s dacha outside Moscow last year. According to Dobrynin, the moratorium idea had been suggested to Brezhnev by working level officials and had then been accepted by him against the advice of the military and others in the Politburo. Brezhnev felt personally attached to the idea and had been disappointed at the lack of response from the U.S. regarding it. Dobrynin also alluded vaguely to the idea that the moratorium concept could be applied in the area of heavy missiles.

I explained our problems with the moratorium idea, saying it seemed clear that such a step would simply freeze Soviet advantages and would stimulate public pressures in the West on us to refrain from proceeding with our efforts to catch up with the Soviets. In my view, the moratorium concept was not a useful one and I thought it should not be pushed if the Soviets were really serious about arms control negotiations.

China:

Dobrynin did not come on as strongly about U.S. arms sales to China as I had anticipated. He expressed concern and some puzzlement...
about our policy and said it seemed designed to be clearly provocative vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. I noted that we would proceed in a careful, measured and prudent way in connection with arms sales to China, handling every item on a case by case basis. I thought it would be advisable for the Soviets to withhold a definitive conclusion regarding our policy pending an opportunity to see how it developed in practice.

**Opportunities for Movement:**

Dobrynin wondered whether I saw any bright spots in a generally drab picture; were there any possibilities for movement? I said it would be wrong to be optimistic in the present situation and that much in our view depended on actions by the Soviet side. However, I pointed to the TNF negotiations as one area where there would be active contact and forward movement might be possible. Dobrynin said that, realistically, he doubted if much would come out of the TNF negotiations, although he agreed it was important to pursue them. I pointed to the current meeting of the SCC in Geneva as evidence of continued interest in the SALT process, noting that the U.S. stance at the SCC was business-like and non-polemical. Dobrynin acknowledged that this was the case.

I also mentioned the CSCE conversations and the acceptance by the present Administration of the French proposal for CDE, including Confidence Building Measures from the Atlantic to the Urals. I thought this was an area where forward movement might be possible, although I noted that the vague Soviet demand for “appropriate” reciprocal measures on the part of the West was a complicating factor. Dobrynin said the Soviets were waiting for Western proposals on this score and he could not understand why we would have any objections. I stressed our position that the Atlantic to the Urals concept should be sufficient for a conference focused on security in Europe. When I said that we were also interested in progress on human rights issues at the CSCE, Dobrynin said this is an old story and seems to be used by the West to block progress on security issues. I denied that this was the case.

**Middle East:**

In a brief discussion on the Middle East, Dobrynin said he thought it would be possible for the U.S. and the USSR to work together in the area. He recalled his earlier discussion several years ago with Joe Sisco, in the course of which it had been agreed that we had a number of common points of view. He thought it would be useful if we could conduct a similar exercise since the way things were going now was dangerous and unproductive.

**US-Soviet Relations:**

Toward the end of our conversation, I spoke frankly of the need for restraint and moderation on the part of the Soviet Union if relations...
are to improve. As examples, I noted that it would be most helpful if the Soviets could do something to dampen Castro’s increased activism in the Caribbean in support of change through violence; I also said that an expression of real interest on the part of the Soviet Union in moves leading to Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan would be helpful.

In response, Dobrynin claimed that the Soviets in fact have been restrained. He said that nothing drastic had happened on the part of the Soviets since the inauguration of President Reagan and that there had been no “testing” of the President. He said that a lot of noise has been made about Poland but that here, too, the Soviets have been restrained.

Dobrynin reiterated Soviet unhappiness that there has been no response on a whole series of proposals from Brezhnev aimed at reducing tension. He said that, on Afghanistan, Brezhnev had made proposals but this, like all the others, had been dismissed as propaganda. Dobrynin said this was getting discouraging for the Soviets and that those in the leadership pushing for a harder line toward the U.S. were gaining strength as a result. He did not wish to overdo the “dove/hawk” analogy as it applies to the Politburo, but he said that we should understand that there is a division of opinion within the leadership and that the hard liners are deriving support for their positions as a result of U.S. policies.

With regard to the Brezhnev proposals, I said that, speaking personally, it seemed to me that they all appeared to be made in a propagandistic sense with a view to appealing to public opinion. There were also so many proposals—not one of which appeared particularly new—that skepticism about them was warranted. I suggested that, if Brezhnev really wanted to advance a serious proposal on a given subject, it would be better to do so privately without public fanfare. I repeated that we desired to have a better relationship with the Soviets and genuinely to resolve problems between us. It was necessary, however, to approach these matters seriously without the aim of making propaganda and with a realistic appreciation of the position of the other party.

As I left, Dobrynin said that he would be returning to Moscow on consultations July 14 and would be expected to consult there in detail about prospects for US-Soviet relations. Before he left, he hoped he would have the opportunity for a thorough discussion with the Secretary. He emphasized again his concern about the present situation, saying that half a year has gone by already and that, in his view, it is urgent to enter into serious talks about our relationship.

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.  

2 Stoessel signed the memorandum “WJS.”
66. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 2, 1981

SUBJECT
Haig-Dobrynin Meeting, July 2, 1981

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had participated in many important meetings between Gromyko and American leaders, but that the forthcoming meeting between the Secretary and Gromyko would be the most important which had occurred since he had been in Washington. There were many people in Moscow—and the number was growing—who had concluded that we were entering into a period of real hostility between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The President had specifically attacked the Soviet leadership, as had the Secretary. There had been absolutely no progress in our relations in the five months since the new Administration took office. The Secretary’s meeting with Gromyko was thus looked upon in Moscow as a sort of benchmark for determining whether there was to be any future to the Soviet-American relationship.

Dobrynin said he needed a direct answer to a question: Is Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan an absolute condition for any relationship with the Soviet Union? The Secretary responded that Afghanistan was a profoundly important issue, as was Kampuchea. Any assurances which the Soviets could give us—for example, with regard to specific plans for a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan—would clearly have an effect on our attitude toward relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, Dobrynin should take note of the fact that we had already broken TNF out of the complex of issues facing us and agreed to negotiations. In the same context, the Secretary noted that we would in due course have something to say about a future long term grains agreement.

It should be clear, the Secretary continued, that the pace of our dealings with the Soviet Union would be affected by Soviet conduct in these two areas (Afghanistan and Kampuchea), and also in two other areas—Iran and Poland. We wanted good relations with the Soviet Union but could not simply put Afghanistan behind us. We therefore hoped that there would be some evidence of Soviet movement on Afghanistan when he met with Gromyko in the fall.

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The Secretary noted that the EC proposal for a conference on Afghanistan ² was a serious one, non-polemical, and not an anti-Soviet gesture. The U.S. was prepared to help in any way it could—but one thing had to be clear, that we could not agree to the establishment of a puppet regime in Kabul that ignored the need for reestablishing a non-aligned Afghanistan. We felt the same way about Kampuchea. We had, for example, taken all the rhetoric out of the ASEAN resolution on Kampuchea, ³ and we viewed the international conference ⁴ as a serious initiative. The Soviets should either participate in the conference or come to the UN with a proposal of their own.

Dobrynin interrupted with a question as to whether the Secretary thought the Soviets were really in control of Vietnam, adding that the Vietnamese had not even informed the Soviets before going into Kampuchea. The Secretary responded that, whether that was true or not, it was clear that the Soviets were at least providing considerable support to Vietnam. He had seen the evidence of what the Soviets were doing at Cam Rahn Bay and of their growing presence elsewhere in Vietnam. This was a fundamentally destabilizing development.

Dobrynin raised the subject of U.S.-China relations and gave the Secretary a non-paper on the subject. ⁵ The Secretary reminded Dobrynin that we had informed the Soviets, before he left for his trip to China, that we were changing the category in which we placed China to that of a friendly, non-allied country. In effect, we were henceforth treating China basically the same as Yugoslavia. We had previously told the Soviets also of our strong objections to the Soviet supply of arms to Central America, and yet that supply had not ceased. Recently the Soviets had provided Nicaragua—a country with 2.5 million people—with a full battalion of tanks. On a pro rata population basis, we would have to supply the Chinese with 5,000 to 6,000 tanks for any sort of equivalent action. We had warned the Soviets, but they paid no attention to our warning. Dobrynin expostulated that we could have discussed the matter, and the Secretary reminded him that we had discussed it on several occasions.

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⁵ Attached but not printed.
Returning to subject of Kampuchea and Afghanistan, the Secretary said that what we needed from the Soviets were constructive approaches. We would be quite prepared to discuss such approaches, including transitional arrangements pending a full settlement. Poland, he said, was a critical case; if the Soviets were to go in, everything in Soviet-American relations would go by the board. As for Iran, we were disturbed by Soviet propaganda claims that we had responsibility for the recent bombing.\(^6\) Dobrynin claimed that Soviet radio was only repeating what was being reported from Teheran. The Secretary stated that that was not true and said he would send Dobrynin a couple of examples of particularly objectionable broadcasts. Non-intervention in Iran, the Secretary continued, was absolutely essential to any future relationship with the Soviet Union. Dobrynin asked what he thought would happen to the leftists in Iran, and the Secretary responded that it appeared they would be going into a meat grinder. Dobrynin commented that they already were. The Secretary stated that the United States was not involved in events in Iran and expected the same of the Soviet Union.

On the subject of East-West trade, the Secretary commented that the Soviets would find that we would be taking a reasonable position. Dobrynin said he had heard that we were making plans to try to isolate the Soviets economically, and the Secretary denied that that was true. There would in time be some movement, though much would of course depend on Soviet conduct in other matters.

Dobrynin said it was essential that the Secretary and Gromyko talk about the Persian Gulf when they met in September. The Secretary responded that there was no possibility of our taking any concerted action with the Soviets concerning the Persian Gulf or the Middle East so long as the Soviets remained in Afghanistan.

Asked what we planned to do about the TTB and the PNET, the Secretary said the matters were under review.

On TNF, Dobrynin asked what our preference would be for a site for negotiations. The Secretary said that we did not yet have a definite position but probably would prefer Geneva. Asked about the relationship between TNF and SALT, the Secretary responded that these were clearly parallel issues and that at some point the tracks would have to be integrated. Dobrynin in that connection voiced a complaint about ACDA Director Rostow’s testimony.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) Rostow’s June 22 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is printed in the \textit{Department of State Bulletin}, August 1981, pp. 59–64.
67. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, July 7, 1981

SUBJECT
My Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, July 2, 1981

I called Dobrynin in primarily to stress the importance of the initiatives on Afghanistan and Poland. I told him that the EC conference proposal was a serious one, not an anti-Soviet gesture, and stressed that the U.S. was prepared to help find a solution to Afghanistan. The essential factor was that we would not agree to a puppet regime in Kabul that ignored the reestablishment of a non-aligned Afghanistan. On Kampuchea, I said we also viewed the forthcoming international conference as a serious initiative and thought the Soviets should either participate or come to the UN with a proposal of their own. What was needed on both issues were constructive approaches from the Soviets, which might include proposals for transitional arrangements pending full settlement.

Dobrynin described the mood in Moscow as one of growing doubt as to where our relationship was headed and said my forthcoming meeting with Gromyko was viewed as a benchmark in determining whether there was to be any future to the U.S.-Soviet relationship. He said he needed to know whether we were saying that Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was an absolute condition for any future relationship with the Soviet Union.

I reminded Dobrynin that we had already broken TNF out of the complex of issues facing us and had agreed to negotiations, and that in due course we would have something to say about a future long term grains agreement. Dobrynin said that he had heard that we were planning to try to isolate the Soviets economically. I denied that this was so, but said that future trade relations would of course be affected by Soviet conduct in other matters. I added that it should be clear that the pace of our dealings with the Soviets in all areas would be affected by their conduct on the Afghanistan and Kampuchea issues—and also by their conduct in two other areas of crucial importance, Iran and

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Pipes Files, Chron 07/02/1981–07/07/1981. Secret. Pipes forwarded the memorandum to Allen on July 7, with an undated covering memorandum from Allen to Reagan. On the uninitialed covering memorandum from Allen to Reagan, Allen wrote: “Except for the demarche on China (which is discussed in a separate memorandum) this is rather routine diplomatic stuff.” (Ibid.)

2 See Document 66.
Poland. It was vital to any future relationship that there be no Soviet intervention in either of these countries.

Dobrynin made another reference to the Soviet Persian Gulf initiative by saying it was essential that we talk about that area with Gromyko in September. I told him there was no possibility of any concerted U.S.-Soviet action concerning either the Persian Gulf or the Middle East so long as the Soviets remained in Afghanistan.

On arms control issues, Dobrynin asked about our plans for Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, and how we saw the relationship between TNF and SALT. He was told that all these issues were under review.

Dobrynin also raised the subject of our relations with China. I am sending you a separate memo on this subject.3

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3 See Document 69.

68. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting1

Washington, July 6, 1981, 11:09 a.m.–12:22 p.m.

SUBJECT
East-West Trade Controls

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
State
Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Deputy Secretary William P. Clark
Mr. Robert D. Hormats

USUN
Amb Jeanette J. Kirkpatrick
USTR
Amb William E. Brock
JCS
General David C. Jones
Lt General John S. Pustay

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MINUTES

The President: Opened the meeting with a brief account of a letter he had recently received from a Navy man.

Mr. Allen: The items we will discuss today are of great importance. Mr. President, the decisions you make based on today’s meeting or perhaps on two NSC meetings this week will set the course of our East-West Trade Policy and will be important in setting the course of our relations with the Soviet Union. Our Allies and the Soviets will both see these decisions as setting the course of our economic and strategic trade policy.

We need decisions before the Ottawa Summit, so that we can inform our Allies of our policies. The Summit countries together do more than 70 percent of the West’s trade with the Soviet Union.

The issues to be discussed are complex and interrelated, ranging from our Allied (COCOM) national security export controls, through U.S. and Allied controls on Oil and Gas Equipment and Technology and U.S. policy on the Siberian Pipeline, to the U.S. decision on a specific export control case—the export of 100 Caterpillar pipelayers to the Soviet Union.

The complexity and breadth of the issues—heavy in both economic and security context—required enlarging the Council for this topic.

Because of the complexity and enlarged attendance, this meeting will be introductory, with a second meeting Thursday to deal with the detailed issues in more detail.²

² See Document 71.
The objectives of this meeting are to determine the basic positions of each agency and the key factors in reaching those positions, and to identify differing views for examination in the second meeting.

The papers to be discussed can be divided into two groups. The first deals with Allied Security Controls. The remaining three papers deal with various aspects of controls on Soviet energy development.

I would like to proceed as follows: In the first round each participant will have two minutes to state his position on the options concerning National Security Controls and to identify the major considerations in his decision. Following that round, the President may wish to ask some questions. Again, we will have to limit the comments to two minutes. Then, we can follow a similar procedure for the second group of papers.

The first paper presents three options for strengthening security controls on exports to the USSR. These options would tighten COCOM security controls by varying degrees. Each would require negotiations with our COCOM allies to implement. The difficulty and length of the negotiations would, of course, probably vary with the degree of tightening of controls.

I suggest we begin with the statements of positions. Secretary Haig, would you like to begin?

Secretary Haig: Yes. It is important to know that we are dealing with a group of interrelated—and sometimes contradictory issues; to recognize that the decisions will affect both our relations with our Allies and with the Soviets. It is also important in making our decision to balance what we want against what we can do.

Option I maintains controls on equipment and technology and would be much as the policy in recent years. Our Allies are comfortable with this policy and it will be difficult to change it.

Option II would add to the controlled items equipment and technology critical to military related industries; for example, shipbuilding and heavy equipment.

Option III would control all military relevant technology.

I believe we should elect Option II, which would significantly broaden restraints. It will be difficult to do this. For two years we have been negotiating in COCOM to make a narrow increase in militarily relevant metallurgical technology with little result. Selling Option II to our Allies will be very difficult. We should seek at the Summit

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meeting a subsequent high-level COCOM meeting. At the same time as we increase these controls, we should loosen up on lower level controls.

Secretary Weinberger: We must consider our Allies’ position, but we must consider whether we wish to aid the Soviets or not, and we must not adopt the attitude that if we don’t sell to them someone else will. This is sometimes true, but our policy should be very restrictive. Almost everything aids their military and helps their economy. We know that they will only be satisfied by world domination, and we cannot satisfy them by appeasing them.

We should not give in to the argument that “if we don’t, others will.” To go along with this weakens our ability to lead and to not supply them.

While Option III is not considered feasible, following Option I should be discontinued. Option II is an improvement, but will still continue to help the Soviets. There will be slippages. We should strengthen Option II by an ad hoc examination of things under Option III. They turn against us what we provide them.

Secretary Baldrige: Mr. President, we have to have a program that works. The present program does not work. We have 5,000 applications in process. Some 2,000 are legally overdue. Our business people—and our Allies—do not understand our current policy.

I think we should go for Option II—tighten controls at the top (the higher technology)—loosening at the bottom on routine items. With fewer items to process, we can process them faster and give more attention to the more important items at the top.

For example, robots are not on the list now. We would deny some under Option II, but the simple “pick and place” robots would go.

Super alloys—there are some 2,000 of them. We can’t control all of them. We would deny the vacuum induction furnaces and technology used to make them, but not the items themselves.

We have the same kind of problem with computers. We would differentiate between the important and the not important—allow shipments of items that can be had from electronic stores.

We believe we could update the COCOM regulations by October.

Deputy Secretary Davis: I note that restrictions on atomic energy items would be continued under any of these options. We lean to Option II. However, denial may stimulate their own research to develop capabilities in the long term they otherwise would not have if dependent on imports.

Ambassador Brock: I follow Mac (Baldrige) in his recommendations. I feel we should ship almost anything in hardware—deny the technology. That way we can freeze them into a position five to ten years behind us.
Mr. Casey: It is a mistake to help the Soviets by exporting to them items they need. There is a greater negative impact from the exports than positive economic value to us as an export. We should be concerned not only about technology, but also about products. We should go as close to Option III as our Allies will allow.

General Jones: We should impose the tightest possible controls. The policy should be somewhere between Options II and III.

Mr. Stockman: I prefer Option II, but would urge the tightest possible analytical framework as to the effects of the option. We need an estimate of the cost to the Soviets in terms of the impact on military investment and the linkage of our policy to their economic expansion.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: We need to be concerned about the impact of our policies on our Allies. But we also need to be concerned about their impact on the rest of the world. Strengthening Soviet capabilities increases their power around the world and their ability to interfere. I don’t believe that denying exports to them will increase their ability to innovate on their own. We should force them to divert productive capacity to developing their own technology. We should follow Option II, plus an item-by-item analysis.

Mr. Allen: Mr. President, after your questions, I would propose following the same procedures on the remaining papers.

The President: I do have a question. The Caterpillar tractors for the pipeline. Where would they fall in the options discussed?

Mr. Allen: Under Option I, the pipelayers could go. Under Option II, they could go—unless restricted by an ad hoc analysis.

Under Option III, they would not go.

The President: Is all this predicated on dealing with our Allies? It is not much to us economically, but, for example, the whole pipeline thing if the Soviet Union can meet its own needs, there is less need to go to the Gulf. But does Western Europe become more dependent?

Secretary Haig: The pipelayers are not related to COCOM controls. I suggest we cover that item, Mr. President, under the next discussion.

Secretary Weinberger: The question was what would happen under these rules? Under Option II, they would get it. This is the reason that Option II must be strengthened to avoid pre-automatic approval that would strengthen Soviet export capabilities.

Mr. Baker: In other words, energy would not be considered a Defense priority item?

Secretary Weinberger: It could be.

Mr. Allen: Let’s go through the arguments on the remaining papers.

Mr. Meese: This topic controls the others.
Secretary Weinberger: I continue to have concerns about Option II.

The President: One more thing. Is this unilateral, or what is the effect on the Allies?

Mr. Allen: Your decision would be a fit topic for the Summit. We all agree on the need to strengthen controls. The vehicle used (to approach the Allies) will be critical. As Al said, your decisions will have tremendous undercurrents.

Secretary Haig: We might look at the history on this. Carter decided post-Afghanistan on a tightening of the controls. We have been attempting to tighten the controls for the last year, but there are two problems. One was the lack of a coherent U.S. policy. The second is the reluctance of our Allies. It will be a strong, uphill battle to strengthen controls (even going for Option II), but it can be accomplished by strong leadership. We would all like Option III, but we can’t do it.

Secretary Baldrige: But they still want to buy them from the U.S. Allowing them to have the pipelayers helps them (to solve their problems).

Mr. Allen: I suggest we go through the same routine on the remaining papers. The remaining three papers examine the U.S. and Allied positions on the export of equipment and technology that would assist the Soviets in the exploration and production of oil and gas.

However, they do not pose the question of whether it is in the interest of the U.S. and the Western Allies to assist development of Soviet energy? The major arguments on this question are:

For:

—Developing Soviet energy helps them overcome potential energy and hard currency shortages and reduces their motivation to aggression in the Persian Gulf Oil area.

—Increases the world oil supply and keeps the Soviets from purchasing on Western oil markets, reducing pressure on world oil prices.

—Maintains a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union in an important economic area to offset the competitive relationship in the military sectors.

—Results in substantial export and employment benefits for U.S. and Allied countries.

Against:

—It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will ever become dependent on the world market for oil imports; if it decides to intervene in the Persian Gulf, it will do so for reasons other than to obtain oil; e.g., to deprive the West of oil.

—Western equipment and technology reduces the costs of energy development to the Soviet Union and frees resources for application in the military sector.
Western assistance contributes to an expansion of Soviet energy exports to the West and to Eastern Europe and increases their dependence on the USSR.

It is inconsistent to seek increases in defense expenditures while making it easier for the Soviets to devote resources to their military.

These are some of the very complex issues. Al, would you like to begin the discussion?

Secretary Haig: There are five options to consider (referring to Oil/Gas Controls). The first three are so restrictive we cannot get Allied cooperation on them. The Allies would argue that these options would result in greater Soviet demand on the world oil market and lead to more aggressive Soviet behavior. This is a complex issue. The toughest to be decided today. It involves—is it in our interest to hinder Soviet energy development? What are the implications of decreased Soviet production? What can be negotiated with our Allies? The Soviets will perceive us as rigid. The Soviets will appear to be forthcoming. We give them no incentive to negotiate with us. The question is do we wish to concentrate on limiting exports of technology, or on end use equipment that is available elsewhere?

We should focus on preventing access to technology—Option IV—but with a case-by-case analysis of end items. But as an overall policy, we should go for controls on export of technology.

Mr. Allen: That covers the second paper, but are you prepared to state your position on the pipeline?

Secretary Haig: Yes, if you want me to. The first two options are overly harsh and not sustainable. Our Allies see Soviet energy as more secure than OPEC. They want to diversify by taking in Soviet energy.

I am concerned about the dependency question. I would recommend a modified Option III, where we would look at end items before licensing. We can put major pressure on our Allies at the Summit, but I have talked to Schmidt twice and to Genscher three times on the pipeline and they refuse to give up on it and, Mr. President, you received a call from Schmidt over the weekend. They say they can go for six months in the event of a Soviet cut-off. I favor Option III, very much toughened on any item.

On the pipelayers, the Japanese are going to sell them anyway. The Soviets have approximately 1,500 of them in inventory. These are replacements for existing equipment. They are not for the Siberian Pipeline. They involve no sophisticated technology. They are not COCOM controlled. They can be used only for pipelaying. They have no other applications. They do not involve a technology transfer. The Japanese would provide them.

Secretary Weinberger: I feel differently on all three issues. I haven’t all the Schmidt arguments, but I am weary of defining our policy on
what Schmidt wants. Our policy should be leadership—not anticipating what our Allies will say and setting our policy on that. The Schmidt government is weak and may not be around long, anyway.

It should be clear to our Allies that it is definitely against our (mutual) interests to increase Soviet capabilities by $20 billion per year.

We sent scrap iron to Japan before World War II and we are doing a great deal to increase Soviet capabilities. We need a harder line position.

We should come closer to Option I on Oil/Gas Export Controls. We need to demonstrate to our Allies that it is not in our interest to increase Soviet capabilities. It will take hard work to develop energy substitutes (alternative supplies for them).

The easy way to go is to give up. The Soviet ability to build the pipeline without Western assistance is questionable. Compressors are necessary to the pipeline. We can work with our competitors to develop internal arrangements to make the Japanese less willing to sell.

Komatsu gets a subsidy from the Japanese government. The Japanese can subsidize because they don’t have to pay for their own defense. We need to persuade the Allies with alternative solutions (to their energy needs) that the pipeline is not in their interest. For example, Komatsu wants into the U.S. market.

I would take a position much closer to our security interests. It seems wrong to authorize equipment they want from us. On the Caterpillar pipelayers, I would elect Option I (deny). On the Siberian Pipeline, somewhere between Options I and II. It is not in our interest to increase Allied dependence.

*The Vice President:* Suppose Caterpillar has a French facility, would U.S. restrictions apply?

*Secretary Weinberger:* Yes, we can enforce U.S. law on a U.S. company. We can persuade them under U.S. law.

*The Vice President:* Suppose the company is 51 percent foreign owned?

*Secretary Weinberger:* There are means by which we can control the exports.

*Secretary Baldrige:* We want to be as tough as we can, operating in the real world. If we go too far and can’t get our Allies to go with us, it won’t work. I have with me Assistant Secretary Larry Brady, who is known as “the toughest gun in the West” on export controls and he supports this position. The products—pipelayers, compressors, drill bits—are generally available from other sources.

As Al said, there are 1,400 pipelayers in the USSR. Komatsu is 1/3 the size of Caterpillar and has the market targeted. We cannot stop all these countries from shipping to the USSR.
My position is Option IV on Oil/Gas Controls, Option III on the pipeline project.

The pipelayers get to be an emotional argument. The Japanese will sell them to the Soviets. The existing licensing requirements were imposed for human rights reasons.

Deputy Secretary Davis: The theme of the discussion seems to be what our Allies will support. We want to restrict export of technology, but this requires Allied support. The international oil companies are the transferring of technology. To control them would require strong Allied support.

My main concern is the Siberian Pipeline. It will have an important effect on Soviet exports. I would like to delay or restrict it.

On the Oil/Gas Controls, I would prefer Option III, if strongly supported by our Allies; Option IV if we do not get that support. On the pipeline, I prefer Option II, but Option III is more likely practical. The pipelayers should not be supplied, but our decision should depend on the Japanese position.

Ambassador Brock: I would recommend Option IV on Oil/Gas; Option III on the pipeline, and Option III on the pipelayers.

There are strong feelings in this room on what should be done. However, I believe there are two threats to our security. There is the Soviet threat and the economic threat.

Increased oil prices have put heavy economic burdens on the Free World. The fact that Schmidt is in trouble and that there are four communists in the French government illustrates the economic weakness. Our Allies are all in political jeopardy, including Mrs. Thatcher. We give far more than $20 billion annually to the OPEC countries. A way to break OPEC would be desirable. But we are not working on it. To break a potential dependency on the Soviets, we need to increase exports of coal, nuclear, etc.

Secretary Regan: We want the Soviets to keep producing oil and gas. We could not supply Europe. We are probably going to have a shortage of gas in the mid-80s. Now Western Europe is hostage to Algeria. Their economies are weakened by energy events. It is advisable to keep the gas flowing.

My recommendations are: Oil/Gas—Option IV; Siberian Pipeline—Option III; Pipelayers—Option III.

Mr. Casey: We need to talk turkey to our Allies. The OPEC problem is a separate one. We are talking about getting two percent of the energy we need from the Soviets at the expense of increasing their hard currency by 25 percent. The Soviets are a small factor in the Allies’ trade accounts. We are a larger factor.
The Soviets cannot do without gas. They will have to divert resources to building pipe and compressors if the West doesn’t supply them.

I understand there is a Senator Garn letter signed by 40 to 50 Senators opposing the pipeline. We have the right to tell our Allies they should not put in the pipeline if they expect us to defend them.

Senator Garn proposes increased exports of coal and nuclear power.

*General Jones:* Oil/Gas has a definite security concern. We recommend on Oil/Gas Controls, Option II; on the pipeline, Option I or II; and on the pipelayers, Option I.

But we cannot restrict everything if the Allies let it flow. We should not take unilateral action. Should have some flexibility in getting our Allies cooperation.

*Mr. Stockman:* I have grave doubts about frustrating Soviet production of energy for three reasons:

1. There is an asymmetry in oil resources versus world populations, with reserves concentrated in the Middle East and in the USSR. Restrictions on Soviet production would impose a burden on the West, which needs energy.
2. The Soviet Bloc is now a large net exporter. If we impede them, we will reduce their exportable surplus. This would cost them foreign exchange, but would increase Western energy prices.
3. There is a good case for exceptionalism (to other restrictive policies) in Oil/Gas. Exports of Oil/Gas equipment come back to the West in the form of Oil and Gas, improving the energy balance and decreasing world prices.

I favor the same options as Treasury.

*Ambassador Kirkpatrick:* We consistently find that, in our negotiations, the Allies are already significantly dependent. France for 15 percent of its gas; the FRG for 30 percent. Our negotiations and discussions with our Allies already mention dependency as an inhibiting factor on their actions.

Increases in energy supplies won’t necessarily hold down Soviet prices. They don’t necessarily price on a supply-demand basis. We have to think about Option I on each of the three issues.

*Mr. Allen:* Mr. President, we will prepare an overview paper for you. We note the urgent requirement for decisions. Because of the size of the Pipeline project and its strategic implications, it is the most urgent and important decision.

*Secretary Haig:* Much of what has been said about the pipeline is theology. It always is. But we have to go to Ottawa with a strong alternative program. We have to have a strong, skeptical view. We should not support the pipeline. We should stay skeptical and work with our Allies.
The President: We are held by our Allies to be most rigid (in our approach) to maintain a stricter position. Our Allies note they have the Soviets next to them. Trade is more essential to them. But, how do we say to our own people that we must continue to sacrifice—and to our Allies—if we are not prepared to use all our weapons? Don’t we seem guilty of hypocrisy—weak—if we are not prepared to take a strong position?

I for one don’t think we are being harsh or rigid. The Soviets have spoken as plainly as Hitler did in “Mein Kampf.” They have spoken world domination—at what point do we dig in our heels?

Mr. Allen: I request that all of you display total reticence in discussion about this meeting and that you do not characterize the positions of other participants. The President makes the decisions—not the NSC.

Secretary Weinberger: You do have the Garn letter, do you not?

Mr. Allen: Yes.

The meeting terminated at 12:22 p.m.

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69. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, July 7, 1981

SUBJECT

Second Soviet Demarche on our Relations with China

When Dobrynin saw me on July 2 he brought in a paper on U.S.-Chinese relations, following up the earlier approach he had made to Walter Stoessel on June 17. Both papers were worded fairly sharply, but this new one drops the subject of “assurances” which previous Administrations had supposedly given the Soviets about not arming the Chinese. Nor does the new one repeat the threat that they would consider our arming the Chinese hostile to the Soviet Union.

The new demarche is not, in fact, limited to the question of arms supply but treats our relationship with the Chinese more broadly, claiming that we are guided in developing that relationship solely by hostility toward the Soviet Union. The main point seems to be a warning

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2 See Document 63.
that we should realize that there is a limit as to how far we can go in developing relations with China without affecting the very nature of our relations with the Soviet Union.

While the June 17 demarche thus appears to have been a quick reaction to the first sensational press reports about our new attitude toward possible arms transfers to China, this second demarche, like some of the more recent Soviet propaganda statements, seems to reflect a more realistic appreciation of the situation. In effect, the message seems to be that the Soviets are waiting to see what we actually do about arms transfers before drawing any firm conclusions. The paper ends with an expression of hope that the USG, and you personally, will take a fresh look at our recent steps toward China and weigh “the real costs and dangers.”

We will be sending a reply directly to Gromyko, using it as a vehicle for our Charge d’Affaires in Moscow to request an appointment with Gromyko. This would assure that our message gets through and would also give us a better indication of Gromyko’s current mood. We will remind Gromyko, as I did Dobrynin, that we will develop relations with the PRC on their merits, and that the Soviet Union cannot expect to exercise a veto over our relationship with a nation of one billion people.

A copy of the Dobrynin paper is attached.

Attachment

Paper

Moscow, undated

The Soviet leadership deems it necessary to touch once again upon the question of US intentions and actions in the field of its relations with the PRC. It appears that the American side has been increasingly guided in that field not by the interests of international peace and stability or even by the logic and dynamics of developing normal relationship between the two States, but exclusively by considerations hostile to the Soviet Union.

Do not, for example, statements pertaining to agreement reached between the USA and the PRC, on coordinating their efforts in order

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3 See Document 81.
4 Secret; Sensitive. A copy of this paper in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File: USSR (06/26/1981–07/02/1981), bears a handwritten note at the top: “From Dobrynin to Secretary. 7/2/81.”
to “limit the Soviet Union’s opportunities”, to co-operate “on a new plateau”, and to expand military ties between them testify to it?

Moreover, the American side openly declared that it was including China from now on into the category of states friendly to the USA while proclaiming its intent to deal with the Soviet Union proceeding from a hostile nature of relations with it. A question is in order—how would the US leadership perceive and qualify declarations of that kind if the United States were in the place of the Soviet Union?

And the matter is not confined to declarations alone. Now on the agenda are already sales of American weapons and military equipment to China. The obvious intent of this decision cannot be disguised or changed by attempts of the American side to present the aforesaid decision as if it were a routine step within the framework of a regular development of Sino-American relations which allegedly does not infringe upon the interests of other states or endanger world peace.

But is it possible to consider it a routine matter to transfer lethal weapons to a country whose leaders openly advocate the inevitability of a new world war and in fact push others toward unleashing it? And is it possible to consider it normal to assist militarily a country which puts groundless territorial claims practically to all of its neighbors and wages armed attacks and incursions on their territories?

The Government of the US ought to know all this. Nevertheless, it invites Peking to address to it its requests for arms deliveries. The American side is obviously far from being disturbed by the flippant way in which Peking is prepared to play with the destiny of the world and to recourse to the military force.

We have already warned the American side of the dangerous consequences that the policy of encouraging the expansionist aspirations of China might have for peace and stability in the Far East and South-East Asia. And it would seem that the leadership of the United States should realize that there is a line in Soviet-American relations in connection with China, crossing which will inevitably affect the very nature of these relations, and to the detriment of not only the Soviet Union.

Reaffirming all that we have said previously in connection with the intentions of the USA to provide China with weapons and military technology, we would like to say quite clearly that whatever the American side is guided by in this matter, it should not deceive itself as to the capability of the Soviet Union to prevent any harm to its security or security of its allies and friends.

The American side should also be aware that any of its practical steps aimed at strengthening China militarily in circumstances when the latter takes an openly hostile stand against the Soviet Union, will be properly taken into account by us.
The Soviet leadership while frankly stating its views on the matter, would like to express its hope that the US Government and the President personally will once again thoroughly weigh all of their latest steps regarding China, and match them against the real costs and dangers they present to the world and not in the least to the US itself.

70. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, July 8, 1981

SUBJECT
Controls on Exports to the Soviet Union

As you consider the issues discussed at Monday’s NSC meeting on East/West trade, I wanted you to be aware of my deep concerns on the subject. Your decisions will have a profound effect on our Alliances and our relations with the Soviets for years to come. For that reason I want to convey an approach which in my judgment meets your desire for a consistent policy which weakens the Soviets’ military capability without weakening our Alliance.

Like you I believe Western assistance to the Soviet energy sector in many respects runs contrary to our security interests. It relieves the Soviets of an important resource burden; it can provide them with equipment and technology with potential military applications; it may increase their leverage over our Allies; and the pipeline particularly would provide them with large sums of hard currency. If I had my preference, I would take an extremely restrictive approach to trade with the Soviets.

However, for any controls to work we need the cooperation of our Allies. For us to attempt to get straight across-the-board restrictions, which some of the more restrictive alternatives before you imply, or to press the Europeans with an approach which they will find completely unacceptable, and threaten to withhold licenses unless they comply, would make it virtually impossible to get their support for a reasonable set of controls. By pursuing our maximum objectives, we run the risk

1 Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Soviet Union: Trade 2/5. Secret.
2 See Document 67.
of coming away with very little, severely weakening the Alliance and isolating us from our Allies.

Our European Allies have legitimate and urgent interests in seeking additional and diversified sources of energy, and the decision, in the end, is theirs. Therefore, we must consider that we can realistically expect to achieve in limiting their involvement with the Soviet energy sector and at what cost. The cost that concerns me most is not lost business opportunities but rather the prospects of divisions within the Alliance. An overly rigid position could produce a confrontation with our Allies that would not only fail to produce any restraint on Soviet energy sales but would itself be an enormous positive gain for the Russians. We do not want to repeat, on a larger scale, the Carter Administration’s disastrous confrontation with the Germans over the sale of German nuclear technology to Brazil.

Therefore, my own position is shaped by weighing what I would like to achieve against what I believe we can actually accomplish. I think that one of our most important objectives is tightening up on technology transfers, including COCOM controls. The past record suggests that this task alone will be very difficult to accomplish. I therefore do not believe that we should be taking categorical negative positions on the sale of end-use equipment or striking a categorical opposition to the pipeline.³

Whatever position you ultimately decide on, Mr. President, it is equally important to stipulate appropriate tactics and style with which to approach our Allies. We must, above all, not adopt a confrontational posture or an inflexible position. We must recognize that they have much more serious energy problems than we do, and that the sacrifices we are proposing would be borne much more heavily by them than by us.

If we are to have any chance of persuading them to modify their current positions (or at least to scale down the size of their proposed dependence on Soviet energy) we must take a stronger lead in evolving a better Energy Cooperation Package. This will require that the United States play a much more practical role than we have in the past in boosting Alaskan oil exports, increasing the pace of U.S. natural gas deregulation, increasing U.S. coal exports, providing a coal gasification program, addressing the major problem of nuclear wastes, pressing Holland and Norway to develop natural gas surge capacity and developing new initiatives. This may even involve increased resource commitments on our part. But if we expect our Allies to bear a burden we

³ An unknown hand underlined: “striking a categorical opposition to pipeline.”
must be prepared to do so ourselves in the general interest of Western security. There is no free lunch.

The development of alternative energy sources is something which we should pursue urgently, whatever we do on the subject of Soviet energy development.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated

**ISSUE 1: Security related export controls**—I continue to believe that restricting technology and equipment critical to defense priority industries which would significantly advance Soviet military capability would be a major step forward in *weakening the Soviet industrial sector* in those areas which provide important support to the Soviet military. To ensure that this option (#2) is pursued in a way which meets Cap Weinberger and Mac Baldrige’s concerns, I propose to get together with them to flesh out the details of implementation and to prepare a strong presentation for you to take to Ottawa in support of this approach. The past record suggests that securing allied support for this approach will be very difficult—but in my judgment it should be our major objective.

**ISSUE 2: Oil and gas equipment and technology**—The central issue is whether to direct our ammunition at restricting technology or to attempt to restrict technology plus all end-use equipment (e.g. pipes and pipelayers). Allied support for restricted end-use equipment will be visibly impossible to obtain. If we press for it we will jeopardize our chances of their agreeing to restrict technology exports. A unified set of allied restrictions on technology which would give the Soviets an independent capability to improve oil and gas usage and infrastructure would be a major step forward. End-use products could be denied on a case by case basis as foreign policy concerns warrant. I genuinely believe that this flexibility in your hands can be extremely important in the pursuit of your foreign policy objective vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and our allies. And, adoption of this course of action—as Don Regan and Dave Stockman noted—will contribute to keeping the Soviets off the world energy market and reduce any incentive which future domes-

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4 Secret.
tic energy shortages might provide for adventurism in the Middle East or other energy rich regions of the world.

**ISSUE 3: The Siberian Gas Pipeline**—I would like to find a way of convincing the Europeans not to build the pipeline. But strong arm-twisting and withholding export licenses is likely to be counterproductive. An approach which would lead Europe not to build the pipeline or perhaps encourage them to scale down its size, would be for the US, Europe and Japan to work out a strong Energy Cooperation Package. This would involve US Alaskan oil exports, faster US natural gas deregulation, increased US coal exports, and increased nuclear cooperation, a strong commitment to deal with oil shortfalls in the context of the International Energy Agency, plus additional efforts by Holland and Norway to develop surge capacity. Even if this approach failed to deter the Europeans from going ahead with, or scale down, the pipeline, it would substantially reduce their vulnerability to Soviet cut-offs if the pipeline were built and reduce levels of gas through the pipeline.

**ISSUE 4: Caterpillar Licenses**—I continue to believe the only real beneficiary of denying these licenses would be the Japanese. The Soviets already have roughly 1,400 pipelayers. The machines do not incorporate sophisticated technology and are not controlled by COCOM.
71. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, July 9, 1981, 3:30–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
East-West Trade Controls

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
State
Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Dep Sec William P. Clark
Mr. Robert D. Hormats
OSD
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Dep Sec Frank C. Carlucci
Treasury
Secretary Donald T. Regan
Commerce
Secretary Malcolm H. Baldrige
Mr. Lawrence J. Brady
Energy
Dep Sec W. Kenneth Davis
OMB
Mr. Edward Harper
CIA
Mr. William J. Casey

The discussion began at 3:40 p.m.

The President: Before we get down to the serious business of the day—Happy birthday to General Jones.

An exchange of pleasantries followed.

Mr. Allen: Mr. President, we have a full agenda today. If you will permit me, I would like to state the objective of today’s meeting and then a suggested method of procedure.

We have two topics to cover. We will continue our discussion of East-West controls. We would also like to devote some attention to the

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Caribbean Basin Policy. Secretary Haig and Ambassador Brock will be going to Nassau this weekend for a Foreign Minister’s meeting.

With regard to the East-West portion of our discussion, we have only a short period to make decisions required to be presented to our Allies at the Ottawa Summit meeting. We need, at that meeting, to seek their support for important initiatives that will have a profound effect on both near- and longer-term military, political and economic facets of our East-West relations.

Our objective today is to complete the NSC discussion of the East-West trade topics, though the President may choose not to make his final decisions for a few more days.

There is a great deal of complex material to be covered and each agency should have an opportunity to advance its key arguments. Therefore, I propose to proceed as follows:

There appear to be substantial areas of agreement on the Allied Security Controls topic. While there is not unanimity on the precise course to be followed, I believe the positions of individual departments are quite well defined. Perhaps some adjustments could be made to narrow if we spent more time. However, I believe it would be better to spend the major portion of time on those key issues where wider divergencies exist; that is, on the Oil/Gas and Siberian Pipeline issues. Additionally, we have three new papers to consider on these issues.

Therefore, Mr. President, unless you wish to propose some questions on the Allied Security Controls, I suggest we move on to the Oil/Gas and Siberian Pipeline problems.

*The President:* I suggest Mac, Al and Cap get together to work out something. Leaning a little toward Option III would be fine with me.

*Mr. Allen:* Mr. President, I suggest the following procedure for the remaining items. Based on an NSC memo request to Secretaries Haig and Weinberger, they have made two additional submissions, answering certain questions. These two additional submissions have been provided to all the participants here. Additionally, today I sent them two further questions based on their submissions. If you will forgive the somewhat rigid nature of this procedure, I will now pose to them the two questions they were provided earlier and they could then answer these questions.

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2 Allen forwarded three papers to NSC members under cover of a July 8 memorandum: a July 6 memorandum from Allen to Haig and Weinberger; a July 8 memorandum from Bremer to Allen forwarding an undated paper entitled “A Positive Approach: The Siberian Pipeline and West European Energy Security”; and a July 8 memorandum from Weinberger to Allen forwarding an undated paper entitled “US Policy on the West Siberian Pipeline.” (Reagan Library, Meese Files, Economic Relations—East-West)
Following that we could then go around the table for additional comments and questions. Secretaries Haig and Weinberger could collect the questions for a response in one fell swoop.

Is that satisfactory to you gentlemen?

Secretary Haig: Yes.

Secretary Weinberger: Yes.

Mr. Allen: Mr. President?

The President: O.K.

Mr. Allen: Secretary Haig, your July 8 paper proposes a “very tough Option III” under which we would “press” our Allies to take several specific measures to minimize their dependency on Soviet gas. If we do not ourselves deny licenses on exports related to the project, and if we do not enlist the aid of the Japanese and British in restricting exports critical to the project, what is it that is “tough” about our policy? Also, what kind of pressure would we put on our Allies to get them to give anything more than lip service to the program of minimizing dependence you have outlined?

Secretary Haig: We should be clear on the two questions. You have singled out the pipeline. The other issue is Oil/Gas Controls. On that issue we don’t believe we could get Allied cooperation on controls on technology and equipment. We want to control the technology, but don’t believe we can do the equipment as well.

Related to the original question, “Where are we on the pipeline?” Gentlemen, we have been talking about “jawboning”—that’s what it is. And we have been doing it. We have talked with Genscher. We have talked with Schmidt. They want the pipeline! It is important to them! If we ask them to stop, we are asking them to sacrifice from a goal of diversifying their energy supply and on trade at the same time. We lifted the controls on three-fourths of our own trade with the Soviets when we lifted the grain embargo. It would be inconsistent to put pressure on them when we are loosening our own controls.

We have been trying to get them to stop the pipeline, but cannot get them to do it. Schmidt has committed himself publicly to this transaction. Public arm-twisting by us would be counter-productive. However, I believe intelligent handling can convince them to decrease their vulnerability and to increase their protective measures.

Now, as far as a “tough” Option III is concerned, “tough” may be a misnomer. We need to be tough vis-a-vis the Soviets. We need to be tough on our budgeteers; we need to be tough on our Allies. We need to be tough on getting a program to put in place on energy security. We need to press our Allies to cut in half the size of the pipeline deliveries. We need to assist them to diversify—to limit their imports of Soviet gas.
In recent weeks the increase in interest rates, the decrease in the projected demand for gas, etc., has been causing consumption problems and a glut in oil.

We should be prepared to give our Allies an alternative package that would involve, perhaps, Alaskan oil. We should deregulate natural gas, make provisions to deepen our harbors to expand coal shipments. This may require some Federal financing. We should reinforce and increase energy sharing arrangements. We must do this whether or not the pipeline is built. We had to help the Dutch in the last oil crisis.

I think, Mr. President, you should mobilize at the Summit a high-level monitoring group.

(The following question was posed in writing to Secretary Haig before the meeting. He answered without the question being reposed.)

Mr. Allen’s question submitted earlier in writing follows:

Would it be inconsistent with your scenario to press very strongly at Ottawa, especially on the Germans and French, perhaps privately, for their agreement to delay further negotiations on the pipeline for, say six months, pending a thorough inter-Allied review of the project and alternatives to it?

Secretary Haig: With regard to the second question, “Would we ask them to delay six months?” We shouldn’t do this. If we start the work to demonstrate there are other alternatives, they don’t want to spend their money there (on the pipeline). But the pipeline is a public problem for Schmidt. He is publicly committed to it. They will tread water anyway, without our requiring them to do so.

Mr. President, you will find at Ottawa that our European Allies are in a blue funk about their economic situation. They blame us in part for their problems, because of our approach to our own economic problems—because of our interest rates. A rigid approach to this problem of the pipeline will bring a repeat of the disastrous Carter Administration confrontation with the Germans over the sale of German nuclear technology to Brazil—with a far more significant effect on our ability to deal on East-West matters!

Mr. Allen: You asked and answered the second question.

Secretary Weinberger, why couldn’t your objectives be best served by imploring—persuading our Allies to delay the pipeline, rather than stop it (Mr. Allen paraphrased the following question that had earlier been delivered to Secretary Weinberger:)

Your objective, as stated in your paper, is to stop the pipeline or, if that is not possible, to scale it down. Why wouldn’t this objective be best served by requesting, at least as a first step, that our Allies, especially the Germans, agree to delay further negotiations for at least six months, until a full examination of all aspects of the project can be
completed, rather than approaching them now with a statement that
the project must be stopped, and with threats to block exports by the
U.S. and other Allies of critical components?

Secretary Weinberger: We are unequivocally in favor of stopping the
pipeline. Leadership does not add up the columns on the opinions of
our Allies, then conclude you are defeated. You decide what is needed
and you do it. The Europeans should be clear on that.

I suspect that the speculation re a shaky economic base for the
pipeline is true. We should drive home that we are unalterably opposed
to it.

Nobody here at this table wants it built. We can do all the things
listed that have been talked about to provide alternatives to the Europe-
ans. They are all good. We can do all the substitutes. But why do all
that and build the pipeline too?

We have the objective of stopping it. That may be impossible, but
we must try. If built, it will produce large hard currency earnings for
the Soviet Union. It will increase European dependence on the Soviets.
We worry, even now, about the course of the Germans.

Realistically, we have persuasive power. We must exercise it.
Otherwise, to offer these alternatives is useless. If the pipeline is built,
we have lost. We give the impression of a weak, undecided country.
We must use all reasonable leadership and tactics and alternatives.

If someone believes we can use delay as a means—fine, but our
objective should be to stop the pipeline. We need to be firm, resolute, in
our objective to stop it. We must use all the proper tactics and strategy.

Mr. Allen: My second question is: “As you indicated, compressors
that must come from either the U.S. or the UK are critical to the pipeline.
However, these compressors offer potential sales of as much as $300–
$600 million to Rolls Royce, a sick company in a sick British economy
with a current unemployment rate of about ten percent. Faced with
high levels of unemployment and with a German and French desire
to go ahead with the pipeline, what incentive would there be for the
British government to block the sale of these compressors? What pres-
sures or incentives could we bring to bear to motivate the British
to go along with our desire to block the pipeline? Wouldn’t British
cooperation be significantly easier to obtain if our stated objective was
only to delay the pipeline, pending a review of alternatives and/or
steps to minimize European dependency, as compared to a position
where we propose to the Allies that the pipeline be permanently
blocked?”

Secretary Weinberger: In the last three years, we have spent $265.3
million with Rolls Royce. We have under current consideration pur-
chase of the Harrier aircraft. There are many other co-production possi-
bilities. It is very easy to give them other sales. Of course, we must not publicly bludgeon them, but motivating them can be done by giving them other contracts.

**Mr. Allen:** Mr. President, we also have a new submission from the CIA providing new information. Bill, would you like to summarize your paper?³

**Mr. Casey:** Yes, Mr. President, I would like to make three points. First, minimizing their dependence (on OPEC oil) would not be achieved by Soviet gas which would provide only three percent of West European energy. More important, this pipeline is the largest East-West deal ever. We have to take this matter very seriously. This is our greatest opportunity ever to force the Soviets to divert resources from military programs.

Second, the $16 billion to be lent to the Soviets for this project should better be lent on this side of the curtain to develop Western sources. There are probably better and less expensive alternatives in the West than the pipeline.

Third, with regard to the tactics at Ottawa, at a minimum we should put it off until we explore other alternatives that will be permanent assets to the West.

**Mr. Allen:** Mr. President, the CIA paper was delivered this morning. You may wish to look it over at your leisure. I commend it to you as I do the other papers received since the last meeting.⁴

We can now move around the table for the comments and questions of others.

**Secretary Baldrige:** Mr. President, the essence of leadership is to take the strongest possible position. But we are weakened if we fail. We don’t believe it is practical to stop compressors and pipelayers and the other equipment needed for the pipeline. There is a cable in today that reports a Japanese sale of 500 pipelayers to the Russians.⁵ Caterpillar has been told by the Soviets that if they do not have a license by 30 July, Caterpillar loses the sale. There are 1,400 pipelayers in the USSR now. They can be moved to work on the pipeline. Other smaller equipment alternatives are available now from other than the U.S. and Japan.

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⁴ See Document 68.

⁵ Reference is to telegram 12715 from Tokyo, July 9. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810320–0186)
These other alternatives can be developed over time to build the pipeline.

The same is true of the compressors. There are two sources now, but others can make compressors in the reasonably near future. In the time needed to get the pipeline going—three to four years—many other alternatives can be developed.

*Mr. Casey:* What about the money?

*Secretary Weinberger:* If they can’t get the money, they can’t build it. We need to stop the entire European support, including the money.

*Secretary Haig:* I think Mac is talking about the technology.

*Secretary Baldrige:* My point, is that simple bilateral arrangements with two countries cannot stop the line. I would like to associate my position with that of State. I recommend a strong program to develop alternatives. We have said we want financing of dredging of harbors, etc., by the private sector. We want foreign capital to develop our resources.

*Mr. Allen:* Mr. Davis, please keep your comments to two minutes, or less.

*Deputy Secretary Davis:* We would like to see it stopped or scaled down. However, we defer to others for evaluations of the prospects of success of doing so.

In either event, we need to increase other alternative sources. However, the other alternatives are not necessarily direct substitutes for gas. Nuclear power development takes considerable time. Deregulation of U.S. gas would free supplies for Western Europe. But we need to get going on such programs.

*Ambassador Brock:* In the last meeting I spoke about the economic aspects of this issue. Now I want to look at it as a politician. There are desperate economic problems in Europe. There is the effect of high U.S. interest rates, which has resulted in a revaluation of the dollar that has brought to Western Europe the equivalent of a “third oil shock.” Western Europe has a $13 billion trade deficit with us.

It is better to go with a request that they delay. I am intrigued with Bill Casey’s suggestion of gas from coal. We have lots of coal here, but we can’t guarantee it will be economic until we cost it out.

How we do it (persuade the Allies to stop/delay) is important. I support, essentially, State’s position.

*Mr. Harper:* I think the points that Mr. Stockman wanted me to make are that by discouraging the pipeline today and subsidizing other sources, we will wind up later with the Soviets having their energy, while we are depleting ours.

The key question is where are we going on a broad picture basis?
Secretary Regan: I would support delay of the pipeline.

Secretary Haig: Code words cause problems. We could not (in the State Department) be able to support going to Schmidt with a request for him to delay. We seek delay, but the way we skin that cat is not to go to Europeans now with a request to stop a project three years along.

We cannot be seen as intervening in their economic fate. It’s their money! It’s their project! We must be very careful on how we intervene.

Mr. Allen: There is no intention to use code words. We are talking about our security.

Secretary Weinberger: Our interest rates won’t decrease if the pipeline is built. Their deficit won’t be decreased if it is built. We must make our position clear. Is the best way to stop the pipeline to go for a delay?

The alternative supply concept is useful, but not much good if the gas is already coming in.

General Jones: We want to stop the pipeline, but others are best qualified to decide how.

Mr. Casey: Our approach should be that we want to show them another way—a way to avoid building the pipeline.

The President: I don’t understand.

Mr. Casey: I want to spend the $16 billion some other way. We could add to the kitty—do a better job.

Mr. Allen: Your argument is that we want the $16 billion of investment on our side of the line—not theirs.

Mr. Harper: There are budget implications in “adding to the pot.”

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: The pipeline would tie Western Europe to the Soviet Union. It’s already tied strongly. Three hundred thousand West German jobs are now dependent on East-West trade. If the Federal Republic becomes thirty percent dependent on Soviet gas, the number of jobs dependent on East-West trade will increase.

Will this make the Germans or us more secure?

We don’t want to increase the tendency toward the Findlandization of Europe. We don’t want to help the Soviets. We don’t want to sell them the rope to hang us!

_____: The question is, if you stop or slow the pipeline, does it hurt the Soviet economy?

Secretary Haig: This is a fundamental Foreign Policy and Security Policy issue. We have just lifted the grain embargo. Three-fourths of U.S. trade with the Soviet Union has been decontrolled. We are about to negotiate a new grain agreement with them. We must be careful that we do not follow inconsistent policies.
I have just spent time with Thorn\(^6\) (EC). There are riots in Europe—unemployment, disaffected youth; there are problems in the Federal Republic of Germany.

No one at this table should think we have not taken a hard position on the pipeline—and I have done it personally! I have already told them no. They have gone ahead anyway.

Nobody here wants this pipeline. The question is how can we best manage this problem. It would be a tragedy even to demand a six-month delay. We must provide alternatives. We must suggest they don’t need it. It is interesting that the Department of Defense and State papers use the same statistics. Yet, we come to different conclusions.

Secretary Weinberger: There are significant differences. We have not yet done anything unequivocal concerning a position against the pipeline, coupled with a positive alternative program. If they think we are going to plead with them, they will not go along.

The pipeline won’t stop the unemployment or the riots. If we are unequivocal, we may stop the pipeline. If we are not unequivocal, we will not have assumed a leadership role.

The President: Is the idea the Europeans are going to do the financing? If they do not, the Soviets will do it themselves for their own use?

Mr. Casey: There are two separate projects. This one is for exports. If there is no prospect of exports, they won’t build it.

The President: I’m glad no one has said “have a happy weekend!”

Mr. Allen: We would welcome added papers on this topic of three or four pages if you wish to submit them to summarize your arguments. Mr. President, we could devote some portion of Monday’s meeting to this subject, if needed.

Secretary Regan: I don’t buy the argument that Western Europe is in such tough economic shape. Much of what they are saying is posturing. The French Socialists are finding the money to nationalize their industries.

Secretary Haig: I hope my comments did not indicate that I thought they were in such desperate economic condition.

Secretary Weinberger: Building the pipeline won’t stop their economic problems.

The President: Could the same individuals get together (as on the Allied Security Controls issue) on this issue and without bloodshed work out a solution?

\(^6\) Reference is to Gaston Thorn, President of the European Commission from 1981 to 1985.
Secretary Haig: Mr. President, that would be O.K., but DOD has all the armaments. (Laughter).

The arguments are the same.

I suggest we handle the problem as we (State) have recommended.

If I thought to stop or delay was achievable, I would be leading the charge, but I do not think that it is.

Mr. Meese: As I see it, there are three basic questions:

1. Should we oppose unequivocally?
2. Should we develop alternatives?
3. Does the President say anything at Ottawa?

Ambassador Brock: Isn’t there a fourth?

What are we willing to pay in damages?

Secretary Weinberger: It’s not a function of damages. The pipeline would cause us damage.

Mr. Meese: It’s part of the question.

The President: Is this an oversimplification? Sixteen billion dollars to build the pipeline—to buy something that will then come through the pipeline? Is there an alternative in the West?

Mr. Casey: Yes.

Mr. Allen: It would take some development. But what is the inconsistency of “why don’t you look at what we have to offer before you go ahead?”

Secretary Weinberger: The ways of saying you oppose vary, but leadership is a firm, consistent position.

Mr. Allen: Mr. President, this clearly is a monumental issue. It is very important. Do we need one more attempt at a synthesis position? We can devote time on Monday if needed.

The President: It seems we are all saying the same thing.

Secretary Haig: Let’s be frank. It will take us years to develop alternatives. The Europeans know that. We have been working seven years on alternatives. Nothing has happened! We need to go in with something. Not because we are subservient, but because they are our Allies and we need them!

The President: How long, if they go ahead, before completion of the pipeline?

Response: Three to four years.

The President: Why is it impossible during that same three to four year period to supply them from other alternatives?

Secretary Weinberger: If we can say to them, you’d have to wait that long to get gas, why not wait that long for other alternatives? It involves resources for coal and nuclear development, etc.
The President: It involves harbor development, among other things. I remember those ships lined up at Norfolk.

Deputy Secretary Davis: In a three to four year period, there are small prospects of increase of supply to Western Europe by anything we can do. We are talking eight to ten years to accomplish anything.

The President: What about nuclear? We are the only ones that take eight to ten years to build a nuclear plant.

Deputy Secretary Davis: It takes about six years actual construction time to build a nuclear plant. And electricity is not a direct substitute for all uses of gas.

Mr. Allen: We have exhausted all our time with no discussion of the Caribbean Basin.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

The meeting terminated at 4:40 p.m.

72. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan

Washington, July 10, 1981

SUBJECT

Secretary Haig’s Memorandum on Second Soviet Demarche Concerning U.S.-Chinese Relations

Al Haig gives you an analysis of a nonpaper (Tab A) handed him by Dobrynin on July 2. It is the second Soviet demarche in two weeks concerning U.S.-Chinese relations as affected by Haig’s recent visit to Beijing. Al accurately remarks on the more temperate tone of this new note. It is not certain, however, that he is correct in interpreting the first note as a “quick reaction” and the second as a “more realistic appreciation”. The June 17 note was a measured and somber warning that had nothing spontaneous about it. The new one has a certain propagandistic element in it. One may argue that the different tone of the two documents reflects confusion in Moscow on how to react to


2 Printed as Document 69.

3 See Document 63.
the U.S. initiatives in the Far East: one time they try threats, the next time they try persuasion. (S)

Al’s decision to approach Gromyko through Matlock is sound. The Soviet leadership should be set straight on the reasons for and implications of our relationship with Beijing: the ball should be tossed into their court. (S)

73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, July 11, 1981, 1858Z

182686. Subject: Secretary’s Letter to Gromyko on UNGA Bilateral.

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. Following FYI is text of a letter the Secretary has asked Dobrynin to convey to Gromyko on his return to Moscow for consultations July 14:

Begin text

July 10, 1981

Dear Mr. Minister:

I am using the opportunity of Ambassador Dobrynin’s return to Moscow to convey some initial thoughts on our forthcoming meeting in New York. I can assure you that we attach the highest importance to this meeting and wish to ensure a positive and productive outcome.

As President Reagan has made clear in his communications with President Brezhnev, we want to establish a constructive and stable relationship with the Soviet Union. There is much we can and must do together to build a more peaceful world. Accepting that we will continue to compete, we also must recognize that unrestrained competition could lead to catastrophe.

Therefore I believe the fundamental purpose of our meeting in New York should be to reach a better understanding about the kind of restraint needed to prevent future crisis. We also should launch a process designed to resolve the specific current problems between us.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810339–0244. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. Drafted by Parris and Palmer; cleared by Eagleburger and Scanlan; approved by Bremer.
Concrete, substantive resolution of these issues would go far toward laying a new and durable foundation for our relationship.

The most significant of these issues remains the question of Afghanistan. I feel it is important that we have a serious, non-polemical discussion. Our interest is to find a solution. Movement toward a political solution in Afghanistan could make a significant difference in our overall relationship.

I also want to explore with you how we might make progress on Kampuchea.

A broader question, one which has repeatedly raised regional and international tensions over the past decade, is that of Cuban adventurism in the developing world.

I will be prepared to discuss other questions involving critical countries and regions, and the need for each of us to make positive efforts. I do not expect that we will be able to reach definitive solutions during our meeting. But recognizing the fundamental and growing problem geopolitical issues have presented for the US-Soviet relationship for several decades, it is imperative that we achieve a better general understanding about the need for restraint. I believe we can make progress if both sides approach the meeting with a determination to avoid polemics and begin defining realistic solutions.

I propose that we make the question of negotiations on limiting long range theater nuclear forces the other main topic on our agenda.

I have conveyed through Ambassador Dobrynin our desire to begin negotiations before the end of the year.

Our goal in these negotiations is to reach agreement on equitable and verifiable limitations on the systems of both sides. Our objective is not superiority, but we cannot accept an outcome which perpetuates the existing imbalance. We are under no illusion that this will be an easy or simple negotiation. But we intend to spare no effort to bring about an agreement that enhances stability.

I look forward to discussing these issues with you further in New York. As you know, we have already begun concrete discussions with your Embassy here to lay the groundwork for our discussions. These will be continuing in the weeks ahead. We would hope that these preparatory talks will enable us to reach agreement in New York on detailed arrangements for the opening of negotiations before the end of this year. If so, I would propose that our agreement be reflected in a joint statement at the conclusion of our talks.

There are other areas of our relationship which can provide mutually advantageous opportunities for cooperation and understanding. In this regard, I will be prepared to review our continuing activities under the U.S.-Soviet exchange agreements and future prospects for
such activities. I will also be prepared to describe in general terms our approach to East-West trade matters, and our views on the SALT process, in addition to the question of long range theater nuclear forces.

The agenda I have outlined above is an ambitious one. I would welcome your ideas on what might be discussed between us, as well as how we might best approach the issues either one of us would like to raise. I would propose, as well, that our meeting there involve two sessions, separated perhaps by two or three days. This would enable us to reflect on our initial talks and, if necessary, consult with our governments before continuing the discussions.

As I noted earlier, Mr. Minister, I look forward to our meeting as an important opportunity to deepen and expand the dialogue we have begun over the past six months. For our part, we will be prepared to do what we can to ensure a productive outcome. Sincerely, Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
international situation, in my view it would be right and natural to concentrate our attention on major issues on whose solution both the state of Soviet-American relations and the situation in the world as a whole depend.

In this connection I would like to recall what L.I. Brezhnev wrote to President R. Reagan: “We do not seek confrontation with the USA, we do not encroach upon legitimate interests of America, we want peace, cooperation, a feeling of mutual trust and goodwill between the USSR and the USA”.

This naturally presupposes that a similar approach is displayed on the US side as well. Otherwise the tensions in relations between our countries with all ensuing consequences will inevitably continue.

Guided by the desire to reverse the present dangerous tendency in world affairs, we propose to the US side to seek mutually acceptable solutions on a wide range of issues of common interest to the Soviet Union and the USA.

It would be, however, not a mere delusion but a serious mistake to believe that the Soviet side is more interested in the dialogue than the US and that by giving consent to the dialogue the US side nearly condescends to us. We are convinced that the United States of America, the American people objectively are no less interested than the USSR, the Soviet people in consideration and resolution of truly pressing problems, above all the problem of curbing the arms race, and lessening the danger of war.

That is why one cannot but express puzzlement over the fact that in your letter the problem of strategic arms limitation is mentioned only in passing, and not as a task of paramount importance which has a direct bearing on the destinies of our and not only our peoples.

What can be said in this regard? Certainly nobody will force the US administration, if it does not want it, to sit at the negotiating table to discuss this problem. But acting in this manner it should clearly realize that it takes on itself all the responsibility for the fact that it looks as if through its fingers at this cardinal problem now facing the mankind. Incidentally it relates also to many other important problems of arms limitation and disarmament which are not even mentioned in your letter and which it seems are not in the priorities of the US foreign policy at all.

At our meeting in New York we will of course be prepared to discuss the questions pertaining to the nuclear arms limitation in Europe, having in mind that under consideration will be the entire complex of medium range nuclear means including the relevant US forward based means as well as medium range nuclear means of the US NATO allies. Only such an approach will be in keeping with the
principle of equality and equal security of the sides. The starting point for discussing all these questions should be the objective fact of the now existing rough parity in the respective means between NATO countries and the USSR. We are ready to seek, without altering this rough parity, to gradually reduce at the same time the level of armaments.

In your letter, Mr. Secretary, you stress the necessity to exercise “restraint” in international affairs. But frankly speaking this appeal to “restraint” that you make sounds unconvincingly against the background of what the USA itself does in the full view of the whole world: among other things, an unprecedented rise of military expenditure, programs for creating new destructive weapon systems, search for new military bases and strongholds all over the world, setting up forces specifically intended to interfere into the internal affairs of other states.

Hardly be called “restraint”, for example, is what the USA is doing now in the Indian Ocean, in the Persian Gulf, and in the Middle East. Meanwhile all these regions lie much closer to the USSR than to the USA.

And can we consider an exercise of “restraint” on the part of the USA such actions it takes as deliveries of arms to China or plans to redeploy the American troops stationed in the FRG closer to the borders of Socialist countries?

So as you can see we have enough to say on the subject of “restraint”.

We will also be prepared to exchange views on other subjects as well, including among them those which you name—Afghanistan and Kampuchea. Naturally, only the international aspects of these questions can be discussed, that is ways of resolving the situations existing around these states, and by no means their internal affairs.

At the same time I want to say at the very outset that we consider unacceptable—both in substance and in form—what is said in your letter with regard to Cuba and its policy.

It goes without saying that questions of bilateral relations, among them the state of affairs with the realization of agreements signed earlier between our countries, which you mention in your letter, will also be a subject of our exchange of views.

In conclusion I would like to express the hope that given the mutual desire of the sides the forthcoming meeting will permit at least to mark the beginning of a businesslike discussion of problems which indeed await their solution. We are in favour of it.

Sincerely,

A. Gromyko\(^3\)

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\(^3\) Printed from a copy bearing this typed signature.
75. Editorial Note

The National Security Planning Group met in the Cabinet Room at the White House July 22, 1981, from 9:39 to 10:14 a.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes were found. In a July 21 memorandum to President Ronald Reagan, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Richard Allen laid out the agenda and forwarded an undated National Security Council (NSC) discussion paper. On the memorandum, Reagan initialed his approval of a one-year extension of the grain agreement with the Soviet Union set to expire on September 30, 1981, and his disapproval of guaranteed access independent of Soviet policies toward Afghanistan, Poland, and leftist guerrillas. He did not indicate a decision on whether to increase Soviet purchase limits above a cumulative 8 million tons of wheat and corn. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, 22 July 1981 (1))

In an undated memorandum to Reagan, sent through Counselor to the President Edwin Meese, Allen wrote: “The National Security Planning Group met on July 22 and discussed the Five Year U.S.–U.S.S.R. Grain Agreement, which will expire on September 30, 1981, and a proposed credit sale of corn to Poland.” Neither Allen nor Meese initialed the memorandum. Attached to the memorandum is an undated paper containing four choices on the agreement: (1) “The current Five Year U.S.–U.S.S.R. Grain Agreement, scheduled to expire on September 30, 1981, shall be extended for a period of one year”; (2) “While the current terms of the agreement requiring the Soviet Union to purchase 6 million tons of grain and allowing the purchase of up to 8 million tons without U.S. approval shall pertain, The United States Special Trade Representative shall be allowed some flexibility with respect to these limits”; (3) “The United States will remain open to the possibility of discussions regarding the negotiation of a new five year agreement and an increase in the limits currently in existence, but only in parallel with an evaluation of Soviet actions in the world”; and (4) “There will be no U.S. guarantees against future embargoes.” Two decisions are also listed with regard to corn sales to Poland. Reagan did not indicate a preference among these choices on this memorandum. (Ibid.) However, he wrote in his diary on July 22: “A half day with an N.S.C. meeting on our grain sales to the Soviet. I agreed to a 1 yr. extension—our agreement expires Sept. 30. We’ll let them wonder for a while whether there can be a long term deal. Frankly I want some give from them on their obvious expansionism.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Volume I, page 58)

In a July 23 memorandum to Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan,
Secretary of Agriculture John Block, Meese, Director of the Office of Management and the Budget David Stockman, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, United States Special Trade Representative William Brock, White House Chief of Staff James Baker, and White House Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, Allen enumerated five decisions: “The current Five Year US–USSR Grain Agreement, scheduled to expire on September 30, 1981, shall be extended for a period of one year; While the current terms of the agreement requiring the Soviet Union to purchase 6 million tons of grain and allowing the purchase of up to 8 million tons without US approval shall pertain, the United States Special Trade Representative shall be given some flexibility with respect to these limits; The United States will remain open to the possibility of discussions regarding the negotiation of a new five-year agreement and an increase in the current limits in parallel with an evaluation of Soviet actions elsewhere in the world; In the event the United States decides to negotiate a new grain agreement with the Soviet Union, there will be no US guarantee against the imposition of embargoes; Sale of Corn to Poland: Action shall be initiated for the purpose of extending $60 million in new credits to Poland for the purchase of 400,000 metric tons of corn.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 0020 22 July 1981 (1 of 2))

76. **Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, July 24, 1981, 1420Z

10307. Subject: July 23 Meeting With Korniyenko.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary: In tour d’horizon with Korniyenko July 23 Charge made points as instructed reftel\(^2\) and Korniyenko replied:

—Soviets, too, await Secretary’s meetings with Gromyko, hope for accomplishment, but see the U.S. as insincere on arms control, and not wanting friendly relations.

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\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N810006–0590. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

\(^2\) Not further identified.
—Soviet written response to Carrington, rejecting the EC’s Afghanistan initiative should end speculation Moscow might consider it.

—U.S. is using Afghanistan as pretext for wrecking principle of equal security at basis of arms control. U.S. is not seriously reviewing SALT.

—UN conference on Kampuchea is U.S.-engineered and cannot be constructive.

—U.S. has no right to call for increased Soviet economic aid to Poland and knows what the USSR is doing.

—Was the U.S., in raising arms supply to Central America, suggesting resumption of the conventional arms transfer talks?

—U.S. was going against prior assurances in arming China. What concerns the USSR is that U.S. considers China a friend and the USSR an enemy.

—He thanked the Charge for the (two hour, bruising) exchange and pronounced it “not unuseful.” End summary.

3. Charge began by noting that he had been in Moscow for six months and appreciated the opportunity to speak about some important questions before going to Washington for a week of consultations. He would be meeting with the Secretary and a number of others, and he expected that interest would be on the coming talks between the Secretary and Gromyko. The U.S. had made clear its determination to deal with the consequences of lack of Soviet and proxy restraint but was interested in a stable, durable and mutually satisfactory relationship. We hoped the coming meeting would lay a basis for that. The Charge said he would be happy to convey to the Secretary any thoughts the Soviets had regarding agenda and format of the September meetings.

Haig/Gromyko talks and TNF

4. Korniyenko said the Soviets, too, looked forward to the September talks and hoped for accomplishments in improving what could not be considered normal relations. Soviet desires, indeed, go further: they would like relations on the basis of friendship, and they note with regret that the U.S. never talks of friendship but treats the USSR as an enemy. As for agenda, both sides would be free in September to raise any questions they wanted. The possibility of a joint statement on the start of TNF negotiations was under discussion in the Eagleburger-Bessmertnykh channel and Bessmertnykh had been authorized to inform Eagleburger that the Soviets would be prepared to begin investigative negotiations November 17 and preferred Geneva as the site—mainly because facilities seemed more adequate there. He considered a November start desirable since the U.S. delegation would doubtless want a break for Christmas and it would be well to allow time for extensive discussions before the break.
5. Charge responded that, in respect to basing our relations on friendship, the U.S. would also desire this in principle. However, we would be less than candid if we did not make clear that Soviet actions and policies stand in contradiction to the principle of friendship. Before we can think of friendship, we must resolve these serious issues and no one will be more pleased than we if we are able to do so.

6. As for preparations for TNF negotiations, Charge expressed pleasure that preparations were proceeding smoothly in the channel established for that purpose. He noted that, as the Secretary had made clear in his recent address, we are well along in our preparations for these talks and hope that the Soviets will be prepared for meaningful discussions. He noted, however, that persistent Soviet efforts to portray the U.S. attitude as less than serious serve only to complicate the process and prospects for progress, and added that he was particularly disturbed by the distorted reports in the Soviet media on the Secretary’s speech on arms control.

7. Korniyenko replied that the Soviets are indeed prepared for serious negotiations on TNF and have been prepared for a long time. As for Soviet accusations of U.S. procrastination, these were based on the facts: the administration had made it clear that it was in no hurry to discuss arms control with the Soviet Union, it proceeded to discuss TNF negotiations only under the pressure of its allies, and then it ostentatiously pictured exchanges on trivial questions as serious discussions.

8. Charge took strong issue with Korniyenko’s allegations of U.S. “procrastination,” pointing out that careful preparations are an indication of our seriousness of intent, and efforts to picture them in any other light are simply unfounded. He then turned to Afghanistan as one of the principal issues which required resolution if U.S.-Soviet relations are to improve substantially.

Afghanistan

9. After Charge delivered talking points provided by Department, Korniyenko said he could reveal that the Soviets had the day before given an official written answer to Carrington, reiterating, as he had been told at the time, that the initiative was unrealistic and unacceptable. The written answer had been sent because there was continuing speculation that the USSR was reflecting on the matter. The answer would not surprise nor be hard to understand. The Soviets had proposed talks on the international aspects, but not to exclude the Afghans. The British proposal would have excluded them and also addressed Afghan internal affairs. The proposal was a camouflage and not made with any expectation it would be accepted. The U.S. is not really interested in a settlement, and proved this by its action in influencing the Pakistanis away from bilateral talks they had initially agreed upon.
10. Charge said that he was distressed to hear that the Soviets considered their rejection of the EC–10 proposal as final, since this proposal offered a reasonable basis for negotiating a solution. The Soviet reaction was all the more deplorable since the EC–10 initiative flowed from the Brezhnev suggestion of an international conference. The Soviets often accuse the West of not taking Soviet proposals seriously, but when we do, the much-publicized proposals turn out to be meaningless. Furthermore, the Soviets must recognize that, in rejecting efforts by the international community to find a solution to this problem, they are choosing to perpetuate a serious disturbance to the international order and a grave impediment to improved US-Soviet relations. The problem will not go away. It is with us and must be addressed.

11. Korniyenko responded with an emotional outburst, accusing the U.S. and China of wishing only to perpetuate the fighting in Afghanistan in order to increase tension and justify an arms build-up. He reiterated, in great detail, accusations that the U.S. brought pressure to bear on Pakistan to change its position on direct talks.

12. Charge observed that he had attempted to make our points in a non-contentious fashion, assuming that Korniyenko thoroughly understood the details of our attitude and the reasons for it. However, in the face of Korniyenko’s unfounded accusations, he was compelled to point out that the basic problem in Afghanistan is the fact that the Soviet Union is attempting to impose a puppet regime on Afghanistan in opposition to the wishes of the population. A true national-liberation struggle is going on there, and the only way to solve it is to remove Soviet troops and let the Afghans settle their own affairs. Korniyenko’s accusations were not only unfounded; they are irrelevant since they do not address the real issue. If the Soviet Union continues to refuse to deal seriously with reasonable proposals to solve the problem, then Afghanistan will continue to burden our relationship and make agreements of all types much more difficult.

Arms Control

13. Korniyenko picked up on this reference to linkage by asserting that U.S. statements on the issue are contradictory. On the one hand we say the SALT process will be difficult if Afghanistan is not solved, while on the other, Secretary Haig has said publicly that SALT and Afghanistan are not connected. Charge inquired when the Secretary had made the alleged statement, and Korniyenko referred to an observation that the SALT–II Treaty would not have been ratified even in the absence of an Afghanistan problem. Charge pointed out that Korniyenko was taking the Secretary’s words out of context and distorting them. As he recalled the statement, it was that the SALT–II Treaty had sufficient defects that it would not have won ratification
even if the Soviets had not invaded Afghanistan. This, of course, was not to say that Afghanistan had no effect on the Senate’s judgment of the utility of agreements with the Soviet Union, or that it does not affect the current prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations.

14. Korniyenko then launched into a disjointed, shotgun polemic, asserting that Afghanistan was just a cover for a U.S. policy decision to wreck the basic principle of SALT, which is equality and equal security. He asserted that statements by administration officials indicated such misunderstanding about the SALT agreements that it was clear the administration was not seriously studying and reviewing the subject. The Soviet Union was in complete compliance with SALT but the U.S. had violated provisions on non-circumvention by preparations to put into Europe weapons which could hit the USSR. The Soviets had not increased their capabilities but the U.S. was upsetting the balance. The Soviets had concluded SALT–I despite the fact that the U.S. was at the time waging aggression against Vietnam. Charge responded that he could not accept a thing Korniyenko was saying. The Soviets might consider it useful propaganda but he hoped the Soviet Government was realistic enough to know it was not true. Korniyenko was grasping at straws. The U.S. was in full compliance with all agreements and indeed is still waiting for satisfactory replies to questions on Soviet compliance with several agreements. Even if SALT–II were a formally ratified agreement, which of course it is not, plans for LRTNF deployments in Europe do not violate it, since the weapons are not strategic as defined by the treaty. The allegation that Pershing II deployment would upset a “balance” is absurd: it was the Soviet deployment of SS–20’s which upset the nuclear balance in Europe and planned NATO deployments are only a belated response to this. Finally, in respect to Korniyenko’s reference to the 1972 summit, Charge pointed out that while he could not accept that Vietnam and Afghanistan were comparable events, he would note that SALT–I was not concluded until the U.S. had already undertaken a phased withdrawal from Vietnam, and that throughout this process the Soviets backed the North Vietnamese to the hilt—and after the U.S. withdrew the Soviet Union supported North Vietnamese in breaking the agreements reached. These observations led to an introduction of the talking points on Kampuchea.

Kampuchea

15. When Charge presented the talking points, Korniyenko complained that the U.S. had not condemned Chinese aggression against Vietnam and he labeled the UN Conference on Kampuchea a U.S. creation, called for, organized and structured in Washington. The conference was not in accord with the UN resolution, which called for participation by all parties involved. Charge responded that in no way
was it a U.S. creation; it was an ASEAN initiative with wide support and participation of the UN as a whole. We regretted the USSR’s negative reaction and hoped it would urge Vietnam to cooperate. It was an effort to find a way out of a situation, like Afghanistan, which had been caused by the intervention of foreign military force. These situations were burdensome to international, regional and bilateral relations. If the Soviets wanted seriously to settle them, they would find a ready partner; otherwise we would draw the appropriate conclusion. However, in regard both to Afghanistan and Kampuchea, he hoped the Soviets would review their position carefully so that the discussions in New York could be more productive.

Poland

16. When the Charge introduced the talking points on Poland, Korniyenko adopted a frigid tone and said the most correct response he could give to the remarks was that it would be inappropriate to discuss internal Polish affairs, and that urging the Soviets to increase their economic aid to Poland was also out of order. The U.S. knew very well what the Soviets were doing in this regard. The U.S. had no moral or other right to raise this. Charge pointed out that he had not suggested a discussion of Polish internal affairs, but that the U.S., as a supplier of aid to Poland, had not only a right but indeed a duty to urge others to join in the effort to provide assistance.

Central America/Nicaragua’s Military Buildup

17. In response to Charge’s points on this subject, Korniyenko came back immediately by asking “Do I understand that you are proposing to renew the talks on conventional arms transfer?” Charge replied that his statement contained no such proposal, but stood on its own. Korniyenko then asked on what basis the question was raised. Is the U.S. reasserting the Monroe Doctrine? The Charge said that he was expressing U.S. concern with dangerous arms transfers in the region and with those countries which are ultimate sources of the arms. If we were discussing the Monroe Doctrine, he added, we would have to talk about a lot more than Nicaragua.

China

18. When the points on China were raised, Korniyenko objected that it seemed that the U.S. could be friends with China but not the Soviet Union, and he also heard talk about the coincidence of strategic interests. Three successive Presidents of the U.S. had given assurances about not supplying arms to China, but the Soviets must conclude that these are no longer valid. Charge pointed out that policies are made in the context of events; events had developed in recent years so that it was anomalous to classify China as a power hostile to U.S. interests. The decision not to deny in principle any supply of arms to China was a logical development of U.S.-Chinese relations. There is simply no
reason for treating China in this respect differently from other friendly
countries who are not allies. What concerns us, Korniyenko said, is
that the U.S. considers the USSR an enemy and the Chinese as friends.
Charge replied that Soviet actions themselves left us no choice but to
consider the Soviet Union an adversary power; recent Chinese actions
had given us no such cause. While we do not enjoy and do not seek
adversarial relations with the Soviet Union, we cannot ignore Soviet
actions which have created this situation.

19. Summing up, Charge said that he hoped that the Soviet leaders
would give further thought to the various concerns we have been
conveying over the past months, and that Gromyko would come to
New York prepared to discuss them in a constructive spirit, rather
than simply reiterating debating points. We knew that their professed
suspicions that the U.S. does not desire an improvement of relations
were groundless, but if the Soviet leaders proceed as if agreement is
impossible and continue to pursue those policies which have created
the tensions in the relationship, then of course there can indeed be no
improvement. Therefore, the Soviets should resolve their doubts on
this score by coming to the table with proposals designed to reduce
rather than perpetuate these tensions.

20. As Charge was leaving the office, Korniyenko remarked—rather
uncharacteristically—that while he and Charge have rarely agreed dur-
during their series of meetings, he found them “not unuseful” (nebezpolez-
yye), and hoped they would continue upon Charge’s return from
Washington.

Matlock
Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen)\(^1\)

Washington, July 29, 1981

SUBJECT
Crisis Areas

Before leaving on my well-earned vacation (August 3 to August 14 and August 24 to August 28), I would like to summarize my thoughts about the outstanding world crises involving the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc. There are three of those, in descending order of urgency (though not necessarily of importance): Poland, Israel-Lebanon, and China. (S)

**Poland**

Poland is entering a period of acute economic crisis: this crisis has major social and political implications. The economy is in shambles as basic items of food and other necessities of everyday living are disappearing. I am told that thousands of combines and trucks necessary to collect the coming harvest are standing idle for lack of spare parts. If the situation deteriorates further there is a possibility of massive strikes and a social breakdown; this, in turn, could lead to the introduction of emergency laws and the gradual reestablishment of controls by pro-Soviet forces which are continuing to reorganize their forces. (The Jaruzelski-Kania Government could easily swing the other way under such conditions.) Should this occur, the Soviet Union could bring Poland back into the fold without recourse to armed intervention. The consequences would be catastrophic:

—The cause of economic and political reform in Eastern Europe would be discredited for a long time on the grounds that freedom spells chaos—and yet the best hope for world peace lies in Communist regimes being compelled to undergo unpleasant reforms.

—The Polish armed forces, now of little use to the Warsaw Pact, would be revivified, significantly enhancing the fighting capabilities of the Communist Bloc.

—European neutralists would have grounds to say “We told you so” and accuse us of alarmist behavior: clearly there is no Soviet military danger to anyone. (S)

To prevent such a catastrophe from happening, two things should be done:

—Some form of immediate financial help to bail Poland out for the next few months, with no strings attached; it appears there is support in Congress for such an emergency measure.

—Coordinated Allied action in the form of a mini-Marshall Plan that would entail both a realistic Polish reconstruction program over so many years, possibly under the supervision of the IMF, and large-scale Allied assistance. (S)

**Middle East**

Here it seems to me that the gravest danger lies in the PLO buildup with Libyan and Soviet assistance. The intention, if I perceive it correctly, is to transform the PLO gunmen in Lebanon from a hit-and-run force into a modern army that would spearhead an assault on Israel. This army would not be restricted in its activities by the kind of internal and international considerations that affect, say, a Jordan or even a Syria. All this was missed in the journalistic hubbub about Israeli bombing of Beirut. (S)

I offer no proposals on how to cope with this major problem. It seems to me, however, that in public pronouncements on the Middle East, Reagan officials should take into account the following facts:

—The major Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia, have no alternative to U.S. support—they have nowhere else to go, no matter what they threaten; for this reason they need not be appeased and should be pressured to give up support of the PLO.

—The real problem in the Middle East is not Israel’s refusal to recognize the Palestinians but the refusal of all Arab states, Egypt excepted, to recognize Israel: this plain fact ought to be reiterated in all our pronouncements until it is perceived as the kind of axiom that it really is.

—To the extent that I know and understand Begin, threats and punishments make him ornery: he needs reassurances. I am quite confident that his willingness to agree to an armistice in Lebanon was due mainly to the supportive words of the President. This is the only way to approach the man. (S)

**China**

The Soviet Union is genuinely worried about our improving relations with China: this is no mere bluff, as is so much else of what they say. Their military, who do not make policy but have a very strong influence on it, are deeply concerned by the prospect of having to plan for a possible two-front war against two modern armies. This must arouse tempting thoughts of preventive war. (Lest we forget, the German General Staff in 1914 decided to press for war because it found that the modernization plan of the Russian armies, carried out with...
French help and meant to be concluded three years later, would have spelled the doom of the Schlieffen Plan.) It seems to me most important as soon as possible to:

—formulate a policy of rewards and punishments for the USSR in terms of our military relationship with China; and
—communicate it clearly and forcefully to Moscow. (S)

I have made this point before and only wish to reemphasize it. (U)

78. Minutes of an Interagency Coordinating Committee for U.S.-Soviet Affairs Meeting

Washington July 29, 1981

*Matlock Presentation*

Matlock (Charge, Embassy Moscow) led off with an assessment of the harsh Soviet polemics against the U.S. as a predictable response to clear and effective policies of the Reagan Administration. Our basic message was that improvement in our bilateral relationship was only possible if certain of their policies were rectified; heading that list was Afghanistan and the Soviet military buildup. The Soviet attitude that the U.S. should treat bygones as bygones was completely unacceptable to us. Matlock expressed his belief that the Soviet leadership understands exactly what we’re talking about, although their statements, of course, give no indication of this and instead concentrate on charges that the U.S. is seeking to create tensions in order to justify a military buildup.

The effect of the strained atmosphere has had a mixed effect on the Moscow Embassy. In terms of doing business, there was no problem getting appointments promptly and at the right level; socially it was another story. At one point, Soviets were being told not to attend U.S. functions although many came despite the instructions. This period has now largely passed.

Matlock gave a strong endorsement of reciprocity and illustrated the effectiveness of this tool by the Embassy’s retaliation against the

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USA Institute’s institution of an Embassy boycott. The Institute ended its boycott about six weeks after the Embassy began to reciprocate. The intent of reciprocity is not to punish the Soviets but to ensure that we both enjoy a fair and balanced relationship. We should remember that in the Soviet Union there is always central direction of even small matters. ICCUSA provides a mechanism through which we can all work together to establish greater reciprocity in U.S.-Soviet relations.

In response to questions, Matlock offered the following comments:

West European-Siberian Gas Pipeline. Soviet interest was high although they had scaled back original plans for two pipelines to one. Perhaps this was due to realization that Soviet reserves were not as great as originally thought or perhaps to the difficulty of financing the enormously expansive project. Soviet interest was based on economic (source of much needed hard currency) and political grounds (increased influence in Western Europe). He noted that the Soviets were hard bargainers, although perhaps too zealous for their own good; the delays caused by their haggling over a better deal led to higher costs in the end because of the effects of inflation.

Brezhnev. Always difficult to predict the longevity of others, particularly in the case of Brezhnev who has reportedly been on his last legs for years. He sticks to a limited schedule paced by long rests; the frequency of his public appearances has not changed much in recent years. The Soviets were apparently so concerned, however, about his stamina that they only televised several minutes of his long address to the last Party Congress. In private sessions, Brezhnev sticks to his written notes and must be frequently prodded. Although his mental alertness and stamina are limited, he plays a valued role in what has always been a consensus leadership. It is clear that no one has been groomed as Brezhnev’s successor although Kirilenko (possibly Chernenko) will likely serve as an interim leader.

Reciprocity and Chancery Construction. Work is now proceeding more or less on schedule. Soviet customs have been subjecting us to costly and cumbersome procedures which should be eased when we can clear incoming material at the new warehouse which should be completed in September.

Soviet Reaction to Polish Events. Soviet concerns appear to have subsided after the Polish Party Congress. Barring a wave of strikes and the outbreak of anarchy, Soviets appear to have passed the point at which they would intervene. They are well aware of the enormous consequences of military intervention. They will continue, however, to exert pressure on Poland since what they are witnessing there is theoretically unacceptable.

Soviet Surveillance of Embassy Personnel and Visitors. There has been no change in the level aside from the flurry of harassment
following the Aeroflot/Customs incident, which had been annoying but not dangerous. Matlock stressed that he was certainly in favor of law enforcement, but that the handling of the aforementioned incident pointed up the necessity of considering in advance what signal our actions will send the Soviets. Matlock said the Soviets interpreted the incident as a clear indication that we were going out of our way to harass them.

Overview

EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Scanlan summed up the Ottawa Summit which produced general agreement on the need to control strategic trade with the Soviet Union and would be followed shortly by a high-level COCOM Meeting. Scanlan announced that the President had just decided to allow Caterpillar to sell one hundred pipelayers to the USSR. Our decision was based on the fact that the technology involved was not new or unique and that an alternative deal from the Japanese was readily available to the Soviets.

Scanlan discussed U.S. financial assistance to Poland which exceeds that of any other Western nation this year. Our total for 1981 was raised to $715 million dollars with the recent decision to provide 350,000 tons of corn under PL480. The other major creditor nations have been informed of our decision and we are urging them to do more to assist Poland. The economic situation there is very serious and it will be difficult for them to work out a stabilization and economic reform package for which Solidarity’s support is essential.

Turning to Afghanistan, Scanlan noted that the Soviets had formally rejected the EC 10 proposal which we nonetheless will continue to support. Our pre-UNGA consultations are designed to keep international pressure on the Soviets over Afghanistan. This issue will be high on the agenda for the UNGA Haig-Gromyko bilateral for which we envision two separate sessions in late September. At the meetings, which will cover the full range of our relations, we will hammer home the point that our insistence on restraint by the Soviet Union and its proxies is not a fleeting fancy but an enduring policy. At the same time, we will demonstrate our willingness to cooperate with the Soviets should they moderate their international behavior.

Scanlan discussed the upcoming discussions with the Soviets in Vienna on August 3 on the extension or negotiation of a new grain agreement after the expiration of the current LTA on September 30. Ambassador Brock, the Special Trade Representative, will head our team and be jointly assisted by Agriculture and State. The U.S. position should be enhanced by the dwindling estimates of the 1981 Soviet grain crop (currently pegged at 190 million metric tons by the CIA) which will be the third successive dismal harvest. We suspect that the
poor crop outlook may have prompted the Soviets’ unwillingness to receive a delegation from the House Agriculture Committee which had planned to visit in August.

Exchanges

Scanlan announced that Secretary Haig had recently reviewed our policy on exchanges with the Soviet Union. The Secretary had decided we should continue on our present course barring any substantial changes in the political climate. Scanlan noted parenthetically that the UNGA Haig-Gromyko bilateral would be the next benchmark in our relations. ICCUSA representatives suggested that a memo on our exchanges policy from Secretary Haig to his Cabinet counterparts would be useful. (Since the ICCUSA Chairman, Assistant Secretary Eagleburger, had already sent such a memo to all ICCUSA agencies, it was decided that an additional memo was unnecessary.)

Soviet Law on Foreigners

Combs (EUR/SOV) discussed the new Soviet law on foreigners. The law was not scheduled to go into effect until January 1982 and full evaluation would have to await its implementation. Agencies were asked to bring the law to the attention of any exchange participants or other personnel who would be visiting the USSR without diplomatic status. EUR/SOV can provide a summary and analysis of the law for use in briefing visitors.

79. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 3, 1981

SUBJECT

Brezhnev’s Health

[less than 1 line not declassified] interesting comments on Brezhnev’s health:

It is apparent that Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev’s health problems affect his ability to play a meaningful leadership role. Brezhnev is being propped up politically as well as physically by a group that is attempting to carry out Brezhnev’s policies and this group seems lacking in military representation.

On more than one occasion Brezhnev had to be escorted from a meeting because of his incoherence or inability to sustain a dialogue. He occasionally had to be helped in his chair when he leaned forward and could not return to an upright position.

There were times when Brezhnev’s interpreter responded [less than 1 line not declassified] without waiting for Brezhnev’s reply which [name not declassified] found very disconcerting. The Soviets offered no explanation or apology other to warn [name not declassified] that Brezhnev could not stand long negotiating sessions. (S)

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80. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan

Washington, August 6, 1981

SUBJECT

Valentin Falin Comments on U.S.-Soviet Relations

In remarks to a West Point associate professor who is currently in Moscow on an exchange program, Valentin Falin, a ranking official of the Soviet central committee’s international information department, offered the following observations on U.S.-Soviet relations:

- Although some in the Kremlin accept that the administration needs time to develop a comprehensive policy, others believe a definitive policy package has already been adopted and is being implemented by the “Reagan group” (Meese, Allen, Ikle and Pipes)—“the engineers behind a worldwide anti-Soviet conspiracy.”

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• The administration made a serious mistake by initially taking a harsh anti-Soviet “tone,” and the Soviets hope the U.S. will not “paint itself into a corner with its rhetoric.”

• At present, the U.S. and Soviet Union are like “two elephants in a crockery store . . . relations are standing on very thin ice, and the danger of miscalculation is very high.”

• While he and other “consultants” to the central committee understand the need for the administration to “finish acting out their fantasies,” it is “high time” to present the Soviets with a coherent, understandable policy.

• “The Soviets are ready to begin talks on any subject right away . . . nothing is non-negotiable.”

Falin concluded by commenting that “we really don’t care what your policy is anymore, just let us know what it is.” (S)

81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, August 26, 1981, 2156Z

228521. Subject: Secretary’s Letter to Gromyko.
1. (S—Entire text.)

2. You should seek an appointment ASAP to deliver the following message from the Secretary to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. If Gromyko is not available, you may deliver the message to First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko.

3. Begin text. Dear Mr. Minister: We have given careful consideration to the views of your government concerning relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China as conveyed by Ambassador Dobrynin on June 17\(^2\) and July 2.\(^3\) Although the position of the United States on the specific question of possible transfers of arms to the People’s Republic of China has previously been conveyed

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N810007–0481. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rueckert; cleared by Stoessel, Eagleburger, Holdridge, Bremer, Simons, and Colson; approved by Haig.

2 See Document 63.

3 See Document 69.
to you, I am writing in an effort to ensure that the Soviet Union has a full and accurate understanding of that position.

Despite the strains in relations between our two countries this administration has not characterized our relationship as one of “hostility.” It is, therefore, regrettable that you have chosen in your recent communications to characterize the development of our relationship with the People’s Republic of China as being motivated by hostile intent toward the Soviet Union. The policies which we follow toward the People’s Republic of China are developed in our respective national interests and are not specifically aimed at any third country.

At the same time, it must be pointed out that the United States would not accept an attempt by any third country to influence our bilateral relationship with this important country, or any other country. We are aware of no “assurances” by this or any previous United States administration by which the Soviet Union acquired a right of veto in this regard.

The development of relations in the security area between the United States and China is a normal part of the process of the broadening of contacts between our two countries. As China’s policies and practices are not threatening to the United States, nor to our friends and allies, it is no longer consistent with the present state of our relationship for the United States to treat China as an adversary. Indeed, as I stated on my recent Asian trip, the United States regards China as a friendly country with which we are not allied, but with which we share many common interests.

As for the question of potential arms transfers, since we have authorized as yet no specific sales to China, it is a misinterpretation of our position to speak of our having embarked upon a policy of “arming China.” Any request which we might receive from the Chinese will be carefully weighed on its merits, with due regard given to its appropriateness, the status of our bilateral relationship with the Chinese, the effects on others in the area, and our appreciation of the needs of international peace and security.

Thus, our decisions will not be made in a political or military vacuum. In this connection, we cannot help noting the fact that the Soviet Union, in formulating and carrying out its own policies, has persistently failed to take into account our frequently expressed concerns over the impact on U.S.-Soviet relations of Soviet actions in third areas, including Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and the Caribbean.

Let me assure you, Mr. Minister, that our purpose in improving relations with the People’s Republic of China is not to complicate relations with the Soviet Union. The United States remains interested
in the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations in all areas, based on the principles of reciprocity and restraint.

Sincerely, Alexander M. Haig, Jr. End text.

4. Afghanistan—Should Gromyko raise the latest DRA proposal, you should draw on the following points:
—It is the illegal invasion and occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops that have caused the Afghan crisis.
—The Afghan proposal ignores UN resolutions which call for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops and thus—point the way toward a settlement.
—We regret that the Soviet Union has not found these UN resolutions or the EC Conference proposal acceptable—they would help lead the crisis toward a political solution. The Afghan proposal clearly does not advance this purpose.

Haig

82. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Haig

Washington, September 4, 1981

SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Gromyko

Mr. Secretary:
My talks with Hal, Brent and Bill Hyland yielded the following:

On Gromyko himself:
—In part because he’s known every American President and Secretary of State since Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, Gromyko has a certain equanimity and serenity about US-Soviet relations. Tough and business-like but not emotional, nor prone to cheap shots—at least in private.  

1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Lawrence Eagleburger Files, Lot 84D204, Chron—September 1982. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads “AMH.” Haig initialed the top of the memorandum.
2 Reference is to Hal Sonnenfeldt, Brent Scowcroft, and William Hyland.
3 Haig wrote a checkmark next to this paragraph.
—If he opts to speak in Russian instead of using his excellent English, it could be a tactical decision to show certain stiffness. You might try to preempt by referring at beginning to his English.

—Gromyko has grown in importance; Politburo relies heavily on him. When combined with fact that he’s good at catching nuances and we believe reports back accurately (perhaps unlike Dobrynin), it’s critical that you present your overall approach at length and with precision. Everything before is prelude to this first act.

—Another reason for precision is that Soviets have tried to twist statements we’ve made in their conversations with our Allies and others.

—After his entirely predictable “injured party” tour d’horizon, Gromyko will probe yours. He listens carefully and asks lots of questions about any proposition. But he holds back as long as possible in presenting even what he’s authorized to do. So you may have to prompt him to say his complete lines; asking “do you have nothing else to say on X?”

—While Gromyko has a broad grasp of key issues, and can fake it on almost any subject, he’s no expert on military questions. For example, it’s a waste of time to debate nuclear doctrine with him.

—In general, debate with Gromyko is not productive. We should just state what U.S. perceptions and policies are, and that Soviets must deal with these as a fact of life—whether they agree with them or not.

—Gromyko has a dry sense of humor. Takes some effort to arouse. Only marginally worth the effort. Generally better to have an air of “civilized firmness.”

On Our Approach

We’ll incorporate some of their substantive suggestions on specific issues like Cuba, military buildup, etc. in the talking points now being drafted. Here are more general observations Hal, Brent and Bill had on your approach.

—Gromyko’s main objectives at this meeting are to try to test this Administration’s mettle, to see how serious we are about our more robust approach, to determine what chinks there are in our armour, and to see whether we want any sort of on-going relationship.

—The Soviets still have doubts that we will be able to sustain our new approach, but they are nervous. It’s likely they interpreted the Vietnam/Watergate era as a permanent change and are now uncertain.

—Thus your main objective should be calmly but clearly to communicate that the main lines of the Administration’s new approach are entirely fixed and clear. The Soviets should focus on the overall direction rather than specific events here (i.e., adjustments in overall increases in defense budget), in Western Europe or elsewhere.
—We must make clear what our interests are and what specific Soviet actions over the past decade have encroached upon them. This doesn’t mean we reject the Soviet Union as a major power with interests, political prestige, etc. It does mean that military intrusions which attempt to shift the geopolitical/strategic balance in areas vital to the United States and not to the Soviet Union now have called forth a serious and sustained American response.

—We shouldn’t be in any hurry. The Soviets are patient and we should be too. We don’t want to give any indication that we are the demandeur, or that we are trying to negotiate or cut deals in New York. At the same time we should indicate that we are prepared to maintain a serious dialogue. Thus agreement on another, early meeting with Gromyko was strongly recommended as the main outcome of your UNGA sessions.4

—All three believe this meeting is of major importance but should be treated very low-key in public.5

Larry Eagleburger6

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4 Haig wrote a checkmark next to this paragraph.
5 Haig underlined “very low-key in public,” and wrote beside it: “agree.”
6 An unknown hand initialed “LSE” on Eagleburger’s behalf.
83. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, September 8, 1981, 1337Z

12552. For Assistant Secretary Eagleburger from Charge. Subject: Gromyko as an Interlocutor. Ref: State 237032.1

1. (Secret—Entire text).
2. The man: judging from his performance when meeting the Senators September 4,2 Gromyko is currently in good health and seems well rested from his vacation. He is as articulate as ever, and displays the quickness of reaction and mastery of facts for which he has long been noted. His approach is that of a consumate and pragmatic geopoli-
tician; he rarely indulges in ideological discussion, and seems to have little patience for it. Despite the dour countenance he often displays in public, he has a sense of humor and a knack for wry jokes and homey but opposite similes to drive home his points. His mind-set is relatively closed, however, and he is not noted for seizing upon new ideas. On the contrary, he usually forces new facts into the mental pigeonholes formed years ago and is not easily swayed from his precon-
ceptions. His basic instinct is to continue doggedly along the course which has been set, relying on persistence and consistency to wear his opponents down. He is, however, more realistic than (for example) a Suslov, knows the world outside the Soviet Union far better, and is more capable of doing geopolitical sums which reflect the actual situation. This means that, however closed his mind may be, he is more likely than many of his Politburo colleagues to adjust policy in accord with real or potential power factors.
3. His status: Gromyko has now been Foreign Minister for over 24 years, and his authority has steadily grown. Initially, he may have been little more than one of several foreign policy advisers with responsibil-
ity for execution of routine overt Soviet diplomacy. However, since his elevation to full Politburo status in 1973, his close working relationship with Brezhnev and his steady public exposure as a foreign policy spokesman second only to Brezhnev have given him an authority which

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis.
2 In telegram 237032 to Moscow, September 4, Eagleburger asked Matlock for his assessment of Gromyko “the man, his current status in the establishment, his overall tactics for the bilateral, and his mood” in anticipation of the UNGA bilateral meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
3 In telegram 12507 from Moscow, September 5, the Embassy reported on Gromyko’s meeting with a congressional delegation led by Senator Alan Cranston. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N810007—0630)
may approach (but probably not match) that which Kissinger exercised in the U.S.G. during the Ford administration. I would presume that his influence is now probably at a historical peak, what with Brezhnev less active and less mentally agile, and with most Politburo members senior to him showing distinct signs of senility. Nevertheless, he does not make Soviet foreign policy on his own, and has competitors for influence in the upper councils. On matters affecting military policy, Ustinov’s influence would equal or exceed his. He probably has little patience for, and limited influence over, the ideological orientation of figures like Suslov and (probably) Ponomarev. The latter are probably more insistent on support to “national-liberation” movements and are capable of providing independent staffing for the Politburo on foreign policy questions through the Central Committee apparatus in which they are entrenched. They would draw on KGB reporting and classified analyses by institutes such as Arbatov’s, in addition to that provided by Gromyko’s ministry. This group (along of course with Andropov) probably exercises more sway over Soviet covert activities than does Gromyko. (Incidentally, Arbatov’s use of the Central Committee channel and his occasional direct access to Brezhnev probably mean that Gromyko—like Dobrynin—views him as an annoying kibitzer rather than an ally.) Having said the above, I would caution that the inner workings of the Politburo are still largely obscure to us, and Gromyko is an undeviating team player; if he is overruled, he will never give us signs of it. Unfortunately neither the Soviet press nor our Soviet contacts here feed us with tantalizing tidbits on policy disputes in the Politburo.

4. Tactics for the Bilateral: Gromyko’s principal objective will be to move the U.S. into negotiation of arms control issues, particularly SALT and TNF, without making concessions in other areas. He will hammer hard against linkage, as he did with the Senators. He will probably come on as the “wounded party,” with repetition of some of the themes he played to Cranston and Mathias: the U.S. illogically suspended the SALT process, the U.S. is an unreliable partner with changes in policy every four years, Soviet intentions are pure and it is the U.S. which is flexing its muscles dangerously, heightening tensions and fanning a war psychosis.

5. Such an approach has the obvious tactical aim of putting the Secretary on the defensive, in effect challenging him to “prove” U.S. good faith and reliability by moving toward the Soviet position that arms control should be negotiated without regard to other issues. Not all of it will be sham, however. Gromyko and the Soviet leadership are seriously concerned with their inability to get a long-term “fix” on U.S. policy; they genuinely find the major U.S. policy shifts that they experience every four years a perplexing and frustrating experience.
They probably also honestly suspect that current U.S. policy aims at strategic superiority and have genuine doubts (which they are too cagey to admit) that they could match us in an all-out arms race.

6. Gromyko will be a master of his brief and will make every effort to channel the discussion into those areas of primary interest to the Soviets. Although he is capable of employing filibustering tactics (as he did with the Senators), I doubt that he would insult the Secretary with excessively long winded lectures. But he will bolster his presentation with frequent examples which cry out for refutation, and it would probably be a mistake to rise automatically to the bait, since this would in effect enable him to determine the agenda of the discussion.

7. I believe the Secretary can best cope with these tactics by insisting on a full discussion of the priority items on our agenda. If Gromyko chooses to play the “offended party” role, the Secretary should counter in kind with a clear exposition of those Soviet actions which have brought us to the current unsatisfactory relationship. (This should be done in any event, but the tone and context might be adjusted to the emotional level Gromyko chooses to adopt.)

8. One favorite Gromyko tactic is simply to ignore significant points raised by his interlocutor, and to talk about other things until time runs out. The Secretary should not let a sense of politeness deter him from returning repeatedly to points of interest to us if Gromyko proves evasive in responding to them.

9. As the Secretary’s agenda is worked out, it would be well to bear in mind that the Soviets will take it as a clear signal that any subject omitted is secondary to the ones raised, in our assessment of priorities. This does not mean that the Secretary must provide a definitive catalog of all our desiderata—which would be quite impossible in any case—but simply that if he does not talk about (for example) compliance issues or mention that we still expect more on Sverdlovsk, the Soviet inference will be that our concerns on these matters are not really very acute. For those subjects raised, the Soviets will be attentive to such matters as the length of time spent on them and the vigor of their presentation as direct clues to U.S. priorities. Perfunctory mention of a subject can be interpreted as signaling low priority since the presumption would be that it was read into the record merely to satisfy some interest group or coterie.

10. If any portion of the meeting is conducted one-on-one, the opportunity should be used to convey our most important points as directly and pointedly as elementary politeness permits. Gromyko, like most Russians, can take straight talk in private. Indeed, they prize it, and the signals given at such a meeting—should one be held—will be
the most important he will bring back to Moscow with him (assuming Gromyko does not meet with the President).

11. His mood: though he never had the benefit of studying the Stanislavsky technique formally, Gromyko is a consummate actor, quite capable of adjusting his performance to what he deems the requirements of the moment. Therefore his underlying mood may well not show very clearly in the actual meetings. However, I am reasonably confident that his real mood will be one combining a deep sense of frustration and genuine concern about the future. The following elements will contribute to it:

—Soviet foreign policy has not been notably successful over the past three or four years, and Gromyko knows it. There must be serious questions in his mind whether the Soviets will be able to hold onto the foreign policy gains achieved through the mid-1970’s, or whether they will be forced onto the defensive.

—Though it is not his official concern, he will be aware of the serious economic and (potentially) political problems which face the USSR in the eighties which will limit Soviet capabilities to keep up with an unrestrained arms race without creating even deeper problems of economic development, morale, and possibly political disaffection.

—These general concerns will be heightened by two specific ones: Poland and the succession. Gromyko, like most Soviet leaders, doubtless realizes that Poland is the most portentous problem—for both foreign and domestic policy—the current leadership has faced in its long tenure. He probably also realizes that it is one which, whatever the Soviet Union does, is almost certain to damage the Soviet position in the long run. On the domestic side, he will be aware that Brezhnev’s parlous health could result in his death and thus bring about a succession struggle with very little notice. While he can not rationally entertain ambitions for the top position himself, he may face a challenge during any succession “debate” on grounds that Soviet foreign policy has been mismanaged. Certainly, one can make a convincing case on geopolitical grounds that, at the very least, Soviet priorities have been misplaced, and that risky foreign adventures have endangered vital Soviet interests in maintaining a tight hold on Eastern Europe, in avoiding a US-China alliance, and in preventing a resurgence of US strength. Unless Gromyko, in the inner councils, fought the decisions which have brought this situation about (and we have no reason to believe he did, though he may not have initiated them), he could sense personal vulnerability during a period of competition for the succession.

—Although I believe that Gromyko’s mood will be characterized more by frustration and concern for the future than by sanguine hopes for new Soviet foreign policy triumphs, he will of course not view the future as unrelievedly bleak. He is acutely aware of our problems with
our Western Allies and doubtless understands that our alliances could be severely weakened—to certain Soviet benefit—if we fail to make a good-faith effort to negotiate on principal arms control issues. In specific areas, he doubtless sees opportunities for the future: in exploiting the Arab reaction to Israeli policies in order to undermine the U.S. position with the moderates in the region; in utilizing local disputes and internal weaknesses in the “Third World” to put the U.S. on the defensive; in playing the long game in Iran with the hope that, if the Tudeh can keep its head down during the current chaos, it may emerge as the most effective organized force when Khomeni and the mullahs have totally discredited themselves or killed themselves off. He will also be aware of U.S. domestic factors which may make it difficult for any U.S. administration to commit the full range of U.S. resources to our military capacity. The termination of the limited grain embargo, the dispute over MX basing, and—most of all—the recent drive to trim back early estimates of defense spending to permit a balanced budget in 1984, are doubtless read in Moscow as clear evidence that there are domestic political limits to the U.S. commitment to the competitive side of our relationship.

—In brief, Gromyko’s concern for the future will be real, but he will not view his country as so beset with difficulties that it is forced to a rapprochement with the U.S. whatever the cost. One key question in Gromyko’s mind will be determining what the cost of better relations really is. While we have made clear our dissatisfaction with Soviet policy in many areas, the Soviets probably have no clear fix on where our priorities lie. We have mentioned Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cuban activities, support for terrorism, compliance with existing arms control agreements, Poland, the SS–20’s and Soviet behavior in the Middle East at various times and in various contexts. All of these—and more, of course—are legitimate issues and must be dealt with. However, Gromyko and his colleagues are probably in a genuine quandary as to what it would take to start on the road toward a better relationship, and specifically, what it would take to rekindle our interest in SALT or SART. Clearly, yielding on all outstanding issues at the outset is not an acceptable price to them, and Gromyko will be alert as to any hints as to where we draw the bottom line on our initial desiderata. Though it is unnecessary and undesirable for the Secretary in effect to write off any important issues between us, some general indication of how Soviet responsiveness in these various areas might affect U.S. policy could provide [garble] to Gromyko which would be useful to us in applying leverage for more acceptable Soviet behavior.

—Aside from his desire to determine the price this administration is asking for better relations, Gromyko will be beset with some doubts about the longevity of current U.S. policies. Though the Soviets have
their tactical and propaganda reasons for stressing the point, their complaints about the inconstancy of U.S. policies rest on a foundation of honest perception of wide and (for them) not always predictable swings in U.S. policy, coupled with what they regard as the repeated inability of successive U.S. Presidents to deliver on commitments. Therefore, in addition to trying to determine what the true intentions of the current administration are, Gromyko will also be making a judgment whether its policy is likely to persist over time or whether it is only a set of passing whims. In order to stress the deep roots in U.S. opinion which support our current approach to the USSR, the Secretary should leave no doubt in Gromyko’s mind that it is precisely Soviet actions which have engendered the current U.S. response, and that only a change in the pattern of those actions can prepare the ground for a more harmonious relationship, which inter alia would make arms reduction much easier.

12. Although Gromyko’s meetings with the Secretary will be critically important in providing clear indicators of the direction of our policy, we should recognize that the Soviets, like ourselves, will look more to actions than to words for clues about our policy. The words will have little effect unless they are seen to be backed by a capability and willingness to act, and this is as true as regards prospective negotiations as it is in respect to moves to strengthen deterrence. While I believe our overall tactical approach to the Soviets has been sound up to now, I feel strongly that—just as in the more limited TNF area—we must devise a credible two-track approach, combining a reasonable negotiating position linked to overall Soviet restraint with a strong deterrent capacity. Weakness in either of these tracks will tend in the long run to undermine our position in the other, since both our own public and those of our allies will expect us to offer alternatives to confrontation if their support is to be forthcoming when confrontations are forced upon us. Conversely, of course, our negotiating position would be weakened disastrously if we neglect our deterrent capacity. Most of our attention up to now seems to have been concentrated on rebuilding our capability for deterrence, and this is as it should be. But I would hope that the Secretary will be in a position when he confronts Gromyko to make clear that either track is a viable option for the U.S. and it is up to the Soviets to chose which they want.

13. One final note. As you are aware, in the past (save last year), Gromyko has usually met with the President during his annual trip to the U.S. for the GA. I do not know whether the question has come up with the Soviets in Washington, but on balance I can see a distinct advantage in the President offering him a meeting. Such a meeting would provide an opportunity for us to convey in the most authoritative manner our current views and also should put to rest for some
time the propaganda effectiveness of Soviet complaints about the alleged U.S. unwillingness to enter into a real dialogue and negotiate differences.

Matlock

84. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, September 18, 1981

SUBJECT

My Forthcoming Meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

As you know, I will be meeting with Gromyko in New York September 23 and 28, during his visit for the fall session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Objectives and Basic Approach

I see those talks as a potential contribution to your objective of putting the US-Soviet relationship on a sounder footing by linking improved bilateral relations with increased Soviet restraint. I will put this right up front in an initial one-on-one session before the Delegations convene: I would like in that session to convey on your behalf that we want to work within a long-term perspective based on respect for each other’s vital interests, but that this will frankly require new Soviet realism, together with a recognition that the world power balance cannot be changed by violence and force without calling forth a response in kind.

Gromyko will of course resist, and any results will be neither large nor immediate, but we may be able to start a process headed in the right direction. My main purpose will be to drive home to him that our whole approach to East-West policy has fundamentally and durably changed: from now on, the Soviet military build-up and lack of international restraint will be met with an appropriate U.S. military and political response. But I also want to convey to Gromyko that there is something for the Soviets in a more moderate course.

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File: USSR, General Secretary Brezhnev (8105567, 8105658). Secret.
Gromyko is an accurate reporter, and I will be making a sober presentation intended to show the Politburo that we have adopted our new course deliberately and will pursue it deliberately; that there are positive benefits if they adjust to it responsibly; and that the process of serious dialogue we are ready for can produce an altogether more solid and durable basis for conducting business and living together than the two superpowers have ever had before.

**Focus on Interventionism**

I plan to deliver this message by hitting hard on Soviet and proxy interventionism in crisis and potential crisis areas: Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and Central American/the Caribbean. I will also highlight Poland and Iran as two countries where future Soviet intervention would have disastrous effects. In this private meeting, the main accent will be on the Cuban military build-up and Cuban activities abroad. I intend to make clear to Gromyko that we are prepared for improvement in US-Soviet relations, but that progress depends on Soviet willingness to take our concerns into account. To reinforce this argument, I plan to raise the possibility of another round of talks with him some months hence, implicitly conditional on Moscow’s responsiveness to our calls for restraint.

**TNF Negotiations**

The second main purpose of the meetings is to reach formal agreement on the time and place for beginning TNF negotiations later this year, in keeping with your commitment, and to initiate substantive dialogue on TNF issues. I will be making a strong pitch for Soviet cooperation in international efforts to follow up on our evidence of toxin use in Southeast Asia, and warn him of the impact on arms control prospects. But getting TNF negotiations started is vital to us, and it is an objective for the first meeting. The Soviets have been sticky in discussions of the joint statement, and the topic may spill over into the second. We should get the public statement we want that talks will begin on November 30 in Geneva, but we will also be in a position to explain to our friends that it is the Soviets, rather than us, who have been holding back.

**Possible Outcomes**

I expect stiff rebuttals rather than explicit concessions on geopolitical issues from Gromyko. But it is important to make our points again at the first Ministerial-level meeting with the Soviets since you were elected, and to test Soviet responsiveness at that level. The evidence will probably come back to us only over the next several months.

It is also important to keep our dialogue before the public. This is the main purpose of my suggesting another meeting with Gromyko,
and I plan to add one or two bilateral elements to the same end. I will raise a number of outstanding human rights cases and have Ambassador-designate Art Hartman turn over another full list of such cases. I will also raise the possibility of opening consulates in Kiev, the heart of the Ukraine, and in New York. Again, results are less important than making the point to the public that we are in fact communicating.

In addition, I am trying to reach interagency agreement on two economic issues: approval of the $300 million International Harvester deal; and closing of the Soviets’ Kama Purchasing Commission in the U.S. Informing Gromyko of these two steps—one positive, one negative—will demonstrate that we have control over the economic relationship.

Gromyko may hold to a total hard line in these meetings, and we may well emerge with nothing more than agreement to begin TNF and meet again at the foreign minister level. Accordingly, we are keeping public and Allied expectations low. Such a result, however, would not be a disaster: on the contrary, it would keep the onus for delay and lack of good will on the Soviets, where it belongs.

85. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, September 18, 1981

SUBJECT
Letter to Brezhnev

As you know, we have now embarked on a public campaign within the Alliance to take the political offensive away from the Soviets. The purpose is to demonstrate to Western publics that it is the Soviets, not the United States, who are blocking the path to a more stable East-West relationship, and that for our part we are ready for better relations if Moscow is ready to show greater restraint.

To get this campaign off the ground, I believe that you should send a letter to Brezhnev timed with the start of the fall session of the U.N. General Assembly describing your views on the future direction of US-Soviet relations. Although we would not release the text of the

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File: USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8105567, 8105658). No classification marking.
letter, we envisage briefing the press on its main themes in order to create the maximum possible impact on Western opinion.

The proposed letter (attached) makes some of the same points that I plan to use with Gromyko in my talks next week. The basic message is that the U.S. is prepared to defend its interests by whatever means necessary, but that a more constructive relationship is possible if the Soviets exercise restraint.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to Brezhnev.²

Attachment

Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev³

Washington, undated

[Begin text.]

Dear President Brezhnev:

As we begin the fall session of the United Nations General Assembly and approach the meetings between our Foreign Ministers, I thought it would be useful for me to describe to you some of my thoughts on the future direction of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Let me say at the outset that the United States is vitally interested in the peaceful resolution of international tensions and in a more constructive and stable relationship with your country. We have repeatedly demonstrated our willingness to settle disagreements by negotiations and to observe scrupulously our international commitments.

I believe, however, that a great deal of the present tension in the world is due to actions by the Soviet Government. As we and our Allies have repeatedly stated, two aspects of Soviet behavior are of particular concern to us:

—First, the Soviet Union’s pursuit of unilateral advantage in various parts of the globe and its repeated resort to the direct and indirect use of force in regional conflicts. The role of Cuba in Africa and Latin America is particularly disturbing and unacceptable to us.

² At the end of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: “President approved letter 9/20/81.”

³ Secret. Transmitted to the Embassy in Moscow on September 21 in telegram 252408 which is the copy printed here. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D81044–0892)
—Second, the USSR’s unremitting and comprehensive military buildup over the past 15 years, a buildup which in our view far exceeds purely defensive requirements and carries disturbing implications of a search for military superiority.

Despite these trends, we are committed to a dialogue with the Soviet Union. We are deeply concerned over the threat to mankind in the age of nuclear weapons. I have stated publicly that the United States is ready to engage in discussions with the USSR that would lead to genuine arms reductions. The existing stockpiles of these weapons and ongoing programs are such that only a serious effort at arms reductions would contribute to the objective which we both share, namely, lifting the threat of nuclear annihilation which hangs over mankind.

While the United States is committed to a stable and peaceful world, it will never accept a position of strategic disadvantage. Because the Soviet Union has, over the past years, embarked on a major program to improve its strategic forces, the United States must also upgrade its forces. We have no desire to tax our societies with a costly, burdensome, and dangerous build-up of armaments. The United States, however, will invest whatever is needed to maintain a secure strategic posture.

The meetings this month between our Foreign Ministers will, I assume, set the time and place for negotiations between our two countries on what we term “theater nuclear forces.” We are deeply committed to achieving a military balance in this area—a balance which has been upset by the unprecedented buildup of military forces by your country in recent years, especially the deployment of the SS–20 missiles. Furthermore, as we have stated at the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, we are prepared to participate in negotiations to fashion a coherent system of commitments on European security that are verifiable and militarily significant.

With our Allies and other concerned nations, the United States is willing to pursue negotiated solutions to the problems that threaten world peace, including the presence of occupation forces in Afghanistan and Kampuchea. Soviet readiness to resolve the Afghanistan problem on the basis of a prompt withdrawal would go far toward restoring the international confidence and trust necessary for the improvement of East-West relations. The Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea has earned widespread condemnation from the international community as a breach of accepted norms of conduct and a threat to peace. I call on your government to exert its influence over the Government of Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea.

In sum, the United States is more interested in actions which further the cause of world peace than in words. We are fully committed to solving outstanding differences by peaceful means, but we are not willing to accept double standards of international behavior. Words
and public statements are, however, important. A major contribution to the reduction of world tensions would be for your country to curb the escalating campaign of anti-Americanism and disinformation both inside the Soviet Union and abroad, a campaign which only serves to poison the political atmosphere.

Mr. President, my country stands ready to begin the search for a better U.S.-Soviet relationship. We are prepared to discuss with the Soviet Union the full range of issues which divide us, to seek significant, verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons, to expand trade, and to increase contacts at all levels of our societies. I am hopeful that the meetings between Secretary of State Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko will start a process leading toward such a relationship.

For such a process to bear fruit, your country must understand the need for greater restraint in the international arena. At the same time, let me add that the United States is fully prepared to take your interests into account, if you are prepared to do the same with ours. If we can succeed in establishing a framework of mutual respect for each other’s interests and mutual restraint in the resolution of international crises, I think we will have created a much more solid and enduring basis for U.S.-Soviet relations than we have ever had before.

End text.

86. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan

Washington, September 21, 1981

SUBJECT
Status Report on Anatolii Shcharanskii

Avital Shcharanskii, whom you met last May 28, had not heard from her imprisoned husband for four and half months. Her mother-in-law had no news either, her letters being returned. There was serious fear that Anatolii Shcharanskii was no longer alive. (C)

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (9/16/81–9/21/81). Confidential. Sent for information. Copied to Meese, Baker, and Deaver. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it on September 22. Reagan wrote in the bottom right-hand corner: “We should talk about this after the Haig-Gromyko meeting. RR.”
Fortunately, a few days ago Anatolii’s mother received a long letter from her son, dated August 30, from which it transpires that he was hospitalized a few days before as a result of recurrent blackouts, high-blood pressure, and some heart problems. His wife tells us that he had never had such problems before and they are probably the result of his having spent nine months in solitary confinement (three months longer than Soviet law provides as the maximum incarceration in solitary). (C)

In light of the present state of your correspondence with Brezhnev (your handwritten letter on Shcharanski was not sent), do you wish to raise the matter now?2 (C)

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2 See footnote 1, Document 46.

87. Editorial Note

In a September 22, 1981, memorandum to President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Richard Allen, Dennis Blair of the National Security Council staff reported that he and Richard Pipes of the National Security Council staff observed that the changes made by Allen and Pipes were not incorporated into the version of President Ronald Reagan’s letter to Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev (see the attachment to Document 85) that was transmitted to Moscow. Blair attributed this oversight to a communications error between himself and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Mark Palmer—not “a calculated move by State to undercut the NSC.” To this memorandum, Blair attached an annotated copy of the letter indicating the discrepancies. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File: USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8105567, 8105658))

In telegram 252408 to all North Atlantic Treaty Organization capitals, Moscow, Canberra, Madrid, Tokyo, and Wellington, September 21, the Department noted: “As part of our campaign to take the political offensive away from the Soviets, the President has decided to send a letter to Brezhnev timed to the start of the UNGA fall session and the Secretary’s meetings with Gromyko, describing his views on the future direction of US-Soviet relations.” The Department instructed the Chargé in Moscow to deliver the letter to the Acting Soviet Foreign Minister or highest-ranking official before noon Eastern Daylight Time,
September 22. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810444–0892) In telegram 13306 from Moscow, September 22, Chief Political Officer Sherrod McCall reported that he had an appointment at the Soviet Foreign Ministry that day at 3 p.m. Moscow time. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810445–0385) In telegram 13383 from Moscow, September 23, McCall reported a conversation with Deputy USA Institute Director Radomir Bodganov, who conveyed Soviet Foreign Minister Anatoly Gromyko’s annoyance at Washington’s having sent the letter after his departure from Moscow. McCall commented: “We take Bogdanov with a grain of salt, but we tend to believe he did consult on the analysis of the President’s letter and that he may be accurately reporting Gromyko’s reaction.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810448–0174)

88. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 23, 1981, 2–4:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig
D. Arenburger, Interpreter

USSR
Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko
V. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Minister Gromyko said that he was prepared to begin a one-on-one discussion with Secretary Haig on some questions, not many questions, initially without going into detail. What were the Secretary’s preferences on that score?

The Secretary, recalling previous meetings during the early period of the Nixon Presidency, expressed the view that it would be well for us to have some frank discussions without extensive notetaking. He would expect his comments to be in support of US positions, whereas Gromyko’s comments would be in support of Soviet positions. He thought that this kind of discussion was clearly in order. In line with previous tradition, he would welcome any comment Gromyko wished to make in this setting. The Secretary intended to do the same and, if necessary, was prepared to devote much time to such a discussion. This would not disturb him because he had discussed this meeting

extensively with President Reagan, whereas his colleagues did not have the benefit of such discussion.

Gromyko wanted to say that it would be useful to discuss Soviet-U.S. relations as such in terms of principle. He thought that to begin with it would be useful to touch on the question of where, in the Secretary’s view, the U.S. and the Soviet Union should be moving with regard to Soviet-U.S. relations, and how the Secretary envisaged this direction. Above all, of course, the Soviet side wanted to understand what the U.S. Administration’s intentions were with regard to Soviet-U.S. relations for the foreseeable future. Did the U.S. expect these relations to develop under the existing momentum? Of course, given the current state of our relations, the Secretary would recognize what retention of the current momentum would mean. Perhaps the Secretary believed, like the Soviet side, that something different was needed on a reliable foundation, consistent with the interests of the Soviet Union and of the U.S. Gromyko believed that the conversation should be pursued in these terms.

The Secretary replied that he would be very happy to deal with this matter because he believed that we were currently at an important junction. He did not expect that during the discussion of this subject he would convince Gromyko or that Gromyko would convince him. But he thought it important for us to communicate on the issues Gromyko had touched upon. For his part, the Secretary wanted to go back a bit in time so as to have the proper background and appreciation, at least from the U.S. standpoint, of what had led to the unsatisfactory state in which we found ourselves. But since Gromyko was the guest, he wanted to hear the latter’s comments on this matter of principle.

Gromyko suggested that it would be appropriate not to go too far back into history because history could provide very rich material. He thought that it would suffice to provide a few examples in order to emphasize the basis on which the relations between the two countries had developed. Gromyko intended to do so now. Over a number of years, and this would not be news to the Secretary, the two sides had exerted no mean effort—in fact, they had exerted major efforts—toward improving relations between the two countries, and toward establishing them upon firmer ground. Thus, the two sides should do everything in their power to retain what had been accomplished, in order not to lose it. Indeed, the two sides had achieved much over the years. They had arrived at numerous agreements and had concluded several treaties which, one could say, still smelled of the sweat of the participants. This was a major step toward development of Soviet-U.S. relations. Gromyko went on to say that suddenly—he wanted to emphasize, suddenly—there was a new administration which told its people and the entire world that much of what had been achieved did not suit it.
Moreover, frequently it did not even announce or provide rationale or justification for its contention that some accord or other did not suit it. This pertained specifically to the SALT II Treaty and to some other agreements which either ground to a halt or on which the administration cast a shadow trying to undermine their adoption.

Gromyko wanted to say further with respect to the overall mood in the U.S., among U.S. leading circles and in the U.S. capital, that an atmosphere was being established on a daily basis which did not facilitate accommodation or compromise. On the contrary, this atmosphere was contributing to a very deep gulf, not only in political terms, but in psychological terms as well. It was being emphasized that these were not only two different countries, but that they constituted different worlds. The Soviet side had taken note of this from the very first days of the new administration as it was observing the new administration but, to repeat, this point had been noted from the very first days. The Soviet side had noted that statements were being made from the very first days of the new administration to the effect that Soviet-U.S. relations might not constitute the major issue, that they might not be the most important issue, that they might not even be an important issue at all, and this led to certain conclusions. Observing this the Soviet side shrugged its shoulders and asked, why? After all, whatever statements are being made in Moscow, London or elsewhere regarding the importance of relations with the Soviet Union, they do not demean the worth of a country or the respect for that country. This applied to the Soviet Union as much as it applied to the United States; the respect in which a country was held would neither increase nor diminish from this. Why was this being done? The Soviet Union existed quite irrespective of the will of the United States, and the U.S. existed irrespective of the will of the USSR. Accordingly, it was necessary to accept the real situation and to assess the status of individual states on the basis of objective reality. Their importance, their place in the world was governed by objective reality. Gromyko thought that the Secretary could not but understand all this. Thus, the Soviet side had reached the conclusion that the U.S. was aware of the above but evidently had decided that there was a need to create an atmosphere in the U.S. so the people of the country would not exaggerate the importance of Soviet-U.S. relations, in fact, would belittle them.

Gromyko went on to say that the Soviet Union considered this to be wrong because this did not reflect the desires of the people and did not meet the interests of the U.S. people or the Soviet people. Given the above, what was the purpose of confusing the American population? We represented two powers, the major powers, specifically in the military sense, especially in the military sense. Thus, it was certainly of special importance to regulate the relations between these two states,
to improve their relations, especially in the military sense. There was no reason for the people to think otherwise. If the above was true, why should we not improve our relations on a more realistic and solid footing? Gromyko didn’t want the Secretary to think that he was asking favors of the U.S. The importance of Soviet-U.S. relations should be enhanced; this was in the interests of the U.S. people. It was necessary to plant one’s feet firmly on the ground of reality. Gromyko was proceeding from existing facts. Whatever the U.S. position, the Soviet side was proceeding from real facts. The Secretary was no doubt familiar with the materials of the 26th Congress of the CPSU and with the report presented by General Secretary of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev regarding the policy of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Secretary would understand that the Soviet Union wanted to develop relations with the U.S. on a realistic basis, that is, good-neighborly, normal, and businesslike relations. The fact that we had different social systems was an objective reality and nothing could be done about that. But whatever differences or conflicts might arise, we should try to resolve them by peaceful means, through negotiations. That was the Soviet position.

Gromyko continued by saying that he could not agree to an approach under which whenever a difference arose, one immediately grabbed for a pistol or revolver, or even reached for the button of a missile. The Soviet Union believed that no country in the world should be able to say that it would press the button of war if something didn’t suit it. In his view, serious statesmen did not have the liberty in such cases to talk of the possibility of war, of the possibility of a nuclear war. In fact, some individuals even thought that two wars were not enough, they spoke of two and one half wars. Why was this being done? Although this was a serious question, sometimes such questions nevertheless could not but produce a smile. Why were officials in high positions doing this? Was it because they wanted to appear brave in the eyes of others? But this need for bravery should be channeled toward cooperation, toward seeking accommodations. It was not appropriate for an official representing a major power to pull a saber out of the scabbard. The Soviet side wanted not an emotional basis, but a more solid basis of relations as was appropriate for statesmen of the major powers. On behalf of the Soviet government he wanted to say that this was the standpoint to which it adhered. In this connection Gromyko recalled that during President Nixon’s first visit to Moscow, the latter had told Brezhnev that the sides had sufficient weapons to

destroy each other seven times. Brezhnev had replied that he was aware of the figures and the two had agreed that there was no need to destroy each other seven times, that the sides should search for ways to reduce these numbers, that both sides should engage in this search.

Gromyko also wanted to say the following which was very important in terms of obtaining a complete picture. A number of U.S. officials in Washington had been saying that in certain areas, such as Asia and Africa, things were not to the liking of the U.S. Gromyko added that he was intentionally refraining from citing names. In the U.S. things seemed to be programmed in advance toward searching for the hand of Moscow by way of conspirator, inciter, or at least, instigator of everything that did not suit the U.S. Gromyko wanted to say that the Soviet Union could not be held responsible for everything that displeased the U.S. There were objective processes. They had existed in the past, they existed at present and would exist in the future, and they governed occurrences in the world. Could it be said that what had happened in Gromyko’s country in 1917 had been produced by some individual? This was a product of objective history. Things of this nature were bound to occur in the future as well, and Gromyko did not believe that this would be the fault of the Soviet Union. He suggested that perhaps there was some misunderstanding on this score. If that was the case, it might be advisable to climb a high tower and take a look at the world in more realistic terms. Of course, if the U.S. recognized that things were not so, if they were being distorted intentionally . . . (Gromyko did not complete the sentence). Perhaps the U.S. truly believed that independence would not benefit Southern Africa, for example, Angola, and that the situation in the Middle East was the fault of the Soviet Union, that the situation in Southeast Asia was the fault of the Soviet Union, and that the situation in Latin America was the fault of the Soviet Union. But that was a gross misunderstanding. On the other hand, if this was an act, the Secretary would know that the Soviet Union was not the mother of history. It was a different matter, of course, if this was the picture the U.S. administration wanted to project to the people. In conclusion, Gromyko wanted to express hope for an improvement in the relations between the two countries.

Gromyko hoped that the Secretary would understand that the Soviet Union by right occupied a worthy and legitimate place in the world, that it had its own interests, including security interests. The Soviet Union, for its part, recognized that the U.S. occupied a worthy and legitimate place in the world and that it, too, had security interests. He noted that we would yet have occasion to return to security interests and thus he did not want to continue that theme at present. The question now was how to establish a more solid foundation for our relations, how emotionalism could be replaced by a more sober assessment.
Perhaps there was some outside influence? Perhaps not all aspects were clear? There had been a time when we had much in common, particularly during World War II when we had a high degree of cooperation, especially in the military area, when we were jointly shedding our blood. Perhaps some individuals were not clear about one thing or other. In that case, we had to remove such doubts. It was necessary to clear up misconceptions and misunderstandings, and get on with the dialogue. The Secretary would recognize that Gromyko had not come here for the express purpose of disagreeing, although, of course, he could do that. He had come here in order to learn U.S. intentions, in order to learn the position of the U.S. regarding major world issues and in order to convince the Secretary that the Soviet Union was for safeguarding its legitimate interests. The U.S. side could repeat a thousand times that there allegedly was a Soviet threat. There was no treacherous plan, the Soviet Union did not need conquests. The Soviet Union wanted to live in peace and it wanted the U.S. to live in peace. Whenever the U.S. side was scaring the U.S. people and others, the Soviet Union could not but explain its own view of the situation. It had done so before and would continue in the future. Gromyko asked rhetorically whether this constituted polemics and answered in the affirmative. He went on to say that it was not the Soviet side which had initiated this process, one of action and reaction. The Soviet Union had not desired it, it had been forced into it. While both sides might be engaged in it, it was not the Soviet Union which had started the process. Accordingly, the Soviet side was very interested in knowing how the U.S. intended to conduct its affairs with the USSR in the future.

Gromyko went on to say that he had no intention of raising one thorny question after another simply to place the Secretary in an uncomfortable position. He wanted to discuss issues in a business-like atmosphere. He was looking forward to business-like discussions with the Secretary with a view to understanding each other’s positions, as befitted the representatives of major world powers. He wanted the U.S. to recognize the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union in the world and not to infringe on them, just as the Soviet Union intended to recognize and respect the legitimate interests of the U.S. The Soviet Union did not pursue a goal of infringing on the legitimate interests of the U.S. Gromyko remarked that as far as the military area was concerned, we would have occasion to discuss it specifically. Much could be said on that score, perhaps in conjunction with some political questions. If he could use the expression, his comments constituted algebra.

The Secretary responded that he was impressed by the serious tone and general expression which Gromyko and his government had attached to subjects that were of extreme importance. Gromyko had
referred to the Reagan Administration, and the Secretary felt it was important that we understand the points of departure of the U.S. Administration. The Secretary knew that Gromyko had been a keen observer of the U.S. scene for many years. Few public figures, if any, today have the experience and the accomplishments of Gromyko. In line with Gromyko’s reference to objective reality, the Secretary felt it necessary to try and communicate to Gromyko how we had arrived at the current state of affairs, which we did not like. He was not doing so in order to score debating points or to raise controversial issues, rather his purpose was to approach the current problems we faced as a backdrop to how we would like to proceed in the future.

Gromyko would know that early in the seventies—and the Secretary had noted Gromyko’s mention of President Nixon’s comments about SALT—he sometimes telephoned from Washington to the President in Moscow following individual meetings. In a number of respects, achievements were made at that time, involving the sweat of people working together. While the term “detente” had not been coined at that time, it had come into special international prominence. At that time, the Secretary had helped in Washington with the preparation of the document on principles that both sides negotiated. It was suggested in this document that neither side was to gain an advantage, whether directly or indirectly. At that time historic events had converged on the U.S., events which were not necessarily the result of an outside hand or evil design, but which constituted historic reality, namely, Vietnam and Watergate.

It was not during the Carter Administration, but during the Ford Administration, that the American people began to witness a number of events which made a profound impression on the U.S. mood and attitude regarding U.S.-Soviet relations. The Secretary wanted to speak very frankly. First, there was the invasion in Angola. No one can objectively insist that the Soviet Union inspired this invasion, but neither can anyone deny that it was made possible by material assistance. The next several events involved Ethiopia, Kampuchea and Southern Yemen, the first situation in Afghanistan and the second situation in Afghanistan. There was clear evidence from the U.S. standpoint of a growing and more active Cuban activity here. In the wake of the Cuban crisis, during the Kennedy Administration, some progress had been made to blunt Cuban activities for a while. But then they rose again to the point where some 40,000 Cuban combat forces currently are in Africa.

All of this left a very serious impression in the U.S. perception of U.S.-Soviet relations, and affected what had been high hopes during the early days of detente. At that time some success had been made with regard to trade and arms control. That was in 1975, before the
Carter period. President Reagan was voted into office because he had articulated for the American people concerns which showed the absence of reciprocity in detente. Soviet policy, for whatever reason, had become a one-way street. Compared to the level of 1975, today we see a Soviet presence in areas of interest to the U.S. and the West, at levels that constitute a potential threat to the West, which is unprecedented in Africa, Afghanistan and the Western Hemisphere. This was resuming again. We have spoken of the high levels of military equipment provided to Cuba. All this pertains to the agreement worked out with the sweat of the bureaucrats and officials of both countries. But the question arises of whether it is being abided by.

We are even refused answers to questions. The Secretary pointed to Sverdlovsk and to the question last month regarding the use of mycotoxins in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea for which we had hard, irrefutable evidence that we will transmit next week through our arms control representative. All this was continuing and thus raising questions in the minds of the American people. This did not start with the current Administration. The current Administration would not have been elected without it. The Administration reflected this growing American mood.

The Secretary expressed the view that our discussions could focus on three areas. First, there was the geopolitical area, that is, strategic crisis areas in the world. Gromyko had discussed the second area, namely the military balance and our goals thereon in the U.S. In this connection the two sides had conflicting priorities. It was not the President’s desire to return to an arms buildup, but there was a need to understand the objective situations. The third area concerned bilateral relations which, as we see it, derive from our understanding with respect to the first two areas.

During this preliminary discussion the Secretary did not want to leave Gromyko with the impression that U.S.-Soviet relations were not important to us. We had been accused of a fixation on these relations. One should have neither. It had to be understood that even reasonably historic events could affect better relations and distort them, whatever the objective criterion. It was a simple fact that the Soviet Government encouraged nations, specifically Cuba and Libya, to engage in activities

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3 In April 1979, accidental release of anthrax from a military research facility in Sverdlovsk (Ekaterinburg) killed an undetermined number of people. On October 1, 1981, ACDA Acting Director Robert Grey presented Soviet Chargé Bessmertnykh a démarche stating, inter alia, that “The United States has strong reason to believe that the Soviet Union is not in compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.” The démarche cited the incident at Sverdlovsk, and linked the Soviet Union to “attacks with lethal agents” in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea. (Telegram 263576 to Moscow, October 1; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810464-0793)

which, perhaps not at the sufferance of Moscow, still could not be maintained without the material resources of Moscow. Therefore, the Secretary wanted to emphasize in all sincerity that President Reagan did not wish a situation of sterile confrontation and an absence of communications between our two governments and peoples. Just the opposite was true. The Secretary thought it essential to move forward toward better communications and towards dealing with matters in which, quite frankly, we Americans considered ourselves to be the aggrieved party. There was a need for a concrete and specific improvement, and consequently for a dialogue together. This would not occur overnight.

In our view our relationship had to be a superpower relationship. The Secretary was not asking the Soviet Union to be humiliated by veering from its courses, for example in Afghanistan where, for whatever reason, the Soviet side was engaged. We were seeking an honorable, not a humiliating solution. Gromyko would recall that in the late 60s and early 70s we had an experience comparable to the Kampuchea situation, though not parallel to it. We understood what had happened. We did not believe that Hanoi was able to do what it was doing without Soviet support. On the other hand, we did not believe that the Soviet Union made Hanoi’s decisions. We were all conscious of what was happening and the Secretary wanted to say that he was not pleased by it.

Turning to the reference in Gromyko’s UNGA speech to Poland, the Secretary said that as a witness together with the Europeans, and in his present capacity, he would note that the West was acting with extreme restraint. We had helped to relieve the economic and the commodity needs of the Polish people. The Secretary pointed to the particular danger of outside interference. This was an objective reality. It could profoundly impact on everything we were talking about. Gromyko would recognize, of course, that we were not going to exploit (though we could) or exacerbate the situation. We were scrupulously trying to avoid this. Turning to the area of arms control, the Secretary noted that this would require good will. While this was not its “raison d’etre,” our objective was to try seriously for a break-through. This would be in our mutual interest. If this was not to be, the Secretary was prepared to accept it. He hoped Gromyko understood that what he saw in Washington was a reflection of the new U.S. concern because for a number of years there has been a lack of reciprocity. Now we have to walk the cat back. It was not our objective to humiliate the Soviet

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side, but realistically, as superpowers, we had to take into account each other's legitimate interests.

The record of the past years does not show a balanced relationship. Indeed, we wanted to move forward. This was our goal, the goal of President Reagan. The Secretary proposed, and we could do as Gromyko preferred, that in a superpower to superpower relationship we leave behind classic rhetoric and speak about some specific areas. Much time could be devoted to a more beneficial and restrained relationship.

As he understood the Soviet standpoint, Gromyko had raised concerns about what he viewed as simple American rhetoric. The Secretary wanted to note that this rhetoric was not new. As for personalities, their mention had been scrupulously avoided. He pointed out that the Soviet side had been referring to “imperialism” and “colonialism” in its organs and we could not tolerate this further without a U.S. response. There has been no reciprocity; there has been no sound basis. We would like all of this to stop. We thought it could stop. The Secretary was saying this quite frankly. He hoped that we could deal with objective reality without infringing upon vital Soviet interests or U.S. interests, and without stagnating in a confrontational, sterile mode. There must be a basis of reciprocity. If the Soviet side had legitimate problems, we would try to improve, remove or modify them.

The Secretary noted that he had said much in this short period of time, having mentioned some specifics. He thought that we could continue by region, or he could be more specific. At this time the Secretary was prepared to discuss some military considerations or some bilateral issues. Perhaps Gromyko preferred to leave these questions for the September 28 meeting. The Secretary was also prepared for the TNF discussion—that is, when and where they would be held and the name of our representative. As he understood it, our experts had exchanged drafts on this question. Perhaps Gromyko preferred to do this now, perhaps he preferred to wait until September 28, or perhaps he preferred to defer it beyond that date. The Secretary wanted Gromyko to understand that we were in favor of a more constructive approach. The Secretary noted again that this was just an initial exchange and hoped that Gromyko understood our intentions and our goals.

Gromyko wanted to respond to one or two points. First, he wanted to ask a question. Did the Secretary recognize the right of the Soviet Union to render assistance and help through the delivery of small quantities of weapons specifically intended for self-defense? After all, the U.S. was doing this with respect to a much larger number of countries than the USSR. He asked for the Secretary’s reply, after which he would have something to add. To repeat the question, did the U.S. recognize in principle the right of the Soviet Union to do so, or did it reserve that right exclusively for itself?
The Secretary replied that in principle we had no objections to the support of historic friends and to assistance intended for defense against an external threat. We had a legitimate objection if this occurred in a sensitive area, or if such supplies were for use elsewhere and intended to upset the status quo in the face of legal international norms and contrary to the rule of law.

Gromyko responded that in other words the Secretary recognized that right, and could not have done otherwise, because the U.S. was providing supplies to a large number of countries, not to mention the U.S. military bases and the military equipment stored there. He was troubled by the question of sensitive areas. Was this to mean that no changes could occur, not even in a million years? The Soviet Union was rendering such assistance when requested, under agreements strictly defining their defensive nature. In contrast to the U.S., no nation receiving Soviet military assistance had Soviet military forces. And how many such forces did the U.S. have? Gromyko was tempted to cite the number, but preferred not to do so at this time. He noted that the two Germanies were a special case, resulting from the wartime situation. The Secretary would know that the Soviet Union was not doing this to encroach upon, or to make inroads on U.S. interests. Absolutely not.

The Soviet Union could not see what U.S. interests there were in Angola, or in Ethiopia. To take the Secretary’s formula, Pakistan would pose a problem. When did history record Pakistan as being within the U.S. sphere? This was a slippery path. Such Soviet assistance was not aimed at the U.S. None of these countries posed a threat to the U.S. and certainly not those countries with which the U.S. has good relations. The Soviet Union was doing nothing to threaten the U.S. Of course, someone like Sadat might do anything. His policies were a greater riddle than the most ancient Egyptian pyramids. He could improvise “hell knows what.”

Incidentally, Gromyko asked, was it true, as reported in the press, that the U.S. had reached an agreement with Sadat concerning purchase of Soviet weapons for delivery to Afghan insurgents who were being infiltrated from Pakistan? If this was true, Gromyko could only express amazement. Was it possible that the U.S. could do something like this? That would be unworthy of the U.S. He thought that a serious country with a serious foreign policy could not act this way.

Gromyko went on to say that no country receiving Soviet military assistance posed a threat to the U.S. or its allies. Moreover, there were not all that many such countries. The Secretary had mentioned Angola

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and Cuba. For one thing, Cuba was not the Soviet Union. Secondly, it was a sovereign country and, third, the assistance was strictly of a defensive nature. Since Gromyko had already dealt with this question in his UN speech, he did not wish to belabor the matter of Cuba at this time. The Soviet Union realized that the U.S. disliked Cuba. The reason for this was the Cuban social system.

Gromyko went on to say that if the U.S. were to get South Africa to leave Angola alone—and the U.S. could do this—this would provide a solution fully in accord with the UN Charter and the resolutions regarding liberation of colonial nations and peoples. If the U.S. were to “put South Africa in its place” and Namibia gained independence, then there would be no problem. The problem of Cuba would disappear. Everything could be regulated.

Gromyko said that he would yet have occasion to refer to the problem of Afghanistan, but the Secretary had already referred to it and had expressed an interest in the Soviet troops there. These troops will be withdrawn, but first, incursions from Pakistan into Afghanistan had to cease. If the U.S. was truly interested in seeing Afghanistan without Soviet troops, if it was genuinely interested in a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, this could be done by working out a relevant document with the participation of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This document could bear the U.S. signature and the Soviet signature. What was required was removal of the interventionist forces. That would be the end of that matter. The Secretary might see a paradox here, but this was a case where the paradox was equated to reality. The U.S. was engaged in actions that kept Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union wanted to withdraw its troops, but the U.S. was not giving it an opportunity to do so. Accordingly, they remained there, and if the intervention continued would remain there.

Incidentally, these bands did not constitute a military force that Soviet troops had to contend with. These were groups of terrorists supplied in Pakistan, specifically by the U.S.—and the U.S. had said so on a high level—and by China. Thus, here was a paradox: it was the U.S. which was keeping the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Since the Soviet troops have to stay in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had to take care of them and ensure their well being. Perhaps there was no political solution with regard to Afghanistan, Pakistan and the U.S.’ friend, Iran; the Secretary would understand in what sense Gromyko meant this. As for the matter of personalities, Gromyko would try not to owe a debt to the Secretary, but he preferred to stay away from polemics.

Gromyko said that regarding U.S. policy with respect to the Soviet Union, Gromyko had noted the U.S. tone in which the Soviet Union was being accused of posing various threats. One would think that the Soviet Union was devoting day and night to devising threats to the
U.S. Gromyko wanted to propose an experiment. If the U.S., for its part, were to cease all hostile unfriendly statements and propaganda against the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union would immediately stop its statements. Thus, everything depended on the U.S. After all, the mass media reflected the position of a country. The Soviet Union could be more moderate, or it could be more active.

As for the U.S., it had developed such a pace that even if it tried to stop fast it would probably find it difficult to do so. Or did the U.S. have such knights who could accomplish this? On second thought, though, the U.S. probably would succeed. In short, what the Secretary saw in the Soviet mass media was nothing but a response to American actions. Perhaps the U.S. side saw the situation differently. But the fact was that when the two sides engaged in public polemics, the Soviet side saw the situation differently. In any event, this process did not originate on the Soviet side; this was not simply a circle.

Gromyko said that this was all he had to offer in the general discussion. As he had said, our discussion had been a kind of algebra, i.e., the fundamentals. It dealt with the guidelines toward moving forward. The Secretary had almost immediately referred to specific reasons. Gromyko thought that rather than exacerbating our relationship we should work toward preventing such exacerbations of the relationship. He noted that in dealing merely with the specifics one could lose sight of the fundamental issues by getting carried away with the details. The situation in the world was complex. This was particularly true with regard to Africa and Asia. Without an overall view, one could lose sight of the fundamental issues.

The Secretary said that he did not disagree. He knew that Gromyko had participated in, and studied history. According to the Hegelian dialectic which Marx had studied astutely, every action led to a counter action. Allowing for the importance of this discussion, we should never lose sight of what incited an action and what generated a counter action. With regard to Gromyko’s view about the level of assistance, the Secretary wanted to say that current statistics showed the Soviet Union exporting arms at a much higher level, at an unprecedented level. Thus, shipments to Cuba were double what they had been previously. That generated a counter action.

The Secretary noted that Gromyko evidently had misunderstood him. He did not believe in a rigidly-defined status quo. This would be futile. He believed that changes should occur peacefully, under the rule of law. He also noted that it would be hard to argue that Western influence in Pakistan was not an historic reality. No one in the U.S. was trying to re-establish old alliances, old security frameworks, as they had existed at the end of World War II. But he believed that much the same applied to the Soviet Union with respect to the independence
and non-alignment of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Secretary empha-
sized that any overt action against Pakistan was predicated precisely
on that. Gromyko had spoken about forays from Pakistan. The Secretary
was surprised to hear this, he had been unaware of them. Perhaps
Gromyko had other information or evidence on that score. The Secre-
tary did know of three million Afghan refugees who had been forced
out as a result of the Soviet intervention, and who were in Pakistan
and Iran. He had to say that he was unaware of any cross-border
activities which constituted a threat to, or justified 80,000 plus Soviet
forces. The simple fact was that Afghanistan had been a neutral and
non-aligned country leaning toward Moscow. No one in the U.S. or
the West had tried to change that. The Soviet Union had first installed
a puppet leader and had then intervened with Soviet forces.

As for Gromyko’s comments about Sadat, the Secretary did not
know the answer. He was not aware of the activities mentioned by
Gromyko. Sadat had been, and continued to be a staunch friend of the
Middle East Peace process. As for what Sadat might have said publicly
regarding arms, the Secretary would have to study the matter, but for
the moment he was unaware of the U.S. Administration being engaged
in it.

The Secretary had heard Gromyko’s comment regarding his Cuban
statement and had noted the unusual way in which this question com-
plemented treatment of Poland in Gromyko’s UNGA address. Perhaps
he should study the matter further, but he did not understand the
significance of that juxtaposition. On Angola, there was a great deal
of evidence to suggest that Cuban forces in Angola were not wanted.
We had spoken of objective reality. We were very interested in the
resolution of the Namibian situation. We thought it was possible and
desirable. If the Soviet side had no designs in this region, then it was
all the more possible. If it did have designs then, of course, this would
be another paradox.

Gromyko interjected that the Soviet Union had no such designs.

The Secretary continued that in that case he was confident that it
would be possible to achieve Namibian independence at an early stage.
If that was the case, this was one particular regional issue where we
could start on the long road back, and we could speak specifically
about independent Namibia very soon. This also involved the Cubans.

Gromyko retorted that this was a matter of the chicken and the
egg, that is, the matter of cause and effect.

The Secretary suggested that both the chicken and the egg should
be on the same plate. He thought that given good will we could resolve
the matter. As for Afghanistan, the Secretary believed that this, also,
should constitute no basis of concern to Moscow, because we were not
seeking any influence in Afghanistan. But the reality was that even if
the present regime were withdrawn, a new neutral Government had to have the support of the people in order to last.

Gromyko remarked that a neutral regime and a neutral country were different things. The Soviet Union was in favor of a neutral country, a non-aligned country. It was strongly in favor of that. As for emigration, he was aware of a figure of two million, perhaps a bit higher. He was not familiar with a figure of three million. The Afghan Government was ready to accept these people back. He knew of a recently-promulgated law that whoever came back would not be punished—in fact would even be given assistance.

The Secretary said that in all fairness he did not believe that under internationally acceptable circumstances with true self-determination this regime could survive five minutes. If the Soviet side accepted self-determination then there was no issue. But if the present regime were to be retained as a facade, then the man would have his throat cut.

Gromyko responded that this would make it all the easier for Pakistan to adopt effective measures and laws to seal the border effectively in order to stop incursions. Once intervention ceased, and this cessation was effectively guaranteed, Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan. In this connection he wanted to note that the Soviet Union did not throw words around lightly.

The Secretary said that he was not familiar with what was coming across the border. But there was evidence of Afghan actions against Pakistan. He was keeping an open mind and was hoping for a solution. This situation was doing considerable damage to U.S.-Soviet relations, to the Western world and to the non-aligned world. He noted that the Islamic Conference was in the forefront of those who had condemned Soviet actions in Afghanistan and this without being prompted by the U.S. or other Western countries. The U.S. was not interested in erecting obstacles. It sincerely wanted to help.

Gromyko suggested that the leaders of Pakistan be “strongly advised” to cease the intervention by gangs organized and trained on Pakistani territory. Gromyko said that following a cessation of such intervention, and given a stable border, Soviet troops would be withdrawn and emigres would be free to return—without weapons of course—without fear of punishment. If necessary, this could be recorded in an appropriate document. In this connection he noted that the Government of Afghanistan had recently made a public declaration regarding peaceful activities. And, if necessary, the Soviet Union was

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prepared at any time to provide friendly advice regarding possible further laws if it should prove advisable to adopt them. Of course, this was an internal affair. He asked why what had just been discussed was not acceptable. This matter was clear. Gromyko accepted what the Secretary had said on this score. Afghanistan should remain a neutral country. Hopefully the Government will be friendly to the Soviet Union, but the latter did not want anything special. The Soviet Union did not need its resources, it had enough raw materials and a large enough population of its own. He suggested that the Secretary give some thought to this. Perhaps there was an extraneous factor here, something originating with Sadat. Or with Moslem circles. They all regard the situation from their own perspectives, but we ought to view it from a higher tower.

The Secretary wanted to suggest that we discuss the problem and see it in terms of different interest groups. For our part, we support the ten nations of the European Community and their proposal for a peaceful solution, involving self-determination and withdrawal of Soviet forces.\textsuperscript{7} If that needed to be fleshed out, we could consider non-interference by third parties, with guaranteed rights for refugees and a guaranteed formula for self-determination. He thought that if this could be worked out, it would be acceptable. We did have an obligation regarding some coordination with our Western European partners. He thought that with good will we could find an acceptable solution for all interested parties.

Gromyko suggested that some further thought be given to this matter. He was pleased to see that the Secretary understood the Soviet position. He repeated that there seemed to be some extraneous matters, some narrow interests, some sort of Moslem interests in and around Afghanistan. Gromyko thought that sufficient time had been devoted to this question. Hopefully a solution could be found, but it was not that promising. As for questions involving weapons, specifically nuclear weapons in Europe, this matter was crucial. In this connection he wondered whether the two ministers should join the rest of the delegations.

The Secretary said that we could do so if Gromyko felt it necessary. If Gromyko wished, we could join the rest of the delegations at the table and discuss the matter of medium-range missiles.

It was agreed to continue the meeting in the broader forum.

89. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Meeting between Secretary Haig and Minister Gromyko with Delegations

PARTICIPANTS

US
Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Secretary of State
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Arthur A. Hartman, Ambassador-designate to the USSR
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Director, EUR/SOV (notetaker)
Dimitri Arensburger, LS (interpreter)

USSR
Andrey Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Georgiy Korniienko, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Vasily Makarov, Senior Assistant to the Foreign Minister
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Minister, Soviet Embassy, Washington
Viktor Sukhodrev, Counselor, MFA, Moscow (interpreter)
Viktor Isakov, Deputy Chief, USA Department, MFA, Moscow (notetaker)

The Secretary said he would like to say a word about Ambassador-designate Hartman. He was chosen because the President wants a professional in this important job.

Gromyko replied that he understood Hartman is still becoming an Ambassador. But the Ambassador knew the Soviets knew him. He had taken part in our conversations before.

The Secretary said he and Gromyko had discussed the whole broad range of principles, and some options for future approaches. They were at the point where they could begin discussions on armaments, and flesh out our views on medium-range weapons negotiations. They could do this today or the 28th. He calculated they had about one and one-half hours left.

Gromyko replied better today if possible. Let them touch on it. He asked when they were supposed to issue the press statement that the delegations will resume their work? If today, then they should discuss it.

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The Secretary said he had no particular schedule. The experts had exchanged drafts. The world was waiting for the results. If they did not have results, people would think there was some kind of disruption in the bilateral relationship. It was better to talk today.

Gromyko thought it was better to talk to the press today. The Secretary suggested that they then, on the 28th, could focus on some of the specific aspects they had touched on today.

Gromyko agreed. In principle, he went on, they could issue a statement that they had had an exchange of views, so people would be clear that the USSR and US had agreed to begin talks this year. As he understood it, the two sides had not been able to agree on a joint text. So unless they would make a revolution to assure a joint text there would not be one. But it would be a minor revolution.

The Secretary said he sensed a fertile opportunity for a revolutionary move on the first day of our meeting. Gromyko said he therefore proposed that they agree in principle, without looking at the text of the paper, to talks on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. Later, when talks begin, they would seek an equivalent formula to reflect that principle. The Secretary replied that this was in the spirit of bloodless revolution. We could agree that there would be no preconditions.

Gromyko said there was no counterrevolution. Let us agree, he suggested, to say that negotiations will begin and will be a continuation of the talks we had before, and that the delegations will meet without preconditions. He had a little secret: during the Geneva talks no substance was discussed; the two sides still had to go the distance to substance.\(^3\) Let them limit themselves to continuation, without characterization. This would not tie them down to the previous administration, to any specifics whatsoever.

The Secretary noted Gromyko had just put his finger on the sensitive issue we want to avoid: the commitments or obligations incurred by the previous administration. Let them not mention Geneva, he suggested. This was not a substantive issue, merely procedure. Eagleburger suggested the words: “A continuation of talks held earlier between the two countries.”

Gromyko rejoined that [if] they made no mention of venue, they had to mention time. All things exist in time and space. The Secretary said if they used just the terminology we had suggested, people can interpret it as they wish. If we were to put in a time limit, there would

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be a certain problem. Let them say “which for a certain period of time have been the subject of discussion between the two sides.”

Gromyko replied that we have discussed so many things, so many various questions. If time and place were not mentioned, it would sound like a riddle and would only attract attention. The positions of the partners, after all, would not be mentioned. Positions were one thing. We were only referring to the section of the negotiation which had a certain time and place. The Secretary said he thought the Soviet September 14 counter-proposal had an acceptable characterization of previous discussion: “which have for a certain period of time been the subject of discussion between the two sides.” This made clear that there were no preconditions with respect to medium-range missiles. Some of this got into matters we hoped will be part of the negotiations, to be determined.

Gromyko rejoined that he did not understand our super-sensitivity on this point. Would the two sides at least refer to October-November of 1980, if we cannot refer to Geneva? He asked if we referred to neither, everything would be lost. His colleagues would ask whether we were to discuss the origins of the universe.

The Secretary replied that President Reagan was not wedded in any way to the Geneva discussions. Gromyko would explain to his colleagues what he had meant, and the Secretary would use the ambiguities to explain that the reference was to the discussions the Ambassador and he have had, as well as to previous discussions. These were peculiarities of the American system. He was willing to come to some other aspects of the Soviet draft. The Secretary suggested a further formula “exchange views regarding arms limitation involving (invent a new term) intermediate range nuclear systems which. . . .”

Gromyko said the Secretary seemed to be working to be more specific. If he started in this paper to be more specific, then specificity would also have to reflect the Soviet position, for instance it should say “in the context of forward-based systems.” The Soviets had wanted to avoid such specifics, and for that reason had preferred a more general formula. They were moving closer to our position than we were. They thought we should avoid positions. The Secretary said we did not want to prejudge anything.

Gromyko suggested that the two sides maybe should try to agree to drop any mention of Geneva, and just mention October and November of 1980 and the various places our representatives had discussions. After all, they had discussed these topics in London, in Paris, in Washington, and, seriously, they had discussed it better in various capitals.

The Secretary replied that unfortunately there would still be the problem, since the time would refer to the previous Administration’s discussions.
Gromyko said, OK, let them use “problems that were discussed between representatives of the USSR and the US.” This would be unclarity on top of unclarity. One could not go further into the twilight without being in black night.

The Secretary asked what about saying “informally?” Gromyko insisted that they should not; there was no such agreement. That would generate too many questions regarding formal and informal talks. The Soviet side had not proposed “official talks;” we should just say “discussed.”

The Secretary responded that the discussion was getting so obscure that they should say “discussed earlier in Geneva.” Let them say: “arms control involving those nuclear arms which were discussed earlier in Geneva between US and USSR representatives.” They should also say “initiate formal negotiations.”

Gromyko rejoined that “formal” did not mean anything in Russian. Let them use “serious;” that was the best way to convey the thought “serious.” The Secretary asked why they should not say “formal and serious?” Gromyko replied “fine.” The U.S. would say “formal and serious,” the Soviet would say “serious.” The Secretary repeated that they agree the Soviets say we will hold “serious”—and the U.S. would say “formal”—on behalf of etc. The U.S. would also be prepared to add the name of its chief negotiator, Paul Nitze. Gromyko said the Soviets would also add theirs: Yu. A. Kvitsinskiy.

The Secretary noted that he had suggestions for a revolution. Gromyko said the Soviets always knew it would come. The Secretary replied that the process was dialectical. Gromyko rejoined that dialectics come from nature. The Secretary mentioned he was seeking the perfect synthesis. In the last paragraph, he proposed they say we seek equal, effective and verifiable outcomes at lowest levels. Gromyko said what the Soviets needed was a reference to the principle of equality and equal security. On the figures we would differ. We might need to draw up some kind of equation. For now, it was the principle that was important.

The Secretary proposed “equal, effective and verifiable outcomes at the lowest levels of forces on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.” Gromyko rejoined that in that case everyone would inject their own meaning into these terms. On verification, the U.S. would say, for example, that NTM were not enough, the Soviets say that they were enough. The two sides should say “on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.” “Equal” itself could be taken to mean equality of numbers, where there might be some inequalities on bombers, or on missiles, pluses and minuses which add up to equality in the long run. That was why they should go back to the principle.
The Secretary said that in the spirit of compromise he proposed to add “verifiable” to the Soviet text. There was nothing objectionable about it. Gromyko objected that it was a subject for the negotiation. The Secretary said he found that hard to understand. The U.S. needed something on verification. It had been a consistent position for many years, and we had never differed on the principle. The U.S. could not explain failure to mention the principle of verification in a text on principles.

Gromyko replied that this certainly complicated the matter. The Soviets were familiar with statements by U.S. officials on verification. During the talks the U.S. could raise it, but why start with polemics at the outset? The Secretary said he did not see it as polemical. It was a key principle. The U.S. had not prejudged the negotiations in mentioning it. Gromyko said that it would not work. It introduced an element of polemics that was out of place in this very first document. The Secretary replied that if there was any mention of principles, he would have to insist on verification.

Gromyko rejoined that without mention of the principle of equality and equal security they would have to do without a joint statement. Principles should not be to the detriment of either side, and these were to the advantage of both, helped both. Indeed, they were the only common principles. The President and the Secretary had made many statements on equality in the situation of both sides. There had been other statements too, but on the whole this principle had been confirmed by this Administration. It was both the most acceptable and most general formula. Mention of verification would not work. The Soviets had gone far to accommodate the U.S. side.

The Secretary suggested elimination of the last paragraph, or abbreviation to mentioning the principle of “equality.” “Both sides believe in the importance of these negotiations for enhancing stability and international security and pledged to spare no effort to reach an equitable outcome at the lowest possible level.” This should not be contentious for either side.

Gromyko said that was altogether different. It would not meet the requirements. Let’s do the following: (1) They would say what the sides had agreed in the first paragraph, except that the Soviets would add “in October and November of 1980.” (2) On the second paragraph the sides had agreed. (3) On the third paragraph both sides would say what they wanted. The Soviet side would say “on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security,” the U.S. would say what it wanted.

The Secretary objected that this would start them off in the midst of controversy. Gromyko agreed it would be worse. The Secretary added that the argument would rage forever. Gromyko said he saw
no other way out. The Secretary said we had accepted the essence of
Soviet demands on the first paragraph; on the second the two sides
were agreed; on the third the Soviets did not even accept mention of
verifiability. He did not understand their objection to “an equal out-
come at lower levels.”

Gromyko replied it was not necessary to mention lower levels in
this first statement. They were basically agreeing to meet, and where.
The Secretary said he agreed. For that they would remove the last
paragraph entirely. Gromyko said this was not possible. They should
go to separate statements. That way the Soviets would have no need
for subterfuge on October and November. The sides would each do
what they wanted, if the U.S. could go to a point statement for some
reason he could not fathom. The salient point at least was agreed.

The Secretary said he could buy the second paragraph. By dropping
the third, all controversy would be out. But if they went to separate
statements, marking substantive differences, it was better to have no
statement at all, since they would be laughingstocks. Gromyko said
they would just have the second paragraph. That would change the
whole meaning. The question would be what kind of talks. On trade?
The Secretary replied on arms. The U.S. was happy with the first
paragraph as discussed—“in Geneva”—and the second had been
agreed. If the third paragraph contained the Soviet principles, there
was a problem of further elaboration. The U.S. was asking just one of
ours. Neither was contradictory to the other. If they were not seeking
a reduced level of forces, what are they talking about?

Gromyko suggested they should say that the first paragraph is as
agreed, and that in the third they would say “spare no effort to reach
an appropriate agreement.” Further, both sides would be free to add
whatever they wanted, with one, two, or three breaths, on their own
responsibility. The Secretary said that should be typed up. The U.S.
did not want to create controversy.

The Secretary opined that in the spirit of revolution they sometimes
flirted with it. He asked how this thing should be done physically.
Gromyko said it was late in Moscow. In order to avoid inequality,
if they went to the press tomorrow morning, was there danger of
counterrevolution? It was too late for Soviet TV and morning newspa-
pers. The Secretary agreed: they could say after their meeting that there
would be a joint announcement tomorrow. Gromyko said they would
announce that tomorrow a joint statement would be made. The Secret-
ary asked what time. Gromyko suggested they say 8:00 a.m. in Wash-
ington, 4:00 p.m. in Moscow. It would be time for the evening news.
Dobrynin said it needed to be earlier if it were to make Izvestiya. The
Secretary suggested 7:00 a.m. Gromyko said no, let them stay with 8:00
a.m. Washington time.
The Secretary asked what, beyond this question, should be their joint press line: perhaps a “far-ranging review of the international situation....” Gromyko replied they should say they had an exchange of views on a series of principled questions of U.S./Soviet relations; and on several problems of the international situation; and that discussion would be continued at the next session. The Secretary agreed.

Gromyko added that whatever else they said would be on their separate consciences, their separate responsibility. The Secretary asked about characterization of the atmosphere. He would suggest “frank and businesslike.” Gromyko said he liked “frank and businesslike.” He agreed.\footnote{The final version of the joint statement read: “At their meeting on September 23, 1981, the U.S. Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and the U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, exchanged views regarding arms control involving those nuclear arms which were earlier discussed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. representatives in Geneva. They agreed on the need to hold formal negotiations on such arms and on behalf of their governments agreed to begin these negotiations on November 30 in Geneva, Switzerland. The U.S. side will be represented at the negotiations by a delegation headed by Ambassador Paul Nitze, and the Soviet side will be represented by a delegation headed by Ambassador U.A. Kvitsinskii. Both sides believe in the importance of these negotiations for enhancing stability and international security and pledged to spare no effort to reach an appropriate agreement.” (Department of State Bulletin, October 1981, p. 5)}

Gromyko said that at their next meeting, they would certainly exchange views on broad questions of strategic arms limitations, also on medium-range nuclear weapons. He would also ask some questions of a geographic, political, and general nature. Since they had more or less discussed Soviet/American relations today, he would touch on some details in that field, to get them out of the way, and pass on to strategic and medium-range weapons. The rest was up to the Secretary.

The Secretary said he would include further details on immediate crisis areas. Afghanistan was one, in line with their earlier discussion. Recognizing the limitations, there was also the Cuban problem. There were also bilateral issues.

Gromyko said if they talked more about Afghanistan there would be nothing left but the bottom of their shoes. The Secretary rejoined he had suggested it.
New York, September 28, 1981, 2–6 p.m.

SUBJECT
Private Meeting Between Secretary Haig and Minister Gromyko

PARTICIPANTS
US
Secretary of State A.M. Haig
D. Arenburger, Interpreter

USSR
Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
V. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Minister Gromyko suggested that we discuss further some major questions involving the relations between the two countries and the general international situation. We had devoted the major portion of our last meeting\(^2\) to this topic, but it was necessary to deal more thoroughly with some issues. Once again it might be advisable to pursue the discussion in terms of principle. Gromyko did not want to delve too deeply into the details. He thought that our interests would be met best by pursuing the discussion in terms of principle and by considering our mutual relations from the standpoint of how to approach them in principle. If Gromyko understood correctly, the Secretary, too, viewed our task along these same lines. Gromyko said that he would welcome Secretary Haig’s comments or, if the Secretary preferred, he, Gromyko, could initiate the discussion.

The Secretary replied that he just wanted to make the point that we should avoid getting into an overly detailed discussion and hoped that today we could speak about some broad geopolitical topics which had been touched upon at the last meeting. Perhaps this conversation would be more specific, but in general he did not want to make it too detailed. Perhaps such detail would be required on some arms control issues, but, again, he preferred to pursue the discussion in a general sense. Perhaps we could reserve the latter part of today’s discussion to a more detailed consideration of bilateral issues which, in a sense, were part of the larger group of questions to be discussed. The Secretary would be guided by Gromyko’s wishes in this regard. To begin with, he wanted to emphasize that on Friday\(^3\) he had discussed our last

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2 See Documents 88 and 89.

3 September 25. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Haig spoke to Reagan on the telephone from 5:15 to 5:23 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum for the record was found.
meeting in some detail with President Reagan. The Secretary wanted to stress that the President had been pleased by the serious, sober and business-like exchanges and was looking forward to the continuation of these discussions.

By way of a starting point, Gromyko wanted to say that in meetings between Soviet representatives and representatives of other states here in New York, the latter had almost without exception expressed a most positive reaction with respect to the understanding reached concerning the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. negotiations in Geneva. He assumed that the Secretary had encountered the same reaction. Gromyko viewed this reaction as appropriate and understood it. Moreover, he assumed that this feeling was characteristic not only for the delegates to the UN General Assembly, but was world-wide. This testified to the great importance attached throughout the world to mutual understanding between the USSR and U.S. on major policy problems. Gromyko assumed that he had drawn the correct conclusion.

Gromyko wished to go on to some questions on which he wanted to express his assessment and present his understanding in terms of Soviet-U.S. relations and in terms of the international situation in general. During our last meeting, while reaching agreement on the text of the joint document, the Soviet side had noted that the Secretary, and thus the U.S. Government, was not fully impressed by the principle of equality and equal security, a principle which, Gromyko wanted to emphasize, the Soviet side considered to be of great importance. The Secretary was aware, of course, that the Soviet side frequently emphasized the importance of this principle. In this connection, Gromyko wanted to pose a question: Why was it that in the past the Soviet Union and the U.S. had succeeded in achieving significant and important agreements? Gromyko noted that the Secretary was no stranger to the negotiations leading to those agreements; in a certain capacity he had something to do with them in a different administration.

Why, he repeated, were those agreements achieved? Because the Soviet Union and the U.S. proceeded from the premise that an indispensable element of our relationship was that it be conducted on the basis on the principle of equality. Conversely, if one of the sides, whether the U.S. or USSR, were to ignore this principle and were to try to impinge on the legitimate interests of the other side, that is, if it were to try to get ahead of the other side, to achieve a unilateral advantage, there could be no agreement.

Gromyko went on to say that the two sides had reached the aforementioned agreements and had successfully moved forward in their mutual relationship—and thus had contributed to an improved international situation—because they had respected this principle. Indeed, in order to erect the structure of our relationship, it was necessary to
envisage a plan for that structure, and at that earlier time the USSR and the U.S. did have such a plan. Gromyko suggested that this was a case of architecture in politics. He was not trying to say by this that there would be no friction, no problems, in the course of negotiations. The Secretary would know very well that especially with respect to strategic arms there had been several concrete situations when it had been necessary, for example, to resolve a number of parameters regarding specific types of strategic systems as they applied to one of the sides. The Soviet side, too, had raised for consideration the matter of parameters involving specific types of strategic offensive arms.

Of course there had been arguments. It had been necessary to establish mutually acceptable equivalents applicable to different specific types. Efforts were made to find solutions—and they were found—in Moscow, if not in Moscow then in Geneva, if not in Geneva, then in Washington. This was done at the ministerial level and at the very highest level; at times differences were thrashed out by experts on the level of the Geneva Delegations and appropriate equivalents, acceptable to both sides, were found.

Gromyko said that to put it mildly the Soviet side reacted with concern—and he did not want to say more—to the cavalier attitude of the U.S. side to the principle of equality and equal security. This put the Soviet side very much—Gromyko repeated, very much—on its guard. Gromyko could not imagine how we could seek understandings if we were to knock the principle of equality and equal security from under our feet. The need for the principle of equality and equal security was crystal clear, especially in negotiations on strategic arms. In the future, as in the past, there could be arguments and differences of view, but, as in the past, we should discuss the issues, weigh them, call on science and technology, and find solutions that were mutually acceptable to both sides. Neither side could impose on the other what was unacceptable to it.

Gromyko went on to say that frequently one could read statements by U.S. officials—and Gromyko did not wish to cite names, since the Secretary was familiar with them—to the effect that the U.S. not only had to be a powerful nation, but that it had to be the most powerful nation. Sometimes this wording was modified slightly to the effect that the U.S. should not be weaker than any other nation, that is the Soviet Union, but basically the meaning was the same: militarily the U.S. was to be the most powerful country. This ran counter to the principle of equality and equal security.

Thus, Gromyko asked the Secretary to respond to the Soviet Union, to the Soviet Government, on the following question: Could the Soviet side expect that negotiations on strategic offensive arms and on those arms which were discussed at our last meeting would be pursued on
the basis of the principle of equality and equal security, or did the U.S. intend to destroy this principle to smithereens. If the U.S. intention was to destroy this principle, even potentially destroy it, then the prospects were grim indeed and the Soviet authorities would be forced to explain the true situation to their own people and others. Gromyko hoped very much—he repeated that he hoped very much—that he would not be faced with such a situation.

The Secretary responded that in his view Gromyko’s comments provided a point of departure from which we must develop our understanding. A major problem with language involved rhetorical concepts because experience and perception affected them. For example, there was the concept of detente, mentioned by the Secretary last week. On the face of it, “equality” was not a difficult word. It could not be abandoned if there were to be constructive negotiations. The Secretary repeated that it could not be abandoned. It had to be the basis of negotiations. But in reflecting upon the early seventies when, for example, we were moving in the direction of SALT, the objective reality was that as these negotiations reached a high level of progress and intensified, we were feeling the consequences of maturing efforts in Soviet arms programs—strategic, medium-range and conventional. In a popular sense all of this tended to generate questions in the minds of the American people regarding the meaning of “equality,” as this word was used in our bilateral relationships, and many people express the view that “equality” was a formula for Soviet advantage. It was the Soviet practice that put the term in question. Therefore we had to be careful that in establishing a principle, we did not ignore events.

The Secretary could say categorically that from the U.S. standpoint he could not conceive of credible negotiations on arms or other geopolitical topics in which mutual advantage, balance and equality were not an essential objective. Thus, the Secretary had no problem with the principle. The problem lay with the application of the principle on the contemporary scene. As for the question raised by Gromyko regarding application of the principle, the Secretary would say that these were code words and words meant little; objective reality must determine their validity.

Gromyko replied that the answer was clear. He wanted to summarize his understanding of the Secretary’s reply. Although the Secretary had spoken of “equality” and had not used the term “principle of equality and equal security”—and of course equal security was the essence of the matter and thus inseparable from equality—the concept was acceptable to the U.S. As for its application, its implementation, in each individual case one had to find the relevant relationships, the relevant proportions between categories of weapons to be included in the negotiations and to be considered. This went without saying. He
had tried to emphasize that the two sides would naturally encounter situations in which the search for genuine equality would require solutions of a kind that satisfied both sides in terms of figures and data. This had been true in the past, it would be true in the future.

Accordingly, Gromyko attached importance to what the Secretary had said about acceptability of the principle of equality and adherence to that principle. He thought that now we could look toward the future with greater confidence, especially with regard to negotiations about strategic systems—a subject on which we had not yet reached an understanding, that is on the timing of these discussions—and with regard to medium-range systems in Europe.

Gromyko wanted to touch on one particular aspect, especially taking into account the Secretary’s statement. The U.S. side was arguing rather emphatically that U.S. Forward Based Systems in Europe did not provide the U.S. with any advantage. In line with this reasoning the U.S. discussed individual problems as if this factor did not exist. The U.S. side saw only two sets of figures: Soviet and U.S. systems, Soviet and NATO systems. The U.S. was comparing only these two columns of figures. Of course, privately the U.S. could not but take this factor into account, but publicly and in discussions with the Soviet Union the U.S. ignored the fact that U.S. medium-range systems were deployed at sites from which they could reach targets in the Soviet Union, whereas Soviet medium-range systems were deployed at sites from which they could not reach targets on U.S. territory. This gave the U.S. a major advantage and was a factor that could not be ignored. Any knowledgeable individual, not necessarily someone dealing with strategic or medium-range systems, recognized its importance. Regardless of whether or not the Secretary agreed with this, Gromyko asked him not to demand a strict mathematical formula. Even if, by way of example, the Soviet Union were to have as many—and Gromyko could have equally well said three times as many or four times as many—nuclear weapons or medium-range systems as NATO, the U.S. advantage would still not be eliminated, precisely because the U.S. systems could reach Soviet territory, whereas not a single Soviet weapon could strike U.S. territory.

The Secretary interjected that a three-to-one ratio was more relevant.

Gromyko continued that in fact the Soviet Union did not have a two-to-one advantage. In reality, at present it was the U.S. which enjoyed a 50 percent advantage in the number of nuclear weapons. He had made these comments merely by way of illustration and because this was a problem the sides would encounter at the negotiations in Geneva. Gromyko did not wish to say more on the subject today. He had provided this illustration in order that the U.S. side not be surprised
when the delegations began negotiations in Geneva. Of course, in discussing this subject the Soviet side would touch on the mathematics of it.

The Secretary wanted to say briefly that he did not anticipate negotiating here and did not wish to prejudge the negotiations concerning arms control. He wanted to emphasize that we were entering these talks with serious intentions and with a view to achieving effective and verifiable agreements. The Secretary would emphasize that we have moved into the so-called TNF or medium-range category within the SALT framework, because of the great complexities involved. In this connection the Secretary wanted to mention several principles in response to the issues Gromyko had just raised.

First, we viewed the vulnerability of our allies in the same category as vulnerability of the U.S. We were completely integrated in security terms. The Secretary wanted to emphasize again that we were approaching the subject within the SALT framework. Second, he had already told Gromyko with regard to medium-range systems in Europe that because of the mobility and range of the system at the center of initial concern they required, in our view, a global approach. Third, in the same spirit of preventing surprises, he wanted to say that if we were to focus initially on the complex issue of Forward Based Systems and corresponding Soviet systems—aircraft and SLBM delivery systems—we might find ourselves facing a confused and incomprehensible situation. Therefore, initially we should focus on medium-range land-based systems.

As we proceeded further and developed a more comprehensive and mutually acceptable concept, the Secretary was looking forward to an equal reduction of capabilities, hopefully at a low level. However, we were entering these negotiations without pre-conditions. In connection with Gromyko’s remarks about two-to-one or three-to-one, he wanted to emphasize that our calculations when the Secretary was with NATO were more like three-to-one and four-to-one in the Soviet favor on comparable systems. This was an issue to be resolved at the negotiating table with an exchange of data. The Secretary hoped to receive such data from the Soviet side, just as we intended to provide our data so as to eliminate a high level of confusion. The Secretary thought that it would be foolish to go much further today.

The Secretary wanted to take this opportunity to say a word or two in connection with SALT because this was intimately linked to what we were discussing. He wanted to outline our thinking on this score, as well as how we intended to approach this matter.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary had touched on SALT and the prospects for future talks on that question. In this connection, he wanted to pose a question: Did the U.S. Administration think that SALT II was
finished?, that the Treaty was dead? The Soviet side did not think so. This Treaty had been worked out and negotiated to account for all the factors involved. The two sides had accomplished delicate work, and the Soviet side was convinced that there was no justification for the sides to abandon the results of that work and to regard the Treaty as having been buried.

In this connection, Gromyko had the following specific question: Sometime ago the Secretary’s predecessor, Secretary Muskie, had inquired whether the Soviet Union thought that while juridically the SALT II Treaty was not in force, the sides could in fact consider it to be in effect until they had reached some other understanding or agreement. In other words, could the two parties consider the obligations assumed by them to be in effect? Of course, at that time the Soviet side believed that the Treaty would be brought into force as soon as possible, and the U.S. had not said “yes” or “no” on that score. Thus, the Soviet side, for its part, had not provided a “yes” or “no” response.

Gromyko was raising the question of whether the current U.S. administration believed that the obligations assumed under the SALT II Treaty could be considered to be in effect. In the event that the Secretary provided a positive response, it would probably be appropriate for the sides to express such an understanding in some way. Perhaps this should be done through a joint statement or through separate synchronized statements; perhaps some other form could be found by mutual agreement between the two sides. Gromyko was thinking along the lines of an arrangement that would not prejudge the final outcome. He added that when he was speaking about the Treaty being actually in effect, he also meant to include the Protocol to the Treaty. Naturally, some wording might be required regarding modification of the timing in connection with certain measures covered by the Protocol. He repeated that naturally the Protocol should also be covered by an appropriate understanding.

The Secretary expressed the view that the answer to Gromyko’s more specific question, raised in the latter part of his comments, would have to be derived from a more fundamental assessment of the first part of his remarks, that is with regard to the status of the SALT II Treaty itself. Here the Secretary wanted to be frank. In the interests of our future dialogue he felt that he should speak frankly and bluntly. This was a requirement in terms of an underpinning for a dialogue on any subject. The simple fact was that unfortunately the SALT II Treaty had been in trouble almost from the day of its inception on substantive grounds, because it contained freeways of unlimited growth for certain systems.

The Secretary was saying this on the basis of his observation in his own country. In terms of the political overtones in the U.S., the
SALT II Treaty was impaled on the rocks because of the perceptions in the U.S. of aggressive Soviet activities in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The Secretary had told this to Gromyko last time. Thus, in principle the SALT II Treaty was on the rockpile of history, it was dead. There was no way in which a U.S. President could revive that agreement.

By this the Secretary did not mean to suggest for a moment that the preparatory work which had gone into the SALT II Treaty, and which had been carried out during the post-SALT I negotiations, should be discarded. This work provided an unprecedented amount of data and thinking of the two sides, which would be invaluable in the future. This was one of the causes of the delay in the U.S. We needed to find a new basis for a better solution of the SALT problem and we were working on it. We had been at it diligently for the past seven months. The Secretary believed that this work would be concluded in the not-too-distant-future, drawing heavily on what had occurred in the past and on political reality.

He did not want to suggest that SALT II was merely a victim of Afghanistan. This was not entirely true. There were a number of reservations of a substantive nature. The status, he thought, was clear: the U.S. would be guided by the SALT I negotiations and the Vladivostok Understanding, and by the spirit thereof, if it was not undercut by the Soviet side. It was in this context that the Secretary wanted to make some comments with respect to Gromyko’s suggestion. We had said unilaterally that we would be guided by Soviet actions. Overall we would be governed by what the Soviet side did, and the Secretary wanted to emphasize this. The Secretary had spoken about the essential importance of a balance, and this involved the SALT II arrangement, which was more dynamic with respect to the Soviet side than the U.S. side. The Secretary concluded by saying that perhaps he had not answered Gromyko’s question as precisely as the latter would have preferred. But the Secretary had spoken with the frankness that he considered necessary.

Gromyko remarked that, as he understood it, the Secretary was unable to give a positive response.

The Secretary said that in a sense there was a public commitment regarding the obligations of the SALT II Treaty. He believed that we would be well served to leave alone our public statements so far. That is, we would be guided by whether or not these obligations were undercut and by whether or not the overall balance remained intact. The Secretary thought that it might be desirable to articulate this matter more precisely at a later time, recognizing that the Soviet side was justified in wanting to know the U.S. position.

Gromyko remarked that of course this question had been raised by Washington quite some time ago. In a way, the Secretary had some-
thing to do with SALT at that time. Now Gromyko wanted to ask a specific question: When would Washington be ready to embark on the SALT problem? Gromyko hoped to hear at least a preliminary answer for planning purposes.

The Secretary responded that he anticipated with a fair degree of certainty that this would occur in the first part of next year. He did not anticipate a delay beyond that. On the outside, this could mean some six months, on the inside perhaps three months. He wanted to emphasize that the President had not had the chance to study the various alternatives being prepared.

Gromyko wanted to inform the Secretary that for all intents and purposes the Soviet Union was prepared to initiate discussions on this problem whenever the U.S. side was ready.

Gromyko said that in reading statements made by the highest U.S. officials, including the President, the Secretary, the Secretary of Defense and other high officials, as well as other statements in the press, one gathered the impression that a concept existed in the U.S. according to which the United States was prepared to consider and resolve outstanding problems with the Soviet Union—bilateral problems and international problems, including those we had discussed a moment ago—only if the Soviet Union renounced its foreign policy. Sometimes this concept was formulated differently: it was said that the Soviet Union should go back on its foreign policy aims, but in fact the point was that it should renounce its foreign policy.

Gromyko did not understand what was behind this. Was this an effort to influence the Soviet Union, to frighten it? To put it mildly, this would be so unrealistic that one could not but be amazed. Why was this concept being advanced? One would think that any expectation that the Soviet Union would renounce its foreign policy—and thus renounce itself—was totally hopeless. What would adherence to such a conception mean? In fact it would mean a dead end in terms of resolving all international issues. Never in the history of the world, never in the history of the Soviet Union, never in the history of the United States or in the history of U.S.-Soviet relations had there been a situation when one power told the other “renounce your foreign policy,” and when relations were conducted on that basis.

The fact was that the advancement of such a condition, above all to a major power, meant that solutions to problems became impossible. This was an utter dead end in terms of resolving international problems. Gromyko suggested that the Secretary imagine a situation in which the Soviet Union told the U.S. that before negotiations could begin on SALT, medium-range systems, the situation in various areas of the world or in Europe, or on bilateral issues, the U.S. first had to renounce its foreign policy, for example, that it had to remove its forces or
military bases from Europe, that it had to close down its military bases along the perimeter of the Soviet Union, or withdraw its navy from the Mediterranean. The Secretary might mention that there was also a Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, but the Soviet Union was not the first to send its fleet to that area—or withdraw U.S. forces from the Indian Ocean—the Secretary might say, of course, that there were Soviet forces in that area too, but the Soviet Union had previously said that it was prepared to withdraw its forces from that area. The U.S. would probably refuse to accept such a concept. To hook one problem to another, and then to a third and a fourth problem, and to tie them all up into one knot, each part to the other and everything to all else, constituted an utter dead end; things would become so hopeless that nothing could be resolved.

Gromyko went on to say that the very effect that such a concept was being raised. . . Gromyko did not complete the sentence, explaining that he did not wish to use strong words. It was thoughtless to use such a concept. Gromyko would think that the Secretary, in his capacity as Secretary of State, would recognize that such a concept was unrealistic and unfounded. Never in the history of the world have relations been conducted on such a basis, and they never would be. The U.S. was driving itself into a corner by advancing that concept. We would not be able to agree on anything if the U.S. were to insist on that concept. On the other hand, if the U.S. were to insist on it, then it would be acting contrary to its own statements. The U.S. was correct not to adhere to that concept, but since this involved an inconsistency with its own statements, why advance that concept in the first place? Accordingly, Gromyko hoped that Washington would adopt a more realistic, more justified and more sober point of view. What he was saying was not some kind of new discovery. The necessity for a realistic basis was not something the Soviet Union was raising only now; this necessity has existed since the creation of the world.

Our common approach should involve solutions to the most pressing problems. As a general rule, solution of one problem helped resolve another problem, and so forth. That was the appropriate concept. It was for this reason that Gromyko had found it necessary to raise this matter with the Secretary. The entire Soviet leadership had wondered why this concept was being advanced ever more frequently in the U.S., and at very high levels at that. President Brezhnev personally had asked Gromyko to pose this question. Adherence to this concept was contrary to what the Secretary had spoken of today. Accordingly, Gromyko hoped to hear the Secretary’s comments on this matter. Perhaps the U.S. was attaching some significance to this in terms of propaganda, but there was hardly any political capital to be gained from this. Gromyko doubted it.
The Secretary replied that a good answer to Gromyko’s question required some detailed listing of issues. He had gone very carefully over our discussion last time and had been somewhat surprised—though perhaps he should not have been, given our global responsibilities—that generally both of us had touched on the same geopolitical issues: Poland, Kampuchea, Libya, Cuba, Southern Africa, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. We had touched on all of these last week. Of course, these issues did not constitute an all-inclusive listing, but it was interesting that we both saw the same set of concrete issues in a global sense. The Secretary wanted to touch on each of them in order to provide Gromyko with a sense of our principles and in conclusion he wanted to ask Gromyko a question.

The Secretary noted that it went without saying that Poland was of grave concern to the Soviet Union, the United States, to the West in general and, the Secretary believed, to all of Eastern Europe as well. We had reiterated, not only on behalf of the U.S. Government, but on behalf of our allies and the entire West, as well as Japan, that it should be made very clear that any external involvement in the internal affairs of the Polish people would lead to grave consequences in connection with everything we have spoken of, in connection with everything we hoped to achieve. He thought that restraint should be the dominant approach, and that the situation, as he saw it, had improved somewhat even now.

The Secretary said with regard to Kampuchea that the international community was opposed to what was occurring in that country. While recognizing that Moscow was not necessarily making Hanoi’s decisions, it also had to be recognized that Hanoi could not carry them out without the substantial support of the Soviet Union. Vietnam was now isolated in the world, its economy devastated, and this would continue in the future. The Secretary recommended that the Soviet Union urge Hanoi to participate in the international conference that had been called for, with a view to achieving a political solution.

The Secretary said that Libya was engaging in increasingly irresponsible actions that constituted a threat to world peace. He thought that Qadhafi had the resources to do what he was doing, but the Secretary also thought that Qadhafi could not do so without the logistical support of the Soviet Union. If Qadhafi continued these actions, international peace and Western interests would be jeopardized, and we would have to react. In the Secretary’s view, it would be most promising and helpful if the Soviet Union let Qadhafi know that he would be on his own if he continued on this risky path of international lawlessness.

The Secretary went on to say that Cuba posed the more difficult problem. Gromyko had said that the U.S. was reacting to the system
which existed in Cuba. History belied that we were influenced by the Cuban system. The system was the business of the Cuban people. But since 1974 and 1975 Cuban activities have been increasingly irresponsible and unacceptable by all criteria of normal international behavior. No one in the U.S. accepted that the Soviet Union could not restrain Cuba. At our last meeting the Secretary had told Gromyko that arms shipments to Cuba had doubled compared to a year ago. Soviet assistance permitted projection of Cuban military power. The Soviet Union had recently provided it with modern frigates, extensive levels of armaments and long-range aircraft. All of this exceeded Cuba’s defensive needs and enabled it to maintain 40,000 combat troops for aggressive goals in Africa. It was stepping up to a high level its subversive activities in the Western hemisphere and was posing a major threat to the United States and other countries that shared our values in this hemisphere. As for the future, we would do what we had to. We were not able to overlook, to turn our heads away from, Cuban activities. The Secretary hoped that the Soviet Union would advise Havana that this was a dangerous course. Eventually we would have to deal with this. The Secretary remarked that his comments had been made in the spirit of frankness.

The Secretary also wanted to say a few words about Iran and Pakistan. The territorial integrity and independence of Iran was of basic importance to the U.S. and the entire West, and it was necessary that this reality be kept in mind in the future. We had a historic relationship with Pakistan, a relationship which advanced international peace and stability and which, the Secretary believed, was in the Soviet interest as well. In the area of nuclear weapons and in terms of political actions, the good relations between the U.S. and Pakistan helped shape a constructive path. We had no other interests with respect to Pakistan. We insisted that Pakistan be left alone.

The Secretary recalled another subject which we had discussed last week. In discussing Southern Africa, which was important at this time, he was aware of the question raised by Gromyko. The Secretary believed that the U.S. and USSR had a common goal. We wanted to see an independent Namibia as soon as possible, and Angola free of external threats or external intervention. The Secretary believed that South Africa should desist from certain actions in which it had engaged. The U.S., like the USSR, had no interest in becoming involved in Southern Africa. Clearly our differences pertained more to tactics than to long-range objectives. Gromyko had referred to Angola as a chicken-and-egg situation. South Africa, the egg, has reversed this, making it an egg-and-chicken situation. After several months of anguishing discussions with South Africa, the latter now accepted a compromise leading to early independence of Namibia, which would not require
Angola or the international community to reverse the chicken-and-
egg situation, but which involved a new concept. The compromise envisione
s a simultaneous withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola 
and of South Africa from Namibia. This offered a major opportunity 
to the U.S. and USSR and was in the interest of world peace in an area 
in which neither of our countries had any interests. The U.S. was not 
 opposed to the MPLA in Angola. The MPLA should on its own work 
towards reconciliation with the help of the OAU, on terms acceptable 
to the MPLA. Why, the Secretary asked rhetorically, should we not 
succeed in resolving a problem that had plagued the international 
community for so long?

The Secretary wanted to offer some considerations with respect to 
Afghanistan. He saw some convergence with respect to our objectives, 
as well as a difference in tactics and what Gromyko had called the 
current paradox. The Secretary believed that both sides would accept 
a non-aligned and secure Afghanistan. He thought that it was in the 
Soviet interest to find a formula for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, 
perhaps a phased withdrawal. Both sides were probably also seeking 
an Afghanistan which was on good terms with its neighbors. This had 
an implication with respect to the Moslem objection Gromyko had 
raised last time.

The U.S. side concluded that there were three areas of action which 
ought to be considered for the future, recognizing that this would 
require some time. He thought that it would be very helpful if the 
following ingredients were included: First, the Afghanistan Govern-
ment should take steps now to broaden its base. Second, the Soviet 
Union could simultaneously study a formula for a phased withdrawal. 
Third, outside powers could take a number of steps, including those 
mentioned by Gromyko last time, regarding cross border activities from 
outside the borders of Afghanistan. He thought that implementation 
of all three steps in tandem could offer a solution. He also suggested 
that they be considered with more care.

The Secretary said that he had raised these regional issues in the 
context of Gromyko’s question. Our experience during the post-Viet-
nam and post-Watergate period indicated a need for more Soviet 
restraint and more reciprocity and, above all, for respect for what had 
been agreed in the early 1970s. That is, a side should not be perceived as 
gaining an advantage over the other. As for Gromyko’s and Brezhnev’s 
question, it involved the concept of linkage and the Secretary had to 
admit that he had spoken about it many times, as early as 1971. Linkage 
was a fact of life. Gromyko himself had touched on linkage when he 
had said that the perception of improvement in one area affected other 
areas. This is what linkage meant. In a recent speech the Secretary had 
said that to deny the concept of linkage meant to deny the right of
challenging illegal actions. Perhaps this was a contentious way of putting it. No one was trying to revolutionize the Soviet Union. The Soviet system was the affair of the Soviet people.

The Secretary next wanted to deal with the matters of equality and mutual respect, which above all involved the engagement of resources. He was not talking about eliminating competition. That would be foolish and impractical. No one hoped for it or expected it. Afghanistan constituted an extremely important problem for the Soviet Union. A near-term solution in Southern Africa—and given good will such a solution was possible—would be a major contribution toward improving the international climate. Events such as Afghanistan were what SALT was impaled on. One could not deny the inter-relationship; one had to deal with it so as to improve East-West relations, because we had no desire for the current kind of situation. Gromyko also had some counsel regarding our participation. This is why communications were so important and why we had to speak frankly without fear of offending each other. The Secretary hoped that he had answered Gromyko’s question and apologized for having taken so much time to do it. He thought that each of these issues affected profoundly all of the questions.

Gromyko responded that the Secretary had evidently concluded from his analysis that it would not be advisable to tie all international problems into one knot. Thus, the Soviet Union should not be confronted with a demand that it renounce its policy as a precondition for negotiating and solving bilateral and international issues. Assuming this was the Secretary’s conclusion, this was precisely what Gromyko had hoped to hear. The Soviet Union has been insisting on this all along.

The Secretary interjected that public renunciation of Soviet policy never had been the official U.S. position. There never had been such a rigid precondition. One had to be careful not to take into account each distorted article or perverted statement of U.S. policy.

Gromyko said that he hoped never again to hear from Washington a demand that the Soviet Union renounce its policy or its approach by way of a precondition for solving any given problem.

Referring to the substantive part of the Secretary’s answer, Gromyko said that the Secretary had dealt with individual areas and with regional issues much more extensively than Gromyko. Thus he would have to do what he had already done at the UN General Assembly. He would start in the East and gradually move to the South and the

4 A possible reference to Haig’s speech before the American Bar Association in New Orleans on August 11: “Linkage is not a theory; it is a fact of life that we overlook at our peril.” (Department of State Bulletin, September 1981, pp. 10–13)
West. Was it really possible that anyone had the intention of defending the Pol Pot regime and his hatchetmen who, with the lighthearted assistance of the American friend Peking, had thought nothing of putting at least one third of their people under ground. The time would come when history would express gratitude to Vietnam for saving the Kampuchean nation, for helping it to free itself from its executioners. Of course, there could be differences of view regarding some domestic activity or other, but that was the internal affair of the Kampuchean people. The fact was that Vietnam had saved a nation that had been on the verge of total annihilation.

Perhaps Vietnamese military assistance constituted a violation of some law, or of the UN Charter? The answer was “no.” Did not the U.S. provide assistance to other countries? As for Vietnam itself, it had entered the path of peaceful development, it was able to solve its own problems, and, in the Soviet view, quite successfully at that. Perhaps this was not to the liking of some of Vietnam’s neighbors. The Secretary was familiar with the act perpetrated by China several years ago against Vietnam. That was naked aggression. It was most unfortunate that one had not heard U.S. condemnation of Peking’s aggression against Vietnam. Yet, by all the canons that was aggression. The Secretary had said that Vietnam was isolating itself. Gromyko had not noticed that. Vietnam was pursuing a peaceful policy in its relations with its neighbors and had no aggressive plans or intentions. As for the ASEAN countries, Burma and others, they had no grounds for concern. As time went on, they would be convinced of Vietnam’s positive intentions toward them and that Vietnam was not scheming against them. Vietnam wanted good relations with these countries. Accordingly, the U.S. had no grounds for concern about future Vietnamese activities.

Turning to Pakistan, Gromyko said that as a matter of fact Soviet relations with Pakistan had not been bad. The USSR had even been providing assistance, for example in the construction of a petroleum facility. But Pakistan’s foreign policy was largely a puzzle. The puzzle was mainly why Pakistan did not wish to normalize its relations with Afghanistan. It was not so much the juridical position of Pakistan on improving its relations with Afghanistan, as the current behavior of Pakistan. The question arose whether the temptation of the Pakistani leadership to obtain U.S. arms might not be stronger than the desire for good relations with Afghanistan. In short, the Soviet Union believed

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5 Reference is to the genocide of the Cambodian people by Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge.


7 Chinese troops invaded Vietnam in February 1979 and withdrew the following month.
that U.S. influence was strong and unfortunately it was not a positive influence.

Gromyko thought it would be better for Pakistan to resolve its differences with Afghanistan and to improve its relations with India and its other neighbors. Evidently, however, under U.S. influence Pakistan had no intention of moving in that direction. Perhaps the Secretary ought to give some thought to this matter. He might conclude that improved relations between Pakistan and its neighbors would not only serve the interests of Pakistan, but also the interests of the U.S. None of Pakistan’s neighbors wanted to be swallowed by Pakistan. The Soviet Union would object strongly. The present Pakistani leadership had an amazing talent for creating enemies along its own borders. As the Soviet Union understood it, this did not serve the interests of U.S. policy either.

Gromyko wanted to make a few comments about Afghanistan, since the Secretary had spoken about it at length today. Here was the U.S. Secretary of State sitting on a couch right next to Gromyko. The two were discussing major issues of Soviet-U.S. relations and of the international situation. The two men reflected the views of the highest authorities in the USSR and in the U.S. Gromyko wanted to say by this that they might well have the opportunity to find the key to resolving this situation. Perhaps they would be able to turn the key that opened the door. Of course, neither side could dictate to Pakistan or to Afghanistan, but why should these two countries, independently and separately from each other, not listen to, and heed friendly advice derived from good intentions, that is if such friendly advice could be found.

As Gromyko had said during our last conversation, we should act toward a cessation of external aggression against Afghanistan. Of course, that required some negotiations between the parties concerned. But since when was Zia ul Haq such a good democrat that he was unable to deal with the Afghan authorities? When did the U.S. transform him into such a good democrat? In any event, perhaps the possibility Gromyko had referred to did exist. This might produce a sigh of relief in Pakistan and would be helpful to the Government of Afghanistan, to the U.S. and to the Soviet Union. An end to outside intervention would suffice to reach agreement on the matter of emigration and would permit the solutions already mentioned by Gromyko to the Secretary. Gromyko wanted to emphasize again what he had said last time, namely that Afghanistan was offering assistance to returning emigres. He believed that in the event of such a development even the American friend Iran would be forced to accept the situation, whether de jure or de facto. Gromyko believed that this was worth trying.

He certainly was not begging the U.S. The Soviet Union did not find itself in water up to its ears. He already had occasion to tell the
Secretary that the Soviet Union did not have an enemy in the military sense in Afghanistan. By the same token, he wanted to note that the internal, the social situation in Afghanistan, was irreversible. As he understood it, the USSR and the U.S. were in agreement on their desire for a non-aligned and sovereign Afghanistan. This was a situation akin to U.S. freeway interchanges. This was at the core of the solution of the Afghan situation. It was necessary to assess the situation, and to do so deliberately. Gromyko asked the Secretary to give further thought to this matter.

Gromyko next wanted to turn to Africa and say a few words about Angola and Cuba. The Soviet Union was surprised: how could the U.S. associate itself with the aggressor, in fact become an accomplice of South Africa, the aggressor? South Africa had attacked Angola in clear daylight; it was strangling the Namibians and had not been opposed strongly enough. Gromyko could not envisage greater indignation against racism than the feeling which Africans held for South Africa. Anything stronger could only be outright war. Even here, at the UN General Assembly, all the delegates were indignant.

As for the Angolans, they were acting peacefully and the Soviet Union was familiar with Angola’s intention; the USSR had good relations with Angola, in fact has a treaty with that country. Angola had no aggressive designs against its neighbors; it had repeatedly assured the Soviet Union of this. It did have difficulties with the UNITA bands and with Savimbi. Were it not for the interference of all these groups, the Cubans would disappear. Unfortunately, U.S. policy hindered resolution of this problem. This was a problem which also ought to be considered carefully. Gromyko was not privy to U.S. plans regarding Angola, whether favorable or unfavorable. In his view, U.S. relations with Angola should be based on the recognition that there were no perfidious plans. Why did the Cubans come? They were asked to come, they did not force their presence on Angola. The U.S. disliked Cuba. Had there been no aggression against Angola, the Secretary’s statement would sound different. But this constituted assistance against external aggression. Emotions had no place there.

Finally, Gromyko wanted to comment on U.S.-Cuban relations. The Secretary had to such an extent tangled up his comments about Cuba, Africa and other matters, that Gromyko felt justified in expressing his views at this stage. The U.S. did not like the Cuban social system, it did not like Cuba’s socialist system. In this connection, he again wanted to draw the Secretary’s attention to what he, Gromyko, had said at the UN General Assembly. The Cuban Socialist system was an internal matter. The Secretary did not refer to Cuba except in a hostile tone. And yet the Secretary had also said that domestic affairs were domestic affairs.
The Secretary had called Cuba an aggressor. What country had Cuba taken over? The answer was “none.” Nor did Cuba have such intentions. The U.S. was accusing Cuba of supplying arms to several Latin American countries. The Soviet Union had become interested in this matter and whether the Secretary would believe it or not, this assertion was not true. Cuba was not supplying such arms. Gromyko suggested that it was up to the Secretary to determine the sources of his information. The U.S. was accusing Cuba of involvement in connection with El Salvador. But this was an artificial accusation, a contrived assertion. Gromyko could not say the same about the U.S. role in El Salvador. Sympathies and antipathies were irrelevant in this connection. Interference was something else again.

Was Cuba not offended by the fact that the U.S. had in effect imposed an economic blockade on it? Gromyko suggested that the Secretary try to picture himself in the Cuban position. Was the existence of a U.S. military base in Cuba, contrary to the wishes of the Cuban people, not deeply offensive to the Cubans? Gromyko did not know whether the Secretary was able mentally to place himself in the Cuban position. The Secretary would also recall that the Cubans had made a number of steps to meet the U.S. halfway, that they had gone far to accommodate the U.S. Admittedly this had occurred during the Administration of President Carter, but it was the same country regardless of whether the Carter Administration or the Reagan Administration was in office.

And in the final analysis, what kind of threat did Cuba pose to the U.S.? It posed no threat, and the U.S. knew this very well. Gromyko went on to say that Soviet-U.S. relations in the context of Cuba were clear. There existed an understanding on that score. So this problem was clear. Given the above, was it appropriate to unleash emotions about Cuba in such a sharp form? The Soviet Union did not think that this was appropriate. Gromyko suggested that the U.S. leave Cuba alone, that it let the Cubans live as they would, and that it permit Cuba to resolve its domestic problems as it saw fit. The USSR believed that such an approach would be a credit to U.S. foreign policy. At this point the U.S. had wound itself up about Cuba. What for? There was no reason for this in connection with Cuba. Gromyko also wanted to make some remarks about China, but first he would welcome any observations the Secretary might wish to offer.

The Secretary noted that clearly U.S. information about Cuba was at variance with what Cuba was telling the Soviet Union. We had absolute, categorical and irrefutable evidence about Cuban aggression.

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8 A reference to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay.
in Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, where it was trying to change the status quo. The Secretary wanted to assure Gromyko that we would deal with matters of this nature. The Secretary regretted that Gromyko seemed to believe that events in this hemisphere required U.S. grace and acceptance. We would not and could not do so. The Secretary was raising all these issues in the context of what was under discussion.

He regretted Gromyko’s standard replies about Angola. Our allies and we will regret a lack of progress in this area. We believed that responsible cooperation could contribute to peace in Southern Africa. The U.S. was not looking for any advantages in Southern Africa. We had hoped, but had again been disappointed by what we thought was the outline of a broad principle. We had hoped for implementation of practical steps and would decry an absence of reciprocity or progress. The Secretary wished to emphasize most clearly that these actions were fundamental and that failure to implement them would complicate our relationship, which the Secretary would regret. He thought that a withdrawal was in the interests of a constructive relationship between the U.S. and USSR.

He sensed no feeling on Gromyko’s part that the latter wanted to cooperate with us with regard to a number of problems, and the Secretary regretted this. He was not begging Gromyko about Angola, this was not in our interest. But he had felt that it was in the interests of international stability and normalcy to be helpful. This was not a plaintive call, rather it was a constructive proposal for peace and stability. This was as true in this hemisphere as it was in Africa. The U.S. was prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Union on this problem, but Gromyko’s value judgments, to the effect that we did not know what we were saying and that we had an emotional fear of Cuba, were nonsense. China and Yugoslavia had systems with which we were not comfortable. The Secretary believed that international behavior involved a system of justice. He hoped that Gromyko could think over this matter more intensely and perhaps it would be possible to find a basis for coordinated action. Otherwise, the whole undertaking would become a farce. We could not approach mutual relations on a set of principles contrary to decency and law. There was no way in which we could do so.

Gromyko now wanted to turn to China. The Secretary was probably aware of Soviet-U.S. discussions of China at different levels. The Soviet side had touched on this matter at the highest levels, including the summit level. This was because for some years now there had been evidence of China and the U.S. drawing closer together. If this drawing together had involved a peace-loving state, then it would be an entirely different matter. The fact was, however, that China pursued a militaris-
tic policy, that it did not believe in peace and that it had a conception of war. Under these conditions the Soviet Union viewed all steps in the direction of a closer drawing together between the U.S. and China as hostile actions against the Soviet Union. Moreover, demonstrated hostility against the Soviet Union was involved. Statements were being openly made that the U.S. and China were in fact acting in a uniform direction even though they were not even allies. No secret was made of the fact that the idea behind all this was opposition to the Soviet Union.

How should the Soviet Union react in the face of all this? Clearly it had to draw the relevant conclusions. Gromyko regretted that the U.S. had embarked on this road. Having drawn the appropriate conclusion, the Soviet Union especially noted the drawing together between the U.S. and China in the military area. It has specifically noted the U.S. decision to supply weapons and military equipment to China. The Soviet Union could not but note this. The Secretary did not have to reply to the following question: Was Washington certain that Peking which today sang with a voice of a nightingale would in the future, behave like a nightingale? Did Washington anticipate any changes in this regard?

Gromyko wanted to point out in this connection that this question had a certain sharp edge in the historical perspective. The Secretary should not think that the Soviet Union was scared out of its wits. It was not scared, it simply viewed the problem in a more long-term perspective. Someone seriously contemplating war against the Soviet Union did not require a large amount of weapons, a high degree of adventurism would suffice. And that was China’s policy. The Soviet Union wanted better relations with China and regretted their absence. The Secretary should not think that the Soviet Union was automatically hostile to China. It wanted good relations, but not at U.S. expense.

Incidentally, in the past, when Soviet relations with China were good, there had not been even one instance when this was turned against the United States, there had not been even a single joint action against the United States. He suggested that this constituted food for thought, not only on the Soviet side, but also on the U.S. side. The Secretary would be utterly amazed if Gromyko were to tell him about some ideas previously advanced by China. He asked the Secretary to understand his comments correctly.

Following a five-minute break the Secretary said that he wanted to make some brief general observations about China and assured Gromyko that he was very familiar with the exchanges in Moscow on the subject. We were not conducting our affairs with China with the intention of affecting our relationship with the Soviet Union. The Secretary rejected the views on this score expressed by U.S. commentators. He wanted to assure Gromyko that this did not underlie our relation-
ship with China. We considered that our relationship with a billion of
the world’s people was in the long-term interest of the U.S., both in a
global and in a regional sense. There remained a number of controver-
sial key issues, and we still had more differences with China than
points of convergence. But we did not let this affect normalization.

As far as the military aspect was concerned, the Secretary noted
that he had made his first visit to China before President Nixon’s trip. Proposals have been made for decades to rearm China, but we have
not done so. This development was only in an evolutionary sense, and
during the Secretary’s talks in Peking there was merely a change in
terms of the category in which China was included with respect to U.S.
foreign military sales. There had been no agreement to sell anything.
We intended to look at this on a case-by-case basis.

The Secretary also had to add that China had full entry to the
Western European arms market. He recalled that in 1975 and 1976
Chinese representatives went all over Western Europe, notably to
France and Great Britain, but had not procured much. There were
several reasons for this, one of them being their shortage of resources.
As the Secretary saw it, under the current Chinese development pro-
gram it continued to have a shortage of funds for weapons procure-
ment. The Secretary understood the problem which the Soviet side
saw with respect to Chinese military forces. He wanted to assure Gro-
myko that we would not take leave of our senses on the matter of the
China problem. On the other hand, it was in our interests to maintain
a good relationship, and from time to time to express concern about
events which could have potential ramifications in terms of our interests
and international peace.

In this context, the Secretary had to say that our policy would be
influenced by whether or not actions corresponded to international
behavior. The Secretary had wanted to say this because of the distinctly
real possibility of a misreading of our relationship with China, espe-
cially in terms of arms. Our purposes were peaceful and constructive.

Gromyko responded that he had honestly presented the Soviet
side’s views regarding its concern in the hope that the U.S. would
understand the Soviet Union and would see the entire problem of
the U.S.-Chinese relationship from the standpoint of the long-term
historical perspective. This involved the fundamental interests of the
Soviet Union and the United States in the world.

9 In January 1972, Haig traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese Prime Minister
Chou En-lai in advance of Nixon’s visit the following month. For the memorandum of
this conversation as well as Haig’s report back to Kissinger, see Foreign Relations, 1969–
The Secretary said that he found Gromyko’s comments today about Cuba sterile and pro forma.

Gromyko responded that he could not believe a U.S. concern regarding the weapons which the Soviet Union supplied to Cuba. The concept of defensive weapons certainly existed and the weapons supplied by the Soviet Union were of a class that was defensive within the defensive category, nothing more. Gromyko could not seriously accept a U.S. concern regarding Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba. If the U.S. side had no other concerns, it had no concerns at all, it did not have a worry in the world. It was not Soviet arms in Cuba that were of interest to the U.S., it was Cuba itself.

There was a proverb regarding a needle in a haystack, but with present technology, one could even find a needle. The U.S. had frequently spoken about verification, especially in the context of SALT. It had voiced suspicions regarding various actions. Apropos of such suspicions, if a country were to force the path of engaging in such actions, it would have to recognize that at present no country could not but be compromised. What was occurring in the U.S. today was that Mr. X talked to Mr. Y and then Mr. Y spoke to Mr. X, after which both of them separately and together voiced their fears to Mr. Z. Gromyko wanted to express one more desire. The Secretary could take it into account or not, as he preferred, but Gromyko suggested that the U.S. give up on the contrived assertions regarding Cuban weapons. Somebody had stepped on the tail of a magpie and the latter mentioned something about Soviet scheming supposedly aimed against the U.S. What was the purpose of all this? Serious people could not take such contrived assertions seriously and repeat them. Gromyko thought that the matter did not deserve any further comment.

Gromyko also wanted to comment on one further question, though he had already touched on it in passing. Statements made in the U.S. frequently referred to U.S. vital interests. One could gain the impression that the U.S. was laying claim not only to every corner of the land mass of the globe, but also to the oceans. Wherever one looked, inevitably there seemed to be some U.S. national or vital interest. This pertained to the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, to Latin America; everywhere, with the possible exception of the Socialist states, there were vital U.S. interests. Gromyko asked rhetorically what would happen if the Soviet Union or any other major country were to make statements along these same lines. He repeated, what would happen then? What would happen if the vital interests of one nation were superimposed on the vital interests of another nation, and then on those of a third nation? This would be a dead-end street. This would be true even if just one or two states were to claim vital interests everywhere. No country, no side could make such claims, and no one could accept them.
But at present it appeared as if the U.S. was trying to stretch some kind of cover over the entire world, with the possible exception of the Socialist countries. Gromyko hoped that he had shown that no country, including the Soviet Union, could accept what was being said in Washington about U.S. vital interests. Gromyko wanted to give an illustration and asked the Secretary to understand him correctly. The U.S. had spoken about the importance it attached to the Persian Gulf region. The U.S. had a naval presence there because it perceived perfidious plans to interrupt the oil trade. This has been said repeatedly. Supposedly the USSR was prepared to jump on the Persian Gulf. Gromyko urged the Secretary not to believe tales about such a truly olympic jump. The Secretary, a statesman responsible for formulating policy, had to be above that sort of thing. If there was a jump, it was in the minds of those who spread such rumors. Such statements constituted a derivative from the overall global concept. The fact was that the Soviet Union had no such designs on the Persian Gulf.

Gromyko wanted to assure the Secretary—and Gromyko was authorized to give such an assurance—that no Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf or any other area of the world had existed in the past or existed at present. He went on to say that the U.S. should happily buy all the oil it wanted in the area. There was no point in saturating the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean with ships, aircraft and guns. The Soviet Union had no intention of encroaching upon anyone’s riches, and the U.S. should cast aside all fears of the Soviet Union. This was a contrived conception, one with huge and fearful horns that should be forgotten because it was nonexistent. The Secretary should cast it out of his mind.

Gromyko remarked that we had discussed a number of issues. From his standpoint today’s talk had been beneficial. He wanted to note that the Soviet side did not cast its words lightly to the winds. He had frankly expressed the views of the Soviet side in the hope that the Secretary, the President and the Administration as a whole, would take into account and weigh what had been said, hopefully drawing the appropriate conclusions. Gromyko had spoken frankly and appreciated the Secretary’s frankness. We ought to conduct our business in a serious way and not fall victim to emotions. The USSR and the U.S. lived in the same house, admittedly not a glass house, but one which was no longer as big or as invulnerable as it had seemed a hundred or two hundred years ago. The Soviet Union hoped that the U.S. was prepared to put Soviet-U.S. relations back on track.

The Secretary said that he was grateful to Gromyko for these observations. He wanted to remind the latter that the issue of Cuba and its arms was a central regional matter, it was not insignificant. The Secretary asked Gromyko to recognize this in assessing his comments. As
for verification, it involved both reality and perceptions. We had obtained firm evidence from Southeast Asia, from Laos and Kampuchea. We were hoping for serious reply in connection with the event in Sverdlovsk in 1979, and with regard to the call for a meeting under Article V of the Convention on Biological Weapons. However, we have been faced by a stone wall; we had encountered negative responses.

The Secretary wanted to make some very brief comments on the Madrid CSCE Conference. It would terminate soon, it had to. We had advanced some confidence-building proposals and hoped that this matter could be resolved at the fall session. We hoped that we would be able to arrive at some arrangement for a continuation of discussion of Basket Three subjects after the Madrid Conference. This involved political reality in the U.S. Should there not be at least some progress on this score, the climate for improving relations between us would be complicated. This was important in terms of our ability to improve the dialogue.

The Secretary noted that as he understood it was traditional at such meetings as this to make special requests regarding certain individuals. The President had asked him to mention one particular case. As we understood it, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy was grievously ill and might die. The Secretary hoped that Soviet authorities might give this matter some important consideration. While the Secretary did not frequently make such requests, he also wanted to mention the names Skuodis, Stolar, Chmykhalov, Vashchenko and Sakharov. Shcharanskiy was a most critical issue in the U.S.

Gromyko replied that although Shcharanskiy was known in the U.S., he was not known in the Soviet Union. This was a little man, a little criminal who was serving time. In the U.S. he was a political figure, in the Soviet Union he was a nobody. He was even a nobody in the criminal world. Gromyko wanted to state from the outset that Shcharanskiy was a criminal. Gromyko was not sure he had understood what the Secretary wanted with respect to Sakharov. Sakharov was an academician, known as a scientist. As for the other names, he did not recognize them.

The Secretary said that Ambassador Hartman would provide Gromyko’s representative with a list.

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10 Reference is to the Second Follow-up Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Madrid, which began in November 1980 and lasted until September 1983.

11 References are to Vytauta Skuodis, a Lithuanian dissident; Abe Stolar, a dual Soviet-American citizen; and the Chmykhalov and Vashchenko families, who were Soviet Pentecostalists living in the basement of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
The Secretary added these cases were of very great significance to the President as a manifestation of an improved dialogue. On top of that, this was a matter of great interest to a number of Congressmen and Senators, especially the case of Shcharanskiy. Regarding Sakharov, there was widespread concern in the U.S. over his welfare, and we hoped that concern would be heeded.

Gromyko remarked that U.S. Congressmen would frequently visit the Soviet Union and then would gingerly reach into their pockets and pull out a list of two, five or ten names. Gromyko would promise to check, and in 90 percent of the cases, he learned that the petitions were without foundation. The individuals concerned had never filed any applications to leave, have never indicated any desire to leave, in fact, had married and were living quite happily. Thus, Gromyko could do nothing and had to explain honestly the real situation. In short, as he understood it, the Secretary was hoping for these “Soviet exports.”

Told by the Secretary that Chmykhalov and Vashchenko involved individuals at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Gromyko said that he had heard about this case and thought that the Embassy should release these individuals. The U.S. Embassy was involved in blackmail. Gromyko assumed that these individuals had already consumed all the bread and all the nuts at the Embassy. Gromyko added that the matter could be considered once the individuals left the Embassy. He thought that the Secretary should give some good advice to the Embassy, namely, put the prestige of the U.S. above the prestige of the Embassy.

The Secretary remarked that this was like the chicken-and-egg situation, and hoped the Soviet side would reconsider its position.

The Secretary expressed the view that our discussions had been helpful and trusted that Gromyko shared this assessment. He was wondering whether it might be useful to hold a further meeting shortly after the beginning of the New Year. If Gromyko agreed, he was willing to meet in Vienna on a date to be agreed. Gromyko inquired whether the Secretary meant Vienna or Geneva. The Secretary said that he would be happy to meet in either city. Gromyko called the proposal acceptable. The Secretary inquired which city Gromyko preferred. Gromyko suggested that Geneva might be preferable since it had been the site of such meetings more frequently. The Secretary agreed to hold the meeting in Geneva.

At this point the members of the two delegations joined the meeting.
91. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 28, 1981, 6–7 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting Between Secretary Haig and Minister Gromyko With Delegations

PARTICIPANTS

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary of State</td>
<td>Foreign Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alexander M. Haig</td>
<td>Andrey A. Gromyko</td>
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<tr>
<td>Under Secretary</td>
<td>First Deputy Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walter J. Stoessel</td>
<td>Georgiy Korniyenko</td>
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<td>Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman</td>
<td>Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin</td>
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<td>Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Mr. Vasilii Markarov</td>
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<td>Lawrence S. Eagleburger</td>
<td>Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. Thomas W. Simons, Jr. (notetaker)</td>
<td>Mr. Viktor Isakov (notetaker)</td>
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<td>Mr. Dimitri Arensburger, Interpreter</td>
<td>Mr. Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter</td>
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Gromyko said that he and the Secretary had touched on many important problems of U.S.-Soviet relations and the international situation generally. They had continued the discussions of September 23. It would probably be necessary to get in touch again through diplomatic channels before talks begin at the end of November to deal with procedural and organizational questions, unless by a stroke of genius someone had an idea on substantive matters. That is, if either side wished to say anything, this could be done through diplomatic channels, unless other forms of contact were made earlier.

Gromyko asked when Ambassador Hartman would be going to Moscow and whether he had already submitted to “interrogation and execution by Congress.” The Secretary replied that Hartman’s confirmation was over, and that he had passed with flying colors. Hartman said he planned to be in Moscow October 16. Gromyko expressed satisfaction, noting that the Embassy had been without a captain too long. The Secretary reiterated that Hartman had been handpicked, as one of our most distinguished professionals. Gromyko said he knew that: they had met many times, particularly on strategic arms limitations questions, in many latitudes and longitudes, though more in latitudes than in longitudes.

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2 See Documents 88 and 89.
Turning to bilateral questions, the Secretary suggested that rather than discuss them in depth today we ask our diplomatic representatives in Washington and Moscow to follow up on them. He agreed there had been a great deal of investment in building them up, much sweat had been expended, to use Gromyko’s term, and that it would be a tragedy to cast it aside. Related questions had been discussed earlier. Concerning our bilateral agreements, five were coming up for renewal this year in one form or another: medical science, environment, world oceans, artificial heart and maritime. He was optimistic on the world oceans agreement. On the artificial heart, he personally favored it, because he might need one.

Gromyko asked if there was anyone in the room who had signed the artificial heart agreement. Hartman said he had negotiated it, and the Under Secretary noted that he had been present. “But I signed it,” said Gromyko.3

With regard to the cultural agreement, the Secretary went on, the situation was somewhat different. There were problems with it for reasons of which Gromyko was aware. On the other hand, we thought that absence of an agreement should not interfere with privately sponsored exchanges, and that would continue to be our position until the larger problem was solved.

Gromyko said the matter of the cultural agreement was both simple and not simple. His fellow citizens found themselves in danger. They did not feel comfortable in the U.S.; they felt that their security was not assured. Steps should be taken to provide the necessary conditions. The Secretary said no one here welcomed dangers to Soviet citizens, and we should talk about this.

Generally, Gromyko said, five agreements were due to expire in the next six months, and several more next year. He trusted we were not burying them. The Secretary replied that each agreement is distinct. The Maritime Agreement, for instance, was coming up in the period ahead. We needed some adjustment of the text, and wished to renegotiate it. It was related to the long-term agreement on grains, which has been extended for the interim, and grains were under discussion now. The President felt that he wished to move on grains as a matter of policy, not to speak of mutual benefit. The Maritime Agreement would expire at the end of the year and will take a lot of work. We would not want an interim extension of the current agreement, because the balance of benefits has been against us. On oceans, he repeated, he

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3 The Agreement on Artificial Heart Research and Development was signed on June 28, 1974, and entered into force the same day. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Documents 186 and 199.
was optimistic. We approach the question of bilateral agreements with the idea of extending, of adjusting them as necessary, not of throwing them out the window.

Gromyko raised the question of air traffic, would the boycott last long? Aircraft servicing, including baggage handling, was being provided by Soviet personnel. This was not very civilized, as a form of gymnastics for the Soviet Embassy personnel in Washington. The Secretary suggested it kept them fit. Gromyko replied it was a benefit they were willing to do without if the American side would display a more civilized approach. The Secretary said this was a matter we should look at together, perhaps next week between Assistant Secretary Eagleburger and Minister Bessmertnykh.

The Secretary noted that he had given Gromyko a list of names of cases of special interest, and Hartman would turn over our latest representation list to First Deputy Korniyenko after the meeting (NOTE: This was done.) Gromyko commented that the Secretary was interested in increasing Soviet exports to the U.S.

The Secretary noted that the question of consulates had earlier been discussed in diplomatic channels. Gromyko interjected that it was the U.S. side which had blocked on this issue, not the Soviet side. There was a building in Kiev. He had not seen it, but he understood it was refurbished and comfortable. It was standing idle. Naturally the Kiev authorities wished to use it. The Soviets needed an answer. The Secretary said he hoped to return to the question of consulates the next time they met. Gromyko said he hoped the approach would be positive, with regard to the building as well. The Secretary concluded that the experts could deal with it.

Gromyko asked if there were any other questions to discuss. The Secretary said he would like to raise an idea, put forward by U.S. businessman Don Kendall, of a joint TV program with a panel of U.S. and Soviet experts, for viewing in both countries. After Dobrynin had explained the concept to him, Gromyko said “let’s take a look.” He asked if the Secretary had in mind a series, or a single program. The Secretary said we should try it once. If it was successful we could do it again. On the U.S. side, it would even have a sponsor. Gromyko said we should look into this.

The Secretary noted that the space and energy agreements would expire in May, the science and technical cooperation agreement in July. Gromyko asked if the U.S. was inclined to renew them. The Secretary said the answer was yes in principle, though how it worked out would

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4 A reference to the refusal of baggage handlers at New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport to service flights arriving on the Soviet airliner Aeroflot.
depend also on progress in other areas he had discussed. But, Gromyko asked, was the U.S. thinking in the direction of continuation? The Secretary repeated that in principle, the U.S. was thinking along these lines.

The Secretary asked how we should deal with the press. Gromyko said that there would be no joint statement. The Soviet side would not discuss details; it would say that many questions had been talked about, including SALT. (Korniyenko interjected with a smile that if they could agree to resume SALT negotiations, then, of course, there could be a joint statement.) Gromyko said each side would make its own statement, and the Soviets would say that in general the meeting was a continuation of previous discussion, that they had talked about bilateral and international issues, that the Soviets had stressed their interest in resolving international problems, especially those of peace and security, and bilateral problems that required settlement. They would not go into details and would not list problems discussed. It would be half a page, unless of course they agreed to begin SALT negotiations in October.

The Secretary asked what we should say about the agreement to continue discussions after the first of the year in Geneva. Perhaps we did not need to mention the place. Eagleburger suggested it would be useful to contact the Swiss first. Gromyko pondered how to formulate the answer and suggested “the exchange of views at the ministerial level on questions of mutual interest will be continued early next year.” The Secretary agreed, and proposed that the sides go to the Swiss soon. Pending that, we might say in response to questions that we would meet at a place to be mutually agreed. Gromyko replied that we should not beat around the bush, and if asked should say “perhaps in Geneva.” The Secretary agreed.
92. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, October 13, 1981, 2–2:45 p.m.

SUBJECTS
Theater Nuclear Forces
Egypt

PARTICIPANTS
President Ronald Reagan
State
Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Deputy Secretary William P. Clark
Mr. Richard Burt, Director, Politico-Military Affairs
Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger
Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci
CIA
Director William Casey
JCS
General David C. Jones
Lieutenant General Paul F. Gorman
ACDA
Acting Director Norman C. Terrell
White House
Mr. Edwin Meese III
Mr. James A. Baker III
Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Mr. Richard V. Allen
Mr. David Gergen
Admiral James W. Nance
Ms. Janet Colson
OMB
Associate Director William Schneider
NSC
Mr. Sven Kraemer

MINUTES OF MEETING

The President: I know what the agenda items are for today, but I want to touch upon another matter first in the area of Soviet human rights. What is the situation now with Professor McClellan’s Russian

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00022 13 Oct 81. Top Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)
wife, who is not being allowed to emigrate? 2 What about the Soviet religious group in the basement of our Embassy in Moscow? What about Shcharanskiy? Would some quiet diplomacy help? These should not be part of our TNF negotiations, but is there any way we could indicate to the Soviets that we would be happier in any negotiations if there were progress with these cases?

Secretary Haig: I raised each of these cases with Gromyko, both in the one-on-ones with him and in the larger planning group. 3 Gromyko did not budge. On Shcharanskiy, he told me that Shcharanskiy was well known in the U.S., but was barely known in the USSR. I urged Gromyko to let Shcharanskiy go; to let this sick man leave now, rather than letting him die, thus causing far greater problems.

The President: Well, let’s keep track of this. Okay, Dick (Allen), let’s get on with the agenda.

Mr. Allen: We have two agenda topics today: First, an update on Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) negotiations preparations, and secondly, a review of the situation in Egypt. We also have a consent item on bringing Central America/Cuba issues before the NSC as soon as possible.

Issue 1: Theater Nuclear Forces Negotiations Preparations

Mr. Allen: TNF negotiations begin with the Soviets on November 30 in Geneva. We earlier affirmed the Administration’s commitment to NATO’s “dual track” decision of December 1979 on modernization and arms control, and at an April 30 NSC meeting reviewed the criteria and timing of such negotiations. 4 The preparatory work has progressed through the Interdepartmental Group (IG) process, under Al Haig’s personal direction and with participation of Defense, ACDA, and others. Now, Cap will be going to Europe to meet with different defense officials, and on October 26, we will again be consulting with our Allies in NATO at the Special Consultative Group (SCG). 5 Our objective here is not to settle on a negotiation position today, but to get an update on where we stand.

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2 Reference is to Irina McClellan, wife of Woodford McClellan, Professor of Russian History at the University of Virginia, who was seeking to emigrate from the Soviet Union to the United States. McClellan’s June 22 letter to the President asking for assistance and Reagan’s August 20 response are in the Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Dissidents (3/23).

3 See Documents 90 and 91.

4 See Document 48.

Secretary Haig: I want to underline that this is not a decision meeting but an update prior to completion of work on our negotiation position. We will need an NSC meeting within a month on the negotiating position we develop.

In their 1979 decision, the Allies agreed to a modernization program that is on track everywhere except in the Netherlands. The Germans, Brits, Italians, and Belgians have all shown great courage. Schmidt and Genscher have both threatened to resign on this issue, even though they face substantial pressures, including the 250,000 protesters who marched in Bonn this weekend. We have had increased concern about the Dutch, but in my meeting in Egypt with Dutch Foreign Minister Talboys, I was assured that the Dutch would not withdraw their deployment decision, but only undertake a necessary delay in reaching a decision.

In 1979, the Allies also agreed to TNF arms control negotiations, and we agreed to consult closely with our Allies. The IG, which State and DOD co-chair, with major ACDA participation, has undertaken extensive work on these issues. The Alliance consultations are important because the primary purpose of the negotiations is political, i.e., to update the TNF modernization program. An actual arms control agreement is secondary and has little prospect because of the imbalance of forces. NATO’s Special Consultative Group, the SCG, is the forum for these consultations. It is chaired by Assistant Secretary Eagleburger and will be meeting next on October 26.

Let me summarize where we stand in the IG. There is general agreement that: (1) we will propose a phased, comprehensive approach that seeks reductions to the lowest possible levels on land-based TNF missiles in the first phase; (2) we will insist on equal limits for like systems, and these limits must be global; (3) we will negotiate only U.S. and Soviet systems and will not even compensate for these Allied systems—a point we may need to reconsider; and (4) we will insist on stringent verification procedures that will almost certainly go beyond National Technical Means (NTM).

More specific elements include IG agreement that: (1) Soviet SS–20’s, 4’s, and 5’s must be limited, and that there must be also constraints on shorter systems, including SS–21’s, 22’s, and 23’s; (2) warheads on launchers will be the unit of account; (3) we want to ban refires; and (4) we will not negotiate aircraft in the first phase, but may be required to discuss them in the first phase because of Soviet claims concerning the balance. Gromyko threw the aircraft balance issue at me in our UN talks.

Issues remaining to be resolved include: (1) the TNF–SALT (START) relationship, which is as yet undefined. As the talks go on, they will merge.
The President: What does that mean, merge?

Secretary Haig: The Soviets will not be allowed to double count us.

Secretary Weinberger: Then you don’t mean merging negotiations.

Secretary Haig: No. I am referring to an interrelationship. You cannot do one thing in one forum without it relating to the other forum.

Secretary Weinberger: But we may not be ready on an issue in one area and could be dragged into that issue through the other forum.

Secretary Haig: We’ll have shrewd negotiators. They can hold the line.

Mr. Allen: We might remind the President that our Chief negotiator for TNF will be Paul Nitze, and that for START, it will be General Ed Rowny.

Secretary Haig: We favor having the two negotiations in the same location to facilitate coordination.

Other issues remaining to be resolved include: (1) levels of reductions, i.e., ceilings and floors; (2) limits on shorter-range missiles; and (3) verification issues. We need to study each of these issues in-depth. Verification could be the most controversial issue for the Allies. We must avoid an Allied perception that we are scuttling the talks at the outset by insisting on verification criteria the Soviets are unlikely to accept; we must treat the Allies gingerly on this matter. In general, the Allies have been supportive on our approach.

Secretary Weinberger: We at Defense agree with many of the points made by Secretary Haig: (1) the emphasis on land-based missiles, including SS–20’s, 4’s, 5’s, 21’s, 22’s, and 23’s; (2) banning refires; (3) omitting aircraft in any first phase; (4) stringent verification procedures; and (5) Alliance consultations.

There is, however, another point we would also like to bring out. It is the question of what we would like to achieve in these negotiations. We are conscious of several difficult dilemmas. If we are perceived as not engaging in serious negotiations, our modernization program will not go through. If we succeed in reaching only a cosmetic agreement, our modernization program will also come to a halt, being perceived as no longer necessary. Or if we are viewed as not making progress in negotiations, the Soviets will make it seem to be our fault, and our modernization program will be endangered.

We need to assess the nature of our tasks brought on by the strength of Soviet programs. They have 750 SS–20 warheads now. The SS–20’s are mobile, accurate, powerful, hard to find and to hit, and they are targeted against all of Europe and against China and Japan. The U.S. has no counter. In addition, a new generation of Soviet shorter-range systems is on the way. We may find our 1979 TNF modernization program to be insufficient.
In this light, we might need to consider a bold plan, sweeping in nature, to capture world opinion. If refused by the Soviets, they would take the blame for its rejection. If the Soviets agreed, we would achieve the balance that we’ve lost. Such a plan would be to propose a “zero option.” Initially, it would, of course, be limited only to long-range land-based missiles, in which the Soviets are preponderant. If it were ultimately decided to adopt this option, it should be proposed by the U.S. in a spectacular Presidential announcement, not at the mid- or lower-level SCG on October 26 or in terms of some “lowest possible numbers” formula. The “zero option” should be considered carefully here, and no parts of it should be given away at the October 26 SCG. We should not be using the “lowest possible numbers” formula at the SCG or in any other forum. —If we adopt the “zero option” approach and the Soviets reject it after we have given it a good try, this will leave the Europeans in a position where they would really have no alternative to modernization.

_The President:_ Do we really want a “zero option” for the battlefield? Don’t we need these nuclear systems? Wouldn’t it be bad for us to give them up since we need them to handle Soviet conventional superiority?

_Secretary Haig:_ The “zero option” will not be viewed as the President’s initiative. It has already been proposed by the German Social Democrats and by Foreign Minister Genscher in Moscow, and it is a subject of intense debate in Europe. There are also some serious problems with any “zero option.” We should be looking for the hooker and must study this issue fully. What would happen in one or two years when it comes time to deploy, if we have a “zero option” on the table? With such an option, the Europeans will surely reject any new deployments.

_Secretary Weinberger:_ The Soviets will certainly reject an American “zero option” proposal. But whether they reject it or they accept it, they would be set back on their heels. We would be left in good shape and would be shown as the White Hats. As to the nuclear battlefield systems we need, we would not be including these shorter battlefield systems, e.g., the Enhanced Radiation Weapons (ERW) systems, only the longer-range ones. Also, we would be insisting on stringent verification criteria and on dismantling.

_Mr. Allen:_ Genscher told me that verification is a popular issue in Europe. —Norm (Terrell), do you want to express ACDA’s views in behalf of Eugene Rostow?

_Mr. Terrell:_ Gene Rostow and Paul Nitze regret that they cannot be here today. They are in Europe discussing some of these issues with our Allies. ACDA supports the IG consensus positions stated by Secretaries Haig and Weinberger. On the “zero option,” we believe it requires further study, and that it should be considered principally in
terms of its impact on our deployment schedule in 1983. We favor keeping the “lowest possible levels” formula for the October 26 SCG meeting. “Lowest possible” includes zero. We also want to stress the importance of accurate data and of effective verification.

_The President:_ How will we verify an agreement?

_Mr. Allen:_ We will have the national technical means, satellites, and so on. But in addition, we will be looking at on-site inspections and other means. The problem is that because of the Soviet obsession against inspections, our insistence may appear to some Europeans to have the effect of scuttling the negotiations.

_The President:_ Even if you could have inspections, who could really travel and verify in that vast country?

_Mr. Casey:_ With a zero ban, it would be easier.

_The President:_ Even then, the Soviet Union is a large country. Couldn’t they easily hide something in Siberia or somewhere else?

_Mr. Meese:_ With a zero ban, we would have an easier indicator of whether or not the Soviets were complying.

_Secretary Weinberger:_ The Soviets would have to dismantle their systems. Third countries and international organizations might need to be involved, but nothing is guaranteeable.

_The President:_ Maybe we should be leasing some of the people from the Third World nations at Cancun⁶ to help verify the dismantling.

_Mr. Allen:_ We are running short of time. General Jones, can you comment on the views of the Chiefs?

_General Jones:_ We support TNF negotiations. I think it’s important to gain Allied confidence so we can proceed with the modernization program. We agree with the outline presented by Secretaries Haig and Weinberger. However, we have two concerns at present. First, on the reference to warheads-on-launchers as the unit of account. We may want to count warheads-on-missiles instead. We will need to study this further. Secondly, and this is a major concern, we do not want the reference to aircraft not being negotiated in a first phase to imply that aircraft could be negotiated in a future phase. That would be a slippery and dangerous slope. Aircraft are required for both nuclear and conventional roles and involve other special consideration as well.

_Secretary Haig:_ General Jones’ points clearly get us into the SALT/TNF relationship. For example, in the data exchange issue on the bal-

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ance, we will need to count aircraft somehow. That will be our nightmare.

Mr. Allen: Cap, you will be gone until the 24th?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes, I take it from the discussion that in my NATO meetings, I will be reporting on our preliminary preparations and will reaffirm the November 30 starting time for negotiations, but will say nothing substantively on our negotiating approach. I take it we have agreed on a similar position for the October 26 SCG.

Issue 2: Egypt and Other Business

Mr. Allen: We are out of time. For the update on the situation in Egypt, could Al Haig and Bill Casey provide the President with written reports? On a different matter, we have received preliminary indications that if embargoed, two U.S. compressor components, which the Soviets want for their Siberian pipelines, would cause a two-year delay in the pipeline’s operation. We will need to check this matter out carefully.

Secretary Haig: I am not so sure that we are confident of the impact of those compressors. We will need to check it out.

Deputy Secretary Carlucci: There is a decision pending before the President on national security considerations in technology transfer. This item should be factored in.

Secretary Weinberger: Senator Percy talked to me on the plane from Egypt about this issue. He is pushing for 200 more caterpillar pipelayers to go to the Soviet Union.

The pipeline brings enormous amounts of hard cash to the Soviet Union, which they use to strengthen themselves militarily.

Mr. Allen: Our next meetings, later this week, will focus on the Central America/Cuba issue and on the East-West paper.

Deputy Secretary Carlucci: The East-West discussion should include the technological transfer issue. Right?

[There was general agreement among participants.]

\[7\] Brackets are again the original.
93. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan

Moscow, October 15, 1981

Dear Mr. President,

Your letter of September 22 contains thoughts which, as you write, touch upon the future of the relations between our two countries. I studied them carefully.

I noted, of course, the statements in your message regarding your readiness to maintain a constructive and stable relationship with the Soviet Union, adherence to the dialogue with it, and interest in peaceful resolution of problems causing the international tensions. Those intentions can only be welcomed. We are fully in favor of proceeding along such a path and, on our part, have been constantly calling upon the United States to act in exactly the same way.

We are convinced that a positive development of relations between the USSR and the USA meets the interests not only of the Soviet and American peoples; leveling off these relations, bringing them back on the road of businesslike cooperation would facilitate lessening the dangerous level of tension in the world and would give a real hope for resolution of many acute international problems.

At the same time, to be frank, it is regrettable that a new attempt is made in your letter to present the matter in such a way, as if the obstacle in the way of improving Soviet-American relations and reducing the general international tensions is the policy of the Soviet Union. In the correspondence between us I already dealt in detail on the absence of any basis for posing the question in such a way. And the fact that this thesis is again present in your message does not make it any more convincing.

Nor any useful purpose is served either by the tendency discernable in your message which suggests in one way or another a linkage between the prospect of development in our relations with some sort

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8106115). Secret. A typewritten note at the top reads: “Unofficial translation.” In a covering memorandum to Reagan, October 16, Haig wrote: “Ambassador Dobrynin delivered the attached letter from Leonid Brezhnev to me tonight. The letter is in response to your letter to him of 22 September. We are studying the letter now and will have a considered analysis of it for you.” Allen forwarded both Haig’s memorandum and Brezhnev’s letter under a separate covering memorandum to Reagan, October 17, who wrote in the margin: “Do you suppose he really believes all that crud—or did he even write it? RR.”

2 See the attachment to Document 85.
of modifications in the Soviet Union’s “behavior”. To proceed on this premise is to steer clearly the whole matter toward a deadlock.

We, Mr. President, just as many other countries, really have serious and legitimate objections to raise with the United States and its policy. However, we are against replacing the consideration of acute and outstanding issues with mutual recriminations over the behavior of any party on the international scene.

You are speaking in favor of taking mutually into account each other’s interests. We are in favor of that, too. But no double standard here should be allowed, whereby one side perceives its interests everywhere and in everything, but any legitimate step on the part of the other side is immediately portrayed as encroachment on those interests, as a desire to get unilateral advantages. Abandonment by the United States of such a double standard will in fact demonstrate readiness to heed the interests of the other side and will be a good contribution to the cause of stabilization of the world situation.

And, of course, each side possesses a sovereign right to have appropriate relations with its allies and friends, and to render them necessary assistance. Let me make a point, if we are to speak of our friends, they threaten nobody. Some people do not wish, however, to leave them alone, but left alone they must be.

Here is an example—the campaign against Cuba—a campaign that is constantly being whipped up. Why, for what purposes, is this being done? One cannot be serious in saying that Cuba can allegedly threaten the vital interests of the United States. We call upon the United States not to aggravate the situation around that country but to embark on the path of establishing normal relations with Cuba.

If the US side is really prepared, as you, Mr. President, write, to seek solutions to international problems through negotiations, there exist all possibilities to start doing that.

Take, for instance, that same question about a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. As is known, the DRA Government has been consistently seeking such a settlement, in whose context the question of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan would also be resolved.

Recently the Afghan leadership came forth with new proposals on a political settlement. We support those proposals and regard them as a good basis for reaching appropriate agreements without any prejudice to the security and prestige of any country. Think about it.

Likewise, why should not the United States take, at last, an unbiased look at what is going on in Kampuchea? Is it really that the American interests are infringed there? How is it possible in pursuance of some expedient calculations to try to play with the destiny of a
nation, which has, as it is, suffered a terrible tragedy. It cannot be permitted that the leftovers of the Pol Pot regime could again stage a bloodbath for the Kampuchean people.

And there is still another question—the one concerning the situation around Egypt. Here too, there should be no outside interference. Nobody has any right to tell the Egyptians how they must solve their problems. The pressure, which is being brought to bear on that country and, in so doing, on the adjacent countries, must be stopped.

As we have already stated to the US Government, the developments around Egypt affect the security interests of the Soviet Union. Indeed, there is approximately the same distance from the USSR border to Egypt, as from Boston to Chicago.

In your message you, Mr. President, mentioned as one of the factors poisoning the political atmosphere “the campaign of anti-Americanism”, which is allegedly waged by the Soviet Union. However, if anybody has the grounds to bring a charge on account of the raging hostile propaganda, it has to be us, the Soviet side. After all, not a day passes in the USA without ever new fabrications about the Soviet Union and its policy being launched. What is more, the most active part in this unseemly exercise is taken by many representatives of the administration.

For instance, what about the incessant campaign about the so-called “Soviet military threat”. All sorts of fantastic fables have been told in this regard on our account.

And why did you, personally, Mr. President, recently need to state publicly that the Soviet Union bases its policy on the calculation to score a victory in the nuclear war? Are you not aware of my repeated and clear statements—may be somebody intentionally conceals them from you—that the nuclear war, should it be unleashed, would turn out to be a catastrophe for the mankind?

I stated on more than one occasion, for all to hear, that the Soviet Union is against any nuclear strike, be it the first or not the first, massive or limited. We are for totally precluding the possibility of using nuclear weapons. This is, indeed, the thrust of our proposals set forth at the current UN General Assembly session. This is our firm and consistent position. It is in this spirit that we are striving to educate also the entire Soviet people.

Presumably a reference to Reagan’s news conference of October 1, 1981, in which the President stated: “It’s very difficult for me to think that there’s a winnable nuclear war, but where our great risk falls is that the Soviet Union has made it very plain that among themselves they believe it is winnable.” See Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, p. 871.
We are not the ones who entertain thoughts about winning a nuclear duel. We believe such calculations to be an insanity.

Of course, we unmasked and will continue to unmask the calumny against our country and our policy. As far as we are concerned, we are against the use of unpermitted methods in conducting the polemics. We are in favor of a quiet, businesslike and, if you will, respectful dialogue.

Your message quite correctly points out what danger for mankind is presented by the already existing nuclear weapons stockpiles as well as the need for serious efforts to reduce the armaments. However, it is difficult to match these thoughts with the program of a steep increase in the US strategic forces that you have recently announced. After all, this program in no way leads in the direction of the restraint, which you seem to be advocating. No reasonable grounds for the adoption of such a program exist.

The implementation of this program will mean placing the arms race into a new spiral with all its consequences.

The Soviet Union never sought a military supremacy. But we simply cannot permit the disruption of the military-strategic parity.

Mr. President, a meeting between our ministers has recently taken place in New York. In a certain sense its results are positive. I have in mind the agreement reached to hold negotiations on limiting nuclear arms in Europe. It is, of course, only the first step, and serious mutual work is yet to be done in search of solutions that would equally meet the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States and be consistent with the principle of equality and equal security. We are prepared to engage in such a search and would like to hope that the US side too will approach the negotiations in a businesslike manner.

The most important question concerning the continuation of strategic arms limitation negotiations remains open. Regrettably, neither your letter, Mr. President, nor what was said by the Secretary of State A. Haig, introduce, so far, clarity in the US position in that respect.

These are the thoughts which I wanted to set forth in connection with your letter. Let us hope that the exchanges between us will serve the cause of establishing a better understanding on the key issues of Soviet-American relations.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

Printed from a copy bearing this typed signature.
94. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, October 16, 1981, 2–3 p.m.

SUBJECT
East-West Trade Controls

PARTICIPANTS

State
Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Deputy Secretary William P. Clark

JCS
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward
Lt General Paul F. Gorman

Treasury
Secretary Donald T. Regan

White House
Mr. Edwin Meese III
Mr. James A. Baker III
Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Mr. Richard V. Allen
Adm James W. Nance
Ms. Janet Colson

OSD
Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

NSC
Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

Commerce
Under Secretary Lionel H. Olmer
Assistant Secretary Lawrence Brady

Mr. James A. Baker III

NSC
Dr. Allen J. Lenz, Notetaker
Mr. Richard Pipes

CIA
Mr. William J. Casey

USUN
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

USTR
Mr. Donald Dekeiffer

MINUTES

Meese: Even though everyone is not here, I believe we can accomplish some work before the President arrives: It seems to me the issues we have to discuss today can be divided into three questions. First, Do we want to impede the construction of the Siberian Pipeline? We haven’t really examined this.

Carlucci: I believe we have decided to impede it.

Clark: Yes.

Meese: A second question is to what extent can we obtain the cooperation of other countries, or impede their participation in the project, and what would the effects be of our actions? Third, what is

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting File: Records, 1981–88 NSC 00023 16 Oct 81 (2/3). Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. All blank underscores and without text are omissions in the original.
the balance of the effects of our action on our domestic employment versus our national security?

Meese: Foreign policy and national security are the same only in State (laughter).

Enter the President and Mr. Allen

Meese: Mr. President, we had got started on this matter by posing three questions:

- The first is whether we want to impede the construction of the Siberian Pipeline. The consensus answer to that question seems to be yes.
- The second question is to what extent can we get others—our Allies—to agree?
- To what extent do domestic considerations weigh in determining our decision?

Casey: I wonder if we could go back a bit? We have a new comprehensive analysis of what the Soviets buy from the West in technology and the effects of these purchases. It is staggering—the things they could not do without Western assistance (technology).

Mr. Allen: Is this a new study?

Casey: Yes. The Soviets go about the acquisition of Western technology in a very organized manner. They lay out what they need and identify where to go to get it. As a result of an increased understanding of the effects of Soviet acquisitions, I see a trend to substantial broadening of COCOM rules and revised methods of control to reduce their technology acquisitions. I believe these new findings will isolate and highlight the technology transfer question as never before.

Carlucci: We want to force the Soviets into a diversified investment strategy—to force hard choices on them. However, selling technology to them saves them investment funds and makes their choices easier.

Casey: This new information shows the value of what they are getting is greater than we had ever conceived.

The President: It seems to me this gets down to showing that if the free world had not helped them and had let their system deteriorate, we wouldn’t have the problems we have today. But we (the U.S.) can’t do it alone. The question is have we worked in good faith with our Allies to get their cooperation? And, if we don’t get their cooperation, at what point do we (by unilateral embargo actions) simply cut off our nose to spite our face and add to our own (economic) problems by not

2 See Document 98.
selling—by depriving ourselves without depriving them (the Soviets) as was the case with grain. Can we make alone a decision to hold them back?

Casey: On some things we can—on some we can’t. Non-agricultural exports are a small portion of our trade with the Soviets. I believe this new study will promote a new Allied attitude. It has not been previously recognized how important this issue is. It has never before been looked at in its totality.

Mr. Allen: Bill is also talking about the acquisition of technology by means other than purchases, such as theft.

The President: I know that. Also, what they get by buying one—tearing it apart—and learning how to do it.

Mr. Allen: It’s called reverse engineering. Bill, what are you going to do with this new information? Are you going to make it available?

Casey: Yes.

Mr. Allen: We have some important decisions to make. Would this new information have an impact on the issue of oil and gas technology?

Casey: This is a broad decision. The Soviet economy is in trouble. The question is do we want to make it harder for them?

Haig: (who had arrived after the discussion began) I am confused. Are we talking about today’s agenda?

Mr. Allen: Bill has indicated that he has a new study examining the totality of technology transfer to the Soviet Union. He feels it looks as if the French are prepared to tighten COCOM and to take steps to decrease sales of technology to the Soviets.

Haig: Mr. President, I believe we need to remember that we had a decision to broaden COCOM from purely military applications, to cover military-industrial items. We hope for a high-level COCOM meeting in November to raise this issue. I hope we understand that we do have an agenda for dealing with this technology transfer matter.

Meese: ????

Haig: Why don’t we put this new information into the bureaucracy and see what happens?

Mr. Allen: Yes, that’s what we should do. Now, we have to deal with the oil/gas policy issue. It is urgent because we have a backlog of licenses to deal with and because our policy on this matter will affect our position on the Siberian Pipeline. We need a decision on our U.S. exports that would contribute to the construction of the pipeline.

Meese: We have arrived at four options. Would the Department of Commerce state its position on this matter?
Olmer: Secretary Baldrige, with whom I have discussed this matter today, says we continue to support Option IV. This option would allow us to sell oil and gas equipment items on which there are not national security controls. This policy is desirable because the majority of oil and gas equipment not covered by national security controls is available from other sources and unilateral U.S. controls would achieve little.

Mr. Allen: What about turbine components? We have new information from the CIA that restricting some few items would cause a pipeline delay of 18–28 months. Is this correct?

Casey: Yes. GE says if a license is not granted for shipment of U.S. components, it would take about two years for European competitors to get started producing them. How much this would delay the pipeline itself is not quite so clear, but it would delay it.

Mr. Allen: Under Secretary Olmer, how would that coincide with your position on Option III?

Olmer: There is disagreement on how long it would take the Soviets to make up the technology shortages that would result from U.S. controls. In an analysis prepared for recent testimony, we found that with very few exceptions, we do not have a U.S. monopoly. For example, GE compressors could be gotten elsewhere. Our Allies are generally unwilling to go along with restrictions. Thus, we are caught in a position of telling our companies they cannot get licenses, because our policy is to impede Soviet production, but not licensing won’t impede them (the Soviets) because of availability from other sources. Our sources say that 18–20 months will not be required to come up with alternatives.

Casey: I agree we don’t have a unique capability. It’s a matter of time needed to catch up. But the compressors the Soviets would get from other sources would be less efficient than those built by GE.

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3 In an October 15 memorandum to Reagan, Allen discussed the upcoming NSC meeting. He also forwarded an undated paper which outlined the four options. Option IV reads: “The U.S. is most concerned about major Soviet projects which contribute to Soviet production capability and our Allies’ vulnerability to Soviet energy leverage (e.g., West Siberian Pipeline). The U.S. will make a major effort with other countries to restrict exports of equipment and technology for such projects. Until this is worked out the U.S. will deny all technology and end-use equipment exports for major projects while approving end use equipment exports not for major projects.”

4 According to the statement of pros and cons attached to Allen’s October 15 memorandum (see footnote 3), Option III stated: “The U.S. is most concerned about major Soviet projects which contribute to Soviet production capability and our Allies’ vulnerability to Soviet energy leverage (e.g., West Siberian Pipeline). The U.S. will make a major effort with other countries to restrict exports of equipment and technology for such projects. Until this is worked out the U.S. will deny all technology and end-use equipment exports for major projects while approving end use equipment exports not for major projects.”
Haig: Aren’t we getting wrapped around the axle on one facet of the problem? We have had an options paper since August. We have no decision as yet. Now, we have a basic oil/gas decision to make—not a pipeline decision to make.

Mr. President, your earlier remarks were, I thought, on the mark. The question is whether we have the luxury of denying the Soviet Union essential equipment. Then we can get to the question of the pipeline.

Meese: I think we should hear the agency positions.

Mr. Allen: It seems to me that the agencies have spoken and that their positions have not changed.

Haig: No, let’s discuss the four options and keep the pipeline out of it.

Meese: No. We need specifics to make it concrete. It’s silly to discuss the issue without it (reference to the pipeline). Under Secretary Olmer has indicated Commerce’s position. We should discuss what position others take. The key question is “what can we get our Allies to do?”

Haig: We should discuss our basic policy on oil/gas controls.

Olmer: I think it should be emphasized that some parts of exports for the pipeline are already covered by national security controls. Much is not, but some items are controlled for national security reasons.

Mr. Allen: The rest is under foreign policy controls. Mr. President, the options have not changed. They are stated in succinct form in the materials provided. Those recommending Option I include: Weinberger, Casey, Kirkpatrick and General Jones.

Essentially the same group also recommends Option II.\(^5\) Energy recommends Option III, while Option IV is recommended by Secretaries Haig, Regan and Baldrige, Under Secretary Davis (Energy), Mr. Stockman and Ambassador Brock. Simply stated, Option IV is:

Rather than attempting to impede oil and gas production and exports, our goal will be to deny exports of technology that allow the Soviets to replicate advanced Western equipment; this technology would give them an independent capability to improve oil and gas output and infrastructure. The U.S. will approve exports of end use equipment.

\(^{5}\) According to the statement of pros and cons attached to Allen’s October 15 memorandum (see footnote 3), Option II reads: “The U.S. will attempt to impede Soviet oil and gas production and export projects. Recognizing that our Allies and friends may not follow suit without unacceptably high political costs, we will use less leverage than in Option I. We would consider, after consultations with our Allies, adopting a multilateral approach less restrictive than implied in Option I. Until this is worked out, the U.S. will deny export licenses for technology and equipment.”
Mr. Allen (cont’d): Some of the end use equipment would be directly affected by your decision—Caterpillar pipelayers, rotors, shafts, etc. All of this has implications for East-West relations and East-West trade, but requires a decision as to what our basic position should be.

Haig: Mr. President, Option IV is restricting the transfer of technology, while dealing with equipment on a case-by-case basis to see if it does violence to our position.

Option IV is preferable because, if we unilaterally deny oil and gas equipment, we will not restrict availability to the Soviets. It will be impossible to convince our Allies to join us in such restrictions. Cap has talked with the Brits. They suggested in no way would they go along with us.

Mr. Allen: This proposal involves giving our Allies some running room. It is the same policy followed by Carter.

Haig: We are talking about holding technology back, while selling them equipment on a case-by-case basis.

Mr. Allen: It would allow shipments of equipment and continued leakage.

Carlucci: Are we discussing the subject in the context of foreign policy or that of national security? No one prefers a unilateral embargo. Options I and II would place security controls on oil and gas equipment and technology. Options III and IV would be foreign policy controls. The question is what degree of diplomacy and example we use with our Allies. We don’t know what they will do until we set an example. We must send our Allies a steady signal. They are confused by our actions, such as our ending of the grain embargo. We seem to make decisions on commercial grounds.

Haig: Yes.

Carlucci: But if we don’t try, we open up the floodgates.

Haig: No! We say tighten up on technology transfer! We are proposing important modifications—new controls—to our Allies.

Mr. Allen: No! Option IV is precisely what Carter did.

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6 According to the statement of pros and cons attached to Allen’s October 15 memorandum (see footnote 3), Option I reads: “The U.S. will actively impede Soviet oil and gas production and export projects. The U.S. will impose national security controls on, and deny export licenses for, all oil and gas equipment and technology. We will use our available leverage to pressure our Allies and friends to adopt similarly restrictive measures.”
"Haig: Look! There is a profound difference between what Carter did as a knee-jerk reaction and what we do in encouraging our Allies to tighten COCOM controls.

To deal with our Allies in a credible way, we have to have a credible position. Options I and II are unilateral control actions, while trying to get Allied support. We won’t get it!

"Haig (cont’d): The President must be concerned about our credibility. Option IV says increased controls on technology transfer. Let’s sit down and do it. On end items we decide case by case. The President and the bureaucracy are capable of doing it.

"Casey: There are risks in the process.

"Haig: Option I is not credible.

"Carlucci: Under Options I or II, the U.S. will actively impede and use pressure. The actions would not be unilateral.

"Haig: Would we permit the sale of oil and gas items during the period we are pressuring our Allies?

"Carlucci: No, we would not. After a fair period of trial, we may need to regroup and change our position (if Allies do not follow us).

"Meese: The President does not decide export controls on a case-by-case basis. We need clear guidelines for the bureaucracy.

"Mr. Allen: Allowing items opens a pretty wide track. Items for the pipeline would not go on I or II. They would go on under III or IV.

"Carlucci: Under Option I or II we control on the basis of national security concerns.

"Meese: Would not it be useful to go around the room for an expression of views, and then to ask questions?

"Mr. Allen: I believe everyone has already spoken.

"Regan: I am confused between Option III and IV. I thought I understood it, but I am not sure now that I do. We need clear guidance for our customs people.

"Mr. Allen: Under a strict interpretation of IV, the U.S. will approve exports of equipment. The pipelayers would go. (To Under Secretary Olmer) Without a license?

"Olmer: No, they would be licensed.

"Meese: If we sent 200 in July, it’s hard to say they can’t have them in September.

"Olmer: No matter which options, I through IV, at least four areas of oil/gas equipment will be controlled—regardless of what decision today. For example, computer controls, rig design, crew training and

"Mr. Allen: So these items would be controlled?
Olmer: Several thousand high technology items would be controlled under any option.

Casey: In 1979, the Soviets got 1000 items that aided in their research and development.

Mr. Allen: There are several locksteps involved in this decision. The oil/gas decision relates to East-West trade. East-West trade in turn relates to East-West relations, which relates to our long-range Soviet policy. Walking up the steps, making these decisions, gets more difficult as you get higher up on the steps.

Carlucci: Unless we select I or II, we make the pipeline decision already made more difficult to sell to our Allies. We would be willing to go from I to II, but let’s not capitulate too soon.

Kirkpatrick: We don’t want to help the Soviets develop their oil and gas production. There are long waiting lists for oil and gas equipment. The waits are years long. Putting them off won’t cost us sales.

The President: Do you mean if Caterpillar does not sell to the Soviets, then they can sell elsewhere?

Kirkpatrick: Yes, in South America and elsewhere.

Haig: Why is International Harvester going broke then?

The President: Do you mean that Caterpillar can sell 200 pipelayers in South America? Then why is Caterpillar pressing so hard on this transaction?

Kirkpatrick: The fact that Chrysler is going broke does not mean there is no market for them in the U.S.

——— : Would the Japanese cooperate in not selling pipelayers to the Soviets?

The President: At Ottawa, Suzuki said he would look into it.

Haig: The Japanese Foreign Minister later said no (they would not withhold sales). They were very clear on it.

Harper: On oil rigs, there is a long waiting line, but on the high technology we want to protect, we need a definition of the technology issues vis-a-vis policy.

Mr. Allen: Mr. President, we need a statement of options satisfactory to you. I gather that you feel reluctant to sign off on this issue from this options paper—that it is not yet crisp enough.

Possibly there is a problem in that we don’t have an overall Soviet policy. But that wouldn’t address the problem of licenses and the problem of COCOM negotiations, and the fact that licensing pipelayers before the COCOM meeting would complicate negotiations.

Olmer: It is important to have a clear statement of policy before the COCOM meeting. Even though our oil/gas decision is not a matter to be treated directly there. The Caterpillar pipelayers will be seen as a sign of our intentions.
**Haig:** There is an important point to be made. We are seeking a broadening of the controls in COCOM to include not just military use technology, but military-industrial equipment. If we now adopt a brittle attitude on oil and gas, it will not be consistent with our COCOM instructions. Option IV would be consistent with our COCOM negotiating position.

I hope that, in the future, no summary of the options will be prepared to go to the President.

We are smoking opium if we think we can get Allied agreement on Option I. We will begin with Option II.

Option III has terrible practical applications. Secretary Regan could not administer it. His customs people would not be able to do it.

We should look at the four options on an interdepartmental basis. The whole matter should go back to the drawing board.

**Mr. Allen:** This (options paper) is the same paper that went through the process earlier. It has not been changed.

**The President:** I’m the most confused person of anyone. Is it possible to have an options paper that says “here’s what we’ll stop selling—here’s where they will get it then—here’s what they can’t get elsewhere?”

I’d like to know the effect on our economy and the effect on them. I’d like to know the effect on our businesses—those that wouldn’t be able to make it (because of our restrictions)—not down to those who make shoelaces, of course.

But I would like to look and see what it would do to the Soviet Union. Is it worth it to make an economic sacrifice? It is difficult to make a decision without knowing this.

**Haig:** We all want to tighten up—to give them the minimum we can. But the doctrinaires here want to cut it off (totally) and to tell our Allies to do the same. But they will tell us to go to hell.

The Option is IV. Under that we tighten our technology—go case by case on equipment. Perhaps we can tighten up on the individual cases. But let’s not stick our head in the pencil sharpener. Let’s have a realistic policy!

**Mr. Allen:** We are trying to reconstruct COCOM. To construct a realistic policy for the 80’s. But what is realism for the 80’s. Your concern is to get along with our Allies.

**Haig:** That’s your interpretation of my policy. I want a policy that is credible and effective.

**Meese:** We must finish. We are keeping a number of people waiting to use this room. Mr. President, your suggestion was to flesh out the options with some examples.
The President: Let me give two more examples concerning the confusion on this issue. First, my understanding is that the technology that slipped through Commerce on ball bearings allowed them (the Soviets) to MIRV their missiles earlier than they otherwise would have been able to do so. We should have been able to prevent that.

Second, the grain embargo. We saw a breakdown (in the embargo) elsewhere. They (the Soviets) were getting it without our help, while our agriculture here was in a tailspin.

We have to look at those two considerations. Even though it helps them, does it help us as much or more than it helps them? If it is spelled out that way, it will help to make the decision. What is it we can cut off from them that they can’t get elsewhere?

Moose: We need to talk about this again as soon as possible—at the next NSC meeting.

The President: Can we repossess the KAMA River truck plant from them?

Mr. Allen: Mr. President, Larry Brady here is the person who is responsible for that.

End of formal meeting, followed by post-meeting exchange between Secretary Haig and Mr. Allen on the insertion of “staff bias” into options papers.

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95. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, October 16, 1981

SUMMARY DEBRIEFING OF THE SECRETARY’S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

Ambassador Dobrynin delivered to the Secretary the attached letter to the President from President Brezhnev. He said that the letter made

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, Box 56, October 16, 1981. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bremer. An unknown hand circled the date and wrote next to it: “Day & Gromyko meet file.”

2 Not found attached; printed as Document 93.
the point that the Soviets felt the Haig/Gromyko talks in New York had been useful. Actually Dobrynin said Gromyko was personally more positive in his assessment of the talks than the letter was.

Afghanistan: Secretary Haig asked Dobrynin why it was that the Japanese had gotten a different picture of the Soviet position on Afghanistan than he had gotten from Gromyko. Haig said this was especially true in the use of the term self-determination. Gromyko had told Haig that what was happening in Afghanistan was essentially irreversible whereas in talking to the Japanese Gromyko told the Japanese that self-determination could happen. Haig asked which was the Soviet position. Dobrynin responded that the position was as described by the Japanese, that self-determination could happen. He explained that Gromyko had felt Haig used the term in the context of negotiations over Afghanistan whereas in his talks with the Japanese the term was used in the context of guarantees and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. After that withdrawal, self-determination was possible.

Dobrynin said that Gromyko had gotten the impression that Haig referred to the possibility of expert level talks on Afghanistan. Haig said this was incorrect. What he said was that he would have our experts look at Afghanistan and then perhaps later we could talk some more about it. In any case Haig told him we would be prepared to discuss Afghanistan further in February.

Haig then asked Dobrynin if he had any comments on the Angola issue (the chicken and egg and omelet issue as Dobrynin said). Dobrynin asked how we intended to handle Savimbi whom we were supporting. The Secretary said we were not supporting Savimbi. His support came from other sources. Dobrynin asked how in any case we intended to handle him and the Secretary replied he thought we would just let the Afghans [Angolans] decide that. Dobrynin then asked if it was true that there was talk of having an outside guarantee force as part of the settlement and Haig said there had perhaps been talk in the OAU about that. Dobrynin asked why the U.S. was so fixated with the Cubans in Angola and Haig replied it was the only way in which there would be independence for Namibia. Dobrynin wondered what we had in mind about simultaneous withdrawal—would one date be set for one side to withdraw and another date for the other side to withdraw? Haig stated that this was not accurate. The withdrawals would have to be concluded at the same time. Dobrynin wondered how this would be achieved. The Secretary said that we would complete our talks with the South Africans at which time we would get a date certain from them on Namibia and then we would use another framework to get the same date in respect to Angola. Dobrynin thought this might be possible.

Dobrynin stated that the Soviets also would like to have a settlement in the Persian Gulf area, perhaps in the context of an Afghan
settlement. The Soviets might give some guarantees to some of the countries the U.S. is interested in in the area.

Dobrynin stated that Brezhnev was concerned by the belief of President Reagan that the Soviets think the Soviets could win a nuclear war. This led Brezhnev to think that perhaps Reagan thought he could win a nuclear war and it worried the Soviet leadership. Turning to SALT Dobrynin encouraged an early move on one or more narrower aspects of SALT to get momentum back to the arms control talks. (He did not mention any specific aspect of SALT.) The Ambassador stated the U.S. arms buildup and recent strategic decisions were matters of great concern to the Soviet leadership.

Dobrynin thought it would be useful to examine some specific areas where progress might be made. He thought that he and the Secretary later in the fall might begin to talk about the agenda for the next round of talks between the Secretary and Gromyko. He said if he had some ideas he would bring them to the Secretary. The Secretary said he thought this was a good idea and we would do the same.

In conclusion Dobrynin asked how we had handled the records of the Haig/Gromyko meeting. Haig told Dobrynin that we had done nothing with them and that they had been very closely held. Dobrynin said this was good and it was also what they had done, but pointed out that the Politburo had read the memcons carefully.

96. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, October 21, 1981, 1603Z

14798. Subject: Initial Call on Gromyko.
1. (C—Entire text)
2. Gromyko received the Ambassador at 10:30 October 21 for his initial, courtesy call. Gromyko was accompanied by USA Department Chief Komplektov and Viktor Sukhodrev, who interpreted. The Ambassador was accompanied by the DCM and Pol Counselor. As customary and requested, the Ambassador gave Gromyko a copy of the statement he will make when he presents his credentials (text

Gromyko said that this would take place without delay and in the next few days.

3. Gromyko asked if there was anything the Ambassador wished to say and the Ambassador replied that the statement which he had just handed over contained the principles which he would follow in carrying out his mission. He had had long talks before leaving Washington. He thought the talks which the Secretary and Gromyko had in New York were a useful beginning. The two sides had exchanged more-or-less well known views. He hoped we could go forward from this, that we could proceed to discuss specific issues and make some progress toward positive solutions to them. The Secretary was looking forward to his next meeting with Gromyko early in the New Year.

4. The Ambassador said he knew from listening to Radio Moscow that there are some doubts on the Soviet side about the willingness of the Reagan administration to negotiate seriously on arms control and a large number of other issues. He could assure Gromyko that we are serious and that he will find us prepared in the coming negotiations, and at the next ministerial meeting, to discuss arms control, including strategic arms control. The careful preparations which the U.S. side was making were necessary in our system; Gromyko was a long time observer of the U.S. and he knew this. If we did not reach agreement among the various groups which are interested and involved in arms control matters, we would not be able to reach a good agreement in negotiations. The Soviet side should welcome our careful preparations, because when we reach agreement it will be one on which we can stand.

5. The Ambassador recalled that he had participated in the SALT process and, speaking personally, he thought that the disappointing results had come from waiting too long and having missed times when we could have reached an agreement earlier. Perhaps the sides had set their sights too high. If we had moved earlier, an agreement would probably be in effect today. He looked forward to discussing arms control issues with Gromyko and also the other issues which had been raised by the Secretary in his meetings with the Minister. He hoped that we could arrive at a better idea of how we see those issues, and reach solutions for them.

6. Gromyko said his attention was drawn to what the Ambassador had said about the American side being prepared for the meeting early next year. It would be good if the American side was ready, because up to now it had not been prepared to touch upon the substance of matters. This was apparent, and the Secretary had said so directly in their meeting. If the U.S. side will be prepared on substance, the Soviet side will be prepared, and that would be a small step in the right direction.

7. Gromyko said he would also not question what the Ambassador had said to the effect that it could have been possible, if both sides
had desired it, to have prepared the SALT agreement earlier. For its part, the Soviet side had done everything required of it to cope with the tasks set before both sides in reaching agreement on SALT II. But this was past and he would like to hope that both sides would take that experience into account. Time does not stand still. Talks should not be dragged out, but should come to agreement. Practical conclusions should be drawn from past experience and concrete agreements should be reached in the future.

8. Gromyko said he believed the Ambassador shared his view that Moscow, like Washington, is a place where there is no lack of work for Ambassadors from major powers. This had always been the case and would be so in the future. He welcomed the Ambassador as an experienced diplomat who would find no lack of work in Moscow. This had always applied equally for Soviet Ambassadors in Washington, and every one of them felt he had quite enough work and a large field of it. He wished the Ambassador every success in fulfilling his very responsible duties in developing relations. He could always count on the cooperation of the MFA, and other agencies and departments of the Soviet Government. He would not be fettered by protocol or any other limitation—not overly fettered, he should say. The door would always be open at the Foreign Ministry.

9. Gromyko (after Komplektov whispered in his ear) said he would take the opportunity to call attention to the reply Brezhnev had given to a question (on limited nuclear war) asked him by a Pravda correspondent, which was published in that day’s issue of Pravda. The Soviet side would like to hope that Washington will approach with all seriousness the reply Brezhnev gave. Gromyko did not wish to dwell upon this but he called attention to it.

10. The Ambassador handed Gromyko the relevant text of the President’s remarks to the out-of-town editors on October 16,2 and said he hoped that after reading it Gromyko would agree that the President had not drawn the conclusions on nuclear war which Pravda attributed to him. As the President said, we do not believe that nuclear war is winnable and we strongly oppose it, the Ambassador said. He looked forward to discussing nuclear arms control with Gromyko in the future. He hoped that, while awaiting discussion on strategic arms control, we could proceed to discuss other issues which the Secretary had raised in his meeting with the Minister. Komplektov asked if the text of the President’s remarks which the Ambassador had handed over was a clarification of what the President had said on the 16th, and when the

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Ambassador replied that it was the verbatim text of those remarks. Gromyko said he understood, that the text which the Ambassador had given him was from the President’s meeting with the “provincial press” (the original source).

11. Gromyko said he well recalled his conversations with the Secretary. They were, of course, very useful, he agreed, but the substance of matters was only ahead; those conversations were only the beginning.

12. The Ambassador said Brezhnev’s letter to the President was appreciated for its expression of willingness to continue the dialogue. Rising to end the conversation, Gromyko replied that “we are in favor of that.”

13. The conversation lasted 30 minutes.

14. Following is text of the Ambassador’s credentials statement, a copy of which was handed to Gromyko. Begin text.

I have the honor to present Your Excellency the letter of credence by which the President of the United States accredits me as Ambassador of the United States of America to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Together with this I present the letter of recall of my predecessor, Ambassador Thomas J. Watson, Jr. It is both a professional and a personal honor for me to present my credentials as the 17th Ambassador of the United States of America to the Soviet Union. I come directly from service in a country with whose government our ties span over two centuries to a country with whose government we have had official contact for less than half a century. Yet nobody can doubt that the bilateral relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union is—and will remain for as far ahead as we can see—of fundamental importance to the peoples of our two countries and to the prospects of peace in the world.

The American and the Soviet people have much in common. Inhabiting a continental land mass, we share a frontier spirit and a sense of pioneering. We are hospitable peoples. We have never fought each other; indeed, we fought side by side in a great World War.

Nevertheless, our relationship has always been fraught with complexity and competition, and often with confrontation and hostility. We are divided, perhaps irrevocably, by political systems which differ in basic and immutable aspects. And we are divided—I hope not irrevocably—by attitudes and actions which may arise from those basic differences in our systems. Such divisions are particularly dangerous because they threaten global stability and peace.

My government is fully committed to reducing those divisions. We are opposed to sterile confrontations, to an arms race, to the absence of dialogue between our governments. We will work for a constructive East-West relationship, for genuine arms control, and for the resolution
of disputes by negotiation. But those objectives can be reached only if each of us acts with restraint and in a spirit of reciprocity. We Americans will do so. And we urge the Soviet Union as well to review, in the light of these two factors, its policies and actions in the world.

In these circumstances, your government will find us, Mr. Chairman, ready to respect your status and your legitimate interests. You will find us ready to conduct a serious dialogue on a wide range of important problems. The agreement of Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko to meet early next year is, for our part, an expression of that readiness.

We are prepared to undertake with you a searching examination of ways to resolve the major issues dividing us. We have specific approaches to these issues—approaches which meet the legitimate interests of all parties. Let me list some of them:

—We will enter the talks on theater nuclear forces next month in a positive and constructive spirit.
—We are ready to begin SALT negotiations during the first half of next year. We will approach them with good will and with the conviction that they must be characterized by reciprocity.
—We have no wish for an expensive and dangerous arms escalation, but—in view of a major and unprovoked Soviet program to build up its military forces—we have no choice but to respond.
—When the Madrid meeting resumes next week, we will maintain our commitment to a conference to consider significant and verifiable confidence-building measures. And we remain convinced that progress in the military field must be balanced by progress on human rights.
—We strongly believe that we both have a responsibility to refrain from seeking unilateral advantages and from supporting—either directly or indirectly—the use of force, subversion, or terrorism. Our obligation, rather, is to work for moderate, lawful, and peaceful solutions in all areas of the world, and to leave sovereign peoples free to determine their own future.
—We believe the Soviet Union has a responsibility to deny support to Cuba for its efforts directed against sovereign governments in Africa and Latin America.
—On Kampuchea we urge the Soviet Union to persuade Vietnam to join an international conference aimed at a political solution.
—In Southern Africa, we believe that our two countries should have common objectives: an independent Namibia and an Angola free of outside involvement or threat.
—And in Afghanistan, we should set as common goals: an Afghanistan which is non-aligned, secure, and free of outside interference, and whose people are free to chart their own course.
This is a difficult agenda, but we are convinced that it must be addressed in a serious manner by both our governments. For our part, that is how we will address it, because we are vitally interested in the peaceful resolution of international tensions and in building a stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. If I did not personally share that vital interest, I would not have participated in earlier high-level meetings between our two governments, and I would not be standing here today. As President Reagan’s representative to your government, I pledge myself to the task of advancing our dialogue with you—a dialogue which is indispensable to progress in our bilateral relations and to enhancement of the prospects for peace. End text.

Hartman

97. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 27, 1981, 3:15–4:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Chatham House Group
Under Secretary Rashish
Deputy Assistant Secretary Niles
M.S. Pendleton, Acting Director, EUR/NE, notetaker

The Secretary met with a group of British businessmen visiting the United States under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) to review US foreign policy.

The Secretary opened by saying he had spent the day on AWACS, an issue about which he remained fundamentally optimistic. He suggested that with the Chatham House Group he might usefully consider issues such as US nuclear policy, East-West relations, Africa and the Middle East. The Secretary observed that the US does have a foreign policy, one that is clear to all in the Administration. This policy is built on four pillars, the first of which is to establish better relations with the Soviet Union based on reciprocity and restraint on Moscow’s part.

1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Haig and Shultz Memcons, Lot 87D327, SEC/Memcons, October 1981. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Pendleton on October 28; cleared by Niles, Goldberg, and McManaway. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Conference Room at the Department of State.
US-Soviet Relations:

The Secretary said he had come away from more than nine and a half hours of meetings with Gromyko² with the broad impression that the Soviets know what we want and do not like it. They are concerned by the historically unique new attitude in America with regard to security issues, the consensus that the United States has to improve the military balance with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is dedicated to shattering the agreement between the American people, Congress and the Executive Branch. However, Moscow is not certain how to achieve this aim. Given its own economic situation, the Soviet Union fears further expenditures on armaments. Moreover, the Soviet policy is dedicated to the proposition that there are fissures between the US and Europe. Moscow is preoccupied with the nuclear genie and anxious to widen those fissures that have developed in the Atlantic Alliance. Its aim is to neutralize the Atlantic community at large.

However, the Soviet Union faces historic problems. These include a faltering economy, as well as the over-extension of its international activity in Africa and Afghanistan. The Soviets never anticipated the political and psychological reaction of the world to their invasion of Afghanistan. The evolution of events in Poland also must be seen as of fundamental significance, along with problems of succession. Brezhnev’s health is very much in decline.

The Secretary said that the above considerations must lead to a reassessment on our part. Above all we must avoid a fragmenting dialogue between the United States and Europe. He said that he was not concerned about US vigor. Yet the US must not sound like an empty barrel. While it is important that we speak with resolve, it is more important that we act with resolve. The Soviets are never impressed by words. They judge by our allocation of resources, and we have to be careful to assure that our rhetoric is not meaningless.

In response to the Secretary’s suggestion that the Group pose questions, Lord Harlech thanked the Secretary for seeing the Group and suggested that his colleagues’ questions concentrate on European-US relations and the Atlantic Alliance, as well as the Middle East, Africa and China if time permitted. With regard to US-European relations, Lord Harlech noted the degree to which Europeans like to be reassured by arms reductions. They prefer to feel that the United States is aiming at overall reductions in nuclear weapons. Harlech asked if there had been any hint from Gromyko that the Soviet Union was anxious to indulge in serious negotiations in this regard.

² See Documents 88–91.
Arms Control: TNF and SALT:

In response, the Secretary said the Soviet Union is very concerned about our build-up and wants to avoid the burden of a further build-up. However, as we look ahead, we see no indication of a letup by the Soviets. They are making a fundamental reassessment as to whether they will have to build up their nuclear capabilities even further. We have to get on with arms control talks, the Secretary observed. These will be difficult talks within the framework of SALT. Ceausescu of Romania had just jumped in with a suggestion that the Soviets move their SS–20s in response to Alliance concessions. Ceausescu’s proposal is a perversion of the “Zero-Option”. Other nations would feel threatened by any Soviet move. The Zero-Option is not something we are opposed to, the Secretary added, providing that it reflects ideal conditions. The Soviets must dismantle all their SS–20s. The benchmark for the present nuclear debate ought to be the deployment by the Soviet Union of the SS–20s in Europe. We had been thinning out our nuclear warheads and have withdrawn about 1,000 such warheads in recent years.

With regard to SALT, the Secretary said the Soviets are extremely anxious to proceed. They wish to be relieved of the armaments burden and desire to crack the US consensus on a military buildup. The Secretary said that having lived through SALT–I himself, he was a little skeptical about the process. However, we cannot afford not to proceed. We must go into the SALT talks very carefully. Failure does not serve Western interest, and at present the US is studying all possibilities. SALT II did not break up on the rocks of Afghanistan, as some would have us believe. It was killed by its own substantive inadequacies and the skepticism about it that developed as a result of these inadequacies. SALT II was a flawed treaty. It permitted an increase in heavy missiles and inordinantly burdened our European partners. Our intensive review is designed to preclude the possibility of a shock once negotiations begin.

Anti-Nuclear Sentiment: “Peace” Movements:

In response to a question about the demonstrations in Europe against nuclear weapons, the Secretary said these are not pacifist/neutralist movements. The underpinnings are more subtle. Frequently, the sentiments we see expressed are based on religious and environmental considerations, as well as concern for the peaceful use of the atom. One also notes the deep concern for their own safety of people who would be directly affected. This concern is deep and genuine. The old argument between Europe and the US is whether the President of the US would sacrifice Washington for Hamburg. Now the argument is that the US is not willing to sacrifice anything at all and, indeed, is
setting Hamburg up for a nuclear attack. This is a serious perversion of the truth, though an understandable one. It provides ammunition for the East. We will find this concern growing in the United States in the months ahead and there will be increasing division here if it is not handled well. Thus, it is a common problem that is shared on both sides of the Atlantic. Young people have to know that their leaders are sensitive to their concerns, since no one can expect a high level of sacrifice if we are not prepared to take their concerns fully into account.

When asked about Soviet orchestration of so-called peace movements, the Secretary noted that there is no question about Soviet involvement. He recalled that the Soviet Ambassador in the Netherlands received the Kremlin’s highest award for his role in the campaign against the ERW. However, we do ourselves a disservice if we think that is all there is to it.

A member of the Chatham House Group observed that if there were less ignorance about the imbalance between Soviet and NATO forces, there would be more understanding for an allied build-up in Europe. The Secretary agreed. We have come a long way since he had first gone to Europe as SACEUR. At that time he had found that Europeans would not normally accept the idea of an imbalance or a threat. However, he added that he is more concerned that if the issue is mishandled and overdramatized, we will move the young from both sides of the Atlantic to decide that it is better to be red than to be burned. This approach could be a reality by 1985.

The Secretary was asked if he had heard from Gromyko about the possibility of the Soviet’s scaling down their own military production and the problems that would be attendant to such a move. The Secretary said that he was not very optimistic about Moscow’s ability to scale down in the near term.

**The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe:**

With regard to a question on how events might unfold in Eastern Europe and how the Soviet Union’s empire might evolve over the next decade, the Secretary observed that the Soviets have profound problems in agriculture, in education and with minorities. They are facing increasing centrifugal pressures. Poland is not a Czechoslovakia or an East Germany. It is a profound political event. The mother church itself is being challenged. We see the independence of the labor movement, the collapse of internal law and order, and a challenge to the political leadership in Poland. Some claim the costs of a Soviet invasion now outweigh the benefits to the Soviets. Others disagree. The truth is somewhere in between. It is clear that the challenge to the Soviets is unacceptable to them, and what we are seeing today is shaped by these challenges. The Secretary added that we have not seen the end
of the Polish situation. However, the contagion has not spread. Most other Eastern Europeans are angry with the Poles. However, the situation in Poland ultimately will affect Eastern Europe across the board. The Secretary said he would have to give the Soviets fairly high marks for their handling of Poland. In their terms they had been moderate and restrained, as has the West. They had had several opportunities to invade in the past year and had prudently chosen to miss all of them. An invasion would have led to a united West that would have sent chills down the back of the Soviet Union. It appears that Brezhnev himself restrained the Soviet Union and nipped pressures for invasion in the bud.

The Succession Issue in the USSR:

Responding to a question about Brezhnev’s health and the succession issue, the Secretary said that Brezhnev appears to be in gradually declining health and that history shows us the Soviet system is ill-prepared to handle succession problems. He would expect that a collective leadership would govern initially, following the passing of Brezhnev from the scene, with the toughest and meanest member eventually assuming the reins in the Soviet Union.

Afghanistan:

Turning to Afghanistan, the Secretary noted the interesting relationship between the Soviet decision to intervene and the demographic changes in the USSR. The Soviet Union’s Muslim population is exploding. The Secretary judged that related economic and demographic problems were among the principal motivations for the invasion of Afghanistan.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]
The attached CIA paper identifies Soviet economic problems and assesses how economic pressures can be put on the Soviets. The Soviets now face serious problems in almost every sector of their economy and their need for Western goods will grow in the 1980s. What will contribute most to their ability to maintain their military buildup are:

1. Western plant and equipment to help on their severe productivity problem;
2. Western oil and gas equipment to find new resources;
3. Specialty steels and large diameter steel pipe, pipe laying machinery and compressors which will help meet their energy problems and which, coupled with the commitment of financing and gas markets from Western European nations, will enable them to maintain their hard currency earnings; and
4. Food, especially grains and meat.

I have asked the Intelligence Community to develop, against the background of this paper, a national estimate on the impact of a coordinated COCOM effort to:

a. Make it as difficult as possible for the Soviets to continue to build their military capability, and

b. To pursue more aggressively the prevailing less sweeping policy of depriving the Soviets of strategically valuable technology, thus forcing them to do their own research and development.

William J. Casey
Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency²

Washington, October 26, 1981

THE STATE OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND THE ROLE OF EAST-WEST TRADE

Overview

As the Soviet Union completes the first year of its new five-year plan, the economy has turned sour before the long anticipated labor and energy problems have come into play. Three bad harvests have left agriculture in disarray. Meanwhile, transportation and materials bottlenecks and smaller productivity gains have reduced industrial growth sharply. Because prospects for raising productivity are poor, GNP growth may well be limited to 1–2 percent on average by the mid-1980s.

Slower economic growth will present President Brezhnev and his colleagues with some increasingly tough and politically painful choices regarding resource allocation and economic management. Annual increments to national output in the early 1980s will be too small to permit them simultaneously to meet mounting investment requirements, to maintain growth in defense spending at rates of the past, and raise the standard of living appreciably. Simply stated, something will have to give.

Given their problems, the Soviet need for Western goods and credits will increase greatly. Western imports would help planners deal with the basic problems confronting the Soviet economy during the 1980s—declining productivity and resource stringencies. Imports of Western plant and equipment, though now only about 5 percent of total domestic investment, make a disproportionately large contribution since their productivity is substantially higher than Soviet-designed equipment. Large food imports will be required to maintain consumer morale and encourage labor productivity during the 1980s.

Soviet leaders, however, would be unlikely to change their foreign policy to ward off a Western economic embargo. They do not believe such a course is economically necessary, in part because they do not think—based on the Afghanistan experience—that a comprehensive embargo can be implemented, much less sustained for more than year or so. Moreover, changing Soviet foreign policy to prevent an embargo

² Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The paper’s title page, attached but not printed, indicates that the paper was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center, on October 26.
would be viewed as appeasement and would undermine the position of anyone who might recommend it.

If an embargo were implemented, however, a denial limited to US-origin equipment, technology and foodstuffs would be disruptive only in the short term; other Western and some East European products would be adequate substitutes. Only if the USSR were denied access to most Western equipment and technology for an extended period would the Soviet economy suffer substantial damage. Politically, the response reaction to a full scale embargo is highly unpredictable. The Soviet leadership, for example, might respond by taking an even more aggressive stance internationally. They probably would see little positive incentive in restraining their behavior abroad and might believe that foreign adventurism could be used to rally support for the economic sacrifices and the greater discipline that would be required at home.

The Current State of the Soviet Economy

As the Soviet Union completes the first year of its new five year plan, the economy has turned sour before the long anticipated labor and energy problems have come into play. After averaging close to 4 percent during most of the 1970s, CIA measures of the average annual rate of GNP growth fell to just 1 percent during 1979–80. Only a weak rebound is expected this year.

Agriculture

Agriculture has been Moscow’s biggest headache. The Soviets have now suffered their third straight harvest failure. We estimate that the grain crop will be about 170 million tons, 19 million tons less than last year’s poor crop. Because meat production and the output of most other crops are expected to exceed last year’s depressed level, however, total farm output should increase slightly compared with last year. Nevertheless, output will still fall short of the 1976 level.

While the odds are that the weather will be better next year, a return in the coming decade to the unusually favorable weather patterns that existed from the mid-60s to the mid-70s seems unlikely. Rather, the somewhat harsher conditions that prevailed for 20 years prior to the mid-60s are likely to be the rule. In this environment, the gains in agricultural output that accrued between the mid-60s and mid-70s—largely the result of good weather—will be nearly impossible to achieve in the 1980s unless there is a sharp reversal of current trends in the delivery of machinery and fertilizer to agriculture.

Industry

While agriculture has grabbed most of the headlines, industry also has been doing poorly. More than halfway through 1981, growth in
almost every major sector is running behind the pace of a year ago. Civilian industrial output grew by less than 2½ percent in first-half 1981 compared with first-half 1980. In the postwar period, only the 1979 first-half showing was worse.

Lagging output of industrial materials is a major reason for the economy’s malaise. An abrupt slowdown in the growth of the steel and construction materials sectors (Table 1) has had a decided effect on new fixed investment, while shortages of nonferrous materials, lumber, and paper have become increasingly evident.

Growth of Soviet energy production also has slowed. After averaging almost 5 percent during most of the 1970s, primary energy production should fall to less than 3 percent this year. Oil output has been almost stagnant for the past year, while coal output—which peaked at 724 million tons in 1978—will probably decline to 710 million tons this year. Only gas continues to do well; the USSR should have little trouble in reaching its 1981 production goal of 16.2 trillion cubic feet. Meanwhile, spot fuel shortages have become more frequent, reflecting a tighter supply situation as well as distribution problems. Although the Soviets are stepping up their efforts to increase the efficiency of energy use in the economy, campaigns of this kind in the past have fallen far short of their targets.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

99. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, November 5, 1981

SUBJECT
Strategy to Preempt Brezhnev

We think the moment is right for you personally to launch a major offensive on the issues of peace, security, and freedom. Building on

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (11/03/1981–11/05/1981), Secret. The President’s Daily Diary indicates that the National Security Planning Group met on November 5 from 4:08 to 5:45 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes were found. Reagan wrote in his diary: “A long afternoon N.S.C. meeting. We plan to talk to the world via T.V. just prior to Brezhnev’s visit to Germany to announce that in the I.N.F. arms limit talks we’ll ask for total elimination of Theatre Nuclear weapons in Europe.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, p. 81)
the recent success at Cancun and with AWACs, your offensive would give a substantial lift to our diplomatic and defense efforts both abroad and at home.

Above all, a Presidential initiative would help derail the Soviet campaign to occupy the high ground on nuclear war and arms control in Europe. The Soviets will be trying to add fuel to the fire which has led to the recent wave of demonstrations. Specifically, during his forthcoming visit to Bonn (Nov. 22–24), Brezhnev may well announce an initiative designed to attract European public support before the TNF negotiations begin November 30. We can and should preempt him.

We have an excellent opportunity to repeat our success in ruining Gromyko’s UNGA speech. Coming just before Gromyko’s speech, the publicity on your last letter to Brezhnev and my address to UNGA left the Soviets in a heavy-handed and confrontational posture. They were simply too rigid to react quickly enough to change their gameplan. I, therefore, recommend that you deliver a televised address just before Brezhnev arrives in Bonn. A forceful but positive Presidential presentation will deflate Brezhnev on the eve of his visit and put the Soviets on the defensive.

It also could help here as it would come on the eve of Congressional votes on funding for the MX and B–1. We need to undermine the growing attacks on our defense program increases by demonstrating that they are essential to our peace program, including the success of arms control.

Your speech would be explicitly addressed to the peoples of the world, and would set forth our overall approach to peace, security and freedom. It would concentrate on the nuclear issues now most at play in Europe. We would seek to reeducate the Europeans about the basic requirements for security and deterrence. We would stress that peace has been preserved for an entire generation for certain basic reasons, above all by preserving deterrence. The U.S. is now strengthening and modernizing its conventional, theater nuclear and strategic nuclear forces to ensure that deterrence remains intact. You would state that our TNF program provides the essential link between the US strategic umbrella and the security of Europe by deterring both Soviet conventional attacks and a limited nuclear war in Europe. Building on the excellent statement you released October 21st, you could stress the necessity for equality and balance.

But you also would stress our desire to achieve these objectives at the lowest possible level of forces. Brezhnev will want to hit hard in Bonn at our alleged unwillingness to negotiate seriously. To preempt him, you would announce that you have communicated to Brezhnev (via a letter Ambassador Hartman could present to Gromyko on the eve of your speech) our comprehensive program to achieve equality at the
lowest possible levels of strategic weapons and TNF. You would challenge Brezhnev to agree.

Specifically on SALT, you would stress that we have informed the Soviets that we will be ready to start talks by the spring of 1982, and emphasize that we are using the time remaining to define approaches which would go well beyond past SALT agreements in achieving substantial reductions.

You then would focus heavily on TNF. The difficulties have started because the Soviets have been moving ahead steadily with their deployment of SS–20s, while the United States actually has decreased the number of its nuclear warheads by 1,000 over the past several years. With a graphic chart behind you to make the point visually, you could stress that the number of Soviet LRTNF missile warheads continues to increase while the U.S. at present deploys no LRTNF missiles. We are prepared to limit our deployments to the lowest possible level to which the Soviets are willing to reduce, ideally to zero.

You then could go on to state that deterrence and arms control are not enough, that we not only want to preserve peace in Europe, we want to help bring peace to other areas of the world torn by crises and tension. Here too we have a concrete program for peace and security. You then could briefly review our diplomatic efforts in various regions, and attack Soviet intervention and aggression. And you could underline that we believe genuine peace and security can unleash a new era of economic growth and individual liberty. Here too we have programs and values which give us confidence in the future.

Obviously we will need to fine-tune these ideas working closely with Cap and your staff. But I would like your agreement to move ahead on the draft of such a speech and with arrangements for you to present it on television November 20th. I am convinced you can steal Brezhnev’s thunder and put us on the offensive.

Recommendation

That you agree to give such a speech on November 20th.²

² There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.
Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, November 9, 1981

SUBJECT
Release of Soviet Dissidents

The CSCE meeting in Madrid could conclude this fall, if we can reach agreement on the mandate for a conference on military confidence-building measures in Europe (CDE), balanced by human rights provisions that go beyond the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. This gives us an opportunity to try to get some people out of the USSR. Specifically, we should seek release of Shcharanskiy, the jailed Jewish dissident and Helsinki monitor, whose wife you met, and Sakharov, the exiled physicist who has been critical of the Soviet regime. If this proves impossible, we could settle for one or the other, or a larger number of lesser-known dissidents.

The incentive for the Soviets to agree to this is that we, in turn, would reduce somewhat our demands for language on human rights in the concluding document at Madrid. We would thus achieve “balance”: in part by the significant political—and humanitarian—symbolism of getting people released. We would meet Congressional concerns that we won’t get enough out of Madrid on human rights, and we would demonstrate that the Administration’s approach to human rights produces more results than rhetoric.

I will raise this initially with Ambassador Dobrynin; then, if the Soviets agree to talk, Ambassador Max Kampelman will pursue it with his Soviet counterpart in Madrid. The discussions would be kept totally secret. While we will resist any Soviet effort to get a quid pro quo beyond the CSCE context, we will tell them that this gesture would improve the tone of our relationship.

This is a long shot, but well worth trying. I will of course keep you informed of any developments.

101. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 11, 1981, 2:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

Secretary’s Debrief on his meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, November 11, 1981, 2:45 pm; with Messrs. Eagleburger and Bremer

The Secretary indicated that he had shown the non-paper on possible release of Soviet dissidents to Dobrynin.2 Dobrynin had noted that Sakharov does not want to leave the Soviet Union and is happy to stay and create problems for the government. He asked that we give him another name in Sakharov’s place. The Secretary said that he had emphasized that Shcharanskiy was very important. Dobrynin noted that Shcharanskiy had been a spy for the Knesset, but otherwise raised no objection to his release. Dobrynin asked what was in it for Moscow if they, in fact, released some dissidents. The Secretary noted that it would ensure a positive outcome for the Madrid CSCE meeting.

Ambassador Dobrynin then asked what was happening in the Administration. He was concerned about Dick Allen’s article on detente.3 The Secretary indicated that the article did not accurately reflect the President’s views on US-Soviet relations. He wants the relationship back on the track. The Secretary gave Dobrynin possible dates for the Secretary’s next meeting with Gromyko. He told him to pick two days in the January 26–29 time frame. Dobrynin commented that it was important that the Secretary be prepared to discuss SALT at that time.

Eagleburger then expressed his concern about the Presidential speech on foreign policy. Bremer indicated that the White House had promised us a draft by November 11. Eagleburger commented that he had heard Dick Perle had been involved in redrafting our draft. He was quite worried and emphasized the need for us to win our position on TNF.

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, Box 58, November 11, 1981. Secret; Sensitive. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “Day & Cuba.”

2 Attached but not printed is the undated non-paper calling for the release of Sakharov and Shcharanskiy “as soon as possible, but in any case by Christmas,” and for quiet negotiations on the topic at the meeting of the CSCE in Madrid.

Discussion then turned to the willingness of the Administration to be tough. The Secretary related that in the previous day’s NSC meeting, when there was significant opposition to any readiness to take military measures, the Secretary said that if we were not willing to go all the way if need be, we should not even start on that path. He then proposed that we immediately open negotiations with Cuba. The Secretary believed that this had jolted the others and caused them to rethink their positions. They were subsequently willing to be a bit tougher. The Secretary noted that he had taken the President through an emotional and intellectual meat grinder. The President had slept on it and judging from the Secretary’s call to him this morning, he now appreciated yesterday’s meeting.

The Secretary then related the substance of his conversation with the President, where the President expressed worry over the reception of his press conference and the Secretary reassured him.

The Secretary gave a brief read-out on the morning’s meeting on East/West trade at the Commerce Department. The bottom line of most of the participants, i.e., Weinberger, Perle, Allen and Casey, is that anything that could in any way be helpful to the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe was wrong. Allen wants to review again the whole of East/West trade. The Secretary commented that this was because Allen and DOD had lost on all their arguments and that they found it difficult to accept such losses even though the President made the decision. The Secretary commented that we needed to get out-of-office help on this issue. We should call together a group of non-government experts such as Billington, Scowcroft and Sonnenfeldt to review all the issues involved in East/West trade and take recommendations. The basic question is should we go into economic warfare as some in the Administration have argued.

Eagleburger asked if we really had to go through all the issues again and the Secretary replied in the affirmative, and lamented that the NSC always tries to redo Presidential decisions with which it does not agree. He commented that we should perhaps not engage in the interagency process any more. The Defense Department has ceased to participate constructively. We may just have to do everything on our

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5 An unknown hand drew two vertical lines in the margin of this sentence and the final clause of the previous sentence and wrote: “Cuba.”

6 Haig spoke to Reagan on the phone from 10:45 to 10:52 a.m. on November 11. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes of this conversation were found.

own from now on. Bremer gave the example that DOD and Commerce have refused even to comment on the papers we had circulated relating to oil and gas technology exports.

Larry Eagleburger then raised the need for the Secretary to call the West German Ambassador. Genscher had told the press that he had asked his Ambassador to talk to the Secretary about the President’s statements on nuclear war. Eagleburger added that as well as reassuring the Germans we should indicate that we have had enough of their bellyaching. The Secretary lamented that the press seems to be trying to push us into a war of words with Europe, and asked if those present had seen the way the press kept harping on the nuclear statement in the Secretary’s press conference yesterday.

At 3:00 pm the Secretary called FRG Ambassador Hermes. He read the talking points which Eagleburger had provided. He added that it is also a burden in Europe for the leadership to speak out boldly on this issue. The Secretary said that anyone who saw the President’s press conference could hardly say that this was an effort to inflate the issue.

E. Anthony Wayne

Wayne initialled “EAW” over his typed signature.
102. Special National Intelligence Estimate


[Omitted here are the title page and preface.]

Dependence of Soviet Military Power on Economic Relations With the West

KEY JUDGMENTS

Acquisition of goods and technology from the West enhances Soviet military programs in two principal ways: by making available specific technologies that permit improvements in weapon and military support systems and the efficiency of military and civilian production technology; and by providing economic gains from trade that improve the efficiency of the economy and thereby reduce the burden of defense. Soviet military power is based fundamentally on the large size and diversity of the Soviet economy and the breadth of the Soviet technical and scientific base, on Soviet success in acquiring sophisticated technology in the West, and on the longstanding preferred status of the military sector.

The USSR recognizes that it will be hard pressed to maintain its relative position in the technical sophistication of its weapons compared with those of the West. Moscow will therefore continue to seek Western technology useful for its future weapon systems by all means, including those illegal means that have been successful in the past, such as clandestine acquisition, illegal imports, and third-country diversions. The Soviets will especially need equipment and technology for their electronics, aerospace, and shipbuilding industries.

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (11/21/1981–11/28/1981). Secret. Issued by the Director of Central Intelligence. Concurred with by the National Foreign Intelligence Board. The CIA, DIA, NSA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and the Treasury, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence of the Department of the Navy, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Department of the Air Force, and the Director of Intelligence of the Marine Corps participated in the preparation of the Estimate. Casey sent the SNIE to the President under cover of a November 21 letter stating: “Knowing your interest in the ability of the Soviet economy to stand up under the massive military burden it is carrying, I thought you might like to read, as you fly west, this Estimate on ‘Dependence of Soviet Military Power on Economic Relations With the West.’” An unknown hand crossed out “as you fly west.” Allen forwarded the SNIE to the President under cover of a November 21 memorandum stating: “Attached is the Special National Intelligence Estimate which I mentioned in today’s Daily Report. It is an extremely important assessment of the Soviet economy and its ability to support its massive military build-up. I commend it to your attention.” In the upper right-hand corner of Allen’s memorandum, Reagan wrote: “RR.”
Soviet economic performance has deteriorated to the point that, if military expenditures continue to expand as in the past, there will be few if any resources left with which to raise living standards. Even slow growth of the Soviet economy depends in substantial part on continued imports of Western machinery, grain, and equipment for the energy sector:

- The USSR needs large-scale imports of Western food, especially grain, to increase food supplies even in good crop years, and to keep them from falling in bad years.
- Western pipe and compressors are essential for the rapid expansion of Soviet gas production, which will be the main source of additional energy supplies and hard currency in the 1980s.
- Western equipment also is increasingly important in oil production, and imports of Western production equipment, especially advanced machine tools, would help to raise labor productivity at a time when the labor force will be growing much more slowly than in the past.

Western restrictions on nonstrategic trade, if broadly supported and sustained, would aggravate Soviet economic problems appreciably. Short of comprehensive Western restrictions on trade, a Western embargo on oil and gas equipment would have the greatest impact. A denial of new Western credits would probably force a decline in overall Soviet hard currency imports. In none of these cases would unilateral US actions have much effect. Any decision to impose additional restrictions would have to consider their impact on the West as well as on the USSR.

Reduced economic capability would make allocations to Soviet military programs more painful but probably would not lead to cuts in these programs in the next several years. The Soviet military buildup has great momentum and domestic political support. Faced with what it would consider economic warfare, Moscow would be likely to turn to more autarkic economic policies, tighter internal discipline, and a more truculent foreign policy. At the same time, it is highly probable that these policies would result in increased popular dissatisfaction, reduced worker productivity, further reductions in long-term investment in order to meet short-term needs, and greater inefficiency overall in the operation of the Soviet economy.

The West could slow improvement in the performance of Soviet weapons by the late 1980s or the early 1990s by broadening controls over exports of military-related technology—and increasing its efforts to plug leakages. While there is little likelihood that even comprehensive and sustained Western economic sanctions in the near term would significantly affect Soviet military programs—many of which are already well under way—such sanctions applied for a number of years could retard qualitative improvements to Soviet weapon systems and
give rise to significant pressures internally to reduce military spending at a time when the rest of the economy is in growing difficulty. This would be even more likely should the USSR’s economic problems be more prolonged than the Soviet leaders expect and the remedies harder to find and slower to take effect.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

103. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Washington, November 17, 1981

Dear President Brezhnev:

Your letter of October 15 makes it clear once again how profound are the differences in our respective assessments of the causes of the major sources of tension in the world. I find it difficult to accept your declaration that Soviet actions in other parts of the world must have no bearing on our relations. Soviet actions are having a direct and adverse impact on American interests in many parts of the world. As I said in my letter to you of September 22, Soviet resort to direct and indirect use of force in regional conflicts is a matter of deep concern to us as is the continued build up of military strength beyond the need for self defense.

Despite these differences, however, we should strive to find a common ground for agreement on matters of vital interest to our two countries and the rest of the world. The cause of peace, and particularly the threat of nuclear destruction hanging over mankind, require that our two countries make an effort, together with our partners, to resolve our differences peacefully. I assure you the United States is committed to such a process. I therefore welcome an opportunity for businesslike cooperation in addressing world problems. I believe that our exchanges, and the discussions in New York between Secretary Haig and Foreign

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8106607). No classification marking. Allen sent a draft of the letter, based on a draft by State, to Reagan under cover of a November 16 memorandum. The President substantially redrafted the letter with numerous corrections, additions, and subtractions (including striking a reference to Sakharov and Shcharanskiy), and wrote on Allen’s covering memorandum: “Dick—I felt it should be shortened so forgive my slashing. Also I tried to give it something of the tone of my 1st letter. Ron.”

2 See the attachment to Document 85.
Minister Gromyko, have laid the essential groundwork for such an effort. The key question now is how we can translate these beginnings into concrete results. We are ready to advance specific solutions and to hear out Soviet proposals aimed at relieving the dangers, as well as the current human suffering, in problem areas around the world.

I am convinced, Mr. President, that we can achieve results in the coming year if there is genuine good will and serious interest on both sides.

Afghanistan remains a major obstacle to progress, beclouding the international atmosphere. It appears from recent communications that we both agree on the need for progress toward an internationally acceptable solution of this issue. We appear to agree on basic goals: a non-aligned, independent Afghanistan, free of any foreign military presence and guaranteed against any outside interference. This calls for a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan at the earliest possible date. The United States is prepared to continue the exchange of views on questions that bear on a political settlement in Afghanistan. Ambassador Hartman will be in touch with Foreign Minister Gromyko to determine whether there is a basis for a serious dialogue.

Now let me address your assertions regarding US policy towards Cuba. We do not seek to interfere with Cuba’s independence nor are we interfering in Cuba’s internal affairs. However, we do find entirely unacceptable Cuba’s unremitting efforts to export its revolution by fomenting violent insurgencies and terrorism against legitimate governments in Central America.

But to get to the real purpose of my letter, arms control is a vital area where progress can be made toward world peace. The United States is prepared to accept equality in conventional, intermediate-range nuclear and strategic forces at the lowest possible level of such forces. We are also prepared to take other steps to enhance general peace and international security.

Let me begin with strategic forces. The United States will be prepared to open negotiations on strategic arms reductions as soon as possible in the new year. In approaching these talks we should learn from past experiences. In my view however, the negotiations also will require fresh ideas—to which both sides should devote urgent and serious attention—in order that we can achieve genuine reductions in strategic forces. This will demand political will and a readiness on both sides to accept a higher degree of openness in order to enhance mutual confidence. In this connection, I welcome your important public statement that verification measures going beyond national technical means might be possible.

Concerning intermediate-range nuclear forces, the agreement to begin talks on these systems on November 30 in Geneva marks an
important beginning in dealing with the difficult issue of the military imbalance in these forces. We are ready to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union which we believe is straightforward and fair. We are prepared to cancel our plan to deploy Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles on the condition that the Soviet Union in turn dismantles all of its SS–20 missiles, retires and dismantles its SS–4, and SS–5 missiles, and desists from further deployments of these or comparable systems.³

Opportunities also exist for reductions in conventional forces in Europe. Your offensive forces have become increasingly capable. The Soviet Union could make no more convincing contribution to peace in Europe than by substantially reducing its conventional forces. Now is the time to take actions to achieve equality at a lower level of conventional forces in Europe.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe offers another practical possibility for increasing confidence and reducing the risks of war. At the Madrid meeting, the Western countries have advanced proposals for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe that could negotiate measures aimed at reducing concerns about surprise attack. At the same time, I would hope we could move the Helsinki process forward in a balanced way in all areas taking favorable action to resolve certain humanitarian matters, such as the reunification of divided families and the individual cases raised during the recent discussions between our foreign ministers in New York. Such action I have no doubt would have a favorable effect on deliberations in Madrid, and on relations between our two countries. I feel I must tell you I am personally concerned with the particular cases under discussion between Secretary Haig and your representatives.

There is no shortage, Mr. President, of opportunities for easing world tensions. If the Soviet Union is prepared to move forward in these areas of genuine concern to the United States and its Allies, you will find me a ready partner.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan⁴


⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature with an indication Reagan signed it. Hartman handed the letter to Gromyko in Moscow on November 18. (Telegram 15964 from Moscow, November 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N810009–0249)
104. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 18, 1981

WITH:

Ambassador Dobrynin

At luncheon hosted by him Wednesday—18 November

Dobrynin began the conversation by recalling staying with Ambassador Thompson at our farm in Maryland. He went on to ask me whether temporary ambassadors for special projects in the U.S. service were paid less than the ambassadors designated to capitals; the question seemed to bear on an issue in the Soviet service that he had to deal with. He asked where I would live in Geneva, which led to a discussion of George Kennan, whose apartment in Geneva we had once rented, and a further discussion of George Kennan as an historian and a poet. He could not understand Kennan's interest in the Franco-Russian negotiations of 1895; they had no visible bearing on today's issues.

Kvitsinskiy When we sat down for lunch, he asked me whether I had ever met Kvitsinskiy. I said I had not but had heard a great deal about him and understood him to be not only very knowledgeable about political issues regarding Germany but also a skilled linguist and competent negotiator. Dobrynin said he was relatively young, known as a "German" in the Ministry, and that Semenov\(^2\) was reluctant to see him leave as his deputy in Bonn. He asked me who would be my deputy; I replied Glitman would be mine. I asked him whether he knew who Kvitsinskiy’s deputy would be. He said when he had last been in Moscow there was a discussion whether the deputy should be a military or political man. He said he did not know how the debate had turned out. He said he had gotten the impression that they were looking toward a group on these negotiations who would be new to the subject of arms control negotiations, whereas, at least for the time being, they were thinking of a SALT delegation composed of those who have had prior experience. I asked whether that meant that Karpov was the likely head of the SALT Delegation. He answered in the affirmative.

INF Decision-Making Process He then asked me who would make decisions in the U.S. Government regarding the INF negotiations. I

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2 Reference is to Soviet Ambassador to West Germany Vladimir Semenov.
said that administratively we reported to ACDA, but that questions of policy were handled interdepartmentally with the final decision going up to the NSC and the President. I asked him how the decision-making process was carried out in the USSR. He said that most decisions were made by Gromyko and Ustinov together, they reporting to the Politburo or directly to Mr. Brezhnev. I recollected that Ustinov, as the minister in charge of war production, and Smirnov, his deputy, had played a role in SALT I separate from the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dobrynin said that was correct. Ustinov and Smirnov knew exactly what factories were able to produce what and in what time, and therefore had an important contribution to make in the SALT I and II discussions. Now that Ustinov was Minister of Defense this type of expertise was no longer necessary, although Smirnov had wider talents than merely war production and was sometimes consulted. I asked Dobrynin whether there was a subcommittee of the Politburo which dealt with national security issues, including arms control. He said there was not.

Duration of Negotiations He asked me how long I expected the negotiations to continue before we arrived at an agreement. I said I hoped for an agreement by next February. I thought the logic of our case was clear. I understood Mr. Kvitsinskii to be a competent and intelligent man and hoped that he, seeing the logic of our case, could come to an agreement early. This response seemed to surprise Dobrynin.

Reagan Speech/Brezhnev Interview He said he had listened to the President’s speech and could not believe that he was serious. There was no possibility that the Soviet Union would agree to what he was proposing. I said that I had carefully studied Brezhnev’s interview in Der Spiegel. There were many things in the interview concerning broad objectives with which I thought my government could agree. However, when it came to the specific proposals outlined in the interview, there was no possibility that the U.S. would agree with those proposals. I could ask him the same question that he had asked me; how would they propose to get from a position unacceptable to the U.S. to one that was mutually acceptable?

Free Discussion I went on to say that in order to get to mutually agreed positions I thought it was important that Mr. Kvitsinskii and I have a wide-ranging discussion and see if we could not agree as

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3 Reference is to Reagan’s speech that morning to the National Press Club in which he called for strategic arms reductions. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, pp. 1062–1067)

4 Reference is to Brezhnev’s interview in Der Spiegel, November 2, on the occasion of his visit to Bonn.
to the facts with respect to the full range of weapon systems which either side might consider to bear upon our negotiations. In this connection, I said I took it that the principle which had applied in preceding negotiations, that either side would be free to raise any points it wished to, would hold in this negotiation. Dobrynin expressed complete agreement with that point.

I then went on to say that, whereas Mr. Brezhnev had mentioned a range of systems in his interview, he had really focused upon the necessity for limitations on what he called the medium-range ground-based missiles; the Pershing IIs and GLCMs on our side and the SS–20s and the 4s and 5s, which he said would be phased out, on their side. I said the point I was leading up to was I thought a distinction should be made between what either side might wish to discuss and the systems on which we should focus for specific limitation at this time.

**Missile Definition** Dobrynin asked me whether there was any difference between what we were referring to as “intermediate-range” missiles and what they called “medium-range” missiles. I said that I considered the word “intermediate-range” to cover the entire range intermediate between that of battlefield weapons and intercontinental-strategic weapons.

**Range vs Location** Dobrynin asked me what we meant when we used the word “global.” I replied that that was something which we would be prepared to discuss in detail with Mr. Kvitsinskiy; in general, it was my view that weapons should be limited by range class rather than location. I asked Dobrynin what Mr. Brezhnev had meant when he had used the phrase “salvo” capability. Dobrynin said that was the inventory of all the available weapons. I said I had the impression that the word implied simultaneity. He said that was true; it meant all the weapons which could be launched at one time.

**Project to Reduce the Risk of War** Dobrynin asked me what I considered the most important factor in an acceptable agreement; was it verification? I said it was not. I thought the most important factor was the substantive contribution that an agreement could make in carrying out the objectives which both Brezhnev and the President had stated so clearly—that of reducing the risk of war. If one took that objective seriously, then it should be possible to work out mutually acceptable methods fully to do so. Having done that, we should then address ourselves cooperatively to the important task of making the agreement verifiable.

**Allies’ Support** At this point Dobrynin changed the subject matter. He asked me why we should not just forget about intermediate-range weapons and just concentrate upon those systems which could attack the territory of the other side. I said that in the long history...
of U.S./USSR relations the differences between us had had little
to do with direct conflicts of interest between the USSR and the
U.S. as such. Most of them had arisen over conflicts of interest
with respect to geopolitical situations between our two countries,
particularly in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, South and Southeast
Asia, and the Far East. We did not in any way plan to separate
their interests from those of our Allies. Dobrynin rather lamely
replied that, of course, they would not separate their interests from
those of the other members of the Warsaw Pact. I noted that our
negotiations were, of course, bilateral and that neither side was
therefore authorized to discuss the limitation of weapon systems
of other countries.

Speech Numbers

Dobrynin then asked me about the numbers in the
President’s speech and inquired if I knew what was included in
the composition of the classes of systems behind those numbers.
I said I had not participated in their preparation and was not able
to reply at this time. I said I was sure that that information would
be made fully available. I went on to repeat the point that I thought
it would be extremely useful if Mr. Kvitsinskiy and I could come
to agreement as to the data on weapon systems by class based on
type and range.

SALT

He asked me about my views on the interface between these
negotiations and the SALT negotiations. I said there was a close
relationship, but that I thought it was possible to have a useful
agreement on INF without necessarily simultaneously having an
agreement on SALT.

He asked me why I had been against the ratification of SALT II. I
said I had not recommended to senators that they vote against
ratification. I had said I did not think they should vote on the issue
without fully understanding its terms and what it did and did not do.
I said I did have strong reservations about some of the aspects
of SALT II. In particular, I thought a mistake had been made in
the Moscow Accord of 1974 of abandoning the objective of having
a treaty of indefinite duration and substituting instead a target of
an agreement expiring at the end of 1985. Dobrynin said he agreed
with this; the Protocol had already expired and the treaty itself
had only a few more years to run. He went on to say that for the
time being it was possible for the USSR to live by the terms of
SALT II, even though not ratified, but it might not be possible to
continue this in the indefinite future.

I went on to say that I was concerned that the structure of SALT
II set up incentives which were perverse. He asked me what I
meant by that. I said that the basic limitation being on numbers
of launchers of various classes, there was a strong incentive for
each side to build the largest missiles permitted by the agreement.
I thought this incentive to be perverse. Dobrynin protested that
they would be willing to see the limitation on heavy missiles provide equal rights to both sides, but they understood that we did not wish to deploy such missiles. They only wanted the right because they already had them.

RV Limit He then went on to ask me whether I thought there was a better method of limitation. I said I thought there was. One such method might be a limitation on the number of reentry vehicles with a further limitation on the power of individual reentry vehicles in order to prevent rabbits from being equated with elephants. Dobrynin said that they could see no problem with a limitation based on RVs; we had more than did they.

“Big” vs “Small” Agreement Dobrynin again changed the subject. He asked me whether I wished a “big” as opposed to a “small” agreement. He said to arrive at a big agreement might take a long time. Would it not perhaps be advantageous to strive for a small agreement which would give the world a sense of progress and might be done relatively quickly. I said I was inherently a “big” agreement man; I took seriously the objective of reducing the risk of war and felt that this could not be done by agreements which were basically cosmetic. I repeated the point that if the Soviets took seriously the general objectives contained in both Brezhnev’s interview and in the President’s speech, it should be possible to work out an agreement which would, in fact, significantly reduce the risk of war. I said that to do so might be more expensive, but that it would be worth the cost. We agreed that both sides have gone to MIRVed weapons primarily because they are more cost-effective per unit of destructiveness than single RV weapons.

Confidentiality I asked Dobrynin what their policy would be on the confidentiality of the negotiations. He said his side was much better disciplined to maintain confidentiality than was ours. I agreed. I said I would talk to Kvitsinskiy about the subject in Geneva. I thought both delegations would wish to maintain a high degree of confidentiality; undoubtedly governments would handle matters as they saw fit.

Personals Dobrynin referred to his 19 years as Ambassador in Washington and the contrast of that life with his upbringing in Russia. He was part of a large family. His father had been a plumber and his mother had died when he was young. He referred to his country retreat on the Eastern Shore, some 15 miles from Gerard Smith’s place, with pleasure.

At this point I changed the subject. I said I thought I had been engaged in the subject of U.S./USSR relations perhaps as long as anyone who was still around. I said that in the summer of 1932 I had run into Bill Bullett on a subway in New York and asked him
to supper at my apartment, which I shared with Sidney Spivak. Spivak was helping Franklin Roosevelt at the time during the election campaign of 1932. Bullett had been a friend of John Maynard Keynes at the Versailles Treaty conference and after the treaty had been put on a mission to Moscow to talk to Chicherin about the possibility of improving Western relations with the USSR. Spivak introduced Bullett to FDR and Bullett was the one who persuaded Roosevelt to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR. I, therefore, felt I had had something to do, even though indirectly, with the beginning of official relations between the two countries.

Dobrynin said that the INF negotiations could be of great importance. For the time being, at least, they were the only ones going on between the USSR and the U.S. They could, in fact, be historic. He made a final point that, if we could work out a successful agreement in this negotiation, that would open the door to all manner of favorable developments in the general field of U.S./Soviet relations.

105. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Allen) to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 18, 1981

SUBJECT

Economic/Financial Situation of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Countries (C)

Recent diplomatic and intelligence reporting provides startling evidence of real economic distress in the Soviet Bloc. (C)

While the situation in Poland is well-known, not so well-known is that the Romanian economy is in such bad shape that Foreign Minister Andrei stated “there will be internal social consequences if we don’t get help.” Our Embassy reports that Romania is in worse shape than

Andrei let on. Yugoslavia is also in serious enough trouble to cause the British to request consultations about upcoming debt problems. Despite that, Yugoslavia has re-lent to Czechoslovakia millions of dollars it borrowed from an American bank. (S)

The Soviet Union itself is drawing down its balances in Western banks, selling gold even at today’s depressed prices and deferring grain shipments because of lack of foreign exchange. The Russians will have to finance grain purchases through commercial bank credit for the first time. (C)

Soviet economic performance is well below target (except for natural gas) and shortages have reached the point where sizable provincial cities have been totally without meat for months on end. (LOU)

Thus, the period of U.S. military vulnerability can to some extent be offset by Western exploitation of Soviet Bloc economic and social vulnerabilities. For example, measures taken to reduce Soviet earnings from oil and gas exports will make their civilian vs. military choices more difficult and increase the likelihood of internal unrest in the satellites. (C)

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2 In telegram 8239 from Bucharest, November 17, Ambassador to Romania David Funderburk reported that “Romania faces a serious liquidity crisis, believes the United States can give it some help; and that our failure to do so would likely force a reappraisal in Bucharest of Romanian policy toward the United States.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810545–0309)

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106. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Haig

Washington, November 24, 1981

SUBJECT
Guidance on US/Soviet Summit

Mr. Secretary,

Senator Percy reportedly told members of the press today that he has your commitment to “aim for” a US/Soviet summit in 1982. With-

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, Box 59, November 24, 1981. Confidential; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “AMH.”
out commenting on Percy’s statement, we prepared the attached guidance\(^2\) which gives our long-standing position on the summit question. The issue came up at the noon briefing, and this guidance was used.

We subsequently learned from a correspondent that Percy is also claiming to have Dick Allen’s commitment to a summit, and that Allen allegedly told Percy that preparations are underway. The correspondent told us he then put this question to Ed Meese, who said a summit is “under consideration.” Asked how actively it is being considered, Meese is said to have replied: “Just say it’s under consideration.”

Although our guidance still seems right to me, I’m concerned that we may be on a somewhat different wave length than the White House on this issue.\(^3\)

\(^2\) Attached but not printed is a November 24 paper drafted by Rueckert and entitled “Reagan/Brezhnev Summit” which states that Reagan and Haig “have indicated in principle U.S. readiness to go to a summit if this would serve a useful purpose and hold good prospects of concrete results,” but had no set timetable.

\(^3\) At the bottom of the memorandum, Haig drew an arrow pointing to this paragraph and wrote: “So what’s new? AH”

107. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union\(^1\)**

Washington, November 28, 1981, 2130Z

316836. Subject: U.S. Demarche to Soviets on Sakharov.
1. (Secret—Entire text).
2. At the Secretary’s request, Under Secretary Stoessel requested Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to call on him November 27 concerning the Sakharov hunger strike. Dobrynin was indisposed so in the interest of urgency Stoessel received Minister-Counselor Bessmertnykh in his stead. EUR/SOV Director Simons accompanied the Under Secretary.
3. FYI, to be held very closely. Posts should be aware that the Secretary raised the cases of Sakharov and his family and of Anatoliy

\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N810009–0428. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to Bonn and Madrid. Drafted by Simons; approved by Stoessel and Scanlan.
Shcharanskiy privately with Dobrynin November 11,\(^2\) that the President reiterated his personal interest in these cases in his November 17 letter to Brezhnev;\(^3\) and that Dobrynin sent the Secretary an instructed non-paper November 19\(^4\) making the point that it is inappropriate for the US side to raise the question about Sakharov and Shcharanskiy (sic) because such a question . . . does not exist in Soviet-American relations. It belongs entirely to the domestic competence of the Soviet state. Unquote. End FYI.

4. Stoessel thanked Bessmertnykh for calling on short notice, and said he wished to talk on the Secretary’s behalf about the Sakharov case and the hunger strike Sakharov and his wife have undertaken to secure release of their daughter-in-law. Bessmertnykh knew the Secretary and the President were concerned about the case of Sakharov and Shcharanskiy, and the hunger strike redoubles this concern, Stoessel said. We had studied the Soviet message received November 19 carefully, and hoped our points would also be studied carefully on the Soviet side.

5. Sakharov’s health is not good, Stoessel went on, and the hunger strike threatens to make it worse. If he becomes gravely ill or dies, there will be a tremendous public outcry. Public interest is intense. The Secretary had asked him to talk about the case on this basis, in a low-key, private way. Such a public outcry would not be in the interest of our relationship.

6. Of course, Stoessel continued, our interest in release of the daughter-in-law does not detract from our interest in the cases of Sakharov and Shcharanskiy themselves.

7. In conclusion, Stoessel drew attention to the November 24 sense of the Senate resolution\(^5\) on the hunger strike which requested the Secretary of State to pass a copy of the resolution to the Soviet Government. On the Secretary’s behalf he wished to pass on this copy, as well as a non-paper embodying the points he had made. (Text of non-paper ends this message.)

8. Bessmertnykh responded that this was not a new subject, so he would not have much to say except that the demarche would be reported. What had been said on instructions November 19 stands. With regard to the daughter-in-law, without entering into technicalities it was true that no valid marriage had been executed. He would report

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\(^2\) See Document 101.
\(^3\) See Document 103.
\(^4\) The Department transmitted the non-paper in telegram 324961 to Moscow, December 8. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
that Congress had asked the Secretary to hand over a copy of the resolution, but since the matter was entirely a Soviet domestic one he could not accept it. However, he repeated, the substance of the demarche would be reported. (FYI Bessmertnykh accepted the text of the non-paper. End FYI.) He did not know the state of Sakharov’s health. In human terms he wished him good health. Of course the hunger strike would hurt. However, he suspected it would not end as tragically as many seemed to think.

9. Speaking off-the-record, Bessmertnykh said the tremendous publicity surrounding the hunger strike “cast a shadow” over it by arousing doubts as to its aims and seriousness. Simons pointed out that good friends of Sakharov were coming to US with pleas for intervention, but of an entirely private, non-publicized kind. Bessmertnykh concluded that may be true, but others—including the relatives who had visited the Soviet Embassy two days ago—always seemed to come with newsmen.

10. Text of U.S. non-paper, begin text. The Secretary has asked me to express to you once again the President’s personal interest and his own in seeing Sakharov and his family and Anatoliy Shcharanskiy released.

The message received November 19 has been carefully studied. There appear to US to be a number of factors we hope the Soviet side will weigh with equal care.

Sakharov’s health is poor. The hunger strike will place his life in danger.

There would be a major public outcry if Sakharov were to become extremely ill or die. Public concern in the United States is intense. The latest evidence is the resolution passed unanimously by the Senate November 24. On the Secretary’s behalf, I would like to present you with a copy.

We cannot believe such a major public outcry with regard to this case is in the interest of your government, any more than it is in our mutual interest to ignore any of the cases mentioned by the Secretary November 11 and by the President in his November 17 letter to President Brezhnev. End text.

Clark
Dear Mr. President,

I note with satisfaction that in your letter of November 17, 1981 you have expressed yourself ready to strive in the spirit of businesslike cooperation, despite the existing differences between our countries, to find a common ground for agreement on matters of vital interest to our two countries and the rest of the world.

On our part we believed and continue to believe that it is precisely such an approach that is required of the USSR and the USA if we are to be guided by the task of eliminating the threat of nuclear war. We cannot and have no right to proceed in a different manner and to avoid responsibility which rests on our States.

The main thing, however, is to substantiate the correct general premise with specific actions by both sides. Mere statements, no matter how good they may sound, are not enough to achieve progress in the resolution of no simple problems before us. What is required is realistic positions and practical proposals which would take into account the legitimate interests of the other side rather than be built around the desire to somehow infringe on those interests. Otherwise the declared positive goals will remain at best good intentions if not just an attempt to score a propaganda point. Neither of the two will be helpful.

From this standpoint, I shall tell you frankly, the considerations advanced in your letter on specific issues are, to put it mildly, very far from the objective reality. Suffice it to mention the assertion to the effect that the Soviet Union is allegedly increasing its military power beyond its defense requirements. A conclusion is drawn then from this clearly distorted premise that the Soviet Union has to disarm unilaterally, while the US can continue to build on and on its military might at its own discretion. And this is what in fact is taking place in the United States.

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8190038, 8190057). Secret. A typewritten note at the top of the letter reads: "Unofficial translation." Bremer forwarded the letter to Nance under cover of a December 2 memorandum, in which he wrote: "Ambassador Dobrynin delivered to Ambassador Stoessel the attached letter from President Brezhnev to President Reagan this morning. (The attachment is the Soviets' translation which we are checking against the original Russian.)" (Ibid.)

2 See Document 103.
Here we are faced with what is called “the double book-keeping” whereby in counting the Soviet arms in question their numbers are made to look many times higher, and—conversely—when it comes to the US, such numbers are drastically understated. Moreover, hundreds of nuclear systems in the possession of Britain and France are totally excluded from the counting, whereas on the Soviet side even those systems are counted which do not belong to the category of medium-range weapons and, indeed, have nothing to do whatsoever with Europe and still less so with the US.

Why is it necessary, Mr. President, to try to compare things which in their essence cannot be compared? It is difficult to dismiss a thought that the calculation here is based on the fact that most people are poorly versed in such matters and therefore will hardly be able to grasp the subject. The past experience shows, however, that sooner or later people will be able to sort things out for themselves. After all, both you and ourselves know very well that even if either side wished to somehow take advantage of the other in such matters, to do so would be impossible. The guarantee in this respect is provided by the national technical means of verification of the USSR and the USA. Recognition of the effectiveness of such a principle lies at the basis of the SALT–I and SALT–2 agreements. Respect for this principle consistently guides the Soviet Union in its practical activities.

As a “straightforward and fair” solution of the problem of medium-range nuclear arms you suggest that all Soviet medium-range missiles—both the new “SS–20’s” and the old “SS–4’s” and “SS–5’s” be eliminated. I wouldn’t argue with respect to the “straightforward” nature of this proposal, but to call it “fair” and generally a serious one was, of course, impossible not for us alone but for all those who retained the sense of reality.

As recently as yesterday the US officials acknowledged, and some of them do so today, that there continues to exist an approximate parity in nuclear arms in Europe. But even those among US officials, who are trying despite the facts to question it, keep only saying that the parity has been allegedly upset by the introduction of the “SS–20” missiles. It follows from this that when a considerably larger number of the “SS–4” and “SS–5” missiles was in place compared to their present number, no question of “disbalance” occurred to anybody. Why then, may we ask, are we offered to scrap all our medium-range missiles while the entire NATO’s nuclear arsenal remains intact? Is there any logic here, Mr. President?

Let me say it straight away that this is not the kind of basis on which questions related to the national security of states can be resolved. In matters of this nature it is necessary to be strictly guided by reciprocity, the principle of equality and equal security. Our delegation in Geneva
has the instructions to proceed exactly on this premise. If the US side also adheres to that principle, then one can expect success in the negotiations. There is no other way to achieve success.

Should the West demonstrate its readiness to reach agreement on a truly complete renunciation by both sides of all types of the existing medium-range nuclear arms deployed in Europe or around it, we on our part will be forthcoming.

We could also agree to free Europe altogether from nuclear arms—both medium-range and tactical. That would be a genuine “zero-option” fair for all sides.

Indeed it really appears to us strange to call on the Soviet Union to make a contribution, as you write, to peace in Europe by reducing its conventional forces there. This call should not be addressed to us. You must be aware of the fact that in recent years we unilaterally withdrew from Central Europe 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks, while the US, on the contrary, added tens of thousands of men to its troops in Europe. That’s the actual state of affairs in real life.

The question is which side is lacking in constructiveness and practical steps?

When you, Mr. President, indicate that the US is prepared to open negotiations on strategic arms reductions as soon as possible in the new year, we would like to understand this to mean that such negotiations will actually resume in the near future. We are for it.

It follows from your letter that the US side stands not just for limitation, but for the reduction of strategic arms. In this connection, I would like to remind you that the SALT–2 treaty provides for such reductions, and very substantial reductions at that. We have been and continue to be committed to this approach. It is important, however, that in this respect, too, all the factors determining the strategic situation should be taken into account, and that the principle of equality and equal security should be strictly observed.

With regard to the Madrid meeting of states-participants of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and, above all, the question of convening a European conference on confidence-building measures and disarmament: if the Western countries on their part—and it is now their turn to act—show readiness to travel their length of the distance in response to our far-reaching constructive steps, then one can expect to conclude this meeting with tangible positive results and to ensure a stable development of the process initiated by the Helsinki Final Act.

I am not going to engage now in polemics on the question of Afghanistan, although I cannot in any way agree with what has been said by you on this matter. As to your indication that you are prepared
to continue the exchange of views on a political settlement around Afghanistan, on our part we did not have and do not have now any objections to that. Our position on concrete aspects of the political settlement is known to you. However, we have not yet received your views on the substance of the problem which you intended to convey through your Ambassador in Moscow.

A few words about Cuba. It has to be stated that the United States continues to deliberately aggravate the situation around that country and to increase tensions in the entire Carribean area. This is a dangerous, slippery road. At the same time, we are convinced that any step by the US towards normalization of relations with Cuba would find an appropriate response on the part of that country.

In conclusion, I would like to reemphasize that although differences between our countries will, of course, remain also in the future, our position is not to exacerbate those differences or multiply them and, even more so, not to attempt to overpower each other—which is an unpromising perspective—instead, we favor efforts to expand areas of accord.

I think that at least there gradually emerges a set of really important questions on whose solution our two countries should primarily concentrate their joint efforts being conscious of our mutual responsibility. We are prepared for such work.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

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3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
109. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Nance) to President Reagan

Washington, December 2, 1981

SUBJECT

Soviet Demarche on Afghanistan (C)

On October 31, the Soviet Ambassador responded to proposals on Afghanistan made by Al Haig to Gromyko during their conversation in New York in September and to Dobrynin on October 16. Interpreting these proposals to mean that “there exists a common point of departure,” the Soviet government proposes that conversations be opened between US and Soviet experts on the subject. (S)

Apparently what the Soviet government has in mind is the following remark of Al’s during his private talk with Gromyko on September 28, as recorded in the memorandum of conversation:

(Secretary Haig) thought that it would be very helpful if the following ingredients were included: First, the Afghanistan government should take steps now to broaden its base. Second, the Soviet government could simultaneously study a formula for a phased withdrawal. Third, outside powers could take a number of steps... regarding cross border activities from outside the borders of Afghanistan. He thought that implementation of all three steps in tandem could offer a solution. (p. 13). (S)

The Soviet government almost certainly interpreted this statement as an about face by the United States on Afghanistan. Instead of insisting on a Soviet withdrawal as a precondition for any international cooperation in the region, this proposal suggests that the Soviets “study a formula for a phased withdrawal” and “broaden the base” of their puppet regime in Kabul, while we and other powers concurrently would help stop the flow of weapons and soldiers to the Afghan Freedom Fighters. (S)

The proposal must have seemed sufficiently tempting for Moscow to propose the meeting of experts. It is doubtful if their response indicates a more conciliatory attitude on Afghanistan. (S)

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2 See Document 90.

3 See Document 95.
Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, November 17, 1981

SUBJECT

Soviet Demarche on Afghanistan

Summary: On October 31, Dobrynin delivered a demarche on Afghanistan (TAB A) which contains a number of interesting points, including a Soviet expression of interest in U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks involving “specialists.” Dobrynin’s demarche may well be a tactical ploy, but we cannot exclude the possibility that it is a signal of tentative willingness to negotiate seriously. After consulting with the Pakistanis and briefing the British, French, and Germans, we will instruct Ambassador Hartman to meet with Gromyko to probe Soviet intentions.

Dobrynin’s Demarche: The most striking and potentially significant aspects of Dobrynin’s demarche are: (1) the highly unusual absence of any direct reference to the unacceptable Afghan/Soviet proposals for a settlement or to the general Soviet line that the root cause of the Afghanistan problem is “external interference” from Pakistan supported by the U.S.; and (2) the reference to Soviet willingness to include “specialists” in U.S.-Soviet exchanges of views on a “political settlement around Afghanistan.”

Potential Pitfalls: There is a strong possibility that the Soviet approach is a tactical ploy designed to engage us in bilateral negotiations which might be used by Moscow to reduce international criticism of the Soviet occupation, create tensions in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship, and complicate our efforts to obtain regional cooperation with our Southwest Asia security strategy. The Soviets might also hope that such talks would advance their current “peace offensive” or that the very fact of the talks would induce us to alter other aspects of our policy and actions on Afghanistan. In the context of U.S.-Soviet relations, Moscow might try to portray its agreement to bilateral talks as a “concession” to us for which we should compensate the Soviet Union in arms control or some other aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Thus, we believe that the Soviet approach should be handled with considerable care.

Possibilities: On the other hand, we cannot exclude the possibility that Dobrynin’s approach is an expression of tentative Soviet flexibility on the Afghanistan issue. In this connection, we find particularly interesting

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[^4]: Secret; Sensitive.
the non-polemical tone of the demarche and the omission of any direct reference to the unacceptable Afghan/Soviet proposals for a settlement. If the Soviet approach does reflect new flexibility on the substance of the Afghanistan problem, it could also have important positive implications for our overall approach to U.S.-Soviet relations.

**Next Steps:** We need now to determine whether Dobrynin’s demarche actually signalled an important shift in the substance of the Soviet position on Afghanistan. We intend to consult closely with the Pakistanis and to seek their views. We will provide more general briefings to the British, French, and Germans. Subsequently, we intend to instruct Ambassador Hartman to seek an appointment with Gromyko to probe for further evidence of Soviet flexibility on the substantive issues. After assessing the Soviet reply to this demarche, we will report to you and seek your approval for next steps.

### Tab A

**Soviet Demarche**

Moscow, undated

In connection with the readiness expressed by the US side to continue on the level of experts the exchange of views on questions concerning a political settlement around Afghanistan, which the Secretary of State spoke for at the meeting with A.A. Gromyko in New York as well as in his conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on October 16, we, on our part, confirm our positive attitude towards such a possibility.

It appears to us that the previous discussions revealed, besides the differences in the positions of our two countries, also certain coinciding elements. We understand what has been said on the American side to mean that the US would like to see Afghanistan remain an independent and non-aligned state maintaining good relations with its neighbors and that there is an interest in Washington in having a stable and secure situation in that region.

If it is the case—and this has been precisely the approach always followed by us—then, apparently, it can be assumed that there exists a common point of departure for a more specific discussion of the pertinent questions concerning the political settlement around Afghanistan.

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5 No classification marking.
We would be prepared to hold an exchange of views on those questions through our embassies in Washington or Moscow with the participation, if need be, of additional specialists who deal with the said questions.

We are for conducting such discussions in a business-like manner, in the spirit of realism, and without unnecessary polemics. The work that would be done by our representatives could be of use for the subsequent exchange of views to be held during the meeting between the ministers of the two countries scheduled early next year.

110. Editorial Note


Midway through the meeting, President Reagan “pointed out that both Options 2 and 3 require investment of some $237 million FY 83. He added that there was no question in his mind that the Soviet Union has a tremendous advantage in civil defense just as it has an advantage in weapons.” Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci responded “that the Soviet Union is already at Option 3.” The President went on to say that “it was obvious that no one wanted Option 1,” that “Option 2 does not yet commit us to the most expensive program,” and that “it was a shame we did not have extensive caves near our population centers.” The President also “pointed out that the Soviets already have underground factories.” (Ibid.)

In response to Counselor to the President Edwin Meese’s suggestion of a Presidential decision, President Reagan “said he would like to
stew about the issue. He then asked if evacuation of cities is practical.” Deputy National Security Advisor James Nance “responded by saying that JCS estimates that if the Soviets evacuate their cities prior to a nuclear attack, their losses would be 15 million, a number less than they lost in the Second World War or in the purges. The U.S., on the other hand, would lose some 150 million people. An effective civil defense program can cut that down to less than 40 million.” President Reagan “asked how we could care for all the evacuees that leave high-risk areas.” Meese “said that it would be just like a weekend in New York State.” Major General Bennett Lewis of the Federal Emergency Management Administration “said that it can be done,” and went on to relate “the explanations given to him by Dr. Edward Teller and outlined some systems that could be put in place early to help with the evacuation itself and to beef-up the host areas,” as well as to say “that the evacuees would not have to stay in host areas very long; nature would take care of most of the radiation and decontamination operations would also be conducted.” (Ibid.)

Meese “then said that the most important element in the program now is the psychological advantage it would offer.” President Reagan stated his approval for Option 2, after which Vice President George Bush “related a story about Soviet Ambassador [Yakov] Malik who was in Japan in the Hiroshima bombings.” President Reagan “responded with a joke about the country boy who wanted to be far enough away from a nuclear blast that he could say, ‘What was that?’” At that point the meeting adjourned. (Ibid.) That evening, Reagan wrote in his diary: “N.S.C meeting—I approved starting a Civil Defense buildup. Right now in a nuclear war we’d lose 150 mil. people. The Soviets could hold their loss down to less than were killed in W.W. II.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Volume I, page 89)
111. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, December 4, 1981, 0100Z

320904/TOSEC 140040. Subject: U.S. Demarche to Soviets on Sakharov. Ref: State 316836.2

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Soviet DCM Bessmertnykh called DAS Scanlan on December 3 and said that he wanted to pass on to us orally a reply the Soviet Embassy had just received from Moscow to Undersecretary Stoessel’s demarche to Bessmertnykh on November 27 about “two Soviet gentlemen.” Bessmertnykh said that Moscow was surprised that this issue had been raised again after Ambassador Dobrynin had presented the official Soviet position to Secretary Haig. Bessmertnykh said he had been instructed to emphasize that there is no such issue in Soviet/American relations.

Stoessel

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to Madrid for US Delegation to CSCE. Sent for information to the Secretary of State’s Delegation. Drafted by Schumaker (EUR/SOV/SOBI); cleared by Simons, Scanlan, and McManaway; approved by Stoessel. Haig was in St. Lucia December 2–4 for a meeting of the OAS General Assembly.

2 See Document 107.
SUBJECT
Sakharov Hunger Strike

Andrei Sakharov, the leading Soviet human rights activist and Nobel Prize Laureate, began a hunger strike on Saturday, November 21, on behalf of his daughter-in-law, Elizaveta Alekseeva. Soviet authorities have repeatedly refused to grant her an exit visa to join her husband, Sakharov’s stepson, who presently is studying at Brandeis University. Sakharov believes that his daughter-in-law is being punished for his activities and has adopted the hunger strike as a last desperate measure to influence the Soviet Government.

Over that weekend a telegram was sent to you and other heads of state by 28 prominent scientists and scholars, twenty of them Nobel Prize Laureates, urging you and them to intercede on behalf of Sakharov (Tab B). Given the outstanding achievements of Sakharov in the field of human rights causes and his great friendship for the United States, it would be most appropriate for you to release, as soon as possible, a Presidential statement on Sakharov’s behalf. A suggested text is included at Tab A. Speechwriters have cleared the text. The State Department concurs in this recommendation.

1 Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Dissidents (6/23). No classification marking. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “The President has seen 12/4/81.” Reagan wrote at the top of the memorandum: “Isn’t this action by the Soviets in direct violation of the Helsinki pact? RR.” In a December 9 memorandum to Reagan, Nance replied that “it certainly violates their intent. Basket II, Section I, Sub-paragraph B of the Helsinki Final Act states: ‘Participating states will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family.’ The Soviet Government could argue that Miss Alekseeva, having married Mr. Semionov by proxy in the United States, is by Soviet law not really a member of his family; but the only reason that a marriage-by-proxy had to be organized last summer is that Miss Alekseeva had been unable for over three years to secure an exit visa which would have enabled her to go through a regular marriage ceremony.” (Ibid.)

2 Not found attached.

3 Attached but not printed is the text: “Academician Andrei Sakharov, a leading Soviet scientist and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, and his wife have been for over a week on a hunger strike. They are protesting the repeated refusal of the Soviet authorities to grant an exit visa to Mr. Sakharov’s daughter-in-law, Elizaveta Alekseeva, to join her husband, Mr. Aleksi Semionov, a student at an American university. The young couple has been separated for a long time. I am concerned for the health of Mr. and Mrs. Sakharov and strongly urge the Soviet government to allow Mrs. Alekseeva to join her husband.” The White House released the statement the same day. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, p. 1142)
RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Presidential statement at Tab A concerning Andrei Sakharov.4

4 Reagan checked and initialed his approval.

113. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Haig1

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Contingency Planning for Sakharov Death

You asked about ideas for what we might do in the event Sakharov were to die in detention.

In fact, the contingency still seems unlikely. The latest reports are very ambiguous. Media reports that he is in “critical” condition are based on a statement by Academy of Sciences President Alexandrov to the daughter-in-law that his “situation” is “very serious” but may be “resolved today or tomorrow.” Meanwhile, the girl has been called in by both KGB and emigration authorities only to find her interlocutors “ill.” It appears to us the Soviets are in a quandary which leaves room for action that could be favorable as well as unfavorable.

That said, we are working on the following possible steps in case Sakharov dies:

— Presidential Statement. The NSC Staff agrees a strong statement would be advisable, and has it under consideration.2

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, Box 60, December 8, 1981. Confidential. Drafted by Simons on December 8; cleared by Scanlan. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “AMH.” Haig wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “will make statement tomorrow.” An unknown hand wrote “12/8/81” beneath Haig’s comment.

2 Haig wrote: “do it!” over this point.
—Memorial Service at the National Cathedral. Presidential participation is assumed. Once again, the NSC Staff is favorably inclined.  

—Congressional Joint Resolution. We are consulting within the Department on the best approach to the Hill.

—CSCE. We are querying Ambassador Kampelman as to what would be most effective in Madrid. Possibilities range from a moment of silence through delegation walkouts to abrupt recess. Our recent exchanges with Genscher on the recess question pertain. You may wish to raise the issue at the Quad Dinner.

—INF. We are discussing with ACDA whether we should ask for a temporary recess in the INF negotiations to mark a death.

—Your Meeting with Gromyko. Similarly, you may wish to consider whether you would wish to postpone your meeting with Gromyko for a stated period.

—Demarche to Gromyko. The action memo on instructions to Hartman which Larry will wish to discuss with you in Brussels includes an item on Sakharov: Hartman would pass over the President’s December 4 statement on your behalf. It would be useful to have this on the record in case Sakharov dies.

—Embassy Representation at the Funeral. We should in any event be ready to instruct Art Hartman to try to represent you and the President at Sakharov’s funeral, assuming he would be buried in Moscow.

—Scientific Exchanges. There is relatively little left in the barrel after Afghanistan—official exchanges are running at 25% of pre-1980 levels—and it would be even more difficult to reverse explicit Sakharov sanctions to reflect future forward movement in the relationship. Nevertheless, the following actions are under consideration:

—Official Exchanges. We would wish to cancel a number of planned or projected visits to register our shock. White House OSTP chief Dr. Keyworth is also considering a personal statement pointing to the damage the event would wreck on prospects for renewal (as distinguished from levels) of existing agreements.

—Private Exchanges. NAS President Frank Press has of course been very active, like many American scientists, and met with Dobrynin yesterday. We are encouraging the NAS to consider a warning statement now on

3 Haig wrote: “do it” over this point.
4 Haig wrote: “Resolution!” at the end of this point.
5 Haig wrote: “will do” at the end of the point.
6 Haig wrote: “do it!” beneath this point.
7 Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this point and wrote: “agree.”
8 Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this point.
9 Haig placed a checkmark at the end of this sentence.
the catastrophic consequences if Sakharov dies, as a prelude to the kind of retribution the Soviets must expect from the American scientific community.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{10} Sakharov ended his hunger strike on December 9 after Soviet authorities granted Yelizaveta Alekseyeva permission to emigrate.

\section*{114. Memorandum of Conversation\textsuperscript{1}}

\begin{flushright}Brussels, December 9, 1981, 7:45–11 p.m.\end{flushright}

\textbf{PARTICIPANTS}

\textbf{FRG}

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher  
Political Director Franz Pfeffer  
Mr. Hans von Ploetz, Aide to the Minister

\textbf{FRANCE}

Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson  
Political Director Jacques Andreani  
Mr. Denis Delbourg, Aide to the Minister

\textbf{UK}

Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington  
Deputy Undersecretary Julian Bullard  
Mr. Brian Fall, Private Secretary to Lord Carrington

\textbf{U.S.}

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary Lawrence S. Eagleburger  
Mr. George F. Ward, Jr. (notetaker)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

\textit{EAST-WEST RELATIONS}

Secretary Haig began by noting the importance of Soviet eagerness to continue the dialogue begun in September with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. The next meeting would be in Geneva on January 26

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, Box 61, December 9, 1981. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Ward; cleared by Eagleburger; approved by Haig. The meeting was held at the residence of the French Ambassador to Belgium. Haig was in Brussels December 9–13 for a NATO Ministerial meeting.
and 27. The Secretary recalled that at the September meeting he had tabled U.S. concerns about a number of Soviet activities. These activities had continued unabated. The Soviet Union had supplied 60,000 tons of military equipment to Cuba in the first nine months of this year. That was three times the flow of recent years. The Soviets had stated that their objective was to modernize the Cuban forces, but the U.S. was skeptical.

In September Secretary Haig had spoken frankly to Gromyko on finding a solution in southern Africa within the framework of the Contact Group. Gromyko had not rejected Haig’s approach, but neither had there been Soviet movement in the meantime. The subject of southern Africa would be high on the U.S. agenda for Geneva. There had been increasing evidence of Angolan, front-line state, and even Cuban interest in a Cuban withdrawal from Angola.

The Secretary said that since the first meeting there had been clear indications that the Soviets were looking for a way out of Afghanistan. It was important for the West to remain unified on that subject. The Secretary thought that the Soviets might well make specific proposals on: withdrawal of forces, Western assurances on cross-border “interferences,” return of refugees, and some sort of tricky formula on self-determination contingent on the implementation of the first three elements. The Secretary promised to be back to the others by telegram in order to coordinate positions.

On the subject of Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), the Secretary mentioned that he hoped soon to have U.S. positions on venue and starting date.

The second meeting with Gromyko, the Secretary continued, would also touch on bilateral issues such as a long-term grain agreement, a maritime agreement, and the status of the U.S. Consulate in Kiev.

As for the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet summit, the Secretary said it was too early to suggest that the Haig-Gromyko discussions could open the door to a summit. President Reagan was well disposed toward the idea of a summit, but only if something meaningful could result.

Summarizing the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, the Secretary said that the tone of exchanges was better. Both sides seemed to have a constructive attitude, which promoted dialogue. However, the U.S. had not found any flexibility in Soviet positions on the more difficult issues. Of course, the U.S. welcomed any advice or counsel from the Allies.

Lord Carrington asked whether it was the U.S. intention to continue the Haig-Gromyko contacts. Those contacts seemed to the UK an admirable channel. The Secretary responded that continuation was probably inevitable because so many topics had been opened.
Carrington went on to say that the question of a U.S.-Soviet summit was of a different scale. A summit required a great deal of preparation. One of the most important purposes the U.S. could achieve in contacts with the Soviets was to lay down the limits of Western tolerance for Soviet activities. Had those limits been clearer in 1979, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan might not have occurred.

The Secretary agreed wholeheartedly. Despite the criticism which was often directed at the U.S. for anti-Soviet rhetoric, the fact remained that the Soviet Union had not undertaken any new aggressive initiative since the beginning of the Reagan Administration. That was partly because the Soviets had overextended themselves, but also was due in part to Soviet perception of new U.S. firmness.

French Foreign Minister Cheysson thought that the pattern of Soviet behavior was also determined to a large extent by the “remarkable sclerosis” of the whole Soviet system. It was important for the Allies to focus on specific subjects like Afghanistan, but there seemed to be little likelihood of positive Soviet responses.

The Secretary observed that while the public focus of U.S.-Soviet relations seemed to be on arms control, he personally did not view arms control as a centerpiece. Soviet aggression in regional disputes was the real threat to peace. The U.S. had to take steps to resolve these threats, but knew that it would be futile to give high priority to situations that could involve serious loss of face by the Soviets. For that reason, the U.S. had to emphasize ambiguous situations, such as southern Africa and support for revolutionary movements in other parts of the Third World.

German Foreign Minister Genscher turned to the subject of the recent visit by Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev to Bonn. One of Brezhnev’s principal aims, Genscher asserted, had undoubtedly been to test German solidarity on both tracks of the NATO double decision. The Soviets were also interested in whether the West would be negotiating seriously on INF. With this in mind, Genscher would stress at the forthcoming NAC Ministerial that the most important thing any NATO Ally could do to contribute to the Western negotiating position on INF would be to declare willingness to deploy INF weapons. Overemphasis on negotiations was not wise.

Commenting on the atmosphere of the Brezhnev visit and on Brezhnev’s health, Genscher said that the Soviet President had read all of his papers and never made an _ad hoc_ statement. It was clear that Brezhnev had little endurance, but he was still clearly number one in the hierarchy. It was also clear, however, that those who control the flow of information to Brezhnev had enormous power.

Carrington suggested that another of Brezhnev’s objectives in Bonn had been to end the isolation imposed by the West in the wake of the
invasion of Afghanistan. Genscher agreed, but said that the first Haig-Gromyko meeting had been a preliminary step out of that isolation. The visit had not been an easy one for the Soviets to undertake; they had to cope with demonstrations organized by the CDU and FDP against the Soviet position in Afghanistan. President Reagan’s November 18 speech had been right on target, and took away 50 percent of Brezhnev’s negotiating offers.

Secretary Haig expressed pleasure at Genscher’s intentions for the NAC Ministerial, especially because the Dutch Foreign Minister seemed to be looking for ways to further weaken communique passages on INF deployments. It was important to prevent that.

Carrington agreed that weakening of the NATO position on deployment would seriously harm the U.S. negotiating position in Geneva.

On Afghanistan, the Ministers agreed that Western unity was essential, and that a return to normal relations with the Soviet Union was not possible as long as Soviet troops were there.

Turning to the general nature of Soviet involvement in regional problems, Carrington asked for the Secretary’s views on coordination between Cuban and Soviet policy.

The Secretary responded that he had always believed that Soviet advisers, not Cubans, were running the Nicaraguan armed forces. In Angola, Soviets, not Cubans, were running SWAPO. That had been confirmed by the government of South Africa and by UNITA leader Savimbi. There were thousands of Soviets in Libya, and they make the key decisions there also.

Carrington asked how that affected Central America. The Secretary said that because the Soviets made the key decisions in regional situations, they could resolve those situations if they were interested in improving relations with the West. The results of a strong U.S. demarche to the Soviets on their activities in Cuba after the assassination of President Kennedy had demonstrated that the Soviets could regulate Cuban behavior precisely. To be sure, insurgencies would continue, but without Soviet exacerbation they would not become threats to world stability. This meant, continued the Secretary, that the West had to continue to press the Soviet Union and the Cubans and also to work at the roots of the economic and social problems which created the basis for successful insurgencies.
115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, December 10, 1981, 2049Z

327309. Subject: Soviet Embassy on Sakharov Decision.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. At working lunch December 9 with EUR DAS Scanlan and EUR/SOV Director Simons, after news that Liza Alexeyeva had been told a visa would be granted, Soviet Minister-Counselor Bessmertnykh said in response to a request for confirmation that the information he had would support the report.

3. At the same time, Bessmertnykh went on, the case had developed in an unfortunate way. He and Ambassador Dobrynin might recommend one thing, but there are “others” who think differently. In the meantime a tremendous public uproar develops, with damaging consequences. It would have been better to choose one course and stick with it. This way, not only has damage been sustained but the “principled, consistent” policy approach which should govern has been sacrificed.

4. Comment. We do not overinterpret these remarks, since they are characteristically ambiguous and ingratiating after the fact. At the same time, they bring to mind Bessmertnykh’s concluding remark during Under Secretary Stoessel’s November 27 démarche2 to him on the Secretary’s behalf concerning Sakharov, where on a “personal” basis he expressed confidence that the case would not end as “many” were then projecting. They also tend to confirm our assumption of serious and shifting policy debate on Sakharov. Finally, they support the thesis that the decision to release Liza Alexeyeva has indeed been taken.

Clark

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent Immediate to Madrid and the U.S. Mission to NATO. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Matthews in P; approved by Scanlan.

2 See Document 107.
116. Editorial Note

On the evening of December 12, 1981, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law in Poland. Secretary of State Alexander Haig was in Belgium for a meeting of the North Atlantic Council. “The news was flashed to me at three o’clock Sunday morning Brussels,” he wrote in his memoir. “The timing of this action, which obviously had been meticulously prepared—and which we knew had been planned in minute detail in the U.S.S.R.—came without forewarning to the United States.” Using a secure telephone in his hotel room, Haig spoke to Vice President George H.W. Bush in Washington and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on a plane over the Atlantic Ocean. (Haig, Caveat, pages 246–250) Haig also spoke to President Ronald Reagan, who was at Camp David, from 9:12 to 9:16 a.m. EST. At 1:33 p.m., Reagan flew from Camp David to Washington and met with Bush, Deputy Secretary of State William Clark, White House Chief of Staff James Baker, Deputy White House Chief of Staff Deaver, and Acting President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Nance, from 3:03 to 3:22 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Minutes for the telephone call and the meeting were not found. Reagan wrote in his diary that day: “A long walk in the morning then an afternoon at the desk. Somehow it seems easier there. Word received that Poland has moved on Solidarity. Leaders have been arrested, union meetings & publications banned, martial law declared. Our intelligence is that it was engineered & ordered by the Soviet. If so, and I believe it is, the situation is really grave. One thing certain—they won’t get that $100 mil. worth of corn.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Volume I, page 92) Further documentation of the U.S. response to the declaration of martial law in Poland is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume VII, Poland, 1977–1981.
117. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State
Haig’s Delegation in Brussels

Washington, December 13, 1981, 2311Z

329853/TOSEC 150178. Subject: Under Secretary Stoessel’s Meeting
with Bessmertnykh, December 13.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Under Secretary called in Soviet DCM Bessmertnykh, in tempo-
rary absence of Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, to provide text of Secre-
tary’s 4:00 p.m. Brussels statement on the Polish situation. The Under
Secretary, in walking Bessmertnykh through the statement, empha-
sized that the U.S. was deeply concerned about developments in Poland
and their effect on the stability of the region. He said the U.S. urged
all parties to exercise the maximum degree of restraint, prudence, and
cautions for their approach to the Polish situation. The USG, in briefing
congressional leaders and other public figures, had urged them to be
cautious in their public statement; the U.S. did not want to see an over-
reaction or excess excitement, but at the same time wanted to convey
to the Soviet Government how deeply concerned we were. Stoessel
drew particular attention to the last paragraph of the Secretary’s state-
ment to effect that Poles should find solution to their problems without
any outside interference.

3. Bessmertnykh, in response, said he wanted to clarify just what
was being discussed. The Secretary’s statement expressed concern
about the situation “in” Poland, and noted that this had been taken
up with the Polish authorities. This was not, he stated, a subject for
the US-Soviet bilateral relationship. The Polish events were a domestic
matter, not the subject for any diplomatic activities between us. The
Under Secretary replied that the USSR was closely allied with Poland.
It had to be assumed that there had been close consultations between
the Polish and Soviet Governments prior to recent events. For this
reason the U.S. wanted to communicate its general concern.

4. Bessmertnykh said he understood the U.S. concern, and wel-
come the U.S. appeal for cautiousness. He urged the U.S. not to get
excited, but to exercise coolness and calmness until it had a clearer
picture of the situation, so that there would be no mis-steps. The Under

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret;
Niac; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to NATO capitals, Moscow,
and Warsaw. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Scanlan; approved by Stoessel.

2 Haig’s statement was transmitted in telegram 329838 to all Diplomatic and Consul-
lar Posts, December 13. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810593–0279)
Secretary replied that this was also the U.S. approach. The Secretary had urged that the situation not be overcharged with emotion.

5. Bessmertnykh said that nothing in the present picture would warrant any U.S. concern about the Soviet Union. The USSR was not part of the situation. Moscow was watching developments but it was for the Poles to decide. The Under Secretary said that the U.S. was also watching the situation. We had seen the initial reaction from Solidarity headquarters, including the call for a general strike. We hoped violence could be avoided, and a peaceful solution found.

6. Bessmertnykh said this was up to the Polish authorities. If they decided that it was necessary to use force, that was their own business. Outside parties could not dictate to a major sovereign power what to do and what not to do. Any legal government, including the USG, had the means to impose its will on certain elements if they acted against the laws of the country. He added that he did not like the part of the Secretary’s statement calling for compromise and negotiation. This could be interpreted as interference in Poland’s internal affairs.

7. The Under Secretary noted that thus far the Polish authorities had been seeking a compromise solution. There were great risks in a turn to violence. Bessmertnykh replied that no one was in favor of violence. But others could not tell the Poles what to do. This was their own business. Bessmertnykh recalled the period of “critical weekends” last spring, when the U.S. had overreacted, and said he hoped the USG would view the present situation more calmly and coolly. It would be an overreaction for a big power to become an element of the situation, one way or the other. The Under Secretary reiterated that all concerned should exercise moderation and restraint.

8. Bessmertnykh used the occasion to hand over non-paper on Soviet position on Law of the Sea consultations, which Dobrynin was to have delivered December 14 (to be cabled septel). Before concluding the meeting, the sides agreed that, in commenting on the meeting before the press, both sides would take the line that several subjects were discussed, Poland among them, and decline further comment.
118. Telegram From Secretary of State Haig’s Delegation to the Department of State and the White House¹

December 14, 1981, 1400Z

SECTO 15097. Subject: Message to the President. For the President from Secretary Haig.

1. Secret—Entire text.
2. Thus far the administration has struck the right balance in the delicate and evolving situation in Poland. As you know, we still lack the basic information that would enable us to draw conclusions on what the imposition of martial law in Poland means for the future of the political reform process there. I believe, and there is intelligence information to substantiate my view, that the Soviets were involved in yesterday’s events and that this could be a prelude to a further internal crackdown. Nevertheless, the pressures for reform in Poland remain high and it is simply too soon to judge whether the process of political liberalization has come to an end. It is thus vital, at this stage, to keep all our options open.

3. For this reason, we must avoid two extremes in our policymaking as well as our public posture. On the one hand, we must not incite internal violence which could lead to full-scale civil war and further repression. At the same time, because we don’t know how the Polish authorities intend to proceed, in the period ahead we cannot allow ourselves to acquiesce in internal or external repression in Poland.

4. In these circumstances, we must avoid taking any premature decisions toward Poland on such issues as food aid, trade and debt rescheduling. As a result I have asked that all such actions now underway be held in abeyance for the immediate future. It is important that we preserve our leverage on the Polish Government, making use of it as we can in the weeks ahead to apply pressure against domestic repression and encourage moderation and reform. Some of our allies may decide to adopt a business-as-usual attitude before it is clear precisely what the Polish Government intends to do, but we must continue to exercise leadership on this issue. Thus, I have instructed our NATO Ambassador, Tap Bennett, in the special session of the North Atlantic Council today, to avoid any hasty decisions by the Alliance.

5. I am also making sure that this posture is maintained in the negotiations we are currently conducting in Geneva (INF) and Madrid (CSCE). At Madrid I am asking our Chief Delegate, Max Kampleman,

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N810010–0084. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent from Haig’s airplane as he traveled from Brussels to Washington.
to inform our allies and friends that in view of the uncertain events in Poland we cannot conclude an agreement on confidence-building measures and human rights at this time. (Such an agreement was in any case highly unlikely.) At Geneva, we should continue the INF talks until popular reaction in Poland crystalizes or until the Soviet role is clarified. For now, I am instructing Paul Nitze to inform the Soviets in private that their conduct vis-a-vis Poland could affect the course of those negotiations.

6. These steps are designed to give us maximum flexibility in what is clearly a very fluid situation in Poland. Only through this tactic will you preserve your ability to influence the Polish authorities or Soviet behavior in the days ahead. While avoiding excessive rhetoric, we must continue to express our serious concern about the future of political reform in Poland. Of course, in order for us to preserve all our options, it will be necessary to maintain tight discipline over public statements as well as our own decision-making process, particularly since some of our critics may well attempt to exploit this situation for partisan political purposes.

7. I will be returning from Brussels this afternoon and will be in touch with you upon my arrival.

Haig

119. Memorandum From the President’s Acting Assistant for National Security Affairs (Nance) to President Reagan

Washington, December 15, 1981

SUBJECT
Pentecostal Families in US Embassy Moscow

Embassy Moscow has provided a good report on the plight of the Vashchenko and Chmykhalov families. It notes that:

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2 Hartman provided a report on the Vaschenko and Chmykhalov families in telegram 16758 from Moscow, December 8. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810584–0507)
—the families are showing some flexibility in the steps they are willing to take to resolve their situation and, in particular, have come to accept that the Soviet authorities are unlikely ever to agree to any direct emigration from the embassy;
—resolution will require the families to agree to a way that will make it easier for Soviet authorities to allow emigration;
—the families are generally in good health, with a couple of exceptions;
—the embassy's policy of liberalized access, implemented in early 1981, is helping and possible improvements in the families' living conditions are being examined;
—interest in the case is growing in the West, particularly in the UK; and
—we must continue high-level expressions of interest in this case as an important factor in our bilateral relations.

120. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, December 18, 1981

SUBJECT
Discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin December 18 about Poland

After dinner at the British Embassy December 18, Ambassador Dobrynin and I had a private conversation about Poland. I stressed our great concern about the repression in Poland, the arrests of Solidarity officials and others and said that, as both the President and the Secretary have underlined, it is essential that moves be made urgently in the direction of reconciliation and compromise. Jaruzelski had said that the process of renewal would be conducted but we see no signs of that. If the present situation continued, I said it would inevitably have an adverse impact on U.S.-Soviet relations, since the influence of the Soviets in Poland was overwhelming. I said that any intervention by the Soviets themselves of course would have an even greater negative effect.

Dobrynin claimed that Jaruzelski is a strong Polish nationalist who was acting in the best interests of the Polish nation. Much had been tolerated in Poland, but, particularly with the meeting in Radom of Solidarity, it had become clear that the real aim of Solidarity was to seize political power in Poland. Dobrynin said that this was beyond the limit of acceptability. He stated that the Soviets would not object if Solidarity wished to form a strong trade union, conduct strikes there and institute self management in Polish factories. All of this could be tolerated but an effort to take over political power could not.

Dobrynin defended the use of force by the Polish regime, saying that all governments have the right to defend the state structure and to preserve law and order. He also said that, as we have seen, the Soviets have been moderate and restrained in their attitude. Not one Soviet soldier has participated in any of the events in Poland.

Dobrynin claimed that the Soviets have given five billion dollars in hard currency assistance to Poland in addition to raw materials and other commodities. He saw no reason why the U.S. should not continue its assistance to Poland.

Dobrynin felt that the U.S. position concerning Polish developments had been moderate and responsible, although he noted that the President’s statement the previous day had been notably sharper in tone. He acknowledged, however, that the President refused to get into details of options open for action. Dobrynin felt that this was a good thing. Dobrynin stressed his hope that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union would look at developments in Poland without emotion and would not permit them to be the cause for deterioration of our relations.

I observed that there is already a great deal of emotion in this country about the Polish events. The fact that we have so many people in this country of Polish origin adds to the strength of these sentiments. When we observe the repression taking place in Poland it is inevitable that emotions will rise and that pressures on the government to do something about the situation will increase. Dobrynin rejoined that the Soviet people also have emotions. They remember how many Soviet soldiers were killed in liberating Poland from the Nazis and they are profoundly upset by what has been happening in Poland over the last year and a half.

In concluding the conversation, I reiterated our great concern and stressed again the necessity of establishing dialogue in Poland between

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2 Reference is to Reagan’s statement at the start of his news conference on December 17. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, pp. 1161–1170)
the authorities, Solidarity, and the Church which could lead to a process of reconciliation.

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.  

3 Stoessel initialed the memorandum above his typed signature.

121. Editorial Note

From December 21 to 23, 1981, President Ronald Reagan held daily meetings of the National Security Council (NSC) on the subject of martial law in Poland. These meetings featured a vigorous debate between Secretary of State Alexander Haig, who advocated restraint and limited economic sanctions, and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick, who advocated that the President embark upon a sustained rhetorical campaign against the Soviet Union and cripple the construction of the Siberian pipeline. On December 21, the NSC met in the Roosevelt Room of the White House from 10:30 to 11:48 a.m. to discuss what message to send Moscow. “I cannot make a ‘Santa Claus is Coming to Town’ speech in this environment,” Reagan stated at the end of the meeting. “The letter to Brezhnev could contain carrots. It could address the fact that they haven’t been able to provide their people the living standard they would like and that they would be in an even worse plight without trade (with the West). We could say that we cannot continue trade (if events in Poland continue) and that we will press our Allies to follow us unless the Polish situation is alleviated. But again holding out our hand. Can he envision what it would be like if trade with the West were open? It would be a different, much better, world. He can have that one, giving up nothing, or the one that will result if we are forced to take trade-cutting actions.” (Minutes of a National Security Council meeting, December 21; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00033)

On December 22, the NSC met in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 2:30 to 4 p.m. to discuss sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union, as well as the President’s letters to Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party Wojciech Jaruzelski and his speech to the nation scheduled for
the following evening. Counselor to the President Edwin Meese summarized the meeting’s conclusion: “The speech tomorrow night will indicate that letters have been sent to Brezhnev and Jaruzelski; It will list specific steps to be taken against the Polish government; If there is no Soviet response, we will select actions from a list without deciding which actions now.” (Minutes of a National Security Council meeting, December 22; Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00034 Dec 81 (1/2)) Reagan summoned the NSC again the following morning, from 11 a.m. to 12:22 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. After a discussion of the draft Presidential address on the situation in Poland, Reagan remarked: “Not enough in this is directed against the Soviet Union. We must say that they are responsible.” Reagan continued: “We can say that martial law was being printed in October in Moscow and imposed in Poland in December.” After further discussion of the speech and a broader public diplomacy campaign, as well as the possibility of appealing to the United Nations, Meese urged members of the administration to keep the White House signal board apprised of their whereabouts over the Christmas break, in case the situation in Poland deteriorated further. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00035) Reagan wrote in his diary on December 23: “In N.S.C. worked out final touches for speech tonite on all networks. OK’d letters to Brezhnev & Jaruzelski. Said more in the letters than I will in the speech.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Volume I, page 96) Reagan’s letter to Jaruzelski as well as the minutes of the December 21, 22, and 23 NSC meetings are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume VII, Poland, 1977–1981. The December 23 speech is in Public Papers: Reagan, 1981, pages 1185–1188. The letter to Brezhnev is printed as Document 122.
122. Message From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Washington, undated

Dear Mr. President:

The recent events in Poland have filled the people of the United States and me with dismay. Since the imposition of martial law on December 13, the most elementary rights of the Polish people have been violated daily: massive arrests without any legal procedures; incarcerations of trade union leaders and intellectuals in overcrowded jails and freezing detention camps; suspension of all rights of assembly and association; and, last but not least, brutal assaults by security forces on citizens.

The recent events in Poland clearly are not an “internal matter” and in writing to you, as the head of the Soviet Government, I am not misaddressing my communication. Your country has repeatedly intervened in Polish affairs during the months preceding the recent tragic events. No clearer proof of such intervention is needed than the letter of June 5, 1981, from the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Polish leadership which warns the Poles that the Soviet Union could not tolerate developments there. There were numerous other communications of this nature which placed pressure on the Polish Government and depicted the reform movement as a threat to the “vital interests” of all Socialist countries. These communications, accompanied by a steady barrage of media assaults as well as military exercises along Poland’s borders, were coupled with warnings of intervention unless the Polish Government sharply restricted the liberties and rights which it was granting its citizens.

All these actions represented a clear violation of many international agreements to which the Soviet Union is a signatory. Let me only mention one provision of the Helsinki Final Act which you, Mr. President, personally initialed on behalf of your country in 1975. There you have agreed with other countries to refrain “from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective in the internal or external

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, Box 38, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8190210). Top Secret; Sensitive; Specat. Sent to Reagan for his approval by Nance under cover of a December 23 memorandum, on which Reagan wrote: “RR OK.” (Ibid.) A December 23 telegram to Moscow indicates that the letter was sent by MOLINK. (Ibid.)

affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating state, regardless of their mutual relations.”

Our two countries have had moments of accord and moments of disagreement but since Afghanistan nothing has so outraged our public opinion as the pressures and threats which your government has exerted on Poland to stifle the stirrings of freedom.

Attempts to suppress the Polish people—either by the Polish army and police acting under Soviet pressure, or through even more direct use of Soviet military force—certainly will not bring about long-term stability in Poland and could unleash a process which neither you nor we could fully control.

The only sensible solution is to allow the Polish Government and people to begin a process of reconciliation, and to do so now, before the situation deteriorates further. This cannot be done in the present atmosphere of political terror, mass arrests and bloodshed. Representatives of the spiritual, political and social forces in Poland need to be promptly released from detention and a new national dialogue initiated. This is as essential to solving Poland’s major economic problems as it is to healing its political wounds. It is the sole path to long-term stability in Poland and therefore in Europe as a whole.

The Soviet Union can either acknowledge the need for this process or continue to prevent it. The consequences of each of these courses for our relationship should be clear.

Over the course of 1981 we have begun to develop a framework, to guide our relations in the years to come. In Secretary Haig’s last meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko\(^3\) and in my last letter to you,\(^4\) we set forth a concrete agenda for negotiations on critical regional and arms control issues. It has been our hope and intention to proceed in 1982 to try to achieve specific progress on each item on this agenda.

The Soviet Union must decide whether we can move ahead with this agenda, or whether we will travel a different path. The heavy responsibility of the Soviet Union for the present repression in Poland threatens to undermine the basis for an improvement in our relationship. We recognize the interest of the Soviet Union in a stable Poland. But a process of reconciliation and moderate reform in Poland represents no threat to the Soviet Union. The United States cannot accept suppression of the Polish peoples legitimate desire for such a process of renewal, particularly when it is imposed under external pressure. Should the Soviet Union persist in aiding the course of continued

\(^3\) See Document 91.
\(^4\) See Document 103.
suppression in Poland, the United States will have no choice but to take concrete measures affecting the full range of our relationship.

Soviet actions in the days and weeks ahead will determine our decisions. As leaders of two great and powerful nations, we bear a mutual obligation to demonstrate wisdom, moderation and restraint. Let me assure you that I am prepared to join in the process of helping to heal Poland’s wounds and to meet its real needs if you are prepared to reciprocate. I call upon you to make clear that you understand the need for national reconciliation in Poland. The alternative is not in the interest of anyone.

I hope to hear from you in the next few days.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

5 Printed from a copy bearing this typed signature.

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123. Memorandum From the Acting President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Nance) to President Reagan

Washington, December 25, 1981

SUBJECT

Letter from Brezhnev

Attached is a letter we have just received from Brezhnev over MOLINK. We have had it translated here in the NSC. As you will see, it is abrasive, and accuses you of gross interference in the internal affairs of Poland and Russia. However, the interesting part of the letter is that it is not as abrasive as some previously received from Brezhnev and asks that we talk. It tries to minimize our differences over Poland as being secondary to overall U.S./Soviet relations and the need for arms control agreements. He hints in response to your assertion we would be forced to take certain actions toward the Soviet Union if

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8190211, 8290012). Secret.
it persisted in pressuring Poland, that so little is left in U.S./Soviet collaboration anyway that your threat isn’t very frightening. The tacit assumption of the letter is that an irreversible change has taken place in Poland’s reverting to the Soviet model, that Poland therefore has ceased to be a “problem”, and the U.S. and the Soviet Union should go on to other issues.

I have discussed the letter with Ed Meese and the Vice President. We are planning the following actions unless you direct otherwise.

1. I will prepare for you a complete list of actions we can take against the Soviet Union. This list will be graduated in severity, will afford you many options and will be predicated on the discussions we had during the NSC meetings.

2. I have scheduled a meeting on Monday morning, with the Vice President chairing, in which we will discuss the list of options I will provide you. Participants in the meeting will be all the principles of the Special Situation Group (SSG).

3. Following the meeting, the Vice President and Ed Meese will call you with the recommendations from the SSG to obtain your approval. They will be speaking from the list of options I will provide you to assist you in making your decisions.

Should you desire any changes in our proposed plan of action, the Vice President and I will be readily available by phone.

Attachment

Message From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan

Moscow, undated

Dear Mr. President:

Your address on the Direct Communications Link has made all the more pressing the necessity to call upon you and the government of the USA to put a final end to the interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state—the Polish People’s Republic. This interference in its various forms—overt and covert—has continued for a long time.

2 December 28.

3 Top Secret; Sensitive; Specat. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “WHCA Second Translation.” On December 26, Haig wrote Reagan a memorandum calling Brezhnev’s letter “the harshest Presidential level communication we have received from the Soviet Union in recent years,” and proposing a number of economic and political measures to take in response. (National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files, SSG 0005, RWR 12/28/81)
In your current letter, you have placed your personal signature upon the fact that gross interference in the internal affairs of Poland is the official policy of the United States. We have condemned and continue to condemn such a policy and consider it unacceptable.

Attempting to mask this policy, you did not address the point of the letter of the Central Committee of our Party dated 5 June of this year, which was sent to the Central Committee of the PZPR (Polish United Worker’s Party). Not to mention the fact that in so doing you distorted its sense, you again speak from the position of interference in the mutual relations between two political parties—the CPSU and the PZPR, between whom, there exists their own completely equal and friendly norms and procedures of contact. Such procedures are not new.

If a frank exchange of opinions between Communist parties and the expressions by them of their opinions to each other is not pleasing to someone in the United States, then, in reply, we must firmly say: that is the business of the parties themselves and only them. And the Polish people do not sit in judgment of others, who would force their values on them.

It is especially important to emphasize such a principal point.

From the standpoint of our party, antipathy has been, and continues to be, expressed in relation to those in Poland who are enemies of the existing system there and who break the laws and violate the law and order of the country and are plunging it into chaos.

You, yourself, as head of the state and government of the United States, are speaking out against the existing state system in Poland; in other words, you favor the overthrow of this system. This has not been imagined, but is the most real interference in the internal affairs of another sovereign state.

And this is taking place not only in relation to Poland. Similar attempts are also being undertaken in relation to the Soviet Union. American officials, yes, even you personally, are defaming our social and state system, our internal order. We resolutely repudiate this.

In the light of these and many other generally known facts, what then remains of your discussions concerning our alleged participation in the internal events in Poland? Nothing remains.

In your address is quoted the good provision of the Helsinki Final Act upon which was placed not only my signature but also the signature of the President of the United States. Yes, this provision stipulates the restraint from any interference in the affairs which concern the internal competence of another state, which, by the way, is the only way to refer to the unacceptability of the United States advancing any sort of demand regarding the introduction of martial law by the highest Polish organs in accordance with the state constitution and the attempt of the
United States to dictate to the Poles what they should and should not do.\(^4\)

No one should interfere with what the Poles and the Polish authorities are doing and will do in their own home.

Instead of letting the Poles themselves decide, you aspire to decide for them by what means and how the Polish society should develop further. But the social order in Poland was chosen not by Washington, not by Moscow, and not by any other capital, but by the Poles themselves. No one can direct the leadership of Poland on how to conduct their own affairs or which methods will more quickly and better stabilize the situation in the country.

Attempts to dictate your will to other states are in gross contradiction to the elementary norms of international law. I would like to say further: they are thoroughly amoral. And no sort of game with words regarding the rights of man can hide this fact.

The Soviet Union repudiates the claims of anyone to interfere in the events occurring in Poland.

In your letter there is mentioned the military maneuvers near Poland. You clearly wish to make your own interpretations about these maneuvers and apply them to the situation in Poland. But this is completely unfounded conjecture.

Speaking of military maneuvers, the question arises: How many maneuvers have the NATO countries, including the USA, conducted and continue to conduct in Western Europe near the borders of the GDR and Czechoslovakia? Could they (GDR and Czechoslovakia) not then present to the United States their assessment of this situation? And could we not assess such maneuvers as a threat to the Soviet Union and to other Socialist countries?

Such is the worth of your references to the military maneuvers.

You, Mr. President, hint that if the further events in Poland should develop in a manner unsatisfactory to the United States, damage will be inflicted along the entire range of Soviet-American relations.

\(^4\) In an undated handwritten note, Reagan wrote: “Mr. B. says we are intervening—we know the Soviets are—maybe we should tell him we won’t if he won’t. On P.3 he says we are dictating to the Poles that now we should interfere with what the Poles and Polish authorities are doing in their own home. It seems to me we are supporting the right of the Polish people to vote on the govt. they’d like to have. Mr. B. is supporting the right of the govt. to deny the Polish people a voice in their govt. Incidentally didn’t the Yalta Pact call for the people having the right to vote on what govt they would have? The Soviets violated that pact. RR.” (Ibid.) The text of this note is similar to the entry in Reagan’s personal diary for that day. (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Vol. I, p. 96)
But if we are to speak frankly, it is your administration that has already done enough to disrupt or at the very least undermine everything positive which was achieved at the cost of great effort by previous American administrations in the relations between our countries. Today, unfortunately, little remains of the reciprocal positive political gains which were achieved earlier.

But what is the use of making allusions of this type? Perhaps, before resorting to them, it would be better to weigh everything calmly.

But one cannot help but notice that the general tone of your letter is not the way in which leaders of such powers as the Soviet Union and the United States should talk with each other, especially considering their power and position in the world and their responsibility for the state of international affairs. This is our opinion.

It is not us, not the Soviet Union, which would bear responsibility should the further undermining of Soviet-American relations take place.

It seems that it would be much more useful if the problems which are vitally important for peoples were objectively discussed by the leadership of the Soviet Union and the United States. Such problems as how to restrain and halt the arms race, which has already acquired an irrational tempo and scale, and how to preserve peace on earth.

It is precisely these problems which should occupy the center of attention of the leadership of our countries and which should find a reasonable solution. I propose, and am even convinced, that the American people need this no less than the Soviet and other people.

Respectfully,

L. Brezhnev\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{5} Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Haig

Washington, January 4, 1982

SUBJECT: Soviet Policy Toward Poland in the Short Term

Summary: Moscow’s minimum objective in Poland—reestablishing order—has been satisfied, and in conditions which have put the Soviets on the desirable diplomatic high ground of defending Poland against outside interference and supporting sovereignty and legality. Over the next few months, the Soviets will be seeking to make martial law a success, to set Poland on the path to economic stabilization and recovery, while preserving as much of detente with the West as possible. Our own policy should seek to take the propaganda initiative away from the Soviets by emphasizing Soviet complicity in martial law, and to harmonize the Western response to Soviet involvement, while remaining alert not only to possible Soviet challenges in third areas, but also to possible Soviet flexibility on such issues as Afghanistan.

Soviet Objectives:

The principal Soviet objectives within Poland are:

—To prop up, but not bail out, the Polish economy in order to mitigate the most extreme hardships and stave off a Polish default to Western creditors. Soviet generosity will be limited, since Moscow likely sees shortages as an inducement for Poles to work, as well as long-overdue punishment.

—To rebuild the discredited Communist Party from the ground up, with conservatives like Grabski and Olszowski brought to the fore, and Solidarity sympathizers purged.

—To allow Jaruzelski to work out a modus vivendi with a much-chastened Solidarity sufficient to get the economy moving again.\(^2\)

In their handling of the East-West ramifications of the Polish crisis, the Soviets’ objectives are:

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, Box 64, January 4, 1982. Secret. Sent through Stoessel. Drafted by Vershbow on December 31, 1981; cleared by Simons, Herspring, and Scanlan. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “AMH.” Eagleburger sent the memorandum to Haig under cover of an undated handwritten note: “AH: This is a short think piece on what the Soviets may be up to re Poland over the next several weeks.” Haig initialed Eagleburger’s handwritten note.

2 Haig wrote over this sentence and the one below it: “Don’t agree. Mission is Crush Solidarity & we need more action to prevent it!!!”
—To divide the U.S. and Western Europe over the response to the Polish crackdown, and to paint the U.S. as an unreliable, irresponsi-
ble power.
—To force the U.S. to accept once again the inviolability of the post-
war division of Europe which, they claim, we were attempting—but
failed—to overturn by “interfering” in Polish affairs.
—To keep Poland out of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue, and keep the INF and
START processes moving forward.

Soviet policy:

With respect to Poland, the Soviets will let the Poles themselves
determine the timing of steps to ease martial law; the Soviets will want
to avoid even the slightest impression that Moscow or Warsaw is caving to
Western pressure. In the meantime, Moscow will keep up both the public
and behind-the-scenes pressure on Jaruzelski to deter him from making
excessive concessions when he decides to reopen the dialogue with
Solidarity (which the Soviets accept as unavoidable). In our view the
Soviets will not press for further top-level leadership changes in the near
term, unless Jaruzelski should suddenly begin to give away the store.
They probably will provide a modest, but steady flow of economic assistance
to avert food riots and the like which could undercut martial law’s
prospects, and necessitate direct Soviet intervention. They may also be
more willing, with martial law succeeding, to provide 11th-hour funds
when necessary to keep the Western rescheduling operation from going under.

In all this, the Soviets are likely to allow Jaruzelski considerable leeway
in how he deals with Solidarity and the Church. They must recognize
that attempting a Kadar-type solution in Poland (a Party hard-liner
imposing reforms from above) would not get the Poles to work, mean-
ing a decade or more of economic stagnation and, by extension, of
total Soviet subsidization. The Soviets may therefore be prepared to see
a return to the status quo of the early post-August, 1980 period (“strict
observance of the Gdansk agreements”), rather than pressing for a total rollback
to the pre-August situation.

The political character of the “new” Solidarity will clearly be at
the top of the bargaining agenda not only among Poles, but between
Poles and Soviets. Moscow would no doubt prefer a thoroughly tame
Solidarity, but they can probably be brought to acquiesce in a Solidarity
with considerable autonomy on economic issues, including a role in worker
self-management a la Yugoslavia, and the right to strike over economic
issues. The Soviets would be banking on the hope that, with the expe-
rience of martial law, Solidarity moderates would be able effectively to
isolate the radicals, and the union’s political inclinations would be self-
contained. A partial reversal of the crackdown along these lines would be a
success for us vis-a-vis both the Poles and the Soviets, it would be a
worthy near-term objective for U.S. policy.
East-West implications:

The Soviets will probably try to counter our sanctions and stave off similar measures by the Europeans with a renewed peace offensive in Europe: further emphasis on arms control, possibly involving some new “initiatives”; increased efforts to sell the Soviet concept of detente-sans-linkage and to emphasize the viability of a Europe-only detente at a time of US-Soviet tension.

Outside of Europe, the Soviets may be tempted to respond to our sanctions by bloodying our noses in such areas as Central America, Somalia, or Southern Africa. Although the Soviets probably feel over-exposed as it is, with Poland and Afghanistan to worry about, this is a real possibility we should be prepared for. It is also possible that the Soviets will make an effort to appear more cooperative on other aspects of East-West dialogue, such as on the question of an Afghanistan political settlement, both to embarrass us and to encourage the Europeans to distance themselves from us. If so, there may be possibilities for movement on other aspects of the US-Soviet agenda even as we move to punish Moscow for its role in Poland.

All this underscores the need for us to counter Soviet policy in the coming months by:

—Keeping the public spotlight on Soviet connivance in the Polish crackdown, and debunking the Soviet claim that Jaruzelski’s action was in defense of the “inviolable” status quo;

—Making a maximum effort to close the gap between the U.S. and European approaches to the Soviets; and

—Being alert to possible Soviet probes and challenges in third areas, as well as to potential Soviet flexibility on geopolitical issues like Afghanistan.

These objectives will come together in your meeting with Gromyko at the end of January.

3 Haig drew a line from this sentence to the bottom of the memorandum and wrote: “How about more action against both USSR & Poland.”
125. Minutes of an Interagency Coordinating Committee for U.S.-Soviet Affairs Meeting

Washington, January 7, 1982

Overview

Deputy Assistant Secretary Scanlan observed that it was particularly useful for ICCUSA representatives to meet at this time to discuss the sanctions recently announced by President Reagan after the imposition of martial law in Poland. He stressed that it was important not to be either behind or in front of the President on these sanctions.

Poland: Scanlan said the situation in Poland is difficult to predict and is unlikely to be clarified in the near term. Despite reports of general calm in the country, passive resistance and low worker productivity prevail. Some Solidarity members remain free while Polish authorities have acknowledged five thousand Poles have been detained; Lech Walesa remains in custody near Warsaw. Contrary to Polish claims, reliable sources indicate that no negotiations with Solidarity are underway nor does the Church feel that its talks with Polish authorities amount to negotiations. Polish authorities will try to put a better face on the situation perhaps by releasing more detainees and easing up on the more onerous aspects of martial law, but it could remain in effect for several more months, and the basic elements of the situation may well remain unchanged.

Soviet Union: There is no question of the role played by the Soviets who had long been pressuring the Poles to crack down. It was the second best and second worst solution for them: while the optimum for the Soviets would have been for the Poles to crush Solidarity politically without recourse to military force, the option selected was preferable to direct Soviet military intervention. The President’s decision to impose sanctions against the USSR was based on the clear evidence of Soviet involvement in the repression in Poland. The sanctions announced December 29 include:

1. The suspension of Aeroflot services in the US.


2. The closure of the Soviet (formerly known as Kama) Purchasing Commission. Its staff has been told to leave the country by January 20. In response to a query from the FBI representative, Scanlan said that those staff members would not be allowed to adjust their status.

3. Suspension of issuance or renewal of licenses to export electronic equipment, computers and high technology to the USSR.

4. Postponement of a start to negotiations on a new Long Term Agreement (LTA) on grain sales to the USSR. The current one year extension of the previous LTA remains in effect until September 30, 1982.

5. Suspension of negotiations on a new Maritime Agreement. The old Maritime Agreement expired December 31 and a more restrictive regime of Soviet access to US ports went into effect at that time. Scanlan noted that we are taking into consideration undue hardships to American firms caused by the imposition of tighter notification requirements and we will seek to minimize damage to American commercial interests during this transitional period.

6. Suspension of licenses required for export to the USSR of an expanded list of oil and gas equipment (including pipelayers).

7. Non-renewal of US–USSR exchange agreements which are coming up for renewal in the near future.

There had been a long list of proposed measures which had been carefully scrutinized by the President before he made his final decision on sanctions. The President’s language (“suspend”, “postpone”) deliberately implied the reversibility of the sanctions should events in Poland warrant it. Scanlan noted the President’s commitment to maintaining the US-Soviet dialogue including the arms control process (INF, START). Preparations are now underway for Secretary Haig’s January 26–27 meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in which Poland will obviously figure prominently.

Allied position: Scanlan acknowledged that differences exist among the Allies about how to deal with Soviet involvement, but he felt the press had probably exaggerated them. The US was encouraged by the EC Ministers’ agreement not to undercut our sanctions as well by the

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3 Meese outlined the list of proposed sanctions to Reagan in a memorandum of December 28, 1981. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (12/28/1981)). Bush, Meese, and Nance went over the sanctions in a telephone call with Reagan, December 28. “The call commenced at 1605 EST with the President at the ranch,” Point-dexter wrote in a December 28 memorandum for the record. “The President approved all recommendations in subject memo. Oil and gas equipment will be on the foreign policy control list for the time being. The President is still considering the action to be taken with respect to the International Harvester combine contract.” (National Security Council, Box SR 118, SSG 0005 RWR 12/28/81 Poland)
stronger position taken by Chancellor Schmidt after his meeting with the President. The U.S. is working on a common Alliance position towards the Soviets which Scanlan expected would be adopted by the NATO Foreign Ministers when they meet in Brussels on January 11.

Exchanges: Turning to exchanges, Scanlan reiterated that it is essential for all agencies to be neither behind nor ahead of the exchange related steps selected by the White House. The sanctions were carefully calibrated to put a measured degree of pressure on the Soviets and to keep some punitive measures in reserve. Activities should be examined on a case-by-case basis. We would be prepared to cut out some activities which appear contrary to the spirit of the sanctions, such as the computer-related exchanges under the Science and Technology agreement. Scanlan informed representatives that they would shortly receive guidelines for a new review of exchange agreements. This is a useful exercise in its own right; we might want to cut those areas where the balance of benefits is unfavorable whether or not international concerns so dictated. On the other side of the coin, such a review could yield convincing arguments to continue an agreement or activities. In this connection, Scanlan confirmed that this review would include those agreements which are not to be renewed under the Dec. 29 sanctions. There is no general policy obstacle to continuation of activities under those agreements until they actually lapse next summer.

Various agencies expressed appreciation for Scanlan’s clarification. The DOE representative noted that his agency would now reconsider an earlier DOE memo which had mandated immediate cessation of all activities with the Soviets. Several representatives said that a State Department memo to agency heads embodying Scanlan’s clarification on exchanges policy would be very useful, particularly in view of intense budget pressures. The OSTP representative felt that such a memo might be viewed as undercutting the President’s sanctions; the NSF representative pointed out that any possible further steps to reduce exchanges could be carried out by simply reprogramming allocated funds whereas it would be difficult to restore funds which might be slashed merely in anticipation of hypothetical moves. Scanlan promised that we would follow up on the possibility of a State memo.

Hurwitz (State, EUR/SOV) urged all representatives to use caution with their Soviet contacts on the question of exchanges; the best tack is simply to refer them to the President’s statement.

The USDA representative asked whether the USG would attempt to curtail privately-sponsored US exchanges with the USSR. Scanlan replied that while officially the US could neither encourage nor discourage such exchanges, depending on the circumstances, we could jawbone private sponsors.

The Interior representative raised the longstanding agreement the US Bureau of Mines had with its Polish counterpart and asked whether
this cooperation could continue. Noting that he was not familiar with the details of this arrangement, Scanlan asked that Interior discuss the case later with State officials. He noted, however, that the US had no desire to sever the contacts and relationships the US had developed with Polish institutions and individuals.

Contacts: Scanlan reiterated guidance on USG officials’ contacts with Soviet officials: No purely social contacts, working level officials may continue contacts as necessary, officials should report prior to planned meetings to the State Department’s Office of Soviet Affairs (Bilateral Section). Adherence to this procedure is necessary so that the USG can monitor reciprocal access.

126. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, January 7, 1982

SUBJECT
World Peace Council

On several occasions your attention has been called to the agenda for 1981 of the so-called “World Peace Council,” a Soviet front organization operating out of Helsinki. (C)

This group seems so pleased with its success that it now plans to expand its activities into the United States. A reliable intelligence source, with close connections to the international “peace” movement, reports as follows:

“Soviet officials have informed World Peace Council President Romesh Chandra that the Soviets have ‘big plans’ for WPC activities in the U.S. in the 1982–1983 period. The Soviets are elated by the ease with which the WPC has been able to hold events in the U.S. and plans to take full advantage of this in the future. They have made it clear to the WPC that they will not stint on providing funds for U.S.-based activities and that Soviet funds will be forthcoming for whatever proposals of this kind the WPC develops.” (S)

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2 Not further identified.
Given the great experience of the World Peace Council in organizing mass demonstrations on behalf of Soviet causes, it would be very important to prevent it from carrying out its plans in the United States. The Department of State in particular should refuse to issue visas to foreign travelers planning to attend World Peace Council functions in this country, which are usually international in scope. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That instructions be given to the Department of State to refuse visas to foreign visitors connected with the World Peace Council or individuals planning to attend WPC functions.³ (C)

³ The President checked his approval, and initialed the memorandum.

127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, January 8, 1982, 2352Z

5511. Subject: Ambassador Hartman’s Luncheon with Korniyenko.
Ref: State 004570.²

1. (S—Entire text).

2. During upcoming luncheon with Korniyenko, Ambassador should discuss Poland, reiterating general approach set forth in the President’s statements, his letter to Brezhnev, and the Secretary’s letter to Gromyko and double-tracking Under Secretary Stoessel’s protest of Soviet jamming of VOA broadcasts to Poland ref tel. In order to underline our continuing concern over Soviet support for Cuban interventionism in Latin America and Africa, you should also raise this issue with Korniyenko. Talking points on both subjects follow.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820001–0208. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to Warsaw and to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. Drafted by Vershbow, Napper, and Glassman; cleared by Stoessel, Scanlan, Eagleburger, Sestanovich, Azrael, Enders, Veliotes, Simons, and Bremer; approved by Haig.

² In telegram 4570 to Moscow, January 8, the Department reported that Stoessel called in Dobrynin on January 7 to deliver a démarche on Soviet jamming of Voice of America broadcasts in Polish. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820088–0360)
3. Poland:
— I want to reiterate the concerns expressed in the letters of President Reagan and Secretary Haig about the situation in Poland.
— I could go on at length about the Soviet role in the present repression in that country, but I don’t want to engage in that debate today.
— Your country’s influence over events in Poland is well known, and that is why my government has called on you to help bring about an end to martial law and the restoration of internationally recognized rights. This can be the basis for resumption of a process of national reconciliation in Poland.
— The U.S. actions announced on December 29\textsuperscript{3} represent a measured response to what has transpired thus far, and to President Brezhnev’s unhelpful reply to President Reagan’s letter of December 24.\textsuperscript{4} We hope that these are the only steps we will have to take.
— As was affirmed in the White House statement of December 29, the U.S. remains committed to a high-level dialogue with your country, and we still hope to be able to make progress on the agenda of regional and arms control issues established by Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister Gromyko in their September meetings.
— Your actions with respect to Poland in the coming weeks will be taken by us as an indication of whether your country is sincerely committed to moving the U.S.-Soviet relationship forward.
— In this regard, I would like to reiterate what Under Secretary Stoessel told Ambassador Dobrynin about the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts in Polish which has been taking place in the past several weeks from facilities within the Soviet Union, specifically from Kharkov, Kaliningrad, and a location near Moscow. This activity is totally unacceptable.
— Such jamming (for that matter, all jamming) is a flagrant violation of the USSR’s commitments under the Helsinki Final Act, Article 35 of the International Telecommunication Convention, and Article 19 of the U.N. Human Rights Declaration.
— VOA broadcasts do not subversive [sic] activity as has been repeatedly alleged in crude propaganda attacks by the Soviet media. VOA carries objective news and information now denied Polish people by their own government-controlled press.
— We demand that these illegal jamming activities cease immediately. As we have stated in the past, we reserve the right to take

\textsuperscript{3} See footnote 2, Document 125.
\textsuperscript{4} See attachment, Document 123, and Document 122.
necessary and appropriate actions to protect our broadcasting interests, should the jamming continue.

4. Cuba/Central America:

—We have carefully reviewed President Brezhnev’s October 16 [15] letter to President Reagan calling on us to leave Cuba alone and normalize relations with it and asserting that Cuba represents no threat to the vital interests of the United States. We note further that President Brezhnev made the same points in his December 1 letter to President Reagan.

—In response to this and other denials of hostile Cuban activity, we must affirm that Cuba’s actions do represent a threat, not only to the United States, but to the vital interest that all nations have in maintaining peace and reducing tensions. I want—in response to President Brezhnev’s letters—to outline to you the areas in which Cuba’s actions cause us serious concern. I do this in the context of looking for means to reduce tensions.

—Because Cuban activities would collapse without Soviet support, the USSR bears a special responsibility for Cuba’s continuing threat to peace. Cuba’s aggressive interventions in Africa and the Caribbean are not acceptable to us. The purpose of any talks with Cuba can only be to end this unacceptable behavior. In that context the U.S. would be ready to address Cuba’s interests. At the same time, U.S.-Soviet relations will continue to be damaged unless Cuba and its friends begin to act responsibly.

The following Cuban activities are of primary concern to us:

. . . continued Cuban troop presence in Angola and Cuban refusal to withdraw troops in parallel with South African withdrawal from Namibia. Given recent forward movement toward an internationally acceptable settlement, attention must focus on this obstacle. The chance to remove it is a real opportunity for statesmanship;

. . . maintenance of Cuban forces in Ethiopia and South Yemen;

. . . the build-up of military forces in Cuba capable of projecting power beyond the environs of the island;

. . . Cuban interference in the internal affairs of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia through support of guerrilla groups;

. . . Cuban dispatch of larger numbers of military and security personnel to Nicaragua, its assistance in the Nicaraguan Armed Forces’ build-up to levels endangering regional security, and its cooperation

5 See Document 93.
6 See Document 108.
with guerrilla groups which use Nicaragua as a headquarters and supply center.

—I hope to discuss each in detail in coming weeks. Today I would like to talk in more detail about Nicaragua:

. Of the 5500–6000 Cuban advisors now in Nicaragua, some 1800 are military and security personnel. This stands in sharp contrast to our 35 military instructors in El Salvador.

. The continued flow of arms and ammunition into Nicaragua has facilitated a build-up of Nicaragua's Armed Forces to regionally unprecedented levels—three times the size of Somoza's Armed Forces (24,000 active duty personnel, 50,000 reserve forces/militia; southern neighbor Costa Rica has no Armed Forces, Northern neighbor Honduras has 11,000). Realization of plans to have 50,000 active duty personnel and 200,000 reservists/militia would be profoundly destabilizing to the region.

. Nicaraguan Foreign Minister D'Escoto has told Secretary Haig that Soviet Combat Aircraft will not be delivered. This is good news. A moratorium on delivery of additional weapons and ammunition in general would be a sign of good faith that there is no intention to disrupt the regional military balance. An understanding not to provide additional heavy offensive weapons would also be useful.

. But this, in itself, is not enough. Other elements of the problem are equally important. At present, the more than 1,500 Cuban military and internal-security advisors in Nicaragua contribute to regional concern over excessive Nicaraguan military expansion, Sandinista persecution of independent elements of the population, and support for foreign guerrillas. The number of these advisors should be immediately reduced to minimal levels.

. A further threat to the region is created by the Salvadoran and other guerrilla groups which maintain their headquarters and communications facilities in and receive their arms from Nicaragua. These foreign guerrilla activities in Nicaragua, which are supported by Cuba and which aim at interfering in the internal affairs of other states, should cease.

—Unless the situation in Central America is altered in some of the ways I have suggested, the tension characterizing the region will continue and will build. The prospect of a wider and more serious confrontation is real. It is not a prospect we seek; it is not a prospect we welcome. We wish to see early significant changes in the pattern of activities I have described. I welcome your thoughts.

5. Afghanistan: Should Korniyenko raise subject of Afghanistan, you should underline our concern over recent Soviet troop reinforcements and continued Soviet pressure on Pakistan and indicate that any
Soviet escalation of the Afghanistan conflict will provoke a response. You should not, however, be drawn into discussion of Dobrynin’s October 31 demarche to the Secretary or the reference in the President’s letter of November 18 to our intention to discuss Afghanistan further with the Soviets. If pressed by Korniyenko, you should reply that Afghanistan will undoubtedly be discussed by Secretary Haig and Gromyko at Geneva.

Haig

7 See Document 109.
8 See the attachment to Tab A, Document 103.

128. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Haig’s Aircraft and the Embassy in Moscow

Washington, January 10, 1982, 1804Z

6652/TOSEC 010003. Subject: Demarche to Soviets on Soviet Provision of Advanced MIG Aircraft to Cuba.

1. S—Entire text

2. Acting Secretary Stoessel called in Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on Sunday, January 10 to make demarche on Soviet delivery of additional advanced MIG aircraft to Cuba. In upcoming meeting with Korniyenko, Ambassador Hartman should reiterate points in demarche in context of larger presentation on Cuba/Central America contained in existing instructions.

3. Begin text of demarche:

—My government wishes to register its deep concern about recent Soviet actions with respect to Cuba.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to Secretary of State Haig’s Delegation and the Special Interests Section in Havana. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Matthews, Bremer; approved by Stoessel, who was Acting Secretary of State. Haig departed for Brussels on January 10 for a special NATO Ministerial meeting on the situation in Poland, and returned on January 12. He wrote “Yuck!” on the copy of the telegram that he received on the plane. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of State, Day File, Box 64, January 10, 1982)
—U.S. intelligence has detected the arrival in Cuba of additional numbers of advanced Soviet fighter aircraft which, based on our present information, are of either the MIG–23 or MIG–27 type.

—Soviet provision of these aircraft is part of a pattern of Soviet arms transfers to Cuba involving increasingly sophisticated military capabilities which far exceed the requirements of Cuban defense.

—The latest deliveries of advanced MIG interceptors and ground-attack aircraft, moreover, are occurring in the context of a continuing escalation in Soviet arms transfers to the region as a whole—including a massive and unjustified build-up of Nicaragua’s military potential—that we view as affecting our security interests.

—The presence in Cuba of additional advanced MIG aircraft is of particular concern in view of the fact that aircraft of these types can be equipped for nuclear weapons, and because the conversion of non-nuclear variants of these aircraft to carry nuclear weapons can be accomplished rapidly.

—This pattern of Soviet arms transfer activity, in our view, raises questions with regard to the US-Soviet understandings on Cuba.

—As Secretary Haig emphasized to Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York, the current pattern of Soviet arms transfers to this hemisphere represents a major obstacle to an improvement in the US-Soviet relationship.

End text of demarche

4. Following presentation of demarche, the Acting Secretary said that the U.S. would be raising this issue at the highest levels of the Soviet Government—specifically, during Secretary Haig’s January meetings with Gromyko. He added that, while the U.S. had no intention of publicizing the matter, it was possible that the story could leak. If so, our public position would be that we view the problem with great concern and have raised it with the Soviet Government. We would not comment publicly on any of the specifics of our demarche.

5. By way of a preliminary response, Dobrynin said that the Soviet Government would consider the demarche solely within the context of the US-Soviet understandings. As far as arms deliveries to Cuba were concerned, the USSR had proposed many times that the two sides hold talks on conventional arms transfers. In fact, negotiations had been initiated—which were to have considered all regions, including Latin America—but they had been broken off by the U.S. side (a reference to the 1978 CAT talks).

2 See Document 90.
6. Dobrynin said that he was not in a position to comment on whether the aircraft cited by the U.S. had actually been delivered to Cuba, or whether they could in fact be converted to carry nuclear weapons. But the USSR was free to sell arms to Cuba, just as the U.S. sold arms all over the world. There was no US-Soviet agreement limiting any conventional arms transfers. So there were no grounds for the U.S. to ask anything of the Soviet Union in this respect.

7. As far as the US-Soviet understandings on Cuba were concerned, Dobrynin said he would convey the U.S. concerns to Moscow. The Acting Secretary interjected to repeat that the U.S. demarche said that the pattern of Soviet activity “raises questions” with respect to the understandings. Dobrynin said that the Soviet military would have to look at this question.

8. In leaving Dobrynin asked the Acting Secretary what was the U.S. thinking thus far with regard to the agenda for the Haig-Gromyko meetings, apart from the Cuba issue. In particular, would there be a discussion of strategic arms negotiations, leading to some sort of announcement on negotiations. The Acting Secretary said that START would certainly be discussed, as well as Poland and the other issues discussed at the September meetings. As far as any announcements were concerned, the Acting Secretary added, he could not say.
129. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, January 14, 1982

SUBJECT
Pentecostal Problem

The Secretary of State has recommended that direct Presidential action, in the form of a message from you to President Brezhnev (Tab A) on behalf of the two Pentecostalists on a hunger strike in our Moscow Embassy, may be our only remaining chance to bring the fast to an end. Our fears for the health and ultimately the lives of these two Christian women, Mrs. Augustina Vashchenko and her daughter, Lidiya, have sharpened as it has become clear that neither we nor their many other supporters in this country can persuade them to end their hunger strike.

Mrs. Vashchenko and Lidiya, who have been living in refuge in our Embassy in Moscow for the last three and a half years with five other Pentecostalists, continue their hunger strike in hopes of gaining Soviet permission to emigrate. The women commenced fasting on the 27th of December, taking only liquids for sustenance. The Embassy reports that the women have lost some weight, but are not yet in serious condition. The women appear determined to maintain their fast until they and their families are permitted to leave the Soviet Union—a solution they continue to believe the U.S. Government can “force” the Soviet Union to grant them.

While we have no guarantee that your intervention will be responded to favorably by the Soviets, the approach outlined in the draft message offers the Soviets a face-saving way out of this tragic problem if they have any interest in this at all. We, therefore, feel that this last attempt to work through direct diplomatic channels is worth trying and should be done now.

It will be essential that your message not be publicized. If the Soviets do not take prompt steps to act on your proposal, however, we will want to consider public statements and a media campaign in support of the Pentecostalists—steps which are unlikely to bring positive action from the Soviets but would demonstrate your continuing concerns.

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2 An unknown hand underlined this sentence.
Former President Carter has been requested to call the Pentecostalists in our Embassy by their friends in this country. Mr. Carter has indicated he intends no publicity, but may not be able to resist because of the drama of his efforts to dissuade the two women from continuing their hunger strike. This call is scheduled for the morning (EST) of the 15th. Should this become known before you have taken direct action, it will increase our problems domestically.

**RECOMMENDATION**

The State Department and the NSC recommend you approve the attached letter for dispatch to Brezhnev.

**Tab A**

**Message From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev**

Washington, undated

**PROPOSED TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO BREZHEV**

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to direct your attention on an urgent basis to the plight of seven Soviet Pentecostalists who have been living in our Embassy in Moscow since seeking refuge there in June, 1978. These people seek permission from Soviet authorities for themselves and their families to emigrate from the Soviet Union according to the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We have repeatedly approached the Soviet Government on behalf of Petr and Augustina Vashchenko and their daughters, Lidiya, Lyuba, and Liliya, and Maria Chmykalov and her son, Timofey, and the other members of these two families, seeking a prompt and humanitarian solution to their plight. Yet three and a half years later, they still await permission to emigrate.

The families’ situation has now taken on a new and potentially tragic aspect. After three and a half years of waiting, in frustration and

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3 An unknown hand underlined: “Former President Carter.”

4 An unknown hand drew an arrow from the right-hand margin to the last two sentences.

5 Reagan initialed his approval.

6 Confidential. The message was transmitted to Moscow for delivery to Gromyko or Korniyenko in telegram 10429 to Moscow, January 15. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8190211, 8290012))
now in despair, two of the family members, Mrs. Augustina Vashenko and her daughter, Lidiya, have embarked upon a hunger strike in support of their goals. Despite the efforts of the Embassy staff and of the families’ other friends and sincere well-wishers in the United States and in Europe to dissuade them from this life-endangering course, the two women have made clear they are determined to continue their fast.

Our Embassy in Moscow has discussed this matter with your Ministry of Foreign Affairs, informing the Ministry that the two families have agreed to leave the Embassy and return to their homes in Chernogorsk for the processing of their applications for emigration, according to Soviet laws and procedures, if their other family members residing in Chernogorsk are first permitted to emigrate, and if the seven family members are guaranteed that they will not be prosecuted by the authorities once they depart the U.S. Embassy and assured that their applications for exit permission for reunification with their other family members abroad will be granted. Out of deep concern for their lives and health and for the plight of their family members, I ask you to intervene personally in this matter to allow these people to emigrate and thereby bring about a humanitarian solution before it is too late.

Ronald Reagan

7 Reagan did not sign the proposed letter.

130. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, January 15, 1982, 1637Z

534. Subject: Message to Brezhnev in Support of Pentecostalists. Ref: State 10429.2
1. (C—Entire text).
2. Immediately on receipt of reftel, DCM delivered President’s letter to MFA USA Division Chief Komplektov with request that it be

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8190211, 8290012). Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.
2 See the attachment to Document 129.
immediately passed on to President Brezhnev. DCM emphasized that the letter was couched in humanitarian terms. That it contained no polemics of any sort, and that it described a proposal which offered a way out of the problem. Komplektov said he would do so and would not comment on the letter itself. But he did have some remarks to make on the Pentecostal issue. Komplektov then, in a tone which was insensitive even for him, said that the Pentecostals were entirely a responsibility of the U.S. Embassy and the Soviet Government had no responsibility in any way. He called the proposal offered in the President’s letter—which the DCM had discussed with his deputy the week before—“not a proposal, but a condition.” The DCM disagreed, saying that it had taken the families several months to agree on such a plan and that it offered a good possibility for solving the problem. Returning to the attack, Komplektov said that the prior emigration of the family members was certainly a pre-condition. He said that the Soviet position was clear and consistent: the families should go back to Chernogorsk and apply for emigration permission there. In closing he asked sarcastically what were our plans for releasing the President’s letter. DCM assured him that the letter would not be released because we wanted to provide the best possibility for resolving this case. Disbelieving, Komplektov said “we will see whether the U.S. side leaks the letter.” In closing, he reiterated that he was not commenting on the President’s letter itself and that it would be transmitted to President Brezhnev.

Hartman

131. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, January 18, 1982

SUBJECT
Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

I had lunch today at the Soviet Embassy with Ambassador Dobrynin. In the course of a wide ranging conversation, we covered the following subjects of interest.

Dobrynin began by discussing plans for the Secretary’s meeting with Gromyko in Geneva January 26–27. In this connection, I noted the possibility that the Secretary might have to restrict his meeting with Gromyko to one day, the 26th. Dobrynin was curious as to the reason for this and I pointed to the Secretary’s plans to travel to the Middle East following the session in Geneva. I stressed, however, that no final decision had been made.

Dobrynin was interested in reviewing probable subjects which would come up at the Haig-Gromyko meeting and whether or not agreement could be reached on any of the topics. He mentioned strategic arms talks as a leading topic. I said that the Secretary probably would be prepared to discuss this in general terms against the background of the President’s continuing interest in working for deep reductions in strategic arms. However, I did not feel that, in present circumstances, there was any prospect that we would be prepared to fix a specific date for the beginning of formal negotiations of START. This was a matter best pursued through diplomatic channels at present.

Dobrynin anticipated that the Secretary would wish to follow up the earlier talks with Gromyko in New York on Poland, Cuba, Afghanistan and Angola. He thought agreement on anything connected with these subjects was unlikely, and I agreed. On Angola, Dobrynin seemed to indicate somewhat more disposition to discuss the matter, as outlined below.

With regard to bilateral matters, Dobrynin thought there would be little to say at Geneva. He felt that there was nothing much to take up on exchanges, since we had placed most of them in suspense. Consulates also seemed dormant, although he understood that it was our intention to keep a hold on our buildings in Kiev.

I mentioned the situation of the Pentecostalists, saying that, as he knew, this was of interest at the highest level in our government. The whole situation was difficult and tragic—the best would be to permit family members in Chernogorsk to leave for the United States, with the Pentecostalists in the Embassy than being released to return to Chernogorsk and then to join their relatives in the United States. Dobrynin said he knew that Carter had talked to the Pentecostalists in Moscow (Carter had also called Dobrynin). Dobrynin said the only way to proceed was for the Pentecostalists to leave the Embassy and return to their homes. Thereafter, they could follow regular procedures and seek emigration.

Dobrynin had the following comments to make on the various subjects mentioned above as possible topics for the discussions in Geneva.

**INF.** Dobrynin said it was “curious” that the US side had not been better prepared for the INF negotiations. He claimed that the Soviets
had presented a detailed statement of their position but that the US to date had failed to do so. The Soviets were waiting for the US to come forward with concrete positions but, he claimed, the latest US suggestion was for a two months’ recess, after which Nitze had said we would be prepared to go into detail. I countered Dobrynin on both of his allegations, saying that it should have been clear that the US side had presented a full statement of its position and that the main problem was that the Soviets did not find it acceptable. When Dobrynin said that Gromyko might wish to discuss the negotiations with the Secretary, I indicated that the Secretary would be prepared to talk about the negotiations in general terms but that it was preferable for the detailed negotiations to be conducted by our respective delegations.

On START, Dobrynin seemed to take in stride my indication that we would not be prepared to set a date for the beginning of formal talks. He felt, in any case, that the subject matter was so complicated that any agreement was a long time off—perhaps three or four years. Since both sides appeared willing to observe the conditions of existing agreements, he wondered if it might not be possible to come up with an interim agreement which would simply state this fact. This, at least, would be a positive step. I said that such a course could cause problems for the US side with the Senate, which would feel that its prerogatives were being undermined by this type of interim agreement.

We argued at some length about relative strengths in the strategic field, with Dobrynin recalling fears in previous administrations about a “bomber gap” and a “missile gap” and claiming that our present concerns about a trend toward Soviet superiority were misplaced. He said it was clear that the United States has more warheads than the Soviets, that the fact we have no heavy missiles is not of Soviet doing, etc. I made clear to him our basic concerns about the extent of Soviet activities in the missile field and the determination of the United States to correct the imbalance.

On Afghanistan, Dobrynin acknowledged that some additional Soviet troops had been introduced into that country. However, the Soviet Union was being cautious and would not follow the US example in Vietnam in introducing great numbers of troops. The main reason for this, he said, was to reduce casualties. Dobrynin said the fighting in Afghanistan was being prolonged because we were supplying the insurgents with weapons through Pakistan. This was causing great resentment in the Soviet Union and he said that “some circles” felt that the Soviet Union should “begin to get something out of the Afghan situation” by, for example, constructing airfields in Afghanistan which could take long-range military jet airplanes. This, he said, at least could “give us something to trade” in response to US pressures. I warned him that this would be a very dangerous game indeed.
I told Dobrynin that we would be interested in serious discussions with the Soviets on Afghanistan and would be glad to hear an elucidation of their ideas. Dobrynin replied that the Soviets were still waiting for the US to take up the subject in Moscow through our Embassy, as had been promised by the Secretary in New York.

On Angola, Dobrynin wondered if the Secretary would wish to pursue this subject further with Gromyko. I said I was sure the Secretary would wish to do so, following up on the talks in New York. I described briefly our Namibian negotiations and pointed to the necessity for Cuban troops to leave Angola simultaneously with the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia. When Dobrynin questioned whether Cubans were really endangering South African forces, I said that the Cuban presence was part of the overall security picture in the area and that it would be essential for them to be withdrawn if independence for Namibia is to be achieved. Dobrynin did not appear to contest this concept vigorously.

In discussing Cuba, I mentioned my representations to Dobrynin about the latest delivery of MIG–23’s to the island, saying that this action was of great concern to the United States and that it appeared to be part of an overall Soviet thrust through Cuba to expand its power base in the hemisphere. I called attention to the restrained press treatment we have given to the MIG–23 story and said that the Secretary would be discussing this with Gromyko in Geneva. I repeated that the delivery of the MIGs raised questions regarding the 1962 understandings which required clarification.2

Dobrynin said the USSR had always observed the 1962 understandings scrupulously. The MIG–23’s did not violate the understandings and the Soviets could not understand our concerns on this score. He said he had received nothing from Moscow regarding my demarche on the planes; it was possible Gromyko would have something to say on the subject. I noted that the MIG's could be said to constitute a “grey area” which should be clarified.

On another aspect of the Cuban situation, Dobrynin recited at some length his conversations with the Secretary about US charges earlier in 1981 that some 1,600 Cuban troops had been sent to Nicaragua. He stated that Brezhnev had taken these charges up directly with Castro and that Castro had totally and convincingly rejected them as false. Dobrynin felt that the United States had never proved its case on these charges and that this had left the Soviets feeling that the US concerns should not be taken seriously.

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2 Reference is to informal agreements reached between Robert Kennedy and Anatoly Dobrynin during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.
Dobrynin said he knew that the Secretary had met with the Cuban Vice President several months ago. He wondered what results had come from that meeting and what the prospects were for US-Cuban relations. I said that, whatever our contacts with Cuba might be, they had produced nothing positive to date. We continued to feel that the export of revolution by Cuba to Central America and other countries, the build up of arms in Cuba and Cuban activities in Africa raised tensions and should be terminated.

On Poland, Dobrynin seemed particularly negative. Referring to our “three demands”—lifting of martial law, freeing of prisoners and a resumption of dialogue between the government, Church and Solidarity—Dobrynin said that all three posed unacceptable demands on the Polish authorities. To lift martial law at this time and free the prisoners would only risk a return to the chaos preceding the December 13 action. He defended at length the right of the Polish government to act against those who wished to usurp power and contested the idea that what had occurred December 13 was in any sense illegal or a “coup d’état”. As to negotiations with Solidarity, this meant placing Solidarity on the same level with the government, which was clearly impossible. Dobrynin went on to say that “Solidarity” has become a “bad word” in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in general. While there could be a place for a vigorous trade union looking after the interests of the workers, he doubted if it would be called “Solidarity” in the future. As to whether it would have the right to strike, Dobrynin was uncertain, saying that “all sorts of things can happen in Poland”. He stated that, of course, any future trade union would be barred from reaching for political power.

Dobrynin referred to sanctions only in passing, saying that there did not seem to be anything left for us to do against the Soviet Union in this area. I assured him that there were, indeed, other measures which could be taken and that we might very well be compelled to take such steps in light of the lack of progress regarding Poland.

Dobrynin was curious regarding our plans for the Madrid CSCE meeting. He asked if the Secretary planned to attend and, if so, for how long. I confirmed that the Secretary intended to be present for the opening session. I did not know how long he would be staying, but I made clear that his focus, as well as that of other Western Ministers present, would be on Poland.

Dobrynin inquired about the possibility for a summit meeting between the President and Brezhnev. He said that he personally

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3 Reference is to a meeting between Haig and Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in Mexico City on November 23, 1981.
thought it was unlikely that a “traditional summit” could be held in ’82 with a full blown communique, etc. Perhaps a “get acquainted” meeting would be more practical. I said that, under present circumstances, I did not see the possibility of any kind of a meeting at the summit. The President has stated several times his interest in meeting with Brezhnev and I felt that this was something the President wanted to do but that Poland made that impossible for the foreseeable future.

Dobrynin said that he was extremely discouraged about the prospects for any kind of agreement between the US and the Soviet Union. In all of his experience, he had never seen such a bad time in US-Soviet relations. He believes the US Administration is on a deliberate confrontation course with the Soviet Union and that the future looked extremely discouraging. I agreed that prospects did not look bright, primarily because of Soviet actions. I contested Dobrynin’s assertion that the Administration wished a confrontation with the Soviet Union. What we hoped for was more moderation and restraint on the Soviet side which would enable us both to get on a more stable basis in our relationship. So long as such moderation and restraint were absent, then the relationship would only suffer.

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.  

4 Stoessel initialed the memorandum above his typed signature.
132. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, January 19, 1982

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva January 26

We have remained flexible up to now on whether or not to proceed with the meeting with Gromyko originally scheduled for the two days of January 26–27. There have been powerful pros and cons on both sides of the question. After considering them and taking into account the encouragement to go ahead I have been getting from the Pope and the Europeans, I believe on balance that I should go ahead with the meeting, and use it to register our outrage at continuing repression in Poland and the fact that we will not be conducting business as usual while it goes on.

As a preliminary signal, I am reducing the duration of the meeting to one day instead of two, and this will be clear when the two sides make their announcement Thursday. At the meeting itself, I will focus on Poland, Cuba and other egregious Soviet breaches of decent behavior and international comity. (I will also follow up on your letter to Brezhnev about the Pentecostalist families in our Moscow Embassy.) My point will be that the Soviet Union has been tearing down the whole structure of political relationships built up since the War, thereby raising serious questions as to the durability of that structure.

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1 Source: Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC 1983–89. Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum, which Clark sent to Reagan under cover a January 23 memorandum in which he wrote: “Al intends to take the Soviets to task on a number of outstanding issues in the meetings, and I believe this session with Gromyko can be useful in conveying to the Kremlin our current concerns about Poland, Cuba and other problems.”

2 January 21.
Moscow, January 21, 1982

Dear Mr. President,

With regard to your communication of January 15, 1982, I would like to say the following.

The people whom you are petitioning for have really found themselves in a situation not to be envied. After all, this situation was created and has long been maintained in an artificial manner. A way out of it could have been found a long time ago. At the present time, too, it is possible to resolve this question.

The only thing needed is that the US side rather than detain those people within the walls of its Embassy, take measures for them to leave it. Nothing stands in the way of such a step—nobody intended or intends to prosecute that group of pentecostalists.

As to their departure from the USSR, this question can be considered in accordance with the procedure established under our laws and equally applicable to all Soviet citizens, after those persons return to the place of their residence.

However, the group of the sect members that happened to be in the US Embassy is being pushed for some reason or another in a different direction—toward violation of the Soviet laws, setting forth prior conditions and all sorts of demands that can lead only to an impasse. Thus, the entire responsibility for the existing situation rests with the US side, including the responsibility of humanitarian nature.

We are not the ones to be called upon to exercise humaneness. For that matter, the references to humaneness are not convincing, while, in fact, attempts are being made to manipulate the destinies of individuals and not only those of the sect members who are kept in the US Embassy.

What kind of humaneness can one invoke, when the children are forcefully separated from their parents, as is the case with the Soviet citizens Polovchaks? Indeed, when even an American court rules to return Vladimir Polovchak—a minor—to his parents and the US execu-

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8200225, 8200410, 8204854). No classification marking. A typewritten note at the top reads: “Unofficial translation.” Bremer forwarded the letter to Clark under cover of a January 22 memorandum, in which he noted that Bessmertnykh had delivered the letter to Scanlan earlier that day. (Ibid.)

2 See the attachment to Document 129.
tive authorities are raising obstacles thereto, it is not simply inhumane
but immoral.

I would like to believe that on the part of the US side necessary
measures will be taken to discontinue the abnormal situation existing
around the group of Soviet citizens who find themselves in the US
Embassy in Moscow.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

134. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 21, 1982, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Gromyko Prep Session, Thursday, January 21, 1982 at 5:30 pm in the Secretary’s
Conference Room

PRESENT
Stoessel, Bremer, McManaway, Rosenblatt, Fischer, Burt, Combs, Simons,
Scanlan, Palmer, Wayne, Schuette

The meeting opened with a light-hearted discussion of “Charlie
Wick Day,” referring to the upcoming extravaganza on Poland.² The
Secretary then proceeded through his talking points page by page.³

The first point raised by the Secretary was that any mention of a
second meeting for later in the year be excised from the talking points.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Haig Papers, Department of
meeting took place in Haig’s conference room.

² Reference is to January 30. In a diary entry that day, Reagan wrote: “Solidarity
Day. Charles Wick has really created a great international telecast studded with celebri-
ties & heads of state proclaiming solidarity with the Polish people.” (Brinkley, ed., The

³ Not found.
The Secretary explained to the group that he had discussed linkage with the President earlier in the day and that he thinks the President understood that in the current context linkage means that we cannot proceed on the START talks nor can we proceed with the summit. INF, however, should be treated as a special case in that abandoning these talks would be more costly to us than to the Soviet. The Secretary also described with some levity the earlier NSC meeting\(^4\) and he noted that the Vice President nearly fell out of his chair when the Secretary suggested “sealing the Hemisphere” in relation to Cuba. The Secretary noted that if these people want to get tough he will show them what being tough is all about. The Secretary also noted in a joking manner that during his own presentation on Cuba Meese was already busy formulating his backgrounder.

Returning to the Gromyko meeting, the Secretary noted that the CIA’s analysis\(^5\) of prospects for the meeting had made him feel bad; that perhaps we had been too mean to the Soviets. The Secretary was obviously worried by the tone of the analysis, and suggested that it was perhaps written by Jimmy Carter. Rick Burt noted that the analysis was produced by Casey’s best Soviet minds, [1 line not declassified].

Referring to the section on Helsinki the Secretary felt certain that Gromyko would turn the issue of interventionism back on us, but that he was adequately prepared to defend our position.

On START, the Secretary noted that he will make some positive noises so that the Soviets cannot reap a propaganda windfall by saying that we have abandoned arms control. The Secretary called attention to his US News interview, which he referred to as being quite starchy. The group agreed that he had laid out a clear rationale for the prospects on START and INF.

Referring to a Boston Globe article of today, the Secretary asked who told Beecher that Henry\(^6\) is advising us. The Secretary recalled a recent conversation with Joe Kraft in which he told Kraft jokingly that the reason we were going to continue with the Geneva meeting was because Henry suggested we should not. The Secretary noted that we will be going to Geneva despite Henry’s admonitions, not because of them.

\(^4\) Reference is to a meeting of the National Security Council, held January 21 from 3:44 to 4:25 p.m. at the Cabinet Room at the White House. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) The minutes are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II.

\(^5\) Not further identified.

\(^6\) Reference is to Henry Kissinger.
Returning to Helsinki, the Secretary asked that relevant paragraphs from the Final Act be included in his briefing materials so that if the need arises he can quote.

The Secretary then discussed the general approach to the meeting, in which he wants to avoid dealing in rigidly ideological terms. Rather, he wants to talk as a superpower should, referring to balances of power as opposed to the suffering of the Polish people, for instance. He noted that in particular page 5 of the talking points was a bit too ideological, but it improved on page 6.

Turning to Cuba, Burt advised the Secretary to mention Nicaragua very early on, perhaps in the first sentence, noting the peculiar Soviet attachment to the order in which issues are raised. It should be clear to the Soviets that Nicaragua is a high priority item.

The Secretary, in reading through talking points on the Floggers, asked why they were designated as MiG–23/27. Burt noted that we were simply not sure which planes they were, but added that Dobrynin had told Stoessel they were 23’s. It was agreed, however, to refer to them in the generic term Floggers.

The Secretary asked that references to the 1962 understanding on pages 8 and 9 be deleted. Burt felt that the specter of abrogating the agreement as a result of Soviet actions should be raised, but not as the central focus. Combs agreed and felt that we should also raise the fact that the Soviets had done this previously in 1978. With Burt in agreement, the Secretary noted that we had lost our pants in 1978 and we did not want to remind the Soviets how easily they had gotten off.

On page 9 regarding the shipment of MiGs to Nicaragua, Burt suggested and the Secretary concurred that we add a sentence along the lines of: “If these deliveries proceed, we will be forced to respond.” Also on page 9, the Secretary noted that the last sentence (“It would be a great mistake to underestimate the depth of our concern”) sounded very Chinese, in that we had heard the same thing from the PRC on the Taiwan issue.

The Secretary observed that the whole Latin American section of the paper was very tough, and all agreed. Scanlan said that Gromyko would come away from this section with a fat lip. The Secretary noted that in this phase of the discussion he would be “moving from the pragmatist to the ideologue.” Bremer suggested that remaining a pragmatist will have a more profound effect upon Gromyko, who will then know that we mean business.

The Secretary also requested that memcons from the first Gromyko meetings be included in his briefing materials, as well as a recent CIA summary on Soviet arms transfers to Cuba.

Turning to Afghanistan on page 10, Burt suggested that we remind Gromyko early on that we are aware that they have recently increased
their presence in Afghanistan. Noting that the Soviets must be aware that we are supporting the Afghan freedom fighters, the Secretary asked if he should make clear to Gromyko that we have additional options in this regard. Stoessel interjected that Dobrynin had mentioned our support for the freedom fighters to him, so clearly the Soviets were aware. The Secretary said that he would like to hold this threat open, and he referred to it as the “Berlin riposte.”

At this point McFarlane stuck his head in and the Secretary teased him about new problems with the NSC now that Bud has moved to the White House. Bud noted sarcastically that there was “real support” for the Secretary’s position on an upcoming exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. The Secretary responded by telling Bud that he should have seen Cap’s reaction when the Secretary raised the issue of sealing the Hemisphere. The Secretary said that Cap jumped up and said: “Mr. President, this is a very serious matter which you should consider at length.”

Returning to the discussion, the Secretary asked for memcons from Kissinger’s 1970 and 1971 discussions with Gromyko on Soviet support for North Vietnam. He would like a few of the key paragraphs so that we might throw some of the Soviets’ own language back at them. The point of this exercise, apart from its rhetorical value, was to show the Soviets that we think historically and keep a long memory. They stuck it right in our eye back then and we should not miss an opportunity to return the favor.

On the question of raising support for the Afghan freedom fighters, Burt advised that a raising of that threat would probably lead the Soviets toward increased action against Pakistan and the Secretary agreed. The Secretary observed that we need another trip over there very soon to quiet the Paks and the Indians down. He noted that Zia is becoming increasingly apprehensive, and said that someone should think about sending Buckley or Walters to the region. Tom Simons, who was not aware of the Secretary’s heavy travel schedule, suggested that perhaps the Secretary should do it. The Secretary responded unbelievingly “Are you talking to me?” He noted that between now and June he would probably be in town for only one week, and that every time he returns he finds Jerry sitting behind his desk.

On Afghanistan, Burt suggested that the best way to hit the Soviets would be to tell them that we know exactly what they’re doing. We are aware of their increased troop strength as well as the fact that they are now teaching Russian to school children. It is clear, said Burt, that they are attempting to absorb the country.

The Secretary interrupted to note that Mac Baldrige was having some fun dabbling in foreign policy on his trade mission to Africa. He noted that King Hassan gave Mac a letter which he had written to
the Algerians. The Secretary, who had apparently just spoken with Baldrige, told him to have his people prepare a memo, then to let our experts look at it, and then the Secretary and Baldrige could have a joint meeting with the President to deliver the letter. The Secretary also noted that Baldrige had played around with foreign policy with the President of Senegal as well.

Turning to a discussion of Southern Africa (page 12), the Secretary said that we would open by noting that the Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola had been increased. Palmer interjected that in fact in every area raised with the Soviets since January of last year the threats have gotten worse. The Secretary was very enamored with this approach and suggested that we use it at the very beginning of his discussions with Gromyko. He wanted to open by saying to Gromyko that all of our agenda items—Afghanistan, Southern Africa, Cuba, Central America, and Poland—have deteriorated since the New York discussions. The Secretary said that he would tell Gromyko that he was profoundly concerned with this trending, which will have a serious impact upon our relations. In addition, the Secretary noted that the Soviets had not done anything on human rights, with the exception of Sakharov’s daughter-in-law. Bremer interjected that Saturday would be a crunch point in terms of the Pentecostals, because they have announced that starting on Saturday they will no longer take even water. Returning to the overall theme, the Secretary noted that the Soviets have moved against us in every area of critical concern and that therefore the nature of this meeting with Gromyko has been profoundly affected.

Turning to INF (page 14), the Secretary asked for a detailed review of progress thus far. Where have we been, what has been the nature of the discussions, and what proposals have emerged since the Christmas recess? The Secretary asked for this review to be available to read on the flight to Europe. The Secretary was pleased with the explicit points raised on Poland.

On CBW, the Secretary was also pleased with the opening sentence that we have confirmed the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. He wanted added to that sentence that this casts a grim shadow on the prospect for progress on other arms control issues. The Secretary also wanted to tell Gromyko that this issue will take on increasing significance and that we will continue to draw increasing attention to it. The Secretary asked for a two-page summary of what we have on them and said “I want to let the bastard know what we have so I can hand it to him.”

\footnote{January 23.}
Stepping back from the details for a moment, the Secretary chuckled that this is “one big God damn round of joy, thinking back to the days of vodka and handshakes with Kissinger and now he’s telling us to be tough.”

Stoessel noted that he had recently come from a meeting with Ted Mann and that he was certain that public pressure would build rapidly for the Secretary to raise Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Simons pointed out that a rather lengthy Congressional letter with a number of signatures would be appearing in the next few days relating to the same issue.

Finishing the talking points, the Secretary observed that the last sentence of the paper was rather weak. He wanted the closing redone to include a brief summary of our agenda items, a mention of our good will, and the specific steps the Soviets could take to earn that good will, and then to close by hammering home the point that the key areas which control our overall relations are all getting worse. The Secretary did not want to say that we are headed on a collision course, but he did pause for a moment and say “It is getting eerie, very eerie.” Stoessel offered that it was perhaps time to fasten our seat belts.

The Secretary wanted to make sure that we made abundantly clear to the Soviets that there is room for progress in Poland, Southern Africa, and Cuba.

The Secretary then observed that from the Soviet perspective we probably have not done very much either. Palmer suggested that we take the approach of playing up the President’s November 18 speech,⁸ that we have offered them a 4-point program for arms control discussions and attempted to open up a whole new dialogue, and that what we got in return was Poland. The Secretary agreed with this approach and asked that it be incorporated. The Secretary commented that our “bitch list” is about overwhelming and “it makes me wonder if we are spending enough for defense.”

The Secretary also asked that in appropriate places in his papers efforts be made to personalize some of the issues. For instance he wanted to say that he himself had participated in the start of the Helsinki process under Nixon. He also asked that his past experiences in NATO as well as recent NATO meetings be referred to in understandable terms.

The Secretary then discussed some of the carrots that should be offered. In Southern Africa he would tell Gromyko that we have a breakthrough imminent which could occur any day with absolutely no cost to the Soviets. He added that we should raise the possibility

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⁸ See Document 137, footnote 3.
of normalizing relations with Cuba in exchange for responsible behavior. He said that we should send Gromyko home with some carrots and not with a "plate full of shit." However, the Secretary did not want the carrots to overshadow the possibility that the whole of post-war East-West relations was now hanging in the balance. We should raise the specter of Yalta and Potsdam to show how seriously we view Soviet irresponsibility, and to make them aware that continuation of present threats will lead to a dismantling of all that has existed between East and West. The Secretary noted that in our preparation we must be aware that this is not merely a dialogue between Gromyko and Haig, but it is a record which will be read by all Kremlin leaders now and in the future.

In summary, the Secretary wanted to close with reference to our historic relations; with a clear elucidation of the carrots and everything that is up for grabs if they take responsible steps; our obligations as superpowers; and a minimum of ideological negativism. The Secretary also asked that something emotional be put in along the lines of "our children’s children." He noted that this would have an effect on Brezhnev, who is "an emotional old guy—the type who would cry after he threw you over the side."

Keith Schuette

9 Printed from a copy bearing this typed signature.

135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, January 22, 1982, 0142Z

16667. Subject: Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin’s Call on Under Secretary Stoessel, January 20, 1982.

1. (S—Entire text)

1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820001–0537. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Scanlan and in S/S–O; approved by Stoessel.
2. Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called on Under Secretary Stoessel at his request at 1630 local January 20 to deliver a non-paper containing the Soviet reply to our January 10 demarche on Cuba. Director Simons also participated. Unofficial Embassy translation of Russian text is at last para of this message.

3. Dobrynin said he was delivering the paper on behalf of his government, and he thought it a clear reply.

4. After reading over text, Stoessel said he was not in a position to make a considered reply, but he could say that our concerns remain. One problem is that these systems can be converted quickly for nuclear delivery. Dobrynin commented that this is also true of MiG–21s; these are MiG–23s.

5. Stoessel continued that we are concerned with the whole Cuban arms buildup, the shipment of arms into Cuba, and Cuban capacity to project power. This is natural: Cuba is very close to the United States. But it also affects Central America. We cannot agree with what is said in the Soviet paper on Nicaragua and other parts of the area. We feel the thrust of the Cuban effort not only in Nicaragua but also in El Salvador is clear. He was sure the Secretary would discuss it with Gromyko.

6. Dobrynin said the Cubans also have great concerns, which they pass on to the Soviets. Belligerent U.S. statements are a major factor. They ask what you intend to do, and cannot but feel concerned. Current developments do not start from zero. That is why they ask the Soviets for defensive weapons. They are getting more than before, but that is because there is more concern.

7. On the understanding, Dobrynin drew attention to the language of the Soviet paper affirming that the USSR is fulfilling it and does not wish to violate it as long as the U.S. does not.

8. Stoessel replied that we continue to feel recent developments raise questions about the understanding, concluding he would leave it at that. Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary would be in a position to say something about the issue. Stoessel said he did not know. Dobrynin said he had mentioned the possibility to Moscow, and there are only a few days left.

9. Stoessel said we consider this a serious matter, and do not plan a propaganda campaign. Dobrynin said this was a welcome sign. We are not stirring it, Stoessel continued; it is the Cubans who are stirring things up.

10. Simons noted that the Soviet paper referred to MiG–23s, and asked if the Soviets made the distinction between MiG–23s and MiG–

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2 See Document 128.
27s, and whether the paper therefore meant what it said. Dobrynin said it meant exactly what it said: the Soviets make the distinction, and what is involved is the same plane, but in the MiG–23 modification.

11. Noting he had read a Gwertzmann NYT article suggesting that a date for START could be announced after the Geneva meeting, Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary would be prepared for this. Stoessel replied that this is not likely under present circumstances; we would wish to continue in diplomatic channels. Dobrynin said this was fair enough.

12. After a brief exchange on the announcement of the Geneva meeting due January 21, Dobrynin asked about a post-meeting statement. Stoessel replied that this would be up to the principals; any statement would probably be very general, he anticipated.

13. Dobrynin said Gromyko would be meeting with the Swiss Foreign Minister in Geneva, but would not be lunching with him. Mrs. Gromyko would accompany him to Geneva.

14. On the way in, Dobrynin told Simons his information from Moscow mentioned only Korniyenko and himself as accompanying Gromyko for the talks, though he naturally assumed Sukhodrev would be there as interpreter.

15. Text of Soviet Embassy translation of non-paper follows. Begin text:

—We cannot but find it strange that the US side is raising such questions that entirely belong to the area of mutual relations between two sovereign states—the Soviet Union and Cuba—and cannot be subject of discussion with anyone else.

—Nor is there any foundation whatsoever, in this case, for making reference to the known Soviet-American understanding of 1962. The Soviet Union has done and is doing nothing of the kind in Cuba that would contradict the 1962 understanding. It fully adheres to its part of the understanding and intends to continue doing so, having in mind that the US side, as has been confirmed by it, will be strictly implementing its part of that understanding.

—Solely as an expression of good will, we can inform the US side that in the framework of ordinary and planned arms deliveries for the Cuban defense requirements a certain quantity of aircraft of the “MiG–23” type is being sent there. The US side, undoubtly, knows that the

3 Reference is presumably to Gwertzman’s article of January 7, in which he wrote: “Mr. Haig has planned to meet with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union in Geneva on Jan. 27 to set the time and place for the renewal of strategic arms reduction talks.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. is Relenting on NATO Sanctions Against Russians,” New York Times, January 7, 1982, p. A1)
aircraft of this type have been in Cuba for a fairly long time. None of the modifications of this plane being delivered to Cuba has the capability for use as a nuclear weapons carrier.

—Thus, the presence of the said aircraft in Cuba introduces no change in the existing situation and has nothing to do with the Soviet-American understanding of 1962.

—Therefore, the US side has no grounds for expressing any concern in this regard, let alone, for viewing this question as allegedly affecting the security interests of the USA. It is clearly artificial to pose this question in such a way. And, of course, no useful purpose can be served by a propaganda drive if it were launched now around this question in the USA.

—At the same time one cannot fail to see that the very attempt by the US side to somehow cast doubt upon the legitimate cooperation between the Soviet Union and Cuba, as well as the desire to involve in this case Nicaragua, do nothing but further exacerbate the situation in the Carribean region and step up tensions around Cuba and Nicaragua. On more than one occasion we have brought this point to the attention of the US Government.

—If one is to speak of the concern over what is going on in that region, it is precisely Cuba and Nicaragua who have more than ample grounds to have such a concern. It is exactly they who are being threatened by the USA with a direct use of force, it is against them that military demonstrations, manoeuvres, troop landings, and so on are being staged. The training of mercenary bands and incursion groups takes place on the territory of the United States. All this causes the peoples of these countries to feel genuinely alarmed and naturally desirous to strengthen their defense capacities.

—For that matter, the general policy of the United States in international affairs in no way makes people feel less threatened as far as their fate is concerned. Urging restraint, the United States does not itself exercise restraint in dispatching huge quantities of most advanced weapons to dozens of countries in the world, including to those areas where it can cause a legitimate concern on the part of the Soviet Union. How are we supposed to regard, for instance, the American-Israeli agreement on “strategic cooperation” which is clearly directed not only against the Arabs but also against the Soviet Union?

—Hence, as to the real causes of the existing tension in Soviet-American relations, the responsibility for that tension rests entirely with the United States. It would serve the interests of all peoples, including the American people, to take measures to ameliorate the situation and not to exacerbate it through raising non-existing questions and making propaganda around them. End text.

Haig
136. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)\(^1\)

Washington, January 22, 1982

**SUBJECT**

Afghanistan Issue in Haig-Gromyko Talks (U)

I have heard that Secretary Haig is going to focus on Afghanistan in his January 26 meeting with Gromyko. If so, I hope that he does not repeat the proposal made to Gromyko during their September 28, 1981 meeting:\(^2\)

—The Afghanistan Government should take steps to broaden its base. (S)

—Second, the Soviet Union could simultaneously study a formula for a phased withdrawal. (S)

—Third, outside powers could take a number of steps, including those mentioned by Gromyko last time (September 23, 1981) regarding cross-border activities from outside the borders of Afghanistan.\(^3\) (S)

Dick Pipes and I were nonplussed by this proposal which had not been subjected to interagency discussion and which, we believe, is replete with pitfalls. The Afghanistan Government could “broaden its base” in a cosmetic fashion as Communist governments have frequently done. The Soviets could go along with supporting in principle a phased withdrawal. They have already stated they were prepared to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. In 1968, the Soviets said they would withdraw their forces from Czechoslovakia, but they are still there. Worst of all, Haig’s last point suggests we would be agreeable to closing Afghanistan’s borders and cutting off assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters. (S)

Secretary Haig’s proposal reflects what I consider to be a common fallacy: the Soviets can be negotiated out of Afghanistan. I am personally convinced that the Soviets are prepared to stay the course until Afghanistan can be turned into another “Mongolian Peoples Republic,” in effect an integral part of the Soviet Union. I see the Soviet move into Afghanistan as a continuation of historic Russian expansion in Central Asia which was going on until the end of the last century and

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\(^2\) See Document 90.

\(^3\) See Document 88.
which was unsuccessfully attempted, in the case of Iran, in this century. The “Great Game” referred to by Kipling was the 19th century British effort to thwart Russian designs on Afghanistan. (S)

The Soviets are prepared to wage long, protracted war in Afghanistan at a relatively low level, and despite their current setbacks, I am afraid they will win in the end. The world’s strongest land power is not going to allow itself to be defeated or driven out by a ragtag collection of very courageous, but poorly armed and poorly organized, Afghan irregulars. (S)

The Russians are not as impatient as we are in the West, and historically they are used to long “pacification” campaigns in this area. It took the Russians thirty years (1830–1860) to pacify the rebellious people of the Caucasus. After the 1917 Russian Revolution, it took the Red Army nearly 15 years to subdue the Basmachis in Soviet Central Asia. It is significant that a Soviet diplomat in Kabul recently compared the war in Afghanistan with the campaign against the Basmachis. (S)

We should maintain constant pressure on the Soviets over Afghanistan and never cease in keeping this issue alive in the form of world opinion, but we should not harbor any illusions that we are going to succeed in getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan through pressure, negotiations or both. For this reason I consider it ill-advised for us to propose a solution which embraces the concessions offered by Secretary Haig last September 28. Such concessions can only encourage the Soviets to believe that we are losing our resolve in opposing this blatant act of aggression, and this can encourage further acts of aggression. (S)

Kemp concurs. (U)
137. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, January 26, 1982, 10 a.m.–12:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Haig-Gromyko Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

US
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig
Mr. William D. Krimer Interpreter

USSR
Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev Interpreter

Foreign Minister Gromyko suggested he and Secretary Haig briefly discuss the best way to proceed at today’s meeting.

The Secretary said that since Gromyko was our guest now, he would offer him the floor for any questions he might care to raise. We had a full agenda, i.e., many topics to discuss.

Gromyko thanked the Secretary and said that if the Secretary had been his guest he would have acted in the same manner, giving him the floor.

Procedure for this Meeting

Gromyko thought it best to say a few words regarding procedure. The agenda for this meeting was not fixed; therefore each of them could raise any question they believed worthwhile holding an exchange of views on. Naturally, these questions should be of the kind that both sides would want to discuss, for if there were some issues that one side wanted to talk about while the other did not, the side that wanted to discuss them could hardly do so with itself. But there would be no lack of questions to choose from.

In speaking for the Soviet side, Gromyko would want to start with discussion of our bilateral relations, i.e., relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Of course, it was just one subject, but what a subject! Later in the meeting Gromyko would want to exchange views with the Secretary on the subject of nuclear weapons in Europe; negotiations on this matter had already started between the two Delegations here in Geneva. In fact, this was also what he and the Secretary had agreed upon when they last met in New York, i.e., that at the next meeting this would be a subject of discussion. Thus, we had a second topic here. Further, in the Soviet view it would also be useful to

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Clark Files, Haig/Gromyko Meetings, 01/26/1982 10:00 AM. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the U.N.

2 See Documents 90 and 91.
exchange views on strategic arms limitation. When they last met in New York, they had touched on this very briefly. Of course, he did not know to what extent the Secretary was prepared to take up this question, but in principle he did have something to say in that connection; so that could be the third topic for discussion. If the Secretary was willing, of course. Then, Gromyko would want to address a subject that Haig had raised with him when they last met in New York: Angola, Cuba and Namibia, in short a southern African Triad where Haig had seen a linkage. Gromyko was prepared to express some views on this topic from the standpoint of the Soviet Union. He thought it would probably also be useful to touch on some questions relating to Asia as a whole or to some regions in Asia. That might depend on how their discussions proceeded. It would probably be equally correct to touch on matters related to the situation in the Middle East. The US had displayed an interest in that area, and this was known to the Soviet Union, and the US was also getting involved in some of the events there. The Soviet Union, too, had an interest in the situation in the Middle East and the Secretary would realize why. After all, this region was close to the borders of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps it would also be useful to talk about one other matter: the US and the Soviet Union had been involved in discussions of very important questions in the field of armaments and disarmament. With regard to some of these aspects, contacts were continuing or had been resumed, but these were very few in number. With respect to some other aspects, matters had come to a standstill. As a practical matter, contacts had ended or had been suspended. Should the Soviet side come to the conclusion that this was a normal state of affairs, that a dialogue on these matters or broader discussions, be they multilateral or bilateral, did not merit the attention of the two sides? That was one more topic for discussion.

Gromyko thought the Secretary would see that all of these problems could be discussed in the interest of progress, provided both sides viewed these matters seriously. He would not suggest that the two of them remain here in Geneva until Easter. The situation was such that their meeting had been abbreviated down to only one day of discussions; therefore they would have to properly assess how best to use the time at their disposal. Gromyko pointed out that the issues he would like to discuss with the Secretary by no means exhausted the list of issues between us. He also wondered whether they should continue their discussions in the composition Gromyko had outlined, and as they had done in New York, or did the Secretary want to suggest another approach? If the Secretary preferred the present composition, he would be prepared to proceed and set forth Soviet views on the issues he had identified. It would be useful if the Secretary were to
respond to each of these issues as it was raised, rather than wait for complete statements on all of the issues at one time. In this way they would cover their ground in sequence until they ran aground on the time barrier to further discussion.

Secretary Haig noted that Gromyko had reviewed a number of topics for discussion and said that he was very comfortable with that review. He thought he would prefer to retain the composition as it was now and go through the basic topics. His approach was to update all the subjects they had discussed in September. At that time, Haig had felt it most important to focus on the international scene and the overall relations between our two countries. He thought he would touch on each subject, updating its status on the basis of events since September so as to have a clear picture of where they stood.

**U.S.-Soviet Relations**

Gromyko agreed and said he would start off on US-Soviet relations. Unfortunately, it was his assessment that during the few months since their meeting in New York bilateral relations between our two countries had not improved at all. On the contrary, one might say that they had become even more difficult.

As far as questions of nuclear weapons were concerned, the United States and the Soviet Union to date had not only been unable to find common language, but had also been unable to find any common ground. In his view, this had an adverse effect on the relations between our two countries. Indeed, quite a few statements had been made in the United States on this subject, at the Presidential level, at Secretary Haig’s level and at other levels. Gromyko regarded these statements as having been made for the purpose of ensuring by hook or by crook that the NATO decision to deploy new types of nuclear weapons in Europe be implemented. Everything had been subordinated to that. Later in this meeting Gromyko would address this matter in greater detail and put forward Soviet considerations in that regard; for now he would only say that he considered the US position on this matter as a position aimed at ensuring implementation of the NATO decision.

This issue was somewhat like a large weight that pulled Soviet-US relations downward. That such an assessment is justified is buttressed by the fact that Washington has been consistently rejecting everything put forward by the Soviet side in order to make it easier to find a compromise solution on the basis of not infringing upon either US or Soviet security. Washington has even rejected efforts aimed at finding some common ground that would not violate the principle of equal security. No matter what had been put forward by the Soviet side, it had all been rejected without any attempt being made to discuss Soviet proposals.
The second situation that Gromyko wanted to emphasize was the following: the Secretary would recall that in New York they had talked about the possibility of resuming or extending some agreements that were about to run out or that had already run out. They had talked about ways of how and when to do so in the near future. But then the US Administration had decided that all this must be discarded, that the agreements that had expired be ended de jure or paralyzed de facto. This, of course, reinforced the unsatisfactory nature of the present Soviet-US relations and was a negative factor that influenced other US-Soviet issues as well.

A third consideration Gromyko wanted to put forward—and he would repeat that this was not a completed inventory of everything that could be talked about—was the following: literally, not a single day passed that statements did not appear in Washington which struck heavy blows at US-Soviet relations. Such statements were being made at all sorts of levels—at the highest level, at the level of Ministers and others—in fact at so many levels that it was difficult even to count them. The Secretary might know better at how many levels such statements were being rolled out. It was almost as if efforts were made to compete and see who could make the most negative statement. All this seriously poisoned Soviet-US relations, and very badly at that. All this resulted in demolishing everything that had been achieved by the Soviet Union and by several US Administrations, working together over a period of at least a decade. In fact, the Secretary had taken part in some of those efforts and had witnessed them being made.

Gromyko said that he had the impression that some of the present leading figures in the United States were rubbing their hands in delight at every new blow that was struck at US-Soviet relations. However, one should recall how much effort and work had gone into building up and improving these relations on a step-by-step basis, in order to ensure that each side respected the reasonable and legitimate interests of the other. Today all this was being burned, and those in Washington who have a hand in this demolition of relations between us express great satisfaction as these relations become worse.

This is indeed a very strange situation. Some special names have been invented to designate certain actions, sometimes these are called sanctions and sometimes something else, but Gromyko believed that what was important was not the names given to these actions, but that their combined effect was to lead to destruction of the results of the labor expended over decades by so many people. He could use stronger words to describe today’s situation, but did not want to exacerbate things further. He still hoped that sooner or later Washington would understand that these steps, i.e., sanctions and others, would not yield the results that those taking them expected. They would surely not yield such results.
Affairs between two major powers should be conducted only on the basis of due regard for each other’s legitimate interests, seeking accommodation and, of course, showing respect for each other. Any other way of proceeding could only produce negative results. For his part, Gromyko would venture to say that he was not inclined to believe that the American people eagerly awaited increases in tensions to a point where such inflammation might escalate to a clash. He did not believe it because he was firmly convinced that people instinctively realized that the Soviet Union and the United States were in the same boat, especially in this nuclear age. Thus, he and the Soviet authorities were inclined to believe that regardless of the emotions some people vented from time to time, Washington, i.e., those officials in the US who had their hands on the helm of US foreign policy, would ultimately also realize that we were in the same boat.

He recalled that when they had last met in New York, they had discussed a closely related subject. In the course of the discussion the Secretary had expressed displeasure about certain statements in the Soviet Union, i.e., statements in the Soviet press that were aimed directly at leading figures in the United States. He had to tell the Secretary once again that what the Soviet side did in this respect, it did by way of reacting to similar statements in the United States and, in fact, by way of reacting to a much lesser extent than would be justified. The Soviet Union lagged far behind the United States in this respect. In the US, such statements in the press appeared constantly, but what especially disturbed the Soviet authorities were the official statements made by leading American officials. The fact that sometimes no specific names were mentioned did not change anything at all. It is absolutely clear in any event who is meant by such statements.

Yet, it would not be difficult to change direction. He believed that the Secretary knew best where things were going in that regard. But he should also know that if the US continued to act in this manner with respect to Soviet authorities, the Soviet Union would have no alternative but to react in kind. This referred to hostile statements directed against the Soviet social system and the Soviet leadership. Why not try an experiment? Try to stop such attacks if only for one month; then the Secretary would see how the Soviet Union would respond.

Gromyko said that he wanted to conclude this portion of his comments by saying that, of course, his authorities wanted to see our relations normalized. This did not mean that the two sides would be able immediately to eliminate all differences on many issues, international as well as bilateral. But it did mean that such differences could be discussed in the spirit of seeking and ultimately finding points of contact. If the US refrained from hostile statements aimed at Soviet
authorities and their social system, the Soviet Union would certainly
display its readiness and willingness to even out the atmosphere sur-
rounding our mutual relations, and that would apply to all areas,
whether this be nuclear weapons or regional complications.

In all other matters the US would find the Soviet Union a partner
who would make every effort to find common language and to contrib-
ute to improvement in our mutual relations. It would be even better
to establish friendly relations between us, as pointed out by Brezhnev
on a number of occasions. This, of course, required the desire on both
sides to establish such friendly relations. Gromyko concluded his
remarks on the general state of relations between our two countries
and said he was prepared to hear the Secretary’s response.

Secretary Haig said he appreciated the considerations Gromyko
had put forward and by way of a tour d’horizon wanted to make some
general observations. First he would assure Gromyko that he had left
their discussion in New York with a cautious sense of optimism that
the months ahead would give us the opportunity of straightening out
a number of long-simmering tensions. He had returned to Washington
and had given President Reagan his assessment to that effect. The
President shared with the Secretary the hope and intent that we could
put our relations on a more even course. It was largely in response to
that assessment that President Reagan had presented his four-point
arms control approach in November.\(^3\)

However, the Secretary had to tell Gromyko that in the process
of preparing for this evening-out effort, we had maintained a careful
watch—hour by hour and day by day—on the subject he and Gromyko
had discussed in New York. He believed it important, in the light of
Gromyko’s comments, that he hastily touch on the conclusions we had
drawn from that careful watch.

First, in New York, when he and Gromyko had discussed regional
problems, the Secretary had made plain our desire to help settle the
Afghanistan problem. Somewhat later, through Ambassador Hartman
in Moscow, we had talked about our three element approach to resolv-
ing this problem. That approach consisted of a provision for self-deter-
mination, guaranteed borders—a question that had been raised by
Gromyko—and a provision for time-phased withdrawal of Soviet
forces from Afghanistan. Instead, we saw increasing troop levels and
increased pressure on the Government of Pakistan, with which we
have historically maintained friendly relations.

\(^3\) See “Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and
A second area he and Gromyko had discussed was the situation in Southern Africa, an area in finding a formula for the achievement of an independent Namibia that would be disassociated from the rivalries of the major powers. What we had witnessed instead were increasing levels of Cuban force in Angola and strong pressures on the Government of Angola to reject all efforts at achieving a solution. The main thrust of Soviet policy in that area, as we assessed and confirmed by local contacts, was precisely the opposite.

He and Gromyko also had discussed issues affecting Central America, in particular Cuban arms and Cuban interventionism. At that time Gromyko had described the Soviet arms there as modest and defensive in nature. In the last few weeks we had seen arms shipments to Cuba increased to such an extent that the total of arms delivered in 1981 amounted to three times, the Secretary wished to emphasize, three times the amount provided to Cuba during 1980. Perhaps what was most important was the character of these arms, i.e., naval, air and ground equipment. We had carefully assessed the exchanges that had taken place between the Carter Administration and the Soviet Union at the time that MiG–23s were first introduced to Cuba. The question about the character of these aircraft had been raised in terms of their capability to deliver nuclear weapons. Our records confirm that U.S. officials involved at that time had made clear that while the United States would accept the assurances of the Soviet Union in that regard, (assurances which were not verifiable), the U.S. also made clear that no additional numbers of these aircraft should be introduced into the area. We now are faced with additional numbers of aircraft, a higher quality air defense—SAM–6 air defense missiles, sophisticated radars, naval patrol craft and helicopters in overall quantities that cannot but give rise to serious doubts in Washington concerning Soviet intentions.

The situation is further complicated by our day-to-day assessment of the situation with regard to Nicaragua, and the fact that the Soviet Union had given clear license to Cuba not only to increase its interference in that country, but particularly to upgrade Nicaragua’s military forces. In that connection, the Secretary had received assurances from the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua at Sta. Lucia that Nicaragua would not receive MiGs from Cuba or from Eastern Europe. We now saw airfields being built and Soviet advisors acting in a training role with Nicaraguan pilots. We believe it essential that the assurances we received regarding aircraft to Nicaragua at the Sta. Lucia meeting be lived up to. We consider the introduction of such aircraft unacceptable.

The Secretary then turned to other questions he and Gromyko had discussed last September, especially those concerning nuclear arms. We had entered the Geneva negotiations in good faith with a view to achieving reductions in nuclear arms and with a special formula to
remove the greatest irritant to US-Soviet relations, namely the Soviet SS–20 missiles which threatened our NATO allies. We remain at the negotiations in good faith, while continuing with the deployment plans of NATO to which Gromyko had referred. The Secretary had to say that the initial exchanges had clearly indicated that the principal difficulties encountered at the negotiations concerned reaching a consensus view regarding the data base. It was our judgment at this time that the principle of equality and equal security, which had been put forward by the Soviet side, cannot be implemented in a situation in which the Soviet side views elimination of all threats from all sources as an immediate objective of the negotiations. This was a clear instance of Soviet striving to maintain superiority.

The Secretary turned to the area of bilateral relations which he and Gromyko had discussed last September. In this area, too, day-to-day responses by the Soviet side had been disappointing and alarming. We had raised a number of human rights cases which could have been resolved, with good will and creative suggestions or solutions. We had specifically mentioned the cases of Shcharanskiy and Skuodis, as well as the Pentecostalists still in the US Embassy in Moscow, where a serious situation exists as these individuals became involved in a hunger strike and their health is in question.\(^4\) We have conceived an innovative formula to resolve these cases and have proposed it to the Soviet Union, but once again without success.\(^5\)

The Secretary said there had been increasing evidence, and we had an up-to-date fact sheet in that respect, of violations of international law with respect to the use of toxic and chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan respectively. The evidence we had was conclusive and overwhelming, and the Soviet role in the use of these weapons was incontrovertible. This could only put a serious dent in the whole credibility of solutions in arms control areas.

The Secretary noted that last September we had also expressed our great concern over the crisis in Poland. Since then events have occurred which as a practical consequence raise doubts among the American people about the future relations between us and the Soviet Union. These doubts are fully shared by our NATO allies. By every assessment we have made, the prospects have increased for violence in Poland, which was something we had hoped to avoid. We have been and are ready today in this regard to join with the Soviet Union in a formula to increase the level of moderation and to rebuild in Poland with whatever resources necessary to ensure the viability of the Polish state.

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\(^4\) See Document 90.
\(^5\) See Document 129.
We clearly understand the importance of this issue to the Soviet Union, but we also understand that the whole framework of our relations is at stake.

In fact, we are at a turning point which, in terms of East-West relations, is the most significant since World War II. Like the Soviet Union, we have no wish to see the situation deteriorate. Like the Soviet Union, we feel that the Helsinki Agreements represent a historic opportunity to continue and to improve our post World War II efforts at bettering our relations. However, speaking frankly, the Secretary would point out that as we assessed each issue, instead of receiving responses from the Soviet side that would be encouraging, we find acts on the Soviet side which complicate and test our assessment of Soviet intentions for future relations between us.

He could assure Gromyko that President Reagan personally shares Brezhnev’s view regarding the need for our two countries to work together. But the Secretary had to say that on no single issue had we received any evidence that the Soviet side was prepared to deal with these issues in a spirit of reciprocity. The Secretary did not expect Gromyko to share the assessment he had just given, but he would ask Gromyko to consider the possibility of carefully developing measurable manifestations of his Government’s actions in each area they had discussed in September. The Secretary concluded by saying that this was the broad tour d’horizon of the problems facing us to which he wanted to draw Gromyko’s attention. He would suggest that we must do everything possible to find ways of reversing this trend in the relations between us before it cannot be reversed. He was prepared to listen to Gromyko’s assessment.

Gromyko noted that in presenting his considerations the Secretary had gone beyond the strict limits of the general subject of our bilateral relations. This was quite understandable because in a way it was difficult to erect a wall separating purely bilateral from international affairs. Gromyko still believed that the problems between us could be discussed in their specifics to the extent this was possible. For this reason he did not intend to enlarge on the first subject he had talked about today. The Secretary had incidentally touched on matters of regional impact and other major international problems that went beyond the limits of our bilateral relations. He would only emphasize to the Secretary that in his view the Secretary’s analysis of our bilateral relations and the current state of affairs generally suffered from being one-sided and wrong in terms of its characterization of Soviet foreign policy, which could not be acceptable. Now Gromyko wanted to turn to specific matters and briefly, in view of limited time, set out his side’s assessment of the problem.
Gromyko turned to the question of nuclear weapons in Europe, the NATO decision of 1979 and the US position and Soviet position at the negotiations initiated here in Geneva. He would provide the Soviet assessment of the state of this problem. In this regard, he had to emphasize above all that the US position, as seen from the Soviet side, which had been expressed in US statements by the President, by the Secretary personally, by other Ministers of the US Administration and by the US Delegation in Geneva, amounted to building up the US nuclear strategic forces directed against the Soviet Union. The US was building up these forces in violation of the principle of equality and equal security which had guided the Soviet side up to now in its dealings with previous US Administrations. Gromyko said that he had not misspoken when he had said “strategic” nuclear forces. That was not a slip of the tongue. The purpose of nuclear weapons deployment in accordance with the NATO decision was what gave this deployment a character that was tantamount to the deployment of strategic weapons. All these weapons were aimed at targets in the Soviet Union, not even to mention the territories of the Soviet Union’s allies. At the same time, those SS–20 missiles which the West was given to painting in such fearful colors were medium-range missiles, not a single one of which could reach the territory of the United States. Consequently the NATO decision was to deploy weapons that were directed at targets on Soviet territory, while, he would repeat again, not a single Soviet missile in question could reach the territory of the US. Thus, qualitatively these were absolutely different categories of weapons. Gromyko did not believe that he was here dealing with some sort of attempt to outsmart the Soviet Union. He was certain that the Secretary was well aware of the facts as just stated. He was not sure as to who played the first fiddle in the United States, military or civilian leaders, but he was sure that the Secretary was well aware of these facts. The Secretary surely knew that the Soviet side knew that the US was building up strategic weapons against the Soviet Union and he was also sure that the Secretary knew that the Soviet side knew that the Secretary was well aware of this fact. That was the first thing that he wanted to emphasize with respect to this subject. It did not augur well for discussions between us or for Soviet-US relations in general. Furthermore, Washington obstinately objects to inclusion in the overall balance of NATO forces the nuclear weaponry belonging to Britain and France. He had to say that this will not work and, in fact, there could not even be a serious discussion on that basis. How could the Soviet Union possibly agree to have all that weaponry left outside of consideration and outside of the count of what constitutes the East-West balance? While it was good that negotiations in Geneva between the Soviet
Union and the United States on medium-range systems in Europe had started, in the final analysis the nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom and France would have to be counted in the balance, even though the UK and France were not party to the negotiations. It seemed to Gromyko that he had mentioned this in New York. If not, he could tell the Secretary now that this question had been raised with a previous US administration. At one time he had a conversation with President Carter at the White House, in the course of which he had told President Carter what he had just now told the Secretary. President Carter had said that he did, of course, fully realize and understand that the British and French forces were directed at the Soviet Union and thus formed grounds for concern on the Soviet side. He further said that he had considered the matter but had not yet reached a conclusion. Gromyko did not believe that former President Carter could have forgotten this conversation. In any case, a record is surely available in the White House. Today there was a new administration in Washington, but the Soviet Union could not agree to being confronted with a new situation just because of that fact. After all, it was completely impossible for the Soviet side not to take into account somewhere around 250 nuclear systems directed at the Soviet Union. These systems did, after all, belong to US allies tied to the United States by treaty obligations.

Gromyko characterized this as a major question of fundamental importance. What should be counted in the overall balance was indeed crucial. The US suggestion that NATO forego the deployment of its new medium-range missiles and the Soviet Union eliminate all its SS–20s, SS–4s and SS–5s sounded very simple. The US side called it the “zero option.” In fact, zero was not even in sight. How could one talk about zero when what would remain after elimination of all medium-range missiles would be massive numbers of aircraft aboard US carriers cruising the Mediterranean and the Atlantic? Gromyko noted incidentally that it seemed that US carriers believed their home to be in European waters. Furthermore, there would remain all the other Western nuclear-capable aircraft that would not count in the balance. Agreement by the Soviet Union to such a position could be ruled out completely. In fact, the Soviet side was astonished that such a proposal could have been made, since it was so crude and so drastically directed against the Soviet Union that it should not have been made in the first place. Nevertheless, it had been submitted for consideration. “That will not work.” All nuclear-capable aircraft must be counted in as a subject at the negotiations and subsequent agreement. Naturally, in such an event, all corresponding Soviet nuclear-capable aircraft would also be counted. The Soviet side had said so at the meetings of Delegations in Geneva. Surely, the Secretary was aware of that proposal of the Soviet Delegation in Geneva.
Gromyko said that, as the Secretary knew, the Soviet side had also presented a zero option. Brezhnev had done so during his visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, but no positive reaction to that proposal had been received from the US side. What the US side called a zero option could not bring the negotiations a single step closer towards an accord. There is simply no place for a zero in that kind of option. Perhaps calling it a zero was due to a misunderstanding, or perhaps one would have to revise the rule of mathematics to arrive at zero on this basis.

Gromyko pointed out that, furthermore, if the US proposal were accepted, the Soviet Union would find itself in a worse position than if the present situation were simply continued and the NATO decision for the deployment of Pershing-IIs and cruise missiles were implemented. Thus, neither the first option nor the second made it possible to arrive at an accord.

Gromyko wanted next to touch on a third matter in the US position at the negotiations, which was also not acceptable. It was said that the Soviet Union must eliminate its SS–20s, and not only those deployed elsewhere. It was implied that no one knew what the Soviet Union had beyond the Urals in the Asiatic portion of Soviet territory. Thus, some thinktank researchers in the US, writing their theoretical dissertations, advocated limiting and reducing various arms beyond the territory of Europe, in other words, that an agreement to be concluded would have to be global in nature. Why was this being done? Why was it suggested that SS–20 missiles be eliminated wherever they were deployed? It was hardly adequate to express astonishment, for this was a solution that was simply unthinkable and objectionable. He would ask the Secretary if the Soviet Union should not be concerned by the situation in Asia, when everyone knew that China did exist and Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union was a matter of common knowledge. Furthermore, there were specific situations along the entire perimeter of the Soviet Union outside of Europe, in the East, the South, the Southeast and the Middle East. In all of these areas the United States had weapons systems, including medium-range systems; he felt no need to enumerate them but would be prepared to do so if the Secretary so desired. In short, Gromyko wanted to stress that the question of eliminating all SS–20s, no matter where located, could not deserve serious consideration.

Gromyko now wanted to touch on another aspect of this same issue. Why had the Soviet Union deployed SS–20s in the first place?

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It seemed to some people on the US side that everything had been fine in terms of the balance in Europe, when suddenly this fearful SS–20 missile had appeared. At first an idyllic situation, and then, suddenly, Armageddon. He wanted to emphasize to the Secretary, and realized that some people might not like it, that Soviet SS–20 deployment was a response to the systematic modernization of NATO’s weapons, above all those of the United States. There had appeared to be a consistent plan to modernize forward-based systems and to build new weapons by US allies. The Soviet Union had watched this development carefully in order to determine whether this was a one-time occurrence or if it was a considered permanent policy. The modernization of forward-based systems and the construction of new weapons by western allies had not ceased, evidently there was a corresponding plan which was being implemented to its conclusion. Thus, the West had raised the capabilities of these systems to such an extent that the Soviet Union felt compelled to respond by deployment of SS–20s.

He wanted to stress that this purposeful policy with regard to US forward-based systems could only be seen as an attempt to shift the balance of forces in Europe in such a way as to favor the West. This was why the Soviet Union had deployed SS–20s, but this had not changed the balance in Europe at all. He would emphasize that no change in that balance had occurred. He would go even further and say that even if the Soviet Union doubled or tripled the number of its medium-range missiles in Europe, the US advantage would nevertheless remain. The reason for that was that US forward-based systems were directed against targets on the territory of the Soviet Union. This was an unalterable geographic factor. In fact, it was almost as if Europe was a kind of launch pad which had been moved from US territory to European territory.

The geographic factor, too, had to be taken into account in determining the balance of forces. The material side alone could be put into a balance, but that would not alter the substance of the matter. He noted in an aside that even in terms of the material factor, the West now had 50 percent more warheads in place than the Soviet Union. The geographic factor had enormous significance from the standpoint of negotiations and agreement. It had always had its effect at past negotiations and did have its effect today. He would repeat that even if the Soviet Union doubled or tripled the number of SS–20s, the US would still retain its advantage. And yet, the US kept ignoring this factor in its Delegation’s statements and proposals. Gromyko believed the situation to be so clear that it was not even necessary to talk about it. It was simply a fact that existed and he would ask the Secretary to imagine himself in the position of the Soviet side. He would then understand that for the Soviet side this fact was indeed decisive.
Gromyko said that he had just enumerated the main difficulties which today separated the positions of the two sides at the negotiations. The US side completely ignores the objectivity of the Soviet position. He would ask the Secretary to take a look at it again in light of the explanations Gromyko had just supplied.

Gromyko thought it would be useful to consider the present stage of the negotiations in Geneva. It seemed to him that it would now be useful to provide some bench marks, as it were, for the Delegations of the two sides to be guided by. Perhaps it might be useful to agree on some sort of bilateral statement or understanding to the effect that two sides would adhere to the principle of equality and would make every effort to bring the positions of the sides closer together. With a view to proposing such a joint document—it did not matter what it might be called—Gromyko had prepared a number of points which he would now present. They were as follows:

"a. In accordance with the principle of equality and equal security the agreement will include and take into account all medium-range nuclear arms, that is, arms with a range or combat radius of 1000 kilometers and more, located on the territory of Europe or the waters adjacent thereto, or intended for use in Europe.

b. Proceeding from a desire to lower the level of the aforementioned systems on the side of NATO as well as that of the Soviet Union to the maximum extent, the agreement will provide for a reduction in their numbers down to 300 systems on each side by the end of 1990, along with the establishment of an interim level of 600 systems by the end of 1985.

c. Each side will have the right at its own discretion to determine the composition of the arms to be reduced, and within the limits of the agreed reduced levels the sides, at their own discretion, will be able to carry out replacement and modernization of arms, with limits for such activities to be determined additionally.

d. The basic method used to reduce medium-range arms will be their destruction, which does not rule out the possibility of withdrawing a certain portion of such arms beyond agreed boundaries.

e. The agreement will contain provisions ensuring adequate verification of compliance with the obligations provided for in the contemplated agreement.

f. The agreement will remain in force until December 31, 1990, at which time its term may be extended by agreement between the sides.

g. While the negotiations are in progress, the sides will refrain from any activities to deploy new medium-range nuclear arms in the
European region. Those medium-range weapons that have already been deployed in this area by the present time will be frozen quantitatively and qualitatively. Nonetheless, either side may at its own discretion reduce the existing level of its own medium-range arms.”

Gromyko expressed the hope that the Secretary and his Government would consider these proposals objectively and in a realistic and level-headed manner. Perhaps something along these lines might be useful in terms of the negotiations. The reason that Gromyko had spoken on this subject was that this problem had indeed become so acute at the present moment. There were other acute questions, of course, which he had touched on earlier and they would surely discuss them at their second meeting today. But he had wanted to make sure that the US side understood the Soviet position on the subject of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe with crystal clarity.

The Secretary wanted to speak briefly on the subject under discussion here. All of Gromyko’s comments confirmed the US saying that not only beauty, but also the threat, is in the eye of the beholder. At their second meeting today the Secretary planned to point out to Gromyko that the latter’s proposal was a clear reiteration of days of discussion here in Geneva between the negotiators and of the underlying fact that we both assess the threat differently. The data which we carry in no way can support the points Gromyko had made. The Secretary would want to go over with Gromyko the historic points he had touched on with reference to the strategic threat posed by the SS–20 missiles here in Europe, as well as globally. As an old NATO expert, the Secretary had a good appreciation of the character of the Soviet force structure. He believed it most important in terms of the interests of both sides that the Delegations exchange data and try to sort out this problem as we had done at SALT. At present our views were diametrically opposite. If we looked at the global or regional threat, we came to the conclusion that overwhelming Soviet superiority was absolutely clear. Thus, it took specifically contrived data to arrive at the approximately 1000 launchers for each side, as talked about by the Soviet Delegation. The fact of the matter was that it was clear that the Secretary could not in any way accept the proposal Gromyko had outlined, because it was merely a detailed reiteration of what Ambassador Nitze had already received from the Soviet Delegation in Geneva. He believed the best way to proceed would be to examine the data, for only then could we structure the kind of reduction we had talked about in our proposal. The old question of US systems versus European systems leads to a dilemma that only reinforces Soviet superiority. We had to find a different way in order to arrive at an appropriate solution.
The Secretary was sure that the two sides did have the ingenuity to do so.

138. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, January 26, 1982, 2–7 p.m.

SUBJECT
Haig-Gromyko Conversation

PARTICIPANTS
US USSR
Secretary of State Foreign Minister
Alexander M. Haig Andrey A. Gromyko
D. Arenburger, Interpreter V. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

INF and SALT

Foreign Minister Gromyko did not know whether Secretary Haig had anything to add on the question of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe. If the Secretary had nothing to add, then there was nothing further that Gromyko could say on that subject. Accordingly, he proposed to move on. Though Gromyko did not know the Secretary’s possibilities, he, Gromyko, wanted to address briefly the matter of strategic arms and to listen to the Secretary’s views on that subject. Lately there had been speculations galore in the press, including speculations to the effect that the Secretary did not want to discuss this issue at the current meeting. There were even press suggestions that the Secretary’s intention was to displease the Soviet Union. Gromyko wanted to think that the situation was different, that such reports were incorrect and that they misinterpreted the views of the Secretary and the US Administration. This was a serious issue. The Soviet Union thought that now that discussions were underway on medium-range nuclear arms, the two states should deal with this question as well. After all, time was marching on and by force of circumstances it would be necessary to deal with the subject. But the more time elapsed, the more difficult it would become to deal with the subject, and the more difficult it would be to find appropriate solutions. Gromyko wanted

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Clark Files, Haig/Gromyko Meetings, 01/26/1982 2:00 PM. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission to the U.N.
to believe that the Secretary was prepared to exchange views on this matter, at least briefly. If so, Gromyko, too, was prepared to address it.

The Secretary replied that in the spirit of the principle of equal security he wanted to comment very briefly on some observations made this morning by Gromyko on the INF topic. Gromyko had really touched on three areas, and during lunch the Secretary had an opportunity to consider Gromyko’s comments regarding the written proposal he had read. The Secretary considered it important to reiterate again the basic observation he had made regarding the Geneva discussions thus far. What was involved was a basic difference in approach in assessing data, threats and arms, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Gromyko had made the point very vigorously that the arms in Western Europe were strategic for the Soviet Union. That, of course, was also true with respect to our Western European allies, especially in the case of the SS–20. Furthermore, Gromyko had raised the question of global versus regional. The Secretary wanted to assure Gromyko that our problem involved mobile application of these systems, especially medium-range missiles, the capability of shifting and moving them.

It was necessary to deal with this matter at the ongoing negotiations in such a way that all sides would be confident that the picture was balanced. Certain statements had been made in Geneva to the effect that aircraft carriers and aircraft on them, the A–6s and the A–7s, which were never deployed here, even FB–111s which were in the United States, were included in Soviet force balances. Accordingly, it was a very difficult problem to be sure that we viewed the threats to each country in a common perspective.

The US saw a number of flaws in the Soviet presentation of the balance of capability. The Soviet position presented thus far in Geneva obscured the fact that the Soviet side had a greater number of nuclear systems, including land-based missiles which have great precision and involve greater accuracy, and also have numerous delivery capabilities. The Soviet position presented in Geneva ignored warheads and focused only on launchers, although a more significant measure of capability involves the question of warheads. The Soviet side insisted on including the arms of the United Kingdom and France, in the balance, overlooking the fact that these were strategic systems of sovereign states outside US control.

Gromyko had focused earlier on FB–111s, A–6s and A–7s, but the Soviet side wanted to exclude several Soviet aircraft with ranges comparable to those of US systems which allegedly constituted a threat to the Soviet Union. It was necessary to have a balance in the figures

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2 See Document 137.
and to resolve the differences in that regard. Until that occurred, it
would be very difficult to make meaningful proposals on reductions.
For example, the Secretary did not know how to tabulate the balances,
even including allied systems. The Soviet inventory was overwhelm-
ingly superior. The 580 SS–20s, SS–5s and SS–4s were associated with
over 1,140 warheads, and using the approach the Soviet side had
applied with regard to US nuclear-capable aircraft, the Soviet inventory
involved 8,500 systems. On the other hand, F–111s, F–16s and F–4s
added up to only 1,800. While the Secretary did not want to take the
time now to discuss these numbers, because this should be left to
experts, he had listed them in order to point out that this is where the
problem started. He thought that, generally speaking, we should work
toward resolving these approaches.

The Secretary said that the second area he wished to raise involved
Gromyko’s rationale regarding Soviet deployment of SS–20s. The Secre-
tary knew the facts because he had much experience with NATO and
with military forces, and had witnessed the evolution of the threat
to NATO Europe. He also knew very clearly the situation regarding
development and deployment of SS–20s, because at that time—that is,
in the late ’60s and early ’70s—he had been Dr. Kissinger’s Deputy in
Washington. In this connection, it was necessary to take into account
other dramatic changes in the Soviet posture, such as an increase in
troop strength by one-third, a thickening of the combat echelons, a
buildup in tank divisions and in mobile divisions, along with greater
fire power. There had also been the most dramatic buildup in aircraft
of modern times. The entire character of the Soviet Air Force had
changed with respect to Western Europe during the period 1970 to
1978/79. It had gone from air defensive capabilities to long-range, dual-
capable offensive capabilities. Manpower advantages had gone to a
two-to-one ratio, the advantage in tanks to a three-to-one ratio. In the
course of this, the number of nuclear warheads had increased six-to-
one. All that had occurred simultaneously with the deployment of the
SS–20s.

No objective observer could attribute SS–20 deployment to a reac-
tion to Western modernization at a time when more than 1,000 war-
heads were withdrawn on our side. The Secretary was familiar with that
withdrawal because he had fought that decision, but it was nevertheless
carried out. It was important to get a clear picture on where we were
with respect to SS–20s and how we got there, because only from that
 standpoint would it be possible to establish some basis for reductions
which were in order. The Secretary had presented the above to be sure
the record was clear in light of what Gromyko had said this morning,
and so that the Soviet side would understand our concern.

The Secretary continued that, with respect to the question raised
by Gromyko about SALT/START, we, too, had read all about that. It
was true that we were not prepared, as we might have been in the
absence of events, to move forward to discussing this subject now. Gromyko would know that we had worked intensively, as the Secretary had noted in September, to prepare our position. He hoped that we could initiate START negotiations at the earliest possible time. Those preparations were continuing, but at this time the Secretary was not prepared to engage in a substantive or procedural discussion, such as on the time of resuming these negotiations, and would not be prepared until the climate was right. When the climate was right, he knew that the President would make this very evident through diplomatic channels. The Secretary hoped that this would occur in the not too distant future.

Gromyko would know that, as the President said in November, the latter was anxious to resume the dialogue on this subject and was seeking substantial reductions in strategic arms. He thought that it was evident from the current INF discussions that there was a strong and clear interrelationship between the two topics, and that progress would be produced simultaneously with regard to INF, as well as strategic systems. The Secretary wanted to underline the relationship between the two. Therefore, we would always approach INF from the standpoint of negotiations on strategic systems, even though there would be different venues and different delegations. The Secretary had wanted to make this observation, as Gromyko had done with regard to the areas he wanted to discuss, because in his view it had been important for him to respond so that there be no question about the area of strategic arms. We were here to listen to each other, not to raise fences to communications on questions of major significance to our overall relationship.

Gromyko replied that he had little to add to what he had said this morning with regard to medium-range nuclear arms in Europe. He wanted to emphasize that, of course, he could not accept the statement that the SS–20 deployment was not caused by corresponding actions by the NATO bloc. It was precisely NATO activities—and NATO was constantly modernizing its corresponding nuclear arms—which had forced the Soviet Union to deploy the SS–20s, even though this had not resolved the problem by a long shot, that is, the problem caused by NATO in upsetting the balance of nuclear arms in Europe. Failure by the Secretary to recognize that the factors with respect to the Soviet Union were justified showed that the US position was not objective, and the Soviet Union could not accept the Secretary’s views of the US position or the Soviet position.

In trying to reverse the ratio between US and Soviet arms in Europe, the Secretary was ignoring one simple fact, namely that with respect to nuclear-capable aircraft, for example, the count proposed by NATO and US representatives involved understating the combat radius of US
aircraft and artificially exaggerating the combat radius of Soviet aircraft. The Soviet Delegation had partly noted this already; it had cited specific types of aircraft, that is, aircraft with a range of “X”. The US side on the other hand, without offering any proof had contested this data, claiming that the range was “X plus Y”. The US side pretended that it knew more about Soviet systems than the Soviet side, and was engaging in this practice in order to fit the figures to its preconceived notion. The Soviet side had encountered this more than once, and the Soviet Union could not accept that kind of approach. The US side’s failure to accept Soviet data involved certain preconceived notions. This was being done artificially, intentionally. Gromyko did not want to attribute these actions to the Secretary personally, he did not know who was responsible, but he was asking the Secretary to sort out the figures objectively and if the Secretary did this he would see an entirely different picture. The force relationship cited by US representatives was incorrect, it was a total invention.

Of course, the Secretary could respond, “no, we are correct.” If the Secretary were to say that, Gromyko could not but express his regrets that the US position involved such an absence of seriousness. The question arises, what individuals, what organizations supply such data which are at odds with reality. For example, some Soviet aircraft which played no significant role in Europe and posed no threat in the European arena were claimed to be strategic.³ In this connection, Gromyko wanted to cite the example of Cuba where the US side was making absurd assertions about certain aircraft being nuclear-delivery vehicles, though in fact these aircraft are of no significance to the region involved. Nevertheless, the US was perceiving them as a threat. Gromyko had mentioned Cuba because the analogy could not be escaped. He did not wish to call this matter by its proper name, it was best to refrain from such words. There had been at least a minimum amount of objectivity during preparation of the SALT I and SALT II Agreements, and as a result we had moved forward. If that principle were not adhered to now, if it were crossed out, it would be very difficult to make any progress.

Gromyko, turning to strategic arms, said that he was very sorry to hear the Secretary say that he was unable at this time to talk about resumption of the strategic arms negotiations, to hear him say that this entire topic had to await a better climate, presumably not only in Soviet-US relations, but also internationally. This was a fallacious conception which did not promise anything good. The US will gain nothing from this. If the US regarded this as a way of applying pressure, Gromyko

³ Reference is to a dispute during the SALT II negotiations over whether the Soviet Tu–22M “Backfire” bomber could reach the continental United States.
would point out that the Soviet Union did not recognize such pressure. This was contrary to conducting relations between states and such a tactic did not work when major powers were involved.

The Soviet Union, of course, would try to make it clear that it did not bear the responsibility for failure to resume strategic arms talks, for failure even to obtain clarity regarding the time for such a resumption. Gromyko thought that it would not be difficult to make this clear to the general public. After all, there can only be two alternatives: either one is in favor of such talks or one is opposed to them. The Soviet Union was very much in favor of them, while the US was opposed to them, was putting them off. That should be clear to anyone. As Gromyko had said earlier, he could only express regret concerning this position of the US Administration.

Southern Africa, Cuba and Nicaragua

Gromyko said that since the Secretary had already touched on the problem of Cuba, he, Gromyko, would expand on this matter by setting forth the Soviet Union’s standpoint regarding the complex of problems involving Cuba, Angola and Namibia. He wanted to express some considerations and present some Soviet views on how the US and USSR should act in order to facilitate and promote a resolution of this complex of problems. The Soviet Union had studied these matters in detail and had come to the conclusion that a comprehensive approach could facilitate a solution. The Soviet Union was convinced that this was a constructive and objective standpoint. At our New York meeting the Secretary had spoken very sharply on the question of Cuba. Subsequently, the US Administration and the Secretary himself had made very sharp statements, and more than once. The Soviet Union knew that the US was consciously exacerbating the situation with regard to Cuba. Gromyko did not mean to blame the Secretary personally, he was referring to the US Administration. But Cuba did not merit such treatment. Cuba is being painted as having incredible capabilities and as posing an unbelievable threat, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

In fact, the arms supplied by the Soviet Union in the past and at present were of infinitesimal quantities. They did not constitute a threat to the US and were not intended for that. Cuba, whether it had such arms or not, did not pose a threat now and had not posed a threat in the past. The US was trying to blame Cuba for situations in other Latin American countries, notably in El Salvador. Clearly, there was no justification for making such changes. But, the US evidently needed this to maintain the fires in Latin America. What was the reason for

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4 See Documents 90 and 91.
this? When Castro directly asked the US to furnish proof and facts in support of US allegations, the US did not cite any evidence, it did not even make an effort to cite such evidence. The reason was that there were no facts in support of US charges about Cuban complicity.

Gromyko continued that what he had said about Cuba also applied to Nicaragua. In New York, the Secretary had referred to his meeting with the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua. Gromyko had also spoken to him, and the Foreign Minister had given him an overall account of his meeting with the Secretary. Of course, Gromyko did not know whether he had been told everything or not. Incidentally, the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua had said that his country wanted good relations with the US. He had said this during a visit to Moscow several weeks ago. Cuba certainly did not pose a threat to El Salvador, and neither did Nicaragua. Yet the US side refers to such a threat here and elsewhere. Accordingly, the Soviet Union has concluded that the underlying reason was US dislike for the social system in Cuba. Gromyko recalled that he had told this to the Secretary during the New York meeting. But the Secretary should understand very well that the form of government should not be imposed on others. That was an internal matter, a result of social development.

At the last meeting, the Secretary had raised questions regarding Cuban activities in Ethiopia and Angola. It was true that there were Cuban troops in Angola. The Secretary had virtually claimed that the Cubans ran the show in Angola, he had for all intents and purposes suggested that through its military forces Cuba was calling the tune in some areas of Africa. But Gromyko knew the real intentions of the Cubans, and the Secretary would recognize that Gromyko was sure of his facts. Thus, Gromyko could say that neither now nor in the past had Cuba done anything evil in rendering aid to Ethiopia and Angola. Cuba was acting legally, consistent with the UN Charter and at the request of the Governments of Angola and Ethiopia. Accordingly, there were no grounds for reproaching Cuba for anything. After all, US troops were stationed in dozens and dozens of countries. And what about other Western countries? France has repeatedly introduced its forces into a number of countries, notably in Africa. Nor is Great Britain innocent, although at present its abilities have declined; history has played a role in this. Why was the US singling out Cuba? Could anyone really believe that Fidel Castro has decided to take over all of Africa. Gromyko was sure that the Secretary did not believe this.

Turning to Namibia, Gromyko said that this issue was in fact separate from the issue of Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia. Namibia should be granted independence in line with the UN resolution.5

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5 Reference is to U.N. Resolution 435, passed on September 29, 1978, which called for the establishment of an independent Namibia.
With Washington’s blessings, South African troops were occupying Namibia. The “group of five,” which included US representatives, was operating under the wings of the South African occupation forces. Today South Africa had grabbed a piece of Namibian territory for a military base, probably with US agreement, though the Secretary should know this better than Gromyko. South Africa has carried out aggression against Angola, carried out bombing raids against that country, and at this very moment when we were talking, was maintaining several battalions of troops there.

Surely the Secretary could not believe that Angola had no right to ask for assistance to defend itself. Moreover, there was the question of Unita and all manner of other bands opposing the government. Naturally, the Secretary could say that such bands were an internal matter. Indeed, most of the personnel were Angolans, but a large part of the commanders were white mercenaries from other countries, including the US. They were operating with the tacit approval of their governments. Gromyko was not familiar with the number of these mercenaries or who they were, but the Soviet Union was studying the matter and would have an answer. Gromyko did not know the number of mercenaries in Savimbi’s bands, though the US could help with this information. But whether the US did or did not help, the Soviet Union would know the answer soon. One could not divorce Cuban activities in Southern Africa from what was being done there by the US and other states. In order to alter the situation it was necessary to cease assistance to Savimbi, to stop South Africa’s aggression against Angola and to permit Namibia to become a truly sovereign state.

Gromyko said he now wanted to formulate what he would call a constructive solution to this complex of problems. The Namibian issue was a separate one, but it so happened that it had become linked in time because South African aggression against Angola is related to South African aggression against Namibia. Gromyko wanted to present for the Secretary’s consideration a Cuban plan, which Gromyko was presenting with Cuba’s knowledge. To begin with, he wanted to outline the Soviet Union’s position on this question, after which he would address the outline of the Cuban plan. Inasmuch as this was a concentrated program, he wanted to dispense with a Russian language presentation and asked his interpreter to read from a prepared statement:

—First, settlement of the Namibian problem should be carried out in strict conformity with UN resolutions which provide for the granting to Namibia of full independence with the preservation of its territorial

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6 Reference to Jonas Savimbi, founder and leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).
integrity, including the region of Walvis Bay. South African troops must be completely withdrawn from Namibia. Any international understanding on that question must be acceptable to the independent African states and SWAPO. The US, for its part, also should propose precisely such a solution of the Namibian problem. The Soviet Union, as a permanent member of the Security Council, also has in mind to play an active part in the Namibian settlement.

—Second, there must be an end to all aggressive activities by South Africa against the People’s Republic of Angola, whether directly or through support for Unita actions. The United States and other Western powers, along with South Africa, must cease all support for Unita and other anti-government groupings in Angola, whose hostile activities against the Angolan Government are directed from the outside, i.e., with regard to the territorial integrity and security of Angola, including its inalienable part, the Cabinda Province, must be secured.

—Third, the presence of Cuban forces in Angola and the question of their possible withdrawal therefrom is, of course, a bilateral matter between Cuba and Angola. The objective reasons why Cuban forces were sent to, and are in Angolan territory, involve the defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola against aggression by South Africa, as well as against the bandit formations of Unita, which are armed by and whose activity is directed from the outside.

—Fourth. Therefore, withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola can be carried out when the threat to the security of the People’s Republic of Angola is removed and when the Government of Angola takes such a decision by virtue of its sovereignty.

—Fifth. As is known, as far back as April 1976 the Governments of Angola and Cuba agreed on a plan for the gradual withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, and less than one year thereafter the numerical strength of the Cuban military contingent was reduced by more than one-third. But subsequently, at the request of the Angolan leadership, implementation of this plan was suspended in connection with the intensified aggressive activities of South African racists and mounting support by them and the US for formations hostile to the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola.

—Sixth, resolution of the Namibian problems along the lines described above, and a guaranteed cessation of all forms of aggressive activities against the People’s Republic of Angola, will enable the Governments of Angola and Cuba to return to the implementation of the previously agreed plan for the gradual withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

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7 Reference is to the South West African People’s Organization, the leading opposition movement to South African rule in Namibia.
Gromyko said that he had wanted to say all the above by way of summarizing the views of the Soviet Union. Cuba had also provided the Soviet Union with its own assessment of the situation. Gromyko wanted to inform the Secretary of this assessment and in order to save time asked his interpreter to read the Cuban text, which he then handed over (attached). In reply to the Secretary’s question, Gromyko answered that this text had not been released elsewhere, that it was prepared for the Secretary’s benefit. Gromyko wanted to add that the Soviet Union viewed this plan by way of a solution to the entire complex of problems which were linked in the US view, that is, regarding Cuba, Angola, Namibia and South Africa. Of course, in the Soviet view the relationship was different, but since there is a relationship in time, these issues could be grouped together. Gromyko had already emphasized that Namibia and Angola involved different questions, but South Africa, through its aggression, had tied everything into one knot. The Soviet Union saw a possibility for resolving these problems, provided the US approached them with understanding. Gromyko thought that this would also be useful from the standpoint of Soviet-US relations and that perhaps it would cast a ray of light on the overall international situation.

The Secretary responded that he had listened with great care. He had looked for and listened for the gleam of light of a possible solution within the dense jungle of propaganda statements. He wanted to deal with these statements first, and noted that he seemed to have discerned more of a glimmer of light in the Soviet articulation than in the Cuban one. With regard to Cuba, he wanted to remark sharply about Cuba’s inflation of tensions. As Gromyko knew, the Secretary had discussed this issue in Mexico with the Cuban Vice President and had further discussed it with him in New York in terms of future relations between the two countries. Asked by Gromyko when this discussion had taken place, the Secretary replied that it had occurred some three or four weeks ago. We were carefully assessing the most recent intelligence information regarding Soviet shipments to Cuba, which we did not regard as purely symbolic. We will make our decision on this in the days and weeks ahead. Even in the discussions with the Cuban Vice President it had been clear, and the latter admitted, that Cuba was sponsoring revolution in Colombia and that the Cuban presence in Nicaragua at this time was in excess of 4,000.

Gromyko interrupted that these were teachers and physicians.

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8 Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled “Cuban Paper on Angola, Namibia and South Africa.”

9 On November 23, 1981, Haig met with Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez in Mexico City.
The Secretary noted that at least 1,500 of them were military personnel. There was one Cuban for every twenty Nicaraguan soldiers. These were not advisors, this was command and control.

Gromyko repeated that they were doctors.

The Secretary noted again that there were at least 1,500 military personnel. We were also well aware of the direction from Nicaragua of so-called guerrillas in El Salvador. We were listening to radio broadcasts and monitoring the shipment of arms by air. This week the Secretary had spoken to a Canadian journalist who had been invited to join the guerrilla groups in El Salvador in order to write a story supporting Nicaraguan forces. There was no question on this. We were listening daily and hourly to radio transmissions. The Secretary thought that it was essential to make note of the unsatisfactory character of these activities, which must be understood by all.

Secondly, the Secretary, too, like Gromyko, had spoken to the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister in Santa Lucia. Incidentally, the Secretary agreed that that regime wanted good relations with the US. It was very unpopular. Just last week there were riots during which Sandinista forces had fired tear gas. The level of dissatisfaction among the people of Nicaragua was growing daily because of its police state tactics, internment without due process, suspension of civil liberties, destruction of the private sector and militarization of the regime. The Foreign Minister had told the Secretary that there would be no delivery of MiG aircraft. We took this assurance very seriously and expected that it would be adhered to.

The Secretary recalled telling Gromyko in New York that the social systems of Nicaragua and Cuba were of no concern to the US. What is of concern to us, however, is the illegal infiltration elsewhere by both governments. Cuba, by its own admission, has been engaged in this over a long period of time, whereas Nicaragua has initiated this kind of activity against neighboring states more recently. The Secretary thought that Gromyko should be as impressed by this as we, because the concern with regard to Nicaragua was generating pressure towards concerted action which we would support if it develops.

The Secretary noted that we have not terminated all assistance to that regime, but we did not understand why it needed 200,000 troops. This was similar to Cuba, which had 50,000 troops in Africa and in the Middle East. We did not believe that this was conducive to international peace and stability, or consistent with UN norms. The Secretary wanted to repeat that the US was not threatening the character of the government of any state; that was up to the people of each country. But, if illegal means were used, as Nicaragua was doing today, then it does concern us, as it should concern the Soviet Union.

The Secretary wanted to say a word about Namibia. Gromyko had labeled his and the Cuban statements as constructive and had referred
to US support for South Africa and Unita. The US is prohibited by law from supporting Unita and has not supported what Gromyko had called “bandits.” We have not supported it directly or indirectly, through arms supply or funds, since 1976. Prior to that, the history is clear. Unita had as much right to inherit power in Angola as did the MPLA. It was not a question of legality, but of de facto military support from the outside, including support by Cuba and the Soviet Union.

As for South Africa, both the Soviet Union and Cuba knew that US relations with South Africa were such as to encourage an opening of that society, of eliminating apartheid policies and of engaging South Africa in constructive actions in Southern Africa, including the independence of Namibia. Unlike the previous US Administration, the US had now ascertained that during the past three years the situation had deteriorated and the likelihood of Namibian independence was growing more distant every day. In good faith, therefore, we had tried a new approach, consistent with UN Resolution 435, in concert with the Contact Group,¹⁰ the Front Line States,¹¹ SWAPO and the South African Government, in moving forward with a three-phased program. In six months we achieved more progress than in the previous four years of failed effort. This progress was becoming increasingly more clear because South Africa can never be forced to withdraw from Namibia in accordance with Resolution 435, unless its legitimate security concerns are taken into account by the Contact Group and the Front Line States. Sometimes conflicting evidence is heard here.

When South Africa moved into Angola, we were opposed to this action but did not condemn it because of Soviet involvement. Some Soviet personnel had been captured, others had been killed. There was physical proof in this regard, including documents, plans and statements by captured Soviet personnel indicating heavy Soviet involvement in overall SWAPO operations. The Secretary would ask if Gromyko could cite similar evidence regarding US involvement with Unita. If Gromyko could find such evidence, the Secretary would gladly consider it. We know of no such evidence because we do not provide any such support. The Soviet Union could not say the same about SWAPO.

Gromyko interjected that there was no point to this discussion. The Secretary underscored that what he had just said was fully documented—indeed, South Africa had obtained a great deal of evidence. Gromyko insisted that the Soviet Union was helping Angola, not

¹⁰ Reference is to the Western Contact Group, comprised of Canada, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
¹¹ Reference is to the Front Line States, comprised of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia.
SWAPO. The Secretary noted that among other things, Soviet advisors had been encountered with SWAPO forces and had admitted their presence there for two years.

Gromyko asked why the US was protecting South Africa. The Secretary cited the large amounts of Soviet weapons captured by South Africa, which went beyond token quantities and involved large caches, and noted that SWAPO personnel had been guarding these stocks.

The Secretary went on to say that he hoped to clear the air with regard to some of the rhetoric in order that Gromyko understand the picture we have with respect to the Soviet Union and Cuba on this problem. However, we wanted to find a solution to this problem. That was our goal, and it would improve our relations. Gromyko had referred to taking small steps on our way back to a more normal relationship. The Secretary thought that it would be a big step if we could achieve peace and stability in Southern Africa. We should disengage super-power competition from this area and let the people in the area find their own solutions. He hoped that the Soviet proposal would arrive at the same reality. However, the Secretary was fully confident that we will succeed with or without Soviet cooperation. We were substantially at the end of the first phase with the Front Line States. We have the agreement of South Africa to the constitutional framework and the enthusiastic support of the Contact Group.

In response to Gromyko’s question about the position of SWAPO, the Secretary replied that we have received their comments which, along with other comments from Namibia and the Front Line States, were basically very positive. The Secretary wanted to add that we had also been in touch with the Angolan Government, which clearly wants the Cuban troops to depart. Angola wanted peace and help from its neighbors. Gromyko questioned the Secretary’s information and asked who could stop Angola if that was its desire. The Secretary said that he was confident of what he was saying. Gromyko suggested that the Secretary read the Cuban position, which was a fresh presentation of its views.

The Secretary said that the real question involved development of simultaneous assurances with regard to Angolan borders and agreed international conditions for resolving the problem of minority rights in Angola. He was referring to tribal considerations, that is, Unita. He was confident that this was possible, if the sides were left to their own independent choice. With all the talk about South African withdrawal from Namibia and a separate Cuban withdrawal from Angola, he thought that these circumstances could be provided.

Gromyko responded that the Soviet Union was in favor of this, as was evident in the plan he had presented. What Gromyko had told the Secretary was true. The Secretary said that accordingly he was
optimistic that we could solve the problem. Gromyko remarked that
this was so if we worked in the same direction, that is, if South African
aggression against Angola was stopped—aggression which was open,
occurring daily for all the world to see—and if Namibia was granted
independence. He wanted to emphasize that Namibia should be
granted independence in line with the resolutions of the UN and with-
out outside interference.

The Secretary remarked that he had spoken to Savimbi. Gromyko
said that he was incredulous why the Secretary had received him, why
he had deemed this to be appropriate after the discussions between
Gromyko and the Secretary.

The Secretary replied that we had to know where Savimbi stood
and what his position was in order to know whether our proposals
were achievable. Savimbi clearly was not an ally of South Africa and
was not receiving any support from South Africa. He was receiving
support from other countries in the region, but not from South Africa
or the US.

After again registering his disagreement with US recognition of
Savimbi, Gromyko inquired about the process that was envisaged. The
Secretary responded that the process involved understanding each
other. We were not explicitly linking Cuban withdrawal from Angola
with the independence of Namibia; the objective was an empirical
outcome. It was necessary to provide for security guarantees for the
Angolan Government, which would permit simultaneous withdrawals.
The two were not linked, but were empirically related, along the lines
of a phased withdrawal of Cuban forces, with physical guarantees for
Angola, while Namibia would obtain real independence.

The Secretary added that there was a separate question involving
Walvis Bay. This involved an independent history, was controversial
since the very beginning, and was separate from all the other concerns.

Gromyko remarked that there should also be agreement with
SWAPO.

The Secretary replied that this pertained to whomever was elected.
We were not prepared to designate SWAPO as the government in
advance. All sides involved thought that progress was being made.
We were finishing the discussions with the Contact Group regarding
the first phase and would be reporting about the constituent assembly.
At present, work was beginning with regard to the modalities of the
second phase. There was a small difference with regard to Resolution
435 and the South African attitude to the UN presence, but pressure
was being exerted on South Africa and the Secretary thought that this
matter could be resolved. At the same time, this question was being
discussed with Angola. It was for this reason that we had talked to
Savimbi, in order to learn his objectives. The Secretary believed that
this was a manageable problem as far as the Angolan Government was concerned, perhaps with the use of some peacekeeping force from the African continent, that is through the OAS. We were continuing our work and the Secretary had apprised Gromyko of our progress. He thought that this would constitute a major assistance to our joint goal.

Gromyko replied that if all this were done more directly—and we had addressed this subject with Cuban consent—then the Soviet Union would go along. Of course, much would depend on the US position as well. The Secretary assured Gromyko that we were intent on resolving the problem, thereby letting the nations of Southern Africa determine their own future—keeping the super-power relationship out of Southern Africa. Otherwise, South Africa would commit further aggression and would do it successfully, going deeper and deeper into Angola. The Cuban forces would become more involved and both the Soviet Union and the US would become increasingly concerned. Gromyko responded that neither Cuba nor the Soviet Union wanted this.

The Secretary said that, Angola aside, the problem of Cuba had to be resolved quickly. Gromyko must be aware that this situation was serious and that the President would not stand by and let Castro disturb the peace in the Western Hemisphere.

Gromyko said that the Secretary was again returning to the same story. Nothing would shake the Soviet Union in its view that this campaign against Cuba was the result of falsifications and tendentious inventions. Why would Nicaragua, which was not yet standing firmly on its legs, be ramming an alien regime down the throat of others, against their will. This was the same story as with Cuba. The Cubans wanted to live in peace in their own house. Moreover, Cuba wanted good relations with the US, but the US was turning its back.

Gromyko asked whether, upon his return to Moscow, he could inform the Soviet leadership and President Brezhnev that the Secretary and Gromyko had concluded that the two sides could act in a common direction with respect to Cuba, Angola, Namibia and South Africa. Could he report that there was agreement between the two countries regarding the way to solve this problem, namely by ensuring the security of Angola and providing for the independence of Namibia. Could he also report that with regard to the question of Cuban forces, the possibility was crystallizing of Soviet-US cooperation in the solution of this question as well? The Secretary said that, on the basis of today’s exchange, he could make such a report.

Gromyko expressed the view that we should make use of this possibility, because this was a major issue which required a major effort. We ought to agree that in the event of slight hitches along the way, we would not act like young ladies of a certain age, who lose their temper and display impatience. We should remain calm and
should persevere in working towards implementation of this plan and this objective. Gromyko thought that this would be beneficial to both countries and, generally speaking, for Africa and the world as well. He thought that we could end our discussion on this.

Chemical and Toxic Weapons

Gromyko said that he wanted to react to something the Secretary had said this morning. First, the Secretary had hinted at some instances of Soviet use of chemical and toxic weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. In this connection, he wanted to say that it was time to cease spreading false rumors containing allegations to the effect that the Soviet Union either had undertaken some steps involving the use of chemical or toxic weapons, or intended to do so. This was a fabrication from start to finish. It was an invention of Washington, though Gromyko did not know who was responsible for this. But then, the situation in Washington was so complex that it was difficult to sort things out. The Soviet Union has not used such weapons, and was categorically opposed to the use of these cursed weapons. There had been discussions regarding their total ban, but an accord was not concluded. What were the reasons? It was the Soviet Union’s impression that when the US had started this rumor involving the Soviet Union, it had concluded that it needed a cover for the production of its own chemical and toxic weapons. Gromyko did not know for how long the US would be able to maintain this position and keep this rumor going. No one in the world believed the US. In Washington people were trying to convince each other. Gromyko wanted to repeat that the Soviet Union resolutely condemns anyone who should use chemical or toxic weapons. We should sit down at a table and work out and sign an agreement on banning these weapons. It was the US position which was responsible for failure to complete this work. Gromyko was asking the Secretary to tell the President and the entire Cabinet that the Soviet Union did not use chemical or toxic weapons anywhere and did not intend to use them. The Soviet Union had no such intent and was opposed to any country having chemical or toxic weapons in their arsenals. The Soviet Union was for banning these weapons, for negotiating, concluding and signing an agreement to that effect. That was the Soviet position.

The Secretary said he wished to give Gromyko a prepared fact sheet on this subject. Surely Gromyko would understand that the Secretary would never make a public statement, as he had, if there had not been overwhelming evidence concerning the facts of the use

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12 See Document 137.
13 Document not found.
of such weapons. We had films, first-hand reports, blood tests and chemical samples, and not just from government sources, but also from independent sources. It was perhaps conceivable that the regimes with which the USSR associated might have somehow developed this capability, but there was a very clear tie to Soviet advisors and Soviet military personnel. The Secretary wanted to hand over the fact sheet in order that Gromyko understand that we had facts and evidence.

Gromyko replied that as a sign of his indignation regarding this falsified information, he did not wish to take this document. He inquired whether this document had been released. The Secretary said that the fact sheet had been prepared for Gromyko and no one else. The Secretary went on to say that he wanted to reiterate that the information presented to him and to the President was absolutely multi-sourced, that it included films, laboratory tests and independent opinions, not just the opinions of government agencies. Clearly, there was a problem—a problem that would not go away.

Poland

Gromyko now wanted to turn to the matter of Poland. He had no intention of discussing the internal affairs of the Polish people with anyone. Other Soviet officials also had no such intention. However, he did want to say that the Soviet Union was resolutely opposed to interference in Poland and objected to the insinuations emanating from Washington and some other NATO capitals. What has not been attributed to the Soviet Union? Allegations were being made that Soviet troops were massing on the Polish border, that they were about to intervene, that the Soviet Union was already intervening. From time to time the Soviet Union denied these allegations, yet new versions of an alleged Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Poland surfaced again and again. The fact was that the Soviet Union had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Poland. Incidentally, the decree on the imposition of martial law was strictly constitutional, and both the Soviet Union and Poland had been saying that this was a national decision.

Had the Soviet Union been involved when Poland took the step, it would be impossible to conceal that from history. The Soviet Union as well as Poland had assured the US that the USSR was not involved in that decision. The question arose why was an effort made to accuse the Soviet Union? In the Soviet opinion—and the Secretary would probably not agree—the explanation was that Washington needed to accuse the Soviet Union in order to cover up longstanding US interference. The US was not alone, but the US was playing the first fiddle. Evidently, the US believed that an accusation against the Soviet Union would act as a shock absorber. Gromyko recognized that some Ameri-
cans fell for this line, but that was because most Americans read only US statements in US propaganda publications. The US was simply disregarding Soviet statements by failing to publish them. Gromyko said that this was not merely a reproach, but an accusation against the US Government. Gromyko did not need to apologize on behalf of the Soviet Union, because the latter was not interfering in the internal affairs of Poland. No one had the right to such interference, which was of a political and economic nature.

The new dance—sanctions—is again appearing. In Europe there were provocative radio stations which Gromyko occasionally had to listen to in the line of his duties, though he could not tolerate such broadcasts for very long. These stations were giving the Poles lessons on how to arrange their affairs. Thus, they were saying that the Poles should turn over one-third of the power to the Church, and another third to Solidarity, or rather the reactionary wing of Solidarity; better yet, they should turn over all power to the latter. Why should Washington be engaged in handing out power, why should it be saying who should receive power and who should lose it?

Did the U.S. expect the Soviet Union to interfere in a backward way to turn power over to the Church and Solidarity? That was absolute fantasy. The Poles should be permitted to live and make their own decisions. Of course, like decent people, the Soviet Union wanted to help. If the US wanted to render honest assistance it, too, could do so. The Soviet Union was providing much assistance; the US could do the same, but it acted otherwise, it chose to exacerbate the situation. Gromyko did not want to discuss Polish affairs, and he would not have addressed the matter if the Secretary had not touched on it. Though, come to think of it, perhaps he would in any case have said, “stop interfering in Polish affairs.”

The Secretary responded that he saw no useful purpose in debating the issues Gromyko had raised. It would serve a useful purpose if both of us recognized that the Polish situation had now become extremely dangerous for the world at large and for our future relationship. As categorically as Gromyko insisted that the Soviet Union was not involved, the Secretary also would insist that there was no US interference in Poland and that there could be no such interference.

The Secretary did know, however, that our own estimate of the situation was fairly accurate and he thought that it did not depart much from the Soviet estimate, namely that the situation in Poland was deteriorating. This should concern everyone. It was not a matter of meddling in the affairs of the Polish people, it was a matter of a threat to international peace. We had made very clear that we wanted to help. Last year we had provided more than one billion dollars by way of credits and food. The same was true of other Western European
countries. Today Poland is drifting either toward total anarchy or toward violence.

We were convinced that the ultimate outcome must be a compromise. Something had to be said publicly on this score because this matter involved all the signatories of the Helsinki Accords which, in their essence, sanctified territorial integrity and noninterference, but also contained fundamental obligations with respect to human rights. The Secretary thought that Gromyko would understand why the strongest forces in the US and in Western Europe with respect to the Polish situation involved unions and working people. The Secretary had looked for some hopeful sign in Gromyko’s comments. Frankly, he had found only propaganda. He was not saying this to add still more propaganda to the discussion, but because this problem was pivotal for the world at large and for the US-Soviet relationship in particular.

We were not here to pressure or to preach, but we could suggest that there ought to be some formula that would be perceived by the world at large as suggesting a moderating approach in all of the following three areas: the release of prisoners, the lifting of martial law and the institution of a dialogue. The above suggestions came from Western Europe, and the US agreed with them. He would refer Gromyko to the statements made in a number of capitals—including Bonn—which mentioned these three conditions. It was the Secretary’s great concern, and it should be Gromyko’s concern too, that if this situation was permitted to drift, it would lead to deterioration in terms of the economy and in terms of law and order, and would heighten the strains. He thought that everyone understood the paramount need for safety valves to relieve the pressures generated by the situation in Poland.

Our standpoint was that the situation was extremely unsatisfactory, very dangerous, and concerned the entire world, not only Europe or the US, and could lead to a very dire outcome. The Secretary believed that it was in the interest of each of us to seek remedies which would bring Poland back on the road of economic and social recovery. The Secretary had listened carefully to Gromyko’s statement that this is what mattered for the Soviet Union. But history belied that. Previously in history the Soviet Union at times had acted in ways which we very much opposed. The Secretary thought that credible, demonstrable moderation was in everyone’s interest; he did not believe this would entail risks that were unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

Gromyko responded that the Secretary’s information was totally incorrect. The situation was improving and improving quite successfully. No one should hamper this process and the Secretary’s gloomy information was inaccurate.
Afghanistan

Gromyko wanted to turn to Asia, specifically Afghanistan. The Secretary would recall that during our New York discussion of the situation in and around Afghanistan mention had been made of a possible meeting between US and Soviet experts. The Soviet Union had mentioned this on several occasions, but the US was not interested and thus no meetings had been held. Gromyko was not saying this by way of a reproach, for it was the Secretary’s business how he intended to discuss this question and with whom. At this time, Gromyko wanted to repeat briefly the Soviet position in case the Secretary was unclear about any parts of it. The Soviet Union had come to Afghanistan to provide assistance against outside aggression. This outside aggression was being committed by individual bands, sometimes numbering ten individuals, sometimes a bit more. Of course, whoever is sending them in is trying to coordinate this activity, but bands are bands. They are engaged in terrorism and were killing peasants, teachers and even school children. They were not active everywhere, only in some provinces. It would seem that those governments which stood behind these bands should recognize that the situation in Afghanistan was irreversible, that the Afghanistan government was firmly in power and would remain so. This was a fact, whether anyone liked it or not. Blood was being spilled needlessly because these bands were treated as they deserved to be treated, that is, they were considered aggressors. Of course, whoever stood behind them did not care about the spilling of Afghan blood. The Soviet Union for its part was, of course, doing its duty and would continue to do so. Accordingly, it would seem that a solution was possible only in one way—by ceasing outside aggression. These bands had to be withdrawn or they had to lay down their arms. All power had to be held by the legal authorities.

Internationally, Afghanistan should have a nonaligned status and there ought to be no question on that score, whether on the US side or on the Soviet side. Let it remain nonaligned. If everyone was in favor of that and against spilling blood, against aggression, if everyone favored the independence and nonaligned status of Afghanistan, then this should be formalized. The Soviet Union and Afghanistan saw no other way to achieve this than to hold a meeting between the representatives of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with a view to reaching an understanding on whatever matters were at issue.

The Soviet Union thought that Pakistan was uneasy about its border, for example, there was an area called Baluchistan. Gromyko had told the Secretary during their last meeting that a resolution of this matter was possible between the current Afghanistan government and Pakistan. Gromyko believed that this would provide certain benefits to Pakistan, because the latter was concerned about its borders. This
would also be advantageous for Afghanistan, for it would end the
shedding of blood. Let there be such a meeting. Why should that be
unacceptable to Washington? Why did the US not say a good word in
favor of this?

As for Pakistan, sometimes it seems to be in favor of such an
approach, sometimes it seems to make an about-face, at other times
it seems to lack interest. Sometimes the Pakistanis speak of bilateral
discussions, sometimes they refuse to engage in discussions without
the US friend Iran. But the situation with Iran was at a different level
of development. It could participate in such a meeting when the time
came, but at this time the main thing was a meeting between Afghan-
istan and Pakistan. Perhaps this could be accomplished with the assist-
ance of the Secretary General of the UN or one of his deputies. It should
not be impossible to organize such a meeting. What was diplomacy
for? If diplomats could not find a way to set up such a meeting, they
should be wrapped up in a package and sent into outer space, beyond
our galaxy. Such a meeting could be of a formal or informal nature, it
could be governmental or nongovernmental. But if this was done, and
if the aggression ceased, then the Soviet troops would be withdrawn.
The US did not like the presence of Soviet personnel in Afghanistan,
but did the Secretary think that the Soviet Union was happy with this?
Soviet forces would stay as long as they have to, they would carry out
their duty, but would not stay any longer.

If the US was truly in favor of a relaxation of tension, it could use
its influence with Pakistan with respect to such a meeting. If this were
to occur, Gromyko thought that it would also reduce tensions between
India and Pakistan. As for Soviet-Pakistani relations, the Soviet Union
had no claims against Pakistan and did not need anything from Paki-
stan, all it wanted was to develop its relations with that country. Fur-
thermore, this would also be beneficial for the general atmosphere of
the entire area, an important area. This would be true not only from
the standpoint of the countries in that area, but also, the Soviet Union
believed, would serve the interests of the US and the USSR, as well as
other states. This would act as a kind of fresh breath of air, Gromyko
hesitated calling it a warm breath. He asked the Secretary to consider
all of this. The Soviet Union had gained the impression that the US
was not concerned very much about improving the situation. It would
almost seem as if the US liked the presence of Soviet personnel there.

The Secretary said it seemed to him that something had been forgot-
ten between September and now. We had discussed this matter actively
in September and Ambassador Hartman had been instructed to discuss
the question further in Moscow. But it seems that there was a serious
difference on one of the three elements required for a solution. That
was the obstacle. Gromyko would recall the Secretary saying in Septem-
ber that as soon as Soviet troops were withdrawn the present leadership would be finished within a matter of days. The elements discussed included guaranteed borders and a timetable for Soviet troop withdrawal. The third area we discussed was the formula regarding self-determination, that is, the matter of a leadership which could preside over national recovery. Historically, we had no direct and vital interest in Afghanistan, except for its nonaligned status, and Gromyko has said the same with respect to the Soviet Union. We had been comfortable with the many years of Afghanistan’s nonalignment. But the Secretary could not but fail to note Gromyko’s statement that the present government was irreversible. The present government would never be able to survive without a Soviet presence. Surely we could imagine a solution to this issue. The US had raised this question with Pakistan after September, but, like us, they view the Kabul regime as an inherent contradiction, which would collapse as soon as Soviet forces were withdrawn. Neither could we condone a circumvention of an accord. The Secretary added that we were not interested in seeing Soviet troops bogged down in Afghanistan. Gromyko remarked that he had said that jokingly, in view of US behavior.

The Secretary said that we had made a conscious effort to find a solution, but self-determination is an essential factor without which there could be no solution. He wanted to assure Gromyko that we were prepared to deal with this question constructively. We had our own views with regard to Pakistan. On all these questions Gromyko had really confirmed to the Secretary that if some of the fundamental questions were to be resolved, this would facilitate resolution of the specific problems. The US remained prepared to seek solutions to the fundamental questions.

Secretary Haig’s Summary and Bilateral Relations

The Secretary had to tell Gromyko that in whatever statement was subsequently made to the press, he would have to say that the Polish question was an overhanging cloud, that this cloud remained and inevitably affected everything we had spoken of. He would also have to say that objectively the reaction to Poland did not involve Poland alone. The Polish situation was seen in the context of Afghanistan, the Soviet arms buildup, as well as Soviet activities and perceptions thereof on the African continent. All of these things over the years made this problem qualitatively different, both in the US and in Europe. He thought that this made the situation of Poland a most serious issue. Therefore, it affected all other solutions and future developments to a greater extent than if this had been an independent problem.

The Secretary noted that we had not talked about bilateral relations. He was never satisfied with respect to matters of human rights. He
would note that Jewish emigration had gone down from 50,000 to 10,000, that there were a number of unresolved family reunification cases involving about ten US citizens. A very unsatisfactory situation had developed in our Embassy in Moscow, which was now at a crisis stage, because it seemed that doctors would need to evacuate the people who are starving themselves.

Afghanistan

Gromyko remarked that evidently the US position on Afghanistan had not improved, and the US contention that there should be interference in the internal affairs of that country—i.e., with respect to its leadership—was hopeless. Gromyko suggested that the Secretary once again weigh US policies and give some further thought to them. Perhaps he would reach more hopeful conclusions.

Near East

Gromyko wanted to say a few words about the Near East. Of course, the Secretary knew the Soviet position in that regard. The Soviet side was in favor of Israel vacating all Arab territories. The Soviet Union was also in favor of the independence of Israel and had said this many times as well, specifically to the Israeli Foreign Minister at the UNGA. The Soviet Union, like a mountain, defended the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to the creation of an independent, albeit small, Palestinian state, headed by the PLO. The Soviet Union had resolutely denounced Camp David which had brought everything to an impasse. Gromyko recognized that the Secretary was trying to paint the prospects in brighter colors, but these prospects were not encouraging.

The developments in the Sinai involving the US and other countries, chiefly US allies, were not promising either. With time this would produce a hatred for everyone who brought military units to the Sinai. The Secretary could not be unaware that the Sinai deal was not the last such deal. This area must be genuinely liberated. A genuine solution, including the solution to the Sinai problem, was possible only through a radical resolution of the entire Middle East problem.

Gromyko wanted to ask why the US had found it necessary to conclude a strategic agreement with Israel. After all, Israel was a US military and political base anyway. Yet the US evidently wanted to demonstrate to the world and to the Arabs that Israel and the US were enemies of the Arabs, and to do so graphically. The Soviet Union viewed this as an anti-Soviet action.

In conclusion, he wanted to say that the situation had worsened since our last meeting, despite US efforts to sweeten the Middle East situation with sugar. The Soviet Union was in favor of solutions. The
Soviet Union condemned most seriously Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights. If the Secretary was planning to say that the US had been opposed to this, he should not depart with the impression that his argument had been convincing. Israel would not have taken this step without US participation. This annexation of foreign land is aggression, pure and simple. The only thing beyond it would have been open warfare. Thus, emotions were building and the situation was being exacerbated. There has been no explosion yet, but it could come any time. The Soviet Union was not in favor of exacerbating the situation. There was a time in the past when it seemed as if there might be some improvement, but then came “Mr.” Camp David and crushed everything.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union had a very negative view of the situation. The situation was complex and dangerous and required the attention of the US and the USSR. Gromyko would welcome it if we could find some joint language on this problem or aspects of this problem. The Soviet Union believed that all countries in this area should be permitted to develop under conditions of peace, and this included Israel. Of course, there were some extremist elements in the Arab World and if there were to appear a front aimed at the annihilation of Israel, the Soviet Union would resolutely oppose this. Yet, Israel did not even have a kind word for the Soviet Union.

Humanitarian Issues

Gromyko asked rhetorically what he could say about humanitarian issues. Was it the Soviet Union which had created these problems? Everyone had to honor the laws of their lands. Americans had to observe US laws, while Soviet citizens and everyone who was on Soviet territory had to respect Soviet laws. The Secretary had raised the question with regard to certain individuals who were Soviet citizens. They had to abide by Soviet laws. Here was a minor matter, but the Secretary may have heard, for example, about the case of the Polovchak boy. The issue arose when he was 12, though he was 14 now. He was not permitted to return to his family, he was forced to stay behind. Even when a US court had issued a favorable ruling, the US Secretary of Justice had said that court or no court, the boy would stay. Perhaps the Secretary was too close to the situation. Thus, he suggested that the Secretary take a look at the political clothing of the US. In any event, the matter of human rights was a question that could be discussed, but Washington abuses it.

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14 Reference is to Walter Polovchak, who refused to emigrate back to Ukraine with his parents, and who was eventually granted asylum in the United States.
Gromyko said that it would be good if the current Madrid meeting could be brought to a close with some resolution on holding a conference about CBMs and disarmament issues. There was a draft text on the table, which had been proposed by the neutral countries. Even though in the Soviet view this draft required some modifications, the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss it and thought that such a discussion would be useful. Gromyko did not want to say anything about possible US efforts to complicate this meeting. The Soviet Union was opposed to such an approach. We ought to conclude this session on some positive note. That would be useful and would serve the interests of the USSR and the US, and would have a favorable impact upon the situation in Europe. Yet, the US was actively inflaming the situation. Thus, Gromyko suggested that the Secretary take a look at this question in terms of the forthcoming Madrid session. Perhaps, for a change, the meeting could end on a positive note. After all, the only thing involved is the forum for a follow-on meeting. The problems as such would be solved in the forum itself. He thought that we might talk briefly about the need for a future forum without getting into any details in Madrid.

The Secretary said that, considering the views he was hearing from Western Europe, Madrid would inevitably develop into a platform for expressing concern over Poland. We had studied the draft mentioned by Gromyko and had found that the first part of it involved a major problem. The others seemed a good deal less troublesome. In any event, we had no fundamental problem with the CSCE process, which should continue.

**Middle East**

The Secretary said that with respect to the Middle East and value judgments about Camp David, we saw no viable alternative to keeping it in force. We had no other way to ensure Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. We were continuing to seek solutions pursuant to Camp David because we could not permit ourselves the luxury of not trying. We condemned the Golan annexation, and since Israel did not act in accordance with Resolution 242, we look upon this as a non-event which was without standing. The situation was dangerous, especially if Israel should move into Lebanon to clean out the PLO. We have restrained them in the past, but if there should be a provocation before an Israeli pull-out from the Sinai, the Secretary thought that Israel might seize

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15 Reference is to the November 1967 United Nations resolution calling on Israel to withdraw from territories occupied after the June 1967 war, in exchange for a cessation of Arab-Israeli hostilities.
on this quickly, because there was a major proclivity to settle problems by force of arms. Thus, he considered the situation dangerous.

Press Contacts

Gromyko said that evidently there would be no joint statement regarding our meeting. Did the Secretary expect to make some statement? If so, in what form did he plan to describe or assess this meeting, that is, in what spirit did he plan to do so. The Secretary replied that clearly the Soviet side would be asked whether we had discussed Poland. Frankly, from the Secretary’s standpoint, Poland cast a shadow on our discussions. But he was not looking for a basis for further polemics.

Gromyko replied that it would be incredible if the Secretary or his Washington colleagues should refrain from polemics. The Secretary reminded Gromyko that the US had abided very carefully to the agreed line following the New York meeting. Gromyko agreed.

Gromyko suggested that we could now terminate our discussion. He thought that this meeting had been necessary and useful and remarked that we had exchanged views on many issues, all of which were important. This exchange was necessary and useful. At the beginning of his summary he would have to say, of course, that at a meeting such as this one a special place should have been assigned to strategic arms limitations, and that for reasons which the Soviet Union could not accept, the US side had found it impossible to discuss this subject even in terms of setting the date for resuming these negotiations. That left an imprint on our relations.

The Secretary noted that he had anticipated that Gromyko would deal with that subject and he was prepared to do the same. As for Gromyko’s summary sheet on INF questions, the Secretary thought that this should not be a topic for discussion with the press. But if Gromyko intended to discuss it, the Secretary wanted to know ahead of time, because he would have to do the same. Gromyko replied that at this time he had no intention of publicizing it. It would be a different matter if it became necessary to do so in the course of subsequent negotiations. He added that the Soviet delegation would table a corresponding proposal. The Secretary noted that he was pleased with the public relations in general, with respect to INF. He thought that if public relations dealt with the substance, this could be counterproductive.

Gromyko said that he would see how the Secretary and his representatives in Washington reacted to this meeting. Of course, if the need arose to make a special statement regarding our discussions, the Soviet side would certainly do so. Presumably the Secretary would act likewise. He could only say that he hardly expected the Secretary or his colleagues to refrain from making statements. The Secretary said that
he expected to make a statement this evening; this was necessary. But generally he intended to follow the line just discussed. Gromyko remarked that the Secretary would be speaking on his own behalf and if his comments required a response, the Soviet side would provide one. If a response was not necessary, it would not be made. The Secretary noted that it had always been so.

139. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, January 27, 1982

SUBJECT
West Siberian Pipeline Project (U)

(S) The events in Poland have created our best opportunity for derailing the West Siberian to Western Europe national gas pipeline project since this Administration came to office. The Europeans, with the Italians in the lead, are finally awakening to the dangers this project poses for the West’s energy security and the financial bonanza it represents to Moscow. The Soviets themselves have helped to tear the scales from the eyes of the West Europeans by threatening trade reprisals against our Allies if they support our sanctions policy. They singled out the gas pipeline project as a trade benefit and even named West German firms committed to this project in a recent thinly veiled warning.

(S) I believe that this is the time to mount a major effort to dismantle the project. The President’s embargo on U.S. oil and gas equipment and technology going to the U.S.S.R. was a major step in this direction. But a policy of denial is not enough. We must also convince the Europeans that we have a strong and positive interest in their energy security. I support Ambassador Rabb’s wise recommendation that we present a cogent, persuasive and economically viable package of alternatives for our Allies to reliance on Soviet energy.

(S) We need to move quickly before the lessons of Poland fade from memory. The interagency process has thus far failed to come up

with the necessary package of alternatives. Indeed, this was one of the key European criticisms of Myer Rashish’s mission to Europe last October. I suggest that your staff take the lead in developing such a package, using detailees from Commerce, Defense, State, and the intelligence agencies. Defense would be willing to provide space and clerical support on a temporary basis.

(S) The slowness with which we have responded to the challenge of the West Siberian project and the difficulties we have had in framing an international economic strategy on an interagency basis suggest the need for a more focused approach to such problems. We need to think more creatively about how to correct these shortcomings in our policy development process. I welcome your thoughts in this area, as well as any recommendations as to how we might contribute to a solution.

Cap

140. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, February 3, 1982, 0027Z

27780. Subject: Demarche to Soviet Embassy Regarding Hospitalization of Hunger-striking Pentecostalist.

1. (Confidential—entire text.)

2. The Acting Secretary telephoned Soviet Charge Bessmertnykh at 4:00 p.m. January 29 to convey the President’s concern that Lidiya Vashchenko be admitted to a Soviet hospital Saturday morning, January 30. The Acting Secretary explained the background of the case, noting that the latest word received by our Embassy in Moscow was that hospitalization would not be possible until Sunday or Monday. The Acting Secretary stressed our concern for Lidiya’s health and urged that all necessary arrangements be made for her hospitalization as the Embassy had requested. He also reiterated the Embassy’s request that the Embassy doctor and a consular officer accompany her to the hospital and be allowed to visit her frequently, and that she be allowed to return to the Embassy, if she wished, when her health permitted.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820058–0760. Confidential. Priority. Sent for information to Leningrad. Drafted by van Laningham; cleared by Darbyshire, Combs, and Scanlan; approved by Stoessel.
Bessmertnykh said he was not informed on the matter but would relay our demarche to Moscow promptly.

3. Charge Bessmertnykh returned the Acting Secretary’s call on Saturday morning, January 30. Bessmertnykh said that he had cabled Moscow after talking to the Acting Secretary on Friday, and that “several messages” had been exchanged. Bessmertnykh noted the report of Lidiya’s hospitalization in Moscow, and expressed the hope that the Soviet action in the case would be considered as favorably responsive by the American side.

Haig

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2 In telegram 1220 from Moscow, January 30, Zimmermann reported that at 11:55 a.m. Moscow time, a U.S. Embassy vehicle drove Lidia Vashchenko to Botkin Hospital in Moscow. She was escorted by a U.S. consular officer and the U.S. Embassy physician. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820053-0493) Later that day, Reagan wrote in his diary: “The Soviets refused to send an ambulance for the Pentecostal Christian woman on hunger strike in our embassy. She is within hours of death unless she receives medical aid. I ordered her sent to hospital after Soviets refused to let us take her out of Moscow for help. We took her to Moscow hospital in embassy car.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Vol. I, pp. 105–106)
141. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, February 4, 1982, 3:30–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Scope and Interpretation of Oil and Gas Equipment Controls

PARTICIPANTS
President Ronald Reagan
Vice President George Bush

State
Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Under Secretary Walter Stoessel

Treasury
Secretary Donald T. Regan

Defense
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci

Commerce
Secretary Malcolm Baldrige
Under Secretary Lionel Olmer

USUN
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

White House
Edwin Meese, III
Michael K. Deaver
Judge William P. Clark
Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Casey: By taking extraterritoriality decisions, we can delay completion of the pipeline by something close to 3 years. The significance of this is to deny them a significant amount of hard currency after 1986 when they will be running out. No oil exports after 1985. Deficit of $15 billion in 1985 (high estimate) or $6.5 billion (low estimate); $18 billion by 1990.

Secretary Haig: All of these questions ought to be viewed in the light of our Allies, our objectives, etc. The perception of the Allies is that our sanctions hurt them and not us. This is not a partnership. In Poland, the situation is deteriorating and bloodshed is a possibility. In the immediate case, the government is going to continue to squeeze. Nothing so far from the Soviets or from Jaruzelski. Probably nothing

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File, 00039. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. All brackets are in the original.
we can do will change their minds. We want to maximize our leverage without risking a confrontation, gain Allied support for strong action. If we use economic/political pressures alone, we can do little. If with allies, we can do a lot. The Soviets are unsure about the situation in Poland—they are surprised at our unity with our Allies. Now they are united in condemning Soviets and joining slowly in sanctions. We must think of any short-term measures only in conjunction with a new package. There is no point in holding off—but economic pressure is important only if we are united with our Allies. It should be reversible if they respond. Credits are the most important single factor of pressure. There should be a sixth option (added to the other five—he then summarizes them). The sixth option is credit. The Allies are moving our way, slowly. We must not take new and jolting actions. By narrow decisions on extraterritoriality, we may destroy our chances to get further Allied actions. Republican Senators are opposed to a grain embargo. We should continue to try to bring our Allies along. If we fail or if the situation changes, we can look at cold turkey steps. We should hit Afghanistan, Libya, the Caribbean. We need a carrot if moderation is restored, a mini-Marshall Plan (by February 9). Polish debt—all agencies except Defense approved the recommendation not to call Poland into default at this time. [N.B. This is not so—the Working Group Report was approved by Defense.] (Notes from Working Group Report.)

Soviet gold sales in January were very high. If we go the default route, we will lose leverage and other countries would be paid first. Thatcher thinks the economic structure of Europe would be shattered and recommends getting the bureaucracy lined up to speak with one voice.

Secretary Weinberger: Cut commercial credit to the Soviets. Extraterritoriality is absolutely the minimum approach. We would have difficulty explaining why we’re not doing it. The pipeline is just as militarily significant as a plane. A total embargo would be effective—not a selective embargo. We should be developing credible alternatives to the pipeline. We should keep open the possibility of default. We have little to gain by not doing it. The English are claiming that it’s too late. We should be willing to do things ourselves. We should not be paying Polish debts ourselves.

Secretary Haig: What is our default policy?

Judge Clark: Not for the time being.

Mr. Meese: We never said we would never use it.

Secretary Baldrige: I am in complete agreement that we should try to stop the pipeline. Costs are now $200 million. Extraterritoriality

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2 Not found.
another $200 million; 1½ to 2 year delay. Technology is presently whole and intact in France. We do not slow down the pipeline for 2 years. But it will not be completed until 1987–1990 in any case. Any 18 month delay is not going to have any effect. So we lose $500 million in exports for nothing. If the Russians don’t get phosphates from Florida, they’ll get them from Morocco. All the General Counsels agree we are on tenuous grounds. (Cites Freuhauf case.)

Mr. Brock: It is not simply to apply extraterritoriality. We are trying to get national treatment for our companies. This step would destroy that effort. We have to have Allied support. Otherwise, we have no possibility of success. They look at it as an assault on their sovereignty.

Secretary Regan: It is necessary to get Allied cooperation. Note that our freeze on Iranian assets would have been unsuccessful. Pipeline financing is all guaranteed credit. The guarantors are Germany and France. To cut off credit to the USSR, you have to get FRG and France to withdraw guarantees.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: The pipeline produces interdependence between the USSR and West Europe. It is already happening. This interdependence is one-sided because the West European countries are democracies, subject to pressures. The question is whether we should help the Soviets with subsidiaries and licensees. No one wants to break the law.

Attorney General Smith: The power of the Presidency is very broad. What is the compensation that would be required?

Secretary Haig: Do we continue extraterritoriality or extend it? My view is that we do not.

Secretary Weinberger: Notes Alsthom contract with G.E. If you do that, you will not get the British to shoot at us. Phosphates—in 15 minutes we can get Morocco not to sell the phosphates. We give G.E. a lot of money in defense contracts made necessary by what we’ve lost to the Soviets.

Secretary Haig: Extend to credit controls.

Mr. Meese: Goes into CCC Polish case. A briefing on this case is necessary.

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5 Reference is to a decision made later that month whereby the United States paid a portion of Polish debt to facilitate that country’s purchase of U.S. grain exports. (Edward Corwan, “U.S. to Pay Part of Polish Debt; Default Avoided,” New York Times, January 31, 1982, p. A1)
Secretary Haig: We need a detailed explanation.
Secretary Regan: Either way the government has to pay up.
The President: We were keeping control of the timing on this matter.
Secretary Weinberger: This is not a final decision.
Secretary Haig: Kirkland is threatening actions. He says he can get European support.
The President: A grain embargo would be no use.
Secretary Regan: Have a year’s stock already.
The President: Farmers always hurt first in recessions. Charge the USSR with violation of the Yalta Agreement. They would have to defend themselves on the issue.
Ambassador Kirkpatrick: This would never pass at the UN.

[Notetaker’s comment: The final decision of this NSC meeting was to send a high-level mission to Europe to try to get the European countries involved (England, France, Germany and Italy) to prevent themselves the export of oil and gas equipment by U.S. subsidiaries and licensees on their territory as well as to negotiate with them concerning a mutually-agreed restriction on official and officially-guaranteed credits to the Soviet Union. This was subsequently embodied in NSDD–24.]

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6 Reference is to Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-CIO.
142. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Stoessel) to Secretary of State Haig

Washington, February 12, 1982

SUBJECT

Status of Interagency Consultations on the Siberian Gas Pipeline and Related Issues

Mr. Secretary:

During the last week, the interested agencies have continued efforts to develop a coherent strategy to deal with the Siberian Gas Pipeline and related issues. Although the SIG meeting which I chaired on February 10 revealed continued disarray and disagreement, the latest developments suggest that a new sense of realism regarding our ability to stop the pipeline and the costs of a futile effort to do so is beginning to percolate through the bureaucracy.

This is particularly striking in the case of the NSC Staff, where the action officer had previously been pushing for an all-out assault on the pipeline but acknowledged today that this was the wrong approach. He now feels that the focus of our efforts with the Europeans should be on future credits and imports from the Soviet Union, in other words essentially the point which you have been emphasizing. The Department of Defense continues to insist upon an all-out effort to stop the pipeline. However, the NSC action officer has advised us that he plans to discuss the subject with Fred Ikle to see if he can be brought around. I personally doubt that this effort will succeed. Secretary Baldrige appears to share our view, although there are differences within Commerce and you may want to discuss the subject with Mac. Bill Brock can probably be counted on to support our position. Treasury also appears to be swinging around to a position compatible with ours. In sum, the bureaucratic environment seems considerably more favorable than I had thought would be the case.

Another favorable development is that the pressure for an early SIG or NSC meeting has dissipated. The NSC action officer has suggested that we have an informal meeting of inter-agency representa-

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1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Walter Stoessel Files, Lot 82D307, P—Stoessel Classified Chron 1982. Secret; Not for the System. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “AMH.” Haig also initialed the top of the memorandum.

2 Reference is to Norman Bailey.
tives in my office on Thursday. I will keep you apprised of developments.  

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

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Haig drew a vertical line to the right of this paragraph.

Stoessel initialed “WJS” over his typed signature.

143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, February 25, 1982, 2245Z

50595. Eyes Only for the Ambassador. Subject: Secretary’s Luncheon with Dobrynin February 23.

1. (S—Entire text)
2. The following report on the highlights of the Secretary’s luncheon with Dobrynin February 23 is made available for your information and on an eyes only basis. You will be aware of its exceptional sensitivity.
4. Begin text.

—Dobrynin said that the Soviets had been thinking back on the Secretary’s meetings with Gromyko in Geneva. He said the Soviets had been prepared to announce the beginning of the START talks in those meetings. Gromyko had spent a lot of time getting ready for the Southern African issue and had made a clear offer. They have talked privately to the Cubans who are ready to withdraw. There has been no response from the U.S. side.

—On Afghanistan Dobrynin said he was surprised that despite what the Secretary had said in September and what was in the President’s letter to Brezhnev, nothing since has happened to get talks started at the expert level.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820002-0406. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Scanlan, Holmes, Eagleburger, and in S/S, S/S-O, and S; approved by Bremer.
2 See Documents 137 and 138.
—The Soviets, Dobrynin said, had drawn the conclusion that the U.S. doesn’t want the START talks. He said the Soviets have therefore decided they had to be prepared to wait this administration out—whether that was 3 years or 7 years. They were obviously dealing with an unfriendly administration in Washington. He said everything the U.S. had done was an insult to them. They would simply have to hunker down and live with it.

—The Secretary told Dobrynin not to attack the President or this administration. It was Soviet actions which had created this administration and the national mood—their actions in Afghanistan, Africa, the Middle East and now on top of it Poland. Dobrynin asked what it was that we wanted in Poland—what was our objective? The Secretary responded that there were two schools of thought. One was that we must seek a lifting of repression on the basis of our three conditions. That after all was the Soviets’ obligation from signing the Helsinki agreements.

—Another school of thought wants to change the face of the earth and roll back all of the injustices since Yalta. The Soviets should not draw conclusions based on rumors about that point of view.

—Dobrynin noted that Poland was a vital security interest to the Soviets and we must understand that. The Secretary responded that we too have vital interests in the Western Hemisphere. Dobrynin said that the Soviet’s concern was that if Jaruzelski eases up the pressure, the situation will go back to where it was before and the Soviets will then have to repress even harder. The Secretary said our assessment is unless repression is lifted the Soviets will be faced with a situation in Poland that will blow up. Dobrynin replied that the Soviets differ on this assessment but nobody knows for sure. Haig agreed that nobody knows for sure but that everything tells us that it will blow.

—South Africa: Dobrynin asked what the U.S. expects of the Soviets in South Africa. The Secretary said we don’t want what you are now doing. Dobrynin denied the Soviets were up to anything and said the problem was that the Front Line states do not agree with the parliamentary system we have pulled together in the contact group. The Soviet Ambassador also said the French agree with the Soviets and were seriously considering pulling out of the Contact Group.

—Dobrynin then pulled out a TASS report of statements by the Nicaraguans and Cubans and noted that the Cubans are ready to negotiate on our hemispheric problems. The Nicaraguans are also anxious to sit down with the U.S. He told the Secretary that these two statements reported today mean what they say and probably even more. He urged us to try them and see what happened. End of text.
Moscow, February 26, 1982, 0957Z

2320. Subject: Conversation with Gosbank Chairman Alkhimov on U.S./Soviet Relations and Poland.
   1. Confidential—Entire text.
   2. Summary: During a conversation I had with Gosbank Chairman Alkhimov on February 24, he argued in favor of more U.S./Soviet contact including a summit. He felt that contact between our two countries was essential if only to limit the possibility of mistakes. On Poland, Alkhimov denied that the U.S.S.R. had anything to do with the imposition of martial law which had prevented a civil war and bloodshed. He remarked that the Soviets were telling the Poles that they could not help them endlessly. I told him how Poland, on top of other developments, had dashed the expectations the U.S. had once had in the de-tenant process. Where the West had once shared the Polish burden with the U.S.S.R., now it was the U.S.S.R.’s alone. End summary.

3. On February 23, I called on Gosbank Chairman Alkhimov accompanied by DCM Zimmermann and EconCouns Semler. He was cordial and friendly, obviously pleased at my courtesy call. Deputy Chairman Pekshev and Voronin from the Foreign Department were also there. The main subjects we covered were U.S./Soviet relations and Poland.

4. U.S./Soviet Relations: Alkhimov made a plea for high-level meetings, including a summit, as well as more contacts between us. He argued that two great powers should not let themselves be drawn into conflict by the desires of small countries, the number of which increases each year. If our leaders sat down together, “perhaps they would find that these problems in Africa and Latin America” were not all that important. When I asked rhetorically how an Afghan Government could be found which would satisfy the Afghan people, Alkhimov hinted obliquely that a summit might be useful to that end. On our economic relations, he conceded that we could place sanctions on the U.S.S.R. which would have the effect of making the U.S.S.R. work harder, but would also entail loss of contact between our countries. Without contact, the possibility of big mistakes becomes greater. Alkhimov was pleased at the results of the Haig/Gromyko meeting on which I briefed him in general terms. He had kind words for President Reagan

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820104–0727. Confidential. Sent for information to Warsaw, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Leningrad, Prague, Sofia, and the U.S. Mission to NATO.
who “he was told” was a good man anxious to do his best for America. In this connection, he noted the belief among Soviets that the President is surrounded by advisers who tell him that the Soviet Union is arming against the United States. Alkhimov added that the thesis was wrong, and the Soviets are probably wrong as well in their characterization of the President’s advisers.

5. Poland: I mentioned how the expectations that we had had in the early period of U.S./Soviet detente, when Mr. Alkhimov had played a prominent role on the Soviet side, had been disappointed, citing Poland. I added that we would not finance the repression in Poland; where the West had once shared the Polish burden with the U.S.S.R., it was now the U.S.S.R.’s alone. In reply, Alkhimov recalled how he and Gosplan Chairman Baybakov had been sent to Warsaw in January 1975 to tell the Poles that their economic policies were leading to disaster, especially the high rate of investment growth. The Poles would not listen. Martial law had prevented a civil war and bloodshed. The Soviets had had nothing to do with the imposition of martial law. Alkhimov conceded that there had been incidents in Gdansk, Poznan and elsewhere, but thought the situation was improving. He argued that if the West cut off credits to Poland, it would suffer more than the East where discipline was being tightened in any case. Alkhimov said that the U.S.S.R. was aiding Poland in the form of energy and raw materials at half the world price, as well as transferable ruble and hard currency credits, but that they were telling the Poles they could not go on endlessly supporting a nation of 35 million people. Looking back at the past 18 months, Alkhimov sounded like many other Soviet citizens when he said that the Poles had stopped working during that period. “They want to live like Americans”, he remarked, “but work even less than Russians”.

6. Hungary: I raised Hungary as an example of a Socialist economy which seemed to work. Alkhimov agreed but added that economic management was easier in a small country. He thought the Hungarians had struck a good balance between state planning and individual incentives. He asserted that the Soviet Union did not have any monopoly on how best to reconcile common and individual benefits in planned economies “which take much more sophistication than the natural economies of the West”. The U.S.S.R. would welcome any ideas which would improve on the Socialist system although the U.S.S.R. could not accept Yugoslavia’s willingness to tolerate unemployment. (Note: The fine performance of the Hungarian State Bank was highlighted in a Budapest editorial article in “Pravda” on February 22—septel). Asked about that article, Alkhimov said that Gosbank follows the same poli-
cies. (We read into “Pravda’s” decision to print a eulogy of imaginative Hungarian financial practices something of a backhand criticism at Gosbank and the Soviet Banking System.)

Hartman

145. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, February 26, 1982, 1–1:37 p.m.

SUBJECT
Terms of Reference for High-Level USG Mission to Europe on Soviet Sanctions

PARTICIPANTS
President Ronald Reagan
State
Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Under Secretary William A. Buckley
Treasury
Deputy Secretary Timothy R. McNamar
Marc Leland
Defense
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci
Justice
Attorney General William French Smith
Commerce
Secretary Malcolm Baldrige
Under Secretary Lionel Olmer
USTR
Ambassador William E. Brock
CIA
Director William J. Casey
USUN
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
White House
Edwin Meese, III
Judge William P. Clark
Robert C. McFarlane
John M. Poindexter
JCS
Chairman, General David C. Jones
Lt. General Paul F. Gorman
Vice President’s Office
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy
OMB
William Schneider, Jr.
NSC
Staff Secretary Michael O. Wheeler
Dr. Norman A. Bailey
Richard Pipes (Notetaker)

Judge Clark: Mr. President, you will have to decide on an interpretation of the sanctions announced on December 29, 1981. It was not

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2 See Document 125.
decided at the time whether the embargoed commodities also included products manufactured by foreign subsidiaries and licensees of U.S. firms. This has created a certain amount of confusion, especially in England and France where component parts for the pipeline are being manufactured. The Department of Commerce has had some difficulty with this confusion. Our agenda today calls for discussing the question of including subsidiaries and licensees of U.S. firms and, secondly, the issue of the so-called Buckley Mission to Europe.³

Secretary Haig: As is frequently the case when decisions have to be made quickly—and speed was unavoidable in this case—the decision was clear, but its implications were not. The sanctions on the transfer of technology and the fulfillment of contracts connected with the technology has created a situation where U.S. corporations stand to lose $265 million, but the loss to Europe would be $874 million. The question before us is threefold:

1. Are contracts already signed to be included in the sanctions?
2. Will the principle of extraterritoriality be enforced?
3. Will we insists on applying retroactively those restraints which will cause further financial loss to our Allies?

The issue, Mr. President, is not unlike that concerning the default question. Your decision here was correct. European governments are very hesitant to put into effect sanctions which will cause loss of jobs, especially if they involve existing contracts. I have discussed this issue in Madrid with Cheyson. The European tells us that the most painful way of hurting the Soviet Union is by limiting future credits. Our long-term policy should aim toward reversing the flow of hard currency. If the Europeans will cooperate with us in choking off the flow of credits, this would represent a trade-off for our willingness to go easy on signed contracts and on the issue of retroactivity. I am against a high-level mission which would go to Europe with the intention of confronting our Allies and producing the impression that there will be winners and losers. I would rather prefer a low-level mission. Credits are more meaningful in any event. What we are talking about is not the complete cutoff of credits to the Soviet Union, but an incremental

³ Reference is to the planned trip of Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Buckley to Western European countries to coordinate economic policies. Under an undated covering memorandum to Reagan, Clark sent the terms of reference for the mission: “To begin negotiations to get the allies to cut off or severely limit and make more expensive medium- and long-term official and officially-guaranteed credits to the Soviet Union”; “To reduce Soviet exports of non-essentials to the West”; “To limit European dependence on Soviet energy”; and “To make clear that we define their offers not to undercut our sanctions to include subsidiaries and licensees of our companies in Europe.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00036 05 Jan 82)
decrease which would force the Russians to borrow at prevailing market rates and thereby pay more for borrowed money. We should establish a mechanism that would supervise all financial deals between East and West. If the credits would go to purchase strategic goods, then no credit should be extended at all; if what is involved are non-strategic purchases, then the Russians should be compelled to borrow at prevailing market rates. For this reason, the Terms of Reference for the proposed Buckley Mission should be modified. If there is a Buckley Mission, it should be downgraded. The pipeline question should not be included in the Buckley Mission. Our pressure in this respect would produce no results and in any way even in this respect control of credit is the most effective impediment. If the pipeline issue becomes a test of European “manhood”, they will reject our pressures.

The President: I must take the blame for having been careless. At the time that I announced the sanctions, I believed that the United States was the dominant factor in what went into the production of the pipeline. Now, Maggie Thatcher has made me realize that I have been wrong. I now realize that the important factors are the subsidiaries and licensees of U.S. corporations. Now it seems to me that if we do it at all, we should figure out whether we want to throw a block at the Soviet Union. If we are not prepared to do that, there will be a split between us and American labor. Labor will refuse to load ships. The question is, can we avoid going all the way? Can we avoid telling Europe that our sanctions apply to subsidiaries and licensees?

Secretary Weinberger: I understand Al’s point. Sanctions, however, had a purpose, and to be effective have to be followed through. One cannot tell American corporations: “You cannot, but your son can.” i.e., General Electric cannot sell the Russians goods, but their subsidiary abroad, under license, may. Hence, we must go for the full reach. Otherwise, we will not appear either as sincere or effective. We do want to stop the pipeline, because of the advantages it gives the Soviet Union in the military sphere—it gives them the capacity to turn off the valves; it also gives them hard currency. The Department of Defense believes that we are able to delay the completion of the pipeline for at least two years by limiting the supply of rotors. To produce these rotors in Europe, it would be necessary to construct a new plant, and this would require two years, during which costs would be rising, and this would give us an additional advantage. Any delay in the construction of the pipeline has great military benefits. I am fully in favor of placing restrictions on the availability of credit, but the European proposals are very limited. They involve five-year loans instead of eight-year loans, raising the interest rates by half a percent, etc. If the so-called
Buckley Mission goes over and talks only about credits, this would demonstrate that we are not willing to stay on course. The loss of jobs is unfortunate—the loss of freedom is worse. I hope also that we can make further attempts to demonstrate to the Europeans the availability of alternate sources of energy. We cannot always modify our policies to adjust to the Europeans. The Department of Defense hopes that the President will adopt that option that calls for the extension of our sanctions to foreign subsidiaries and licensees.

Secretary Baldrige: Two points need to be made. One, there is no way to stop the pipeline. Two, we cannot even delay the pipeline significantly. We talked to experts, and they tell us that at most we can delay it by a very short time. The pipeline will be finished in 1987. It will be a far tougher policy to have Buckley get from the Europeans a framework on credit guarantee restraints. Extraterritoriality is not a practical way to get Europe to cooperate.

Judge Clark: You would then revoke the earlier Presidential resolution on sanctions?

Secretary Baldrige: No, but I would review it to see where it is effective and where not. We should particularly emphasize credit restraints.

Ambassador Brock: I know of no expert who says the pipeline can be completed by 1984. Baldrige is correct. They can replace the missing equipment during this period. Our action will not delay completion of the pipeline. The other factor to consider is that extraterritoriality would be a fundamental violation of international agreements. The French certainly would never be allowed to apply extraterritoriality to their firms operating in this country. Britain passed a law through Parliament that would make it impossible for us to extend extraterritoriality to the United Kingdom. The way to deal with the problem is to stop imports from the Soviet Union—these amount to $25 billion—and to place restrictions on credit.

Judge Clark: You then would repeal the decision of December 29?

Ambassador Brock: I would exempt subsidiaries and licensees.

Admiral Murphy: The Vice President agrees with the Department of State.

Mr. Meese: We should include subsidiaries and licensees to the extent allowed by law. We should do anything that we can. We should declare a default as soon as possible.

Deputy Secretary McNamar: We cannot stop the pipeline, we can delay it. Extraterritoriality will not be effective—European parliaments can pass laws to get around it. The stuff is available elsewhere. If the Mission goes to consult, it will not look as if it is backing off if it has no success. Controls on credit will greatly enhance the Soviet problem.
Director Casey: I have reluctantly come to agree with the Department of Treasury that extraterritoriality will not work. The pipeline is an accomplished fact. We should invoke the Tank Clause to delay the pipeline. This has a real prospect. The Tank Clause and the threat of extraterritoriality will work. We might be successful in stopping the construction of a second pipeline. We should press the Norwegians to produce more gas. We should restrict credit. This will give us a chance.

General Jones: We favor the maximum sanctions, but the health of the Alliance is not in the best of shape right now. One should be balanced.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: I would like to call attention to the fact that the French press was very hostile to their government’s pipeline deal with the Soviet Union last month—that credits were given at eight and a half percent. What the French media criticized was not so much the growing French dependence on Soviet energy, but that French jobs are becoming dependent on the Soviet Union. In other words, that Soviet orders create jobs that make Europeans dependent on the Soviet Union. There is widespread discussion of this in Europe. We should provide leadership in this matter. I don’t know if we can stop the pipeline: this is a technical and a legal question. The issue is: do we wish to make it clear that we would like to stop Europe’s growing dependence on the Soviet Union.

Attorney General Smith: I favor extending the sanctions extraterritorially. However, if we go retroactive, we may make ourselves liable to having to pay compensation.

Judge Clark: Any further questions? Mr. President, there is a consensus that you should take the matter under advisement. Next, should the Buckley group go?

Secretary Haig: We have a major political problem on our hands. It has to be attended to. The Europeans expect us to sit down with them and discuss the matter. They would like us to give them relief from contractual pressures and in return they will give us concessions on credits. The Buckley group should not be a “high-profile” group; it should not be involved in a test of strength; it should not endeavor to kill the pipeline. We all want to apply pressure, but we must get cooperation. Let Buckley go and when he comes back we can reassess our position.

Judge Clark: Are the Terms of Reference for the Buckley Mission O.K.?

4 Reference is to an April 1981 stipulation of a rescheduling of Polish debt that would allow creditors to declare Poland to be in default upon the development of exceptional circumstances (e.g., a Soviet invasion of that country).
Haig: No. The bracketed sections should be removed.
Baldrige: I agree. The bracketed sections should be removed.
Weinberger: The issue of extraterritoriality is overblown. We have information to the effect that the President of Alsthom-Atlantique, a licensee of General Electric, has said that if the President of General Electric called him and asked that they not produce these rotors for the pipeline, they would acquiesce. This is not a matter of law, but of the relationship between the two firms.

The meeting adjourned at 1:37 p.m. On March 1, Judge Clark signed a memorandum approving the Buckley Mission to Europe (Tab A). 5

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5 Attached but not printed. See Document 146.

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146. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Vice President Bush

Washington, March 1, 1982

SUBJECT

High Level Mission to Europe

The President has determined to defer his decision on applicability of the December 30, 1981, sanctions involving the embargo of oil and gas equipment exports to the Soviet Union pending return of a Mission to Europe headed by Under Secretary of State James Buckley to consult with representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The consultations will address restricting medium- and long-term government and government guaranteed export credits to the Soviet Union and convening a conference of these countries and others to consider the establishment of a standing mechanism for the management of such credit restrictions in the future. Agreement to convene a conference will be subject to concurrence by the governments involved that no new government or government-guaranteed medium- or long-

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Pipes Files, NSC Meetings: NSC 02/26/1982 Sanctions. Confidential. Also addressed to Haig, Regan, Weinberger, Baldrige, Casey, Kirkpatrick, Stockman, Brock, and Jones.
term credit commitments will be made to the Soviet Union in the interim.

In its discussions with European leaders, the Mission should also encourage them to move ahead with further restrictions on non-essential imports from the Soviet Union. The Mission should also encourage the Allied Governments to join with us in an effort to limit European energy dependence on the Soviet Union. However, these latter points should be subordinated to the key objective of significant restraints on credits to the Soviet Union.

In addition to Under Secretary Buckley, the Mission will include representatives from the Departments of Treasury, Defense, Commerce and the National Security Council staff.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

147. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, March 4, 1982, 1424Z

2615. Subject: Alkhimov on US/Soviet Relations. Ref: Moscow 2320.2

1. (C— Entire text.)

2. At dinner on March 3, Gosbank Chairman Alkhimov expanded on themes he had discussed with Ambassador Hartman on Feb. 24 (ref tel). In long conversation with Econ Couns Alkhimov said that US and USSR were acting like children, letting themselves be led around by the nose by small countries. When Econ Couns cited Afghanistan and Poland as reasons why the American public had become disillusioned with Soviet intentions, Alkhimov said that as far as he was concerned “Afghanistan is a mistake, and we are paying for it.” As for Poland, the Poles do what they want for better or for worse and the USSR cannot control them. Alkhimov again expressed concern that while President Reagan probably understands the real issues of peace

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820116–0868. Confidential. Sent for information to Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Warsaw, Leningrad, Prague, Sofia, and the U.S. Mission to NATO.

2 See Document 144.
and disarmament, he may be surrounded by advisers who give him bad advice. Again and again, he returned to his main idea which is that Presidents Brezhnev and Reagan should get together to discuss the issues, and they may well find it possible to make real progress. When Econ Couns suggested that there would need to be careful preparation for such a summit, and at least the prospect of achievement during it, Alkhimov seemed to dismiss both points as of secondary importance: the important thing was for the two leaders to talk to each other. Asked whether he sometimes broached this idea with his colleagues in the Council of Ministers, Alkhimov said he did and then everyone disagreed with each other. “Probably the same thing happens in Washington,” he added.

3. During the evening both Alkhimov and one of his Deputy Chairmen, Pekshev, separately raised the visit of Under Secretary Buckley, with Econ Couns. They both seemed rather anxious about it. Econ Couns, interrupted both times by other guests, said that he did not know the precise dates of the visit but understood that Under Secretary Buckley was going to listen to the views of Europeans.

4. Efforts to obtain information about the Soviet hard currency shortage from Alkhimov, Pekshev or Foreign Trade Bank Deputy Chairman Nikitkin proved fruitless. Alkhimov changed the subject, Pekshev, despite his position at Gosbank, disclaimed any knowledge of the subject, and Nikitkin said there was no problem, and promptly launched into a story about three girls on a raft who thought they had a problem. Comment: It is clear that availability of hard currency is not a favorite subject of conversation among Moscow bankers.

5. Alkhimov also had kind words about Ambassador Hartman whom he described as an intelligent, experienced diplomat. He suggested jocularly that Ambassadors Dobrynin and Hartman should be kept in each other’s capitals and not allowed to return to their homes until relations between the two countries improve.

Zimmermann
148. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, March 4, 1982

SUBJECT
My Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin March 3

I met with Dobrynin this morning and went over the points you approved for use with him last week. The main topic was Poland, and it struck the sour note in what Dobrynin called an otherwise positive presentation.

On Poland, I told Dobrynin we want fulfillment of the three conditions needed for the country’s stable development, as the only way to bring it out of its political and economic mess. He said he regretted hearing these “negative things,” since the Soviet assessment of the situation is “better.” He gave no signals that dramatic improvement is in the offing, but did suggest there may be some small steps coming up in the period ahead to show repression is easing. Prisoners will soon be released, he said; there will be no crackdown on the Church; there will be a trade union movement, although it would have to confine itself to work conditions. I said I regretted it was necessary for me to be so firm, but our assessment is that things will get worse unless concrete steps are taken to deal with the situation. Soviet statements are not of themselves adequate.

On Afghanistan and Southern Africa, Dobrynin challenged some of my individual points—self-determination in Afghanistan and simultaneity of Cuban departure from Angola and South African withdrawal from Namibia—but gave every evidence of wanting to pursue discussions.

Overall, Dobrynin’s response tends to confirm that the Soviets are getting the point that we are committed to constructive communication with them in several areas, but that Poland stands in the way.

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: County File: USSR (03/03/1982–03/15/1982). Secret. An unknown hand wrote in the top right-hand corner: “Delivered via LDX (Clark) to Pres 3/5/82.” Reagan was at his ranch in California from March 4 to 8.

2 No minutes of this conversation were found.
149. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)\(^1\)

Washington, March 5, 1982

**SUBJECT**
Statement of U.S. Strategy Toward Soviet Union

Over the past several weeks (ever since the introduction of sanctions toward Poland and the USSR) more and more Europeans are demanding to know what the long-term purpose of our hard-line actions toward the Communist Bloc is. Do we intend to provoke a confrontation? Do we want to isolate the Soviet Bloc? Do we have some other purpose in mind? Or are we being merely impulsive? There is absolutely no hope of securing cooperation for our sanctions from our Allies, who are recalcitrant to follow us anyway, unless our objectives are clearly and persuasively spelled out. And unless such cooperation is forthcoming we will either produce a final split in the Alliance or else have to abandon our current policies, either of which would be a tragedy. The matter was well put by the French Minister of Commerce, Michel Jobert, the other day, when he told a group of Americans at the American Enterprise Institute: “You are asking us to go with you on a journey but you are not telling us where you are heading and where we will end up”. (S)

It seems to me, therefore, quite imperative that a decision be made on what our long-term policy toward the Communist Bloc is (i.e., what we expect to result from our hard-line policies) and then to make the broad outlines of these objectives public. The first and most critical step can be accomplished through an NSDD on the Soviet Union (there is no PD on the subject to revise, strange as it may seem). Once this NSDD has been approved by the NSC and the President, a speech could be drafted: ideally, the President could make a major statement on this subject in the context of his June trip to Europe. Time is of some urgency in this matter. (The NSDD on the Soviet Union could be submitted for NSC consideration concurrently with one on Eastern Europe, which is being worked on presently.) (S)

Norman Bailey, Jim Rentschler and Bill Stearman concur.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) All three initialed next to their names.
RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize NSC staff members to draft the Terms of Reference for a NSDD on the Soviet Union, to be followed by interagency consideration on the subject, chaired by State, and submission to NSC, the process to be completed no later than April 30.\(^3\) (S)

\(^3\) Clark initialed his approval.

150. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan\(^1\)

Washington, March 15, 1982

SUBJECT

Soviet Succession Crisis

Al Haig’s memorandum (Tab A) calls your attention to a number of events which have occurred in recent weeks that indicate that the struggle for power in the Kremlin among Brezhnev’s potential successors has begun. Two additional comments may be made:

—The succession conflict got underway with the death several weeks ago of M. Suslov, the most doctrinaire of Soviet leaders: his death removed the guardian of orthodoxy and the only individual who had enough prestige to keep his Politburo colleagues in line.

—Chernenko, whom Brezhnev has been grooming for his succession, appears to be the most “liberal” among top Soviet leaders in the sense that he has shown genuine appreciation of the significance of the Polish events and has urged the Soviet Communist Party to draw closer to the workers. He also is known to admire the Hungarian economic experiment. (S)

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan²

Washington, March 9, 1982

SUBJECT

Kremlin Succession Politics Heating Up

The ouster last week of trade union chief Shibayev was the latest sign of intensified pre-succession maneuvering among members of the Politburo. Brezhnev’s protege Konstantin Chernenko seems to be moving to the fore. But the battle has only begun, and it is still far from certain that he will inherit Brezhnev’s position as leader of the party.

Recent signs of Kremlin infighting have included:

—rumors implicating Brezhnev’s son and daughter in corruption and smuggling;
—publication of a literary piece (subsequently and without explanation withdrawn from public sale) about an aging man hanging on to power—presumably an allusion to Brezhnev;
—TV clips that make no attempt to disguise Brezhnev’s physical deterioration; and
—a March 5 rumor of his death (which the Foreign Ministry’s denial attributed to “unsavory sources”).

These jibes at Brezhnev were probably aimed in part at his favorite Chernenko. Chernenko’s recent political ascent may already have eased him into the party’s number two spot, which had belonged to the recently deceased ideologue, Suslov. This is suggested by Chernenko’s:

—presence as the ranking Politburo member at the trade union session which fired Shibayev (March 5);
—high profile during Jaruzelski’s visit to Moscow (March 1–2); and
—prominence in the media coverage of a February 25 award ceremony.

In addition, Dobrynin told a State Department officer on March 3 that Chernenko will probably take Suslov’s place in running Politburo meetings when Brezhnev vacations in the Crimea.³

² Secret; Exdis.
³ A reference to Simons who spoke with Dobrynin on March 3. Their conversation was reported in telegram 60034 to Moscow, March 6. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820121–0227)
In contrast, Chernenko’s rival, Andrey Kirilenko, apparently has been losing ground. He failed to attend the February 25 award ceremony or participate in the talks with Jaruzelski. Moreover, he did not join Brezhnev and six of the Moscow-based Politburo members (including Chernenko) at the March 3 performance of a controversial new play about Lenin’s last days. The plot, which highlighted Lenin’s misgivings about Stalin, was implicitly a dig at Kirilenko.

A key policy issue in the Chernenko-Kirilenko rivalry probably is the allocation of resources. Chernenko’s rhetoric suggests a readiness to do somewhat more for the consumer, while Kirilenko’s indicates firm support of the military and heavy industry.

In spite of his recent gains, Chernenko’s narrow power base (he is dependent largely on Brezhnev’s patronage) casts a shadow over his prospects. Kirilenko, having long been the more senior of the two party secretaries, has the advantage of a well-entrenched constituency in the establishment.

The outcome at this point remains unclear, but the abrupt increase in open jockeying for position between the principal rivals suggests that the question of who will inherit Brezhnev’s mantle of power may be more immediate than we had previously estimated.

151. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, March 17, 1982

SUBJECT
My Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin March 16

I met with Dobrynin late yesterday evening at his request, and he gave me a copy of Brezhnev’s March 15 speech and made some points

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with reference to the topics we discussed March 3.\(^3\) I let the speech lie on the table; the points were more interesting.

He began with the general point that the Soviets agree with us about the importance of reciprocity, restraint and willingness to engage in “joint and parallel efforts” to resolve “pressing international problems”. But he insisted we must move forward simultaneously on various issues and not pick and choose issues critical to only one side, and complained I had left out strategic arms limitation and reduction, the Middle East and continuing the Helsinki process. We have wasted a whole year, he said. I agreed emphatically, and urged the Soviets to stop making trouble close to us, noting we could do the same if we wished. At that point he sweetened and did what he could to demonstrate flexibility on the basically rigid points he had been given.

On Poland, he complained about pressure, deadlines and conditions, but then argued that progress is being made in each of the three condition areas and that the Polish leadership intends to go farther, though at a pace only they can decide. I urged release of Walesa and scoffed when he claimed in reply they do not control that decision.

On arms control, Dobrynin commented only that he could see no chance for progress on INF until it was paired with START.

On Afghanistan he repeated that the Soviets are willing to talk but had nothing new to offer on substance. On Cuba and Southern Africa, he also stuck to Soviet positions “of principle”. On the other hand, with regard to both he claimed the Soviets would not interfere with whatever we can work out (including on the question of arms shipments to Cuba), and on Southern Africa he said the Soviet “understanding” is that a basis for mutual action exists.

On balance, this response and Dobrynin’s evident desire to appear flexible despite a tough-sounding brief leave me not unhopeful. The fact that Poland is an obstacle to good discussion in a variety of areas appears to be sinking even further in, and we should keep talking on selected topics to put their professions of flexibility to the test and thus keep the pressure on.

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\(^3\) See Document 148.
152. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 25, 1982, 1:02–1:50 p.m.

SUBJECT
Debrief of Under Secretary Buckley’s Trip to Europe

PARTICIPANTS
President Ronald Reagan
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan
The Attorney General William French Smith
Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige
Edwin Meese III, Counselor to the President
Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey
United States Trade Representative William E. Brock
Deputy Chief of Staff to the President Michael K. Deaver
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs William P. Clark
Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones
Under Secretary of State James L. Buckley
Under Secretary of Defense Fred C. Ikle
Dr. William Schneider, Jr., OMB

Observers
Lawrence J. Brady, Assistant Secretary for Trade (Commerce)
Marc E. Leland, Assistant Secretary (Treasury)
Lt. General Paul F. Gorman (JCS)
Richard G. Darman (White House)
John M. Poindexter (White House)
Michael O. Wheeler (Staff Secretary, NSC)
Norman A. Bailey (NSC)
Richard Pipes (NSC, Notetaker)

The meeting opened at 1:02 p.m.

Clark: Mr. President, Jim Buckley, having returned from his mission to Europe, will report on the results of his consultations with our Allies on the subject of restricting government and government-guaranteed loans to the Soviet Union.

Buckley: The purpose of the mission was to show the idiocy of subsidizing the Soviet arms buildup through credits: we wanted to look at credits extended to the USSR in strategic terms, to treat them in the same manner as we do the transfer of sensitive technology. Specifically, we wanted to discuss (1) subsidized credits, offered at

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00044 25 Mar 82. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. All brackets are in the original. Attached but not printed is a press release reporting on Buckley’s trip.
below market rates (sometimes as much as 50 percent below), and (2) government-guaranteed loans. Most countries provide both types of loans: the Germans have a peculiar form of loan insurance known as “Hermes” which is private but has government backing, so it amounts to the same thing.

More specifically, the mission wished to accomplish three objectives:

1. To consult with the European Allies and Japan on the need for credit restraint and the creation of an appropriate mechanism to achieve this aim.
2. “Transparency”: the exchange among ourselves of information on loans; and,
3. “Pause”: a moratorium on further credits and credit guarantees until the mechanism to control them has been set in place.

We failed in the third objective. The Germans and French said they could not adopt such a moratorium. The Italians said they have already stopped extending credit anyway but for purely economic reasons. We obtained cooperation on “transparency”. The reaction to our first objective, the request for consultations and a “mechanism”, met with a mixed response. It was coolest in Germany where it was said that that country finds it beneficial to extend credit at preferential rates and that “Hermes” is a private organization (although admittedly government-backed). The Germans were also disturbed by the notion of singling out the Soviet Union for discrimination in matters of trade, a practice they described as “hostile”. We stressed that indeed one must single out the Soviet Union—such discrimination is implicit in the maintenance of NATO and in our defense buildup. (Ambassador Hermes\(^2\) of the FRG, however, whom I saw today, was more forthcoming.) The French were very French: they were prepared to do away with subsidies but they claimed they could not cooperate in restraining the flow of credits because of a 1981 protocol with the Soviet Union committing them to provide the moneys necessary for Soviet purchases in France. We will try to smoke out this accord: we doubt that it exists in this form. The British expressed a willingness to act as “middlesmen”. The Italians were a joy: fully willing to cooperate, as long as no country took advantage of the arrangement at the expense of others.

The meeting in Brussels was immensely encouraging. We met with the NATO Council, the EC, and Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans. The smaller industrial nations are sick and tired of having to compete with larger powers.

\(^2\) Reference is to West German Ambassador to the United States Peter Hermes.
In general, one could discern growing Allied concern over East Bloc debts and an understanding that easy money helps the USSR solve its critical problems. The idea of doing away with subsidized loans met with sympathy. We stressed President Reagan’s sense of urgency: that the President has put the December 30 sanctions on hold until we have reported on our mission. There is also growing congressional impatience. A telling argument was that our ability to cooperate in the matter of the ballooning debt [of the Soviet Bloc] depended entirely on the willingness of the Allies to restrict loans to the Soviet Union.

We laid a groundwork to go forward with bilaterals. We will start these bilaterals with the Germans next week. After the bilaterals there is to be a conference of the leading powers to create a consensus. An agreement should be reached well in advance of the Versailles Summit.

The President has also asked us to raise the matter of energy dependence. We did this everywhere. We spoke of North Sea gas, opening the ears of our Allies, especially in Italy and Belgium which are not yet committed to the Soviet pipeline. The Germans may reduce their commitment for Siberian gas by 10 percent.

The President: Well done.

Clark: The question is whether we should continue bilaterals on credits and continue deferring the decision on applying extraterritoriality to sanctions. Al?

Haig: Jim Buckley spoke for me.

Carlucci: Defense favors bilaterals but also extraterritoriality: we believe we can stop or at least delay the pipeline.

Clark: There is no doubt of the Defense Department’s position on this.

Ikle: If we give up too soon [on extraterritoriality] we may lose leverage. We should hold on to it.

Baldrige: The position of Defense is wrong. We cannot stop the pipeline. The Russians will delay completion until 1986 (rather than 1984)—any delay based on a 1986 deadline therefore has no value. We have gone on this matter as far as we can. It is unfair to the United States—there is plenty of evidence of cheating (e.g., the Japanese back-dating of memoranda). No one is going along with us: this is costing many jobs in the U.S. I have no recommendation to make but we should be aware that (1) the Allies are not cooperating with our sanctions, (2) we are losing jobs, and (3) we cannot delay the pipeline.

Clark: Should the President void the December 30 sanctions?

Baldrige: We should think about that. Credits are strong action. I would not propose voiding the sanctions without credit controls.

Regan: Let us continue negotiating a while longer. No one expected complete agreement from such a quick trip. Some two to three months
are needed. Soviet trade and credits go beyond the pipeline issue: there are many other things we want to cut off besides the pipeline. Our lever lies in the fact that all East European countries are coming up for review: Poland, Romania, Hungary. The rescheduling of loans, where the Allies want help, can be tied up to their actions vis-a-vis the Russians. If we get no cooperation in two-three months, that will be the time to pull the stops.

Casey: We have ample leverage on credits. Delaying the pipeline is not adequate: it will be on stream in 1985–87. We should take advantage of the economic situation. The demand for gas is declining, also in Germany. Our fundamental objective should be to develop energy on our side of the line, not theirs. The Allies ought to commit themselves not to support the second pipeline, to keep the gas takes to a minimum, and to develop resources elsewhere (Norway, etc.). Do not worry about the [Siberian] pipeline.

Brock: I completely agree with Bill Casey. Our opportunities are: (1) expediting development of Western gas resources; (2) tackling the fundamental problem of credits. This should not be jeopardized for the sake of delaying the pipeline by one year. Place extraterritoriality on hold and continue active negotiations on credit. This will really hurt. If we push the extraterritoriality game we will lose out on credit constraints.

Smith: If we enforce sanctions they should be extraterritorial or they are not credible. Talks [on credits] should go on.

Haig: We recently had a meeting of some Soviet experts from the universities, including the Wharton School. Their conclusions agreed with the consensus that seems to be forming here.

The Norwegian Government wanted to delay the exploitation of its substantial gas reserves until the 1990s because of the energy glut. However, the new Norwegian Government is different from the old one which opposed large-scale economic development. Let us move away from trying to tamper with contractual agreements [on the Siberian gas line]. The Europeans are beginning to feel we are crazy. This takes attention away from the really important issue: the second pipeline and the substitution for it of Norwegian energy, which would give good business to U.S. firms.

On extraterritoriality, I agree with Baldrige: European subsidiaries and licensees must fulfill their contracts. This does not hurt us. But there was an agreement that there would be no undercutting and this is being circumvented (for instance by Komatsu which backdates trade agreements).

I also agree with Bill Casey: trying to stop the pipeline is a secondary objective which irritates Europe. Keep this issue dangling. The same applies to the default.
The academic experts on the Soviet Union said that the U.S. is beginning to acquire a reputation for economic warfare against the Soviet Union. This would be disaster when Eastern Europe is drifting away, when we should want to differentiate [between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe].

I hit the ceiling when I read a Reuters dispatch claiming Cheysson spoke of “insurmountable” differences with the United States. I telephoned Cheysson and he said there was no truth whatever in this report. The same applies to the Buckley Mission. We began to open Europe’s eyes to overcommitments in Eastern Europe: that it is bad business. This awareness causes them to cooperate. They are afraid they will never get back their $80 billion. We must show the same patience here that we have shown in COCOM. In the meantime, things aren’t so bad: the private banks are not rushing to lend money [to the East].

*The President:* Does anyone believe they will ever get back their money?

*Haig:* Experts say you can write $40–50 billion off.

*The President:* Should we not cut off credit?

*Haig:* To the Soviet Union, yes; to Eastern Europe, no.

*Meese:* We should look at credit worthiness.

*Haig:* On occasion you have to make a political judgment to keep a country afloat. The academic experts say: we will not bust the Soviet Union. This is a crazy idea. They are in trouble but you will not change their system with economic warfare.

*Brock:* We can make them change priorities.

*Casey:* Yes.

*Haig:* Jim Buckley did great work: he established the mechanism for the June meeting.

*Clark:* The President has asked Bill Casey to supply daily data on the Soviet and East European economic situation. Al Haig will report to the President on this next week.

*Carlucci:* There is a question of interpretation. What is meant by “putting extraterritoriality on hold”? Only one firm is involved, Alsthom-Atlantique. The question is: will they manufacture the rotors or not? Will they desist if we request them to?

*Clark:* The December 29 sanctions applied only to domestic firms. The President deferred the extension of sanctions to subsidiaries and licensees.

*Carlucci:* Only one firm is involved, a GE licensee in France.

*Buckley:* Also a German firm.

*Ikle:* They are waiting for a signal.
Baldrige: That is right. The situation is confusing. There are reports they only have to be asked and they will stop. Other reports say they will expand production.

Haig: Keeping the issue hanging gives Buckley great leverage. We threaten Europe that we will apply extraterritoriality if they do not cooperate on credits.

Baldrige: Credit restraints are a far stronger measure.

The President: If we control credits they won’t be able to buy.

Regan: The more uncertain the situation the less credits will flow because the banks will be unsure of government guarantees. They are shortening loan periods as is. We are accomplishing things. Uncertainty restraints banks.

Clark: What we have is “organized uncertainty”.

The President: Let me raise a question from the world of fantasy. So far we are doing things which threaten to deny. But they are still in Afghanistan, they are still supplying Cuba, they are still preventing Jews and Christians from emigrating. Is there a right time for the West to cooperate? The Europeans do not understand. Can we foresee a time when they [the Soviets] are in a desperate plight, when the military deprives the people of food, and we might be able to say to them: “Have you learned your lesson? If you rejoin the civilized world we will help you bring wonderful things to your people. But you must get out of Afghanistan, deal realistically in Geneva. No one wants to attack you.”

Brock: If you tie this to real reductions in arms so that their insecurity does not increase. They must accept the carrot.

Carlucci: They are not convinced we mean it.

Brock: Like the Japanese, they feel that if they can only hold on until the next Administration . . . There has to be a carrot.

Ikle: Economic pressures may force them to deal with us.

The President: Will they be desperate enough to grab Middle Eastern oil and tell Europe you will have to buy it from us?

Carlucci: A new generation is coming in: it may be different.

Clark: You may have a Pearl Harbor in Iran if we press them too hard on credits.

Mr. President, anything further on what appears to be a consensus? We then have two alternatives: (1) prepare a short, low-keyed statement [for the press]; (2) await a leak. I recommend the second option.

The President: Let us write a statement as a courtesy and correct any errors that may appear in the leak.

The meeting adjourned at 1:50 p.m.
153. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 1, 1982

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Eugene V. Rostow, Director, ACDA

The Director lunched with Ambassador Dobrynin on 1 April 1982, at a Washington restaurant. Rostow was returning Dobrynin’s hospitality on an earlier occasion. The tone was relaxed and cordial.

After the conversation had covered most of the topics mentioned in the enclosed list of talking points, Rostow gave Dobrynin a copy, which he read attentively and put in his pocket.

1. Dobrynin expressed a personal interest in the possibility of a joint Soviet American approach to the ICRC for some sort of study or enquiry into the charges of Soviet use of chemical and biological weapons in Asia. He thought Rostow should develop a more detailed plan, which Dobrynin would then discuss with Rostow and send on to Moscow. Dobrynin thought we should not mention the Cuban Missile Crisis precedent, which would be irritating in Moscow. Meanwhile, certain questions occurred to him. What would be the relation of such a group to the UN body? Would a Soviet and an American scientist be on the panel? How big would it be? Rostow undertook to prepare a more concrete proposal and come back with it shortly.

2. Dobrynin expressed a positive view of our suggestion that the next round of the INF talks would have to tackle the problem of data and the achievement of an agreed data base, as comprehensive as possible. He made no objections of principle, and seemed to indicate that Soviet thinking was along the same lines. He had pressed hard on the importance of the British and French systems to the “unsophisticated” Soviet members of the Politburo, who could not understand why those systems were not part of the NATO arsenal. Rostow countered by recalling Ambassador Nitze’s presentation at Geneva of the six Soviet errors on the subject of the British and French systems. Dobrynin said that while, as a chess player, he appreciated the elegance of Ambassador Nitze’s arguments, the plain, simple men of the Politburo were not impressed by such reasoning. If we could only solve this problem, he was sure many other problems could be solved. With all our wonder-

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2 Not attached.
ful experts about Soviet life available to us, why weren’t we more sensitive to the nature of the Russian temperament? (He sounded this theme with variations a number of times during the lunch, evoking a touching picture of staunch, sturdy, rather angry Russian peasant-patriots.) Rostow replied that if we could reach agreement on the figures, so that we were not confronting a different method of calculation every time we turned around, it might be possible to see the British-French problem and many other issues in a more realistic perspective.

3. On START, Dobrynin seemed satisfied with the indications in the President’s statement and in the press about when START would start. Dobrynin was more interested in two other points: the unit of account and the linkage to the evolution of events in Poland. On the unit of account, he asked about the accuracy of the Newsweek story, and seemed comfortable with all its implications, as had been the case in their talk several months earlier. Rostow reported to him his conversation with Kvitsinskiy about the “Nitez” as a way of measuring the destructive power of nuclear weapons. Dobrynin wondered helpfully, “why not a Rostow?” On political linkage, he said that some people in Moscow bristled at the idea of linking the course of events in Poland to START. Poland was an internal problem. Rostow replied that this was not a matter for irritation or anger. In his speech before the CD in Geneva, Rostow had listed a number of factors making the course of events in Poland a matter of international concern. President Reagan had made a constructive proposal for initiating a peaceful resolution of the crisis in December—a proposal that fully respected the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Those ideas should be addressed soon seriously and without anger.

4. The conversation did not go far on verification, because of the passage of time, but Dobrynin did note that his assurances to Rostow at their previous lunch were not “private” but official.

Eugene V. Rostow

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3 On March 31, Reagan opened his news conference with a statement calling for “an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons that reduces the risk of war, lowers the level of armaments, and enhances global security.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, vol. I, pp. 398–405)

154. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, April 2, 1982

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations Over the Near Term

I believe the attached analysis of the critical issues facing us in the U.S.-Soviet relationship is worth your personal attention. Unfortunately, it is long and detailed because of the complexity of the issues. But I would urge you to study it over the weekend, and I would like to talk to you about it thereafter.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS OVER THE NEAR TERM

SUMMARY

We are now at the threshold of announcing the beginning of START negotiations with the USSR, without commensurate Soviet actions to address our geopolitical concerns. Our national priorities and general policy approach are in place, but they have not yet produced the kind of Soviet restraint we can point to and follow up on to validate them. The initial regional/arms control balance of our approach to the U.S.-Soviet relationship is therefore at risk, and there is an inescapable agenda with the Soviets: if we do not drive events, there will be events that can drive us. We have the choice between: (1) proceeding case-by-case on the basis of our national priorities and present approach, hoping they will produce results on regional issues to balance the start of START; and (2) seeking to force events at a pace and in the sequence which would maintain the integrity of our approach, but without guarantees of success. I favor the latter course, and a game plan with an initial focus this spring on geopolitical issues built around our action

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (04/01/1981–04/05/1982). Secret; Sensitive. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the memorandum: "President has seen."

2 Secret; Sensitive.
program in Central America and early commencement of U.S.-Soviet experts’ talks on Afghanistan, to be made public in the same time frame as the START announcement. Subsequently, in late spring and summer we would add a supplementary focus on further arms control and bilateral relations.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE ISSUES

As between running in place and moving forward in a sequence of our choosing, we need to decide on the course most likely to preserve the credibility and effectiveness of the Administration’s overall approach to relations with the USSR.

THE BALANCED APPROACH AT THE CROSSROADS

We spent the first year establishing a coherent and rational approach and explaining it patiently and consistently to the Soviets, our Allies and friends, and the U.S. public.

That approach is based on the requirement that the Soviets show real restraint and accept reciprocity not just in the area they would prefer—arms control and “European security”—but in three areas of vital concern to U.S. interests—geopolitical issues, including but extending far beyond Poland; security and arms control overall; and bilateral relations.

We have jarred the Soviets from the disdain toward us they had fallen into over the past decade, without provoking them to radical new testing and challenging initiatives. But if they have been jarred, they have not been moved. They have not responded directly to sanctions nor driven bilateral relations further downhill, but they continue to arm-wrestle us for the propaganda high ground in arms control, and they continue to sustain or escalate the kind of egregious behavior in regional situations which destroyed the “detente” they are still nostalgic for. Except in very tentative fashion, e.g., in Southern Africa, we have not yet been able to create the new realities that will force them to move, and show that our approach is working.

The outlook for the next six months is not bright. It includes continuing domestic and international economic difficulties; continuing uncertainty over the fate of your economic and rearmament programs; resurgent opposition to INF deployments in Europe; tension and instability without clear direction in Poland; and mounting crisis and domestic hostility to U.S. involvement in Central America. And in this vexed situation, increasing public and Congressional concerns about nuclear weapons and the need to make the June summits successful will give new impetus to arms control negotiations.

Meanwhile, in the USSR, the Soviet leadership continues to hope that our economic stringencies and Transatlantic dissension will drive
us back willy-nilly toward a version of “detente” without the need for basic adjustments from them. Our first-year approach to the Soviets has been firm and tough, but necessarily rhetorical. There has been little in it that allows them to conclude that our new approach is anything but a cover for a new Cold War, to which they must react appropriately. At the same time, Brezhnev may be failing, and in any event leadership maneuvering for the succession rose a notch with the death of Suslov. This makes it correspondingly important that we offer potential successors a plausible alternative to a neo-Stalinist retrenchment based on East-West confrontation, belt-tightening, and autarky. Although we cannot determine the outcome, we will influence it in a constructive direction only if we demonstrate convincingly that we are genuinely prepared to develop relations on the new basis we have defined.

**THE SIX-MONTH AGENDA**

And, meanwhile, the calendar of events on our present agenda with the Soviets is inescapable over the next six months. Issues must be dealt with in every area of the relationship.

—Among geopolitical concerns, Poland will be only one of a number of trouble spots. The others will certainly include Latin America and Afghanistan, and could well include Pakistan, Iran, and Lebanon.

—The grains issue is both geopolitical (as a potential Poland sanction) and bilateral. The extended year of the U.S.-Soviet Long-Term Agreement (LTA) expires September 30. The question of further extension must be faced in the context of Poland sanctions, a record grain harvest, rising world stocks, falling prices, Congressional elections, and a Farm Bill which raises questions about the value of an LTA as a foreign policy instrument.

—We must manage at least three strictly bilateral issues. (1) Human rights/emigration issues will inevitably take on a higher profile this year, beginning with the Pentecostalists, but very much including Jewish emigration. (2) On cooperative activities, we must decide on a short fuse whether or not to renew a fisheries agreement with the Soviets that has important advantages for West Coast fishermen and support from West Coast Congressmen, and we will face a series of similar decisions regarding activities clearly beneficial to the U.S. under agreements we have decided not to renew because of Poland. (3) There is also the question of whether to recommence the process of opening consulates in Kiev and New York, frozen by a misguided Carter Administration sanction for Afghanistan.

—In arms control, we are obliged to move on START by early summer, whether or not we can show results in other areas of the relationship.
ANOTHER GRAND DESIGN?

We have a choice between running in place and moving forward, but in either case we should proceed on the basis of the balance between regional concerns and arms control that we have defined this past year. If we choose any other basis at this point, before we can show results, the likelihood that we will sacrifice the credibility of our whole policy is almost overwhelming.

In the context of Poland sanctions and preparations for the June Summits, we can expect to hear calls for light at the end of the tunnel on arms control and European security as a tradeoff for European responsiveness to our leadership on Poland. While intellectually appealing, in practical terms the concept would require a rapid and radical departure from the Administration’s whole policy approach up to now, onto the USSR’s chosen ground. Our carrots with the Soviets are essentially in the political field, and if we offer them up in Europe before the Soviets have begun tangibly to exercise new restraint outside Europe, we will be moving, and probably irreversibly, from our agenda to theirs.

We should by all means seek to sell moves we make in the framework of our current approach to the Europeans as “light at the end of the tunnel.” But the current approach is based on solid and accurate analysis of what has gone wrong with East-West relations this last decade, and what is needed to put them right. We will not be doing either ourselves or the Europeans or in the long term the Soviets any favors if we jettison that approach for short-term Transatlantic gain. Our objective must be to control the pace of developments so as to maintain the integrity of our approach, and thus our leadership credibility. That means making sure that when we move in one area we can point to as much Soviet movement as possible on our key regional concerns. As we see it, there are only two realistic options.

ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS

Basically, we can deal with the agenda on a case-by-case basis within the context of our priorities and general approach, in the hope that our leverage on the Soviets will grow with time, or we can seek to force results in areas of our choosing which show some promise, and in the sequence most likely to keep our overall approach intact.

Case-by-case steadiness has many advantages. In particular, it would avoid the political risks of taking any new initiatives with Moscow which the other option would entail, and put off the day when we would have to decide what if any credit to give the Soviets for responsiveness on their part.

Simple steadiness also has multiple disadvantages, however. With honorable exceptions our approach has been necessarily but primarily
reactive in this first year, basically a “talk-and-talk” mode, and continuation would leave most of the initiative to the Soviets. And in terms of their perceptions this has two major if alternative possible defects. On the one hand, it would consolidate Soviet hopes that our bark is worse than our bite, and that our economic and Transatlantic difficulties will chivy us back toward “detente” without substantial concessions from them. On the other hand, failing to test the seriousness of Soviet signals on geopolitical issues could consolidate the conviction in some quarters in Moscow that we are not serious ourselves about the need for regional restraint, that we are really driving for “superiority,” and that the USSR must take radical steps to defend its interests.

Result-oriented activism would require us to identify areas where the results we want—restraint and reciprocity—are most likely to be achievable over the next half year, and to make the hard decisions to go after them with the Soviets.

This option differs from “talk-and-talk” in that it would require more positive action and more initiative from us in selected areas on both the pressure and negotiation tracks. To some extent it reverses the pros and cons of the other option. But it would also give the Soviet leadership the test of our real intentions needed to avoid both complacency and dangerous alarmism as the succession proceeds.

At the same time, as a higher-risk approach the option is also demanding in specific ways. The element of strong action it requires—diplomatic, economic, but also possibly military—will frighten our Allies and sectors of our public. And the Soviets can be counted on to fan this fear, and seek to perch even higher on their preferred (and undeserved) high ground as defenders of peace and the political status quo against American adventurism and willingness to destroy the status quo. If we choose to pursue this approach seriously, therefore, we will need to establish ourselves as the real defenders of peaceful change within a flexible, internationally acceptable framework of law and comity. Practically, this means we may suspend agreements and activities, but should not abrogate them; that we should defend the Helsinki Final Act and the Helsinki process, and not denounce them; and that we should denounce Soviet violations of postwar agreements but not the agreements themselves. If the structure of international relations within which peaceful change must take place is damaged or torn down, it must be the Soviets who are—and who are seen to be—responsible, rather than the United States.

ELEMENTS OF A GAME PLAN

I favor an activist approach and a game plan for action in all three areas of the relationship. The initial primary focus is on geopolitical issues, followed quickly by an overlapping additional focus on arms control and bilateral issues coming on line this summer.
If the game plan is moderately successful in its elements and in its sequence, we will have laid the basis for proceeding toward a bilateral summit with our approach and credibility intact. At this point, committing ourselves to a summit would be disastrously premature, since it would bring with it a rush for “results” without any sound policy basis for real results. Most likely it would confirm the Soviet insistence that arms control is “central” and geopolitical worries are “secondary.” We might begin to introduce the idea of a summit into our private discussions with the Soviets, as an added “carrot” for results on our geopolitical concerns. But we must be careful to avoid loose summit talk propelling us toward either the “Spirit of Geneva”—euphoria without results—or the “Spirit of Glassboro”—sourness without results.

—Public Leadership. As a capstone and anchor for the regional/arms control balance during this difficult period, in our public declarations both you and I should register the critical importance of progress on both elements for the constructive East-West relations we seek. Your May speech, in other words, should give due weight to geopolitical issues, alongside arms control; I plan to do the same when I talk.

—Regional Issues. Over the next three months we should focus primarily on this area, beginning with Central America/Caribbean and Afghanistan. We should resist linkage among regional issues, since it leads too easily to spheres of influence, and we should be able to do so successfully, on the basis of our main message that the U.S. will create new realities by solving regional problems in their own terms.

1. Afghanistan. In the wake of Afghanistan Day it is important to keep attention focussed on this issue, and I propose to move forward on the bilateral “experts’ talks” we have been discussing with the Soviets since October in the same timeframe as the START beginning announcement. We would consult carefully beforehand with the Pakistanis, key European Allies and the Chinese, and we would let the news that the experts’ talks are beginning become public in a way that does not make Afghanistan primarily a U.S.-Soviet issue, since the Pakistanis and the non-aligned/Islamic countries should remain out front. We will also make sure we control the agenda and public perceptions of what we are doing. By putting out the news in the same timeframe as the START announcement, we will have given tangible form to the critical policy point that geopolitical issues and arms control are equally central in our approach to the Soviets.

3 Reference is to the so-called Big Four Summit at the Geneva Summit in July 1955.
4 Reference is to the Glassboro Summit in June 1967.
2. Cuba in Central America. You will recall that when Phase I of our Central America game plan was before you, I insisted on how important it was for you to look down the road at the implications, up to and including Phase III. It remains as important today as it was then. We have set in train a process that is potentially explosive, and the policy stakes are very high. The Soviets will not take us seriously in general unless we can follow through at every step in Central America. The covert action program currently underway will raise the political temperature in the area to new levels over the next month. In itself it is unlikely to accomplish much, however. Thereafter I see several possible development tracks:

—In response to Nicaraguan fear, the Cubans could feel impelled to become more heavily involved in Nicaragua, and ship in MIGs, more advisors, or even whole military units. If that happens and we stand back, it will be a major foreign policy disaster: we must be prepared to react, and react strenuously.

—If, on the other hand, the Nicaraguans emerge unified from this test and feel they can manage on their own, there will not be much change on the ground. We will still suffer policy damage, but so long as the Cubans do not become more directly involved, there is a chance of success for our policy over the long haul, provided we remain involved in El Salvador, continue our multilateral efforts, and keep public support for staying the course.

—Whatever development track emerges, we must face the fact that if our negotiating scenario should fail, as it well might, we need to be prepared for the tougher, higher-risk alternative of moving against the Cubans in more dramatic ways, including military action. Once it is apparent that our basic credibility is at stake, we may have no other option consonant with the national interest.

3. Poland. In our public approach and in international fora, we should refocus attention on the real terms of this regional problem: it is the Soviets and Polish military who have made it more dangerous and intractable, and who have the responsibility to put the country on a less dangerous course. Our responsibility is to combine pressure and inducements for them to do so. Hence, we should take care to keep open the option of further sanctions even as we make clear that we are prepared to reverse sanctions and make a major contribution to Polish economic recovery together with our Allies, once the Polish regime has committed itself to real fulfillment of the conditions we have defined. The destruction of Poland’s trade with the West in the wake of sanctions is our major lever for a moderate course. It works both ways: to go beyond talk of debt default would hurt us more than it hurts the Poles and Soviets, but discussing it keeps the issue alive as pressure, and could lead us easily into discussion of debt rescheduling—an inducement—if conditions warrant.
4. Southern Africa. Here we should continue to test the meaning of Soviet “proposals” on behalf of Cuba while proceeding apace with our action track, the Namibia/Angola negotiations. In its own way, the Soviet approach resembles our approach to Afghanistan, and we should be wary of linkage. Our objective should be to secure Soviet agreement not to block the peace process, but also to keep the Soviets out of it until we have a settlement in hand.

During the late spring and early summer, we should add an additional focus on arms control and bilateral issues.

—Security/Arms Control. The Soviet “peace offensive” and our own pressures and interests all point to the need for early forward movement beyond our current firm but low-key approach to arms control. We should accept this, and make it our objective to control the process within our overall policy approach. Hence the initial focus on Central America and Afghanistan, as balance-wheels for arms control movement. But we should also engage now in intensified internal preparations on both arms control and bilateral relations.

1. START. Your personal involvement will be needed if we are to have in hand an agreed, politically rational START opening position which would permit us to begin negotiations this summer. To bring the Allies along on defense measures, to help the INF deployment decision, and to counter the “peace offensive,” we should aim to announce a starting date for START at the earliest reasonable opportunity, and well before the June summits. Negotiations could then begin in mid-to-late June.

2. INF. For the time being we should proceed on our present course, and the last thing we need at this point is more hype in Europe or within the USG on INF. By the fall, however, we will urgently need a political strategy for ensuring deployment in at least the UK, the FRG and Italy, even if the Dutch and Belgians drop out, and a political strategy for repairing the damage if the hemorrhaging goes beyond the point of no return.

3. MBFR. A significant new approach is being prepared with the UK and FRG, and depending on Polish developments, it could be tabled soon.

—Bilateral Issues. Pacing will depend somewhat on the course of the Polish crisis, but in general these issues will need to be dealt with in the summer, before the UNGA opens. Decisions will be needed primarily in the June–September period.

—1. Grains. We will need to deal with extension of the U.S.-Soviet LTA beyond September 30. At this point I am inclined toward simple extension for another year on the same basis (6 mmt. minimum, 8 mmt. maximum without consultations). As the optics will be unfavorable in
Western Europe, the state of play on Poland-related measures will be an important variable regarding timing.

2. **Cooperative Activities.** We are moving to renew our fisheries agreement with the Soviets, but only for one year. It must be submitted to Congress by April 30 if it is not to lapse, and we must therefore propose this solution quickly to the Soviets. It would preserve the advantages our fishermen enjoy under the joint venture provided for by the agreement and signal our commitment to structures, but it would also signal to the Soviets that they are on a short leash until relations improve. The dilemma is typical of bilateral cooperative activities in general, and there will be at least one more test case this summer:

—Our review of activities under the sanctions program is concluding that a strong case can be made that the Space Agreement whose termination was announced December 29 is on balance strongly advantageous, in terms of benefit to programs and scientists, to the U.S. In its way, the sanction is as misguided as its Carter Administration analogue, the Kiev Consulate. If conditions in Poland permit, we should make it the first concrete example of reversibility of sanctions against the Soviets, and negotiate extension of the agreement.

3. **Kiev and New York Consulates.** There is a strong case for reversing a wrongheaded Carter sanction (especially as we commence experts’ talks with the Soviets on Afghanistan) and restarting the process leading to establishment of a U.S. official presence in the heart of the Ukraine. The Soviets are pressing us to fish or cut bait on a fine Kiev consulate building they have prepared for us but we have neither occupied nor made payments on. But there is a downside. The intelligence community is lukewarm in its support for our establishing in Kiev. The FBI was resigned to opening in New York before, but now is opposed to an additional Soviet presence there. We will draw some political heat in any event by a decision to move forward on an Afghanistan sanction, much less after Poland. After considering the pros and cons, I would propose to risk the building by telling the Soviets we would like to keep it, but are not in a position to move forward to negotiations on reopening now.
155. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Alexander Haig’s Memorandum “U.S.-Soviet Relations over the Near Term”.

I enclose my comments on Haig’s memorandum “U.S.-Soviet Relations over the Near Term”.\textsuperscript{2} I apologize for the amateurish format: I had to type it myself.\textsuperscript{3}

Enclosure

Paper Prepared by Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff\textsuperscript{4}

Washington, April 3, 1982

Preliminary comments on Secretary Haig’s Memorandum “U.S.-Soviet Relations Over the Near Term” (April 2, 1982).

The basic theme of this memorandum is that the growing foreign and domestic pressures for US-Soviet strategic arms negotiations before the Soviet Union hasshown restraint in its activities around the globe place at risk our policy of linking these two actions. The Secretary states that there are two options before us in meeting this challenge. We can either deal with our geopolitical disagreements with the Soviet Union case by case, in the hope that somehow this will produce enough positive results to compensate for\textsuperscript{5} START. Or we can force the pace of events that would preserve our policy by giving us (of course, without any guarantee of success) enough so that we can enter START talks without losing face. He himself favors the latter approach, urging commencement of negotiations (at the “expert” level) over Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records, 1983–89, Haig, Secretary of State (4). No classification marking.

\textsuperscript{2} See Document 154.

\textsuperscript{3} On April 8, Poindexter wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “Dick, Judge read this and feels it is very close to President’s thinking. Request you develop this and prepare a memo to Haig from Judge (For the President). John.” See Document 159.

\textsuperscript{4} Secret; Sensitive.

\textsuperscript{5} A handwritten note in the left margin next to “compensate for” reads: “justify commencing?”
and some tough actions in the Caribbean to precede announcement and initiation of START negotiations in June of this year.

Without going into details of the Secretary’s proposals (most of which impress me as sound and realistic) let me raise a fundamental question about the premise which underpins it: that there must be linkage between Soviet restraint globally and progress on arms control. I believe that this approach is basically faulty and if pursued further will land us in the kind of trouble this memorandum addresses itself to, only more so. Only by decoupling arms control from Soviet global actions can we avoid alternative consequences, both of them unfavorable: either being forced to capitulate on our demand for Soviet restraint, or else engaging in adventures to prove that we are not capitulating but the success of which, by the Secretary’s own admission, cannot be guaranteed.

The point is that the nuclear competition and the emotionalism to which it gives rise is unlike any regional, geopolitical issue: it is sui generis. People in the free world are so afraid of the arms race and the risk of nuclear war that they are not prepared to stand up to the Russians on any regional issue—be it Afghanistan, Poland, or Central America—if such resistance seems to enhance the danger of nuclear war. Given this fact, our policy places us at a great disadvantage because the Soviets can always neutralize a public outcry over their actions with a campaign that to resist them risks ultimate destruction of mankind.

It so happens that the public, both here and in Europe, believes (unrealistically, in my opinion) that the mere act of negotiating arms limitations or reductions between the “superpowers” attenuates the arms race and reduces the risk of nuclear war. Given this perception it will not do to say: we are not prepared to negotiate with Moscow on matters of such paramount importance until it satisfies us on matters of secondary importance in selected regions of the globe. This is a losing position. What we ought to do is to say: “Of course, deceleration of the arms race is so supreme an objective that we are prepared to negotiate it at any time, any place even though our adversary behaves in an utterly uncivilized manner.” This will go far toward defusing the public pressures and allow us to cope with the Russians on geopolitical matters at a time and place of our own choosing rather than in order to “prove” that we can enter START negotiations without having sacrificed our principles. To induce Moscow to behave globally, we should use economic, political, and scientific levers which can be very effective but do not become objects of massive public opinion campaigns.

I may also add that the Secretary’s memorandum does not seem to take account sufficiently, in my opinion, of the looming Soviet eco-
nomic and political (succession) crises which are likely to make the
Soviet leadership more open to active initiatives on our part.

Richard Pipes

6 Printed from a copy bearing this typed signature.

156. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, April 5, 1982

SUBJECT

When to Negotiate with the Soviet Union

The Soviet Government engages in negotiations not in order to
promote a peaceful and stable world order or to improve the lot of its
people but in order to derive some concrete political, military or eco-
nomic benefits for itself. Moscow always likes to negotiate with the
West because it feels it enjoys immense advantages over us in two
respects:

1. The Soviet Government has far greater continuity than ours and
therefore a greater store of expertise in international affairs (one only
has to consider that Gromyko has been involved in diplomacy continu-
ously for some 40 years).

2. Negotiations arouse expectations in free societies which enables
Moscow, by influencing Western opinion, to exert pressure on their
opposite numbers for concessions. (S)

Moscow is most likely to negotiate seriously when it feels weak:
either when it is behind us, or we are behind it and making good

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (4/13/82–
4/23/82); Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Pipes. A stamped notation at the
top of the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Reagan initialed the memoran-
dum next to the date. Pipes sent the memorandum to Clark for his signature under
cover of a March 29 memorandum, in which he noted that “It addresses itself to the
question raised by the President back at the NSC meeting of March 25 and at the DIA
briefing on the Soviet economy the following day: ’When is the time to sit down and
negotiate with the Soviets?’” (Ibid.)
progress catching up. Its readiness to engage in effective bargaining is highest when there is a succession crisis in the USSR because, since there is no legal way of one administration taking over from its predecessor, the death or removal of a leader unsettles the whole system of administration and requires a breathing spell in foreign relations. (S)

We should get ready to negotiate a number of outstanding issues with Moscow as soon as Brezhnev leaves office. This calls for us preparing our positions well in advance so that we are not caught by events and are forced to improvise, responding to Soviet initiatives instead of confronting them with ours. Our positions should deal with specifics and not generalities, i.e., they should aim at concrete, mutually advantageous *quid pro quos* rather than at grandiose attempts to settle affairs of the world between us. As the new Soviet administration attempts to establish itself it is likely to be more agreeable to making concessions than at any time since the death of Stalin. (S)

The current economic and imperial crisis of the Soviet regime, acute though it is, does not offer good opportunities for negotiations. The Soviet regime has never made political concessions out of economic considerations: it has made political concessions only to meet its political needs. (S)

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157. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, April 9, 1982

SUBJECT

Soviet and East European Update

*Polish Economy:* Bad and getting worse. Insufficient availability of raw materials and supplies has caused some 40 percent of Polish industrial capacity to be shut down. Light industry has been especially hard hit. For the first time in years there is a surplus of electric power. There is talk of layoffs and an estimated 300,000 Polish workers are said by official Polish newspapers to be threatened with unemployment. High Polish bureaucrats admit both privately and publicly that

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without the lifting of Western sanctions and fresh credits the Polish economy cannot be improved and faces “catastrophe”. There is fear in Warsaw of mass violence caused not by political motives but by anger over the dramatic drop in living standards. (S)

Soviet Union:

Because of personnel shortages, the Soviet Union has altered its student draft deferments, sharply cutting down the number of students eligible for them. (C)

A senior Soviet official told an American executive that because of hard currency shortages, in the immediate future the USSR will have to confine its imports largely to food: even important energy-related projects will have to be delayed. (S)

There are rumors that Soviet authorities have ceased to accept applications from Jews wishing to emigrate. There is a likelihood that Jewish emigration will be completely suspended. (S)

On the succession crisis there is nothing new to report: Brezhnev is suffering from a heart-related complication which has incapacitated him but does not seem to pose an immediate danger to his life. (S)

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158. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, April 10, 1982

SUBJECT

Fisheries Agreement with the Soviet Union

Issue: Should the Governing International Fisheries Agreement (GIFA) with the USSR be renewed? (S)

Facts: The GIFA, signed November 26, 1976, by the United States and the Soviet Union expires on July 1, 1982, and thus, will terminate the ongoing U.S.-Soviet joint fisheries venture. This agreement covers a broad range of fishery-related activities. However, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, all sections of the agreement with the exception of the joint fisheries venture were suspended in January 1980. The

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joint venture entails a delivery of fish by U.S. trawlers to Soviet fish processing vessels. (S)

**Discussion:** As Al Haig’s memorandum (Tab A)\(^2\) indicates, the joint fisheries agreement has been profitable to U.S. fishermen. Last year their earnings from this venture doubled. A renewal of GIFA would entail only a renewal of the joint fisheries venture and would not reinstate those agreement sections affected by the Afghanistan-related sanctions. The agreement, however, should be renewed for only one year on the condition that the U.S. can abrogate this venture at any time, if warranted. The right to terminate the venture will provide us with leverage in the event any further sanctions are contemplated. Thus, as the proposed renewal is short-term, narrow in scope and conditional, it cannot be construed as “business as usual” with Moscow. State, Commerce and various West Coast Senators (Jackson, Packwood and Gorton) endorse a one-year renewal of GIFA. (S)

**RECOMMENDATION**\(^3\)

That you approve a one-year renewal of the Governing International Fisheries Agreement with the USSR, reserving the right to terminate its benefits if warranted. (S)

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\(^2\) Attached but not printed is Haig’s memorandum to Reagan, April 2, on which Reagan signed his approval of a one-year extension of the GIFA.

\(^3\) Reagan initialed his approval.
159. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Al Haig’s Memorandum “U.S.-Soviet Relations Over the Near Term”

Al’s memorandum (Tab A) addresses itself to the question of linking Soviet behavior around the globe with our readiness to enter with the USSR into START negotiations. The basic theme of his memo is that our policy of linkage is coming under increasing strain: public pressures for the opening of START are intensifying while the Soviet Union gives no indication it is willing to moderate its global behavior. This situation, according to Al, confronts us with two choices. We can either try to settle our geopolitical disagreements with the Soviet Union case by case, in the hope that this policy will somehow yield enough positive results to allow us to proceed with START without loss of face. Or else, we can force the pace of events by undertaking actions that will (hopefully) give us enough returns to enter START on our terms. Al favors the second option, urging the opening of negotiations (at the so-called “expert” level) with the Soviets over Afghanistan and some tough actions in the Caribbean to precede the anticipated initiation of START early in the summer. (S)

Much of what Al says is eminently sound but valid questions can be raised about the basic premise of his approach, namely that progress on arms control negotiations must be linked to Soviet global behavior. Two basic arguments can be raised against this approach:

—The nuclear competition between the U.S. and USSR gives rise to an emotionalism which is quite unlike that aroused by any regional issues (Afghanistan or Poland, for example). Citizens of the free world are so frightened of the arms race and the threat of nuclear war that they are unwilling to stand up to the Soviets on regional issues if such resistance seems to exacerbate the risks of nuclear competition and general war.

—Aware of this situation (which it does not confront within its own realm) the Soviet Union is able to intensify international regional
conflicts at its pleasure and then blame the United States for failure to negotiate arms control. (S)

The linkage principle places us in a no-win situation. Under its terms, we are compelled either to capitulate on our demand for Soviet global restraint, or else to engage in adventures and/or dubious negotiations on regional issues (e.g., Afghanistan) in order to prove that we are not capitulating. (S)

The best way out of this unfavorable situation is to decouple nuclear arms negotiations from regional issues, exactly as we have done in the case of INF talks in Geneva. Public opinion in the West tends to believe—realistically or not is another matter—that the mere act of negotiating arms limitations between the so-called “superpowers” restrains the arms race and reduces the risk of nuclear war. We should, therefore, not say: “We are not prepared to negotiate with Moscow on a matter of such overriding importance until it satisfies us on disagreements of secondary importance in selected regions of the globe”. Our position should rather be: “Of course, slowing down the nuclear arms race and the risk of an holocaust is an issue of such gravity that we are prepared to sit down and talk with the Soviets about these matters despite the fact that they behave in an utterly uncivilized manner all over the globe. Our delay so far has been caused by the need to define our position. This work has now been completed and we invite the Soviet Government to meet with us and discuss seriously strategic arms reductions.” (S)

Such a position will go far toward taking steam out of public pressures here and abroad for an automatic “freeze” and “no first use” declaration. It will also enable us to cope with Russian regional challenges at times and places of our own choosing rather than in order to “prove” that we can enter START negotiations without having sacrificed our principles. To induce Moscow to behave regionally, we can have resort to the economic and political levers at our disposal: these can be very effective and yet are not subject to massive public opinion campaigns. (S)

160. Editorial Note

On April 16, 1982, President Ronald Reagan met with the National Security Council from 11 a.m. to 12:05 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House to discuss National Security Study Directive (NSSD) 1–82, on “U.S. National Security Strategy.” NSSD 1–82, which the Presi-
dent had signed on February 5, called for a review of: “Fundamental U.S. national security objectives, regional security objectives, impact of Soviet military power and international behavior on U.S. National Strategy, role of Allies in U.S. National Strategy”, and strategic and general purpose forces, security assistance; and interim goals. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00045 16 April 82) The administration appointed former Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Reed to lead the study. He discussed the first five parts of the study at the April 16 NSC meeting. (Ibid.) The NSC met again from 2:15 to 3:15 p.m. on April 27 in the Cabinet Room of the White House to discuss the remaining four parts. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00047 27 April 82)

On May 20, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 32, which articulated eleven global objectives that would guide the national security policy of the United States, the first three of which were: “To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its allies, and other important countries across the spectrum of conflict; and to defeat such attack should deterrence fail”; “To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the world by strengthening existing alliances, by improving relations with other nations, by forming and supporting coalitions of states friendly to U.S. interests, and by a full range of diplomatic, political, economic, and information efforts”; and “To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces.” NSSD 1–82, NSDD 32, and the minutes of the NSC meetings of April 16 and April 27 are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.
161. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, April 16, 1982

SUBJECT
Extending Brezhnev an Invitation to Meet With You at the SSOD

Your public invitation to Brezhnev to meet with you during the UN Special Session on Disarmament next June\(^2\) raises the question of whether a more formal invitation should be extended through diplomatic channels. Moscow’s extremely cautious public and private response to your offer of a meeting suggests that the Soviets were caught off guard, and that it may be difficult to pin them down unless we extend Brezhnev a direct invitation. Putting your invitation in diplomatic channels would also underscore its seriousness and insulate us against possible Soviet efforts to question the sincerity of your offer.

At the same time, there are a number of good reasons why a formal letter from you to Brezhnev would not be the most effective means of extending the invitation. If, as seems likely, the fact of your letter to Brezhnev became public knowledge, it would inevitably complicate our efforts to manage domestic and allied expectations. Intense speculation about a possible meeting between you and Brezhnev might detract from our effort to keep the immediate focus on your trip to Europe and participation in the Versailles and Bonn Summits. A direct letter from you to Brezhnev might be viewed by the Soviets as an effort to humiliate him and take advantage of Soviet leadership uncertainties by personalizing an invitation that Brezhnev might find it physically difficult to accept.

We might minimize some of these disadvantages if I called in Dobrynin to underscore the seriousness of your invitation and put it on the diplomatic record more formally. The groundwork for such a meeting has already been laid in a recent conversation between Ambassador Hartman and Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniienko.\(^3\) While extending the invitation on your behalf, I would reiterate for Dobrynin the distinction you have already made between the meeting you have proposed and a full-blown U.S.-Soviet Summit.

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Pipes Files, CHRON 04/14/1982-04/19/1982. Secret; Sensitive.
3 Hartman reported on this conversation in telegram 4240 from Moscow, April 8. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820003-0294)
also put Dobrynin on notice that our agenda for such a meeting could not be limited to arms control, and would cover the entire range of U.S.-Soviet issues, including Poland, Afghanistan, the Caribbean, and human rights. I could also suggest to Dobrynin that, should Brezhnev not be able to accept the invitation, an alternative would be another meeting between Gromyko and me. Finally, I would make clear to Dobrynin that we need an authoritative, if informal, Soviet response to your invitation in order to make the necessary preparations.

**Recommendation:**

That you authorize me to call in Dobrynin to extend an invitation to Brezhnev on your behalf for a meeting during the upcoming UN Special Session on Disarmament.\(^4\)

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\(^4\) No recommendation is recorded on the memorandum, but see Document 165.

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162. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State\(^1\)

Moscow, April 19, 1982, 1550Z

4671. Subject: Brezhnev Summit Counterproposal. Ref: Moscow 4629.\(^2\)

1. C—Entire text.

2. Summary. Brezhnev’s “response” to Pravda on the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet summit reflects Soviet perceptions that President Reagan’s proposal for a meeting on the margins of SSOD-II posed a challenge both to Brezhnev’s health and to Soviet policy. The Soviet counterproposal of an October meeting in a neutral European capital meets both challenges: It casts a vote of confidence in Brezhnev’s health and longev-

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\(^2\) In telegram 4629 from Moscow, April 17, the Embassy reported on Minister of Defense Ustinov’s April 16 speech in Sochi, the first speech by a Politburo member since Brezhnev fell ill on March 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820202–0083)
ity, and puts the summit ball back in the American court. In a meeting April 19 with the Ambassador, candidate Politburo member Demichev mentioned in passing that it was not so important whether a summit took place in June or in October; what was important was that it should take place. End summary.

3. One of the key purposes of the Brezhnev statement was to dash domestic and foreign speculation on the Soviet leader’s health and on his viability as a functioning leader. The Pravda “interview” was printed on the front page of all central newspapers, and, judging by the Soviet media handling of past Pravda “interviews,” will be carried on the front page of all local newspapers as well. The suggested October meeting date is sufficiently distant as to commit the Soviets to very little, but at the same time conveys the expectation that Brezhnev will be on the job for the foreseeable future. The fact that the Soviets have suggested a European site for the summit, however, will be read by Soviets as an implicit acknowledgement that the old man is not up to a transatlantic journey.

4. Speculation on Brezhnev’s health has been rampant since the Soviet leader fell ill on March 25. Over the past weekend, rumors were circulating among Soviets all over Moscow that Brezhnev had died. A number of Soviet sources recounting this rumor to Emboffs voiced the possibility that news of Brezhnev’s death is being withheld. One Soviet citizen told us on Saturday that he and several of his friends were expecting the Sunday papers to report Brezhnev’s death. We are still hearing rumors of his death today, despite the summit counterproposal. This climate forms an important backdrop not only to the Brezhnev interview, but also to Ustinov’s remarks in Sochi (reported ref) and to the April 15 press conference staged to deny rumors of Brezhnev’s failing health.

5. Another key purpose of Brezhnev’s proposal of a summit this fall in a European neutral capital was to put the propaganda ball back in the American court. By repeating his 1981 proposal—voiced at the 26th Party Congress—for a Soviet-American summit, Brezhnev claims priority for the idea for the Soviet side. Furthermore, he renews the challenge to the U.S. to join in a high-level dialogue which Soviet propaganda all along has claimed we are avoiding. The statement contains thinly veiled criticism of the way President Reagan broached the subject in his White House press briefing. The Pravda interviewer notes that the President’s remarks on the subject evoked “contradictory commentaries.” Brezhnev agrees, saying that Reagan’s remarks left a “rather diffused impression,” whereas his own statement is “completely clear and definite.”

6. In a meeting April 19 with the Ambassador, candidate Politburo member Demichev mentioned in passing that it was not so important
whether a summit took place in June or in October; what was important was that it should take place. Comment: That Demichev, in a private conversation, should emphasize the importance of a summit’s taking place irrespective of the date contrasts with the public media emphasis on October rather than June. This variance is an additional indication that the public mention of October has the ulterior purpose of reassuring readers that Leonid Il’Yich will still be around six months from now. End comment.

Hartman

163. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, April 24, 1982

SUBJECT

Effect of Hard Currency Shortages on Soviet Bloc Foreign Adventures

Economic stringencies are beginning to produce their first visible effects on Communist Bloc expansionist policies. DIA reports (Tab A) that

—an official of the 10th Directorate (Foreign Military Assistance) of the Soviet General Staff last December has indicated that economic pressures will compel a reduction in the number of Soviet military advisors and instructors serving abroad.

—East Germany is said to be contemplating a 30 percent reduction of its personnel in Ethiopia. (S)

All this suggests how significant the West’s economic and financial pressures are in inhibiting Soviet aggressiveness in the Third World. (S)

Memorandum From Nils Ohman of the Defense Intelligence Agency Staff to Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, April 13, 1982

SUBJECT
Soviet Bloc Reassesses Foreign Aid and Trade

Recent reporting indicates that the USSR, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia are considering measures that would restructure some aspects of their foreign aid to the Third World, as well as trade with the industrial West. The policy deliberations can be linked to these nations’ growing shortages of hard currency—an outgrowth of Poland’s financial crisis—and to the declining growth in their domestic economies.

Last December, an official of the 10th Directorate (Foreign Military Assistance) of the General Staff of the Soviet Ministry of Defense reported that the USSR’s military aid programs were coming under pressure from the ailing Soviet economy and from needs of the armed forces. Consequently, the overall number of Soviet military advisers and instructors abroad might be reduced.

Since January, we have seen similar reports regarding a possible change in East Germany’s aid and trade policies. In response to economic problems, including a growing trade deficit, the East German Government is considering a 30-percent reduction in its technical assistance personnel in Ethiopia; a cutback in imports of Western components needed for East Germany’s military research and development program; and a redirection of trade from financially strapped Third World nations to those capable of paying with hard currency, important energy sources, or raw materials.

Czechoslovakia clearly considered a similar change in its foreign policy. Last September, the Czechoslovak Party Presidium endorsed a decision to reduce aid to Third World nations, a measure designed to alleviate the nation’s financial problems.

DIA COMMENT: We believe these reports accurately reflect the seriousness of the Soviet and East European hard currency situation,

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2 Secret; Noform; Wnintel; Orcon; No Contract. Copied to Poindexter, Shoemaker, and Stearman.
characterized by fewer available Western credits and a diminished ability to generate hard currency earnings.

Poland’s financial crisis has exacerbated Eastern Europe’s hard currency problems in two ways. First, the specter of a Polish default has made the West less willing to extend credit to other East European countries. Second, shortfalls in Polish deliveries of coal and other goods have forced several East European nations to purchase additional supplies from the West, thereby adding to their hard-currency indebtedness.

Overall economic malaise in the USSR and Eastern Europe is another factor aggravating the region’s financial problems. In the USSR, consecutive crop failures and the need to import record amounts of food have severely strained the Soviet hard currency position. In Eastern Europe, falling productivity has limited the flow of saleable commodities to the West, making Western imports required for industrial expansion difficult to finance.

These financial difficulties are likely to persist. Thus, we expect the USSR and Eastern Europe to continue to reassess foreign aid with the Third World and trade with the West in an effort to alleviate their faltering hard currency positions.

Nils B. Ohman
Lt Colonel, USAF
Senior Intelligence Analyst

164. Minutes of an Interagency Coordinating Committee for U.S.-Soviet Affairs Meeting

Washington, April 26, 1982

Overview of U.S.-Soviet Relations

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scanlan drew attention to Leonid Brezhnev’s reappearance at the April 22 Lenin Day ceremonies which had ended weeks of guessing about the Soviet leader’s health and whereabouts. While Brezhnev’s reemergence proved he was still alive, it will not still the speculation over who will be his eventual successor. Chernenko and Andropov are both being touted while Kiri-

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (4/28/82 (4)). Confidential. Bremer sent the minutes to Clark under cover of an April 28 memorandum. (Ibid.)
lenko’s apparent illness appears to have taken him at least temporarily out of the running.

Scanlan noted that the questionable state of Brezhnev’s health may have influenced the Soviet counterproposal of an October summit to President Reagan’s offer to meet with Brezhnev if the latter attends the UN’s Special Session on Disarmament in June. The desire to one-up the President may have been uppermost in the Soviets’ calculation. Brezhnev’s offer is now under study; our response will be determined by events and the character of our dialogue in the coming period.

Preparations are now in full swing for the President’s trip to Europe which will include the Bonn and Versailles summits with our Allies. One of the US’s main goals is to limit subsidized credits and official guarantees to the Soviet Union. Under Secretary Buckley has been deeply engaged in this effort which had recently taken him to Europe again. We hope to have achieved a unified position on this issue before the President’s trip to Europe in June.

Turning to the various geopolitical problems which plague US-Soviet relations, Scanlan said that we have seen no evidence that the Soviets have softened their positions but that we will continue to probe their intentions.

Regarding Poland, we are now waiting to see how Jaruzelski carries through on a pledge to release a “significant number” of detainees by the end of April. The Poles have also stated their intention to lift some aspects of martial law, including the curfew, by that same date. We have sought to ascertain from the Poles what the future role of Solidarity and in particular Lech Walesa will be and have made clear the importance Americans attach to these questions. We have received no indication of what those plans are; perhaps the Poles themselves don’t know how to handle this problem.

In Afghanistan, the Soviets have increased their troop levels to around 95,000 and their spring offensive against the opposition is underway. We have seen no movement on the part of the Soviets to seek a negotiated settlement although we have made clear that we will not acquiesce to their continued occupation. Afghanistan Day and our recently released report on Soviet use of chemical and biological warfare have helped to keep public pressure on the Soviets. Diego Cordovez, the UN Secretary General’s special representative on Afghanistan, recently completed a trip to the area. It is doubtful that he made much headway. The US remains opposed to any efforts which would lend the Babrak regime legitimacy.

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Turning to bilateral issues, Scanlan reported that we had recently responded to a Soviet query on our intentions with regard to the property held for us in Kiev. While we will continue to retain several apartments in the city, the state of our relations would not allow us to sign an agreement which would preserve our rights to a major office and residential complex. Although the Soviets have suggested that we may lose our rights to the complex, we are prepared to live with that possibility.

In line with our policy of preserving cooperative programs with the Soviets with clear benefit to the US, we have notified the Soviets of our decision to extend for one year without modification the Governing International Fisheries Agreement (GIFA). We also advised them of the deletion of two ports (Seattle and Honolulu) to which they have access under the agreement. We are prepared to discuss alternative ports with them but they have not yet suggested any.

In the arms control field, we are now in the final stages of our interagency review of START. We hope talks may begin this summer. The INF talks are now in recess until May.

Scanlan concluded his remarks with a reference to the Soviet treatment of the Falkland Islands dispute which he termed unhelpful and opportunistic. Although President Reagan had clearly advised the Soviets to “butt out” we suspect they are busy figuring out how to “butt in”.

**US Human Rights Policy**

Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams described our human rights policy under the Reagan Administration. We are more interested in actual results than in speeches which merely sound good. Tactically, we prefer quiet diplomacy in those areas where we have some diplomatic clout and are achieving a measure of success. The Administration is also concerned that publicity could result in the destabilizing of regimes whose successors could prove to have worse human rights records. El Salvador is a clear case in point; Vietnam and Iran serve as past examples. If quiet diplomacy fails, then we can employ overt tactics such as votes in the UN and international banking institutions and the denial of bilateral military and economic assistance.

Abrams posed the question of how we can be most effective in influencing the human rights behavior of the Soviet Union. Since we obviously do not have the diplomatic leverage which we possess in such countries as the Philippines or Korea, we must rely more on public discourse. Our public criticism serves two parallel purposes. One extrinsic effect is to underscore for other countries the contrast between East and West. For example, little in Europe is known of the more unsavory aspects of Castro’s regime in Cuba. We can expect to
have an effect within the Soviet Union as well since the Soviets are sensitive to public opinion and particularly to European opinion. The Soviet decision to allow the emigration of Sakharov’s daughter-in-law, Lisa Alekseyeva, is a case in point. Although the Soviets did not respond to private approaches, public demonstrations on her behalf had the desired effect.

Abrams stressed his conviction that a moral component of US foreign policy is an inescapable fact of American politics. While we have no illusions about our ability to change Soviet or other societies, our political goal is to help those individuals, whether religious or political dissenters, who seek to establish an island outside of government control.

Abrams advised exchange visitors to make their human rights concerns known to their Soviet hosts. They could do this most effectively by arguing that exchanges with the Soviet Union cannot be insulated from political relations and that the US, and in particular the scientific community, will have to draw away from exchange programs in the face of human rights abuses. He felt that we should encourage all those involved in exchange programs to meet with dissidents in the Soviet Union although an obvious concern would be to avoid placing either American or Soviet participants in danger.

Exchanges

Scanlan noted that all representatives had received a copy of the review of the bilateral exchange agreements which had been undertaken after the imposition of martial law in Poland. Our conclusion was that the level and content of exchange activity are appropriate to the current state of US-Soviet relations. The review, including COMEX’s contribution indicates that the exchanges have provided significant benefit to the US. He urged that all representatives study the document and provide any comments to the Office of Soviet Affairs (Hurwitz).

Scanlan reported that the Soviets had recently reversed their long-standing position on the bilateral agriculture agreement by signalling their willingness to resume activity under the agreement which they had previously refused to do in the absence of a high-level Joint Committee Meeting (prohibited by us as a post-Afghanistan sanction). The State Department is now working with USDA on how to respond to the Soviets.

Scanlan confirmed that we will be sending a note to the Soviets informing them of our non-renewal of the Energy Agreement. The return of the US magnet provided in the context of the Magnetohydrodynamics (MHD) program is a separate issue which we are discussing with the Department of Energy. Metzler (DOE) noted that the future of the MHD program was itself unclear and subject to budgetary considerations.
165. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan  \(^1\)

Washington, April 27, 1982

SUBJECT

Handling the Question of a Possible Meeting with Brezhnev

Despite Brezhnev’s weekend deflection of your offer of a June meeting, I believe that we should proceed with the strategy outlined in my memo to you of last week.\(^2\) If you authorize me to call in Dobrynin, I would reiterate your offer of a June meeting and express regret that the Soviet side seems unprepared to take up your proposal for expansion of high-level U.S.-Soviet dialogue at the time of the UN Special Session on Disarmament. In response to Dobrynin’s likely effort to push Brezhnev’s counteroffer of a full-fledged Summit in October, I would state that we will consider the proposal in light of events and the substance of our dialogue in coming months. Finally, I would suggest that, if Brezhnev does not intend to accept your invitation for a June meeting, Gromyko and I should meet during the SSOD.

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\(^1\) Source: Reagan Library, Pipes Files, CHRON 05/01/1982–05/04/1982. Secret; Sensitive.

\(^2\) See Document 161.

166. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev  \(^1\)

Washington, May 7, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to address a question of critical importance to our two countries and to the world—negotiations to reduce the threat
of nuclear war and the burden of nuclear armaments. It is entirely appropriate that this question has been one of the central issues in the U.S.-Soviet relationship throughout the post-war period. Indeed, the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons imposes on our two countries both the practical necessity and the moral imperative to do everything in our power to reduce and even eliminate the possibility of their use in war. This has been the thrust of my country’s approach to nuclear arms control negotiations over the past thirty-five years.

As we look back over almost three decades of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear arms control, we can identify a number of notable achievements, such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the ABM Treaty. These agreements have laid the basis for new efforts in the nuclear arms control process. We can take considerable inspiration from the statesmanship of leaders in both countries, which made these agreements possible. At the same time, we must also recognize that certain international events, such as the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, have undermined prospects for reductions of nuclear arms.

We now stand at another historic juncture in the effort to reduce the threat of nuclear war and the burden of nuclear armaments. One of the highest priorities of my Administration has been to undertake a thorough review of these issues in order to ensure that our approach to the problem of strategic arms reductions is fair, equitable, and understandable to the American people. We have proceeded deliberately to avoid the mistakes of the past. We are now prepared to move forward. Therefore, I propose that U.S.-Soviet negotiations on reductions of nuclear arms begin in Geneva by the end of June, and that we immediately begin exchanges in diplomatic channels to fix an exact date.

Our objective in the negotiations will be substantially to reduce the numbers and destructive potential of strategic nuclear weapons, in the framework of equal and verifiable limitations on both sides. As you know, it is my view that our previous efforts at limiting strategic offensive arms did not adequately meet the standards of reductions, equality, and verifiability. I am particularly concerned by the failure of previous agreements sufficiently to limit the deployment of those systems that, because of their capability to destroy the other side’s land-based systems, heighten the risk of nuclear war. An important task in START must be to address more effectively the problem of these destabilizing systems.

In pointing out these deficiencies, I do not mean to suggest that there is nothing positive that can be learned from previous SALT agreements. It does mean, however, that we must go well beyond those efforts in START. If we set our sights too low, we will fail to make a meaningful contribution to the goals of enhancing strategic stability
and reducing the risk of nuclear war. In such circumstances, it will be
difficult to obtain the support of the American people and Congress
for a new strategic arms agreement. We owe it to both our peoples,
and to the World at large, to do better.

I believe that the goals set forth above provide a positive and
constructive basis for progress in the forthcoming negotiations. At the
same time, the lessons of the past teach us that the arms control process
cannot be insulated from the overall state of relations between our two
countries and the international atmosphere in general. This is a reality
of political life.

Our two countries have begun a dialogue on a number of sensitive
regional problems. What is now needed, if we are to move toward
resolution of these problems, is concrete action on the part of the Soviet
Union indicating that it is prepared to exercise restraint. Only in this
way can an environment conducive to progress on strategic arms reduc-
tions be created and sustained.

In closing, I would like to reiterate that my Administration has no
higher priority than reducing the threat of war. I will personally spare
no effort to achieve this objective, and I hope that I can count on a
similar personal commitment from you. Nothing less will meet the
obligations imposed upon us by the responsibilities of leadership in
the nuclear age.2

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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2 In telegram 5621 from Moscow, May 8, Zimmermann reported that he had deliv-
ered Reagan’s letter to Korniyenko at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Department
of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820004–0478)
167. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, May 11, 1982, 2317Z


1. (Secret)—Entire text.

2. Summary: Secretary called in Dobrynin May 7 to inform him of President's intention to begin START negotiations, as well as to clarify our position on an eventual summit. Secretary balanced the current focus on START by stressing the geopolitical issues on which we seek Soviet restraint—Afghanistan, Poland, Falkland Islands, and Southern Africa. Secretary also informed Dobrynin of great concern of administration and American people over decreased level of Soviet Jewish emigration, noting that emigration and situation of Soviet Jewry were critical to overall U.S.-Soviet relationship. At the end of the meeting, Dobrynin raised two bilateral issues: Joint fishing agreement and consulates. Copy of Secretary's talking points being pouch to Embassy. Highlights of meeting given below. End summary.

3. START and Summit: Secretary outlined the contents of the President's letter to Brezhnev on START, that Embassy Moscow would deliver it in Moscow on the President's behalf. Secretary told Dobrynin we would be in touch shortly regarding the modalities for commencing START negotiations. On the summit issue, Secretary said the President's suggestion for a meeting with Brezhnev in New York still stood, but if Gromyko led the SSOD delegation, the Secretary would look forward to meeting with him. Asked about a formal summit in October, Secretary said in principle we had nothing against an eventual summit, provided conditions were right.

4. Geopolitical Issues: On Poland, Secretary emphasized that dialogue, not confrontation, was the only solution to the Polish crisis, that recent demonstrations only underlined the need for a process of national reconciliation, and that further regime brutality could sour the atmosphere of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Dobrynin said the Soviet side saw things differently; if the U.S. would ease up on Poland, the U.S. would be surprised at the response. The Secretary indicated that the Polish leadership was well aware that we were prepared to be forthcoming on economic relations once our three conditions were met.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. Drafted by Combs; cleared by Holmes, Bremer, Goldberg, and in S/S–O; approved by Eagleburger.

2 See Document 166.
On South Africa, the Secretary said we were fully aware of Soviet efforts to undermine our peace efforts, and gave Dobrynin a non-paper (being pouched) on this score. Dobrynin claimed the Soviet side also wished to see the problems of that region solved, and said the Soviet side might be able to assist if it knew more precisely what the U.S. was up to. The Secretary responded that, as he had made clear to Gromyko, we hoped for Moscow’s cooperation and were prepared to discuss the problem further with the Soviet side. On Afghanistan, the Secretary said this issue remained a major impediment to progress in the relationship. Dobrynin remarked that the Soviet side was still awaiting a U.S. response on experts’ talks; the Secretary said we had the matter under active review and would be back in touch on this shortly. On the Falklands, the Secretary underscored our earlier warnings that the USSR remain uninvolved (Dobrynin predictably insisted that the Soviets were uninvolved).

5. Jewish Emigration: The Secretary said that Soviet Jewish emigration had come to a virtual halt, and this was of great concern to the administration as well as to the American Congress and people. Dobrynin replied that this issue should not be placed at the center of U.S.-Soviet relations. The Secretary emphasized that no matter where one placed the issue, it remained critical to the overall relationship.

6. Bilateral Issues: Dobrynin raised the recent U.S. decision to extend the West Coast cooperative fishing venture, saying that “top levels” in Moscow took note of a statement by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that this USG decision should not be read as a political signal. Dobrynin ridiculed this statement, remarking that since the agreement was of substantial economic benefit to the U.S., it was hard to see how any sort of “signal” was involved. Dobrynin also raised the consulates issue, noting that the Soviet Embassy had recently been informed that the Soviet-owned consulate building in New York could not be occupied by even one or two Soviet families, while the U.S. was free to use its apartments in Kiev. The Secretary indicated that the U.S. decision on joint fishing spoke for itself, and that he would look into the consulates question.

Haig
168. Editorial Note

On May 9, 1982, President Ronald Reagan delivered the commencement address at his alma mater, Eureka College. In it, he spoke about his May 7 letter to Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev (see Document 166), and his direction that Secretary of State Alexander Haig pursue “the initiation of formal negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms, START, at the earliest opportunity. We hope negotiations will begin by the end of June.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, volume 1, page 585) Over the span of a month, Reagan met three times with his National Security Council to establish U.S. negotiating positions on the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START): on April 21, in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 10:30 to 11:40 a.m. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00046 21 April 82); on May 3, in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 9:45 to 10:52 a.m. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00049 3 May 82); and on May 21, in the Cabinet Room of the White House from 9:45 to 10:45 a.m. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00049 21 May 82) On May 14, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 33, which pronounced the START goal “to enhance deterrence and to achieve stability through significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems, ballistic missiles, and especially ICBMs, while maintaining an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, underwrite our national security, and meet our commitments to Allies and friends.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, 1981–1987, NSDD 33) Minutes from the NSC meetings of April 21, May 3, and May 21, as well as NSDD 33, are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume XI, START I, 1981–1991.
169. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, May 10, 1982

SUBJECT

Afghanistan “Experts’ Talks” with the Soviet Union

With Afghanistan Day\(^2\) well behind us, we must now decide what we should do to keep Afghanistan front and center as a geopolitical issue, while maintaining the support of the many other countries opposing Soviet aggression there. This is particularly important as we move to commence START negotiations, since we must leave no doubt in anyone’s mind that we are not retreating toward an arms control-centered relationship with the Soviets and easing up on our geopolitical concerns.

I believe that one aspect of our effort to keep Afghanistan up front should be an intensification of our ongoing dialogue with the Soviets on what would be required to achieve a political solution, especially withdrawal of Soviet forces. We are moving to increase pressure on the ground and ensure that the costs of the occupation to the Soviets remain high. To balance this in a way that makes clear both our concern for Afghanistan and our willingness to talk as well as fight, we should take a step forward in our direct exchanges with the Soviets, and let it be known that we are doing so.

In these exchanges we have made clear that we are determined to talk only if the Soviets are willing to address the issues seriously. The possibility of U.S.-Soviet “experts’ talks” has also arisen. Such talks would permit us to probe further whether there is real willingness on Moscow’s part to move toward an acceptable political settlement. I am not overly hopeful that Soviet willingness to engage in such talks reflects a decision to seek a way out of their stalemated situation in Afghanistan, but our exchanges thus far justify further probing.

I propose to go to the Soviets to start such talks. If they agree, as I expect they will, we will background the media that we are intensifying the dialogue on Afghanistan. We will do this at roughly the same time we announce a beginning to START. While we would not directly

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link the Afghanistan “experts’ talks” to START, the roughly parallel timing of the two steps would speak for itself.

A decision to begin more detailed “experts’ talks” with the Soviets would involve some risk to our relations with our partners on the Afghanistan problem. Thus, it will be important for us [to] contain these risks by making clear that these talks are an intensification of our existing contacts with the Soviets in diplomatic channels, rather than a new departure reflecting our abandonment of the UN’s and EC–10’s efforts to achieve a political settlement. At the same time, by demonstrating our own commitment to a political settlement based on Soviet withdrawal, we might also shore up Pakistani determination not to allow the current UN initiative for indirect talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan to lend legitimacy to the Afghan puppet regime.

Our intention would be to carry out the talks through our respective embassies in Washington and Moscow, rather than in a separate forum as in the INF talks. We would also make clear that the fact of our talks with the Soviets will not affect other aspects of our Afghanistan policy or our broader Southwest Asia strategy. Indeed, we would handle these talks as only one element of an ongoing strategy to sustain and intensify pressure on Moscow for withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Before approaching the Soviets to suggest that more detailed, exploratory talks begin, we will conduct appropriate consultations with the Pakistanis, as well with our closest European Allies, the Chinese and the ASEAN countries, who see a close parallel between Afghanistan and the situation in Kampuchea.

**Recommendation**

That you authorize us to proceed with the steps outlined above on the question of intensified bilateral talks with the Soviets on Afghanistan.³

³ Reagan did not approve or disapprove this recommendation. In an unsigned and undated memorandum to Haig, Clark wrote: “The President has read your memorandum of May 10 requesting authorization to proceed with ‘expert’ level talks with the Soviet Union on Afghanistan. Given the importance of such an initiative and its potential ramifications, the President requests that you convene a SIG to discuss this issue and submit to him an interagency approved position.” (Reagan Library, Pipes Files, CHRON 05/27/1982–05/31/1982)
170. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, May 14, 1982

SUBJECT

Summits with Soviet Leaders

Soviet leaders are keen on summits with U.S. Presidents and for good reason. They feel confident they will come out ahead in such encounters because

— their government has greater continuity than ours and therefore greater store of expertise in international affairs;
— well-publicized summits arouse expectations in free societies which enable Moscow, by manipulating Western opinion, to exert pressure on their opposite numbers for unreciprocated concessions. (C)

They further favor summits because they afford them the opportunity to size up the President as a person and as a statesman. (C)

Experience indicates that U.S.-Soviet summits, from Roosevelt’s Yalta to Nixon’s Moscow, have generally turned out to the disadvantage of the United States. Still, inasmuch as every U.S. President since 1933 has personally met with his Soviet counterpart, it will be difficult for you to reject a summit altogether. A full-fledged summit, however, should take place only if the following conditions are met:

— Moscow demonstrates by deeds rather than words that it is prepared to negotiate seriously.
— The groundwork is well prepared beforehand so that you discuss concrete agenda items and do not become embroiled in longwinded ideological disputes of the kind that Khruschev lured Kennedy into in Vienna in 1961 and which invariably end in the hardening of respective positions. (C)

A good model to follow in this matter is President Eisenhower who had given it much thought. In 1953, after Stalin’s death President Eisenhower came under great pressure from our Allies (especially Britain) and the State Department to hold a summit with G. Malenkov, Stalin’s immediate successor. In his memoirs, Eisenhower tells why he resisted these pressures. He reviews the disappointing experiences of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt with summit meetings and says: “I was . . . not willing to meet with Communist leaders unless

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there was some likelihood that the confrontation would produce results acceptable to the peoples of the West”. (C)

“... I developed a stock answer to any question about a possible Summit. I would not go to a Summit merely because of friendly words and plausible promises by the men in the Kremlin; actual deeds giving some indication of a Communist readiness to negotiate constructively will have to be produced before I would agree to such a meeting.”

He was rewarded for his firm stand with a Soviet troop withdrawal from Austria. (C)

This is a good principle to keep in mind as the Russians increase their pressure for a summit. It would be best to have no summit this year: but if one is to be held the Russians should be required to demonstrate their good will by such actions as acceptance of our “zero option”, withdrawal from Afghanistan or lifting of the martial law in Poland. (C)

171. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, May 22, 1982

SUBJECT
Brezhnev’s May 20 Letter to You

Brezhnev’s letter (Tab A) is a reply to your May 7 message and repeats some of the salient points of his May 18 Komsomol Congress speech. He says your May 9 speech causes “apprehension” and even doubts as to US seriousness in approaching negotiations.

He criticizes negotiations on “any one component” with “no connection to others”—probably referring to bombers and cruise missiles—and claims that the “substantial” reductions we propose would be substantial only for the Soviet side. Brezhnev again called for preserving “positive” achievements so far—meaning the essential elements of


2 See Document 166.

3 See Document 173.
SALT II. He also repeated his call for a quantitative freeze on strategic arsenals and limiting modernization as soon as START begins. This does not seem to be a precondition for talks, but only to “create favorable conditions” for them. Brezhnev agreed that the time and venue for START be discussed in the “near future” through diplomatic channels.

Brezhnev felt compelled to come back at you on the matter of restraint in international affairs by stating that the Soviets expect restraint on our part. While noting “incessant (US) attacks” regarding the Soviet Union, he claimed to be seeking neither sharp polemics nor confrontation. The tone of the letter is cool and correct by Soviet standards.

Tab A

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan

Moscow, May 20, 1982

Dear Mr. President,

With regard to your message to me of May 7, 1982 I would like above all to emphasize that the Soviet Union—the correspondence between us being a clear testimony thereof—has been steadily and persistently calling on the United States to agree on joint measures aimed at effectively bridling the arms race, first of all, in nuclear weapons.

We have been proceeding from the premise that only by moving along this path is it possible to achieve the objective of preventing a nuclear war, which would become an irreparable tragedy for all mankind.

Life itself puts questions of limitation and reduction of strategic arms in the center of Soviet-American relations. We have always favored increasingly radical steps in this direction. And it is not our fault that the strategic arms limitation process was interrupted for a long period of time.

References made to this or that event on the international scene cannot justify the lack of readiness on the part of the U.S. to resolve the issue which you yourself justly call one of critical importance for

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4 Secret. A typewritten note at the top of the page reads: “Unofficial Translation.”
5 Reagan underlined the previous two sentences and wrote in the right-hand margin: “? History does not confirm.”
our two countries and the world at large. And the special responsibility of our two countries and their leaders in this respect is certainly not a thing that has emerged today. That responsibility existed in equal measure one year ago, a year and a half ago. On our part we always proceeded from this premise.\(^6\)

If the U.S. side has now come to understand the need to resume negotiations on the problem of strategic arms, that in itself is a positive fact.

Our position of principle in favor of continuing such negotiations is surely well known to you. I can reaffirm that it has not changed. We agree that specific questions concerning the organizational aspect of those negotiations, including the time and venue for holding them, be discussed in the near future through diplomatic channels.

Speaking of the coming negotiations, one can be certain that a great deal of effort will be required to recoup for the time lost and the opportunities missed. But that must be done. Helpful in this respect can be, first, the preservation of whatever positive has already been achieved through the joint efforts of our two countries in the area of strategic arms limitation and, second, a genuinely serious willingness to seek a mutually acceptable agreement commensurate with the scope and significance of the truly historic task that stands before us.

In other words it is important that the negotiations be set on the right course from the very beginning, that they be conducted constructively without one side attempting to gain advantage in them at the expense of the other.

I deem it necessary to say it with all clarity, since the position with which the U.S., judging by your speech of May 9, is approaching the negotiations cannot but cause apprehension and even doubts as to the seriousness of the intentions of the U.S. side.\(^7\)

After all, it is obvious that to isolate just any one component out of the totality of the strategic systems and to make it a subject of negotiations with no connection to the others, as you suggest, would inevitably lead to a distorted picture of the balance of forces between the sides. Thus, the “substantial” reductions the U.S. side is talking about on the basis of the picture it has itself presented would naturally be substantial only for the Soviet side.\(^8\)

\(^6\) Reagan underlined the previous two sentences and wrote in the right-hand margin: “How about the last 35 years?"

\(^7\) Reagan underlined this paragraph and wrote in the right-hand margin: “He has to be kidding.”

\(^8\) Reagan underlined this sentence and wrote in the right-hand margin: “Because they have the most.”
Only one thing would be the result of such a one-sided approach—an upsetting of the existing balance of forces\(^9\) and a breach of that very stability which the U.S. side is allegedly so anxious to ensure.

There should be no misunderstanding, Mr. President: this is not a realistic position, not the path toward agreement. Besides, as you know, we are not the only ones who hold such a view.

We believe it is difficult to argue against the fact that, when it comes to matters touching upon national security, neither side can allow a tilt to be made in favor of the other and to the detriment of its legitimate interests. We are realists and do not expect that the United States would accept that. To an equal degree, it cannot be expected of the Soviet Union either. I consider it necessary to state this directly, with nothing omitted.

In your letter you mention that a possible agreement should be understandable and acceptable to the American people. But this does not make any more convincing the arguments for such an approach which is clearly unacceptable to the USSR, to the Soviet people.

Taking this opportunity, I would like to say that I found it necessary also to express publicly in my speech on May 18, 1982 at the Komsomol Congress, our attitude toward such a one-sided approach and our opinion regarding the principles on which a genuinely fair and equitable agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms should be based.

In doing so, I also stated the readiness of the Soviet Union to reach agreement with the United States to the effect that right now, as soon as the negotiations begin, the strategic nature of both countries be frozen quantitatively and that their modernization be limited to the utmost. Such agreement would, in our view, create favorable conditions for the negotiations and facilitate achieving the objectives therein. I would ask you, Mr. President, carefully to consider this proposal.\(^10\)

I am convinced that the American people would understand and support an agreement between the USSR and the USA which would be based on the principle of equality and equal security, and which would meet the objective of mutual limitation and reduction of strategic arms, just as they have supported the previously reached agreements that you cited. Soviet people—and you can take my word for that—will resolutely support such an agreement.\(^11\)

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\(^9\) Reagan underlined “of the existing balance of forces” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “He means imbalance.”

\(^10\) Reagan underlined the two previous sentences and wrote in the right-hand margin: “I have and it is an apple for an orchard.”

\(^11\) Reagan underlined this sentence and wrote in the right-hand margin: “How will they know? They haven’t been told the truth for years.”
And the last point. In our correspondence I have already spoken about to whom an appeal for restraint in international affairs should be addressed. Since you raise that subject again, I shall only say, without repeating myself, that it is precisely of the U.S. that we, and indeed other countries, expect restraint and a constructive approach both to issues of bilateral relations and to fundamental international problems, above all to those related to limiting the arms race and strengthening common security.

We, of course, are giving and will continue to give a proper evaluation to unacceptable manifestations in U.S. policy as well as to the incessant attacks made regarding the Soviet Union. But we, on our part, have been seeking neither sharp polemics nor confrontation.

You may be assured, Mr. President, that a readiness to deal on an equal basis, to respect the interests of each other, and to develop mutual trust, will meet a most positive response on the part of the Soviet Union.

We will, as before, continue to do all we can so that people can look into the future with confidence and calm, without fearing for the threat of war which is not needed equally—I repeat, equally—either by the Soviet or the American people.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

12 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. To the right of Brezhnev’s printed signature, Reagan wrote: “He’s a barrel of laughs.”
172. Letter From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, May 22, 1982

Dear Bill:

When we spoke last week you encouraged me to share with you my thoughts on U.S. foreign policy. I am taking advantage of this invitation to convey to you my sense of alarm over the possibility that the U.S. may, in effect, suspend its current sanctions against the Soviet Union. Nothing that has occurred since President Reagan assumed office fourteen months ago seems to me so fraught with dangers to national security and to the political fortunes of the President.

Let me briefly recall how these sanctions had come into force. When on December 13th the Jaruzelski junta declared war on its own people we at once pinpointed the Soviet Union as the main culprit and set in motion a series of economic sanctions as punishment. We explicitly warned at the time that unless the situation in Poland improved significantly, further sanctions would follow. In reality, neither happened: the situation in Poland has not improved, nor have we introduced additional sanctions. For a while we contemplated extending our sanctions extraterritorially to U.S. subsidiaries and licencees abroad but this was not done because it was decided such a measure would cause too much friction in the alliance. Instead, we were to explore the possibilities of inter-allied cooperation on restricting credit flows to the USSR. The purpose of the Buckley Mission was to ascertain how far the Allies would be willing to go in cooperating with us on credit controls in order to avoid the extension of U.S. sanctions extraterritorially. Its results were meager but at least major friction in the alliance was avoided.

Now, I understand, the Department of State proposes that we significantly dilute the sanctions by exempting items contracted for before December 30, 1981 in return for allied cooperation on credit controls (that had been originally proposed as a quid pro quo for the abandonment of extraterritoriality on our part). This would enable General Electric to sell the rotors that seem essential if the Siberian Pipeline is to be completed on schedule.

I am convinced that such a move would be catastrophic. We can live with the Siberian Pipeline, but we will find it hard to live down

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the loss of credibility. Twice in three years we have introduced sanctions against the Soviet Union: first for the invasion of Afghanistan, then for martial law in Poland. The Afghan sanctions, which were centered on the grain embargo, were rescinded by President Reagan—a move which, whatever its economic rationale, encouraged cynicism in Europe about our motives and made it that much more difficult to secure European cooperation in December 1981. If we now dilute to the point of emasculation the sanctions imposed in December 1981, without the Soviet Union or Poland having met our stated preconditions for such action, we will destroy once and for all any credibility of the policy of economic sanctions. In fact, we will have given up using economic leverage to influence Soviet behavior. Please consider what this will mean for our relations with friend and foe alike:

—Our Allies will dismiss any future pressures we may want to exert on them to react to Soviet aggression outside of Western Europe and confine themselves to verbal condemnation: we will only confirm the argumentation of those among them who argue we are an impulsive people who need to be humored but must not be followed.

—Conservative Republicans and Democrats alike will be dismayed; American liberals will be gratified but they are so strongly opposed to the President’s domestic programs that they will still refuse him their support.

—The Soviet government will conclude that President Reagan has no staying power and that his anti-Communism is (as some of them have argued all along) mainly rhetorical: such a perception will surely have immense bearing on Soviet calculations in planning future aggression (e.g. against Iran or Pakistan) as well as on Soviet negotiating strategies in INF and START talks.

Of course, it is said that we would be only exchanging one set of sanctions for another. But a realistic appraisal of Europe’s trade relations with the USSR must lead one to the conclusion that there is virtually no chance of effective credit controls being enacted. The Allies regard trade with the Soviet Bloc as essential to their economies. The Germans, in addition, view trade—and the credits which make it possible—as critical to the maintenance of working relations with East Germany. I am persuaded that any credit accords we will obtain in exchange for lifting the sanctions will be essentially cosmetic in nature.

We have basically two and only two levers to use toward the Soviet Union: the economic and the military. If we drop the economic lever (as, in effect, we will be doing if we follow State’s advice) we will have no choice but to rely on the military one. In other words, as we abandon economic pressures in the face of Soviet aggression we will, of necessity, have to resort to military moves which will increase the likelihood of confrontation and conflict. Unless we are prepared to accept Soviet
global hegemony—which I am sure none of us do—giving up economic sanctions will force us unto dangerous paths. This would be particularly regrettable now that the Soviet Union faces an unprecedented economic crisis and is more than ever vulnerable to various economic pressures.

For all these reasons, I urge you strongly to oppose State’s proposal. Yours sincerely,

Richard Pipes

2 Pipes signed the letter “Dick” above his typed signature.

173. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, May 24, 1982

SUBJECT
Secretary Haig’s Memo on President Brezhnev’s Komsomol Speech

Attached for your information is a memo from Al Haig summarizing the Department of State’s assessment of President Brezhnev’s START and INF statements (Tab A), in Brezhnev’s May 18 speech to the Komsomol.2

The speech took a predictable posture in its critique of the U.S. position and in advocacy of a freeze. Nevertheless, as Al’s memo points out, it “constitutes a relatively mild and constructive-sounding reply” to your May 9 speech.


Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan³

Washington, May 19, 1982

SUBJECT
THE BREZHNEV KOMSOMOL SPEECH

Brezhnev’s speech is clearly aimed at public opinion in the United States and especially Western Europe. It emphasizes grand gestures, both in START and INF, but gives little insight into the Soviet negotiating approach. It nevertheless constitutes a relatively mild and constructive-sounding reply to your Eureka speech. Brezhnev’s major points and our comments follow.

START

Brezhnev proposes a prompt interim quantitative freeze and qualitative restraints on strategic nuclear weapons. Playing to the nuclear freeze movement, this proposal is a logical extension of Soviet proposals for an INF freeze. It does not specify the units which would be frozen or the way in which modernization could be limited. We can expect Brezhnev’s call for a strategic weapons freeze to feature prominently in Soviet propaganda.

Concurring in the need for substantial reductions, he welcomes US willingness to negotiate on strategic arms and says the talks should begin immediately. He gives no signal on a date or venue, but I expect to hear from the Soviet side through diplomatic channels in the near future.

Brezhnev predictably criticizes your START proposals as facilitating a quest for US military superiority and jeopardizing Soviet security. These criticisms fall short of rejecting the US proposals, although the Soviets will clearly seek to broaden the focus of START negotiations well beyond the US proposals when talks begin.

He proposes banning or severely restricting the development of new types of strategic weapons. While this posture has public appeal, it also probably results from the Soviet desire to restrain US technology, particularly development of the D–5.

He proposes three general principles for successful strategic negotiations: the pursuit of actual limits and reductions, not camouflage for a

³ Secret.
continuing buildup; respect for each other’s legitimate security interests and the principle of equality and equal security; and preservation of “everything positive” which has been achieved earlier. Brezhnev stopped short of mentioning SALT II.

INF

Brezhnev pays more detailed attention to INF than to START and says that “the key task today (in the quest for peace) is to lower the nuclear confrontation in Europe.”

Brezhnev expresses readiness to consider deeper INF reductions than the two-third cuts the Soviet Union had previously proposed. The meaning of this will have to be explored in the INF negotiations.

He reports reduction of a “considerable” number of INF missiles. These are presumably obsolete SS–4s and SS–5s undergoing normal retirement.

He announces that “no medium-range missiles will be additionally deployed in places from which both the FRG and other countries of Western Europe could be within their reach.” We believe that the Soviet moratorium offer of 16 March included SS–20s at some Asian bases within range of Western Europe. If this is true, he is making explicit an aspect of their original offer, but in so doing he admits the validity of our position that limits on missiles “in Europe” alone are inadequate.

He confirms that the Soviet INF freeze “envisages” termination of preparation for missile deployments, including construction of launch sites. This clarification is aimed at hampering our own site preparations, and it responds to US criticism that construction was continuing at some sites even after the moratorium. Very recent intelligence indicates ongoing construction at SS–20 sites, and we will watch closely to see if it stops after the speech.

Calling our desire for a US-Soviet agreement on global INF limitations “absurd,” he announces that the question of missiles in the Eastern part of the USSR could only be addressed in negotiations “with those in whose hands are the nuclear means which are opposed by our missiles.” Without calling for Asian INF negotiations involving China, Brezhnev says that the USSR “does not object” to such negotiations. Soviet INF negotiators will presumably now use this line in rejecting our global approach.
174. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, May 24, 1982, 10:30–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Review of December 30, 1981 Sanctions

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan
Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige
Secretary of Energy James B. Edwards
Counselor to the President Edwin Meese III
Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, USUN
Chief of Staff to the President James A. Baker, III
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs William P. Clark
Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones
Chief of Staff to the Vice President Admiral Daniel J. Murphy
Deputy Attorney General Edward Schmults
Deputy United States Trade Representative, Ambassador David Macdonald
Dr. William Schneider, Jr., OMB
Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology James Buckley
Under Secretary of Defense Fred C. Ikle

Observers
Under Secretary of Commerce Lionel Olmer
Mr. Marc E. Leland, Treasury
Lt. General Paul F. Gorman, JCS
Mr. Richard G. Darman, White House
Admiral John M. Poindexter, White House
Colonel Michael O. Wheeler, Staff Secretary, NSC
Mr. Norman Bailey, NSC
Mr. Henry Nau, NSC
Mr. Richard Pipes, NSC (Notetaker)

Clark: Mr. President, this is the time and the place to further consider our sanctions of December 30. The question is whether they should be maintained, expanded or rescinded as we approach the Versailles Conference. Jim Buckley is present here, awaiting further instructions. Secretary Haig, would you please present the State Department’s view.

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Pipes Files, CHRON 05/27/1982–05/31/1982. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. All brackets are in the original.

2 A reference to the G–7 Summit, to be held June 4–6.
Haig: Mr. President, as you will recall, you have decided to hold in abeyance the extraterritorial application of sanctions in order to give Jim Buckley the opportunity to see if a mechanism to restrict the flow of government guaranteed credits can be put in place. He and I have worked with the Europeans on this matter. We have not made an explicit offer of a deal, but we have told them that we would be flexible on existing contracts if a mechanism similar to COCOM could be put in place to control the flow of credits for the remainder of this century. Most European countries are very supportive and so are the Japanese. The most negative response comes from the French who claim that they have a private arrangement with the Soviet Union which precludes such measures. There is a problem with the rotors for the Siberian pipeline, but the Europeans are determined to go ahead and find alternate sources if we give them no choice. Cheysson suggested that they would be flexible on this matter, however. This Thursday [May 27] Jim Buckley will have further meetings with the Europeans. I suggest that we make the Europeans a specific, rather than an implicit, offer. The Europeans realize that we are prepared to suspend extraterritoriality if we obtain in return good and hard commitments on the pipeline issue. The first leg of the Siberian pipeline is a fait accompli: whether or not we help, we cannot prevent its completion. Our leverage applies only to the future. I suggest that we ask Jim to tell the Europeans we are prepared to be flexible on sanctions if they support credit controls and promise to limit future pipeline construction: that is, that they not build a second leg of the Siberian pipeline. They also should be prepared to limit their purchases of Soviet fuel in the future. Then, after the Summit, we should go back and take a look at the whole issue of sanctions because there are serious doubts as to whether they are effective and whether they do not punish us more than the Soviet Union. A good case can be made that they do.

In addition, there is a peripheral question of lesser magnitude. It involves the Japanese participation in the Sakhalin project. The Japanese require critical drilling equipment, worth about $2.0 million, which they can obtain only in the United States. The Japanese must know before the end of the month whether this equipment will become available to them or they will be in deep trouble with the Soviets. The Soviets threaten that, if they do not get it, they will go elsewhere. We must be consistent. Painful as it may be, we should let the Japanese obtain this drilling equipment, if they give us in return firm support on credits and energy.

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3 A reference to a Soviet-Japanese agreement to drill for oil on the Soviet island of Sakhalin using Japanese equipment in exchange for oil exports to Japan at a reduced price.
Casey: I have difficulty in understanding what sort of a deal we could obtain from the Allies on long-term energy projects. We believe that the probability of the completion of the first leg of the Siberian pipeline is only about 85 percent.

Haig: We think it is 100 percent. The United States should be constructive. I have talked to the North Sea energy producers and they think the development of this source is very viable. It will provide business for us and for the Europeans. However, we should move fast.

Carlucci: We disagree in general with the State Department’s position. We concur that the Sakhalin project is part of an overall problem and that if you give in to the Japanese you will jeopardize the sanctions as a whole and open us up to European pressures. This is no time to lift the sanctions. Martial law continues in Poland and we should continue our pressures. Al Haig is right that our pressure will cause the Europeans to look elsewhere and that GE jobs will in effect be exported to France, but the alternative is to lift the sanctions entirely and this is not the time for that. Credit controls are fine, but we seriously doubt if anything tangible can be obtained on this issue. Should the Siberian and Sakhalin pipelines be built, this will be as important in the long run as are credits. The pipeline is by no means set, many Europeans have doubts about it. The CIA estimates that the construction of the rotors by Alsthom-Atlantique will push up the price. It is true that we cannot stop the Siberian pipeline, but we can delay it. Some Europeans are beginning to worry whether the construction of the Siberian pipeline will not preempt the development of North Sea oil resources.

Baldrige: I am not speaking for any business constituency, but I am convinced that the sanctions won’t work in the sense that we want them to work, that is to delay the pipeline construction. The Russians will have many delays in any event. It is unlikely that the pipeline will be completed before 1986. I support the position of the State Department, but I believe we should not make specific promises until we have had a chance to agree with the Europeans on alternate sources and credit restrictions. What we will lose in sanctions will be well worth the gains attained by this strategy. As concerns Sakhalin, we have seen some movement from the Japanese on credit restraints. In general, the Japanese have been cooperative even though there is evidence that they have backdated their Komatsu contracts. I have mixed emotions on the Sakhalin project, but if we can get help from the Japanese on credits and a promise of no further Komatsu sales, then it may be well worth it to let them have what they want.

Murphy. When the Vice President was in the Far East, he was approached on the Sakhalin issue and asked whether we could be helpful. The Vice President would agree more with Al Haig and would
concur with his position if we can get commitments on credit restraints or, better yet, an agreement on this subject. On the Siberian pipeline, the Vice President would be torn between the two opposite positions, but he would be inclined more toward the position held by Al Haig.

Regan: We should keep the two problems [the pipeline and credit restraints] separate. If I were you, Mr. President, I would not make any decision today. Let us see what Jim Buckley will accomplish on the 27th on the issue of credits. After that we can give attention to the pipeline. We should send a letter to the heads of state urging an agreement on limiting credits to the Soviets. If we get concurrence on this, then this issue can be removed from the agenda of the summit. If the Japanese feel that they have to go ahead, let them, as long as they keep the downpayment to 40 percent. But don’t let them have the equipment unless they agree—they are desperate for time. I think we can let the GE rotors go but not until we have obtained a real commitment on limiting purchases of gas and the development of the North Sea. As concerns credits, this is not a big deal. There are only $400–$500 million of export subsidies a year. Let us ask the Russians to put up 30 percent instead of 15 percent. The French say they have a protocol with the Russians, but no one has seen it. They claim they are committed in it until 1985 to go on 15 percent. Their credits are mainly government backed. Private sources charge more than the government. By placing the Soviet Union in the top bracket, all one got was a raise in interest rates from 11-½ to 12-½ percent. We are really not talking about an awful lot in restraining credits. It will cost the Russians something, but not bring them to their knees. In sum, I urge that a letter be sent to the heads of state, tied to the Buckley mission, to get an agreement. Then we can talk about the pipeline after the summit.

Clark: What should one tell Buckley?

Regan: Push as hard as you can. If we trade, make sure we get something for what we give up.

Haig: This is precisely what we propose, except we would prefer to call in the French Ambassador and write to Mitterrand. It is not necessary to write to the other European heads of state because they are already on board. Hence, the President need not write to everyone. But on Thursday, Jim has to be specific rather than general. The French do not want the summit mucked up.

Buckley: I feel we’ve made a lot of progress yesterday, except for the French. We have secured agreement on a mechanism, but I have not been able to give the Europeans a quid pro quo. We are getting more vibrations on the rotors. We could offer them the rotors. If I have authority, I would have something more concrete to give. The French do not want Versailles to get bogged down in East-West controversies.

Baldrige: The French want specific commitments, but if the French say no to credit controls, do we apply extraterritoriality?
Buckley: Yes, this will have to be our position.

Baldrige: In other words there will be no extraterritoriality if we get concessions [on credit restraints]. We will still keep the sanctions at home. If your mission fails, then we will apply extraterritoriality. This gives you leverage.

Buckley: It has been implicit all along that the President can extend the sanctions extraterritorially. Sanctions will still apply to new contracts.

Casey: Europe will depend for 20–25 percent of its energy resources on the Soviet Union. If Soviet energy supplies are fully developed, then whoever sits where you are sitting now, Mr. President, ten years from now will confront a situation where Europe obtains 50 percent of its gas supplies from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union at that time will earn 80 percent of its hard currency earnings from gas sales. Any leverage we have should be used because credit controls are not adequate. It is true that the pipeline cannot be stopped, but we can delay it and make it more costly. We should aim at a swap: develop North Sea resources and give up the pipeline. I certainly agree with Don Regan that no decision should be made before the summit. Also, we should not relax the sanctions imposed on Poland, where the situation has gotten worse. Norway has great potential to supply energy. It is critical that we do what we can to restrict long-term dependency on Soviet supplies. Credit restraints are nowhere near adequate compensation.

Jones: The Joint Chiefs are concerned over controversies in the Alliance: controversies over such issues as nuclear strategy and the presence of troops in Europe. This should be a time of healing at Versailles. We prefer that no pipeline be built, but if we try too much at the summit, we may get nothing. We need a successful summit at Versailles.

Macdonald: Brock feels, as does Baldrige, that our first objective should be to convince Europeans to get alternate sources of energy. This objective cannot be achieved by technology restrictions. The latter penalize us.

Kirkpatrick: I would like to say that there is a great deal of criticism in France of the gas deal, even in the Socialist Party. The critics agree that anything that can be done to delay the pipeline and develop North Sea resources would be to the good. In other words, we have support inside France. More importantly, I believe that to lift sanctions would be political dynamite. On four specific occasions, Mr. President, you have publicly committed yourself to take stronger measures if there is no easing of the situation in Poland. There has been no easing of the situation there and now we may retract the sanctions. You have been criticized for being too weak. We would be very vulnerable. To permit
the rotors to be built abroad would leave us open to the charge that we are exporting U.S. jobs.

Schmults: This is a bad time politically to lift the sanctions. Europe should be passive on the Siberian pipeline and develop closer contacts with Norway.

Haig: All this is good stuff. No one is happy with the pipeline: we have been arguing against it for 17 months, but now you have hard choices. British and other European firms can no longer wait to fulfill existing contracts. You may end up where the Europeans will develop alternatives and you will put U.S. manufacturers out of business. All this for an enterprise that is already set in place. When you hit a mule with a baseball bat, he will start kicking. The contracts have been signed and there is no use talking about them. [Turning to Casey.] Why do you say that the credit mechanism means nothing? It does. COCOM has for many years meant nothing but Jim Buckley has put some teeth into it after Poland. We are in a cooperative mood. We want something similar for credits. It would be a major advantage to have a credit control mechanism in place. It will not only affect money but also improve cooperation. We should tell the Europeans to put their money where their mouth is.

Buckley: What I want meets Bill Casey’s objections: a commitment to build no second pipeline and exploration of Norwegian resources. But we must bear in mind that the latter will take ten years.

Casey: I believe that unless we can come to an energy and credit agreement with the Europeans on the basis of their own self-interest it won’t work and won’t mean too much anyway. There can be no deals on this matter.

The President: I will not decide on this matter today, but I will tell you how I feel in a manner that perhaps will indicate that I lean one way rather than the other. I felt all along that we imposed the sanctions because of Poland and that credit controls were to be a quid pro quo for our not applying extraterritoriality. Now it looks as though we are backing off. I am feeling myself like that mule who is ready to kick. How much do we have to give up to get a harmonious meeting at Versailles? What is it worth to go to Versailles? All you get is some jet lag . . . We said there would be more punishments coming and here Walesa is still in jail and we are already talking about relaxing the sanctions. We will lose all credibility. We talk well, but the Europeans will always back off. The Soviet Union is economically on the ropes—they are selling rat meat on the market. This is the time to punish them. The Europeans should tell the Russians to ease up in Poland, relax martial law, release Lech Walesa. We are not able to afford politically to relax. The Europeans should have a bit of guts. We should tell them: we will help you with North Sea energy resources—O.K. have your
pipeline, but no second pipeline, and develop Norway. I had to swallow
hard on the sanctions. I care for the U.S. unemployed. How are we
going to explain that nothing has improved in Poland, but that business
is business? We have arguments on our side. Why don’t we provide
the leadership and tell the Europeans who is the enemy—it is not us.
We are willing to help the Russians if they straighten up and fly right.
We want deeds and they can begin with Poland. We don’t even wait
for the finale on the credits and are ready to give up.

Buckley: But, there is a quid pro quo.

The President: But this is for extraterritoriality. What happens to
our promise that we shall do more nasty things? The Europeans are
in a better position because they do business with the Soviet Union:
let them tell the Russians we want action on Poland.

Baldrige: On the quid pro quo. I do not agree with Bill Casey that
credit restraints are not significant. They are more significant than
restraints on manufactured goods. Today you can always obtain tech-
nology in two years or so, but credits cover the entire economy. Control
on credits will hurt the Soviets more. This, however, may be difficult
to explain politically.

The President: I agree. Yes, our sanctions are a leaky sieve and if
credit sanctions are imposed, they will have to pay hard cash. Here
they are vulnerable. Moscow has to hold out its hand.

Clark: Unless there is something further, we will now adjourn. In
sum, there is no decision to be taken, but a strong direction has been
indicated. Please hold all this in the family.

The meeting adjourned at 11:30 a.m.
175. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

Washington, May 25, 1982, 2327Z

143520. Subject: Soviet Charge’s May 25 Call on Deputy Secretary Stoessel.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. Begin summary. Calling on instructions May 25, Soviet Charge Bessmertnykh registered Soviet non-acceptance of U.S. conceptual approach as sole basis for beginning START negotiations and then proposed that negotiations begin in Geneva June 29, with announcement June 1. (We are staffing further discussion of modalities and this info is FYI only.) Bessmertnykh made further instructed comments, keyed to Secretary’s May 7 talk with Dobrynin, on Poland, the South Atlantic, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and the summit prospect, and there was an additional instructed comment on the Middle East. Stoessel read and gave Bessmertnykh text of nonpaper warning against Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Falklands crisis. EUR Assistant Secretary-designate Burt asked about Haig-Gromyko meeting at SSOD; Bessmertnykh said he expected to be back in touch soon. End summary.

3. Soviet Charge Aleksandr Bessmertnykh called at his request at 1000 hrs May 25 on Deputy Secretary Stoessel to make instructed comments on START, geopolitical issues discussed by Secretary and Dobrynin May 7, and Middle East. EUR AS designate Burt participated; EUR/SOV Director Simons was notetaker.

4. START substance. Bessmertnykh said he was instructed to provide additional considerations on the essence of the Soviet approach. Reading from notes, he said Brezhnev’s May 20 letter to the President sets forth the Soviet position of principle re negotiations on limitation and reduction of strategic arms. As should be clear from that letter, the Soviet side cannot agree that U.S. proposals on the substance of the problem, as formulated in the President’s May 9 speech, are of a realistic nature and that they are feasible and suitable as a subject of negotiations.

5. The Soviets have the definite impression, as do others, that the administration is approaching the negotiations with a clearly unacceptable, one-sided position, Bessmertnykh continued. It must be under-

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2 See Document 168.

3 See the attachment to Document 171.
stood that to declare a slogan of radical reductions is not enough, and that what is required is a basis for negotiations that would ensure achieving lower levels of opposing nuclear forces—and the Soviet side is for this—but without upsetting the existing balance or disrupting strategic stability. In other words we must be strictly guided by the principle of equality and equal security and must take each other’s interests into account.

6. The Soviets are convinced, he went on, that the interests of both sides would be served if negotiations were set on the right track from the very beginning, if they opened a realistic way to reach mutually acceptable agreement. It would be a mistake to believe that one side is more interested than the other in reaching such an agreement. The issues involved are too great and sensitive for that. Their resolution will determine not only the state of U.S.-Soviet relations in the future but also the prospects for preserving peace throughout the world. The Soviets believe negotiations should be conducted in a serious manner and not serve as a cover for a continued arms race.

7. START substance—U.S. response. Stoessel said we would study the Soviet comments carefully. As he had said before, we believe the U.S. proposals set forth in general terms by the President are reasonable and form a good basis for talks leading to reductions. The President also promised we would study all Soviet proposals. Burt noted the President had also stated nothing is excluded from the negotiation. Our focus is on the most destabilizing systems, but we are willing to look at other approaches too.

8. Stoessel asked if the Soviet statement concerning the basis for negotiation meant the Soviet side rejects the U.S. approach. Bessmertnykh specified that it meant the U.S. approach cannot be considered the sole conceptual basis for talks. It is not, however, a precondition for talks; he also had instructions concerning modalities. The Soviet statement means that each side has now made clear what it thinks the basic approach to talks should be. The Soviets do not accept that the U.S. line set forth by the President and elaborated by the Secretary is a feasible approach to negotiations; it is too one-sided.

9. START modalities. Proceeding to his instructions on “organizational aspects,” Bessmertnykh said:
—On venue, the Soviets find Geneva acceptable, and think it can be considered agreed.
—On time, the Soviets propose June 29, Tuesday.
—On “personalities,” the Soviet delegation will be led by Ambassador Karpov, known to the U.S. side from SALT, and he assumed the U.S. delegation would be led by General Rowny.
—On characterization, the Soviets propose “negotiations on limitation and reduction of strategic arms.” This reflects the subject more
completely and more accurately, Bessmertnykh argued, since there are qualitative as well as quantitative limitations involved.

—On announcements, the Soviets propose a joint announcement June 1. Bessmertnykh commented he hoped the U.S. side would be back soon on this question, since the practice had been to inform the Swiss through instructions to our two Ambassadors in Switzerland beforehand.

10. START modalities: U.S. response. Stoessel said we welcome the specific Soviet ideas and will respond quickly. Burt would be in touch soon concerning the announcement. (FYI, we are staffing the next steps concerning the announcement, and this report on discussion of modalities is for your information only. End FYI.)

11. Bessmertnykh then proceeded to make instructed comments on the regional issues raised in the Secretary’s May 7 meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin.

12. Poland. Bessmertnykh said the Soviets would like to call our attention to the fact that the Polish leadership has taken a number of steps to normalize the situation. To turn a blind eye to this fact would be to ignore the actual situation in Poland deliberately. There is also evidence that there are forces which would like to complicate the normalization process artificially and to aggravate the situation both in and around Poland. The Polish authorities have facts concerning the involvement of the United States in this regard. If the U.S. side really wishes to see the situation in Poland calm down, it will have to renounce efforts to interfere in Polish affairs completely.

13. Poland—U.S. response. Stoessel replied that we reject the assertions about U.S. involvement in the type of activity mentioned, and continue to hope for progress toward stabilization and reconciliation. We had noted the steps taken, but our hopes had been dashed by the brutal repression of the demonstrations of May 13. This had caused great concern here. It was not a mark of progress. But we still continue to hope that Poland will return to the objectives Jaruzelski had identified after December 13: Release of the prisoners and resumption of dialogue with the church and the labor union.

14. Bessmertnykh rejoined that normalization is going on, in industry, in the flow of money back to Western banks and last, in transport. The situation is difficult, but normalization is on track. Stoessel concluded that too many Poles, including Walesa, are still locked up.

15. Afghanistan. Bessmertnykh said that re a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan, the Soviets understand that the U.S. expressed interest in an appropriate exchange of views between the two countries at the level of experts. The Soviets have agreed to that, and the Secretary noted he would be addressing the issue concretely. The Soviets believe the matter is now up to the U.S. side.
16. Afghanistan—U.S. response. Stoessel said we have the topic under active consideration.

17. South Atlantic. Bessmertnykh affirmed that the Soviet Union is not involved in developments in the South Atlantic, but this does not mean it is indifferent to what is going on in the region. The conflict around the Falklands/Malvinas is becoming increasingly dangerous due to British actions, he said, and creates a threat to peace and international security. The Soviet Union will determine its policy on this issue accordingly, including its policy in the United Nations. It believes that attempts to draw the issue into the context of East-West relations serve no useful purpose either for Soviet-American relations or for settlement of the conflict.

18. South Atlantic—U.S. response. In reply Stoessel read and presented Bessmertnykh with the text of a non-paper (text at conclusion of this message).

19. South Atlantic—discussion of Cuban role. With regard to the Cuban aspect mentioned in the U.S. non-paper, Bessmertnykh said he had two comments:

—If the U.S. is concerned with or has problems with Cuban activities, this should be the subject of discussions with the Cubans. (Stoessel interjected that they are well aware of our views.)

—Did the U.S. have facts, evidence, indications concerning Cuban involvement? These would be useful in clarification. Burt replied that we have clear indications the Cubans would like to become involved. Bessmertnykh said he would transmit the U.S. demarche to Moscow but concluded by urging the U.S. again to talk to the Cubans directly if it had problems.

20. Southern Africa. Bessmertnykh affirmed that from what the Secretary had said concerning a settlement it follows that the U.S. side sees a resolution of the Namibia problem to be gained by imposed conditions unacceptable to SWAPO—the only legitimate representative of the Namibian people—through the contact group (CG). There is no ground whatsoever, in the Soviet view, for the CG to determine precisely what serves the interests of the Namibian people, as is the case with the proposed electoral system. SWAPO has presented clear and unambiguous reasons why such a system cannot be accepted, and they are fully supported by the Front-Line states. The Soviet Union shares the SWAPO position, but it resolutely rejects the charge that the SWAPO position resulted from Soviet influence.

21. If the U.S. efforts are reduced to safeguarding the interests of only one side in a settlement, Bessmertnykh continued, that approach has no promise. And the Soviets cannot be expected to contribute. The Soviets have given the U.S. their views on how to achieve a just
settlement in Namibia, and also to assure the security of Angola. They have not yet received an answer, although one was promised after AS Crocker’s trip to Africa. The question therefore arises as to whether Washington is still interested in a dialogue with the Soviets once favored by the U.S. side too.

22. Speaking personally, Bessmertnykh said the basic issue is that the Haig-Dobrynin talk made clear the U.S. blames the Soviet Union for SWAPO’s rejection of the electoral proposal, and this is simply not true.

23. Southern Africa—U.S. response. Stoessel said that in general we are interested in continuing our contacts and discussions on Southern Africa; we want to stay in dialogue. Neither the U.S. nor the contact group has any idea of imposing a system in Namibia. We had made some proposals. SWAPO had not accepted them, and this was regrettable because they were reasonable proposals. We are now considering next steps with regard to procedures. But our intention is to agree with SWAPO, and not to impose anything. We are also working within the context of the UN resolution. We have made progress in bringing the SAG along; our approach is not one-sided. We want a solution, and we hope the Soviets also have a favorable attitude toward one.

24. Bessmertnykh said the Soviets had seen reports of Crocker’s discussion with South African officials in Geneva and the CG meeting in Paris, and reports that we were proceeding with “stage II” even though “stage I” is not completed. Stoessel replied that these issues were still under consideration, and that more information could be made available by Crocker or by Burt; we would be glad to be in touch.

25. Middle East. Bessmertnykh said he wished to discuss one issue not treated in the May 7 Haig-Dobrynin meeting, and draw the Secretary’s attention to the “aggravating” situation in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon. The danger of an explosion there is growing, and it still has the same source: Israel. If urgent measures are not taken the situation could get out of control with unpredictable consequences. The U.S. and USSR acting together could do a lot to prevent it.

26. Middle East—discussion. Stoessel asked if the Soviets had anything specific in mind. Bessmertnykh said they do not; rather the whole area is cause for concern, and we could do important things together. Stoessel said the U.S. is also concerned and sees the situation as dangerous. We do not accept the statement that Israel is the source; the situation is much more complicated. We are communicating with all parties and urging restraint and respect for the ceasefire. In general it is being observed. We agree the situation is dangerous, and all parties should work to emphasize to the parties involved that restraint is necessary. Bessmertnykh noted that one reason why the ceasefire is holding, however precariously, is PLO restraint in face of Israeli raids.

27. U.S.-Soviet summit. Bessmertnykh said the Soviet side had noted the Secretary’s explanations, on the President’s instruction, con-
cerning a summit. They understand the President also believes it advis-
able to hold a thorough, full-scale meeting with careful prior prepara-
tion. The U.S. side is also aware of the Soviet suggestions on timing
and venue for such a meeting. The Soviets consider it is up to the U.S.
to say the next word. Stoessel said we are considering the question,
and will be back in touch in due course.

28. Haig-Gromyko meeting at UN SSOD. Burt asked whether Bess-
mertnykh had anything to say concerning this possibility. Bessmert-
nykh said the Soviets had registered the Secretary’s remarks on televi-
sion May 23 that the U.S. side welcomed the prospect. However, he
had nothing at the moment concerning the composition of the Soviet
SSOD delegation. He would pass on our comment to Gromyko and
be back as soon as he had a reply. Stoessel confirmed that we would
welcome such a meeting, and invited Bessmertnykh to be in touch
when he had further information.

29. U.S. non-paper on the Falklands. Begin text:

Recent events in the South Atlantic crisis are of great concern to
the United States Government and to all other governments which
seek a peaceful resolution of the dispute. The intensification of military
operations in the South Atlantic has already imposed a high human
cost on both Argentina and the United Kingdom. We are also concerned
that the conflict may widen, thus raising broader implications for peace
and security in the region and globally.

As has been made clear in previous contacts with the Soviet side,
our objective throughout the crisis has been to bring the conflict to a
peaceful resolution at the earliest possible time with minimum loss of
life and property. This was the basis of the mediation effort undertaken
by Secretary Haig, and the U.S. support of UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 502. At the same time, our policy has been based on the principle
that the first use of force is not a legitimate means of resolving interna-
tional disputes. We continue to believe that this approach can serve as
the basis of an international agreement to bring hostilities to a close
and assist the parties in moving toward a negotiated resolution of
their differences. The United States Government will continue to do
everything in its power to achieve that objective.

In our view the South Atlantic crisis is not an East-West issue. At
the same time, we have communicated with the Soviet side in order
to ensure that there is no misunderstanding of our position. As we
have previously made clear, involvement by the Soviet Union in the
South Atlantic crisis would further inflame the situation and would
have the most serious and far-reaching impact on the entire range of
our bilateral relations.

We have discussed our concerns over Cuban activities in the hemi-
sphere and beyond. The Soviet Union is aware that Cuban activities
have serious implications for our bilateral relations. It should thus be clear that involvement by Cuba in the crisis would raise grave dangers and have a severe impact on efforts to achieve a more stable and productive bilateral relationship.

The Cuban Government should be made to understand that if it takes actions with regard to the Falklands dispute that are inimical to our interests, the United States will act as necessary to protect those interests. End text.

Haig

176. Note Prepared in the Situation Room¹

Washington, May 26, 1982

Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade’s Urgent Requirement for Funds

A reliable clandestine source reports the chairman and deputy chairman of the Soviet State Bank believe the Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade (VTB) does not have sufficient money to meet all its commitments.

- The officials felt that was the reason all the Soviet-owned banks abroad were urgently required to search for funds to transfer to VTB.
- The Soviets hope the situation will improve as the year progresses, decreasing the need to impose drastic cuts on lending to other CEMA countries. (S)

In a possibly related matter, the U.S. grain consultation team recently concluded two days of talks with the Soviet team and found particularly interesting Soviet indications that financial resources and financing were a current problem. Additionally, Soviet grain officials in Moscow recently told a U.S. businessman that the USSR did not have hard currency for grain purchases at this time, allegedly because the new allocation of funds had not been approved.

- However, a U.S. businessman claims Western banks still consider the Soviets good credit risks for grain financing. The banks are cur-

rently considering Soviet requests that their present loan terms be
extended.² (C)

² Poindexter bracketed the final two paragraphs and wrote at the bottom of the
note: “Judge, We must be very careful on this. Our position may be a bit of a dichotomy.
We have grain to sell and are willing to sell and even willing to extend credit. The
Europeans have industrial products and are willing to sell and finance. We are asking
them for credit restrictions. I’ve asked Henry to do a paper for President.”

177. Editorial Note

On June 2, 1982, President Ronald Reagan flew to Paris, where he
attended the Versailles G–7 Summit from June 4 to 6. On the morning
of June 7, 1982, President Reagan flew from Paris to Rome, where he
met with Pope John Paul II. That evening, he flew from Rome to
London, where he met with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
Queen Elizabeth II, and delivered a speech to the British Parliament.
(Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)

In his speech to Parliament at Westminster, June 8, Reagan para-
phrased former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill: “From Stet-
tin on the Baltic to Varna on the Black Sea, the regimes planted by
totalitarianism have had more than 30 years to establish their legiti-
macy. But none—not one regime—has yet been able to risk free elec-
tions.” He went on to cite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and
support for martial law in Poland. “In an ironic sense Karl Marx was
right,” Reagan went on to say. “We are witnessing today a great revolu-
tionary crisis, a crisis where the demands of the economic order are
conflicting directly with those of the political order. But the crisis is
happening not in the free, non-Marxist West, but in the home of the
Marxist-Leninism, the Soviet Union. It is the Soviet Union that runs
against the tide of history by denying human freedom and human
dignity to its citizens. It also is in deep economic difficulty. The rate
of growth in the national product has been steadily declining since the
fifties and is less than half of what it was then.” Reagan cited several
other examples of the lackluster economic performance of Communist
countries. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, volume I, pages 742–748)

While the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization
allies supported nuclear arms reductions talks, Reagan commented
that did not mean they accepted the permanence of Communist govern-
ments: “Some argue that we should encourage democratic change in
right-wing dictatorships, but not in Communist regimes. Well, to accept this preposterous notion—as some well-meaning people have—is to invite the argument that once countries achieve a nuclear capability, they should be allowed an undisturbed reign of terror over their own citizens. We reject this course." The President then outlined an agenda to promote freedom and democracy. "What I am describing now is a plan and a hope for the long term—the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people." He concluded the speech with a call for a "crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation," and movement "toward a world in which all people are at last free to determine their own destiny." (Ibid.) Reagan’s Westminster speech is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

On June 9, Reagan flew from London to Bonn, where he met Federal Republic of Germany Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, addressed the Bundestag, and attended a meeting of the North Atlantic Council. On June 11, he flew from Bonn to West Berlin and back, before returning to Washington. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary). Reagan described highlights from the trip in a long diary entry, back-dated June 2, which closed: “While in Bonn learned the House had passed a budget—we’re on our way. Also learned though that Israel had invaded Lebanon. I’m afraid we are faced with a real crisis.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Volume I, page 136)
Washington, June 9, 1982

His Excellency Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America

I deem it essential to turn to you in connection with the very dangerous situation in Lebanon and its vicinity. Israel is continuing large scale aggression against a sovereign country, a member of the UN. Blood is being shed, thousands of people are tragically perishing, the peaceful population of the country—Lebanese, Palestinians—are experiencing unbelievable suffering.

In essence, Israel is pursuing a regular war against Lebanon. Israel began this war with an act unprecedented in its impudence and contempt for the norms of the international community: its troops have crossed the lines of the armed forces of the UN, by this act demonstratively trampling the flag of this organization. Israel continues and intensifies its aggression, despite the unanimously adopted resolution of the Security Council demanding the termination of military actions and the immediate and unconditional removal of Israeli troops from the territory of Lebanon.

In this manner there has been created an intolerable and most dangerous situation.

The Israeli assault places in doubt the fate of Lebanon as an independent and unitary state. The actions of Israel which directly threaten the security of other Arab states are pregnant with (the possibility) of a further spread of the crisis situation, the broadening of the military conflict and the involvement in it of other countries. This is a fact which no one can escape.

The situation which has arisen in this region demands the adoption without delay of measures to carry into practice the resolution of the Security Council. It is the duty of states, and, above all, of the permanent members of the Security Council, effectively to apply themselves to this task. Israel must know that it cannot count on anyone’s tolerance and support.

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290378, 8290381). Top Secret. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the message: “Translation by Richard Pipes.” Moscow transmitted the letter to Washington between 0402 and 0416 EDT. (MOLINK Message Chronology, June 9; ibid.)

2 On June 6, Israeli troops invaded Lebanon.
I turn to you Mr. President in view of the well-known fact that the United States has at its disposal major possibilities of influencing Israel. This, of course, places on the United States a particular responsibility for the termination of aggression against Lebanon and the removal of Israeli troops from its territory.

In connection with the events in Lebanon and its vicinity I must state: The Soviet Union watches with utmost attention developments of the situation in this region which is located in the immediate proximity of our southern borders and where we have no shortage of friends. You will understand me correctly, Mr. President, if you proceed on the assumption that the Soviet Union will act in accordance with this and be guided by the interests of Soviet and international security.

It cannot be denied that unless the war of Israel against Lebanon and the UN is immediately stopped the consequences may prove unpredictable. We expect the United States to undertake active steps to have Israel without delay stop its aggression and fulfill the decision of the Security Council.

Leonid Brezhnev

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

179. Message From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Washington, June 9, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

I have carefully studied your message of June 9 on the situation in Lebanon.

We are as concerned as you are at developments there, and I agree that the situation is grave. Our position is clear. Like the Soviet Union,

In that regard, I have just learned that there has been a major escalation in the fighting between Israeli and Syrian forces. I have, therefore, called on the parties to agree to a ceasefire to take effect at 6:00 a.m. local (Lebanese) time, June 10. I urge you to use your strong influence on Syria, as I am using my influence in Israel, to bring about immediate acceptance of that proposal.

Ambassador Habib, during earlier extensive discussions with Prime Minister Begin, made abundantly clear to the Government of Israel that in the view of the United States:

—Hostilities must cease forthwith,
—Every effort must be made to avoid escalating the current hostilities and widening the conflict,
—Israeli forces must be withdrawn from Lebanon,
—The unilateral use of force to change the situation in the area is unacceptable.

But it is also clear, Mr. President, that Israel is not prepared to accept a restoration of the previous pattern of aggression against its northern territories—an objective that we fully understand and with which we sympathize.

As you may know, Ambassador Habib is now in Damascus for discussions with Syrian leaders to clarify the situation and urge restraint and the acceptance of my proposal for a ceasefire.

At the same time, Mr. President, I am compelled to point out that your government bears no little responsibility for the current crisis in the Middle East by its failure to support the Camp David Accords and its readiness to furnish a steady supply of weapons to PLO forces in Lebanon. While we use our influence to restrain Israel, we expect your government to exercise its influence over the PLO, Syria and your other friends in the area in the same direction.

Ronald Reagan

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2 U.N. Resolution 508, June 5, called for a cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Lebanese territory. U.N. Resolution 509, June 6, called for Israeli forces to withdraw from Lebanon.
180. Message From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan

Moscow, June 10, 1982

Dear Mr. President, We have received your reply of 9 June. Developments in and around Lebanon, including those in the last few hours, indicate that the situation is becoming more and more dangerous. This compels me to turn to you. Israel’s aggression continues to widen, Israeli troops have captured a considerable portion of Lebanese territory. They are advancing on Beirut—the capital of a sovereign state. The number of victims among the peaceful population, Lebanese and Palestinians, is increasing. Facts indicate that the Israeli invasion is a previously planned operation, which the U.S. must have known about.

No attempts to mitigate the aggressive nature of Israel’s actions can help to justify them. Even less can the U.S. actions, like the imposition of a veto on the Security Council Resolution of 8 June 1982 aid in halting the aggression.

As we warned, the conflict is spreading. Israel’s intervention is provoking an answering reaction from Syrian forces. We must be aware that the conflict is becoming wider and wider and can flare up even more. The fact that more than a hundred aircraft from both sides are taking part simultaneously in air battles is indicative of this.

You write that you are also concerned with the development of events. In this connection, I must repeat the main thought of my previous appeal. Urgent and concrete, especially concrete, actions are needed to halt Israeli aggression and to extinguish the war.

There is a reliable basis for this. It is the resolution of the United Nations Security Council to which you yourself refer, and which demands a halt to military actions and the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territory of Lebanon. If you firmly seek the implementation of these resolutions and do not seek any sort of obstructive measures (the U.S. representative in this region is resorting to such measures, it must be noted), then a solution can and will be found.

I see no use in getting involved in polemics when it is a question of such seriousness for international security. I only note that attempts

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290378, 8290381). Top Secret; Sensitive; Specat. Printed from a draft translation.

2 See Document 179.
to shift responsibility for the crisis situation in the Near East upon the
Soviet Union are futile. We have sought and continue to seek the
establishment of a durable peace in this region, and the attainment of
a comprehensive and just settlement.

In conclusion, I will tell you frankly that whether Israel finally
begins to implement the Security Council resolution depends primarily
on the position of the United States.

L. Brezhnev

181. Note Prepared in the Situation Room¹

Washington, June 11, 1982

Soviet Comments on Upcoming Summit

Soviet Embassy First Secretary Gennadiy Domakhin recently asked
a former senior-level U.S. official who is a Soviet affairs expert to tell
U.S. officials that the Soviets are unsure of the President's interests and
intentions regarding the upcoming summit. Domakhin predicted that
if the President intends to use the summit as a vehicle for a message
similar to that he presented in London, the summit would be a debacle.
Domakhin added:

• If the President wants to strengthen U.S.-Soviet accord, a Moscow
summit and Soviet television for the summit are likely. Even if the
summit is held in a neutral location, Soviet television would be available
for the President.
• The President would gain credibility in Soviet eyes if he takes a
more conciliatory approach.

In response to a question, Domakhin said Brezhnev's attendance
at the summit "at this point is certain," but without elaboration he
noted the possibility of an "historical accident" precluding Brezhnev's
attendance.

• Domakhin implied that Brezhnev's attendance might be contingent
upon what President Reagan's summit objectives are, and perhaps
even upon the line the President takes in Bonn and Berlin.

Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the note reads: "WPC has seen." An unknown
hand wrote at the top of the note: "Save (Summit File)."
• The source doubts the latter, but feels perhaps the reality of Brezhnev being at the summit is in doubt and certainly the reality of a positive outcome is in doubt.

Domakhin expressed much interest in the possibility of a joint U.S.-Soviet “action” to insure Lebanon’s integrity. (S)

182. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, June 12, 1982

SUBJECT

Reply to Brezhnev’s June 10 Letter on Lebanon

Given the tenuous ceasefire in Lebanon, I recommend that you respond promptly to Brezhnev’s June 10 letter\(^2\) to you on the crisis. Brezhnev’s letter was moderate in tone and lacked any hint of threat or bluster. In this sense, it was more restrained than his June 9 letter to you,\(^3\) despite the heavy losses incurred by Syria since the first letter was written.

We cannot assume that the relatively restrained content and tone of Brezhnev’s correspondence with you during the crisis conveys any weakening of Soviet resolve to support Syria. Indeed, I believe that we can expect a Soviet effort to replace Syrian combat losses to begin almost immediately. It is nonetheless striking that the Soviets did so little to assist their Syrian allies and PLO clients over the past few days. They did not mount a major resupply effort, nor were there any dramatic changes in the readiness status of Soviet forces in the area or in the Soviet Union itself. Even Soviet rhetoric lacked any hint of threats to Israel or the U.S. and any Soviet commitment to assist their beleaguered friends. The net result can only be described as a major setback to Soviet prestige and objectives in the Middle East. The Soviets can be expected to begin immediately to repair the damage to their position.

\(^1\) Source: Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290378, 8290381). Secret; Sensitive.
\(^2\) See Document 180.
\(^3\) See Document 178.
The draft reply stresses that continuance of the ceasefire depends upon restraint by all parties and that the Soviets have a responsibility to use their influence with Syria and the PLO constructively. It forcefully rejects Brezhnev’s allegations about Phil Habib’s “obstructionism” and underscores that his mission will continue. Finally, it rejects Brezhnev’s repetition of Soviet media charges that we had advance knowledge of the Israeli attack.

**Recommendation**

That you send the attached reply to Brezhnev’s letter.4

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4 Not attached. See Document 183.

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**183. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

Washington, June 13, 1982, 0344Z

163010. Subject: Presidential Message to President Brezhnev.

1. Please deliver the following letter from President Reagan to President Brezhnev in response to Brezhnev’s June 10 Molink message.

2. Begin text: Dear Mr. President: I have carefully considered your letter of June 10.2

3. As you know, at my urging the Israeli Government announced June 11 that Israeli forces in Lebanon would observe a ceasefire from 12:00 p.m. that day. Unfortunately, fighting between PLO and Israeli forces continued. My government went, again, to the Israelis urging restraint. This approach resulted in a new Israeli ceasefire—agreed to by the PLO—to go into effect at 9:00 p.m. (Lebanese time) June 12.

4. This decision by the Government of Israel is a constructive step that could result in a halt to the conflict in Lebanon which has raised such grave dangers to peace throughout the region. Obviously, the

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290378, 8290381). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. In telegram 7204 from Moscow, June 13, Zimmermann reported that a member of the Embassy delivered the letter to Tarasenko at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs that day. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy Files, N820005–0600)

2 See Document 180.
maintenance of the ceasefire depends upon restraint by all parties to the conflict. I shall continue to use my influence with Israel to that end; I expect that you will urge similar restraint on Syria and the PLO.

5. The ceasefire is only a first step toward a lasting solution of the problems which are at the root of the recent tragic events in Lebanon. My government will continue to work for the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509, and the creation of political arrangements which will ensure the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon under an effective central government. The maintenance of peace will also require that Israel be assured that attacks on its Northern territories originating in Lebanon not be resumed.

6. My personal representative in the area, Ambassador Philip Habib, will continue his contacts with all concerned parties, including the Governments of Israel, Syria, and Lebanon with a view to working out such arrangements. In this connection, I must reject emphatically the suggestion in your letter that Ambassador Habib’s activities in the area have obstructed the search for peace. Indeed, Ambassador Habib has carried out his difficult mission with distinction, and his efforts to assist the parties in the search for peace will continue.

7. I agree with you that polemics should have no place in our exchanges at any time—but particularly during this critical period. However, your letter contains the allegation which has also appeared in the Soviet media that the U.S. Government had been aware of the Israeli attack in advance. This charge is totally without foundation; thus, in keeping with your own view of polemics, it has no appropriate place in communications between us.

8. In closing, I wish to reiterate that my government will continue its energetic efforts to advance the cause of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Sincerely, Ronald Reagan. End text.

Haig
SUBJECT

Moscow’s Reactions to Your June 9 London Speech

You may not be aware of the immense impression your London speech has made in Moscow. For several months now Soviet experts on the U.S. have lulled the Kremlin into believing that you have fundamentally softened your stance toward the Soviet Union and Communism, adopting a “pragmatic” line that in all but name is identical with detente. In so doing, they were largely victims of the U.S. media on which they rely for insights into our politics. The uncompromising and philosophical tone of your speech proved, therefore, a grave shock to the Kremlin, placing it in a quandary as to what sort of a response to adopt. Here are some illustrations:

— In its initial reaction TASS could not even get itself to admit that you were talking about communism, saying instead that you contrasted “the West” with that “part of the world where power is in the hands of the people” (!).

— Our Moscow Embassy reports that numerous Soviet contacts have raised the issue of the London speech. A senior Izvestiia correspondent referred to Soviet criticism leveled at your speech as the harshest since your inauguration. Time Magazine correspondent in Moscow, Strobe Talbott, was told by a high Central Committee official that your London speech was not “ideological warfare” but a declaration of intent to “destroy” the USSR (Tab A).3 (S)

All this indicates how extremely vulnerable Moscow is to a bold ideological challenge, and how panically afraid of it. Lest, however, it be able to misinterpret your challenge to be not ideological but military (as it has been doing already), it is very important that in your future speeches on the subject you stress that what you have in mind is, indeed, “ideological competition”. This might be accomplished in the context of a speech in which you spell out your Soviet policy and

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2 Reference is to Reagan’s June 8 address to members of the British Parliament, see Document 177.

3 Attached but not printed is telegram 7264 from Moscow, June 14. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D820309–1032)
propose concrete steps the Soviet leadership needs to take internally and externally in order to earn a more sympathetic attitude from the U.S. Given the evident disarray in Moscow, such an address may help tip the scales in favor of more realistic elements in the Soviet leadership. (S)

185. Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, June 15, 1982

SUBJECT
My Meeting with Gromyko June 18

Gromyko and I will meet Friday afternoon and, if we decide we need more time, again Saturday morning. I expect to find Gromyko in a complaining mood following your successful European trip and the beating the Syrians and PLO have taken in Lebanon. The meeting is therefore likely to be a sober affair with few if any immediate results.

It is nevertheless an important opportunity to register the essential continuity of our overall approach to the Soviets at a moment when the spotlight is on arms control. The full scope of your negotiating program is now on display, and we have the high ground. But I also want to use this meeting to make clear to Gromyko that the Soviets are not off the hook with regard to the agenda of regional concerns we have set before them: Poland, Afghanistan, southern Africa, Central America and Kampuchea.

The message, once again, will be that the constructive East-West relations we want are not possible without serious adjustments in Soviet behavior on these issues. In particular, I will want to probe for openings toward progress concerning Poland, where the situation remains unstable. In the same spirit, I plan to suggest intensified bilateral discussions of what it would take to achieve political solutions in Afghanistan and in southern Africa. Explaining to the Soviets our policy on southern Africa seems to me particularly important at this point, since we are entering a critical phase on Namibia/Angola and need to deprive them of the excuse that they were unaware of what we are

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doing. On the Middle East, I will be responding to—and deflecting—Gromyko’s complaints.

On arms control, I will take advantage of your initiatives and Alliance support for your negotiating program to put Gromyko on the defensive, building on your UNSSOD speech. The message will be that we have a sensible and comprehensive program for negotiating improved security for both sides through significant reductions; that the Soviets cannot be serious when they accuse us of not being sincere; and that it is up to them to demonstrate in negotiations that they really favor arms control.

I do not plan to raise a possible meeting between you and Brezhnev myself, because it is important at this point that we not appear anxious to get to the summit. When Gromyko raises it, as he almost certainly will, I will make very clear that we do not favor the kind of summit without substance that has occurred in the past, and will therefore be looking for real progress on our agenda as we assess the prospects of a summit in the months ahead.

186. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, June 18, 1982, 2:30–7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS
US
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig
Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter

USSR
Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko
Victor Sukhodrev, MFA, USSR

Haig welcomed the Foreign Minister, and said that since he was the host at this meeting, it was Gromyko’s turn to make the opening remarks, and he would listen with interest to anything that Gromyko had to say. He hoped that Gromyko would be open and frank.

Gromyko indicated that he thought the structure of the conversation could be such that he would speak in short passages rather than long ones and that this would be better and more natural. If he were to give very long presentations, then Haig would want to reply in even longer ones since the Americans always like to be first; so this would be a more rational approach.

Haig replied that the US side tended to lag behind in such exchanges, and would try to catch up. He quipped that this leads to increased tensions.

Gromyko said he would like to start by asking one question, namely in which direction the policy of the present US Administration was directed—toward peace or toward war or preparation for war? He thought that it was difficult to contest that at the present time this was the main question of interest to people, governments, and most nations, that is, the question of whether peace can be preserved or whether mankind will fall into the abyss of a new war. He hoped that Haig did not consider this too direct a question, since the Soviet side considered that it was better to be direct than to take a zig-zag path, wherein one scratches the left ear with the right hand or vice versa. He wanted Haig to answer not in a purely formal way but in a substantive way.

Haig replied that, as is frequently the case, the Minister gets immediately to the point, and this is a good way to begin. It is clear that the President of the United States feels strongly that it is imperative for the nuclear superpowers to establish a framework for peace and stability. However, the experience of the past decade left not only the President, but also the American people and other countries of the world, with the strong feeling that atmospherics, slogans and similar things mean little when actions are taken that threaten peace. The President has set a special agenda in the search for more positive relations with the Soviet Union. As two superpowers we have a major burden to bear. We must be judged not by our dedication to slogans, but by our actions.

In the two previous meetings on this level, the US spoke of what Haig considered and the President also considered unsettling policies on the Soviet side. But a great deal remains to be desired with regard to actions. This is an important aspect in response to Gromyko’s question.

When the President wrote to Brezhnev about his aspirations he expressed this very clearly, and he remains clear on this today. So Haig hoped that Gromyko’s response and his own response would facilitate specific actions to improve the climate for broader possibilities of peace and stability and the reduction of the levels of armaments, which

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2 See Documents 90, 91, 137, and 138.
would be of mutual benefit for the whole spectrum of relations between 
our countries.

Gromyko stated that he would like to stress the position of the USSR 
and the Soviet leadership with regard to the question proposed and 
the reply given by Haig. He wished to emphasize that the Soviet Union 
has always been and is interested in a policy of peace. The Soviet side, 
and Brezhnev personally, have always indicated a desire to have good 
relations with the US, and they had always followed this general line 
both in their internal and external policies. Their policy is a policy of 
peace. The actions they take are purely of a defensive nature. The 
Soviet Union has no other aims, and will have no other aims. He wished 
that the US Administration would understand this. He was saying this 
in part because of what had been said by the US President.

He wanted to ask Haig a second question about US policy. The 
Soviet side has a very definite opinion that the US, especially the 
present Administration, has set as an important goal the achievement 
of first place from the military point of view in the world. Is this a 
correct assessment of American goals? The Soviets had gathered this 
from US official statements.

Haig said that if we look back over the past 65 years, and examine 
the ideological differences between the Marxist and Leninist ideology 
in their Soviet model, on the one hand, and the capitalist and the 
market economy ideology in the American model, on the other hand, 
we find that the offensive and aggressive actions have always come 
from the East. President Reagan is a leader who believes in the principle 
of reciprocity. So long as the struggle continues in ideological terms, the 
rhetoric will be more inclined to point out our systematic differences.

American aims remain as before—to have sufficient defensive military 
capabilities to ensure that there is no incentive for disturbing the 
peace. The US is not striving for superiority or advantage over the 
Soviet Union. Indeed, the US currently has less than half the number 
of men under arms than the Soviet Union has—two million as opposed 
to over four million men. The US has fewer aircraft and less nuclear 
destructive power. In considering the threat faced by the two sides, 
one can see a dangerous imbalance. No American President can look 
upon Soviet policies as policies of peace. Perhaps this can change in 
the future. Meanwhile the US wishes to assure equity in the arms 
area, and an increase of US capabilities is now underway. This can be 
adjusted from the point of view of arms control but only in the context 
of some equitable changes in comparative systems and capabilities.

Gromyko said that the Soviet side had been watching American 
policies over many years and what the US does in the area of arms 
buildup. It has especially been watching the present Administration, 
which has openly said that the basis of its foreign policy is to achieve
first place as a military power, and the US Administration has made
statements to the effect that the US way of life should be accepted by
everyone. He did not want to go too deeply into this and would say
more about it later. The Soviet side condemns the philosophy of any
country seeking to be first, including the superpowers. This is danger-
ous, since the logic of life (especially with superpowers) indicates that
other nations cannot permit one power to become dominant. The US
probably has people who like to calculate economics and other things
which support this goal of being first. But if the US has such calculating
people who are glad to see such results of their calculations, they
are very much mistaken, and the Soviet side cannot agree with this
approach. The Soviet Union has not set such a goal for itself, i.e., to
be the best nation—neither in theory, nor in international affairs.

In the Soviet view, the basis of relations between the US and the
USSR should be the principle of equality and equal security. This is
the bedrock foundation on which our relations can be built, maintained,
and developed. Haig had said in passing that in the Soviet Union there
are more personnel in the armed forces than in the US, but Haig must
know that the structure of the Soviet military and the structure of the
US military, as well as the military structures of other countries, are
not simply carbon copies of each other. The US and the Soviet Union
can make good and precise calculations in defining the potential of
both sides from the point of view of all of the components involved.
In this regard, the two sides have military parity, which is tantamount
to saying that there is military parity between the Warsaw Pact and
NATO. He wished to emphasize that the Soviet side cannot depart
from this principle and all hopes that the Soviet Union will tire of
listening to all the speeches against it, or will be frightened by this,
rest on sand. He wished to say these things to Haig especially in view
of the very important negotiations coming up, i.e., continuation of
the talks regarding nuclear armaments in Europe and strategic arms.
During the negotiations and before them it is very important to know
the positions of principle of both partners. This makes it easier to
go forward.

Sometimes the US has accepted the position that the USSR and the
US should build their relations on the basis of equality and equal
security, and the SALT II treaty (in which Haig had been personally
involved on occasion) was based on this principle. But now we are to
believe that during the Administrations of Ford, Carter, and Nixon,
the mathematics of the situation was not properly understood. Can
the Soviet Union seriously accept that past US Administrations made
a serious mistake in its mathematics and the present one knows mathe-
matics better, and is correcting the mistake? No, it cannot. Any reason-
able person would say that this is not possible, and that such an
approach reflects a change of political aims.
So it would be good if the US really had a policy of peace and the intention to build relations with other countries on the basis of peace, and if it returned to this principle as the basis for negotiations, confirming it by concluding an appropriate agreement. Then it would be easier to live, to build relations between the USSR and the US, and it would be easier for other countries. It would be easier for the world to breathe.

Haig indicated that they had been through similar discussions in past meetings, and that he knew the Minister would recall our conviction that arms control such as START or INF or, for conventional weapons, MBFR, must inevitably proceed from the premise of equity. But the basis of our relations consists of a mosaic which goes beyond the general criterion of equal security and equity. There has been a continuing pattern of Soviet arms build-up which has contributed to a reassessment of military levels. But perhaps the most serious aspect of our relations, if we assess the past decade, is the deterioration of equality and equal security, and of the basic principles of relations agreed to between our countries at the beginning of the 1970’s—i.e., not to take unfair advantage of each other in the conduct of our mutual affairs. Immediately after that agreement, there was an alarming number of Soviet violations of the basic principles of international behavior. Haig had had a great deal of experience in Vietnam, when the US tried to get the Soviet Union to influence Hanoi, but without success. Only after the US escalated the conflict was an agreement reached, and then it was ruthlessly violated by Hanoi with arms furnished to it by the USSR. That was followed by Cuban troops in Angola, who were brought there by Soviet resources. Then there was the expansion into Ethiopia, and the events of the late 70’s, such as those in the Yemens. The Soviet Union then became involved in neutral (yet pro-Soviet) Afghanistan, and subsequently interfered directly in Afghanistan. During all of this, the US did nothing to increase its influence by military force or subversive means.

This week Mr. Rodriguez stated in the UN that Cuba’s arms have doubled in the past few years. This has happened as a result of Soviet arms shipments, despite what was said by the US over the past 18 months. President Reagan and all Americans have been greatly influenced by the bitter experiences of the past decade, and by the size of the Soviets arms buildup.

After the era of detente, Soviet arms have increased by 4-5 percent every year, while American arms were steadily decreasing until the last year of the Carter Administration and the first year of the Reagan

Administration. So if equity existed in the early 70’s, the Soviet Union has now changed that situation, and this is clearly an obstacle today in US-Soviet relations. President Reagan wishes to reverse this situation, but not because of a desire to be first. Any arms negotiations based on such a principle would be sterile. Equity must be a basic criterion. The problem has been that there have been great abuses on the part of the Soviet Union. Over the past 18 months, during the two meetings with Minister Gromyko and in the meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin, the US tried to emphasize that the basis for US-Soviet relations must be actions, not rhetoric. Haig had spoken about Southern Africa, where the US has no desire and no reason to increase its influence. No progress has been made in that area. The Soviet Union has been an obstacle to progress. Haig had spoken about shipments of arms to Cuba, but no precautions have been taken by the Soviets in this regard. The US had spoken about the situation in Poland. It could be greatly improved as a result of American economic assistance, but the Soviets have taken no steps to improve the situation. Nothing has happened to improve matters in Afghanistan. All of this is not equality. In all of this—arms or political, economic or security relations—the imbalance which exists is a direct result of Soviet policy.

Haig would find it sterile to propose to depart from the principle of equal security and equality, either in a broad sense or in arms negotiations. But if equality existed in the 70’s, during the period of detente, and in the agreements on basic principles of relations, then it is the Soviet Union, and not the United States which has flagrantly violated these principles.

Gromyko asked for examples.

Haig mentioned Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Cuba, Kampuchea, as well as the level of resources allocated to military buildup. There had been no change in Soviet policy in this regard.

On the other hand, it has been only in the past two years that the US has begun to increase the level of its arms expenditures, and has not reached the level of Soviets arms expenditures over the past 15 years. The evidence was irrefutable.

Gromyko indicated that in his reply, Haig had departed from the discussion of the basic principles of our relations, that is, equality and equal security, and had turned to the policies of the Soviet Union and the U.S. in different parts of the globe. He would reply on these matters subsequently, but it would be more logical to continue to talk about basic principles and on questions of cessation of the arms race, reduction of arms, and of disarmaments, specifically on the two questions of nuclear arms in Europe and strategic arms.

Gromyko indicated that the question of nuclear arms in Europe had been discussed for a long period of time. Our two nations, as well
as many other nations, have spoken out about this question, but as yet there has been no agreement, and no results. Therefore, it would be desirable to compare the positions of the two sides, and to examine future prospects. Of course he and Haig would not go into the details of this question, but would discuss it only in principle, since the details would be left for discussion to the delegations in Geneva. However, the specific data would hover in the background, like phantoms, helping in the discussions.

The principle of equality should apply not only in the global sense to US/USSR military relations, but should apply to Europe as well. So when we speak of approximate equality between the US and the USSR, this applies to Europe, with one reservation of which he would speak. Approximate equality in Europe between the US (NATO) and the USSR (Warsaw Pact), had not been contested by the US until recently. These recent doubts have had no basis. Now, with regard to the reservation of which he had spoken: there is now equality in Europe from the point of view of arms materiel, but there is also a geographical factor which favors the US, as the Soviet side had previously mentioned. In actual fact the US has transferred a launching pad for its strategic weapons from the US to Europe. And the US now wants a significant increase in its potential on this launching pad by adding Pershing II and cruise missiles. These are in actual fact strategic weapons and must be taken into consideration. This is the first thing that he wanted to say.

The second thing involves the question of flight time, which exists whether we like it or not. Both military specialists and political specialists must take into consideration the use of weapons from US territory and Western European territory, and the time parameters involved in both cases. If the Soviet side were religious it would say that the whole world prays to all the gods that this will not happen, but we must take this into consideration.

The nuclear weapons of England and France must be taken into account. It is not acceptable to leave them out. It is not enough to say that these are matters of prestige, and that they involve independent countries. For the Soviet Union this is unimportant, and a loss of time to argue about it.

One other aspect should be taken into account. Although there is approximate equality between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, even in terms of materiel, the US does have an advantage from the point of the number of warheads, i.e., it has 50 percent more than the USSR. In number of delivery vehicles, there is approximate equality, if comparable categories are considered.

Although the Soviet side did not know what proposals the US delegation in Geneva would come up with in the future, the proposals which have been presented not only do not form a basis for an agree-
ment, but do not even form a basis for bringing the positions of the two sides closer together. The Soviet proposals, on the other hand, whether the US agrees with this or not (and the US has been critical of them), are equitable. But the US proposals do not form a basis for agreement. The US should be more objective in regards to the Soviet proposals and in regard to all aspects of the relations of the strategic arms of the two countries in Europe.

He knew that the US side was aware of the proposals made by Leonid Brezhnev concerning a moratorium, Soviet SS–20’s and a freeze. There had been no discussion of these matters, since the US side had not wished to discuss them in context with other matters. This is unfortunate. The Soviet side would like to have the US give these matters due attention.

The Soviet side has the impression that Washington has set its sights on implementing its plan to place Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, and that everything else is not very important. Would the US side agree with such a conclusion?

The Soviet Union wants to have agreement on nuclear arms in Europe and considers it very important. Such an agreement would improve the situation with regard to strategic arms as well.

Haig said he was sure that Gromyko realized he had been “counting beans” for many years, during five years as NATO commander, and long before that, when questions of nuclear and conventional arms were addressed. He could not let pass the statement that there was no contention on the existence of an arms balance between East and West. One should examine this from an historical perspective. For example, the West never sought to match Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional arms capabilities with equivalent Western conventional capabilities. From the early days, the Western approach has been to compensate for this by relying heavily not only on strategic weapons, but also on theater weapons. As the Soviet capabilities in nuclear weapons began to grow, the difference between East and West in this area began to decrease. Before, there had been a period of “accepted” stability. The West accepted its qualitative advantage as a compensation for the increase of nuclear capabilities in the East.

But there has been a shift in the balance. There has been no compensation on the part of the West in the area of conventional weapons. The Western levels have stayed the same, and have tended to decrease after the crisis of the 1950’s, with the one exception of the FRG. When Haig went to Western Europe, the situation had not changed. In the area of conventional weapons, the Soviet Union had about a 2–1 advantage in in-place forward-deployed divisions, a 3–1 advantage in tanks, a 4–1 advantage in artillery, and a 2–1 advantage in aircraft. In the area of aircraft, the Soviet side had increased the number of new dual-
capability aircraft made available to the Warsaw Pact. Those imbalances are roughly the same today. This is in reply to Gromyko’s statement that there was never any contention on this issue.

In 1975 the “bean-counting” in Europe became more intense as the Soviets began increasing deployment of SS–20’s and dual-capable Warsaw Pact fighters and fighter-bombers. Alarms began to sound in Western circles, especially military circles. By 1977, NATO calculations showed that in the area of nuclear delivery systems, the pattern of superiority enjoyed by the West to offset Eastern superiority in conventional weapons began to change. Such a situation still exists today. As our experts have strongly indicated in Geneva, by any reasonable calculation, the Soviet side has anywhere from a 3–1 to a 6–1 advantage, and the disparity is being aggravated by the deployment of the extremely destabilizing SS–20’s, which has been continuing since the mid-1970’s. Moreover, the old S–4 and S–5 missiles, which the SS–20’s were designed to replace, have not been removed. All in all, the Warsaw Pact has over 900 warheads in place, which is much greater than the number on the S–4’s and S–5’s had been. Therefore, at the present time there is a very large imbalance both with regard to conventional weapons and with regard to nuclear weapons, where the West has at least a 3–1 disadvantage in nuclear delivery vehicles.

Haig was well aware of the recent Soviet proposal put forth in Geneva, and considered that it showed a measure of good faith and flexibility, especially in the willingness of the Soviet side to accept that SS–20’s east of the Urals are capable of hitting European targets, and that depending on where they are located, they may be considered strategic. It is clear that such weapons are strategic if one looks at them from Paris, London, or Bonn. One of the advantages in beginning the START negotiations lies in the interrelation of theater and strategic forces. As the US assesses Soviet bean-counting, some of the Western systems the USSR has mentioned will be shown as being counted twice in the START talks. These systems might be considered strategic.

At any rate, an important step forward has been made in initiating these talks. The subject of bean-counting has posed difficulties in the past. It has been dealt with in SALT I and SALT II, and a number of subjective differences have been eliminated. This will be an important contribution in the START talks. It will help to bring the two sides closer together, and to avoid double jeopardy in counting.

Haig was not contesting what Gromyko had mentioned in regard to flight time for strategic weapons. The problem is that one cannot deal with theater weapons without appropriate consideration of strategic weapons. This problem will have to be addressed in due course.

Regarding START, Soviet official reaction to US proposals have shown a certain misunderstanding, perhaps based upon a misinterpre-
tation of the President’s public statements. In such public statements, the US has tried to avoid going into the details of the START proposal, but has only given its broad framework. There might be misinterpretations of the motives behind the proposal. In the first place, it is a serious proposal, and not propaganda. There is a serious desire to bring about significant reductions in the arsenals of both sides, an equal reduction by both sides. The US insists on talking about the warheads and launchers in the first phase because it wishes to build on the experience of SALT I and SALT II.

The charge has been made that this is a one-sided approach involving reduction only by the Soviet side. This is not so. The US is also speaking of reductions on its side, which are to be as dramatic as those on the Soviet side. The US wishes to deal with those systems which are the most destabilizing and which raise uncertainties regarding the intentions of the two sides, thus creating a major threat to peace. The US does see reductions by its side not only of the old systems, but new systems as well, similar to those which are asked from the Soviet side. Aircraft are not excluded. The US sees reductions to equal levels of capabilities. It is not excluding cruise missiles. It sees the possibility of reduction of cruise missile levels under phased conditions.

Haig wished to make it very clear for the record that he could not agree with Gromyko’s statement that equality in the theater area had never been contested. He could remember how President Nixon and Brezhnev agonized until 4 o’clock in the morning, and how he, Haig, was on the phone in Washington talking about submarines and various other categories of weapons.

Haig was not pessimistic. Both sides should not be rigid but should have an open mind. Some issues might quickly be resolved. Haig could barely understand the feelings of the Soviet side about the weapons of the US allies, but was even less understanding of statements about the existence of equality. There is no equality. There is a 3–1 inequality at the very least, involving such things as Warsaw Pact aircraft, which the East does not count. But all of this will be better handled in the coming months.

Haig wished to assure Gromyko and the Soviet leadership that President Reagan is very serious about arms control, and is not engaged in propaganda. The US feels that the Soviet Union is engaged in propaganda. The US does not favor the idea of a moratorium, since it considers that the West is in an inferior position and would not want to solidify such a position. The US has rejected such a moratorium and has publicly said so. Obviously the Soviet side can challenge this, but the US is unconvinced.

Haig understood that the Soviet leadership was disturbed over the non-ratification of the SALT II Treaty. There was a great deal of
controversy in the US over that treaty, and that controversy is what caused its collapse. The collapse was not a reaction to Afghanistan, but was caused by the view that there were inadequacies in the treaty itself.

Other areas where progress is possible also exist. One of these is the area of verification, in which the US had noted the encouraging remarks of the Soviet side.

A great challenge lies before us in our negotiations, but Haig was not pessimistic that solutions could be found which would reduce the likelihood of nuclear conflict and would relieve the tremendous economic burden posed by an arms buildup. Of course, equality and equal security must form a basis for the negotiations. At the same time, the US has not abandoned the concept of linkage, because linkage is not a policy which can be simply adopted or rejected. Linkage is a fact of life. If progress is not made in other areas, this necessarily impacts on progress in the arms area. This is as clear as night follows day. If the USSR had doubts about US actions in the Soviet sphere of concern, the USSR would also begin to apply pressure. This was not something that was optional. Linkage has always existed and remains a fact.

Gromyko indicated that one example of linkage was the table before them at that moment which had water, coffee, and other things on it. The two sides are engaged in conversation next to this table. Let’s say that the table is taken away. Should this mean that the conversation must also stop as long as the table is not present?

Haig replied that this was a mechanistic view of linkage.

Gromyko said that that was exactly what it was.

Haig replied that linkage was not mechanistic.

Gromyko said that such an approach was equivalent to asking what the sum of the Eiffel Tower and good health was.

Haig said that he would not presume to recall history better than Gromyko, but he was sure that Gromyko was aware of the stands of previous Presidents on this issue.

Gromyko countered that linkage was an invention of the present Administration.

Haig said it was not, that in actual fact, Henry Kissinger had coined the word.

Gromyko replied that Kissinger had coined the word, but had kept it in his pocket. Kissinger had always had great praise for Metternich, but Gromyko had always wondered whether Metternich’s efforts had not led in the end to the fall of the Austrian Empire.

Haig said he thought that for whatever reason, the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate had whetted Moscow’s appetite. The USSR undertook actions which proved costly to the US and which had brought about a great deal of tension. US-Soviet relations cannot be
examined without looking at the experience of the past decade. From
the American point of view, it had been a bitter experience. But all of
this is behind us, and it is important to look to the future.

Gromyko indicated that he had listened carefully to what Haig had
said, and that he wished to refer some questions to future discussion.
For the moment, he wished to direct Haig’s attention to the question
of nuclear arms in Europe.

First of all, Haig had mentioned conventional arms. The two of
them should leave this question aside, since Haig had only touched
upon it in passing, and they were not discussing this matter at present.
There are negotiations which deal with this. The USSR is not afraid of
any reproaches from the West. The Soviet position is very clear. The
Soviet side would like to reach agreement with the West, but the
West has other views. Nevertheless, the USSR will be patient and will
continue its work. He noted that the US did not even say “thank you”
for the Soviet withdrawal of 1000 tanks and 20,000 troops from the
GDR to the USSR.

Secondly, it cannot be contested that in the area of nuclear forces in
Europe, NATO (the US) and the Warsaw Pact (USSR) have approximate
equality in the area of delivery vehicles, and that NATO had 50 percent
more nuclear warheads.

Thirdly, the US side is trying to change the dividing line defining
medium-range systems: it takes into consideration aircraft with a range
of less than 1,000, 900, 800, 700, 600 miles, sometimes calling these
systems intermediate, and then begins to compare. Why is this done?
The US has included some of the Soviet aircraft which do not carry
nuclear weapons. The US has been capricious in its estimates.

Fourthly, if this is the approach the US takes, not recognizing the
dividing line of medium-range aircraft—we should go further. We
should include all nuclear weapons, including tactical ones. The Soviet
side would agree with such an approach. Brezhnev has indicated his
approval for such an approach. But Washington has not reacted posi-
tively to this. So the two sides should get away from various combina-
tions and artificial constraints of this kind. They should take a scientific
and mathematical approach, and take all factors into consideration.

Fifthly, Gromyko was glad to hear that, although Haig had been
careful in his remarks, he had nevertheless indicated that the US saw
a certain flexibility in the Soviet proposal made in Geneva and that it
could be helpful. The US side should look more closely at the proposal,
and perhaps it might see not only a sign of flexibility, but a basis for
progress in the negotiations.

Sixthly, Gromyko repeated that the USSR would like to see an
agreement on nuclear arms in Europe.
Seventh, US stationing of the Pershing II and cruise missiles would elicit a very strong response and would sound a negative note for the situation in Europe, the world, and US-USSR relations. The USSR would be forced to react accordingly. Then Soviet proposals concerning a moratorium, our missiles east of the Urals and a freeze would no longer be valid. The situation would then be different and the USSR would have to think about how best to improve its security and that of its allies in the Warsaw Pact. The USSR would not permit itself to be in an unfavorable position. It would protect its interests.

The US did not think that the Soviet Union had forgotten about other US plans and possibilities in other regions of the world—not in strategic arms, but in other areas of the world. He was thinking of medium or intermediate range weapons, and how they could be dangerous to the USSR. He was referring to what might be called the “beyond the Urals” range. These weapons had not been included in the negotiations but the Soviets might be forced into including them given certain situations. It remains to be seen how such a “Urals” version develops, i.e., involving areas like the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the ocean areas in the east of the Soviet Union.

The USSR would like to hope that the US Administration could be more flexible in all this, realizing that the Soviet Union would not like the US to be in a better position than it is. The Soviet Union does not strive to have the upper hand with regard to nuclear arms in Europe.

The Soviet Union does not want to make the US the underdog as a result of negotiations or agreement. This was Gromyko’s reply to Haig’s comments and if Haig had no other comments perhaps they could talk about strategic arms and the principles which apply to them. Of course the two delegations in Geneva will continue these talks, but if the basic principles have been worked out, their work will be easier.

Haig indicated that he wanted to make a brief comment since he was disturbed by Gromyko’s last statement. The Minister knows that it was the Soviet Union, and not the US, that deployed the SS–20’s. The US has no comparable means to deal with this. There are more than 900 warheads aimed at the West. A decision was made by the previous administration to place Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe. This was not only a moderate reply but if recalculations are made due to the continuing deployment of SS–20’s, the West will still be at a disadvantage unless it can compensate for the measures taken by the Soviet side. Threats about what the USSR will do if the West does what it has decided to do as a result of Soviet actions are counter-productive. If the Soviet Union were to compensate for these measures, the West could do likewise. It would not want to, but it would be ready to. If the West is forced to have a jousting match, it is ready to do so. Haig was hopeful that before long the negotiations in
Geneva would resolve these matters. The US intends to reduce, not increase nuclear arms, but it is ready to deal with such a contingency if it arises.

Haig indicated puzzlement regarding Gromyko’s second reference concerning other geographical areas for location of nuclear arms. Perhaps Gromyko could enlighten him about this. It was hard for Haig to say whether he was looking at the same thing that Gromyko was.

Gromyko said that he was not proposing to add other questions to the European agenda. He simply wished to say that the USSR has not lost sight of US plans to use nuclear weapons of various types which would generally be considered medium-range weapons (such as cruise missiles) against the USSR in certain areas. The US has not said it will not use such weapons. He did not want to formally broaden the agenda for this meeting, but simply to direct Haig’s attention to this question. Lack of progress on nuclear weapons would be bad for everyone—the Soviet Union, the United Nations, Europe and the world.

Haig indicated that he was confused about what Gromyko had said regarding cruise missiles. He thought that he had made it clear that cruise missiles would be considered in the START talks, in the context of establishing equal ceilings.

Gromyko replied that if this would not be a problem, that would be good. Then there will be no confusion.

Haig replied that that was the reason why it was so important to begin START talks. He emphasized that the US was thinking about a two-phase approach. The first phase would involve the types of systems to be limited, i.e., warheads and launchers. The US is thinking about a thirty percent reduction in these systems by both sides. The world is waiting for such a step.

Gromyko noted that there is a lot of good will shown in the world concerning this cause.

The relation of the US Administration to strategic arms and nuclear arms in Europe is clear. But perhaps the US has plans for nuclear arms which are not strategic and which are not concentrated on Europe—i.e. they involve the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, the Persian Gulf, etc. The systems involved might be cruise missiles and submarines. In Soviet terminology their range would be described as medium range, i.e., less than strategic. Would these then be considered “wild” weapons? Should that be a comfort to the USSR? Gromyko indicated that he was looking ahead in regard to these matters.

Gromyko added that it would be good if the US were to make a statement about excluding these types of systems. He was a little concerned about this. In Europe, the two sides are looking for agreement. But the US wants to be able to have systems which cover the eastern
part of the USSR, the central part of that country, Central Asia, etc. He thought he had made his point clearly.

Haig indicated that he understood. The two sides would have to deal with that question. As technology changed, previous definitions would have to be given careful thought. These are questions which involve bookkeeping. When should weapons be considered theater weapons? By US standards, certain types of weapons have traditionally been considered strategic, i.e., submarine-based weapons. Other questions involving ranges of weapons, i.e., those on mobile platforms, should be included.

For the above reasons, as Haig had said, the relation between INF and START is very important. Some questions of definition which pose problems with regard to theater weapons may be dealt with more readily if examined from the point of view of different categories. President Reagan had also indicated in West Berlin that the US looks forward to a greater exchange of information with the USSR in the future, aimed at confidence building measures, such as notification of military exercises and missile launchings, whether or not the missiles leave the territory of the launching state. The US would soon present its concrete proposals about such exchanges of data for confidence building measures and arms control in general. At the moment, the US has still not decided on the best venue for dealing with these matters, but it urges the Soviet side to be receptive.

Gromyko suggested that he and Haig might now turn to strategic arms.

Haig agreed.

Gromyko indicated that the Soviet side thought we would be remiss if we simply forgot about the treaty concluded by the former US Administration. A great deal of work was put into that treaty. It had been signed by Brezhnev and Carter in Vienna. The treaty was balanced. It was in the interests of both sides, and these interests had been very carefully weighed. The present US Administration has indicated that the usefulness of SALT II has been exhausted. It has been buried. But the US has not said how deeply it has been buried. The Soviet side feels that this matter should not be dealt with so lightly. All the positive results of those negotiations should be preserved.

First of all, it would be good if SALT II were ratified by both the US and the USSR. Questions of prestige (i.e. who proposed and signed the treaty) should take second place.

Some questions concerning time would exist, of course, since the treaty has not been ratified, and the Protocol has not been put into effect. Certain rules concerning missiles, strategic bombers and cruise missiles would not take effect. For example, the Soviet side had been
bound to remove 200 land-based missile sites. Such an obligation was based on implementation of all the provisions of the treaty and Protocol, and since these provisions had not been confirmed, the Soviet side would not carry out these obligations. Otherwise the treaty is a good one. If the question of strategic arms were to be solved, this would help improve the atmosphere for solving the questions of nuclear arms in Europe as well.

Secondly, with regard to the recent proposals announced by Washington in the area of what should be discussed first in regard to strategic arms, the US has the right, of course, to publicly announce its position on this. But such a proposal has no future. It is not acceptable for the Soviet Union. Why? Because it would change the nuclear balance in favor of the United States.

Attention in the proposals has been concentrated primarily on Soviet heavy SS–18 missiles, which the US side has not taken a liking to for some reason. This is a very one sided and arbitrary approach which is intended to undercut Soviet security in the area of nuclear arms.

Gromyko could not believe that Haig was not aware of the situation concerning SALT II, but perhaps he was not, although this did not seem probable. Perhaps Haig knew, but was closing his eyes to it. In this regard Gromyko wanted to make some clarifications. There had been intensive discussions, especially in Vladivostok between President Ford and Brezhnev (Kissinger and Gromyko has also been present), in which the US voiced very strong concerns about the Soviet heavy missiles.4 The Soviet side, on its part insisted by [that] US forward-based systems should be included in SALT II. There had been a long argument about this, and finally, agreement was reached that the Soviet Union would be permitted to have its SS–18s and US forward-based systems would not be included in SALT II. Obviously, no such statement was made, but there was agreement that forward-based systems should be handled in SALT III. So how can the US side accuse the Soviet Union of having these missiles and thereby creating an imbalance? It is hard to find the proper words to describe such an approach.

The fact that such an agreement was reached should be made known. But it is not known, and Gromyko is convinced that US Congressmen are not aware of it because the Administration is not telling them. They are saying that there is not equality between the sides, and that SALT II is a bad treaty, and that the heavy missiles are the main

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destabilizing factor. But these missiles are a result of the agreement. They are not destabilizing, and they are not the main factor of concern.

If the Soviet Union wished to look at destabilizing factors in order to throw a shadow on the treaty, it could say that the main destabilizing factor is the existence of twice as many warheads on US submarines as on Soviet submarines. The Soviet side would say that we should begin with this subject. But the Soviet side is not saying this. Haig should try to see the situation through Soviet eyes. The Soviet Union is ready for the negotiations on strategic weapons, and it will present its position when the time comes. But it asks the US to take a closer look at its proposals, and to take a more serious position.

Haig wished to comment on the observations presented by Gromyko. He wished to reassure Gromyko in certain respects and to bother him in others. The US side has said that SALT II is dead, not buried. This is so for several reasons. First of all, any attempt to revive the treaty would reopen the controversy which raged in 1979 in the Senate and in the House. Since the President campaigned against SALT II, it would be politically impossible for the President to support the treaty, which he does not believe (and which Haig also does not believe) constitutes a constructive and fair approach. Having said this, however, Haig would not deny that there were positive things which had been negotiated in SALT II.

Haig wished to reassure Gromyko that the head of the US negotiating team, General Rowny, was perhaps the most active arms control representative in the US government. Perhaps the Soviet side did not share his views. But he had worked on SALT I, SALT II, the Vladivostok accords and the Test Ban Treaty. Gromyko would recall that Rowny had worked out the threshold agreements.

The US side does not reject everything that was accomplished in SALT II. As President Reagan recently stated publicly, the US will abide by the restraints of that treaty. It is aware of the problems of the Protocol, which was one of the difficult problems in the way of the treaty ratification.

Haig did not want to dwell on Mr. Warnke’s⁵ and Carter’s lack of judgment, since this was not relevant at the moment, but there is no way of resurrecting SALT II.

All of the balanced approaches of the two sides can be included in the new treaty. The sides would also need to examine American plans for force modernization, as well as, undoubtedly, Soviet plans for force modernization. The Soviets side had spoken of the US advan-

⁵ Paul Warnke, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and chief negotiator for SALT II from 1977 to 1978.
stage in MIRVed SLBMs. These matters must be dealt with in START as destabilizing systems. But the most important destabilizing systems are the heavy land-based missiles. The US is ready to compensate for a reduction in these systems. Hopefully, the Soviet side is not against sharp reductions on both sides. This is the essence of the President’s program, where the focus is on destabilizing systems.

Gromyko should be aware that everything achieved in the past will not be thrown out the window. The positive aspects of SALT II can be used, although the treaty itself is dead, if not buried.

The President is ready for give-and-take in Geneva, but he would never agree to a treaty which would not provide for substantive reductions, or which would permit avenues for increasing destabilizing systems while restraining others which are less destabilizing. Substantial reductions below current levels are very important, not only with regard to systems presently deployed, but future systems as well. A very important question is the question of instantaneous hard-target kill, which the Soviet have with their ICBMs and the US has (and will have much more of) on SLBMs. Another important question was the breakout potential of heavy missiles. Value judgments will be made by experts on both sides. But neither side should fear that the other side will not take its interests into account.

(At this point, there was a short break.)

Gromyko indicated that the main difference between the Soviet approach and the US approach to the discussion of strategic arms was not that the US wanted substantial reductions and the USSR did not. The ideal of substantial reductions is not foreign to the USSR. The Soviet side considers that such reductions must take place. The differences arise over the way in which we see the path of negotiations aimed at such reductions. If the two sides are to discuss only one type of weapon and leave everything else aside, then there is a very large gap between the two positions. Such a position is not realistic. Moreover, the Soviet side had serious doubts when it saw the US position. It wondered whether the US side really wants an agreement.

Haig wished to reassure Gromyko that the US is very serious about reaching agreement, and very serious about substantial reductions. The US does not believe that the American people or the people of the world would be satisfied with less. But the sides should not prejudge the outcome of the talks until experts look at the US side’s Phase I proposals, and listen to the Soviet side’s counter proposals. Apparently, public presentation of the US proposals has raised doubts about the way these questions would be resolved at the table. It is very important to take an approach which would not leave the possibility of destabilizing kinds of weapons—first strike, instantaneous hard-target kill systems on both sides. It is difficult to understand why a proposal of
reduction by both sides in this category is called one-sided. But perhaps when the experts get together, the two sides could deal with the matter. However, the Soviet side should not prejudge the outcome solely on the basis of the President’s remarks, without the additional considerations just indicated.

Gromyko said that the US side is the master of its position. He had raised the subject because the US had openly spoken about it. The US should take a different approach. This is the official Soviet position.

Gromyko said it would be good to discuss one independent but related matter. He had presented Brezhnev’s statement at the UNGA concerning the unilateral promise about no first-strike use of nuclear weapons. It would not be immodest to say that this is an historic decision. If other countries did the same, there would be no nuclear war, no first-strike, no second-strike, and so on. The Soviet side was surprised at the initial reaction of Washington to this. It considers that the US should take a more serious approach. It makes no sense to say that if one takes an obligation of no first strike use of nuclear weapons, this opens the door for use of conventional weapons. This is a contrived stance. It is hard to explain. Perhaps it is political inertia, namely, that since the Soviets have made an important decision, it is better for Washington to oppose it. The USSR asks that the US take a more objective approach.

Gromyko indicated that the US is aware that the Soviet side made a proposal to have an agreement on no use of force (and this was approved by the UNGA). But no such agreement exists, since the US reacted negatively. So we have an impenetrable wall. Should we simply knock our heads against it? The US also has no desire to fall into the abyss. Even if there are people in Washington who say that they are not bothered by this, no one really believes them.

The US and the USSR, as well as the other countries of the world, are in one big trench. Both sides should look at the most serious problems before them. And the most serious problem is that of nuclear war. The USSR is not seeking tricks or subterfuge in order to hurt US interests. The only desire of the USSR is to ensure peace in the world. The actions of the USSR will not harm one hair on the head of any nation in the world.

The Soviet Union is disappointed at the reaction of the US to its no first strike proposal, and hopes that this is just an initial reaction, and that US leaders, including the President and Haig, would think this matter over. If all the world’s nuclear powers would do this, questions of strategic arms, European arms and regional questions would appear in a new light.

Haig replied that he was aware of Gromyko’s experience in witnessing history, so Haig was not surprised at such a proposal, since the
Soviet Union had made such a proposal before, along with other proposals, such as nuclear free zones. But in the first place, Western military doctrine had long been structured on the principle of force compensation. Western strategy is defensive, not offensive. Nothing in Western actions since the Second World War suggests the use of force, except with regard to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Unfortunately, this has not been the case with the Soviet Union. But the US is looking toward the future and not the past. The West has a defensive strategy. It is against first use of any kind of force. But the topic of use of force is very broad, and involves not only nuclear weapons, which are, indeed, very devastating. There have been more than one hundred conventional military conflicts since the last war and hundreds of thousands of people have been killed in them. These consequences are equally heinous. In addition to conventional warfare, there has been terrorism, insurgency, and violence involving extra-legal means. The West has recoiled from this. This has been the pattern of Soviet actions after World War II, and these actions have caused a large percentage of the conflicts Haig had spoken of. Analyses would confirm this. So it is difficult to isolate one particular area (although an especially heinous one) unless some comparable principle is applied globally by the superpowers to outlaw any kind of conflict. Specifically, revolutionary movements have been sustained, led and instigated from outside on the territories of peaceful nations. There has been illegal use of force in subtle ways. Everything should be viewed in totality. There is a fine line between political struggle and application of force. The two sides should get together to discuss the consequences of conflict in general before such one sided proposals as the no first-use of nuclear weapons can make sense. If a person dies from an axe, a stone, a spear or nuclear weapon, it is still unacceptable. This should be discussed in detail, case-by-case.

It is difficult for the US to seriously accept the pledge not to use nuclear weapons first in light of the agreements of principle of the agreements of principle of 1972. The sides had taken a pledge not to take advantage of each other. There have been wholesale violations of that pledge, and this is the basis for American suspiciousness.

The West has never used force directly. It has not done so in Western Europe, where the philosophy of structured response has been developed. If the Soviet Union is so magnanimous in its no first strike proposal, it should add credence to it by dismantling some of its systems or at least stopping their build-up.

Substantial reductions of nuclear weapons is fair for both sides. President Reagan is truly dedicated to this. His letters to Brezhnev have not been cynical. The US is very serious about significant reductions, as the coming weeks and months will confirm. Hopefully, the USSR
is as interested as it says. If it is, the talks will succeed. But such one
sided proclamations or even two sided ones are meaningless when
every day, in various regions of the world, the Soviet Union either
directly or indirectly violates the spirit, if not the letter, of such a
proposal.

Gromyko replied that he categorically disagreed with such views.
They were not convincing. They went against the real desires of those
who cherished life and who are opposed to nuclear conflict.

He thought that Haig had talked strangely, and wondered if every-
one in Washington talks the same way and compares the use of stones
and swords to nuclear weapons. If we take one individual, then it does
not matter whether he dies from a stone or a nuclear weapon. Death
is death. But surely it makes a difference whether one person or a
thousand people or one million people or three hundred million or
five hundred million people die. Haig’s answer seems to have been a
stereotyped response. How can there be no distinction between the
death of one person and the death of one thousand, one million, three
hundred million and five hundred million, people? The Soviet side
cannot agree with such an approach, if it reflects the position of the
US Administration. Armed conflicts are not all of an equal nature. But,
returning to the talks on nuclear arms in Europe and strategic arms,
Gromyko wished to emphasize that they should proceed as planned.

Gromyko suggested that discussion of regional issues, especially
the Middle East, could be postponed to the following day.

Haig agreed. He specifically mentioned the Middle East, Poland,
southern Africa and Afghanistan.

Gromyko agreed on Africa and Afghanistan, but regarding Poland,
said that he would say the same thing he had said in Geneva, i.e., that
the Poles had not authorized them to intervene in internal Polish
matters.

Haig replied that the Poles had been contacting the US, and that
he felt that he and Gromyko were free to discuss any issue.

Haig indicated that Gromyko had selectively rebuffed his views
on the no first-strike proposal. In order that the Soviet record and the
US record of the meeting not be distorted, he wished to point out that
no one in the world can be insensitive to the problem of nuclear weap-
ons. But there must also be sensitivity to the order of international
conduct which could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. The history
of the world has seen many efforts directed at applying the rule of law
to relations between states and the avoidance of conflict. But when the
Soviet Union constantly sends arms to assist insurgents, Haig would
not accept a lecture on the lack of American understanding of humane
principles. The US side considers that there should be a change in this
record if we are to achieve progress in arms control, reduction of the nuclear threat and improvement of the relations between our countries which the people of the world demand and which is in their interest.

Gromyko replied that he would answer Haig’s statement the next day, and would also talk about regional issues.

Haig and Gromyko agreed to meet at 9:30 a.m. the following day at the Soviet UN Mission.

187. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, June 19, 1982, 9:30 a.m.–1:40 p.m.

SUBJECT
Private Meeting Between Secretary Haig and Minister Gromyko

PARTICIPANTS

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<tr>
<td>Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig</td>
<td>Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko</td>
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<td>Cyril Muromcew, Interpreter</td>
<td>Victor Sukhodrev, MFA, USSR</td>
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Foreign Minister Gromyko suggested to Secretary Haig that they continue where they had left off the previous day. Gromyko would briefly answer Haig’s questions, concentrating on the topic of US-Soviet relations, strategic arms, medium-range missiles in Europe and on the Soviet position of non-first-use of nuclear arms.

Gromyko said that the last topic logically related to Haig’s last statement. Gromyko wished to stress first of all that the Soviet Union has not violated any obligations assumed under bilateral arrangements with the US or other international obligations. There were no violations of any kind. Gromyko added that the document mentioned by Haig previously dealing with US-Soviet relations, and the obligation undertaken not to take any step to harm the other side or take advantage of it, was still valid. Gromyko emphasized that his side did not, does not

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2 See Document 186.
and will not do any harm to the US side and he categorically rejected any reproaches made by the US side.

However, the Soviet Union had solid grounds to reproach the US because even now as Gromyko and Haig are conducting their talks, the US side has undertaken political steps designed to harm the Soviet Union. At first glance this issue as announced in Washington may seem to be of an economic nature only. But only at first glance. As Haig should know, international economic affairs are so closely interwoven with politics that they cannot be separated. Gromyko did not think it necessary to be specific as to the steps taken by the US side. It sufficed to say that statements in Washington referred to the Soviet Union and to certain economic problems. There are, Gromyko continued, certain diplomatic niceties that are usually observed. What happened in Washington was a gross, tactless act, not acceptable in international relations where tact is needed. Gromyko saw in this a violation of elementary diplomatic norms. Within hours of the meeting between Gromyko and Haig this announcement was made in Washington while the two Ministers were discussing issues of war and peace. He accused Haig of ignoring all norms of international behavior, adding that these were trampled underfoot just to harm the Soviet Union.

To continue the same line of thought, Gromyko wanted to make it clear that the Soviet Union has never undertaken any action in the international arena to implant revolutions in other countries. Revolutions in other countries, when a new social regime follows an old one, happen due to internal developments in those countries and cannot be imported from without. To insist that this is so amounts to hysterical illiteracy. The Russian revolution of 1917 was not implanted, was not brought to Russia from without, it was not imported. The Russian people did it all themselves. If one tries to implant a revolution then it is an episode of very short duration. Serious changes, so-called social revolutions, are due to internal causes of a given country. Gromyko had to categorically refute the notion that the reason for social changes in Cuba, in Vietnam, in Afghanistan, in Kampuchea and other countries was due to Soviet policy. In some countries where the changes took place, there were no Soviet diplomats, no representatives and no diplomatic representation. It would be superficial to think that the export of revolutions was a part of the arsenal of the Soviet Union.

As for situations in other regions of the world, Gromyko and Haig have previously agreed to discuss them and Gromyko would not evade it now. During their previous talks, Gromyko and Haig referred to

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3 On June 18, the Reagan administration extended sanctions on the sale of equipment for use on the Siberian pipeline to also apply to licenses obtained by Western European firms from U.S. corporations. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, vol. I, p. 798)
these topics as geographical questions, so he proposed to address now the situations in various parts of the world and proposed to move in an organized fashion from topic to topic. He added that each side had the right to raise any question it wanted to discuss.

As for nuclear arms, he felt that everything had been said before and Gromyko had nothing to add to that score now. However, he wished to note with all clarity that no one should miscalculate the grave consequences of a nuclear war. What consequences there would be for the US and the Soviet Union was well known. Therefore, no one, especially those who hold the tiller and steer the policy of a country, should make such a miscalculation. No one has the right to make such a fatal mistake. The Soviet Union knows that only a madman who has lost touch with reality cannot comprehend the consequences of a nuclear war. He asked Haig to bear in mind that in the Soviet Union the people regard this problem with utmost seriousness and gravity and are aware of the dangers of a nuclear conflict. There was no greater problem facing mankind today than the avoidance of a nuclear war. For this was a matter of life and death. In international politics there is now a duel going on, that is to say those who value the concept of life and those who are against it. This encounter may end in a catastrophe.

Gromyko felt that he had answered all the questions pertaining to a nuclear conflict and would hope that Haig would regard them with a great deal of attention. Gromyko wanted to add that his side always weighs Haig’s words and all statements of the US President. He asked Haig again to do the same and to weigh Gromyko’s words and to try to understand his thoughts, the development of his thoughts and his analysis of the situation.

Haig expressed his gratitude to Gromyko for the response and the exchange of views. Haig felt that the question of a nuclear conflict was very clear to the US side, and the President of the US fully recognizes the problem and also the growing danger of a miscalculation. However, as the nuclear inventory increases, the other side feels free and compelled to do the same to match the first side. Haig felt no need to point a finger at the side that was the first to start the nuclear arms race. He knew that the Soviet Union might hold a different point of view on the situation. He wished to emphasize again that the President was fully committed to the goal of a verifiable decrease in nuclear arms. The details of this will be further discussed in Geneva during the START talks.

About revolutions, Haig continued, there were different ways to subscribe to these concepts because there were just revolutions aimed at improving social conditions and introducing a new, just system. There were also revolutions which were transplanted from other coun-
tries. He did not want to challenge the Russian theory on revolutions, but history has been transformed by revolutions which contained seeds of social justice. However, looking back, he cannot fail to notice that now the Soviet Union is using force to preserve the status quo. As an example, Afghanistan wanted to introduce political reforms and changes. Force was used to stop them. Such changes take place in other parts of the world too. In Poland, for instance, there was a complete change of the situation where an attempt for reform led to the use of force by the present regime. Therefore, there is a new phase in history, and there is a certain reversal in the way countries react to revolutions. The powerful forces which desire a change may be greater threats to peace than just nuclear arms, because the latter are only tools in the hands of man. The two countries, Haig continued, cannot ignore the tensions existing between East and West. Therefore, if the two powers are serious in preventing a danger of a nuclear encounter, they must deal with other aspects of the East-West confrontation.

Haig then addressed Gromyko’s statement about a certain announcement made in Washington the previous day. Haig assured Gromyko that this move was not preconceived to coincide with the present meeting. It was an unrelated event, and Haig had to reiterate that the US does not believe in waging economic war against the Soviet Union. The decision which was previously taken related to events in Poland alone. Haig would return to this topic shortly.

In previous exchanges between the two countries, the Soviet Union has stated it has the right to support wars of liberation. The US side could do this too, but such actions could lead to increased tensions in the future and have a pervasive effect on the relations between the two powers. He felt that cooperation was necessary and that the two powers should use their influence to improve the atmosphere. Having made this general historical review, Haig wanted to conclude that it was not for the US to exploit certain situations to aggravate them and to jeopardize interests of the Soviet Union. But the US side reserved the right to take measures if the Soviet Union does not join in an improvement of East-West relations. Such a move would benefit both sides. The US was ready to cooperate fully and was equally prepared to join in any meaningful cooperative venture to improve the situation. It was clear to Haig that there were hot spots in the world, and he called upon Gromyko for cooperation in these areas on a basis of reciprocity and equality. If an overall understanding cannot be reached, it is likely that difficulties may arise in many different areas of US-Soviet relations. Haig would ask Gromyko to inform his leadership that in the US all doors are open, all opportunities are there and President Reagan is fully prepared to work across the whole spectrum to improve East-West relations.
Gromyko replied that he, too, shared Haig’s concerns but wished to continue with a review of the world situation and concentrate on some countries mentioned by Haig. But mainly he wanted to evaluate the situation in regions where tension does exist. He then wanted to evaluate US policy in certain parts of the world and finally what can be done to solve certain problems and relax tensions in these areas.

In previous discussions, he and Haig mentioned Cuba. In Gromyko’s view, Cuba is an independent, sovereign country and the social system in that country is up to the Cuban people. The US is trying to pressure Cuba because Cuba has chosen the road to socialism. The US holds a part of that country, namely the Guantanamo Base, which is a military base, and can only be regarded as such. Leave Cuba in peace, Gromyko pleaded, for Cuba was not a threat to the United States, absolutely not. Is Cuba a threat to any Latin American country or Latin American people or to the US?, he asked. If you ask this question of any Latin American, he will only smile. Leave Cuba alone because otherwise the situation there will never become normal; the US blockade was not justified. Cuba should conduct its own domestic and social affairs the way it wishes. Please establish normal relations with Cuba. Gromyko asked that the US refrain from sending emissaries to Cuba, some in civilian clothes who talk softly, then again those with military shoulder boards who irritate the Cubans. By normalizing relations with Cuba, the US will gain a two-fold advantage: relations with that country would be normal and an irritating element in US-Soviet relations would also disappear.

In Nicaragua, Gromyko continued, the situation is similar to that in Cuba, that is, the situation is not normal. You pressure Nicaragua; you know it better than we do. You tell Nicaragua which is a small and weak country, what government to have, what social order to install and how to live, and we have to condemn your attitude. Furthermore, neither Cuba or Nicaragua, together or separately, can do anything to other countries and certainly cannot harm the US. You said that Cuba and Nicaragua are doing something to turn other South American countries against the United States. This is a distorted view because they do not do it. If you have such information, it is unrelated to the true state of affairs and would be another case of suspicion and disinformation that is rampant and excessive in your capital.

Previously you also mentioned El Salvador and I cannot ignore this issue. It will take a long time to remove that blot from the page of your history because this is a blood bath. People are getting killed. There is no justice. You know better than we how many people have perished, but even what we know makes us shudder. You replace one puppet with another puppet. You use methods which cannot be justified, and you will be held responsible for it. Let the El Salvador
people determine their own social and economic relations. Let them improve relations with other countries without any interference from Washington. The people in El Salvador are not against you. They want peace with their neighbors, with the US which is a big country, and they want to be left alone.

Gromyko continued that although much time had been devoted to the Angolan question both in Geneva and in New York, much remains to be done to improve the situation and to find ways to normalize the situation in Angola, Namibia and South Africa which carried out aggression against Angola and Namibia. In that context, there could also be a discussion of the question of Cuban troops in Angola. Gromyko felt that he and Haig were at one time not far apart on some issues regarding the above and expected the US to act in a certain way. However, he felt that now Washington has bypassed certain arrangements and he was puzzled by it. There was a joint Angolan and Cuban statement in which it was stated that Cuban troops will leave Angola when South African aggression has stopped, when Namibia has gained independence and the security of Angola had been assured. If this was solved, there would be no obstacle to the departure of Cuban troops. Nor would there be if the Angolan government asks the Cuban troops to leave. Therefore, as Gromyko saw it, it was an either/or situation. The Soviet Union expected Washington to welcome this declaration and to use its influence in South Africa to bring this about. But instead, Washington did nothing about it. Perhaps Washington took this issue too lightly. So, to repeat, Cuban troops will leave Angola when there is no aggression from South Africa, when there is an independent Namibia, and he felt that these issues could be solved and would be good for US-Soviet relations. But instead the US remained indifferent—yes, yes, Gromyko knew that the US maintained certain contacts there, but there was no direction to that policy and no progress is visible. Gromyko would like to clarify this policy with Haig; was there a change in US policy, or is it simply inertia on the part of the US?

Gromyko wished to leave the Middle East aside for a moment and move on to the Afghanistan problem. He reminded Haig of the discussion about meetings between Soviet and US experts on the Afghanistan question. Points of contact were established but then US interest seemed to have cooled. To sum up the Soviet position: the Soviet Union would like to see an independent, nonaligned, repeat nonaligned, Afghanistan. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan would be at the request of the Afghanistan government which originally invited Soviet troops to come in, and if outside intervention ceased, by which Gromyko meant no gangs infiltrating from Pakistan and, to some degree, from Iran. If such intervention would stop, then Soviet troops could be pulled out of Afghanistan. If not, it is clear that

Soviet troops will stay there and do their duty. Then let the foreign gangs invade that country for they will be ground up and massacred by the defending forces. This would not be in the US interest. Furthermore, a settlement in Afghanistan would remove tensions in that part of Asia. This would be one less irritant in US-Soviet relations. Such were Gromyko’s views on Afghanistan.

Next Gromyko wished to move on to Kampuchea. First of all, Gromyko wished to stress an anomaly at the UN, where this country was represented by the Pol Pot henchmen. He did not know whether this suited US policy or whether it was simply a case of inertia. The time will come, Gromyko was sure, when real representatives of the Kampuchean people will sit in the UN. Gromyko wanted to stress that Pol Pot was a politically dead entity and it was an ugly act to impose this puppet regime from without. It would be good if the US would adopt a more realistic policy in Kampuchea, and the sooner the better. By doing so, this would also lessen tensions in that part of the world.

The situation in Vietnam and in Laos was viewed in a positive spirit by the Soviet Union. If the US would establish relations, based on international norms and on the UN Charter, the Soviet Union would only be glad to see such a development.

Gromyko would also hope that the US will stop driving wedges between certain nations and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was against such a policy and it never applied such measures itself. As an example, Gromyko could name several countries in Latin America. Everytime the Soviet Union speaks to these nations it makes it very clear that it does not want to harm the relations between Latin American countries and the US. The Soviet Union has no wedges to drive between countries. In fact, it has no specialists to make wedges and would have to ask for US assistance to make wedges and then the US would impose sanctions on wedges.

As for Poland, Gromyko continued, he was not about to discuss it with the US or any other country. The Polish question was an internal Polish question and again no representative of the Soviet government will discuss this problem with any other country of the world. The Poles and only the Poles are competent to resolve their own affairs. Washington is making a mistake by undertaking gross steps against Poland or the Soviet Union and artificially linking these two countries together. It may give the US some momentary political capital, but no long-range advantage.

In your Administration today, Gromyko continued, those who believe in short-range advantages have gained the upper hand and try to pressure Poland. Gromyko was sure that Washington had levers numbered one, two, three, four and perhaps many more that they could pull at will to pressure Poland and at the same time not miss
the occasion to step on the Soviet Union’s toes. Gromyko believed that it would be more realistic to take the long-range view and not think that what the Polish government does is due to pressure from the Soviet Union. This is a fatal and erroneous concept and the Soviet Union rejects this categorically. What can be more authoritative than the declarations made by the Soviet leadership and by the Polish leadership concerning the situation in Poland? Gromyko would like to hope that the US Administration will adopt a more realistic policy towards Poland and stop pressure, sanctions, and similar actions often not of a very clean nature. It would be best to maintain normal relations and to draw proper conclusions and not blame the Soviet government for it.

Gromyko concluded that he had now covered all areas and questions raised by Haig and would hope that the US Administration will devote some attention to it. But before closing he wanted to say a few words about China. The Soviet Union knew the nature of US relations with China and there were no well-kept secrets there. He would like to repeat what he had already told Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter that, it would be best in US-China relations not to look at momentary advantages but to look at the long-range prospect and not to forget interests and perspectives of US-Soviet relations and not to ignore the general situation of the world because this was the key to permanent peace. Gromyko wanted to stress that aid to China which included armaments could be against the interests of the Soviet Union and its security. Gromyko wished to assure Haig that his government kept these developments clearly in their field of vision. That completed Gromyko’s main coverage.

Haig replied that he felt less than satisfied with the progress made since their last meeting and attributed it to a number of factors.

As for the Cuban situation, Haig said that the US had no interest in interfering in the internal affairs of Cuba. However, the US was concerned by the export of arms, revolution and terrorism from Cuba to other countries. This was an unsatisfactory state of affairs. The US has talked with Cuban leaders such as Mr. Rodriguez, and General Walters talked to Mr. Castro about normalization of relations and US willingness to do so. But deeds and acts show otherwise. However, progress could be reported in such areas as the elections in El Salvador, although there was an increase in arms shipments from Cuba to terrorist bands in El Salvador. But the people of El Salvador showed clearly their choice. While the Soviet Union was concerned about US arms to China, the US was concerned about arms from Cuba to Nicaragua and Haig wanted this to be clearly understood. Haig repeated that the US would welcome a normalization of relations with Cuba, but Cuban intervention in friendly countries and in Nicaragua spoke against it. It was clear what the Nicaraguan people wanted and they were against
the Sandinista policy. The US offered an eight-point proposal⁴ and will explore the possibilities in the weeks ahead. However, the US will not accept interference in El Salvador, will not tolerate terrorism and will not tolerate interference in Honduras. There is no doubt that South American countries are appalled by the situation in Nicaragua. It is up to the Nicaraguan people to make the choice and, as for El Salvador, what Gromyko called a blot is a manifestation of the strength of the free spirit of the Salvadoran people, as could be seen in the number of votes cast in the elections. The people of El Salvador want to be free of external interference and internal subversion. The social reform program as a result of the elections in El Salvador is a success.

On the subject of Angola and Namibia, Haig wanted to assure Gromyko that the US was active and was able to make South Africa respond to the UN Resolution 435, which was an unprecedented success. Haig also referred to his communication with Ambassador Dobrynin regarding this problem. Haig felt that the presence of Cuban soldiers in Angola during the last six years was unacceptable and the time for them to leave has come. The Angolan government and the Angolan people suffer from internal conflicts and foreign insurgents in the southern part of the country. The South African government is concerned about raids across the border into Namibia. There was a three-phase proposal concerning SWAPO, South Africa and the Front-Line States but the Soviet Union advised SWAPO to reject it, although the plan was reluctantly accepted by South Africa.

South Africa proposed a plan for Namibian independence by next year. This was endorsed by the Front-Line States and SWAPO and now a trigger was needed to set it in motion, namely the withdrawal of Cuban soldiers from Angola. Haig felt that the Soviet Union could help with this problem by confirming that Cuban soldiers will indeed leave. This in turn would influence South African withdrawal from Namibia. There would be no public linkage of these events, but they would have to occur simultaneously. The US would support such a development. Haig felt that this opportunity should not be missed, otherwise the Front-Line States and other African countries would lay blame where it belongs. Haig stressed that the US was seeking no advantage for itself in that part of the world other than the pullout of superpowers, which would leave these countries to decide their own fate. He mentioned that Assistant Secretary Crocker discussed these issues with Soviet Deputy Minister Korniyenko the previous day. Haig repeated that US and Soviet interests were very similar, and the two powers could cooperate to obtain desired results, namely independent

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Namibia which South Africa was ready to recognize. But if the opportunity is missed, South Africa will take matters into her own hands and a long conflict would ensue which would be a tragedy to the whole region. Haig would welcome Gromyko’s comments on the above.

_Gromyko_ replied that as for Cuban troops in Angola, he saw an organic connection between the cessation of South African aggression against Angola, South African pullout from Namibia, a free Namibia as a nonaligned state and the pullout of Cuban troops from Angola. Gromyko wondered what would happen if Cuban troops would leave but aggression against Angola (air raids) does not stop, if Namibia does not become a state and if South Africa remains in Namibia. The Soviet Union was not seeking a subterfuge there, but then again there are voices in Washington which claim that Cubans will remain in Angola forever and ever. No credence should be given to such voices.

_Haig_ replied that the critical point in the settlement of the problem was near. He felt that contacts should be kept up and indicated that he would be in touch with Ambassador Dobrynin within a week or two.

Concerning Afghanistan, Haig was well aware of the difficulties involved in self-determination of that country and would be willing to have experts of the two sides meet in Moscow in July to discuss the Afghanistan issue. Haig was sure that Gromyko was aware of the US basic attitudes. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General held informal discussions with the Government of Pakistan. Bilateral discussions should look at the existing gaps which were known to Gromyko. The US side was interested in normalizing the situation in Afghanistan, in a truly nonaligned government in Kabul, a program for national reconstruction and reconciliation, provisions for the return of refugees and the total pullout of Soviet forces. All this was not an easy task, but the US was prepared to have its experts examine the differences. However, Haig did not wish to imply that he agreed with all of Gromyko’s observations, but, Haig continued, he was here to communicate and not to discuss history.

Haig then turned to Kampuchea. He felt that memory was short concerning the invasion of that country and the installation of a certain regime. It was not US inertia but the willingness on the part of the US to let the people of the region determine their fate and solve their problems. Hanoi has isolated itself from the international community by illegally occupying Kampuchea. Pol Pot was not a US choice and the US rejected him as a tyrant. At the same time, the present regime there was also tyrannical. Washington and Moscow would benefit if North Vietnam would pull out its troops, if a referendum could be held about self-determination in that region. In addition, Moscow would not have to bear the substantial costs of that operation. The US is willing to work with Hanoi only if Hanoi pulls out of Kampuchea and allows the people self-determination.
The situation in Laos is ambiguous, there are conflicting forces and influences but a normalization there would be desirable. Nations of that region should take the lead and the US would be willing to cooperate but so far has met with intransigence.

Haig then turned to the Polish question, which he regarded as difficult and an obstacle to East-West relations. He felt that no expert or student of the situation would exclude a collapse in Poland during the summer or fall. This in turn could lead to total anarchy. He felt that the relaxation of present measures would involve a certain risk, but to improve relations it would be necessary to introduce a reform along the lines proposed by US and West European countries. This would consist of the following: a dialogue with Solidarity, a release of prisoners, but most importantly, release of Lech Walesa who would conduct the dialogue with the regime. It was clear that resentment was deep-seated in Poland and that there may be difficulties. However, the continuation of the status quo will unleash difficulties not only of an economic but also of a political nature. Polish leaders should attempt a normalization of conditions and not preserve the status quo. The US side was not rigid in its view and would respond to any meaningful move. But the release of Walesa, who is a symbol to the Polish people, was essential, as was a role for the Polish church, since it is an element of moderation. Some prisoners would have to be released, and martial law would have to be removed because it represented a state of oppression. Haig also wished to make an observation that the US is deeply concerned about the situation in Poland and that there might be more trouble on the horizon. Western powers could bring no relief unless certain steps were first taken by the Polish regime. The weeks and months ahead could be very difficult and the US side could see the dilemma that the Polish regime was facing.

As for China, Haig assured Gromyko that the US did not believe its relations with that country should affect its relations with the Soviet Union. This policy goes back to the early 70’s. The US was interested in maintaining good relations with one billion Chinese, but Haig assured Gromyko that President Reagan will never play the China card nor will the US do anything in relations with China that would undermine its relations with the Soviet Union. Haig repeated that the China card is not in the US lexicon. Returning to a statement by Gromyko, in which he accused the US of trying to veto the relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba, Haig now felt that Gromyko should not veto US relations with China.

As for Cuba, Haig felt that the statement by Cuban Vice President Rodriguez in the United Nations was an outrage to the US and to world opinion. That the source of Cuban arms was in Moscow was well known. The statement by Rodriguez that the shipments occurred
before the increased tension in the area is a manifestation of Cuban 
offensive activity in that area.

In summing up the discussion of regional issues, Haig felt that the 
review was useful but the level of actual progress had declined. Haig 
would hope to narrow the differences of opinion on South Africa, on 
Afghanistan and other issues that were still to be solved. He felt that it 
would be a tragedy for the American and the Soviet people to squander 
valuable resources in difficult times.

_Haig_ said he wanted to move now to several bilateral issues, such 
as the consulates in New York and Kiev and human rights, which were 
sensitive to the Soviet Union but presented a political problem in the 
United States. Haig could give details not as an irritant but as examples 
of a burden and an obstacle to better relations. The President was 
receiving daily letters and appeals concerning Jewish emigration and 
on behalf of such individuals as Shcharanskiy. Then there are the 
START talks to think about. As for tensions in Afghanistan, in Poland 
and human rights—the new Administration does not display a rigid 
mentality but it reflects the attitude of the American people. Many 
people react to small things; they react positively to positive gestures.

Haig started to ask Gromyko about his press conference on Mon-
day, but _Gromyko_ asked to speak on the Middle East first. Gromyko 
did not wish to trade accusations about Cuba but asked again that the 
U.S. not pressure Cuba and start building normal relations with that 
country on the basis of the UN Charter and international legal norms. 
“Do not throw stones into our garden—as the Russian proverb goes,” 
he added. As for China, there was of course no veto on any relations 
between any countries, but he felt that US-Chinese relations might be 
developing at the expense of Soviet security, which was a concern to the 
Soviet Union. Gromyko would hope that the present US Administration 
would understand this Soviet position. He assured Haig that the Soviet 
Union will follow US-Chinese relations with great interest and adjust 
its policy accordingly.

Gromyko then turned to the situation in the Middle East. Gromyko 
wanted Haig to know that the Soviet Union was highly indignant at 
the Israeli aggression against Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and in 
Syria and he regarded it as a highly gross aggression and a gross 
provocation. The responsibility for it was not only Israel’s; the US was 
also responsible for it to a high degree. Looking at it realistically, 
Gromyko continued, no one can fail to note that the US is mainly 
responsible for that aggression. Although the US may look at it in a 
different way, this action did not decrease but in fact heightened the 
tension in the Middle East and will lead to potential complications on 
a higher level. The region of the Middle East was not distant from the 
Soviet Union and the Soviet Union was interested in it in general and
also from the point of view of Soviet security. The Soviet Union does not believe that the Israeli gain of additional territory will help Israel’s security. To hold this view indicates a narrow, even a primitive approach, to that whole question. Those who do it do not understand the full picture and the potential danger in it.

The Soviet Union believes that there is more explosive material in the Middle East now than there was before. It would be prudent for the US to influence the Israelis to pull out from Lebanon and not to seize any new territory. After all, Israel did annex the Golan Heights. Neither the Palestinians nor the Lebanese claim any legitimate Israeli territory. He would hope that US will exert pressure on Israel and should know the Soviet point of view.

Secondly, Gromyko felt that since the more dangerous and more complicated situation in the Middle East was due to Israeli aggression, a Middle East conference should be convened with the states and forces participating in it—Gromyko will not name a list of the participants since that was an old Soviet proposal elucidated by Leonid Brezhnev during the Party Congress. He asked Haig not to be distracted by momentary considerations but to look at the long-range possibilities because there were other unresolved issues of that region regardless of Egypt, and possible solutions to unresolved questions could possibly be found in such a conference. Gromyko was sure that the US could be helpful in such an arrangement.

As a separate issue, Gromyko wanted Haig to know how the USSR regarded US thinking that giving more arms to Israel would be helpful. Gromyko knew that Israel was saturated with arms, and he knew that if all the arms were to be put into a big pile, the diameter of that pile would be larger than Israeli territory. As a separate issue, Arabs in some respect cannot compete with Israel today but who would know about tomorrow? Gromyko knew that these fateful events of the last few weeks were causing much headache to Haig. Haig immediately retorted that, yes, he had been swallowing aspirins lately.

Gromyko continued that the sides may disagree on many Middle Eastern issues, but a long-range settlement was essential and would benefit not only the people of that area but also improve US-Soviet relations. He repeated that his side was full of indignation but he was now ready to listen to Haig’s views.

Haig replied that it was wrong to blame the US for the tragedy in the Middle East. He wanted Gromyko to know that for the last eleven months his government struggled to prevent the tragedy; that the US was working with the Saudis on this question; and that the ceasefire held for eleven months. He referred Gromyko to his Chicago speech
in May outlining three points. Haig felt that the Soviet Union contributed to the problem by shipping arms to the PLO and thus increasing Israeli paranoia. The US tried to deal with the problem until the situation broke down. The US supported Resolutions 508 and 509. The US side took steps to moderate the attitude of the Israeli government. At the same time, there was no help from the Soviet government, which vetoed the proposal for a peace force in the Sinai and at no time did the US condone Israeli action. Haig suggested that one should not rush to conclusions as to what brought about the current state of affairs. The US is for a prompt Israeli pullback and a return of Lebanese territory to the Lebanese government. The government within a government by the PLO has now ceased to exist, and the Palestinian movement should be responsible to the Lebanese government.

As for the situation in Iran and Iraq, the US remained impartial in that region and supplied no arms, while the Soviet Union does supply arms to both sides and is creating an even greater danger.

Gromyko immediately replied that US information was wrong, that the Soviet Union only supplied a small quantity of spare parts, due to inertia. However, rumors were being circulated by each side claiming that the other side is receiving arms from the Soviet Union.

Gromyko continued that Haig’s accusation that the Soviet Union was responsible for Israeli action was unacceptable. He felt that it was US attitude that allowed Israel to act with impunity. He then warned Haig to be aware that Israel may try to colonize the United States. Gromyko then concluded that it was his position and the position of the Soviet leadership that the US should take effective measures to make Israel pull out of Lebanon. The Soviet Union will try to maintain peace in the Middle East, but the Soviet Union does not agree to Israeli capture of Arab territory and it therefore proposes a conference to find a political solution to the problems in that area. Among other things, the Soviet Union felt that the Palestinian desire for statehood was justified.

Gromyko still had two issues to discuss. With respect to SALT II, could the Soviet Union expect the US to observe the provisions of SALT II, although the agreement was never ratified? If so, the Soviet Union would abide by these provisions, except for those which have become obsolete because of the passage of time and because of the Protocol.

Haig replied in the affirmative and assured that the US will maintain this position. Gromyko intervened by saying that in the past Haig’s

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5 For the text of Haig’s speech before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, May 26, see Department of State Bulletin, July 1982, pp. 44-47.
6 See footnote 2, Document 179.
answers were so careful that they did plant some seeds of doubt in his mind. Haig said that his reply is still the same, namely that the SALT II arrangements will be important for the Geneva talks and will be addressed in detail in START. The President has stated publicly that the US will abide by existing agreements as long as the Soviet Union does the same.7

Gromyko then asked about an answer to a Brezhnev/Reagan summit. He felt that a clear answer was needed.

Haig replied that first of all the US side was disappointed that Brezhnev could not attend the Disarmament Conference.8 Had he done so, the US side would have invited him to visit with President Reagan, as the President had made clear. Secondly, as for the summit, this issue was pushed forward by newspaper articles. In principle, the President is looking forward to meeting Mr. Brezhnev, and Soviet official statements about a summit, its purpose and significance were well known. Summits need preparatory work so that the outcome of a summit meeting could be perceived before the event. Otherwise, such meetings could be disappointing. Therefore, in principle the US is in favor of a summit before the end of the year but much will depend on a joint assessment of the situation, the possible benefits, the timeliness and the results leading to an improvement of relations. In the past, there were summits for the sake of having a summit. Haig felt that his view was close to Gromyko’s attitude. Gromyko replied that he would be ready for an American reply as to the time and place of a possible summit. As for the preparatory work, Gromyko’s views were the same as Haig’s.

Haig then referred to Gromyko’s press conference on Monday9 and was confident that Gromyko will do a brilliant job. Haig himself had to face the press this very afternoon. He thought it useful to exchange views on what is to be said at the press conference.

Gromyko replied that he would limit himself to describing the meetings as useful without going into any content of these talks. Once contents were disclosed there would be no end to questions from the press. Haig replied that he would not cross this line, and would describe the exchange as dealing with bilateral, global and areas of mutual

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7 Reference is to the President’s remarks at Arlington National Cemetery at Memorial Day Ceremonies on May 31: “As for existing strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, vol. I, pp. 708–709)


9 June 21.
concern. Gromyko proposed that the talks be only described as useful. However, as for other issues, such as disarmament, each side would be free to state its position.

To put the lid on this meeting, Gromyko said, he felt that all issues were discussed on the level of main principles. He then pointed out that he, Gromyko, Brezhnev and other Soviet officials when negotiating with the US side never bring ideological views into the field of foreign policy. He never mentioned ideology to Haig or tried to convert him to Marxism. In this connection, he wanted to point out that any brave talk against other ideologies, even cursing the ideology of the other side, even trying to bury socialism with or without honor, or saying who would or would not attend this funeral, was a waste of time. His side never indulged in it, and he did not believe in mixing ideology with foreign policy. Having said that, he considered the meeting closed and was ready to put his eyeglasses away.

Before closing, Haig wished to make an observation. He felt sure that both sides adhered to the above principles but Haig wanted to make clear that attacks on personalities should be excluded from political polemics. He stressed that the US side felt strongly about it, perhaps the Soviet side less so. Gromyko hastened to assure Haig that his side, too, was against such attacks but that things did happen in the press, especially in the US press, and the press tended to sin in this respect. US press 99 percent, the Soviet press one percent.

Meeting was adjourned at 1:40 p.m.

188. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Al Haig’s Meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko June 18–19, 1982

Al held two drawn-out meetings with Gromyko: the one on June 18 (Tab A) was to concentrate on arms control, the one on June 19 (Tab B) was to deal with regional problems but because there was so little

new to say on this subject, the second meeting, too, switched to arms control. (S)

In the first session, Gromyko restated old Soviet claims, insisting that when due allowance was made for their different enemies and allies, the two great powers had nuclear parity. As concerns concrete proposals he could think of nothing fresh to say and reiterated the need to revive the Vladivostok Accords and SALT II. He appeared particularly upset by your bold proposals for arms reductions which have helped defuse the global unilateral disarmament movement on which Moscow counts heavily to soften our determination to build up U.S. defenses. (S)

The second day’s discussions indicated little flexibility on Moscow’s part. Gromyko remained unyielding on Afghanistan though he agreed to uncommitting Embassy-level talks on this subject. He had nothing new to say on Central America and the Caribbean, or on the Middle East. Only in discussing Southern Africa did he hint at possible concessions in the sense that the Soviet Union might consider a Namibian settlement if there were ways of guaranteeing a Marxist-Leninist regime in Angola following the departure of Cuban troops. He was bitter over your “economic warfare” policies, including the expansion of the gas and oil sanctions. (S)

Gromyko pressed for a commitment on a summit which is important to certain factions in the Soviet leadership—those, like himself, grouped around Brezhnev—inasmuch as by meeting formally with the Soviet leader you help legitimize his status at home. (S)

In all, the meeting indicated no change in Soviet policy and no move toward serious negotiations and compromises. Gromyko’s evident anxiety and inflexibility reflect the disarray which the opening of the succession struggle and its recent military and psychological defeats have engendered in Moscow. The Kremlin is still on “hold”. (S)
Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan

Washington, June 19, 1982

SUBJECT

MY JUNE 18 SESSION WITH GROMYKO

This session lasted five hours, and we concentrated (by his choice as guest and thus first speaker in our UN Mission) on principles and on arms control. We will deal with critical regional security issues when we resume tomorrow; he told me he would start with the Middle East, and I told him I would start with Poland. It was a tough session, and I expect tomorrow's exchange to be similarly rough.

Gromyko was clearly on the defensive, following your successful European trip, the unveiling of your program for arms control and your U.N. speech. He complained forcefully and at length that in fashioning our arms control proposals, we have ignored the long-standing Soviet insistence upon "equal security". His presentation was one long protestation of Soviet innocence while blaming the U.S. for the deterioration of our relationship and international relations generally.

His detailed comments on arms control made clear again that when the Soviets talk about equal security they mean we must admit that an overall nuclear and conventional balance currently exists because they deserve special compensation for their geography and for our Allies' military strength and systems. He pressed hard for the resuscitation of inadequate arms control agreements of the past, especially the Soviet 1974 Vladivostok accord and SALT II. He reiterated the Soviet nuclear non-first-use pledge he made at the U.N. on Tuesday.3

In response, I told him in no uncertain terms that strict equality is the only basis for agreements between us; that previous agreements were inadequate because they failed to limit the most destabilizing systems in both sides' arsenals; and that reductions in these systems are the only good answer. I told him that the nuclear non-first-use pledge is entirely self-serving given the tremendous Soviet conventional advantage, and restated that in NATO Europe, the West would never be the first to initiate conflict at any level. It is the Soviet Union,
I pointed out, that bears full responsibility for deterioration in relations because it has used and continues to use or help others to use force.

Overall, I came away from the session impressed with how worried and disturbed Gromyko was at the degree to which we have seized the high ground and the initiative in East-West relations. What worries the Soviets the most is your comprehensive program for arms control.

American newsmen tell us he is planning a major press conference for Monday\(^4\) (the day he was originally scheduled to depart for Moscow), and I expect him to make some of the same points he made yesterday, and in general, to try to regain some of the high ground for the Soviets through accusations that we have gone over to the offensive and are refusing to negotiate seriously and sincerely etc., in contrast to them. I therefore plan to meet with the press today, partly to draw some of his poison preemptively, mainly to maintain the offensive on arms control and East-West relations overall that you have seized.

Tab B

Memorandum From Secretary of State Haig to President Reagan\(^5\)

Washington, June 20, 1982

SUBJECT
My Session with Gromyko, June 19

Today’s session lasted four and a third hours, and was devoted largely to regional issues as I had planned. And, as I expected, it was as rough as yesterday’s meeting.

We went over the whole gamut of U.S. regional concerns, from Poland to Kampuchea, and also discussed the Middle East at his initiative.

On Poland, Gromyko listened impassively while I stated our position on the problems and the prospects, and offered no indication of give. But he reacted bitterly to your decision to extend sanctions, as announced in the newspapers. He complained that it coincided with our meeting, claimed it represented economic warfare, and predicted it would spill over into political relations, since they cannot be separated. Agreeing with the last point, I explained that business-as-usual is

\(^4\) June 21.
\(^5\) Secret; Sensitive.
impossible and that economic relations cannot improve so long as Soviet behavior in Poland, Afghanistan, etc., remains unchanged.

On Afghanistan, Gromyko gave no hint of a change in the Soviet position. As you and I agreed, however, I did suggest that Ambassador Hartman conduct intensified bilateral discussions in Moscow in July, and Gromyko agreed.

The exchange on Central America and the Caribbean was standard: I reiterated the dangers we see and the importance of the issue in our relationship, with particular reference to Soviet military shipments, while Gromyko insisted once again that we must settle with the locals, but that the Soviets will not stand in the way.

Southern Africa presented the one slight ray of hope in an otherwise somber meeting. Gromyko continued to hint that the Soviets would be willing to stand aside from a Namibia settlement which included a Cuban withdrawal from Angola. His major concern seemed to be the stability of the Angola Government and the threat from Savimbi. I told him that reconciliation among the factions in Angola is something the parties must work out themselves. The Soviets understand that we are working hard for a genuine settlement, and that they will bear the onus for failure if it fails.

On the Middle East, Gromyko repeated all the familiar Soviet claims and proposals about the area. They are obviously smarting from the beating their clients have taken. I made clear that we are working hard on the problem, and remain the only major power capable of moving the disputes of the area toward settlement. Gromyko did raise the possibility that the Soviets will call again for an international conference, and this is something we should be watching carefully in the days ahead.

Toward the end of the meeting Gromyko raised the possibility of a summit. I expressed regret that Brezhnev had not been able to attend the SSOD and meet with you, and explained that much would depend on future developments and the possibility of carefully prepared results. He did not seem entirely satisfied, concluding that we should let them know when we have chosen a date and place. For obvious political reasons, I think, the Soviets are anxious to have a summit as soon as possible.

Gromyko also returned to the question of respecting SALT II commitments, asking for more precise details about what you meant when you said we would not undercut existing agreements as long as they do not. I was deliberately vague in response, saying we are comfortable with existing policy, and any questions should be discussed by our negotiators in Geneva.

Finally, I made a pitch on humanitarian issues with special reference to Jewish emigration, citing your interest and pointing out that
small gestures in this field can have a disproportionately large payoff in overall relations.

It was a wearing meeting, but useful, and not only in the sense that it registered the fact of superpower dialogue in tense times. It built on the momentum you have created in our favor in recent days and weeks by presenting a sensible, full-scale program for arms control negotiations and getting Allied support for it by making absolutely clear to the Soviets that our full agenda is intact, and that we will not be able to move forward on a broad front unless they are willing to take all our concerns into account—regional security, military security, human rights and other bilateral issues—and act on them.

189. Editorial Note

On June 18, 1982, President Ronald Reagan convened the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room at the White House, from 1:15 to 2 p.m., to discuss East-West sanctions. Attendees included the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs William Clark, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldridge, Counselor to the President Edwin Meese, Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, Secretary of Energy James Edwards, and Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Geza Feketekuty, who represented U.S. Trade Representative William Brock. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger represented Secretary of State Alexander Haig. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)

In his memoir, Haig contended that Clark had purposely scheduled the meeting to coincide with Haig’s meeting with Gromyko at the United Nations in New York City. “As my deputy, Walt Stoessel, was also unavailable, Larry Eagleburger represented the State Department in our place. By now fearful of the worst, but determined that the historical record would show that the State Department had fought for a rational course of policy, I instructed Eagleburger to oppose the extension of sanctions to overseas manufacturers. Eagleburger did so with his usual capability, but when the moment for decision came, Clark placed only the strongest option paper before Reagan, who uncharacteristically approved it on the spot.” (Haig, Caveat, page 312)

In a diary entry of June 18, Reagan wrote: “Met to finally decide whether to lift sanctions on pipe line material to Soviets. Cabinet very divided. I ruled we would not remove sanctions. There hadn’t been the slightest move on the Soviets part to change their evil ways.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, Volume I, pages 137–138) That day, the White House released a statement in Reagan’s name: “I have reviewed the sanctions on the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union imposed on December 30, 1981, and have decided to extend these sanctions through adoption of new regulations to include equipment produced by subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad, as well as equipment produced abroad under licenses by U.S. companies.” (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1982, page 798) On June 22, Reagan signed National Security Directive Decision 41, which renewed the sanctions on the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union imposed on December 31, 1981, and extended them “to include equipment produced by subsidiaries of U.S. companies abroad as well as equipment produced abroad under licenses issued by U.S. companies.” (Reagan Library, Myer Files, Oil/Gas Technology/USSR (1))

190. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 24, 1982, 9–10:20 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

Minutes of 6–24–82 meeting on export controls on oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union

**PARTICIPANTS**

William P. Clark
Senator Charles Percy
Business executives and Congressmen (See Tab I)²

*Judge Clark:* In his opening remarks, Judge Clark reviewed the original purpose of the sanctions and stated that the President had selected to respond to the repression in Poland with a measured embargo. He made clear that principle is an important part of the

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² Not found attached.
President’s life and that this is reflected in his policies. The embargo was described as being “conditional” with periodic reviews. The complete lifting of the sanctions would be contingent on fulfillment of the three stated preconditions for advancing human freedoms and reconciliation in Poland. Since the inception of the sanctions, the question of how far they would be extended was left open.

The President warned the Soviets at the time that he would be compelled to take further action if the repression continued unabated. As a result of the President’s decision on June 18,3 the sanctions were extended “to the full reach of the law.” During the course of Al Haig’s meeting with Gromyko4 in the interim, Gromyko provided indications that a thaw would occur in Poland and that the sanctions were creating difficulties. Judge Clark stated that our intelligence confirms that the sanctions are raising havoc at a time when the Soviets are scrambling for hard currency earnings. He further stated that Gromyko’s representations were not borne out—Walesa is still confined even further from his home—with virtually no movement toward reconciliation.

The President continued to defer a decision on the controls until after the Versailles Summit.5 At no time did we suggest that a decision was conditional on progress concerning the credit initiative. We have been in constant communication with the Allies through State, Commerce and other agencies and carefully monitoring the Polish situation. After Versailles—where there were “certain results and non-results”—the President again deliberated on this issue. The Polish situation was judged as not having improved and even worsened—thus the President acted on the same leverage principle—the sanctions were extended to the reach that the law will allow “which is yet to be determined.”

Since the decision the Administration has received a “parade” of complaints from the British, West Germans and others. Nevertheless, Judge Clark made clear that the President will not retreat from this solid principle until there is “some deed or sign from the Soviet Bloc.” Judge Clark stated that he hoped these measures would be temporary and that we have information that the East Bloc is deeply concerned about their economic situation. He assured the group that the President would be briefed on the results of the meeting.

Senator Percy: The Senator stated that there was “no one in this room who does not put country ahead of company.” The question raised was: “How do we back our country effectively?” He further questioned if the sanctions were devastating a part of the US business

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3 See Document 189.
4 See Documents 186 and 187.
5 A reference to the Versailles G–7, which took place from June 4 to 6.
community with no results or negative impact on the Soviets. He proceeded to encourage the respective business executives to state their concerns.

Caterpillar (Lee Morgan):

Background

—Until mid-1978 the company had 85% of Soviet pipelayer business. Due to “on again—off again” USG policies, it was down to only a 15% market share.

—12,000 man-years of jobs lost to US because of transfer of business to Japan (Komatsu).

—Overall, 17,000 workers laid off by the company (35% of employees).

—Operating at “break-even” level. Situation described as “major disaster.”

Political component (US policy)

—Heavy tractors and pipelayers are comprised of 70% commonly available pieces.

—Can sell upper machine but not lower machine (boom). Given the low technology of the boom, this restriction was termed “ridiculous.”

—Equipment reportedly would not delay the pipeline and only result in loss of business.

—Due to sanctions policy, the Soviet market is closed to the company. Soviets now refuse to even discuss general machines not restricted by the embargo because of the company’s perceived support for USG policy and the President in this matter.

—Company has $1 million in Soviet ordered items having to be scrapped.

—Carrying costs on other inventory was $4.5 million due to two-year period to sell elsewhere.

—Seen as needless sacrifice as pipeline will be built anyway.

Political component (domestic)

—Congressman Bill Michel presently running for reelection in a rearranged district with 50% of the district new (increase from 41% to 46% democratic).

—8,000 out of work in Peoria alone—UAW very concerned and is “making considerable hay” out of President’s decision. Using slogan “Reagan/Michel sanctions.”

—Republican Leader of the House put in political jeopardy.

Senator Percy: Saw chance of splitting Alliance on this issue.
General Electric (John Welch)
—No question that Soviet gas delivery schedule would be delayed by the sanctions.
—GE has 15-year relationship with USSR. Sanctions are very damaging to reliability as a partner.
—Althosm-Atlantique told GE they would build rotors if the government of France gave instructions. GE informed them they would not ship.
—Total of some $500 million in business lost. “They will laugh at our regulations and build anyway.” “AEG may go belly-up.”
—UK has misread our intentions and reportedly gave John Brown “go ahead” to build despite sanctions.

Senator Percy: Said he met with Chancellor Schmidt and that FRG will also give green light to its companies. Restated concern over fracturing Alliance.

Fiat-Allis (87% owned by Fiat)
—Described the large size of Russian orders which Komatsu is now filling due to sanctions. Reiterated low technology of its company’s equipment and ready availability of alternative suppliers.
—Made 1000 tractor sales in past 3 years. Reported Russian offer to pay $150 million up front for deliveries over several years. “Fallout effect tremendous in Midwest.”
—Fiat doing business since 1932—questioned constraint on selling outdated technology at a time of worst downturn in construction history.

GE
—Commented that they are the company that can “delay or not delay” the pipeline while others are only giving over business to foreign competitors.
—GE can absorb sanctions as they are larger and stronger. Favored differentiation approach to sanctions.

Secretary Baldrige: Expressed less confidence in substantial delay in the pipeline caused by sanctions.

Senator Percy: Cited some inconsistency of principle due to President’s coming out against grain embargo.

Judge Clark: Stated he would review the possibility of differentiating products affected by the sanctions but could make no commitments. Reiterated his concern over the issue of US credibility.

Secretary Baldrige: Cited extreme difficulty in making a case-by-case determination for exceptions to the sanctions due to the way the regulations are drafted and “the legal reality.”
John Deere (Robert Hanson)

—Overall 9,500 workers laid off. Stated that unilateral sanctions have not in the past accomplished our objectives. Showed concern over being viewed as reliable supplier.

NSC staff member: Referenced intelligence reports concerning the serious difficulties encountered by the Soviets and European suppliers to the pipeline as a result of the sanctions. Provided the example of the higher cost of the Althsom substitute rotors which would reportedly wipe out the profit margin of John Brown’s Engineering turbine contract. Prospect of cancellation of contracts if Soviets would not allow the extra cost of Althsom rotors to be added on the original contract price (on assumption Soviets should select this alternative).

General Electric: Stated they had different information on the behavior and level of concern of the European manufacturers. Agreed that Althsom rotors were unrealistically priced.

Senator Percy: Requested CIA cable traffic on the pipeline.

NSC staff member

—in an effort to summarize the Administration’s position on the President’s June 18 action and respond to questions and statements made by other participants, the following points were made:

Grain versus December 29 Sanctions

• These policies should be differentiated.

• Pipeline sanctions are part of a measured and selective response to the Polish situation.

• Past Administration’s Afghanistan embargo demonstrated the unilateral sacrifice to our farmers from using a grain sanction due to abundant alternative suppliers of this fungible commodity. (EC sales increased 400% to USSR in helping to offset US supply shortfalls.)

Select US oil and gas technology and equipment is unique and extremely difficult to replace with substitutes.

• Pipeline will generate a huge amount of hard currency ($6–8 billion annually), while grain absorbs an even greater volume of hard currency ($11–12 billion in the last purchasing year).

—No negotiations in progress on a new long-term grain agreement. We have reserved our options on grain.

Framework in which to view President’s decision:

Were the President to have lifted the sanctions or maintained unchanged:

• Would undermine US credibility, will and consistency in being able to pursue a stated policy toward Polish authorities and the Soviet
Union; i.e., demonstration to USSR and Allies alike that “stonewalling” the US over a sufficient period of time will result in the USG unilaterally “caving in.” Danger of being viewed as a country with a policy half-life of six months—US would appear indecisive and weak.

- Commercial interests cannot be allowed to supersede principles. If the business community and trade relations were permitted to be totally insulated and sheltered from advancing important US foreign policy objectives:
  —The denial of the foremost non-military policy tool available to the US for moderating Soviet geopolitical behavior, particularly given its limping economy.
  —If not the repression in Poland, then when do we interrupt “business as usual” with an aggressive Soviet customer? If not the United States, then who will lead the Alliance away from undue dependency on Soviet gas and providing the USSR with the necessary hard currency to pursue its geopolitical objectives?

Conclusion: The meeting concluded with perceptions concerning the wisdom of the sanctions policy still significantly different. However, all agreed that it had been a highly useful session and a dialogue that should be continued.

191. Editorial Note

Disputes over policy and procedure led to the disintegration of relations between Secretary of State Alexander Haig and President Ronald Reagan at the beginning of the summer of 1982. On June 25, 1982, Reagan wrote in his diary: “Today was the day—I told Al H. I had decided to accept his resignation. He didn’t seem surprised but he said his differences were on policy and then said we didn’t agree on China or Russia etc. I made a simple announcement to the press and said I was nominating George Shultz for the job. I’d called him & like the patriot he is he said ‘yes.’ This has been a heavy load. Up to Camp David where we were in time to see Al read his letter of resignation on T.V. I’m told it was his 4th re-write. Apparently his 1st was pretty strong—then he thought better of it. I must say it was O.K. He gave only one reason & did say there was a disagreement on foreign policy. Actually the only disagreement was over whether I made policy or the Sec. of State did.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Volume I, page 139) In his own memoir, Haig recalled: “The President was accepting a letter of resignation that I had not submitted.” (Haig, Caveat, page 314)
On June 26, the Department sent telegram 177670 to the Embassy in Moscow with a message from Haig to Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko: “Dear Mr. Minister: You have by now received word of my decision to resign as Secretary of State. After intense and prolonged consideration, I concluded that the nation’s interests would best be served by leaving the service of my country at this time. My decision, you can be sure, will in no way affect the state of relations between our two countries. The United States will persevere in its efforts to achieve a more stable and constructive long-term relationship with the Soviet Union. The policies which the United States has pursued over the past year and a half are those of the President, and they shall endure. As I turn over my responsibilities, you should know that I have valued my own relationship with you. We have had frank, but useful exchanges on the many issues that face our two countries. My successor will, I know, continue to attach great importance to this dialogue. I urge you, Mr. Minister, to work closely with him in the months and years ahead; the welfare of both of our countries, and the world at large, will depend in large measure on what the two of you are able to accomplish together.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820006-0154)

192. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan

Moscow, July 7, 1982

Dear Mr. President,

The situation in Lebanon and in its capital—Beirut, in particular, is assuming an even more tragic character. The Israeli forces are engaged in blanket destruction of the Lebanese and the Palestinians—women, children and the elderly. Israel perpetrates in Beirut acts of sheer vandalism against the civilian population and destroys the vital functions of the city.

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290425, 8290431, 8290480). No classification marking. A typewritten note at the top of the letter reads: “Unofficial translation.” Dobrynin delivered the text of the letter and the Soviet Embassy’s unofficial translation to Acting Secretary of State Stoessel on July 7. (Telegram 188302 to Moscow, July 8; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) Bremer sent the letter to Clark under cover of a July 7 memorandum.
No matter what political criteria you may apply to the events in Lebanon one perfectly obvious fact is undeniable—a barbaric destruction of people is taking place there by Israel which is in fact an ally of the U.S. Surely, no one will believe that Washington is allegedly unable to persuade Israel to end the bloodshed and to cease fire.

Through all of its actions, especially in the latest days and hours, the aggressor demonstrates that it cannot wait consummating its criminal acts, with no thought being given whatsoever to what new mountains of hatred it is creating around the Israeli state and the Jewish people. Indeed those mountains can crush on them in the future with all their weight.

Today, perhaps, even leaders with stone hearts cannot turn a deaf ear to the appeals of those who every day and every hour are dying in Beirut and in Lebanon by the hand of the Israeli invaders.

I wish to express the hope that at this critical moment in the events in Lebanon and around that country the sense of responsibility and common reason will, after all, prevail over calculations of expedient and momentary nature, and that the U.S. will do all in its power so that there be a cease-fire and the mission of the U.S. emissary in the Middle East stop serving as a screen for continuing the Israeli aggression.

If various plans come into being right now with regard to participation of some international forces in achieving separation between the forces defending West Beirut, on the one hand, and the Israeli troops, on the other, what is the reason for not using the U.N. military units which are already deployed on the Lebanese soil by a decision of the Security Council?

We are aware of your statement that you are prepared in principle to send a contingent of American forces to Lebanon.\(^2\) I must warn you that, if this actually takes place, the Soviet Union will conduct its policy taking this fact into account.

I expect that you will consider the matters raised in my present message with all due seriousness and urgency.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

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\(^2\) Reference is to a July 6 press conference in Los Angeles where Reagan stated: “The Lebanese Government has not made a formal proposal, but I have agreed in principle to contribute a small contingent of U.S. personnel, subject to certain conditions.” (\textit{Public Papers: Reagan}, 1982, vol. II, p. 899)
Washington, July 9, 1982, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.S.R.
Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
United States
Acting Secretary Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

In response to Dobrynin’s suggestion that we have lunch before his departure for the Soviet Union on consultations and leave on July 14, I invited him to lunch at the Department July 9. Following are the highlights of our conversation.

U.S.-SOVIET AFFAIRS

General

Dobrynin asked how I saw the future development of relations between our two countries. He could tell me quite frankly that the view of most of the Politburo members was that it was “hopeless” to expect an improvement in the relationship during the Reagan Administration. He acknowledged that the President himself had toned down somewhat the sharpness of his anti-Soviet rhetoric and this was helpful. However, the President still referred to the idea—which Dobrynin called “ridiculous”—that the Soviet Union could be toppled by economic sanctions.

Overall, Dobrynin said the view in Moscow was that the general attitude of the Reagan Administration toward the Soviet Union was so negative that it was simply not realistic to think in terms of a basic improvement of relations. It is true that we are talking about various subjects, but the talk refers only to details and no progress is made. He felt that what is needed is a break with this approach and a new initiative from the U.S. which could overcome the obstacles between us.

In response, I said that the U.S. Administration took a realistic view of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. It was true that we were critical of many aspects of Soviet performance and policies. No one hid this, least of all the President, and I thought this attitude was reflective of...
the wide majority of the U.S. people. In this regard, I noted our concern, *inter alia*, about the Soviet military buildup; Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; Soviet pressures against Poland; increased Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba; and continued support of Communist interference in Central America. I said that progress on such issues would be welcomed and would contribute to improving the climate between our two countries.

With regard to Afghanistan, I noted our proposal for beginning expert talks in Moscow July 22–23 and said we hope the Soviets would agree to this. Dobrynin thought that this proposal already had been approved and promised to check on it.

Referring to Poland, I said we continued to hope that steps would be taken in Poland to lift martial law, release the prisoners and reinstitute a dialogue with Solidarity. I wondered if any moves in this direction could be expected on July 22, the Polish National Day. Dobrynin made no substantive response.

I raised the question of Namibian independence and said that Secretary Haig had the impression from his talk with Gromyko that the Soviet Union might be interested in working cooperatively to create conditions to make independence possible.

Dobrynin confirmed that the Soviets would be interested in further discussions in this regard. I indicated that we might propose a continuation of expert talks with the Soviets as a follow-up to the discussions Assistant Secretary Crocker had in New York with Korniyenko.\(^2\) Dobrynin said this would be viewed favorably.

**Summit**

Dobrynin asked for our views regarding a U.S.-Soviet Summit. He disclaimed any intention of pressing for such a meeting, but said that Secretary Haig had agreed “in principle” to such a meeting in his discussion with Gromyko in New York.\(^3\) Dobrynin said that the Soviets consider that the ball is now in our court to come up with suggestions for a time and place for a summit. He recalled that Brezhnev had spoken of a meeting in October in either Helsinki or Geneva.

I said that, as the President had suggested, he would have been prepared to meet with Brezhnev in New York at the time of the UN Special Session on Disarmament. In general, we felt that any summit meeting should be well prepared and should hold the prospect of positive results.

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\(^2\) On June 16, Chester Crocker and Georgiy Kornienko met in New York to discuss Namibia.

\(^3\) See Documents 186 and 187.
Dobrynin agreed and inquired whether we were now engaged in specific preparation for a summit. I said that I felt the talks already underway on INF and START could be considered in this light; we would wish to review the status of those talks as well as anything which might develop from our contacts on Afghanistan and Southern Africa in connection with our consideration of a summit meeting. Poland is important, too.

Dobrynin observed that Secretary Shultz and Gromyko presumably would be meeting in New York at the time of the General Assembly in September. It would be natural to expect that they would take up the question of a summit meeting at that time; while the period following New York and before a possible summit in October would be short, it probably still would be possible to prepare adequately for a summit.

Humanitarian Questions

I referred to the general area of humanitarian questions, including emigration, reunification of families and treatment of dissidents and said that progress on these would be very helpful in terms of our relationship. These matters, of course, were of concern to the Administration, to Congress and to the general public.

I drew particular attention to the situation of the Pentacostalists and expressed hope for a favorable resolution of this long-standing problem. I also mentioned the recent cases involving U.S.-Soviet marriages, noting that two Soviets spouses of American citizens were now on a hunger strike to protest their inability to receive visas to come to the United States to join their wives.

Dobrynin had no substantive comment to make on these questions except to say that family reunification cases are easier to handle than emigration cases (the latter presumably a reference to the Pentacostalists).

Dobrynin said that he understood that our list of reunification cases had decreased and said he attached importance to resolving reunification questions.

Secretary-Designate Shultz

Dobrynin noted that the Secretary-Designate had visited Moscow several times and was known to some of the Soviet leaders. He thought this was a positive factor. He recalled that, whatever Secretary Haig’s views may have been, the anti-Soviet rhetoric of his speeches had been particularly noted in Moscow and had not been appreciated. He hoped Secretary Shultz would avoid such statements.

Dobrynin said he had heard a rumor that Mr. Shultz would be making a trip to China in the near future and asked if this was true.
I said I had heard nothing about such a trip and that the Secretary-Designate’s travel plans for the fall had not been worked out.

Dobrynin wondered if it would be possible for him to call on the Secretary-Designate before his (Dobrynin’s) departure the afternoon of July 14. He noted in this regard his status as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps. I said that the Secretary-Designate was not seeing any Ambassadors prior to his confirmation and that I did not think an appointment would be possible.

(I confirmed this to the Soviet Embassy July 10.)

INF–START

Dobrynin took a rather negative view about both negotiations. He observed that INF had been going on for many months but the two sides seemed as far apart as ever and he could not see any realistic prospect for achieving agreement. He agreed with me that the START talks had begun in a businesslike and serious manner but said this was hardly unusual. He thought the positions of the two sides seemed so different that little progress was in prospect.

LEBANON

Dobrynin asked if a reply had been made to the latest letter from Brezhnev concerning Lebanon.4 I said that it had not been, but that the President was considering it and would respond in due course. Dobrynin went over again the substance of his remarks concerning the situation in Lebanon which he made in his call on me July 7, with particular reference to the announced intention of the U.S. to send a Marine contingent to Beirut. He said he could not understand the rationale for an international force and that, in any event, he felt that U.S. forces should not be sent. If it were really necessary to have an international force, then it should be done preferably under UN auspices and using forces which would not include the U.S.

I explained in detail our views regarding the need for strengthening the central government of Lebanon and achieving peace. In this regard, as a first step it was necessary to resolve the question of the evacuation of the PLO from West Beirut. The idea of an international force and of the inclusion of a U.S. contingent had been suggested by the Lebanese. I noted that we would not send the Marines unless all parties agreed and I stressed that their stay in West Beirut would be temporary, not to exceed 30 days.

Referring to Brezhnev’s letter, I commented that some of the language could be interpreted as being threatening in nature. I also could
not understand why the Soviets had seen fit to publish almost immedi-
ately the substance of the letter; this violated the traditional confidential
character of correspondence at the highest level.

Dobrynin squirmed a bit at this saying that, while the Soviets
generally wished to observe the principle of confidentiality, the publica-
tion of the substance of the Brezhnev letter in this instance was an
indication of the Kremlin’s concern about the proposed move by the
U.S. to put its soldiers into Beirut. He said so long as the conflict
preserved a regional character involving Israelis, Palestinians and Syri-
ans, it could be regarded as something regrettable but not of major
concern. He remarked that “we would never go to war for the Syrians,
and we told the Syrians that”. However, if the U.S. forces enter the
picture, then a new element is introduced—that of the U.S.-Soviet
relationship. The Soviet Union is a super power like the United States,
Dobrynin said, and it should be understood that it would have to react
in some way if the U.S. introduced its forces. He could not predict
what the consequences would be, but there would be consequences.

Dobrynin continued that the Soviet leadership is elderly and it
could be said that this has an advantage in that old men don’t want
to take risks or get involved in new problems. At the same time, they
cannot be seen as “chicken”. If the U.S. puts Marines into Lebanon, an
area not far removed from the Soviet Union, it could be seen by some as
a challenge to the Soviet Union and this is bound to produce a reaction.

I emphasized again our peaceful intent and the limited nature of
our involvement if it occurs. I made clear that we would proceed with
our plans if there is agreement with all parties concerned.

LAW OF THE SEA

Dobrynin said he understood that we would be announcing our
opposition to signing the Law of the Sea Treaty. He was puzzled, since
he thought the U.S., like the Soviet Union, believed that the provisions
in the treaty covering navigational passage through straits, etc., were
advantageous.

I explained the problems we had with the portion of the treaty
concerning the deep seabed mining regime and said that the treaty as
it stood could never be ratified by our Senate.

Dobrynin commented that, while he could understand our objec-
tion to some of the terms of the seabed regime, he did not see why we
could not go along with the treaty as a whole, particularly since, by
our refusal to sign, we would be isolating ourselves from almost all
other nations.

SOVIET UNION—INTERNAL

In answer to my query, Dobrynin said he was not aware of any
Central Committee Plenum to be held this summer. While one could
be called on short notice, his personal view was that this was unlikely, given the absence of Brezhnev from Moscow and the vacation plans of Gromyko this summer.

I inquired whether Andropov would be chairing meetings of the Politburo in Brezhnev’s absence. Dobrynin said he did not know for certain. He remarked that, before he died, Suslov had always taken Brezhnev’s place in chairing the Politburo. After Suslov’s death, Kirilenko assumed this role. More recently, Kirilenko has not been active because of failing health and Chernenko took over the chairmanship in Brezhnev’s absence. Dobrynin acknowledged that Andropov has become “increasingly active” recently and he thought that there might be some system whereby Andropov and Chernenko would alternate in taking the Politburo chair when Brezhnev was not there. He stressed, however, that he did not know for sure.

Dobrynin speculated that Andropov may have been made responsible for ideological affairs previously supervised by Suslov. If this is the case, it might also be that Chernenko is responsible for personnel matters in the Party. Again, Dobrynin said this was all speculation on his part.

Speaking of Andropov, Dobrynin said he had always found him easy to deal with. He is a man with long experience in government and foreign affairs and is generally well informed about the world.

Commenting on the organization of the Foreign Office, Dobrynin said that Gromyko to an increasing extent is delegating day-to-day activities to his deputies, reserving to himself only items of major importance. The two deputies are Korniyenko and Maltsev. Dobrynin said that Korniyenko is the person Gromyko relies on the most; he is a professional who is thoroughly capable and experienced. On the other hand, Dobrynin said that Maltsev, while a very good person, has primarily Party background (although he did serve as Ambassador to Sweden) and is not generally as capable of handling the details of foreign affairs as is Korniyenko.

Dobrynin recalled that when Kuznetsov had left the Foreign Office position as First Deputy several years ago for the Presidium, Gromyko had wanted him (Dobrynin) to take Kuznetsov’s place. However, Dobrynin related, Brezhnev had objected to such a move, saying that Dobrynin would be more useful in the United States in view of his long experience here. Dobrynin asserted that he was quite content with this decision and that he preferred to be in Washington rather than in the Foreign Office in Moscow.
194. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)\(^1\)

Washington, July 9, 1982

SUBJECT
Talking Points for Your Meeting with Dobrynin, Monday, July 12, 1982

Ambassador Dobrynin has requested a meeting with you in order to secure information. The information he most likely seeks has to do with the President’s thinking about political, economic, and military matters, especially as these bear on the Soviet Union. Some of the President’s recent actions—notably his London speech,\(^2\) which rattled them severely, and the extension of sanctions—have thrown confusion into the Politburo. The prevalent view there had been that Ronald Reagan would sooner or later succumb to Allied pressure and the force of U.S. public opinion and adopt a more conciliatory position \textit{vis-a-vis} Moscow. His move in the opposite direction in June, combined with the concurrent departure of Haig, seems to indicate to Moscow some major shift in U.S. foreign policy the drift of which they would like to know. This is of particular importance at this time since some of them seem to have concluded (Tab I)\(^3\) that “the President is now in command of foreign policy”. (S)

I believe that it is good for us that they are uncertain and confused: this tends to make them hesitant and less aggressive. It would not serve much purpose for you to clarify in Dobrynin’s mind what our strategy is, for once they know it is easier for them to prepare effective countermeasures. It would be best therefore if, to the extent possible, you drew him out on such subjects as:

—Soviet position on Afghanistan: Do they really regard the situation there as “irreversible” (Gromyko’s words to Haig)? How long do they intend to wage this losing war?

—Soviet pressure on Poland: Do they believe that by preventing any kind of liberalization in Poland they will be able to solve Poland’s catastrophic economic situation?

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\(^1\) Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (6/30/82–7/14/82). Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “RCM has seen.” No record of Clark’s July 12 meeting with Dobrynin has been found.

\(^2\) See Document 177.

\(^3\) Not found attached.
—Concerning their own economic situation: How do they expect to overcome in the future a steadily falling rate of economic growth and perennial agrarian failures?
—Will they show flexibility in INF and START negotiations instead of reiterating fixed positions?
—Is authority in Moscow at present in secure hands? (You need not be embarrassed to ask—he will understand we must know if there is someone there we can deal with.) (S)

It will be hard to get him to talk but gentle persistence may do the trick. (S)

In response to his questions, I would stick to fixed, declared positions:

1. Sanctions: We intend to adhere to them (Gelb’s article was without substance) until and unless there is significant improvement in Poland.

2. INF and START: The President is determined to obtain equitable reductions and we are not likely to be worn out by Soviet intransigence to the point where we will start negotiating among ourselves. At the same time we do not strive for military superiority as is mistakenly asserted in Moscow.

3. Middle East: The current crisis is the result of Soviet support of Syria and the PLO which between them have destroyed Lebanon; Israel will not stay there once foreign troops are out. No return to previous situation of threatening Israel from Lebanon.

4. Summit: This can take place only if and when much progress has been made on outstanding differences between us: not in the cards yet. (S)

On all other questions I would be evasive and/or vague. (S)

You may want to make it clear that this meeting was exceptional, that you normally do not deal with Ambassadors and that in the future he should communicate with Shultz; otherwise he may feel he has opened a new “channel”. (S)

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Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Stoessel to President Reagan

Washington, July 11, 1982

SUBJECT
Response to Brezhnev’s Letter on Lebanon

The highly unusual Soviet decision to make public the substance of Brezhnev’s July 7 letter to you on Lebanon reflects growing Soviet alarm that U.S. forces might successfully be deployed in Beirut in the context of a settlement orchestrated by U.S. diplomacy. The Soviets probably are apprehensive that such an outcome would confirm the ascendancy of the U.S. and Israel in the Middle East and further accelerate the erosion of Soviet influence and prestige throughout the region. Thus, the public release of Brezhnev’s letter is almost certainly intended to impede the emerging, but still tenuous, Beirut settlement.

Specifically, the Soviets probably hope that the public warning contained in Brezhnev’s letter will:
—Appear responsive to PLO and other Arab pressure for more concrete Soviet support in the crisis, thereby stiffening PLO resolve to resist further concessions in the interest of a settlement.
—Complicate our efforts to obtain French participation in a multinational peacekeeping force for Beirut by making clear that the GOF would be acting in the face of a Soviet warning, however vague.
—Erode international support for deployment of a multinational force, by suggesting that any such deployment first receive endorsement by the UN Security Council.

The tone and substance of Brezhnev’s warning is, in itself, relatively low-key, and so was Dobrynin’s handling of it with me. The Soviets presently have few good military options for response to an actual or impending deployment of U.S. forces, given the overwhelming Israeli superiority on the ground, the weakness of the Soviet Union’s regional clients, and the presence of strong U.S. naval forces in the area.

However, the decision to make Brezhnev’s warning public will itself generate pressure on the Soviet Union to respond in some visible way, or see Soviet international credibility erode even further. Moscow might either privately or publicly insist that its forces be included in any multinational force organized for Beirut.

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290425, 8290431, 8290480). Secret; Sensitive.
2 See Document 192.
The Soviets could further increase their naval presence in the Mediterranean or increase the visibility of their resupply efforts to Syria. It is conceivable that Moscow might even consider a limited deployment of Soviet ground forces to Syria, although Soviet forces would almost certainly be kept well away from areas where they might become involved in direct combat with Israeli forces. Of course, to the extent that the Syrians and other Arabs had agreed to the arrangements under discussion, the Soviets would find it difficult to elicit an invitation for such a deployment.

In order to limit the impact of the release of Brezhnev’s letter on our efforts to settle the Beirut crisis, we should adopt a firm, but measured course of action involving:

1. A reply from you to Brezhnev which rejects the outrageous allegations in his letter and makes clear both that we are the promoters of peace in the area and that his warning will not affect our determination to take the actions necessary to bring about a settlement of the crisis. We believe that this letter should be delivered as soon as possible. A draft is attached for your consideration.³

2. A presentation to the French Ambassador pointing out how mild and ambiguous Brezhnev’s warning actually is. We would provide the French Ambassador with a thorough briefing on my meeting with Dobrynin and, if possible, provide him with the outlines of the reply which you will make to Brezhnev.

3. Immediate instructions to Phil Habib and Sam Lewis containing assurances for the Beirut parties and the Israelis that Brezhnev’s warning will in no way affect our determination to press forward urgently with efforts to nail down a settlement.

Recommendation

That you approve the above course of action and the attached draft letter to Brezhnev.

³ Printed as Document 196.
Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of July 7. The suffering of the people inhabiting Lebanon, about which your letter speaks, is indeed tragic and requires most urgent action by all the parties involved to bring about the restoration of peace in Beirut and the rest of Lebanon. I do wish to call your attention, however, to the fact that the current fighting in Lebanon is the inevitable consequence of the violation in the 1970s of Lebanese territory by Syrian and PLO forces which established an armed presence there. These forces have divided the country into hostile, warring regions and used it as a base for aggression against Israel. The Israeli incursion of last month thus is one of the effects and not the cause of the tragedy.

The United States is hoping for a lasting solution of the problem. This objective demands, first and foremost, the removal of the armed forces of all the foreign powers and movements from Lebanon and the creation of conditions under which the Government of Lebanon is once again able to exert effective authority throughout its country. Any other interpretation of United States objectives and efforts in this region is without foundation. This holds particularly true with regard to the actions of my personal emissary in the area, Ambassador Philip Habib. Thanks in large part to his tireless and imaginative diplomacy an opportunity has been created for a peaceful resolution of the present conflict in Beirut. It is my firm resolve that the United States do everything in its power to help achieve such an outcome.

Discussions in Beirut have now reached a critical phase in which all parties involved must make the difficult decisions required for progress toward peace. In this context, the Government of Lebanon has raised the possibility of limited deployment of military units, including a U.S. component, to assist that government in reestablishing its authority in Beirut and facilitating the departure of outside armed

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, Box 38, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290425, 8290431, 8290480). No classification marking. Poindexter sent the letter to Bremer under cover of a July 14 memorandum: “Please transmit the attached letter from President Reagan to President Brezhnev via cable and follow up with the original by pouch.” (Ibid.) In telegram 6861 from Moscow, July 16, Hartman reported that Zimmermann delivered the letter to Komplektov at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs that day. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820006–0559)

2 See Document 192.
forces from that city. As we have declared publicly, the United States would consent to such a deployment only at the express invitation of the Government of Lebanon and with the approval of the parties to the negotiations. If deployed in Beirut, U.S. forces would remain there only for the limited time necessary to accomplish the objectives I have described. These forces would then be withdrawn. This is not only morally sound policy; it is also a course dictated by prudence, for as experience shows, any attempt by outside powers to impose their military will on the people of the Middle East can only lead to such powers becoming bogged down in a bloody and humiliating quagmire.

Although the crisis in Lebanon is at an extremely sensitive stage, I want to take this opportunity to reiterate my deep concern about the situation in Poland. In our view, conditions in that troubled country have not improved since the imposition of martial law seven months ago. The United States and its Allies have made clear our considered view as to what is needed to bring about a process of national reconciliation in Poland. Without a significant improvement in the internal conditions of Poland, it will be all the more difficult to make the kind of progress I would like toward improved U.S.-Soviet relations. I urge you to help Poland return to the path of national reconciliation and peaceful development.

Let me close, Mr. President, by expressing my concern at your decision to make public the substance of your letter of July 7, thereby breaching the confidentiality of our personal exchanges. This action cannot contribute to the easing of the current crisis.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan
197. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, July 23, 1982

SUBJECT
Haig-Gromyko Meeting, June 18-19, 1982

I have now gone over the memcons of Haig’s talks with Gromyko on June 18 and 19, 1982. The general impression is one of wasted effort. Gromyko restated in all cases standard Soviet positions and would not budge an inch from them. His tone throughout was condescending, sometimes snide and downright rude. Much of the time he lied through his teeth. While clearly we need to maintain this channel of communications with Moscow, I wonder if it really serves any useful purpose for the Secretary of State to spend so much time with his Soviet counterpart to go over and over well-traversed ground and be subjected to the same verbal humiliation. My recommendation would be for Secretary Shultz, if he proposes to meet Gromyko, to devote initially no more than one morning or afternoon to a preliminary dialogue and continue only if there is some sense of genuine progress. (S)

Basically, the material presented in this memcon duplicates that from the two previous encounters (Haig-Gromyko September 1981 and January 1982) so I will not bother to go into detail. All the familiar themes are here: the United States is belligerent and seeks military superiority, the Russians have no desire to export revolution, we should be friendly to Cuba, the Israelis and we are responsible for all the trouble in the Middle East, and so on and so forth. (S)

On the two issues which you specifically mentioned to me, I have the following to report:

—Poland. Gromyko restated the Soviet position that what went on in Poland is a purely internal Polish affair: “no representative of the Soviet Government will discuss this problem with any other country in the world”. Consistent with this viewpoint, Gromyko refused to be drawn into any discussions on the situation in Poland. Nowhere did he promise a lifting of the martial law or linking our relaxation of sanctions with possible Polish reforms.

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2 See Documents 186 and 187.
Nicaragua. Gromyko complained that we are bullying Nicaragua which has no hostile intentions toward us. The issue of MIGs in Nicaragua never came up: all discussion on this country, as on all other subjects was maintained by the Soviet side on a Himalayan level of platitude. (S)

198. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, July 23, 1982

SUBJECT

US-USSR Grain Agreement

As Walt Stoessel informed you in his memorandum of July 21, the measures announced by General Jaruzelski on July 21 failed, to any significant degree, to meet the three Allied conditions for removing sanctions on Poland. We will be working closely with our Allies during the next few days to develop a coordinated response to the Polish actions. Thus far, Allied reactions to Jaruzelski’s speech appear generally consistent with our own, and there appears to be a good prospect for maintaining unity on this issue.

In view of your concern for the Polish situation and your desire to avoid a dispute with the Allies on our response to Jaruzelski’s speech, I want to call to your attention the serious problems which would arise should you make a decision on the US-USSR grain agreement, as I understand you currently intend, early next week. As you know, I believe that from the perspective of foreign policy, our interests would be best served by a decision to extend again the existing agreement at current levels. However, in raising this issue, I am not questioning the basic decision; only its timing. Our first meeting with the Allies in NATO to compare our assessments of developments in Poland is scheduled for July 26. By the end of that week, we hope to have completed our consultations.


As you know from your meetings last month in Europe, the Allies claim to see a contradiction between our continuing grain sales and our sanctions on industrial items which impact negatively on European sales to the USSR. Although the European contention can be refuted, it is a fact which we must take into account in our relations with the Allies. There is a risk that a decision on the grain agreement prior to the completion of our consultations with the Allies could result in Allied decisions to take unilateral steps on Poland. Some sanctions might be lifted, while pressure could develop to reschedule the Polish debt. We would in all likelihood refuse to reschedule, which would create yet another painful public dispute between us, the only beneficiaries of which would be Jaruzelski and the Soviets.

For these reasons, I urge that you postpone a decision on the grain agreement until approximately August 1, by which time we should have completed our consultations with the Allies, thus avoiding risks to Allied unity essential for effective pressure on Poland. I also believe that we should make every effort, when you make your decision, to give the Allies advance notification and explanation.3

3 On July 30, Reagan announced that he was authorizing U.S. officials to seek a one-year extension of the existing grain agreement with the Soviet Union and ruling out the possibility of a new long-term grain agreement in the near term. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, vol. II, p. 994)

199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1

Washington, August 3, 1982, 1404Z

215384. Subject: Letter From President Brezhnev to President Reagan on Lebanon.
1. (S—Entire text.)
2. There follows the text of a letter to President Reagan from President Brezhnev delivered to the State Department by Soviet Embassy August 1.
3. Begin text.

1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820007-0178. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. Drafted by Combs; cleared in S/S-S; approved by Burt.
Mr. President,

I write you again in connection with the situation in Lebanon. You have undoubtedly been informed that the night of July 31–August 1 the Israeli forces, having again perfidiously broken the ceasefire, undertook a massive offensive on West Beirut. Peaceful residents are being ruthlessly killed, the city is being destroyed.

It cannot escape one’s notice that this perfidious attack followed soon after all members of the UN Security Council, with the exception of the US, had voted for a resolution demanding that Israel raise the siege of West Beirut. A conclusion suggests itself that there is a direct link between the US position, as it has manifested itself, inter alia, in the Security Council, and what Israel is perpetrating in Lebanon. Tel Aviv could not act so impudently if it did not feel that it enjoys the support of the United States.

The tragedy of Lebanon, and especially of the population of its capital, will be an indelible stain on the conscience of those, too, who could have stopped the aggressor, but have not done so.

I urgently call upon you, Mr. President, to use in a speediest manner the possibilities at your disposal in order not to permit continued annihilation of people in Beirut. The situation is so serious—I would say, critical—that the most urgent measures are required.

Sincerely, L. Brezhnev

Shultz
200. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev\(^1\)

Washington, August 5, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of August 2.\(^2\)

As I have said in response to your previous letters, the United States deeply regrets the suffering of the people of Lebanon, and is making every effort to bring about an end to the tragedy through the removal from Lebanon of the armed forces of all foreign powers and movements as well as the restoration of the Lebanese Government’s effective authority throughout the country. Contrary to the assertion in your latest letter, we have worked closely with other members of the United Nations to support constructive international efforts at resolving the crisis, as our vote for the Security Council resolution of August 1 clearly demonstrated.

I must, therefore, categorically reject the insinuation in your letter that the United States encouraged the Israeli side to break the ceasefire this past weekend, or on any other occasion. As I have stressed before, we shall continue our active diplomatic efforts in search of the humane and peaceful goals which we seek. I hope that the Soviet Union would do nothing to make a resolution of this tragedy more difficult.

I may add that although the United States Government and Israel maintain close and friendly relations, we are not responsible for the actions of the Israeli Government, a sovereign state. If, therefore, the Soviet Government has representations to make in this regard, it should communicate directly with the Israeli authorities.

Mr. President, I also feel compelled to reiterate my concern at your unilateral decision to make public once more the substance of one of your letters thereby breaching the confidentiality of our personal exchanges. Such actions devalue this privileged channel of communication, and raise serious doubts about the Soviet Union’s interest in a peaceful resolution of the Lebanese crisis.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

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\(^1\) Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290587, 8290654). No classification marking. In telegram 221252 to Moscow, the Department instructed that the Embassy deliver Reagan’s letter to Korniyenko or a “comparably senior MFA official” on August 9. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, NS20007-0244)

\(^2\) See Document 199.
201. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, August 9, 1982

SUBJECT

“Can the Soviets ‘Stand Down’ Militarily?” (U)

The CIA has prepared a report which raises the question whether the Soviet Union, facing mounting economic problems, may at some point decide to shift resources from arms production to civilian uses.

Without committing itself to an answer, the report stresses the great difficulties inherent in such a policy change. By its very nature the Soviet economy finds it much more difficult to shift resources from the defense sector to the civilian one than is the case in market economies. While in the United States the expansion or contraction of the defense sector is essentially a factor of the defense budget, in a planned economy like the Soviet one, the process is infinitely more complicated. There one must make not only a budgetary adjustment but also put through changes in highly complex production plans, reallocate financial, material and human resources, etc., all of which are directed by the state.

The study assumes that the Soviet Government could, if it so wishes, make a 20 percent cut in defense expenditures by the late 1980s. It believes such a cut would have appreciable effects on the ailing economy. All the branches of the Soviet military would have to bear the burden of the cuts except the strategic forces which would emerge relatively intact. Western policies would play a major role in such a development. “The credit, goods, food and technology provided by the West have helped Moscow maintain its current resource allocation scheme.” Denial of such assistance would produce additional pressure on the leadership to shift resources from military to civilian uses.

The report warns that such a shift, once it occurred, would be difficult to monitor, at any rate, in its early phases.

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Attachment

Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

SOV 82–10101 Washington, July, 1982

CAN THE SOVIETS STAND DOWN MILITARILY?

Foreword

As the Soviet economy continues to deteriorate, more and more attention is being given to the notion that at some point the leadership might attempt to prop up the Soviet Union’s faltering economy by shifting some resources from arms production to civilian end uses. To be sure, there is no evidence that any resource shift is under way, or even that Soviet leaders are seriously contemplating one; the dominant feature of Soviet defense spending has been the persistence of its growth. Nevertheless, as economic problems mount—and as the struggle for leadership intensifies in Moscow—the possibility of a resource shift requires that Western policymakers have some grasp of the Soviet system’s technical capacity to accommodate such a shift if, in fact, a decision of this sort were to be reached or even considered.

Apart from ideological imperatives, perceived national security needs, and the personal commitment of Soviet leaders to growing military power, the very structure of Soviet defense planning and production, which is vastly different from ours, contributes heavily to the momentum of defense spending in the USSR and makes any shift of resources out of the defense sector more difficult than would be the case in a market economy.

In the United States, the allocation of resources for the production of both guns and butter is carried out in the free market. Government’s role is to allocate enough money to provide the minimum number of guns judged necessary to assure the national security. A political decision to expand or contract the US military sector, once reached, is implemented merely by raising or lowering the defense budget. The free market then reallocates resources, and it is an efficient mechanism for doing so. By contrast, the entire Soviet system—with its five-year

2 Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. According to a title page, attached but not printed, W. Alan Messer prepared the assessment based on information available as of June 1.
plans, its comprehensive resource-allocation process, its command economy—is designed and managed by the government to provide a high priority to defense production. A political decision to alter the guns-vs.-butter ratio requires far more from the government than merely a budgetary adjustment: production plans must be changed; financial, material, and human resources must be reallocated; production must be rescheduled in government plants; and the actual goods and services that emerge must be given prices and assigned to customers—all by government officials. [portion marking not declassified]

After briefly outlining the Soviet industrial structure, this paper examines the technical capacity of the Soviet Union to shift resources from military-related production to civilian end uses—assuming a Politburo decision to attempt such a shift. It examines the time that a significant resource shift would require and the impact of such a shift on the Soviet Union’s economic performance and military prowess. After outlining the role of Western economic assistance in maintaining the Soviet Union’s current resource allocation scheme, this paper discusses the difficulties that the US Intelligence Community would have in detecting and monitoring a resource shift from arms production to civilian end uses. [portion marking not declassified]

Key Judgments

On the basis of observed military activity, we expect that Soviet defense spending will continue to grow 4 to 5 percent a year through at least 1985. Sustaining this policy over the long term will be increasingly difficult, however, especially if economic conditions worsen beyond our projections. Indeed, a new leadership by mid-decade will feel greater pressure to reduce the growth rate of defense expenditures to free up labor, capital, and materials—resources urgently needed in key civilian sectors. [portion marking not declassified]

An absolute cut in defense spending on the order of 20 percent by 1990—a hypothesis discussed in this paper—could result in meaningful economic changes. A gain in per capita consumption growth of up to one percentage point a year would be likely, and there could be a moderate increase in the growth of GNP. We believe such an abrupt shift is highly unlikely in the short run. If it were made at all, it would be phased in gradually after 1985. [portion marking not declassified]

Absolute cuts would almost immediately free up raw materials and some semifinished goods such as high-quality steels, construction materials, chemicals, and fuels. These could help eradicate bottlenecks in such critical economic sectors as energy, agriculture, and transportation. Many military production facilities could begin producing goods for the civilian sector within a reasonable period of time. Capacity currently used in armored vehicle and tank production, for example,
could be converted in roughly a year to support increased production of a broad range of civilian vehicles—for example, railway rolling stock, tractors, trucks, and construction equipment. [portion marking not declassified]

Absolute cuts in military programs would probably impact most on theater air, naval, and land arms, possibly causing a major restructuring of missions and postponing replacements. The Soviet strategic forces could emerge relatively intact. [portion marking not declassified]

The military would object strongly to a resource shift of this magnitude, but the objections would be manageable once the Politburo decision was final. [portion marking not declassified]

The credit, goods, food, and technology provided by the West have helped Moscow maintain its current resource allocation scheme. If the West were able to deny or limit Moscow’s access to these forms of assistance, pressure would be increased on the Soviet leadership to shift resources from arms production to the civilian economy. By curtailing the Soviets’ import capacity—primarily by restricting credit but also by hampering their oil and gas production and thus their hard currency exports—the West would further raise the cost to the USSR of maintaining its present resource allocation policy. [portion marking not declassified]

It is, of course, impossible to say for certain that the Soviets would respond to Western pressure by shifting resources. However, it is important to note that in some instances they have deemed a shift to be in their best interests and have directed the military-industrial complex to support the civilian economy. [portion marking not declassified]

Monitoring Soviet weapons production by intelligence methods is extremely difficult. Thus it is highly possible that should Soviet leaders in fact shift some resources from arms production to civilian end uses—especially if the magnitude of the shift is smaller than hypothesized in this paper—the change could go unnoticed for quite some time. [portion marking not declassified]
202. Information Memorandum From the Director of Policy Planning (Wolfowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, August 16, 1982

SUBJECT

Upcoming East-West Strategy “Seminar”

The attached talking points for your August 21 “seminar” identify four broad areas of discussion:

—Soviet assets and vulnerabilities
—Current Soviet policy
—US leverage and priorities
—Building public support

Below, under the same four headings, are themes, problems, and propositions you may want to put before the group. They should provide the structure for a very general review of Soviet-American relations. Three narrower questions—linkage, arms control prospects, and a summit—are more fully developed in brief tabs.

One theme that recurs in every section below (and deserves special emphasis at the outset) is the difference between the bilateral half of our relationship and our broader efforts to create an environment in which we can limit Soviet openings and resist Soviet advances. The Soviet-American competition is, to a large extent, governed by each side’s relationship with third parties—with allies and proxies, with local troublemakers and their targets. Yet both those who want us to be tougher with the Soviets and those who want us to ease up too often treat bilateral dealings as the core of the competition. The first group, for example, treats pipeline sanctions as the ultimate test of our strength, no matter the impact on the Alliance; the second envisions fine-tuned leverage toward the Soviets, while demanding nothing more of Alliance relations than lowest-common-denominator unity.

Areas for Discussion

1. Soviet Assets and Vulnerabilities

a) How will the Soviets manage their economic crisis? In the group’s discussion of Soviet assets and vulnerabilities (most of them now well known), you will hear an increasing emphasis on Soviet resource constraints. This is important, but incomplete: we need to know how the

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1982 Soviet Union. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Sestanovich. All tabs are attached but not printed.
Soviets will resolve the choices and conflicts created by these constraints. We should not think they will face a simple choice between reallocation (economic growth, but less for defense) and turning to the West (economic growth, but under tight leverage). Soviet problems are unquestionably severe, but in dealing with them the Soviet leadership knows that:

—some of them could change quickly (substantial price increases for gold and energy could cut Soviet mid-decade credit needs almost in half),
—some will change during this decade (labor-force growth turns back upward by 1990), and
—some may never change (low productivity and poor resource-management reflect structural defects of the Soviet system).

These facts may encourage the leadership to keep muddling through: the obstacles to systemic reform are, in today’s more institutionalized system, probably even greater than they were 20 years ago; great increases in Western resources may not seem worth the economic (or, possibly, political) price. Finally, even if resources are reallocated, nothing we now know tells us that completely new priorities will govern the decisions.

b) How will the Soviets manage the burden of the bloc? The outline of Soviet policy is firm: bloc living-standards will decline. The Polish experience has unsettled the Soviets, but two of its chief lessons will suggest a cautious, conservative policy:

—Steady reduction in living standards can be imposed and weathered.
—Even small socio-political experiments are very dangerous.

If this is the Soviet reading, we must expect recurrent repression in the bloc as a backdrop of our management of East-West relations.

2. Current Soviet Policy

a) How do the Soviets see their own position? Reduced internal flexibility does not always reduce flexibility in foreign policy. Can the Soviets minimize the impact of their internal vulnerabilities on their foreign policy interests? If so, how? In the short run, obvious opportunities exist, for example, in pursuing the following goals.

—In Europe: to promote West European independence, especially in East-West trade; to blunt the President’s arms control proposals; to limit European support for US policy on issues like Poland, Afghanistan, or southern Africa.
—In the Third World: to preserve and exploit the proxy positions built up over the past decade, perhaps to regain or compensate for lost ground in the Middle East; to keep the costs of the Afghan war at their
present low level; and more generally, to divide the West from the Third World (using pressure on Pakistan or Somalia, for example, to show the dangers of close association with the US).

—In arms control: to move the talks toward preserving present imbalances, or to weaken political support for Western defense programs.

—In East Asia: to create at least the appearance of movement toward better relations with China; failing that, to isolate China.

These goals will not be attained easily, but they are not narrowly dependent upon resources. And they do not require high risk or high-cost initiatives that would further expose the Soviet position. In light of problems in Eastern Europe and within the leadership, this consideration will help to sustain Soviet self-confidence.

b) How do the Soviets see this Administration? It is often said that they are uncertain about US policy. This uncertainty can have two different forms:

—first, whether they can do business with us at all, and
—second, whether we mean what we say and will stay the course (especially given our own political and resource constraints).

The Soviets may doubt both points. Thus, to clarify our basic message to them, we must demonstrate:

—first, that we do not deny their legitimate interests (narrowly defined), or aim simply to overturn their system, and
—second, that their conduct has exceeded their legitimate interests, and we will make this costly for them.

3. US Leverage and Priorities

a) What leverage can restrain Soviet behavior? Most problems of Soviet-American relations can be resolved above all (perhaps only) in an environment that limits Soviet opportunities—that is, by a favorable military balance, by active cooperation with friendly states, and by political stability and economic growth. The prime task of our Soviet policy even in the short term is to increase such leverage.

This Administration, however, also claims to favor “linkage”—between Soviet conduct and our readiness to cooperate on other issues. Exercise of linkage has always been very hard, and it may become more so:

—Arms control (though some call it a prime Soviet goal) may be a progressively less effective restraint. The radical Soviet concessions we propose reduce the Soviet stake in reaching an agreement. And the mere fact of negotiating may seem less likely to slow US weapons programs than it did five years ago; in fact, especially in INF, lack of negotiations might best stop Western programs.
Economic incentives may also be ineffective, despite Soviet difficulties. Free-market systems are resistant to use as leverage, and lack of Western unity further limits the economic penalties we can impose; because Soviet economic problems are systemic, the benefits of East-West trade may be marginal too. The scale of Soviet problems may make marginal differences more important than usual, but our own recession will also increase opposition to regular use of such linkage.

Soviet human rights policy—an appropriate and permanent issue of our bilateral relations—may be quite unstable during the succession. Offering inducements for liberalization in this period may be tempting (and useful for p.r. reasons), but leadership instability may preclude enduring results.

Finally, geopolitical issues are hard to trade off against each other. The Soviets will cede valuable positions in the Third World—as in southern Africa—only under substantial US leverage. Yet our room to maneuver is slight. In area after area we want something of the Soviets. (You should ask the group’s view of what the Soviets want of us in the geopolitical realm and whether we have assets that can be safely and effectively bargained away; Tab A develops this issue.)

b) Which elements of US-Soviet relations require most urgent attention? Where can we most realistically hope for results?

Significantly, many urgent problems about which you may hear from the group concern third parties directly and the Soviets only indirectly. Yet each affects our ability to deal with the Soviets.

—Restoring Alliance unity. Since unity of inaction will not protect the West in the long term, it is essential to find ways of acting together effectively. The immediate cause of disunity is Poland. Friendly critics should be asked what policy package can both allay allied unhappiness and effectively strengthen our Polish policy (the President’s prime condition). If there is none in the short term, how can this problem best be made less urgent?

—Countering Soviet proxies. The Soviets are perhaps best positioned, by proxy, to do imminent damage to our policy in southern Africa. If they prove able to block Cuban withdrawal from Angola, what additional leverage can strengthen our position? The growing likelihood of such an impasse (and of other Soviet proxy probes) makes a common front with our Allies (now in question) all the more important.

—China. Severe downgrading would reverse one of the major accomplishments of US policy in the last 15 years, with domestic and international costs. Has this triangle become so difficult to manage because the Chinese take US anti-Sovietism for granted? Can the Soviets exploit this? How can we move the Chinese back to an interest in strategic cooperation?
c) Finally, can we do better than damage-limitation in the medium term? A firm US policy and the Soviets’ own difficulties may well persuade them to hunker down over the next several years—cautiously awaiting both a more receptive US administration and an upswing in their own downturn indicators. Such a Soviet pause may be a working definition of US success for the medium term. Does it, however, miss opportunities, created by developing Soviet difficulties, to put the relationship on a better long-term basis? These opportunities might lie in the direction either of more actively weakening the Soviets or of more energetically seeking out ways to resolve differences on favorable terms. How can we identify and explore such opportunities as they appear?

4. Building Public Support

How can we correct the public confusion about our Soviet policy? Soviet efforts to divide the West against itself will be encouraged by, among other factors:
—uncertain public support if arms talks stagnate,
—the apparent inconsistency of our trading policies, and
—the contradictory picture of Soviet aggression and weakness.

Our strengths lie in the enduring power of the human rights issue, in our openness to negotiation, and our diplomatic activism in resolving conflicts. Yet in trying to convey consistency, firmness, and balance, we face this dilemma:

—Harsh and ideological rhetoric, particularly when directed at the Soviet system rather than at Soviet behavior, may seem likely only to increase tensions (and thereby the public’s fear of war). Emphasizing the need to overturn Communism may in fact set a standard by which we will be seen to fail.

—Failure to emphasize our ideological differences, however, may signal business-as-usual and make it harder to defend costly policies. It also surrenders a key basis of Allied unity—the common commitment to Western values.

(You might ask the group to give concluding thoughts to the public presentation of our policy; Tab C discusses how a summit might strengthen this effort.)
203. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Valuable Insight into Soviet Society

Issue: The Agency has been able to procure from a well-placed Soviet source a survey of the views and attitudes which the Soviet ruling elite (*nomenklatura*) has of itself and its society. It is very rare that we obtain such a detailed and authoritative insight into the self-image of the Communist apparatus.

Discussion: The Soviet source seems to enjoy excellent access to the high levels of the Soviet bureaucracy, especially to the KGB, which is in the best position to know how things really stand in the USSR. The picture which he paints is very pessimistic:

—There is widespread feeling among the Soviet elite that Soviet society is sick, that the Communist Party has lost prestige, and that things cannot go on the way they are.

—Crime and corruption are rampant and increasing: robberies, muggings and murder have become common, but even more so are bribery and theft of state property in which the militia actively participates. (Even the ex-head of the KGB, Andropov, is not safe as unknown thieves had taken several fur hats from a rack outside his office in the Liubianka.)

—Workers and peasants are dissatisfied with economic conditions and unwilling to work.

—The account stresses the deep animosity of the KGB toward the Party for the unique privileges it enjoys, and toward the militia for its corrupt practices. The KGB is unhappy that it cannot restore “order”.

—The source is pessimistic about the possibility of significant reform after Brezhnev departs and expects a return to Stalinism, which would entail severe repression for theft of state property and dissent, as well as a hard line in foreign policy. These measures may work in the short run, the source believes, but not in the long one, and he

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darkly hints at the possibility of revolution. (There seem to be numerous weapons illegally held by private persons in the USSR.)

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated

THE MALAISE OF SOVIET SOCIETY

1. In recent years there has been a growing feeling of malaise in most sections and at most levels of Soviet society. People simply no longer believe in the Party. They do not think in terms of problems being overcome by changes in the leadership, but rather that the whole party system has to be done away with. Young people even say as much in the presence of Brezhnev’s grandchildren. Only careerists are willing to talk about their faith in the system as if they believe what they are saying.

2. Over the years, the gradual increase in corruption and theft by party officials has encouraged more and more people to see what they can get out of the system for themselves—with ever decreasing concern about the legality of what they are doing. This malaise had been reflected in both the growth and the pattern of Soviet crime. Certain parts of Moscow and other big cities are no longer considered safe after dark. There has been a sharp increase in the number of muggings by teenagers and the number of murders committed in general. The authorities are worried by the fact that the proportion of murders committed without a known motive has now risen to 80 percent.

3. Robberies from private flats used to be virtually unknown in the Soviet Union. Now, however, people are so worried that they install double doors and burglar alarms (wired via the telephone system) in their homes. Despite such precautions the apartments of violinist David Oistrakh and other leading artists have been burglarized, as have those of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and even KGB) officials. Public concern has been heightened by revelations that some of the militia, which control the burglar alarms, have been working in conjunction with professional thieves.

4. There has also been a steady rise in the number of armed robberies of big stores, jewelry shops, banks and couriers delivering wages
to big enterprises. Such robberies are now frequent enough occurrences for them to be mentioned in novels, which they never were before.

5. Nowadays no place seems to be safe from thieving fingers—even the KGB Headquarters in Lubianka. Yuriy Andropov, KGB Chief, would still like to know who stole six fine fur hats belonging to important visitors from the hat stand outside his office in the latter 1970’s. (Fearing that more than hats might leave the inner sanctum of the Lubianka unnoticed, Andropov then ordered a high security “screen” to be built around his suite of offices.)

6. Despite this malaise there are few, if any, signs that crime has acquired a distinctly political focus. There is little political graffiti to be seen and such armed attacks as there have been on party officials have usually been in the republics. In the short term terrorist attacks are more likely to come from national minorities (e.g. the bombing of the Moscow Metro by three Armenians) than from European Russians themselves.

7. The story of the Soviet leadership’s recent efforts to cover up corruption in high places and details of some of the things which have been going on in the militia provide vivid vignettes of the present state of Soviet society.

THE DISCONTENTED GROUPS

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

8. The serious food shortages in recent years have added to the discontent of the working class with their generally low standard of living, the shortages of consumer goods, the “failures” of the system and the resentment they feel about the privileges enjoyed by senior party officials.

9. The authorities have long felt that alcohol was an essential opiate for the Soviet people in general, and the working class in particular. People are well aware that the authorities make reusable caps for the bottles of vodka which are exported, but not those sold in the home market. Once a Soviet man opens his bottle he is expected to finish it. In 1971 a secret party directive went so far as to recommend that local authorities should open liquor shops close to the entrances of all major plants. At the same time the authorities launched an official campaign against alcoholism. In the recent past much official concern has been expressed about the increase in alcoholism in the Soviet Union, but the authorities have not really tried to combat the problem. Prices have gone up, but supplies are still good and are consumed just as quickly as before.

10. Workers can often be heard saying that they do not care whether they are employed by a capitalist “boss” or the state, so long as the
money is good—and there is something worth buying with it. In the past workers said such things in public when drunk. Now they frequently say them when sober.

11. The more skilled the worker, the less fear he has of voicing his discontent. If the KGB suggests a skilled worker should lose his job because of what he has said, the factory manager and the party secretary are likely to defend him because they cannot replace him easily.

12. Discontent, aggravated by food shortages, has already led to many brief strikes. The two major strikes of 1981 were at Gorkiy and Togliatti. By the spring of 1981 meat and milk shops in Gorkiy had been closed for months. Unrest and tension had been growing. Without warning stoppages broke out one day in several separate parts of the Gorkiy plant. Within a short while the strike had spread and production was at a standstill. The next day the meat and milk shops, miraculously well stocked, reopened. Production restarted at the plant without delay. There were no arrests and at the time the authorities made no attempts to find strike leaders. The main interest, as usual, was hushing up the matter as quickly as possible.

13. Despite the authorities’ efforts a similar pattern of events soon unfolded in the nearby major car plant at Togliatti. Again the workers were bought off with improved food supplies.

14. Efforts to modernize industrial practices have also run into difficulty. At a number of plants the introduction of piece rates has been badly handled. Productivity has usually shot up quickly in response to the incentives of the new system. This has made the authorities think they set the piece rate too high. They think that they will still be able to get much of the increase in production they want even if they pay a lower piece rate. Cuts in piece rates, however, have usually led to strikes. One of the most important of these strikes took place a few years ago at the tractor plant at Volgograd.

AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

15. The great majority of agricultural workers want collective farms (the Kolkhoz), in effect to be broken up—at least into small cooperatives, if not independent farms. They argue that only such a reorganization, together with a freer market for their produce, will give them the type of incentives they need to increase their output significantly.

16. Recent regional experiments have shown production can be increased significantly when small groups are allowed to farm land for their own profit (i.e. the Zveno/“Link”/System). The party leadership, however, has rejected the idea that Soviet agriculture should be remodelled on these lines. They are simply terrified by the prospects of people having an independent economic base, free to a large extent from party control.
17. During the past couple of years state help for private plots has increased and price controls have been removed on sales at the officially sanctioned private markets. These changes, however, have only produced a slight improvement in supplies from that sector. Most farmers have found, of course, that they need to sell less to earn the same amount of money. As the choice of goods they can buy is not great, they have little incentive to earn more cash.

18. The food program to 1990, approved by the Central Committee Plenum on 24 May 1982, is unlikely to produce a significant increase in output. There will still be far too much bureaucracy interfering with farming decisions and price incentives will not be great enough for the agricultural workers. In these circumstances the investments planned under the program will neither be very productive, nor will they really overcome some of the main structural problems of Soviet agriculture.

19. One of the key problems of Soviet agriculture stems from the fact that rural life in much of the country is very disagreeable. In European Russia, for example, collective farms are usually unprofitable and rundown. The majority of young people have drifted to the cities. It will be a long time before conditions improve sufficiently to encourage young people to stay on the farms, let alone bring them back from the cities. After all industry, too, is eager to get more labor.

20. In the Ukraine the situation is somewhat better. Agriculture there has been fairly profitable for many years. This has made it possible to improve the quality of rural life. As a result a good proportion of young people have remained on the land—which in turn has helped production and profitability. But retaining manpower and winning it back are very different matters.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

21. At present the most influential members of the intelligentsia are the writers. Many of them are, in reality, both subtle and profound critics of many aspects of the Soviet system. They not only find ways to criticize the negative side of Soviet society, but they also articulate the discontent of a large number of people against the Soviet system as a whole.

22. Influential writers today tend to be against the party, for less antagonism between classes in Soviet society and for a greater pride in Russian nationalism. The KGB watches such writers closely, but most of their books are still published. The leading members of this group include Vladimir Soloukhin, Valentin Pikul, and Valentin Rasputin, as were Gil Lepatov (who wrote critically about local party officials), Vasili Shukshin and Vladimir Vysotsky (the very popular poet/singer) who kept on protesting until their recent deaths.

23. Soloukhin’s novel about a peasant who wished to restore a 13th century church conveys well the way these writers get across their
message. The peasant in this novel feels so strongly about the importance of saving his village church from delapidation and collapse that he is willing to restore it himself. He gives up drink to save the money to buy the materials he needs to supplement his own building skills. All he wants from the authorities is permission to restore the church (which for him is symbolic of Russia and its historic greatness). No one in the local administration or the local party or the next level up is willing to give him the go ahead. In the end this good peasant, frustrated and enraged, throws away his tools, gets drunk and curses Soviet society.

24. Pikul, in his books, has continued to develop his theme that Russians should be proud of their history. Generally speaking, he argues, Russia had great Tsars, good rulers and good political leaders before the October revolution. This is one of the themes of his book “At the Limit,” which dealt with the last period of Tsarism. Suslov was enraged by the fact that Pikul did not even make the slightest reference to the Bolsheviks. But Pikul still writes and his books are published. One way or another he conveys the same message.

25. Among the non-literary intelligentsia Sakharov still commands much respect. His academic standing, his personal history and the fact that he remains in the country tend to override any criticism people may voice about his links with the West or some of the advice he has given the West (e.g. his call to the West to increase its military strength). In some intellectual circles Sakharov’s confinement in Gorkiy is often referred to by the words “Lenin in exile.”

26. The dissident movement itself enjoys little public support, even in intellectual circles. The writers referred to above and their supporters feel that the Soviet Union must solve its own problems, in its own way, and in its own good time. The public dissidents are disliked because of their links with the West. Moreover, it is generally felt that these groups (for example, the Helsinki Monitoring Group) are little more than devices which Jews unable to leave the Soviet Union use to further their own cause, not that of “Russia.”

THE MILITIA (POLICE)

27. The militia is one of the least discontented, yet most disliked, groups in Soviet society. The reason is simple—the militia is doing so well through corruption. These days militiamen are mainly former soldiers from the provinces who have come to Moscow and Leningrad, in particular, in the hope of cashing in on the local corruption. They have become brazen enough to take bribes from almost anyone, even from known KGB officers.

28. The most corrupt group in the militia is the one responsible for investigations into the theft of state property). These militiamen
have numerous opportunities to take bribes and to ask for them. They
have become deeply involved in the activities they are supposed to be
stopping. Corruption in the militia has become such a serious matter
that the KGB is trying to persuade the party to let them have the
responsibility for investigating theft of state property.

29. The militia is also involved in organized crime, including mur-
der. At the lower end of the scale, the militia is involved in robberies
from homes of some of the more prosperous Soviet citizens where they
have installed the burglar alarms (via the telephone system). At the
other end of the scale, groups of militia have been discovered murder-
ing well-to-do people for their apparel and personal possessions.

30. The most infamous case took place in 1978/80. During that
period a number of people had disappeared without trace. The KGB
got involved when one of Andropov’s senior colleagues (his personal
adviser on personnel matters) joined the list of those missing. A massive
KGB operation was mounted to discover what had happened to him.
After many months the KGB discovered a group of 25 militiamen,
headed by a Lieutenant Colonel, which had murdered more than 20
people for their possessions and had then effectively disposed of the
bodies. Other similar groups were exposed later.

31. As a result of these exposures and other incidents, relations are
now extremely bad between the KGB and the militia. If ever arrested
by the militia, KGB officers have instructions to conceal their true
function. The reason is that the militia is believed to be so keen to
embarrass the KGB that they will even fabricate the evidence if they
think they can get away with doing so. A more important reflection
of the leadership’s view of the militia is that the KGB expects that it
will soon be allowed to recruit agents in the militia, something which
it has been forbidden to do for many years.

THE KGB

32. Within the KGB there is a strong feeling that “something needs
to be done to put this country in order.” The KGB is particularly
disgruntled by its inability to take effective action against those it
believes are undermining “society,” particularly dissidents and the
party itself. Legally, the KGB has difficulty in stopping the expression
of anti-regime sentiments. A man, even in the Soviet Union, is entitled
to his personal opinion. He only commits an offense when he tries to
courage others to pursue anti-Soviet activities. Skilled workers are
usually protected by their employer and the local party secretary,
almost regardless of what the KGB says. The KGB resents having to
“caution” dissidents, instead of being able to take executive action
against them.

33. The other problems connected with dissidence have also been
preoccupying the KGB. For some years the Soviet authorities have been
worried about the use which might be made in periods of social unrest of the sizeable amounts of unauthorized weapons in private hands and the illegal presses used for printing Samizdat.

34. Although the KGB has had some success in collecting weapons, greater quantities of arms continue to be smuggled out of arms factories (e.g. at Tula and Kovrov). Most of these weapons are small arms, but the KGB believes that some heavier items, still in working order, have remained concealed since the Second World War, mainly in the western part of the Soviet Union and the Caucasus. Tracking down these weapons has remained one of the KGB’s top priorities since the mid 1970’s.

35. The KGB has had no difficulty in monitoring the circulation of Samizdat publications and the authorities have not been unduly concerned by the tone of their contents. What has been more disturbing for the KGB (and for the authorities) is the little success it has had in locating the illegal printing presses. The authorities fear that in more troubled times these presses will be used to print inflammatory leaflets, posters, etc.

36. Even more resentment in the KGB is caused by the Party’s privileges and the abuse of its powers. Party secretaries at the raikom (district) level and other party employees of that rank and above enjoy extensive privileges, including access to special food shops. Compared to their party colleagues the KGB, the Army and the government, even though they are also party members and hold equally senior positions, only receive small perks.

37. The KGB knows a lot about corruption and straight theft from state enterprises. It has great difficulty, however, in getting charges brought against those concerned for the simple reason that they are protected by their party position or their connections. Rarely is the Party willing to do more than chide the offenders. The Party, KGB officers often say, wants to maintain its isolation from society and protect itself from prying eyes. It also wishes to avoid its laundry being washed in public. Scandal is to be avoided if at all possible.

38. If the KGB acquires incriminating evidence against a party official (or the close relative of a senior party member) it is under strict instructions to take no further action and to report the matter directly to the head of the KGB. During the many years Andropov headed the KGB he claimed that he would deal with the matter “personally” and in his party capacity as a member of the Politburo. It was noticeable that despite the evidence he received rarely did anything ever happen to the accused. Many KGB officers feel that this sense of “discretion” is one of the main reasons Andropov is acceptable to the Party.

THE ARMY

39. There is widespread belief among Army officers that the Party has shown itself incapable of running the country—either by Stalinism
or through reform. Some middle ranking officers, including lecturers at the General Staff Academy, go so far as to tell friends that sooner or later someone will lead a coup d’etat against the Party. The Army dislikes and resents the Party because of the general state of the country, the Party’s involvement in corruption and theft and because party officials’ privileges are much greater than those enjoyed by Army officers of equal standing.

40. Although the Army wishes to see change, it is generally opposed to the idea of a return to Stalinist policies. One of the main reasons for this is the Army’s memories of the purges of the 1930’s. The Army, and particularly the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence), has never forgotten the enthusiasm with which the KGB (then known as the NKVD) had pursued its role as “the armed detachment of the party.” Moreover, the Army dislikes what it views as the close symbiotic relationship between the KGB and the Party.

41. For all of the Soviet dislike of the state of affairs in Poland, many Soviet Army officers (including some senior officers) view with a certain interest the role which Premier Wojciech Jaruzelski and the Polish Armed Forces are now playing in the country’s affairs.

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

42. Until a few years ago many of the younger officials believed that it was still possible for the Soviet Union to follow the path of gradual economic reform which in due course would widen the margins of cultural freedom and political debate. Few people still believe such hopes can be realized. Within Soviet society, these younger officials see widespread discontent with the Party from the industrial and agricultural workers, the KGB, the Army and the intellectuals. Moreover, they see a party which seems incapable of overcoming the problems which it faces because it is preoccupied with preserving its own position.

43. In 1920 Lenin had written (in “Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder”) that: “only when the ‘lower classes’ do not want the old, and the ‘upper classes’ cannot continue in the old way, can the revolution be victorious.” Many of the younger officials are beginning to feel that the Soviet Union is moving closer and closer to such a situation.

CONCLUSIONS

44. There is little prospect that after Brezhnev leaves the political scene the Soviet leadership will embark upon a more systematic program of reform.

45. In some respects the Party itself has become one of the discontented sections of Soviet society. It still has its privileges, but it is less
sure about how much authority it can command. Economic problems pose the most serious threat to the Party’s position.

46. The influence of detente and the general erosion of discipline in Soviet society have led to growing criticism of Soviet institutions and the regime in general. To embark on reform in any circumstances would be to court disaster. In Eastern Europe some experimentation can be tolerated because if the situation gets out of hand there, Soviet troops are on hand to reassert control; if things go wrong in the Soviet Union itself, however, no one will protect the party.

47. Given the tensions within Soviet society a return to a more Stalinist policy is quite possible. Andropov’s recent appointment as a party secretary will facilitate such a move, but it is not dependent upon him replacing Brezhnev as General Secretary.

48. If more draconian domestic policies are pursued the main features will probably be:

A. A propaganda campaign claiming that the Soviet Union is seriously threatened by the West.
B. Severe penalties for theft of state property and associated corruption (e.g. food destined for state shops is often sold in cooperative shops, with the connivance of the state shops who take cut of the profits).
C. Tough KGB measures against any form of anti-socialism.

49. Initially, such draconian measures can win the acceptance, even favor of some discontented elements in Soviet society. In the medium and longer term, however, the measures will lose their impact. The main reason for this is that the Soviet people have become more difficult to control individually and there are now so many of them who are discontented. As draconian measures cannot overcome these problems, discontent will build up and an incident could, at some stage, unleash a crisis.

A PROBLEM BECOMES A CRISIS

50. Many Soviet people believe that industrial unrest could easily lead to clashes with the police and workers being shot. Bloodshed, in turn, could lead to massive and spontaneous demonstrations against the authorities. Large scale protests could not easily be stopped by the authorities quickly buying off the demonstrators with improved food supplies as happened in Gorkiy and Togliatti in 1981. If demonstrations burst out in several places, the authorities would not be able to provide supplies quickly enough to keep everyone happy.

51. A more serious problem for the authorities, however, is the weakening of the cohesion and discipline of Soviet society which has taken place in recent years. This could make it very difficult for the authorities to regain control of the situation.

52. Faced with widespread demonstrations the Party would have to call in the Army. European conscripts would be most reluctant to
fire on other Europeans voicing similar discontents to their own. KGB troops might fire on demonstrators at first, but it is doubtful for how long they would hold the line. The authorities would try, no doubt, to use non-European troops to re-establish order. Given the present structure of the Soviet Army, however, this would not be easy—particularly to move them quickly to the areas where they were needed. The outcome of such clashes would be unpredictable. Bloodshed could soon lead to widespread violence. Faced with social unrest other discontented groups could well turn against the Party—and one of the discontented groups is, after all, the Army. If that happened the Party would have little chance of surviving in its present form.

204. National Security Study Directive 11–82

Washington, August 21, 1982

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

Introduction

A Review will be conducted of U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union. This National Security Study Directive establishes the Terms of Reference for the Review. (S)

Objectives of the Review

The Review will assess the nature of the Soviet threat to U.S. national security interests in the short and long terms, with emphasis on its non-military aspects, and recommend appropriate U.S. policy responses, by:

—Analyzing the determinants of Soviet foreign policy and domestic policies of concern to the U.S. and other outside powers;
—Assessing Soviet strengths and weaknesses;
—Identifying key elements of likely continuity and change in the Soviet system and Soviet policies; and
—Determining the political, economic, military and ideological means at our disposal for achieving favorable changes in Soviet interna-

tional behavior, including assessment of the costs and obstacles involved in using them. (S)

The Review will proceed on the premise that Soviet international behavior is determined not only by the external environment but also by political, economic, social and ideological features of the Soviet system itself. It will produce a paper for consideration by the National Security Council, and subsequently, for decision by the President. (S)

Scope of the Review

The Review will deal with the following subjects:

1. The likelihood of changes in the Soviet system: to ascertain what realistic expectation one can have of significant changes in the Soviet system and in Soviet international behavior, and in which areas; whether such changes are likely to make the country more or less threatening, and in which areas. The question of non-evolutionary (violent) collapse of the system from within and its implications for U.S. security will also be considered. (S)

2. Soviet vulnerabilities and strengths: the sources of strains and tensions within the Soviet system and the bases for continuity:

   A. Internal
   
   —Economic (resources and structures by sector, strengths and weaknesses of central planning, other constraints on Soviet economic growth, trends in industrial and agricultural productivity, degree of dependence on foreign trade, the financial outlook, the burden of military expenditures, consumer passivity and dissatisfaction).

   —Political (party, police and society; social malaise and revolutionary consciousness; the self-assertion of the working class; dissident movements among Russians and ethnic minorities; the succession problem).

   —Social (demographic trends; urban and rural society; youth; deviance; the religious factor).

   B. External

   —Imperial challenges: increasing burdens of projecting a global presence; allies and proxies; strains in Eastern Europe, including economic relations with CEMA.

   —Communist movements: centrifugal tendencies in the international Communist movement; heresies and deviations.

   —International challenges: the United States, Western Europe, Japan, China, the Third World. (S)

3. The Balance of Internal Forces Making for Continuity or Change: to analyze the Soviet ruling elite in terms of elements favoring the status quo and those favoring change in either a more liberal or a more
conservative direction, and to determine what actions by foreign powers assist each of these competing groups. (S)

4. Meeting the Soviet Challenge in the Short and Long Terms: to define the Soviet challenge to our interests over the next three-five years and ten years, and to ascertain the means at the disposal of the United States, its Allies and other mobilizable forces to influence the evolution of Soviet policies and the Soviet regime in directions favorable to our interests:

—Political (key regional crises; the role of U.S. and multi-lateral diplomacy in inhibiting Soviet interventionism; political assistance and support to democratic elements in the USSR and other countries; neutralization of Soviet “active measures”); the role of covert action should also be assessed.

—Economic (altering the mix of available Soviet policy options; technology transfer; energy policy and competition for raw materials; management of East/West trade, including grain sales; sectors of the economy susceptible to influence through Western trade policies; policy on extension of Western credits to the USSR).

—Ideological (the nature and thrust of U.S. informational efforts directed at the Soviet Union; the role of U.S.-Soviet cultural, scientific and other exchanges; scope and intensity of U.S. efforts to counter Soviet disinformation activities; presenting a democratic alternative).

—High-level dialogue (advantages and disadvantages in relation to frequency and scope; the historical record of summitry). (S)

5. Shaping the Soviet environment:

—The military balance (the importance of U.S. and Allied rearmament; the U.S. military strategy most likely to neutralize Soviet strategic and regional objectives; the role of arms control in advancing U.S. national security interests; security assistance to Allies and assistance to anti-Communist forces; regional commitments of U.S. forces). (This section should draw on NSSD–1.)²

—Allied cooperation (how best to secure and support the cooperation of our Allies in pursuit of our policies toward the USSR).

—Third World cooperation (actual and potential; bilateral and multi-lateral; the place of diplomacy). (S)

6. Recommended Policies for the U.S. (how U.S., Western and Third-World leverage can be applied against Soviet vulnerabilities to induce Soviet restraint in the short and long term). (S)

Management of the NSSD 11–82 Review will be the responsibility of an interagency group that will report its findings in a paper of no more than 25 pages, single-spaced, no later than October 1, 1982. The group will be chaired by the Department of State and will include Assistant Secretary-level representation from the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, the International Communication Agency, the Department of Agriculture and the National Security Council staff. (S)

All matters relating to this NSSD will be classified SECRET. Dissemination of this NSSD, the subsequent study material, and the resulting draft NSSD will be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. (C)

Ronald Reagan

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205. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, August 21, 1982

SUBJECT

Meeting with Outside Experts on East-West Relations

Secretary Shultz today convened a group of former Administration officials to discuss alternative U.S. strategies toward East-West relations. The outsiders included former Secretaries of Defense Don Rumsfeld and Harold Brown, former Secretary of Commerce Pete Peterson, Norman Podhoretz (an extremely articulate, self-confessed ideologue hard-liner), Bill Hyland and Brent Scowcroft. Hal Sonnenfeld was the moderator. Those from inside the Administration included Secretary Shultz, Ken Damm, Allen Wallis, Harry Rowen, Cap Weinberger, Walt Stoessel, Rick Burt, Jon Howe, Paul Wolfowitz and myself.

At the outset I passed a note to Hal Sonnenfeldt which I thought ought to frame the basic discussion. Basically it posed the question,
“What should our goals be—to concentrate on changing the internal structure and objectives of the Soviet system or, to concern ourselves pragmatically with the external manifestations of the Soviet policy which threaten Western interests. In short, should we be motivated by ideological concerns and try to change the Soviet Union, or should we accept it as a fact of life subject to only evolutionary change and concern ourselves with its containment?”

The discussion brought forth an extremely rich commentary from both schools with the preponderant tilt being toward the latter course—that is, to concerning ourselves with the external manifestations of Soviet policy and try to limit them, bearing in mind that this strategy gives you collateral pressure for internal Soviet change anyway. In this regard, Harry Rowen (CIA) noted that a pragmatic policy of limiting Soviet expansion will bring the Soviet Union to a strategic decision within ten years when the burden of defense expenditures deprives all other accounts to an unacceptable degree.

The discussion then shifted to how best to translate those goals and that strategy into real world policies. Don Rumsfeld and Pete Peterson made extremely persuasive presentations on the point that our policies must be sustainable for the long haul, and that we must avoid the polar extremes of the past ten years in which we ask the American people to support either a soft-headed detente or an unyielding hard-line confrontation (with the broad swings in defense expenditures which accompany these poles). In short, our policy must be simple and oriented toward the long term in order to be understood and thus sustainable.

It was not possible to translate this conceptual framework into specific policy prescriptions in the areas of trade, arms control and defense spending although some individual views were expressed and one or two points of consensus emerged. Specifically, all agreed on the need for sustaining a steady strengthening of our military strength and on the need for a restrictive trade policy (although most participants acknowledged that there were some political goals such as Allied cohesion which could justify exceptions to this restrictive approach). As a separate but related matter it was generally felt that we should concentrate our arms control efforts on INF (as opposed to START) since it is in that area that we will reap greatest political gain with our Allies.

The discussion went on for about six hours. Perhaps its greatest benefit will derive from the enrichment it provided to insiders who will be participating in the recently launched NSSD on U.S.-Soviet relations.2 The Terms of Reference for the study frame the issue the

2 See Document 204.
same way I did for this morning’s session; that is, should we concentrate on trying to change the Soviet system (Dick Pipes’ approach) or focus instead on dealing with its external manifestations as they affect U.S. interests (State’s approach). I expect that Secretary Shultz may task additional analysis within the Department to follow up today’s meeting as he did following his Middle East meeting with outsiders. Alternatively, he may simply channel that effort into the NSDD framework (which would best serve our interests).

206. Memorandum From the Director of Policy Planning (Wolfowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, August 27, 1982

SUBJECT

Soviet Strategy Seminar

You opened Saturday’s meeting by asking the participants’ view of the Soviet Union and of the relationship we should seek with it. The discussion that followed brought to light three fundamentally different approaches to Soviet-American relations, with disagreements among them centering on whether and how the two sides’ competition can be moderated. There was the familiar disagreement between the view that it can be moderated only by the break-up of the Soviet Union, and alternately, the view that it can be adequately moderated by the right bargaining approach on issues that affect Soviet interests. A third analysis, which emphasized the importance of blocking Soviet opportunities, assumed no fundamental moderation is possible.

Not every participant, of course, fits neatly into the following description of these views. This is sometimes due to shadings in their view, sometimes to outright contradiction.

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Richard Files, CHRON 09/15/1982–09/19/1982. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Under a September 9 covering letter, Shultz forwarded Wolfowitz’s memorandum to Clark. (Ibid.) An unsigned and undated letter from Clark to Shultz reads: “Dear George: Thank you for the report on your August 21 seminar on U.S.-Soviet relations which was read here with great interest. The distinction between the three approaches which surfaced at the meeting seems well to reflect the dominant currents of public opinion in this country as well as the options available to us. It will be very useful in the drafting of the NSDD on this same subject which is now in progress.” (Ibid.) For another account of the August 21 meeting, see Document 205.
Three Outlooks

1. For the bargainers, the key to a satisfactory relationship lies in positioning ourselves to maximize our bilateral leverage. There is a potential for mutual accommodation, created by the vulnerabilities of the Soviet system (and resultant Soviet caution). Yet to exploit this potential several steps are needed: trade must increase substantially, the U.S. government must acquire the legal power and flexibility to control trade, and we must earn European confidence and cooperation by setting out a balanced strategy for using this leverage. To further strengthen this cooperation, we must also assign the highest priority, not only to conducting arms talks, but to the early conclusion of an agreement, even though its impact on the overall balance is expected to be negligible. The bargainers favor other agreements as well, and express confidence that the use of rewards and penalties will facilitate “rules of the game” for competition in the Third World. Although based on a picture of Soviet weakness, this view foresees an enduring relationship even as the weakness passes: our task is to limit the Soviet Union’s misbehavior, and this will be possible even as it prospers.

2. For the proponents of breaking the Soviet Union up, the West’s only choice is between a Soviet demise and the “Finlandization” of Europe. With no basis left for a stable relationship, contacts must be kept to a minimum. Arms control merely unravels our defense efforts, and trade merely creates reverse leverage against the West; in this way, the Soviets have exploited Western internal weakness in the past. Now, however, the application of economic pressures is the key to Western success: the Soviet Union’s internal weakness (above all, its economic crisis) is great enough to bring it down, if—and only if—the US squeezes. To do so requires the same government control over economic relations that the bargainers desire. On the basis of such an all-out struggle, the problem of managing Western public opinion can also be solved: our leaders, rather than offer a complex and multi-faceted relationship with the enemy, can now hold out victory. (They do not, however, have to scare our people: the pressure tactics of the break-up school are “risk-free.”)

3. Those who focus on blocking Soviet misbehavior spell out the implications of concluding that the competition cannot be fundamentally moderated: first, that overturning the Soviet system requires more leverage than we have; second, that bargaining directly with the Soviets—on trade or arms control—gives us less leverage than we need. Effective leverage comes instead from creating an environment in which Soviet opportunities are limited, and Soviet advances can be resisted—through an improved military balance, cooperation with like-minded states, and promotion of political and economic stability. Trade and arms control are not incompatible with this approach, but the marginal
benefits they yield must be strictly weighed against the confusing signals they send our own public. Economic pressures are also not incompatible, but because they too yield only marginal benefits these have to be weighed against the damage done to our efforts to promote cooperation and unity with other states.

Assessment

All three of these outlooks are found in the Administration, and obviously have some ground in common. In particular, all emphasize the importance of pursuing a policy that can sustain public support over the long term. You heard some sophisticated advice from all sides about managing this difficult problem:

—The bargaining partisans point out that a showy openness to negotiation is not enough. To command the public and allied support that will strengthen our negotiating hand, we need a convincing strategy that promises results, that can get from here to there.

—The break-up advocates would sustain public support by stating our differences with the Soviets in maximum terms, in principled, ideological rhetoric.

Yet both of these analyses expect to put the Soviet-American relationship on a new basis, and for this reason they may compromise sustainability for other goals. For example:

—The bargainers set an extremely stiff test for showing that our policy is realistic and effective: in this way an early arms agreement becomes a top priority. The paradoxical conclusion is that the only way to sustain a long-term competitive posture is to satisfy the public’s desire for an end to competition. In practice, this may be simply self-defeating.

—The bargainers’ view of economic leverage makes the same compromise. To strengthen our hand in the long run, we have to increase the US share of East-West trade; in the short run, this is not likely to convince our allies to practice restraint. If it does not, our leverage will not increase.

—The break-up school similarly compromises its long-term prospects for a massive effort in the short run. Our allies and our publics will demand early results, which may prove unattainable.

Implications

The problem of sustainability, by contrast, looks most acute to those who envision continuing Soviet opportunities throughout (and beyond) this decade. The blocking strategy you heard at the meeting rejected our bilateral leverage toward the Soviets as marginal. In this view, there is less to be gained and more to be lost by nuanced use of rewards and penalties. The key word here is “simplicity.” The economic, diplomatic and security dimensions of our policy must be consistent.
This seemed to me a very powerful line of argument. The Soviet Union retains considerable flexibility and our policy must serve us whether the Soviets hunker down for a few years or take a more confrontational line. One difficult problem is left unresolved, however: our approach to negotiation. The public wants consistency but it also wants all means for resolving conflicts explored. And those who have least hope of moderating the competition for good are always suspected of negotiating half-heartedly.

If we are not to be whip-sawed by these conflicting pressures, we need a fuller negotiating strategy, particularly for arms control, but extending to other areas as well. We run risks whether we stand indefinitely by radical proposals or fall back to positions that seem to call the competition off. To resolve this problem, we need to see the fundamental difference between agreements that put the competition on a new, qualitatively safer basis and those that affect it marginally at best. In the right circumstances, either one can be acceptable as long as we know—and the public knows—which is which. If we are settling for second-best, it should be clear that we are settling, and that the broader competition goes on. An innovative approach (botched in the follow-up) to solving this problem was the Carter Administration’s March 1977 double offer on SALT: letting the Soviets choose between major and marginal change. Our problems are a bit different now, but this may not be a bad model for our relationship as a whole.

207. Memorandum From Paula Dobriansky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, August 30, 1982

SUBJECT

NSSD 11–82: U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union

On Friday, August 27, I attended a State-chaired interagency meeting convened to task drafting responsibilities of NSSD 11–82, a U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. At the meeting, State distributed an outline which differs in part from the Terms of Reference signed by

the President. Specifically, their outline omits an introduction, a section detailing the objectives of the directive and recommended policies for the U.S. These sections are crucial in providing the appropriate background, overview and focus that the directive needs. During the meeting, State also recommended that only CIA and State should draft the directive, thus excluding NSC and all other agencies. Hence, I proposed that NSC should draft the introduction and the section on the objectives of the review and should work jointly with State on recommended U.S. policies. My suggestions were met with resistance by State. I, therefore, propose that you authorize Richard Pipes to secure State’s approval of NSC’s drafting role and direct him to write the omitted sections.

**RECOMMENDATION**

That you authorize Richard Pipes to secure State approval of NSC drafting role and to write the omitted sections.³

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² An unknown hand underlined “introduction, a section detailing the objectives of the directive.”

³ Clark checked his approval of the recommendation.

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**208. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury Regan, and Secretary of Defense Weinberger**¹

Washington, September 1, 1982

**SUBJECT**

Enforcement of U.S. Sanctions Against the Soviet Union

On August 26 the Commerce Department, on the President’s direction and in response to the shipment to the Soviet Union of compressors covered by our sanctions, issued a temporary denial order barring the

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firms Dresser France and Creusot-Loire from access to U.S. technology, materials or equipment. Should other companies in the near future ship to the Soviet Union oil and gas equipment which has been denied by U.S. sanctions issued on June 18, the United States will be taking further actions to enforce the President’s policy.

There has been considerable press speculation, both in the U.S. and abroad, about the Commerce Department actions and the policy on which they are based. The effect has been to call into question the consistency and steadfastness of U.S. policy. In coming weeks, in discussions with the press and with representatives of foreign governments, the President wishes to reaffirm that it is absolutely imperative that all U.S. officials convey the same message:

—U.S. sanctions of December 29, 1981, and their extension on June 18, 1982, and the imposition of enforcement penalties on August 26, are a consistent and measured response to Soviet actions in Poland. U.S. policy is fully consistent with Western policy announced by the January 11 North Atlantic Council communique.

—The U.S. is prepared to moderate its sanctions against the Soviet Union if significant progress is made in Poland on the three conditions specified by the January 11 communique: lifting martial law, releasing those detained, and resuming the dialogue among the government, Solidarity and the Church.

—Meanwhile, the U.S. intends to implement the sanctions consistently and fairly and continues to hope that the allies will cooperate to the best of their ability.

—The U.S. regrets that the sanctions on the Soviet Union will cause some economic hardship to its allies, as they have and will to the U.S. We are willing to consult on proposals by the allies for actions which would advance Western objectives for Poland while minimizing the economic penalty to the West.

—The President fully understands the allied governments’ objections to U.S. policies. He has not found them persuasive enough to change U.S. policies, and is by no means looking for an excuse to withdraw U.S. sanctions or penalties.

I also attach my memorandum of August 2,2 which outlines in more detail the basis for the President’s actions of June 18. I would appreciate it if you would make it clear to all officials in your depart-

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2 Attached but not printed is an August 2 memorandum from Clark to Shultz, Regan, Weinberger, Block, Baldridge, Edwards, Casey, and Brock, entitled “Poland and the President’s June 18 Decision on Sanctions Extension.”
ments that these points are the basis for U.S. policy as it is to be conveyed to the press and other governments.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark\(^3\)

\(^3\) Clark signed the memorandum “Bill Clark” above his typed signature.

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209. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Shultz\(^1\)

Washington, September 4, 1982

SUBJECT

Haig-Gromyko Conversations

Attached are the final *edited* versions of the three sets of talks which Al Haig held with Gromyko. They cover talks in:

—New York on September 23 and 28, 1981 (Tab 1);\(^2\)
—Geneva on January 26, 1982 (Tab 2);\(^3\)
—New York on June 18 and 19, 1982 (Tab 3).\(^4\)

By far the largest portion of these conversations were one-on-one plus interpreters. While there are advantages to this arrangement, there are also disadvantages which you should consider before the format is set for your first round with Gromyko at the upcoming UNGA. (Incidentally, you will be the ninth US Secretary of State with whom Gromyko has dealt in his 25 years as Soviet Foreign Minister.)

*Editing of the Record*

We also have *unedited* versions of these conversations, and you should be aware of the differences. First, the raw versions contain numerous minor flaws in grammar and syntax (not surprisingly!)

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\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Lawrence Eagleburger Files, Lot 84D204, Chron—September 4, 1982. Secret; Sensitive.
\(^2\) Attached but not printed. See Documents 88–91.
\(^3\) Attached but not printed. See Documents 137 and 138.
\(^4\) Attached but not printed. See Documents 186 and 187.
which we fixed in the final versions. Secondly, the conversations sometimes drifted into trivial or contentious by-play which did not add anything to the substance of the exchange and which could be condensed without loss of meaning. For example, in the January meeting there was an extended exchange on details of alleged Soviet involvement with SWAPO, including weapons and advisers, and on alleged US involvement with Savimbi and South Africa. This exchange was singularly uninformative and acerbic and parts of it were dropped. Similarly, some parts of Gromyko’s litany on US attitudes toward Cuba and Nicaragua and of our replies, which were uninformative and repetitive were condensed.

Thirdly, a few passages were edited out because of the sensitivity of the subject matter, or the manner in which issues were addressed. For example, cuts were made in several references to Carter, Nixon, the “detente” period of the early 70s, and earlier arms control “understandings” (although as you will see, a great amount of time in all three sets of talks was spent on arms control). A portion of one talk, where Haig referred to “spheres of influence” in a manner which implied understanding for Soviet concerns about Poland and Afghanistan, was modified to refer to “sensitive areas,” not “spheres.” Along the same line, Haig expressed a bit too much understanding for Soviet “restraint” in Poland on one occasion. And in one of the discussions of Afghanistan, he assured Gromyko that we would take steps to reduce or eliminate “outside interference” from Pakistan as part of a larger settlement. In that connection, by the way, Haig and Gromyko went considerably farther than either side did in the recent “experts” talks in Moscow, as even the edited record shows.

On China, which Gromyko raised each time with warnings about the dangers of US–PRC military cooperation, Haig assured him (probably more than necessary) that we would not act in a way which threatened Soviet interests and that there was not much going on with the Chinese anyway. He also slightly misstated the results of Harold Brown’s 1980 China trip. Haig’s reassurances and reference to Brown were cut.

Finally, on human rights cases, Haig frankly was not much interested and his presentations showed it. He did not press and he was too willing to accept the grounds for Gromyko’s rebuffs. The record was altered to imply a tougher posture.

In the context of the discussions, none of these issues (except perhaps human rights) was more than a tactical or verbal ploy to keep the conversation aimed toward the objectives Haig was trying to reach.
But the context could easily have been distorted and the words used to Haig’s disadvantage. The sum total of the revisions and deletions amounts to perhaps 2% of the many pages of record. The record is not verbatim in any case, but is reconstructed by the interpreters from their notes. It is very long and detailed, as you will see, and it conveys an accurate picture of what was said and how each issue was covered by both sides.

**Analysis**

Each set of talks followed a similar pattern: broad principles, arms control (in general and in detail), geopolitical issues (Poland, Afghanistan, Southern Africa, Cuba, China, Kampuchea, Middle East), and bilateral irritants. The tone varied from occasional humor and even cordiality to business-like problem solving to strong statements of differing positions to occasional wrangling.

Gromyko is truly a master of his craft. He can be earnest, articulate and highly persuasive. He knows his brief inside out and almost never refers to notes. He can also be relentless and even rude, especially if he feels that his counterpart is on the defensive. He covers a weak case (e.g., on Afghanistan, or Cuban troops in Africa, or Soviet INF deployments) by trying to shift the focus of the argument (e.g. to Pakistan, or the US boycott of Cuba, or US/NATO weapons plans). He can be polemical, but not in an ideological sense. He argues that US policies are consciously designed to damage Soviet interests (e.g., increased defense spending, cooperation with China) and that the US unfairly charges that Moscow is responsible for every unpleasant development in the world. He claims, in contrast, that Soviet policies are not intended to hurt the US or its real interest, but that we hurt ourselves and blame them. He argues that better US-Soviet relations—even cooperation—would serve the interests of both sides, but without promising concrete steps which Moscow would be prepared to take to help it happen. The best (or worst) example of Gromyko’s negotiating style is the short meeting of September 28, 1981 (in which I participated) where we spent one whole hour haggling over a short joint statement announcing the beginning of the INF talks in Geneva in November, 1981.

A suggestion on preparations: if you read these conversations in sequence, you will see that Haig was much better in the third set than in the first. You could shorten that learning curve somewhat by meeting with him and getting his advice/comments/suggestions sometime between now and the end of this month. You could do the same with Kissinger, but his direct experience with Gromyko is less fresh. And you should definitely schedule a dry-run several days ahead of time.
with a few of us to try to anticipate both the content and the style of Gromyko’s presentation.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

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5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

210. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 10, 1982, 3:45–4:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Soviet Union and the U.S. Approach

PARTICIPANTS

United States

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State

Walter J. Stoeessel, Jr., Deputy Secretary of State

Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State-Designate

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Paul Wolfowitz, Director for Policy Planning, Department of State

Robert D. Blackwill, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Director, EUR/SOV, Department of State (notetaker)

Canada

Robert A.D. Ford, former Canadian Ambassador to Moscow, Consultant to the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs

H.E. Allan E. Gotlieb, Ambassador of Canada

The Secretary welcomed Ambassador Ford, thanking him for coming. He had glanced through Ambassador Ford’s paper with interest. His education on the Soviet Union was continuing. Following the recent seminar he had held on the topic, Hal Sonnenfeldt has suggested Ambassador Ford as the most knowledgeable man in the world on the Soviet Union, and he had been in touch through Ambassador Gotlieb.

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1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308. Confidential; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on September 14; cleared by Burt and Wayne. The meeting took place in Shultz’s conference room at the Department of State.

2 Not found.

3 See Documents 205 and 206.
He would welcome Ambassador Ford’s comments, and then perhaps the discussion could roam over Soviet behavior and prospects, U.S. behavior and policies, and how they might relate.

Ford said he would not spend much time on Soviet internal matters. Everyone knows what Soviet internal difficulties are. It is hard to separate domestic and international aspects in the Soviet case. He was pessimistic that the Soviets can resolve their internal problems. He saw three basic option mixes for trying:

—1. Return to detente, an effort to improve the USSR’s international position and acquire capital from the West, some economic reform, and arms control. Ford said he thought economic reform impossible to implement, since it would threaten to unravel the whole system. It was clear to him that one of the main reasons the Soviets had intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was apprehension over the political implications of economic reform. From their point of view he thought they were perfectly right. The small bosses around the country would support the status quo. Poland made this option even harder. It could also include serious arms control designed to reduce the proportion of GNP going to military expenditures. Ford thought all these elements would be resisted by the military, the hardliners and the little bosses in the system.

—2. Immobilism. This had been the Brezhnev solution over the past few years. The Soviets are cautious and would prefer to continue. This involves no basic concessions to the West, but also not-too-bad relations with the West, i.e., doing little.

—3. Stiffening. Here the Soviets would say to hell with it, claiming the West is determined to weaken them, and give even more support to the military as the only way to respond.

Even if there were support for the first option, Ford thought, there would still be the almost insuperable obstacles of Poland and Afghanistan. Even if the West says it is possible to improve relations, say in arms control, if Poland and Afghanistan are unresolved it will be hard.

The Secretary asked if Ford considered arms control a means of improving relations.

Ford said it was important both in terms of domestic costs to the Soviets and, of course, in East-West terms.

The Secretary said this suggested the idea, which he did not endorse, that the best strategy was to have no arms control as the best means of forcing the pace, since it would pressure them more than anything else.

Ford replied that he thought economic pressure, especially if it were coordinated Allied pressure, was probably the best, or even only, way to change the Soviet system. The trouble is that it takes a long time to work. In the short run the Soviets will resort to belt-tightening
and more stress on the military, and they can do it. We are in for a
tricky 5–6 years until the West achieves parity or superiority, and in
the meantime they can be expected to tighten up. Ford did not believe
they would resort to war, since this would risk their privileges, but
they would be more willing to take risks. After 5–6 years, he was
convinced, what the Soviets call the “correlation of forces” would be
shifting very strongly in our favor. Until then, however, the situation
will be dangerous.

Asked what our policy approach should be over the next 5–10
years, Ford said that in the short run we cannot alter the regime. It will
change from within if at all, as in the past. International problems will
be dangerous, and the Soviets will have a tendency to rely on their
military strength to deal with them; Poland and Afghanistan will
remain problems. Ford said he could imagine a strong leader wishing
to indicate something to the West on Afghanistan, but not on Poland.
Poland in his view would be the most serious obstacle to improvement
in relations with the West.

The Secretary asked if this meant Ford saw no way for the Poles to
get out of their box.

Ford said he did not. By this he meant he saw no solution that
could please the Russians. The Poles could not reinstate a party that
could both rule the country and be loyal to the USSR, and for the
Russians there is no other solution. For them junta rule must be a
terrible example for other parties. Economic reform is also something
the Soviet Union finds it hard to permit; finally there is the concern
for security and order. Minor cosmetic changes may be possible, but
it is hard to see more than that without the Russians objecting. Ford
thought it likely that they would eventually have to intervene militarily.

Stoessel said military intervention remains a real possibility, but
for the moment the Soviets seem relatively satisfied with the Polish
military in power. At the moment they do not appear to be overly
worried. Over the long run, of course, what Ford said was true.

Ford said the policy objective should thus be to reduce the dangers
of the next years. First, we should give greater recognition to the fact
that the Soviets see themselves as beleaguered and think we see them
the same way, and are trying to destroy their regime. This is not to
say we should not correct the military situation; on the contrary, the
West surely needs to correct its military posture and achieve parity or
in some areas superiority. But isn’t there something we can do to give
the Soviets the feeling we recognize their fears? They are touchy and
obsessed by this issue, want to be considered as on the same level with
us; they are terribly sensitive to slights to their great power status.

The Secretary asked for example of slights and of what Ford would
consider proper recognition.
As slights, Ford mentioned the failure to ratify SALT II, which they interpreted as a slight; “Jackson-Pollock” (sic); Carter’s letter to Sakharov, which was tremendously insulting to them; and, “with respect,” elements in President Reagan’s speeches which touched raw nerves. We are dealing with a paradox, since they say they are convinced their own system will win and ours will be destroyed, but do not believe their own ideology.

Ford said he thought it very important to reestablish an element of crisis control. There had been some work done under the Nixon Administration which could be built on. This would be of benefit to both sides; he saw it as purely preventive. It would also help the U.S. with its Allies, who continue to look to the U.S. lead.

The Secretary asked if this meant giving them a sense that there is a pattern of communication between us and the Soviets. Ford said yes, in the sense of dealing with crises, preventing them from getting out of hand.

Stoessel asked what Ford meant by work formerly done that could be built on. Ford said he thought we had made a good start in this area under Nixon.

Another element useful for “proper recognition,” Ford said, was arms control. In discussion these issues with his Prime Minister, they did not always agree, but he had to say that he did agree with the Prime Minister that there should not be any linkage on arms talks.

As a final element, Ford said, after the succession we should seize any opportunity that they are offering to back down on key issues. There are examples of their wanting a pause; the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is one. Many Russians feel they have been pushing their people as hard as possible, and that in renewed military competition with the West they will need to pay too much to keep the parity they have achieved. The West should respond if the opportunity of a Soviet backdown arises.

Stoessel asked how East-West trade fitted in this.

Ford said he personally did not see much of a future in East-West trade. It was of course important for some factories and for the employment it provides. Probably the U.S. and Canada got the most advantage from it among Western countries, since they sell grain. But it is not overall a very key element.

The Secretary asked what Ford had meant at the end of his paper when he spoke of the Soviets playing “their only really valid card.” Ford said he had meant deriving political benefits from the military force they have built up.

Blackwill asked how Ford saw the Soviets exploiting differences among the Western Allies. Ford replied that the Soviets of course always
seek to divide the Allies. Right now they may see some hope of success in the internal situations in France, Germany and the Netherlands. It was his personal feeling that the pipeline decision was all wrong, although once it was signed it was necessary to go through with it. On the other hand, the Europeans should also do more, and would certainly look silly if the pipeline were finished and they then saw the Soviets invade Poland. European resistance to the pipeline is not unanimous; the French, for instance, feel very strongly about Poland, and this is particularly true of the trade unions. Europe should make more of an effort. What is needed are agreed guidelines on future economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.

The Secretary said we too would like nothing better, if only the Europeans would agree. Ambassador Gotlieb said he too hoped we can find diplomatic common ground on this topic; it is the only way to go.

Stoessel asked if Ford saw pressures from the Soviets in this matter. Ford replied that he suspected the Soviets would continue to try to separate the Allies but realized that all such quarrels, like the De Gaulle episode, are temporary and will be overcome in time.

Wolfowitz commented that neither side had up to now saved much money by arms control agreements, and it was hard to see arms control agreements coming up that would save money if concluded. If the pressures on Soviet military spending were as strong as Ford appeared to believe, one place where real savings might be possible was in Soviet relations with China. Here there was a huge buildup, very costly in addition to being psychologically important. They might try a latter-day 1939 in this area.

Ford said he doubted cost was the main factor in the Soviet approach to China. They will not in any case demobilize. Conventional force costs are smaller for them than for us. He thought a pact with China or even a big improvement in relations unlikely. Even if there were some kind of agreement the Soviets would still need a large standing army, and there was the added psychological importance for the Soviets of maintaining a visible Soviet presence in the Far East.

With regard to costs, Ford said, it is perfectly true that the Soviets have up to now done what they felt they needed to do. But we are now entering a new era in arms development which is likely to be extremely expensive. It will require inputs from a civilian economy that is already beggared, especially in trained personnel. The savings possible are perhaps not great, but it is the aim of some Russians to reduce a little bit. If they do not they are bound to weaken the civilian economy even further.

The Secretary asked why the economic situation is bound to get worse.
Ford said it is because the situation is so bad now and because against that background more capital will be needed to prevent the civilian sector slipping disastrously.

Dam said it was not clear to him why Soviet military expenditures kept going up whatever the political context. Perhaps they went up through immobilism rather than in response to international events.

Ford said this was true, and it will be hard to cut the military budget in the best of circumstances. As he saw it, the R&D for the SS–20 had been done in 1968 and 1969, during the worst of the Vietnam War, and the military had probably convinced the civilians that it was needed because the U.S. was growing more menacing. By the time detente came along in 1972–73, however, it was already in production. At that point the military had probably argued the Soviets had to use what they had in hand. This was just a hypothesis, but it was plausible to him.

Eagleburger asked Ford to relate this momentum factor to succession prospects, to possible shifts in the Soviet mindset and how we might affect them. He asked what we should be particularly careful about.

Ford said he thought we should give the Soviets the respect they feel they are entitled to, and respond to opportunities if they appear. We will lack the information to go further than that: in the Stalin succession Khrushchev at first looked like the most sycophantic Stalinist around. He felt there was no question that the leadership after Brezhnev would devolve onto a troika and even greater diffusion of power. The situation was likely to resemble the post-Khrushchev period, when Brezhnev had taken six years to make his imprint on the bureaucracy. He had survived since because he had nourished the feeling of identification with him on domestic and foreign policy grounds down through the Central Committee level. It was hard to believe that a new leader would have the character or strength to impose himself as a new ruler. He would have come up through the aparat, in the hard school of bureaucratic politics, and the aparat wants to hold on to what it has got, and sees no reason to change.

The Secretary commented that this seems to be a comfortable or good approach for members of the leadership, but a bad situation from the general standpoint. We asked whether this distinction will not affect prospects.

Ford replied that the primary objective of all Soviet leaders is to keep the Communist Party in power. They only changed if this objective is threatened by pressures from the economy or international pressures, if they otherwise face a blank wall.

Stoessel asked about the theory that the technocrats will gain more influence as economic problems come to the fore. As the party becomes
more despised for ineptitude, the power of technicians might grow, with the younger generation shifting toward them.

Ford said the problem was that the technicians are also Party members, and their privileges come from what the Party has given them.

Ambassador Gotlieb asked if he were right to say Ford was recommending “attenism”—a kind of intellectual holding concept—for the short term, and an attempt to reduce the dangers of confrontation for the medium term.

Ford replied that he did not consider a return to détente to be a serious option. He thought it would be a mistake to make offers of improvement before we can say that our rearmament effort is working. But we should by all means be cautious.

Blackwill asked how we are to understand the Soviet Union’s geopolitical activism in the 1970’s if it is true that the Soviets lack historical confidence in their future.

Ford said one of the mistakes of détente was to exclude the Soviet commitment to support national-liberation movements from consideration. It has always been there, and was needed to prove the regime’s bona fides. It was one way to allow the Soviets to give foreign affairs support to almost any movement. It will continue. After a long period of hesitation, the Soviets did more in this area during the 1970’s because the opportunities were there. They saw no contradiction with détente, and they were also feeling their oats, experimenting with use of the military power they had acquired to achieve parity with the U.S. It was also the peak period of Brezhnev as a world leader.

Speaking for Canada, Ambassador Gotlieb said the GOC focusses on a stabilizing environment for the future. It agrees it is sensible to have two legs in one’s approach: rebuilding Western strength and “attenism.” The third possible leg is a long-term conception in U.S. policy that the wave of history is with us and the Soviet system won’t work. The resulting prescription is to mobilize all elements favoring this wave of history. To be successful, this would require a major consensus to use economic instruments. He thought that consensus was probably “not there.” Trying to achieve it would have high costs in West-West relations, which would benefit the Soviets greatly. It is sensible to seek it on small things—technology transfer, credits—but one cannot proceed too far down this road without losing the consensus necessary to make the approach work.

The Secretary commented that it is one thing to seek the Soviet Union’s demise and another to seek to limit Soviet options, confining them to their own resources.

The Secretary thanked Ambassador Ford for sharing his wisdom, invited him to get in touch when he was visiting Washington, and asked him not to be surprised if the Secretary called upon his counsel again.
211. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, September 13, 1982

SUBJECT
START and INF

Nuclear negotiations with the Soviets will return to center stage over the next several months, what with the resumption of the talks themselves, your meeting with Gromyko, UN and NATO diplomatic activity, and “freeze” politics at home. I want to share with you and Ken my thoughts on the issues we will face in this period and beyond.

START

The Soviet proposal is not, in my opinion, warmed-over SALT II, as our chief negotiator suggests. Rather, it is roughly what might have been expected from them in SALT III, had SALT II been ratified—an offer of significant, but not deep, reductions linked to restrictions on US forces of chief concern to Moscow, cruise and theater (INF) missiles. The Administration’s approach has thus produced dividends:

—By convincing the Soviets that we’re committed to US nuclear force modernization, we’ve induced them to offer more than they’ve offered before in order to restrain our programs.

—By adopting a politically appealing deep reductions proposal, we’ve caused them to follow suit, albeit in lesser measure, in order to deny us sole possession of the high ground.

—By saying, in effect, we’ll respect SALT II limits, we’ve convinced them to move on to more ambitious arms control instead of concentrating on bringing SALT II formally into force.

The main differences between us and the Soviets concern: (1) the level of reductions; and (2) the fact that the Soviets do not share our interest in concentrating reductions in ballistic weapons. They haven’t accepted our view that fast (i.e., ballistic) weapons are more destabilizing than slow (i.e., bomber and cruise) weapons. Moreover, concentrating on ballistic weapons would require major changes in their ballistic-

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1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Lawrence Eagleburger Files, Lot 84D204, Chron—September 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Dam. In an undated handwritten note to Shultz, Eagleburger wrote: “GS—I don’t claim to be a disarmament expert (with good reason). But the ramifications politically—particularly in Europe and here at home—are substantial. Thus, I’ve done the attached to try to give some sense of the complexity of the issues.”
oriented force posture while leaving us free to produce in great numbers
the weapons about which they are most concerned: cruise missiles.

To be sure, there are other obstacles: whether or not the Soviet
Backfire bomber should be counted as a strategic delivery vehicle;
whether and how to limit non-deployed missiles; and whether the
Soviets will accept intrusive verification measures. But these should
prove manageable if a deal could be struck on the central issues of
how far and what to reduce. (I address below the Soviet demand
that a START agreement be accompanied by abandonment of our INF
deployment program.) All in all, it is not unrealistic to contemplate a
START agreement within the next two years, provided both sides make
a determined effort.

I happen to believe that a START agreement somewhere between
the current US and Soviet positions would be very much in our strategic
interest, not to mention a major success for the President and proof
that our approach to nuclear arms control and dealing with Moscow
has been correct. I’m convinced that there will be no agreement if we
do not go a reasonable distance to meet Soviet concerns about cruise
missiles, especially the air- and sea-launched versions, where our
growth potential is greatest, and that the pay-off of cutting the Soviet
ballistic force would more than justify placing our cruise programs
under limits.

Others will argue that an agreement is in our interest only if it is
based on our opening position. They claim that the survivability of
our land-based missiles would not be enhanced by a START agreement
permitting the Soviets significantly more land-based missiles than our
proposal would allow. They point out that our air- and sea-launched
cruise missiles are strictly retaliatory forces and that constraining them
would therefore weaken deterrence. Finally, some will argue that a
START agreement is almost certain to undercut popular support for
sustained growth in defense spending, so we’d better insist on an
agreement that cuts Soviet forces drastically. While I’m not persuaded
by these arguments, they are serious and deserve your consideration.

The question of whether to make a serious effort to get an agree-
ment should also be viewed in the context of what relationship we
want with Moscow. The Soviet move suggests to me that Moscow still
wants to do business with this Administration. The Soviets will draw
conclusions from how we handle START about whether we want to
do business with them in areas of potential common interest.

If, in this succession period, the Soviets conclude that the Adminis-
tration is not interested in progress in what has always been treated
as an area of strong common interest, they will have to wonder whether
there is any point in showing moderation in other areas. Again, there
are other ways to look at it. We have said that progress in arms control
should be accompanied by progress toward settling international problems caused by Soviet misdeeds. Some would argue—and I’m not altogether unsympathetic—that a US effort to yield progress in START would lead the Soviets to conclude that all the talk about linkage was just that: talk. My own view is that, even with tight linkage, we won’t find it easy to use Soviet interest in restraining our nuclear programs as a lever to alter Soviet international conduct—but what leverage we have will be removed if the Soviets think we want arms control progress no matter how they and their proxies behave.

Assuming we want to go for an agreement—unless the Soviets embark on new foreign adventures—timing can be crucial. On the one hand, if, say, a year passes from the time the negotiations began (this past spring) and the US has not budged, the Soviets are likely to dismiss the idea of an agreement with this Administration. On the other hand, if we leap too quickly, the Soviets may conclude that they can get an agreement closer to their current position than to ours if they just stand pat. We might therefore think in terms of a substantive move early next year, perhaps signalled in a January meeting between you and Gromyko. This would leave a full year for give-and-take before getting so close to the American election as to create an appearance of using START for electoral purposes.

INF

Differences between us and the Soviets in this negotiation are more profound. The prospects for convergence are poor: we lack negotiating leverage (our missile deployments don’t even start until late next year); our demand that the Soviets dismantle their entire long-range missile force is not remotely realistic; and we and the Soviets disagree sharply over whether to include aircraft (we say no, they say yes), French and British forces (we say no, they say yes), and Soviet forces opposite China (we say yes, they say no).

Through two negotiating rounds, we haven’t budged. The Soviets have made cosmetic changes and are likely to make substantive concessions in order to pin blame for the lack of progress on us, induce the Allies to pressure us to soften our position, and, most importantly, erode support for our missile deployment plan. The Allies will want us to show that we are making every effort to get an agreement before deployments begin, even if they realize that an agreement may be unobtainable.

In considering the possibility of changing our INF position, the most important question is what impact it would have on Allied support for modernization. If European publics perceive the sides to be far apart because of US intransigence, they will be susceptible to the claim that we are using the negotiations as a cover to permit the
deployments—then we’ll be in trouble. If they see the sides far apart because of Soviet intransigence, we can make the argument that the deployments must begin before the Soviets will have sufficient incentive to negotiate in earnest. At the same time, if we make a move, we could create a sense of progress and put the Soviets in the position of moving further themselves while warning that hopes for an agreement would evaporate if deployments commence. It’s important to bear in mind that much of the European support for deployments is based on the argument that the Soviets would have no incentive to negotiate unless they were convinced that we will proceed with deployments absent an agreement. Faced with new hope that success in negotiations might make deployments unnecessary, combined with a fear that commencing deployments might damage the negotiations, large segments of European opinion might be drawn to the idea of delaying deployments “to give arms control more time.” It’s hard to forecast how “Europe” will react to INF negotiating developments. But it’s clear that managing these political dynamics will require great skill and close consultations with key Allied leaders, especially the German Chancellor.

My own feeling is that we should be prepared to alter our INF position if and when it becomes clear that failure to do so will jeopardize support for modernization. That said, we should not stray from our insistence or equal limits and significant reductions. Nor should we get drawn into a deal that would allow both us and the Soviets to maintain INF missiles outside of Europe while banning them in Europe; this would suggest a “decoupling” of the US from Europe without eliminating the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.

Rather, we should consider such possibilities as offering limits on aircraft (which the Joint Chiefs would oppose) and proposing equal missile limits greater than zero (but well below current Soviet and planned US force levels). We might also think about the possibility of offering limits on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) as part of an INF agreement. The Soviets will insist that these weapons be treated either in START or INF; if we put them in START the Allies will see us using the negotiating leverage of our SLCM program to limit the threat to us instead of the threat to them. There are those who argue that we shouldn’t put SLCM’s on the negotiating block at all—and, indeed, I would recommend considering a numerical ceiling, not a ban.

The START–INF Link

The Soviets have said they will not go along with strategic reductions if we are left free to build up forces that can strike the USSR from Europe. While they may soften this stance, they will at least want to have an INF agreement more or less in hand before accepting a START
agreement. For vastly different reasons, the Allies will insist on the same link. We’d face a violent political storm—especially in Germany—if it appeared that we were making a more serious effort to reduce the nuclear threat to the US than to reduce the nuclear threat to Western Europe.

The link works in reverse as well. An INF agreement would be largely irrelevant without a START agreement, since the Soviets would be free to add “strategic” forces and target them on Europe instead of on us. In practice, however, we’re unlikely to find it easier to reach an INF agreement than a START agreement.

There are a range of possibilities for linking START and INF: separate negotiations leading to separate agreements at separate times; separate negotiations leading to separate agreements at roughly the same time; separate negotiations leading to a single agreement with separate limits on strategic and INF systems; merged negotiations leading to a single agreement with integrated limits on strategic and INF systems. It’s too early to say which approach is best. One option we don’t have is going for a START agreement without at least being prepared to try for movement in INF. Ultimately, we may face the dilemma of what to do if we and the Soviets are ready to settle on strategic limits but are still far apart on INF limits. For now, we’d be wise to accompany any move in START with an equally significant move in INF, lest we trigger a German anxiety attack.

“Freeze” Politics

The Administration stayed ahead of the freeze movement this past spring by beginning START and making the argument that a freeze would remove the Soviets’ incentive to agree to strategic reductions. Of course, posing the issue as a choice between a freeze and reductions only works if reductions are believed to be achievable. It won’t be long before the critics start asking (rhetorically) where the progress is. If the Administration responds that we are making progress, it will be admitting that the Soviets have made an important proposal, in which case pressures will increase to alter our own START position. If the Administration wants to avoid giving the Soviets credit for their move, it will have to claim there has been little progress, in which case interest in a freeze will grow. One advantage of a US move in START is that it permits us to cite progress without crediting the Soviets and adding to the pressure on ourselves. That said, I for one would not favor a move until early next year.

The Interagency Problem

I haven’t tried to convince you to follow a particular course; you’ll want to get others’ views and do some thinking of your own. But I hope I have convinced you that success—however defined—will
require agility. Unfortunately, the existing interagency process relies on bottom-up thinking and is plagued by philosophical differences so severe that those who have good ideas that might produce progress are afraid to float them. Unless the process is made more responsive, those opposed to movement will prevail by default. At a minimum, the initiative in these negotiations will shift to the Soviets, and we’ll find it hard to manage the politics of INF in Europe and the politics of the “freeze” at home.

Altering interagency procedures—e.g., setting up a new group chaired by NSC staff—won’t solve the basic problem. What is needed is for everyone to have a clearer sense of where the President wants to see these negotiations go. If he wants progress, he will need to make known that he wants to consider options that would produce progress. If he wants to sit tight, we shouldn’t worry that the system is unresponsive. My hunch is that he would at least want to consider what might be done to get movement. The way to find out is not by asking him to react piece-meal to specific negotiating issues that cannot be settled in the bureaucratic trenches, but rather by offering him your broad ideas directly and getting a reaction.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger²

² Eagleburger initialed the memorandum “LSE” over his typed signature.
212. Minutes of a Senior Interdepartmental Group for International Economic Policy\(^1\)

Washington, September 16, 1982, 4:30 p.m.

**SUBJECT**
Poland-related sanctions

**PARTICIPANTS**

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**Minutes**

Secretary Regan opened the meeting. He stated that the objective of the meeting was to agree on a package of sanctions which the U.S. Government would be willing to exchange for the sanctions currently in place against the Soviet Union in response to the events in Poland. He also stated that the problem of including Japan in any agreement should be addressed. The meeting was then turned over to Secretary Shultz.

Secretary Shultz stated that we need to review our overall objectives toward the USSR and establish where we are now. He referred to the President’s four point decision in response to his memorandum of

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August 24. He noted that the final point of that set of decisions was a charge to prepare the U.S. position for the time that the European allies proposed discussions on the sanctions issue. He then briefly reviewed the history and status of the arrangements for talks with the European allies affected by the extraterritorial application of the sanctions. Originally the British had proposed talks on the issues and Secretary Shultz had accepted the proposal. After negotiations among the European countries themselves and a British request that the U.S. call a meeting, which the Secretary refused, the plans for a meeting had been suspended. The Secretary said that there would be the opportunity to discuss these issues during the bilateral meetings on the margins of the UN General Assembly, but a definite meeting had not been scheduled. He stated that in this setting it did not seem wise to work out a detailed negotiating package or set of guidelines since any meeting would simply be used to feel the Europeans out.

The Secretary then proceeded to outline his understanding of the President’s policy on East-West trade. First, the President was realistic about the behavior of the Soviet Union—military buildup, the use of chemical weapons, Central America, Horn of Africa, Kampuchea, the invasion of Afghanistan and, finally, the suppression in Poland were both objectionable in themselves and examples of underlying Soviet behavior. To deal with the Soviets, the U.S. needed strength—military strength, based on an adequate military budget—and the capacity to use it if necessary. By the same token, the U.S. needed economic strength and the capacity to bring it to bear. The President was willing to negotiate with the USSR in areas of mutual advantage, for example in arms reductions, and in economic areas such as the sale of grain. However, in all negotiations, it was necessary to negotiate from strength and the U.S. objective was to limit Soviet options—military, economic and ideological. Once the Soviets understood that their options were limited, they would have the incentive to change their behavior. If this occurred, the U.S. would be willing to discuss a constructive relationship.

Thus, although the primary dimension of U.S. strength in dealing with the Soviet Union is military, it is in a political setting. This means that the political dimension of alliances such as NATO is important, and the “whole thing relates together.” The problem is that many European countries do not have the “stand in there” attitude of the Reagan administration.

The economic dimension of national strength is an adjunct to military strength. The Secretary then proceeded to summarize a paper on East-West trade which he had written before assuming his current
office. Trade is by its nature mutually advantageous, although not equally advantageous. Because of its ability to buy and sell as a single unit, the Soviet Union has been able to gain advantages which are out of proportion to its overall economic strength compared to the West. A good example has been grain sales, and it is for this reason that Secretary Shultz has favored long-term agreements in this area. Furthermore, trade involves the transfer of “ideas,” and in East-West trade, the ideas flow (with the exception of grain) from West to East. Despite its economic superiority, the West today finds that trade has given advantages to the East: the U.S. farmers are dependent on Soviet markets, and Western bankers find themselves dependent on their East European debtors. The long-term challenge is to alter these relationships, so that the advantages of East-West trade swing to the West.

By definition, any trade with the Soviet Union gives some advantage to the Soviet Union, and thereby increases Soviet military capability. However, this administration has not adopted a “no trade” policy. The allies are firmly in favor of East-West trade. The question is to set the limits on this trade, to question individual transactions as to whether substitutes are available, whether there are military applications of the items traded, and to evaluate each transaction. A second set of criteria to apply to limiting trade with the USSR is whether it can be used for “tactical maneuver” in putting pressure on the behavior of the Soviet Union. In general, the Secretary believed, short-term trade measures have little effect on Soviet behavior. Policies needed to be sustained to have effect. The current sanctions, for example, the Secretary believes, should be maintained or, if replaced, replaced with sustainable measures. A third consideration is cooperation with allies. Almost any trade measure in East-West trade is more effective if implemented by all the Western countries.

As the officer charged by the President with preparing for talks with the Europeans on possible replacement measures for the current sanctions, Secretary Shultz was looking for a set of measures that would have clarity, would affect the Soviet Union, could be sustained, and would have broad Western support. There had been a number of suggestions within the SIG, several of which had already been discussed with the allies. Now the United States had shown a depth of determination which had not been clear earlier, and it might be better able to reach agreement with the allies. The Secretary noted that, con-

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2 Reference is to a paper Shultz wrote on March 17, on the subject of trade and diplomacy in U.S.-Soviet relations. Shultz forwarded copies to Eagleburger, Wallis, and Buckley under cover of a separate August 24 note, and to Weinberger under cover of an August 25 note. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, The Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption Documents, Lot 92D630, “Not for System—August 1982”)
trary to certain press reports, the U.S. Government was not looking for a way to drop the sanctions. If an acceptable alternative package could not be worked out, we would “stick with what we have.”

The Secretary then reviewed the elements which could be included in an alternative sanctions package. The first was credit, which the Secretary considered “our best tool.” It was difficult for any government to argue that it made sense to give the Soviet Union subsidized credit. Some progress had been made with the allies before Versailles. The remaining work was to gain agreement or down payments and set up a monitoring body. This was essential because of the possibilities of manipulation of the price of equipment and credit terms, i.e. hidden subsidies.

The second area was affirming and expanding COCOM. Like credits, COCOM was an area in which it was relatively easy to gain agreement in principle, but difficult to agree on specific implementing measures.

The third area was sanctions on the export of oil and gas technology. In this area, it would be difficult to secure allied agreement, even though the United States was the dominant supplier. It might be necessary to “play hardball” with the European countries, refusing them this technology for non-Soviet sales if they did not go along with embargoing sales to the Soviet Union. With carefully chosen items, this area might be suitable for an agreement.

The fourth area was alternative energy sources. This area was also “susceptible” to agreement in principle, but difficult in implementation. Algeria, for example, had proved itself an unreliable supplier. However, the Secretary felt that the Norwegian/Dutch arrangements might be worked out, and this alternative source brought on line before the 1990s. Another problem was Soviet pricing policies, which would undercut Norwegian and Dutch prices.

The Europeans would place grain sales on the agenda. The U.S. must maintain the position of no subsidies for grain sales, and keep these sales as an example of why we should not adopt a “no trade” position.

Concluding his summary, Secretary Shultz noted that in the various agency papers there were detailed discussions in each of these areas. He reiterated his belief that it did not make sense to formulate a detailed U.S. position. For example, in discussions it might turn out that the Europeans were willing to offer more attractive propositions. However, it was important to maintain the principle that any alternative set of sanctions must be at least as effective in punishing the Soviet Union as the current sanctions, and must be more broadly supported, to include Europe and Japan. In the meantime, we should not underestimate the power or the temporary denial orders of the Commerce Department. They are wreaking a great deal of havoc,
both with European companies and with our own. They also demonstrate the depth of our determination, which is valuable in any negotiation. The President has made his preference clear, and it is up to his “agents” to carry them out.

Secretary Weinberger stated that the President’s objective was to improve the situation in Poland by punishing the Soviet Union using the tool of the pipeline sanctions. Any alternative measures to be adopted should not set back those objectives, yet should assist in limiting the damage to alliance relations. Germany promised to be a special problem, since it is so strongly committed to trade with the Soviet Union. Concerning credit restraint, Secretary Weinberger had never been impressed by shortening maturity dates. It was important to arrange credit restraints so that they restricted hard currency available to the Soviet Union. In the area of alternative energy sources, it was important to bring other sources on stream before the 1990s—the MidEast and our own Alaskan fields were possibilities. France, for example, is only importing Soviet gas as a backup fuel, and could be worked on in this area. The U.S. could ask for a limitation to the deliveries from the first strand of the pipeline, as it should have three years ago. If there is to be a meeting between the United States and the Europeans, there should be clear instructions to the U.S. side. If other attractive possibilities arose, the instructions could be adjusted. However, clear instructions were in many ways an advantage. The current U.S. sanctions should not be underestimated in their effect, and should not be exchanged for something else lightly.

Secretary Baldrige stated that what was needed was a fundamental policy on East-West trade, particularly in the oil and gas area. This policy should be constructed independent of Poland. In addition, in taking sanctions against the Soviet Union, it is important that the burdens be shared within the alliance. It is important to win in this dispute, now that it has been joined, and the U.S. position would be stronger if we were supported by our allies.

Secretary Baldrige went on to several near-term decisions which needed to be made concerning our current policies: First, the “unintended effects” of our temporary denial orders. Dresser France supplies equipment to Brazil, Western oil companies in the North Sea, and even Australia. Our orders are holding up supplies to these projects outside of the Soviet Union. Second, “hardship” cases: a German subsidiary of the Cameron Iron Works of Houston, Texas stands to lose a $100M contract signed in March 1982 of low-technology oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union. Third, “legal” problems which involve closing loopholes in the denial orders. For example, the thirteen subsidiaries of Creusot-Loire now have to be included in the temporary denial order making this our “most shakey” legal case. The U.S. could sustain
a reversal in this instance which could hurt us. Secretary Baldrige stated that a system was needed for reviewing the problems in these three categories. He pointed out that the primary objective of the current policies were not to harm U.S. companies, and to do so risked losing U.S. support for the policies. In this connection, he stated there should be a way to make exceptions as we are doing ourselves damage.

Director Casey stated that an Intelligence Estimate was in final stages of preparation which would give in some detail the military effects of East-West trade. Director Casey stated that he believed that the restriction of the transfer of high technology to the Soviet Union was perhaps the most important measure the West could take, followed by the restriction of militarily relevant oil and gas technology, and finally, future pipelines to Western Europe which generate substantial hard currency. In reply to a question from Secretary Shultz, Director Casey said that he agreed with the categories of measures against the Soviet Union which had been discussed, but that we needed to look carefully at the priority of those categories based on their effect on the Soviet Union, and to consider whether they could be negotiated with the allies.

Secretary Regan then proposed four items as a result of the meeting:

—First, that Secretary Shultz hold discussions with the allies as he had suggested, under only the broad instructions that an alternative package should cause “equal pain to the Soviet Union to what we are now inflicting.” At the completion of those talks, if there had been no European offer, the SIG would reevaluate the situation.

—Second, that the Secretary of Commerce would be authorized to make exceptions for those features of the denial orders which were damaging U.S. companies, but not the Soviet Union.

—Third, that the CIA proceed quickly with the Intelligence Estimate.

—Fourth, that in public, all members of the SIG–IEP would continue the current stance: that the U.S. is prepared to listen to any allied proposals for alternative sanctions against the Soviet Union, and that the U.S. has a clear idea of where it is going. If questioned closely about the status of consultations with the Europeans, all members would refer the questions to Secretary Shultz.

—Finally, that these four points would be put in a paper for the NSC.

Ambassador Brock pointed out that in dealings with the Soviet Union, it was possible to make real progress if the agreements and

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3 See Document 213.
their implementation were kept out of the limelight. The same was true for agreements with the Europeans.

The discussion then turned to several immediate cases before the Commerce Department for exceptions to the current temporary denial orders. First, the Cameron Iron Works, the German subsidiary of which had signed a contract in March with the Soviet Union for oil and gas equipment which was not for use on the Yamal pipeline. The deal had been caught by the June extension of the December sanctions.

Secretary Regan pointed out that the SIG–IEP could not sit “like a Supreme Court” rendering judgment on individual cases. It was necessary to give general guidance to Commerce and allow the Secretary to make the individual decisions. Secretary Baldrige said that he had the authority to grant exceptions to the orders on the basis of hardship, but that for exceptions on the basis of “unintended effects” he needed higher authority. He said that in general the U.S. sanctions and denial orders were a tough policy that had caused a great deal of economic damage both in Europe and the United States: what was needed now was sensible decisions to ameliorate them.

Secretary Weinberger stated that if we granted exceptions to U.S. companies, it would cause an uproar in Europe greater than that caused by the grain sales agreement extension. Secretary Shultz stated that the criteria should be to distinguish between American and European companies. If harm were being caused to European companies, then this would induce them to pressure their governments to change their positions; if the damage were being caused to U.S. companies, then an exception should be made. Secretary Baldrige stated that he now had all the guidance he needed to make his decisions on the hardship cases.

Secretary Baldrige then raised the “unintended effects” category. Hewlett Packard and several other computer companies had service contracts with Dresser France on office computers which had been sold to Dresser France. An exception was needed to allow Hewlett Packard and the other companies to repair these computers. There was general approval in the SIG that these exceptions should be made.
213. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 3–11/2–82 Washington, September 21, 1982

The Soviet Gas Pipeline in Perspective

KEY JUDGMENTS

1. The USSR has used imports from the West to enhance its military capabilities.

—By obtaining goods and technology, legally and illegally, that contribute directly to the production and technical sophistication of weapon systems.

—By expanding the base of industries of particular importance to military production.

—And, more generally, by easing economic problems, thereby reducing the burden of defense.

2. The rapid increase in Soviet imports from the West in the 1970s was made possible by large windfall gains in export earnings due to the surge in oil prices and the willingness of Western countries to provide large credits, most of which were government guaranteed. The USSR is encountering growing economic difficulties, which will make it more difficult for Moscow to increase its imports from the West in the future. The outlook for most Soviet exports, including oil, is not favorable, and Western banks are unwilling to extend new long-term credits without government guarantees.

3. Only the increase in gas exports through the Siberia-to-Western Europe pipeline will prevent a marked decline in Soviet hard currency imports in the 1980s. The USSR almost certainly will be able to meet scheduled deliveries of gas through the pipeline without diverting Soviet equipment from domestic uses. Enough equipment has already been delivered, or soon will be, to enable the USSR to meet likely West European demand for gas until the late 1980s. By then, Moscow will probably be able to produce enough modern turbines and compressors to bring the line to full capacity, or will have found new sources of equipment for any it may have lost as a result of US actions. Meeting gas delivery commitments and becoming self-sufficient in turbines and compressors will impose costs on the Soviets in inefficiencies and shifts in resources and effort.

4. While gas exports are the most promising future source of hard currency, oil exports still account for some 50 percent of Soviet export earnings, and it is important for Moscow to minimize their future decline. The USSR depends on the West for specialized oil exploration, drilling, pumping, and processing equipment. As its deposits of high-quality, accessible oil are depleted, the Soviets are turning to more remote oil and gas fields and more costly exploitation techniques. But they lag badly behind the West in the necessary technology. Without any access to Western equipment, the adverse impact on Soviet oil production could be as high as 10 percent of output by 1990.

5. Moscow’s best hope of improving its strained hard currency position in the longer run is to secure the cooperation of Western Europe in building large new pipelines for the delivery of additional natural gas in the late 1980s or in the 1990s. With enormous gas reserves and a powerful incentive to earn more hard currency, Moscow is prepared to sell as much gas as the West Europeans will accept. There is potential uncovered gas demand in Western Europe to fill not only the Siberia-to-Western Europe pipeline now being built, but also a second and third strand during the 1990s. Development of these large gas projects currently requires Western pipe, equipment, and credit and markets as part of a package deal, although Soviet need for these Western products will diminish as Moscow develops its domestic gas equipment industry. Alternative sources of gas exist, notably in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea and in North Africa, although they are in general relatively costly and some are considered insecure.

6. It will be difficult to enlist Allied cooperation in restricting trade with the USSR. Beyond economic incentives, there are political considerations that fuel the West Europeans’ reluctance to accept restrictions on trade and credits to the USSR. These include:
   —Their desire to restore the detente climate in Europe and to avoid exacerbating East-West strains.
   —Their desire to maintain access to Eastern Europe.
   —Their belief that economic and other ties with the USSR will influence Soviet behavior.

These political considerations, combined with the economic incentive, continue to limit West European cooperation with the United States in restricting East-West trade.

7. The crux of the problem lies in developing with the West European countries a common understanding of the strategic implications of East-West trade. Such an understanding has been notably absent, but the chances of achieving it may be better now that the West Europeans are becoming more aware of the issues and the depth of US concern. Allied leaders have asserted that they will not conduct economic war-
fare against the Soviet Union. But adequate analysis and discussion can lead to a common conclusion:

—That deficiencies in security policies among the Western Allies have resulted in Soviet acquisition of militarily important technology, financial subsidies, and, potentially, an important role in Western Europe’s energy supply.

—That taking steps to withhold these benefits is merely prudent security policy which Allies owe to each other, and can be seen as self-protection rather than economic warfare.

8. Accordingly, Western countries might be willing to cooperate in:

—Developing and implementing broader and tighter COCOM restrictions.

—Agreeing to stricter limits on the terms and volume of government-supported credits.

—Developing other energy sources as an alternative to additional Soviet pipelines.

9. Making Western military-related technology, subsidized credit, and locked-in gas markets available helps the Soviet military buildup. Western governments would then be under increased pressure to raise defense costs, a move that requires heavy taxes, sometimes leads to deficit spending, and contributes to inflation and high interest rates. The United States is now committing some 6 percent of its economic effort and the European Allies some 4 percent of theirs to defend against a Soviet military threat that consumes 14 percent or more of their GNP. At the same time Western leaders are asking their citizens to carry a heavy defense burden they are pursuing policies that help the Soviets maintain a threat that adds to this burden.

10. This Estimate includes analysis of the potential impact of Western actions, including actions by Western Europe and Japan, on Soviet economic and military programs:

—The reduced availability of hard currency and energy would make more difficult the decisions Moscow must make among key priorities in the 1980s—sustaining growth in military programs, feeding the population, modernizing the civilian economy, supporting its East European clients, and expanding (or maintaining) its overseas involvements.

—While the cumulative impact of Western actions would clearly increase pressures on Soviet decisionmakers, we cannot judge how they would choose to spread such losses throughout the economy.

—Because economic growth will be slow through the 1980s, annual additions to national output will be too small to simultaneously meet the incremental demands that planners are placing on the domestic economy. Even now, stagnation in the production of key industrial
materials is retarding growth in machinery output—the source of military hardware, investment goods, and consumer durables.

—Shortfalls in Soviet hard currency earnings due to Western actions probably would force further cuts in imports of machinery and equipment. Moscow fears that reductions in food imports would cause popular unrest and wants to avoid the bottlenecks that would be caused by cutting imports of industrial materials, such as steel.

—In the longer term, cuts in machinery imports would retard progress in modernizing a number of industrial sectors—steel, machine building, oil refining, robotics, microelectronics, transportation, and construction equipment—at a time when Moscow is counting on a strategy of limited investment growth and relying instead on productivity growth.

—Placing controls on energy-related equipment and technology would aggravate civilian industrial bottlenecks and, therefore, might cause civilian encroachment on defense production, such as a reallocation of some military-oriented metallurgical and machine-building facilities to produce the embargoed oil and gas equipment.

—The combination of enhanced COCOM controls and foreign exchange shortfalls would raise the cost of Soviet military modernization while at the same time weakening the industrial base for military production.

11. The relative impact of Western economic measures on the USSR can be estimated only as general orders of magnitude, as follows:

—Eschewing future gas projects—up to $10 billion a year in the 1990s.

—Denying all oil equipment and technology—about $10 billion a year for several years but then declining.

—Eliminating interest subsidies—less than $500 million a year. In the long run, tighter COCOM restrictions on militarily sensitive technology (including technology and equipment that indirectly contributes to significant improvements in weapon systems) would perhaps be the most valuable action for the West. Such action would retard major improvements in Soviet weaponry, which the West would be forced to counter. While the dollar value of such action is difficult to estimate, the savings in terms of Western spending for defense annually would probably come to billions of dollars.

12. Moscow has the means to react to Western pressure by giving defense needs an even greater priority than at present and by pursuing a more truculent foreign policy. The Soviets meet their fundamental military requirements from their own large industrial base. Military programs, moreover, have great momentum and political support; they would not easily be scaled back, although the rate of modernization
could be slowed. Even so, Moscow could not escape the reality that its basic choices between military and economic programs would become more difficult, at a time when a change in leadership might also make those choices less predictable.

214. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, September 22, 1982, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Pipeline Sanctions

PARTICIPANTS

The President
State
Secretary George P. Shultz
OSD
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger
Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci
Treasury
Secretary Donald T. Regan
Mr. Marc E. Leland
Commerce
Secretary Malcolm Baldrige
CIA
Mr. John McMahon
USUN
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
USTR
Ambassador William E. Brock
OMB
Dr. Alton Keel

OPD
Mr. Roger Porter
CEA
Mr. William Niskanen
JCS
General Jerome F. O’Malley
White House
Mr. Edwin Meese III
Mr. James A. Baker III
Mr. Richard G. Darman
Judge William P. Clark
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Admiral John M. Poindexter
The Vice President’s Office
Mr. Donald Gregg
NSC
Mr. Norman Bailey

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00091 22 Sep 82 [2/4]. Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room and lasted from 10:35 until 11:30 a.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) In a diary entry that day, Reagan wrote: “In N.S.C. meeting consensus that we should not weaken our sanctions on Russian gas pipe line.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Vol. I, p. 156)
Deputy Secretary Carlucci reported on Senate action on missile basing. At this point, we have the basing decisions we want in committee. Senator Stevens has been recalcitrant and will create problems on the floor.

Judge Clark presented the agenda items.

Secretary Baldrige reported on the rules being followed in connection with sanction violations. Temporary denial orders (TDO’s) are being issued against alleged violators, whether the violation was a company decision or taken under governmental duress. They are also applied to subsidiaries and affiliates where appropriate. TDO’s do not extend to non-oil and gas related items. We are getting many requests for exceptions on hardship grounds, such as the Sensor case where a Dutch court has ordered the company to ship. Unintended effects cases are also coming in, such as a case preventing supply for an Australian pipeline. He said there should not be any exceptions at this time—it would represent opening Pandora’s box. But after Secretary Shultz has had his meetings in New York, we should consider refining the rules. If equipment or technology is for free world projects, if significant hardships are being imposed on innocent third parties and if the project involved reduces energy dependency on the Soviet Union, we should examine a change in rules.

Secretary Regan mentioned that there will be political fallout because of lost jobs in the U.S. Many of the products involved are interchangeable so that effects are mainly on U.S. companies. He agreed with Secretary Baldrige’s recommendation, but the domestic implications should not be overlooked.

The President: We want to hurt the Soviets. Are we stopping an Australian pipeline?

Secretary Baldrige: It might be delayed. But we should not make exceptions now. One exception leads to another.

Judge Clark: Ambassador Hermes (of West Germany) said last night that they don’t agree with the sanctions, but you (the President) should not show vacillation now.

Ambassador Brock: A number of Europeans have told me that if all of this leads to greater allied unity, it was worth doing. But we are on extremely weak legal grounds if our actions are seen as punitive rather than deterrent. How is a pipeline in Australia a deterrent? We must be very precise about the standards on which we make our decisions.

The President: Can’t we buy from Caterpillar and others?

Secretary Weinberger: We do. We even have increased purchases from John Brown. But I’m disturbed at Europeans being unwilling to meet. I support Secretary Baldrige’s recommendation.
Secretary Shultz: Procedurally, you authorized discussions with the Europeans if they wanted to have a meeting. Foreign Secretary Pym asked for a meeting. I accepted. Since then they have had trouble getting together—the British, Germans and Italians want to have a meeting. The French believe if they wait we will fold. We have maintained the posture that we will meet, but they shouldn’t believe we’re looking for a way out. We’re looking for a better approach to East-West economic relations. The British, Germans and Italians understand this. The French don’t yet. I have meetings set up in New York. The first is with Cheysson next Sunday. At some point, they will probably decide on a joint meeting. They will have to take the initiative. If we move from the pipeline to the broader issues of East-West economic relations, we must involve the Japanese and perhaps also the Canadians, at least on a parallel track. I have to play with the situation as it emerges. There must be room for maneuvering and exploration.

We should aspire to a strengthening of COCOM controls, a list revision and a firming of the process of policing. The question of insufficient funds must be addressed.

Secondly, credit restraints on the Soviet Union must be addressed. It is easier to persuade people now not to be too liberal on international lending. It is difficult to police and define. We need to emphasize both substance and procedure. The deals are very complex.

Thirdly, we must try to get agreement on not selling certain key oil and gas technologies and equipment to the USSR. U.S. companies control a major portion of this material, so the Europeans can’t say we’re being unfair. One possibility might be no government guaranteed credit for this material.

Finally, there is concern over the Soviets taking a bigger share of market than implied by the first pipeline. The temptation is there to go ahead and gain a much higher percent of the European market. We must reserve space in the market for additional Norwegian North Sea gas. There have been changes in attitude in Norway due to changed market conditions. We are considering an interesting combination of Dutch/Norwegian gas in the future.

The British don’t want to discuss this without discussing food exports to the USSR. We should reply that our policy is no subsidized sales of American grain. There is no all-out trade war planned—we’re talking about European vulnerability. The Europeans are out of their minds to put themselves in the position of reliance on Soviet energy they are moving towards.

As I told Geoffrey Howe, they’re not offering us something. This is an alliance—we see Soviet behavior, technology transfer and other unacceptable actions. Let’s get together and decide what to do about it. The whole atmosphere is cockeyed now.
Secretary Weinberger: We are in full and total agreement on this matter. We are not trying to wriggle out of the sanctions.

The President: I have no quarrel with this exposition.

Secretary Regan: What if something happens in Poland—have we come to grips with this problem?

The President: Our pipeline position has to do with European exposure. Poland gave us a reason to act. There is more at stake here than Poland.

Secretary Shultz: The political, strategic and economic factors are related. We will not alter the sanctions until we see moves by the USSR. We will stick to our positions. We can’t fall off on COCOM and other things. We must move to a strategic posture not necessarily related to Poland.

Ambassador Brock: We must separate what we hope to achieve strategically from the sanctions per se which are related to Poland.

Secretary Baldrige (to the President): You have said that if the three conditions were met we would lift sanctions.

The President: Yes.

Secretary Shultz: Even if the conditions are fulfilled and we lift sanctions, we still want to do these things.

Mr. Baker: But by agreement, not unilateral sanctions.

Secretary Shultz: Any measure will be much stronger if taken with allied agreement.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: We hope for improvement in Poland. I was in France and the French press thinks our legal position is stronger and our companies’ licensing contracts more important than we do. But there is confusion on our motivations. Our policy must be made clear.

Judge Clark: We were opposed to the pipeline before the declaration of martial law. Favorable developments in Poland would lead to a review of the sanctions, but the issue is broader.

Secretary Regan (to Secretary Shultz): Be careful. The OECD consensus rates are now at the top of the range and may have to be negotiated downwards.

Secretary Shultz: We must move with the market.

Secretary Baldrige: The sanctions were imposed because of Poland. We must not be ambiguous. We want other things, of course. But we are giving the allies leadership on high moral grounds on Poland, not to force our allies to do things they don’t want to do. Sanctions are a means to an end, not an objective in and of themselves.

The President: This is what we indicated at the Summit. The Europeans should go quietly to the USSR and put on the pressure. But they did not agree. We must stick to our position that the sanctions are related to Poland.
Judge Clark: Please review the press guidance.2

Secretary Weinberger: “No” movement, not “sufficient” movement (the text was changed).

Secretary Baldrige: Just a final word to emphasize that the measures we have taken are preventive, not punitive. If asked why they are not effective, we should say they represent only the tip of the iceberg so far.

The President: President Roosevelt called for a quarantine on Germany in 1939. He had his brains kicked out. What would history have been like if he had been listened to?

Judge Clark: Thank you, Mr. President.

2 The approved September 22 text reads: “The President reaffirmed his determination to maintain pressure on the Soviet Union to meet the three Western conditions for reconciliation in Poland. There has been no movement toward these goals which would justify positive reciprocal measures on our part. The President reiterated U.S. readiness to listen to allied proposals concerning equivalent or more effective sanctions against the USSR than those presently in place, but the United States remains firm in its policy not to conduct ‘business as usual’ with the Soviet Union during this period.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 0091 22 Sep 82 [2/4])

215. Information Memorandum From the Director of Policy Planning (Wolfowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz1

Washington, September 22, 1982

SUBJECT
A Report from Moscow

Summary
A group of us (including Allen Wallis) met last Friday2 with Columbia professor Seweryn Bialer, who passed on the views of upper-middle-level Soviet officials and experts to which his recent three-week stay in Moscow exposed him. His presentation put forward Soviet

2 September 17.
views in all their variety and even contradictoriness. Two important points stood out:

1) The Soviets claim to take the Reagan Administration change of course in foreign policy very seriously, to the point of alarm.

2) But, while cautious and conscious of their own problems, the Soviets are not (yet?) considering how to adjust to the new US policy, both because of paralyzed decision-making and ideological rigidity.

Soviet Views

Like other visitors to the Soviet Union, Bialer heard that the early hopes for the Reagan Administration have yielded to a recognition that a new policy is here to stay. Its distinctive features are seen as a quest for military superiority, resort to “economic warfare”, escalation of anti-Soviet rhetoric, etc. But even more important is the redefinition of US aims—in place of traditional US demands for improved Soviet behavior, these officials see a new focus on weakening and destabilizing the Soviet system itself, with the aim of driving the Soviets off the world stage (“rollback of Soviet global influence”). In this view, the Reagan Administration’s ambitious aims are explained by the President’s personal determination, the representation of more radical viewpoints among close advisers, his effective manipulation of Congress and the public, and his ability to count on European loyalties in a pinch. (These Soviets, for example, reportedly take INF deployment for granted.)

Bialer found some Soviets believing a US course correction will occur in time, but not a return to 70’s-style detente. What most believe, he claims, is that detente itself was a kind of fluke and that (with the Vietnam defeat receding) an older, more powerful, and more ideological tradition of US policy has reasserted itself. All the more important Soviet officials he spoke to expressed this “hard line” outlook.

Bialer also notes that the new Soviet assessment has not been fully digested. Intellectually and diplomatically, the Soviets consider themselves in a “holding pattern”, for several reasons. Their caution reflects 1) their own policy overextension, as in Afghanistan and Poland; 2) the priority of their European “peace offensive”; 3) the immobility created by the succession and 4) a growing preoccupation with domestic affairs.

As described to Bialer, this holding pattern is likely to endure for some time. No major decisions, he was told, are being taken now. (The Soviets seem on the ultimate “continuing resolution”.) It is said that every major policy is a matter of inertia, with no hope at middle levels that new proposals can gain a hearing. Even apart from the succession, however, ideological rigidity strengthens this standpat posture: The Soviets do not, even in principle, consider US objections to their behav-
ior in the Third World to be legitimate (even in the limited form of specific demands, not all-out warfare). Promoting left-wing insurrections is a matter of both right and duty, of “inevitable progress” from which the Soviets, for ideological reasons, cannot stand aside. (The absence of internal Soviet reform is explained by Bialer in the same way. While taking its economic weaknesses seriously, the Soviet leadership is at present incapable of devising any reform program; but even when it becomes capable, it will oppose all but superficial changes so as to protect its own power.)

Assessment

There was this interesting contradiction in the Soviet attitudes Bialer picked up: a growing anxiety, especially about U.S. ultimate purposes and military programs, but also a rejection of accommodation in those areas where we have objected to Soviet behavior. (He heard admissions that although the Soviet arms control positions were, like ours, propagandistic, they would not and could not soon be changed.)

Either one of these conflicting views could, in principle, give way to the other. Fear of war could in time lead to serious negotiations; alternately, Soviet unwillingness to compromise may lead to still greater arms efforts and more belligerent diplomacy. Our policy, of course, should take both possibilities into account, but if Bialer is right neither adjustment is likely soon. Instead, we may witness a cautious Soviet hunkering-down but without any interest in resolving disagreements.

This was a very suggestive report. Unfortunately, it is not easy to interpret the findings of even so experienced an observer as Seweryn Bialer. As he himself acknowledges, the views communicated to him represent some mix of real convictions and what the Soviets want us to believe they think. An example is the issue of rhetoric, which bulked very large in what Bialer heard. He reported both 1) that the Soviets are frightened of the President’s rhetoric and 2) that they consider it one source of public support for his policies.

How true the former is we simply cannot know. At a minimum, the disparity between the Administration’s early talk and its cautious subsequent record (on Cuba, for example) must partly calm Soviet fears (although they may, as Bialer heard, believe the President would act much more firmly and decisively in something like the Iranian hostage crisis). But if what they really are convinced of is the latter, that the President’s talk strengthens his internal position, then it may be to their advantage to suggest that his strong rhetoric adds to international instability and makes accommodation less likely. Certainly in Europe this is the Soviet line—to focus their propaganda on a picture of US irresponsibility and unreliability, putting the burden on us to show that this is not true. Their complaints center on the President as
they would have him be (quick on the trigger and ready for war) rather than on the sophisticated combination of uncompromising rhetoric, ambitious proposals, and prudence in action that has in fact made him a more formidable opponent.

Your Meeting with Gromyko

Bialer offered the personal prediction that Gromyko will come on rather strong in presenting Soviet grievances to you, in particular the demand for recognition of the Soviet Union’s rights as a great power. He might appear more cautious and reasonable on specific issues, but this will not make him any more yielding in answering our grievances (at least at the level of principle).

216. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, September 22, 1982

SUBJECT
Strategy for Your Meeting with Gromyko

General Approach

I wanted you to have my thoughts on how to approach the Gromyko meeting before you discuss the subject with the President. I am dubious about the approach EUR has recommended. It is not enough to plan on being neither too soft nor too harsh. Nor will running down a checklist of complaints get us anywhere—indeed it will tend to reinforce Gromyko’s belief that our true aim is to force Moscow to abandon its entire foreign policy and its effort to achieve equal superpower status.

1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, The Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption Documents, Lot 92D630, Not for System—September 1982. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Gompert; cleared by Montgomery.

2 Shultz, Bush, Clark, and McFarlane met with Reagan from 11:02 to 11:07 a.m. on September 23. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Minutes for this meeting were not found. In a diary entry, Reagan wrote: “Met with Sec. Shultz re his upcoming meeting with Gromyko. Decided he should low key and with regard to a summit agree in principle but say we’d have to see some action 1st—permission for Jews to emigrate, let the Pentecostals out of our embassy in Moscow. Seven of them have been trapped there for 4 years. Then there is always Afghanistan & Poland.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Vol. I, p. 157)
The trick is to find a way, without altering the substance of our positions, to convince the Soviets that it is in their interest to try to do business with this Administration. With the succession struggle now well underway, it is more important than ever that the Soviet leaders see neither discontinuity nor total rigidity when they peer at us through the window your talk with Gromyko will provide. Moreover, Gromyko will be fully prepared to parry and counterpunch if you simply recite the litany of complaints and US positions; but he will be thrown off balance if you show a genuine interest in doing business. Thus, for both substantive and tactical reasons, you need to shift the terms of reference from what the Soviets are probably anticipating, without letting them think a general shift in our policies is in the offing.

One way to do this is to identify a category of issues on which, in our view, there ought to be common interests and room for movement on both sides. Even if this doesn’t produce early results—which may be impossible no matter how you skin the cat—it will at least help focus the dialogue on some constructive possibilities. It would also show that this Administration is capable of identifying common interests. And by focussing on relatively few (albeit important) issues, the Soviets would correctly infer that, while narrow progress is possible, across-the-board cooperation is not. I would place in this category: START/INF; nuclear non-proliferation; Southern Africa; Afghanistan; and—paradoxically, perhaps—Poland.

A second category consists of issues on which our purpose is essentially to warn the Soviets to avoid actions that would threaten our interests and thus further harm the relationship. In this category would be: Nicaragua; support for Cuban and Libyan subversion generally; the Persian Gulf. By casting our views on these issues as warnings (in contrast to expressing our desire for progress in category one), we would be making clear that we expect Soviet caution, not cooperation, where our vital interests are at stake but theirs are not. Moreover, by addressing category one more positively, the Soviets will take more seriously a don’t-tread-on-me line in category two.

A third category consists of issues on which we neither look for Soviet cooperation nor need—or want—to warn the Soviets: the Middle East and Sino-American relations. The Soviet frustration about their diplomatic impotence in the Middle East is symptomatic of their complex about not being treated as our equal as a world-class political player. In addition to wanting to keep them on the diplomatic sidelines in order to preserve our unique role and freedom of maneuver, we should consider letting them play only at a price. Similarly, we should let the mystique of Sino-American relations worry the Soviets, neither using our China tie threateningly nor being apologetic. Thus, you should offer nothing on these two questions, and respond—with a certain aloofness—only if Gromyko says something outrageous.
There are, of course, other issues to be discussed that don’t fit neatly into this construct, namely: Soviet human rights performance and bilateral matters. In addition, the question of a summit will either come up directly or lurk in the background, depending on how the uncertainty about future Soviet leadership affects how Gromyko plays that issue. The idea of identifying issues on which we believe progress is possible fits well with the concept of a “carefully prepared” summit. The Soviets may be willing to pay a substantive price for a summit; but it’s up to us to steer them toward the issues on which we would consider movement helpful in laying the basis for a summit.

Conduct of the Meeting

I suggest that you be quite explicit about your belief that there are areas in which there ought to be room for progress. By discussing these first, you can show your desire to accentuate the positive:

—START/INF. It’s important—but it won’t be easy—to convince Gromyko that we are quite serious about wanting agreements. The Soviets should share our interest in reducing nuclear forces, especially the most threatening systems. The Soviets appear more willing to move in START than INF. We want progress in both. Soviet moves in these negotiations would help the relationship generally.

—Non-Proliferation. This is a long-standing but now-dormant area of clear common interest. We would like to set up regular technical discussions. (We obviously aren’t prepared to discuss specific concerns, e.g., Pakistan.)

—Southern Africa. Our aim is to make the Soviets realize that their support for the Cuban presence in Angola is an obstacle to a Namibian settlement, and that this position will become politically untenable. Put in this predicament, the Soviets might have a common—if expedient—interest with us in arriving at a timetable for Cuban withdrawal. They will be reluctant to help if they think we’ll then trumpet it as a major Soviet retreat; so we’ve got to convince them that a constructive approach will earn them some credit.

—Afghanistan. It is very doubtful that experts’ talks will lead to results in the foreseeable future. But this is a good way to keep the issue alive, and it’s useful to have a mechanism in place in the event that the Soviets some day decide to look for an exit. We should therefore propose another round.

—Poland. The point is not that US-Soviet discussions per se could lead to progress; indeed, the Soviets would not welcome talks on Poland. But it is an issue on which a strong case can be made that there should be a common interest in progress. The current situation is only aggravating economic decline and political volatility. It’s not stable and not safe. A controlled renewal of the reform process would threaten
Soviet interests less than does the attempt to suppress the movement. Conversely, you should stress that our aims are limited: we want reconciliation, not chaos.

You should be equally candid in identifying areas where our message is essentially a warning:

—Nicaragua. The basic point is: we will do what is necessary to combat subversion in Central America. Such actions as transferring MiG’s would be intolerable and would leave us with no choice but to conclude that Moscow isn’t genuinely interested in a better relationship.

—The Persian Gulf. We don’t claim vital interests everywhere—as Gromyko once accused Haig of doing—but let there be no mistake about the Gulf. This is already a highly unstable region, and it could become dangerous if the Soviets attempt to exploit the instability.

—Libyan and Cuban Subversion. You will want to reinforce whatever concerns the Soviets have about getting drawn into a confrontation with us as a result of the recklessness of their clients. We may not have much success in weakening the Soviet-Cuban relationship, but the Soviets can be convinced to put more distance between themselves and Qadhafi. You need not recite a litany of proxy misdeeds in order to make the basic argument.

I suggest you lay out for the President your plans for the Gromyko meeting in the above manner, stressing:

—that there is no change in substance;
— that the aim is to dangle the prospect of making headway on specific issues;
— that a summit should be linked to progress on these issues (without being more specific than that).

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

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3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
217. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 28, 1982, 3:30–6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting Between Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
Secretary of State George Shultz
Undersecretary for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Ambassador to the USSR Arthur A. Hartman
Cyril Muromcew (Interpreter)

USSR
Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko
Ambassador to US Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
U.S.A. Department (MFA) Deputy Chief V.F. Isakov
Gromyko’s Senior Assistant V.G. Makarov
V. Sukhodrev (Interpreter)

Secretary Shultz as host asked Gromyko to speak first. Gromyko requested that his statements in Russian be translated into English but said no interpretation from English into Russian would be required. He also asked in what manner these talks should be conducted since he didn’t know the Secretary’s preference. He suggested that they could discuss matters of substance or talk in a round-about way trying to smooth out sharp corners. Gromyko would prefer to discuss matters of substance because there was no time to go into details on this occasion. The Secretary replied that substance was of importance and asked Gromyko to lead off. To give the discussion the pace of a conversation Gromyko proposed to raise a problem, hear the reaction of his partner, and then move on—taking the most important issues first. The Secretary replied that he would like to hear Gromyko’s views and then offer his own comments. Gromyko then suggested that they should address each other as Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko.

To begin, Gromyko wanted to direct the Secretary’s attention to the following: the Soviet leadership could not fail to note that the new Administration in Washington has radically changed its policy toward...
the Soviet Union, and changed it for the worse. U.S. policy is creating tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. Statements made in Washington to the effect that the Soviet Union has a different social system, that it is a socialist country, has a different philosophy, has a different view of the world and therefore no common language with the U.S. could be given a hostile interpretation to create problems between the two countries. They also could suggest that no accord could be reached and that no practical steps could be undertaken between the two powers. Moreover, the U.S. had declared that much that had been accomplished in the past in bilateral relations was invalid, and this had led to a politically tense relationship. In the past, other administrations had established relationships with the Soviet Union, and under Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon and Carter, relations with the Soviet Union were normal despite different political and social systems. There was then a common language that could be used. Looking back, he could remember that in World War II the Soviets and Americans were even allied against fascist Germany although they had different systems.

Was all of this past record in error? Present U.S. policy seemed to indicate that this might be true. In Washington the Soviet Union is regarded as anathema. There is no respect for the different social system in the Soviet Union and statements are being made which are not worth characterizing by their proper name.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union do have different systems, but from the days of Lenin, the Soviet Union has tried to maintain business-like relations with countries with differing political and economic systems and has always regarded peaceful coexistence as one of its political principles. The Soviet Union always has wanted to live in peace and to avoid resolving conflicts by force of arms. This remains the basic policy of the Soviet Union.

In view of the above, Gromyko wanted to know whether Washington is following a line seeking to deny respect to the Soviet system and even to repudiate past U.S.-Soviet accomplishments. Must this situation continue to escalate? Does Washington believe that the catastrophe which threatens cannot be avoided? If this is the U.S. line toward the Soviet Union, then where is this going to lead? Does Washington believe that unless U.S. conditions are accepted a conflict or war are inevitable? What are your views on that subject? Gromyko said that he was eager to know because he had to convey his impressions to the Soviet leadership and to President Brezhnev. He added that he wanted to have a sincere exchange of views with the Secretary and would like to hear his answers.

*The Secretary* noted Gromyko’s questions and added that he also had asked himself, in preparation for this meeting, where U.S.-Soviet
relations should be going. He said he remembered that, when he was in government some eight or nine years ago, relations between the two countries were constructive, whereas now these relations were tense. Therefore we have to ask how to improve the situation.

In his talks with the President, whom he knows well and with whom he can communicate easily, he has discussed these matters and therefore could state the following. It is fair to say that the President wants the U.S. to be a strong country with a strong economy and that he wants it to be militarily secure and also in the forefront of world affairs. If other countries show a pattern of behavior that leads to tensions and to unsatisfactory relations, the U.S. is prepared to look after its interests and the interests of the world. Also the President and the American people would prefer to have constructive relations with the Soviet Union. It was therefore necessary to examine why things got to be so bad. This in turn could give clues as to what to do about it.

The Secretary said that when he was out of office the U.S. did not engage in an arms build-up. However, the Soviet Union was engaged in a steady and impressive build-up of its armed forces. Although the Soviet Union was a signatory of the Helsinki Accord, the behavior of the Soviet Union was not in line with that Accord. Other events took place at that time that did not help constructive relations between the two powers. Here the Secretary would have to mention Afghanistan, Poland and other events where not words but deeds made matters worse.

This is a whole pattern of behavior. It makes the President ask himself what relations the Soviet Union really wanted to have with the United States.

Here, the Secretary said, he had to explain our approach to values. Values such as human freedom, human dignity, and free movement are basic to the American outlook. These principles go back some 200 hundred years; they are the principles of the American Revolution. Americans struggle to defend these ideals. When looking at the situation today, when these values and principles were being violated (especially after the signature of the Helsinki agreement), Americans begin to worry. He was saying this not to engage in rhetoric but to show how much Americans do care about these values.

Looking at such principles as the non-use of force or respect for human rights, the Soviet Union’s actions are inconsistent with these principles. It would be worthwhile to look at the final act. It mentions family ties, reunification of families, etc. (Here the Secretary read from the Helsinki agreement on unification of families, freedom of thought, freedom of movement and freedom of conscience).

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2 Reference is to the Helsinki Final Act of August 1975.
belief, civil rights, and so on.) When people in the Soviet Union who monitor the observance of these provisions are persecuted, this is a violation of the Helsinki agreement. Secretary Haig had already discussed these issues with Gromyko on previous occasions. The Secretary stressed that the U.S. attaches great importance to the problem of free emigration by Soviet Jews; this issue continues to be of considerable importance in America today. He added that Ambassador Hartman would pass on a list of names to Minister Korniyenko. We believe some progress could be made in this area. We are not raising these concerns for propaganda purposes, but because the issue is important to the United States.

The Secretary said that history shows that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have been able to conclude agreements and resolve issues. As examples, there are the Austrian State Treaty, the Hotline Agreement, the Nuclear Test Ban, the Four Power Agreement on Berlin, the Incidents at Sea Agreement, and the ABM Agreement. These were all of a constructive nature, and they are still in force. They show that sometimes ways can be found to address certain problems jointly. But the pattern of behavior described—the situation in Poland and in Afghanistan, the role of Cuba in the Caribbean area, the situation in Central America, the delivery of weapons to Nicaragua—all makes it difficult to maintain the peaceful relations Gromyko has talked about. The U.S. side would like to review prospects on issues where the sides might focus and do constructive work. At the same time this has to be done against the background of a pattern of behavior that is not acceptable to the American side.

The U.S. side is trying to reduce the arms build-up, the Secretary said. Having talked to his negotiators he believed that negotiations in Geneva are being conducted in a business-like and professional manner. This suggests a serious intent to reduce arms. But the setting in which these talks are being conducted makes progress difficult for the U.S. side.

To sum up, the Secretary said that in the President’s view it is up to the Soviet Union to determine what relations it wishes to have with the United States. The U.S. side prefers a constructive and problem-solving approach. He had personally seen this kind of approach at work in his dealings with the Soviet Union in the past. The U.S. wants such an approach. We recognize that the Soviet Union is a superpower and a key country in the world, and that it can therefore do much to maintain such constructive relations. Things can go either way. However, one must not forget the pattern of behavior that provides the background for the actions we take. The President of the United States wants substantive exchanges; Gromyko had also proposed to talk substance. If relations are to assume a more constructive trend, then the
two countries together must examine difficult issues facing them, and do so in parallel.

Gromyko thanked the Secretary for his reply and said that the matters which the Secretary mentioned could be divided into two categories. The first comprises major issues, such as strategic arms and weapons of mass destruction, which affect not only relations between the two countries but also the whole world; intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe also is included in this group. In the second category there are issues that Gromyko could not regard as truly important and which in no way should affect relations between the two countries. Is it so important, for instance, Gromyko asked, if Mr. or Mrs. or Miss so and so can or cannot leave such and such a country, whether they get permission or do not get permission to leave it? This is a tenth-rate question. And yet such issues seem to have a pronounced effect on international relations. Also, the portion of the Helsinki final act quoted by the Secretary was not the only provision of that act. There were also provisions dealing with non-interference in internal affairs of a sovereign country, especially when dealing with citizens of that country. The act also said that a sovereign country had the right to decide these issues as it saw fit.

Looking at these two categories of questions Gromyko wished to speak to those that the Secretary mentioned last because these were the important issues. The Geneva talks on INF and START were of prime importance, but before getting down to specifics he wanted to digress for a moment. The Secretary was defending the thesis that present US policy is based on the perception that the Soviet Union is threatening US interests, without ever clearly defining these interests. These interests seemed to be in almost every corner of the globe, but perhaps they do not reach as far as the suburbs of Moscow. The Soviet Union does not intend to threaten any legitimate interests of the United States or its allies or to limit American rights in any way. The Soviet Union does not want, in contrast to the United States, to be first in armaments, because the Soviet Union only wishes to defend the equality and equilibrium established over a fairly long period of time between the two powers. For practical purposes this balance also applies to NATO and to Warsaw Treaty nations. The numbers indicate that there is a balance between the US and the Soviet Union, including an approximate balance in strategic arms. In Europe one could accept this balance or even say that the US and its allies have the upper hand: when counting identical types of nuclear warheads, NATO has 50% more than the Warsaw Pact countries. Therefore, looking at these objective figures, it is difficult to see how anyone could claim that the Soviet Union is a threat to the US and to the world. In addition the US has an advantage because Europe could be used as a launch pad by the
US; the Soviet Union has no such comparable facility. US intermediate range weapons can reach Soviet territory while similar Soviet weapons cannot reach US territory.

Turning to START and INF, Gromyko said that he was glad to hear that, in the Secretary’s view, both sides are engaged in serious discussions and that Soviet efforts are serious, which they are. However, the current US position on START and on INF could not form a basis for an agreement. As matters now stand the US wants to gain advantage over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons, but such an approach is totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union, whether you call it a zero option or something else. A reduction as proposed by the U.S. is an attempt to disarm the Soviet Union.

Another issue Gromyko wanted to raise was the fate of SALT II. The Soviet side is not only disappointed but ready to condemn this Administration’s view of SALT and its refusal to ratify the agreement. The Soviet side views this rejection as a gross miscalculation because SALT II would have been equally beneficial to both sides. Gromyko had received various answers from Secretary Haig about US attitudes toward the status of SALT II. One of them was that SALT II was dead; another was “we will continue to observe SALT II.” What were Secretary Shultz’s views on SALT II? How could Washington treat so lightly an agreement that took eight years to work out, carefully discussing and weighing the pros and cons of every provision. After all that work, the US rejection cannot but be viewed by the Soviet side as a bad omen for other treaties. Is this an example of how the new Administration views serious agreements and treaties? Gromyko was also concerned about two agreements which were signed but not ratified—namely, the treaty dealing with peaceful nuclear explosions and the threshold test ban treaty. These were apparently pigeon holed and forgotten although both sides had worked on them very seriously. Gromyko was eager to learn about their destiny. Another abandoned issue was the attempt to discuss chemical weapons. Was it simply that the US side did not want to deal with this question, without even proposing amendments or offering its own views? Such refusals to discuss these matters are worrisome because Washington seems to be moving at full speed to develop chemical weapons, and this could be interpreted as a preparation for a chemical war. The Soviet Union is determined to reach an agreement to ban chemical weapons, no less now than before. Statements that the Soviet Union is using chemical weapons are untrue. The Secretary should not believe in such tales because the Soviet Union has not and will not use chemical weapons. Such use is against Soviet morals and principles. Perhaps somebody is trying to mislead Mr. Shultz. The Soviet Union would welcome a US effort to take a fresh look at this issue.
There were some other questions on Gromyko’s mind which he wanted to mention; principally the deployment of INF in Europe. There apparently is a US plan to develop various forms of cruise missiles in different areas and thereby to encircle the Soviet Union and to put it under pressure. It is possible to think that there might be an agreement covering strategic arms in Europe, but that the US nevertheless would have other weapons not covered by this agreement because they are neither strategic nor stationed in Europe. And yet such weapons could reach various parts of the Soviet Union such as Siberia, the Far East and Central Asia. The Soviet Union will draw proper conclusions from such an approach and take necessary defensive measures. Otherwise the US will some day fill the oceans and seas around the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons and will say “we have duped the Soviets”. We will never allow this to happen.

Another issue that Gromyko wished to discuss was the use of outer space for military purposes. The Soviets have noted that there are some in the US who are considering such activities. It would not be in the interest of either the US or the Soviet Union to use space for military purposes. The policy of the Soviet Union is to maintain peace in outer space and prevent it from becoming militarized. There are enough difficult issues on earth without adding to them in outer space.

Gromyko said that there are other bilateral agreements and forums which were either suspended, declared invalid or allowed to lapse by the United States. The Soviet Union cannot understand why Washington has decided to withdraw from certain contacts; this only weakens Soviet/American relations. At one time Washington became enthusiastic about placing limitations on arms deliveries to other countries. US-Soviet Conventional Arms Treaty delegations met several times but then Washington decided to slam the door shut on this endeavor. The Indian Ocean talks are another example of the door suddenly being shut. There are other negotiations which were never fully developed because the US did not want to continue. Gromyko summed up his statement by saying that there were certain questions in Soviet-American relations and international relations which deserved top priority.

Having said that, Gromyko wanted to move on to the second category of questions, i.e., those that the Secretary mentioned in the second half of his exposition. Gromyko added that these categories were of course purely arbitrary. In addition to Helsinki, there are other outstanding issues demanding attention. One of them is Poland, especially when viewed in the context of the Helsinki Final Act. The Poles would protest against any interference from any party and in any international forum. Poland is a sovereign country, and the Soviet Union is not involved in Polish internal affairs. It is for the Poles themselves to settle their internal affairs. The Soviet Union is against
any economic sanctions, be they directed against Poland or against any other countries. Gromyko was sure that Washington would realize that sanctions could only be harmful in the long run; he referred to a statement by Brezhnev dealing with sanctions.

As for Afghanistan, Gromyko believed that, in the context of the Helsinki Final Act, one could see two aspects to this question: one internal and the other one external. Internal, domestic affairs are a matter for the Afghan regime to settle. As for the external aspect, there are invasions by armed bandits from Pakistan. It is an open book that this is happening with the assistance of the United States. As soon as these armed incursions stop, the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and Afghanistan will be left alone, if effective guarantees can be obtained that no external invasions into Afghanistan will recur. Gromyko added that contacts will be established in Geneva, with the indirect help from the UN Secretary General, between representatives of Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is hope that they will make some headway.

Gromyko appealed to Shultz to consider the long range interests of the United States and not to get involved in internal matters of other countries. He asked again that the issue of a non-aligned Afghanistan be considered by Washington, adding that if Pakistan could look at the issue in the same spirit, the whole Afghanistan question could be taken off of the agenda.

With regard to Kampuchea and Vietnam, the Vietnamese were invited by the Kampuchean people to help them. The genocide committed by the Pol Pot regime is well-known. Now Kampuchea has a different regime and it is up to the Kampuchean people to determine what regime they desire. Sihanouk seems to have revitalized himself and some are opening doors to him—it’s a question if these are front or back doors. At any rate, the Secretary should not play with puppets. In conclusion, Gromyko advised Washington and other western countries not to interfere in Kampuchea, Afghanistan or Poland.

Gromyko continued to say that there were other international problems to be discussed, but that he was not sure whether there was time enough to discuss them today. He wanted to hear the Secretary’s view and those of the Administration on the following issues: the Middle East, Africa, and the Caribbean. There are, of course, other important issues deserving an exchange of views. However, there would have to be a focus on crucial matters, matters dealing with war or peace in the world, and these depend on the policy of big powers such as the Soviet Union and the United States. In this regard, the Soviet Union and the United States are both “in the same tower”.

Gromyko was very eager to learn more about the policy line, the mood, and the thoughts of the present US Administration, so that he
could form a broad impression in his mind about the possibility of doing business with the US. But the issues of the first order are the arms race and the reduction of arms. Gromyko stressed again that he wanted to utilize this chance to exchange views on as many issues as possible because there were so few chances to discuss these issues on other levels. He would be willing to meet again if the Secretary agreed. He assured the Secretary that he was not engaging in polemics. There are thoughts that had to be expressed. One could not close one’s eyes, not wishing to look at reality, because reality would open them again. There are urgent problems to be resolved, and to a great extent the destiny of the world will depend on the policy that the US and the Soviet Union will follow. We cannot be 100% responsible for the world, but “we are all in the same boat”.

The Secretary replied that Gromyko’s last question—where we are going—was a critical one. He had listened for 1½ hours to Gromyko’s review on a wide range of topics and he had tried to ask himself what the Foreign Minister was telling him. The Foreign Minister is a serious man whom the Secretary met before and who represents a country of great importance and power. The Secretary had listened and reviewed his notes. He found that his broad reaction to many items raised by Gromyko was that of discouragement, although here and there the two appeared to be thinking along similar lines. The Secretary was frankly disappointed that Gromyko devoted so little time to human problems and called them a tenth priority. Perhaps that is one of the difficulties facing the two sides. Human problems always enjoy the highest priority in the United States and the Secretary hoped that deep down Gromyko would feel that too. The Secretary remembered his visit to Leningrad with Soviet Minister of Trade Patolichev, when they were taken to a cemetery. He remembered walking down the central path of the cemetery to lay a wreath to those who had died in that battle. He remembered tears in Patolichev’s eyes and how the interpreter was so overcome by emotion that she could not interpret. The Secretary was sure that all must feel that the well-spring of human values should not be placed at tenth priority but must be emphasized. He reminded Gromyko that the US view of the world depended on how people were treated. He wanted Gromyko to know how much Americans cared about human problems. This was necessary to understand present US policy.

The Secretary then turned to the chemical weapons issue, saying that he was somewhat puzzled by Gromyko’s approach. Secretary Haig had presented some evidence on the use of chemical and bacteriological

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3 Shultz recounted this story in greater detail in *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 117–119.
weapons, which had created a big issue in the United States. Questions are being asked about violations of treaties as well as verification. Verification is a problem also with regard to peaceful nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union, which appear to be above the agreed limit. Such explosions are detected by certain devices which, although not without problems, indicate explosions in excess of the agreed level. The Soviet Union has made similar comments about explosions in the United States. This meant that the problem of verification needs some more work.

As for SALT II, Shultz pointed out that the treaty was presented to the US Senate before the Reagan Administration; it was the previous administration that could not get it approved in that body. In the eyes of the Senate, SALT II is not a good bargain for the United States. As for the status of SALT II, the Secretary could confirm what Haig had previously said: that in a basic sense, the US intends to observe its provisions in the broad dimensions, but that SALT II is not now a treaty; it is a piece of history. The proposals advanced by the President of the United States would be much better for the Soviet Union and for the world at large.

Turning to Poland, Afghanistan and Kampuchea, the Secretary pointed out that these were places where the US could not be credited with creating problems. The existing problems there occurred otherwise. We were encouraged to hear that, with the Secretary-General’s help, there might be some movement in Geneva this November, that as a result Soviet troops might leave Afghanistan, and that an independent regime might be established there. The US would only welcome such a development. The talks conducted by Ambassador Hartmann on Afghanistan produced no results. As for Poland, Soviet influence there is great, even decisive. It is impossible not to see that martial law is still in effect, that dependent labor unions are suppressed, that there is no dialogue between opposing parties and that the economy is unable to produce enough to prevent deprivation. The US would like to see a change in the situation and would only welcome such a development.

The Secretary also pointed out that it was the Vietnamese and not Americans who were in Kampuchea. Any constructive moves by countries in that area, including initiatives in the UN, deserve recognition. The US would certainly be glad to see some movement in this area.

The Secretary wanted Gromyko to know that he was not engaging in propaganda when he said that a change for the better in Afghanistan, Poland, Kampuchea would be welcome and that it would undoubtedly improve the atmosphere for negotiations, including arms control issues.

The Secretary remembered Gromyko’s question about how far flung US interests were. The US is concerned about events of the world
because there is no isolated place in the world anymore. When outside the government, the Secretary had been impressed by how easy it was to get involved in disputes although one could not shoulder 100% of the world’s burden. The Falkland Islands are an example: a remote place which in no time at all assumed great international importance. This example illustrates how great powers such as the US and the Soviet Union must pay attention to such developments.

The Secretary had other comments on other matters and also on matters mentioned by Gromyko. The Secretary would welcome an additional exchange of views with Gromyko. Before moving to other topics, the Secretary wanted to mention Central America. Central America was a neighbor of the United States and the US could see a pattern of arms flow to Nicaragua—not directly from the Soviet Union—but arms which for the most part came from the Soviet Union and were spreading to other countries in that area. He assured Gromyko that the US would not stand still and watch it. To be explicit, information was available that jet planes may be delivered to Nicaragua. Such a development would be unacceptable to the US and, as Haig had mentioned to Gromyko before, the US would not stand still for it.

The Secretary assured Gromyko again that he would like to continue an exchange of views and to make such exchanges more constructive; it might be well, as previously mentioned to Ambassador Dobrynin, to identify items of concern that would be fruitful to discuss. The Secretary added that such discussions should not be limited to meetings between Gromyko and himself, but that others could be commissioned to hold useful exchanges on some occasions.

The Secretary and Gromyko then discussed the possibility of an additional meeting and agreed to meet on Monday, October 4, 1982 from 3:00–6:00 p.m. at the Soviet Mission. Gromyko added that he would then discuss and react to the Secretary’s statement on Nicaragua and also take up the Caribbean issue. He also believed that the war between Iran and Iraq deserved some attention, because although the US and USSR were not involved, this war could complicate other issues. Other items Gromyko would like to take up at the next meeting were: an exchange of views on the Law of the Sea Conference, the General Assembly—to see what aims the Soviet Union and the US are pursuing there. In addition, he called the Secretary’s attention to the UN Security Council, established by the great powers after WWII as an instrument for preserving peace, but whose potential has never fully been realized. “The Security Council does not play the role assigned to it. It is too weak in character, it does not meet the requirements of the day.”

The Secretary added that other issues to be taken up would be Namibia and Southern Africa. Gromyko agreed Namibia would have
to be discussed. The Secretary then suggested that non-proliferation, being a matter of great importance, should be added to the list. Gromyko agreed that non-proliferation was an internationally sensitive issue. The meeting was then adjourned.

218. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Gromyko September 28

I met with Gromyko for three hours yesterday. \(^2\) Judged against what we know of the kind of polemical and aggressive stance Gromyko can take, I was struck by how sober his presentation was. Clearly he wants to keep talking to us, despite the claims some Soviets make that they have written off the Reagan Administration.

Gromyko led off. Noting that our relations are “politically tense,” he asked whether the US wants “peaceful coexistence” or confrontation. I replied that the choice was for Moscow to make; the deterioration in our relations is a result of Soviet conduct—their persistent refusal to honor agreements on human rights, their relentless military buildup, and irresponsible activities in Poland, Afghanistan and elsewhere. I went through our human rights concerns in particular detail—family reunification, the persecution of the Helsinki Watch Group, Jewish emigration—putting them in the context of their relationship to our own fundamental values.

I made it clear that we are serious in our approach to INF, START and other negotiations. He agreed that the talks in Geneva are proceeding in a businesslike fashion. Nonetheless, he strongly criticized the specifics of our proposals, particularly the zero option in INF, saying that it could not form the basis for an agreement. I stressed the importance of verification, indicating that our concern applied not only to


\(^2\) See Document 217.
START and INF, but to agreements previously concluded (the chemical weapons ban) as well as to agreements not yet ratified (Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties).

In addition to arms control, I dwelt at some length on some of our regional concerns: Poland, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Central America. As you and I agreed, on Nicaragua I told Gromyko that we are concerned by the pattern of arms shipments, and said that the introduction of jet fighters into Nicaragua would be “unacceptable.”

Toward the close of the meeting, I stressed that Soviet moves in areas such as emigration, human rights, Poland, Afghanistan and Kampuchea would be welcome. If the pattern of Soviet conduct changes there may be a basis for mutually beneficial agreements. We are prepared to go either way, I said. I intend to take the same approach in next Monday’s meeting, where regional issues not covered yesterday will surely be a major focus.

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219. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, September 30, 1982

SUBJECT

Your Second Meeting with Gromyko

Were I Gromyko, I would come away from the first meeting with the following impressions:

—The tone and substance of American concerns have not changed.
—Washington holds Moscow responsible for the sorry state of the relationship.
—Therefore, changes in American policy toward the USSR will not occur absent changes in Soviet behavior.
—The new Secretary of State professes an interest in making practical progress on specific questions.

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1 Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, The Executive Secretariat’s Special Caption Documents, Lot 92D630, Not for System—September 1982. Secret; Sensitive.

2 See Document 217.
These are all essential messages. However, fundamental questions must still loom in Gromyko’s mind.

—If the USSR makes some moves—recognizing that anything more than modest moves are excluded because of the Soviet succession situation—what will the U.S. do?

—Will it show flexibility and “credit” the USSR for having taken constructive actions, or will it remain rigid and crow about Soviet “retreats” as a way of vindicating and reinforcing a tough line?

—Does the new Secretary’s concept of progress in certain areas involve movement by both sides?

Your aim now should be to help Gromyko answer these questions in a way that could lead to improvement in Soviet behavior. In developing an approach to the next meeting, you should have in mind some concept of what would constitute “improvement.”

I would distinguish five categories:

1. More cautious future international behavior—i.e., avoidance of new unhelpful actions.
2. Steps to ease one or more existing trouble spots.
3. Actions responsive to our concerns about human rights.
5. Willingness to discuss issues of common concern.

Bearing in mind the questions Gromyko may have about what we expect and what the Soviets would get out of being responsive to our concerns, you will want to:

—be quite concrete about what we would consider constructive;
—be as convincing as possible that we will respond positively (i.e., no crowing and where applicable, flexibility on our side);
—suggest practical next steps.

The following illustrates the approach I have in mind. It identifies what we would regard as constructive Soviet action in each of the five categories.

1. **Refusing to ship MiGs to Nicaragua.** You have said this would be unacceptable. Gromyko wants to return to the subject of Central America. You should restate our warning. Obviously, we should not reward the Soviets in any way for avoiding a provocative act in an area of vital interest to us. That said, you may want to find an opportunity to assure Gromyko that we will not boast about Moscow having backed down.

2. **Accepting Cuban withdrawal from Angola.** You should press the point that the Soviets will not be able to escape responsibility for frustrating a Namibian settlement if an understanding on Cuban withdrawal cannot be reached. Moscow is unlikely to be helpful if they
suspect the result will be American claims of a Soviet retreat. Indeed, you should say that we would depict it as a constructive step with positive effects on the relationship. What you should not offer is direct Soviet participation in the current diplomatic effort or in shaping the solution, UNTAG, etc. By way of follow-on, you should suggest that Hartman and Crocker meet soon with Kornyenko and Crocker’s counterpart.

3. Movement on dissidents. You will not want to get into specific personalities with Gromyko, but it’s worth reiterating that letting some people out would have a positive political effect and would not be exploited by us. Without implying a commitment (e.g., that agreement to a CDE would be the quid), you should also point out that the prospects for progress in the Madrid CSCE talks would climb if some people were let go. As you know, the Soviets have evinced interest in a meeting between Max Kampelman and his counterpart to discuss Madrid. I recommend that you tell Gromyko we would like to hold this meeting promptly and that we approach it hopefully.

4. Shifting to more forthcoming positions in arms control. You do not want the second meeting to dwell on arms control. If it does come up, however, there are two basic points worth making: (1) just as improved Soviet international conduct would improve the prospects for arms control, more forthcoming Soviet positions in arms control would be taken as a sign of Moscow’s desire for progress in the broader relationship; (2) the USSR will find the US flexible once Soviet positions reflect a genuine interest in significant, verifiable arms reductions. This second point is important because it could help dispel Soviet suspicions that we would simply “pocket” any moves on their part. Bearing in mind how hard it will be to get Washington to change US positions in START and INF, you should make this point more as a prediction—and personal view, if you will—than as an offer.

5. Agreeing to discussions on nuclear non-proliferation. In view of our clear and common—and, I might add, growing—concern about halting the spread of nuclear weapons, it is logical for us to suggest talks and for the Soviets to agree. Beyond the intrinsic value, the willingness and ability of the two sides to discuss this issue could have a modestly positive political effect on the relationship. There are pitfalls, of course; e.g., the Soviets could use such talks to lambast us on Israel and Pakistan. You should characterize them as “technical” and propose that the Soviets name someone to meet with Dick Kennedy. I think it best that we not publicize such talks—at least not yet.

Again, the basic concept is to zero in on particular possibilities and to convince Gromyko that the US will respond positively to constructive Soviet steps. You may want to be more selective; indeed, the more possibilities you identify the more it may seem to Gromyko that we
insist that the Soviet overhaul their whole foreign policy before relations can improve. The counter argument is that the more ideas you lay out the higher the probability that Gromyko will find some bait that interests him. Of those that I’ve identified, Southern Africa and nonproliferation would seem to offer the best prospects for actual results; I recommend you cover at least these.

I have not mentioned Afghanistan. You should suggest that Hartman and Kornyenko have another round of talks; but there should be no connotation that the Soviets are doing us a favor by agreeing—so I wouldn’t cast it as an example of a positive Soviet action.

Let me suggest that you look at the attached matrix, which displays how to define and address each objective. If this framework appeals to you, we can tailor your opening statement and package your talking points accordingly.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

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3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Areas for Progress</th>
<th>Specific Steps</th>
<th>US Response</th>
<th>Practical Next Steps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avoiding new unhelpful actions.</td>
<td>No MiGs to Nicaragua</td>
<td>No crowing</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easing existing trouble spots</td>
<td>Acceptance of Cuban withdrawal from Angola</td>
<td>Credit USSR for contributing to solution</td>
<td>Hartman/Crocker-Komyenko/Ilychev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responding to our human rights concerns</td>
<td>Releasing dissidents</td>
<td>Credit USSR for steps in the right direction; possible CSCE movement</td>
<td>Kampelman-Kovalev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More forthcoming positions in arms control</td>
<td>Movement toward US reductions proposals in START and INF</td>
<td>Will address Soviet concerns about US systems</td>
<td>Geneva negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to discuss common concerns</td>
<td>Non-proliferation technical talks</td>
<td>Serious exchanges</td>
<td>Kennedy-Counterpart</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Washington, undated

4 Secret; Sensitive.
PARTICIPANTS

   Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
   Under Secretary Eagleburger

SUBJECT
Proposal for Upcoming Shultz/Gromyko Bilateral

Summary. Ambassador Dobrynin met at his request with Under Secretary Eagleburger and passed on a Gromyko proposal that as a positive measure the second Shultz-Gromyko meeting would agree on some topics that the two sides would follow-up in later lower-level confidential, informal meetings. Areas mentioned were nuclear non-proliferation, restrictions on conventional arms sales, chemical weapons, Indian Ocean, and the Nuclear Test Ban. Dobrynin emphasized this was a non-inclusive list with the US free to add or subtract from it. End Summary.

1. Ambassador Dobrynin met at his request on Friday, October 1, with Under Secretary Eagleburger. He said that Foreign Minister Gromyko was looking ahead to the upcoming second Shultz-Gromyko bilateral and was thinking of what positive results could come of it. “Off the top of his head” there were a few areas where Gromyko thought something could be done. Dobrynin mentioned nuclear non-proliferation; the test ban treaty; the chemical warfare treaty; restrictions on sales of conventional weapons, and the Indian Ocean as some examples.

2. Dobrynin emphasized that these were just suggestions and that the Soviets were open-minded and would welcome any other suggestions that we wished to make. Gromyko’s idea would be that the topics could be briefly discussed in the Shultz-Gromyko meeting and agreement reached on which specific areas would be followed up. The follow-up would be done in a confidential, informal way at a lower level: perhaps by the respective Embassies in some instances; on the periphery of international conferences by experts in others, and so on. The method can be worked out; the point is to get agreement on what areas will be pursued.


2 See Document 221.
3. Under Secretary Eagleburger said that a point that bothered him was that all the Soviet suggestions were in the area of arms control. Dobrynin hastened to say that these were only rough suggestions and other issues could of course be suggested as well. He said that the Soviets did not expect us to agree to pursue all the Soviet suggestions. We were certainly free to state our objections on any of the topics. They wanted to throw out a variety of ideas for us to choose from.

4. The meeting ended with an agreement that Under Secretary Eagleburger would discuss the Soviet proposal with Secretary Shultz and get back to Dobrynin with a reply on Sunday night or Monday morning.\(^3\)

\(^3\) October 3 or 4.

221. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

New York, October 4, 1982, 3–7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting Between Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Undersecretary for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Ambassador to the USSR Arthur A. Hartman
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richart Burt
Cyril Muromcew, Interpreter (Notetaker)

USSR

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi M. Korniyenko
Ambassador to U.S. Anatoly F. Dobrynin
U.S.A. Department (MFA) Deputy Chief Mr. V.F. Isakov
Gromyko’s Senior Assistant Mr. Makarov
Victor Sukhodrev, Interpreter (Notetaker)

After brief exchange of pleasantries, Gromyko said that he would like to continue the exchange of views if there were no objections from the Secretary. Gromyko would like to start with a discussion of the Middle East because the situation there was of interest to both, but he would not attempt to weigh the importance each side attached to this issue. Nevertheless, the question was of great importance and he would like to discuss it.

The Secretary replied that indeed the Middle East was an important question. However, the Secretary would like to make a counter suggestion and present a list of five items, which could be discussed in any order, time permitting. But first, he wanted to speak about the general relations between the two powers. The views held by the two sides were not always similar, but he wanted to find a way to improve the U.S.-Soviet relationship by discussing questions of mutual interest and identifying areas where the two sides could constructively work together. Ambassador Dobrynin and Mr. Eagleburger had already done some preliminary work.

In this spirit, the Secretary said he would like to present the following list:

1. Under a general heading he would like to put the human rights issue on the agenda. This was an issue of great importance to the United States.
2. Regional issues. This would be a discussion of preventive measures to be taken, especially in areas of the world where things could get worse.
3. Regional trouble spots such as the Middle East.
4. Arms reduction, specifically how to make possible headway on a test ban treaty.
5. Areas of parallel interest, such as nuclear non-proliferation.

Gromyko had no objections but, since the question of the Middle East was “in the air” all the time he would start with the Middle East and then discuss the proposed list, noting that other questions might arise during the discussion which might not fit into the Secretary’s suggested framework. However, Gromyko believed that he and the Secretary were not confined to a rigid bureaucratic framework and could discuss any other issues. This, in his view, would be the proper approach. In other words, other questions might be squeezed into the general framework.

The Secretary replied that he was ready to give Gromyko his views on the problems of the Middle East and what to do about them; then he would like to hear Gromyko’s views too.

These were difficult matters to resolve. It would be necessary to find a way to fulfill the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people which
would be fully consistent with the security needs of Israel. The Secretary saw many dimensions to that problem. Many proposals were expressed by the President in his statement on September 1, and if Gromyko were not familiar with them, the Secretary would be glad to give him a copy. The U.S. side believed that a central problem now was the situation in Lebanon, which was complex and distressing. Lebanon was a country that became an innocent bystander in a larger conflict, plagued from 1975 on by the existence of a state within a state and incapable of governing itself. People got killed, wounded, and displaced. Previous disputes and threats to Israel’s security, especially from the southern part of Lebanon, had lead to present conflict, death and destruction. Now there were problems with the PLO evacuation and recently, with the massacre. The problem was to get the Syrian, PLO and Israeli forces out of the country and to do everything possible to establish a free and independent government and to start reconstruction of the country. At the same time, there was the parallel need to make progress in the Middle East process. This process would be possible with the cooperation of every party involved, but the heart of the problem was the reconciliation of the people and making the legitimate rights of the Palestinians compatible with the interests of Israel. The President’s speech on September 1 was an effort to advance this process within the framework of the Camp David Accord.

A related issue was the Iran/Iraq conflict. The U.S. was determined to remain neutral but held the view that the former territorial boundaries were to be respected. The U.S. was for a ceasefire and supported UN Resolutions pertinent to that situation.

Gromyko replied that there was no need to say more about U.S. and Soviet interests in the Middle East. It was sufficient to look at the map to see that this whole region was adjacent to the Soviet Union and any situation in that region was of no little concern to the Soviet Union from the point of view of security. The Secretary should not think that Gromyko was regarding this matter from a distance. Over a number of years the Soviet Union was aware of an American attempt to ease the Soviet Union out of any participation leading to a solution to the Middle East problem. No one should believe that the Soviet Union could be left out of the Middle East solution. One must proceed from the premise that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union can be excluded from an examination of Middle East problems. If anyone

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3 Reference is to the massacre of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila camps in the aftermath of the assassination of Bashir Gemayel on September 14.
suggested that the Soviet Union could simply be crossed out when talking about the Middle East, the Secretary should not heed him.

Gromyko continued to say that the U.S. should not fear Soviet participation in a Middle East settlement. He stressed that the Soviet Union was in favor of the existence of Israel as a state because many years ago Washington and Moscow proposed simultaneously that Israel should be established as an independent state while it was still under British mandate. Gromyko recalled that in 1947 he was heading the Soviet delegation to the UN where he never wavered through the difficult negotiations and stood fast before extremist Arab factions who did not want Israel to exist. Neither Israel nor the U.S. should fear the presence of the Soviet Union in that area. Why not sit down together, think together and perhaps do something together to bring about a real settlement? What has happened in the Mideast was not in accordance with plans and intentions of those who wanted to establish an independent Arab/Palestinian along with an independent Jewish state. The Soviet Union wanted Israel to be a normal peace-loving state and not an aggressive one. The Soviet Union was not worried about Israel as a state, but about the direction of its policy. Israel seemed to see aggression as the way of its future expansion. To justify their actions the Israelis referred to the Bible, invoked ancient history but forgot that the Bible dealt with different times and that these references might not benefit Israel in the long run. He added that the Soviet Union wanted Israel to exist and to live in peace and maintain normal relations with Arab countries. He knew that the Arabs wanted peace with Israel—he was not talking about Arab extremists which he mentioned earlier, but recent acts perpetrated by Israel caused dismay, indignation and even anger among the people of the Soviet Union. It was not long ago that the Soviet people had saved European Jews from annihilation at the hands of Hitler’s invaders. Now the whole world could see the Jews assuming some characteristics of Nazi Germany. At the same time, Gromyko would not be afraid to look for a common language and for a role for the Soviet Union to resolve the problem. What Israel had recently perpetrated had to be corrected—the dead could not be resurrected but at least Israeli forces should be withdrawn from the occupied areas. He could not be sure that the Israelis would not do something similar or worse and start a chain of events that neither the Secretary nor Gromyko would want to see.

In view of the above, Gromyko wanted the Secretary to take a broad view of the situation, a view from a high tower to get things into perspective. The Soviet point of view on the Camp David Accords was well known. A broader view of the situation should be taken. The area is a “warehouse of explosives”. No one wanted such a development—neither the Soviet Union nor the United States, nor any other country.
Gromyko then turned to the Fez meeting. The Fez principles were reasonable and could be the basis of a settlement, and were not in opposition to certain Soviet principles. As for Washington’s plans and the statements by the President, the most acute problem of the area was not mentioned, namely—an autonomous Palestinian state. How viable could such a plan be? Such a plan would not work, was not realistic and could not be implemented. A plan that would not provide for a Palestinian state and also for an independent state of Israel was not viable.

As for the procedural or organizational aspects, Gromyko said that the Arab proposal to raise the issue in the Security Council was acceptable to him, even if Washington did not like it, and any other Arab state could participate in it. What was needed was a qualified vote in the Security Council. Gromyko’s idea was that in spite of the proceedings in the Security Council, the United States, the Soviet Union and some Arab states could seek in parallel an effective solution of the problem. What he had in mind was a conference of countries such as Israel, Syria, Jordan, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and perhaps some other countries wishing to participate. This would not be an attempt to create a mini-General Assembly. There would be no imposition by majority vote in such a conference, which would be a fresh forum where new ideas to reach an agreement could be tried. It was not by chance that after WW II some peace conferences were held with interested countries. In his view, Arab countries would be willing to recognize Israel—after a withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab lands, but Israel would feel safer too. Would the U.S. be willing to guarantee such an arrangement? Perhaps the Soviet Union and other countries would do it too. This was no “evil eye” that the U.S. need fear. Perhaps if Washington would cast a fresh glance at the issue, some people there might be willing to think about it.

No matter what, Gromyko continued, the end of military action in the area would not be the end of the problem. Problems would continue. Today, Israel was powerful, but would Israel want to remain at war for the next 100 years? Would Israel be equally strong in say, 10, 15 or 20 years?

The Secretary said that he wanted in his comment to combine substantive and procedural aspects.

1. In Lebanon, the substantive problem was how to get the foreign forces out.
2. Beyond this, to encourage the formation of a stable central Lebanese government and in the process to stimulate reconstruction and redevelopment.

Currently, the problem was how to deal with Israeli, Syrian and PLO forces. The U.S. was using its persuasive powers to get the Israelis
to withdraw their forces. The current withdrawal from all of Beirut and from the airport was a “downpayment.” At the same time, the U.S. was talking to the Syrians though there was no direct way to talk with the PLO. The Soviet Union had provided the PLO with Soviet weapons; therefore, the influence that the Soviet Union had with the PLO and the Syrians could be used constructively to encourage their withdrawal from Lebanon. Meanwhile, the U.S. would put up funds for humanitarian purposes and for the reconstruction of Lebanon. Government funds would be needed to rebuild the infrastructure, such as roads, etc., while private capital could be attracted to Lebanon for other forms of development. In other words, a stable climate was needed to attract capital. The Soviet Union could help persuade the Syrians and the PLO to leave Lebanon so that reconstruction could begin. In this regard, the Secretary noted disturbing reports that armed Palestinians had returned to northern Lebanon.

Gromyko interrupted to ask if we meant the withdrawal of PLO civilians? The Secretary replied that he had been referring to PLO fighters. Gromyko replied that all the fighters had pulled out. The Secretary said that the fighters were dispersed but that there were still a substantial number of them in northern Lebanon, according to reliable information. Those from Beirut were returning to that area. Gromyko replied that he did not believe it. The Secretary repeated that the PLO must pull out.

The Secretary then turned to the Palestinian issue, noting that Gromyko had charged that President Reagan had bypassed the issue of a Palestinian state. The Secretary explained that the President had examined this idea, but had specifically rejected it. He believed it more promising to have a Palestinian affiliation with Jordan; such a plan was more workable. The Secretary remembered travelling through the area a few years ago and found it rather barren. It was difficult for the Secretary to imagine how it could work as an independent entity. The President also believed that an independent sovereign state with its own independent armed forces and the ability to use these forces would be a destabilizing factor in that area. He believed that fewer not more arms were needed there. According to the President’s plan, this would be a territory to be governed together with Jordan; it would be a demilitarized area that Israel would not have to worry about.

The Secretary remembered travelling to Israel right after Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and he felt that the natural disposition of the Israelis was to have peace in the area. He pointed out that the Israelis were willing to give up the Sinai desert to achieve peace. At any rate, the Camp David forum did prove successful in establishing peaceful relations between Israel and Egypt. In other words, the Camp David Accords were an effective framework and no different forum was
needed now, only the emergence of the willingness on the part of the Arab leaders, King Hussein, West Bank Palestinians and others to help resolve an issue between the Palestinian people and Israel. The Secretary noted that Camp David contained explicit mention of legitimate Palestinian rights and talked of “self-governing” authority for the West Bank. Thus, the basics were up to Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians to work out.

Gromyko replied that Camp David provided for self-government for the Palestinians, which meant that they could vote on the West Bank and in Gaza for this or that Mayor or perhaps a sheriff. But, he added with a smile, the basic issue was the creation of an independent and autonomous state. He believed that the concept of self-government suffered from too many different interpretations. It was one thing to live in your own house, but something else to be able to vote for mayor, a judge, or a policeman. Gromyko then asked whether if the Syrians leave, will the Israelis pull out? He then quickly said that he didn’t know Syrian plans, and that he had not discussed it with the Syrians and somebody would have to talk to the Syrians about it because these were Syrian troops that they were talking about. He asked the Secretary to give him his clear view on the issue because he only wanted a better understanding of the problem and that the Secretary should not draw any conclusions from the question.

The Secretary said that perhaps they had found something they could agree on noting that certain words have a certain meaning and connotation in the Middle East. As for self-determination, the U.S. was in favor of it. As for self-government, the U.S. envisioned more than just voting for your own sheriff. The issue was the environment: social and economic life and the ability to control these factors. That’s how the President’s plan would work. This would not include a military establishment, which would be destabilizing in that area. The thinking was that the territory in question could be best set up in association with Jordan. Such an arrangement would give better economic scope to the Palestinians.

As for PLO fighters in north Lebanon, the Secretary continued, the evidence of their presence was clear. In time, they might lay down arms and become part of the population, but that was not clear. As for Israeli intentions concerning withdrawal, the Secretary himself had put that question to Foreign Minister Shamir, who had said, once the Syrians were out, that Israel would leave all of Lebanon and not occupy any part of it. The President would hold Israel to its word. The U.S. would hope that conditions could be created to allow this to happen before the end of the year. But the Secretary noted that it was important to recognize how the current situation came about. Southern Lebanon was an area with many PLO fighters who harassed Israelis
in the northern part of the country. This constituted a base against northern Israel. This was the reason why the Israelis moved into Lebanon. Israel needed an assurance, as the role that UNIFIL is meant to play has shown, that this area would not again be used to harass Israel. Some kind of security arrangements, like UNIFIL, would be necessary. In short, the answer to Gromyko’s question, was a “pretty good yes,” the U.S. intention was to push hard to make the Israelis pull out of Lebanon and to do it promptly before they had a chance to settle in.

Gromyko then asked the Secretary whether it would be useful to agree on some basic consultations between the U.S. and Soviet representatives at some agreed level to discuss the Middle East. There would be no time frame at this point, but Gromyko would propose about one month to establish such an exchange and asked whether the Secretary would agree to it or whether such an approach was taboo.

The Secretary replied that he and Gromyko were exchanging views on the Middle East right now and there was no reason why this should not be continued. Perhaps such meetings could take place in Moscow or in Washington. The U.S. had a very good Ambassador and so did the Soviet Union and such an exchange of views could be set up periodically, whenever something of importance had to be discussed. The Secretary felt that since the Soviet Ambassador could see many people in Washington, he would hope that Hartman could see Gromyko and others when necessary. He concluded that, having such outstanding Ambassadors, we should let them handle such exchanges.

Gromyko replied that if the Secretary was uneasy about a special exchange of views, there was no need for it, and both sides could agree through their Ambassadors to conduct such exchanges, perhaps on a rotating basis. When necessary and the sides were agreeable, some special talks might also be arranged. In summary, the Soviet Union wanted peace in the Middle East without diminishing lawful interests of Israel in defending its right to exist, but was strictly against Israel’s aggressive policy and the trend towards annexation. The USSR could not be shut out of Middle East diplomacy. He assured the Secretary that the Soviet side would be ready for an exchange of views.

The Secretary wanted to raise a question related to a different part of the Middle East, namely the Iran/Iraq conflict, which had turned into a substantial war. This conflict seemed to be rooted in Shiite fundamentalism that was spreading through the region and could spill over into other areas. The U.S. was determined to remain neutral and had called for a ceasefire and the observance of national boundaries. The U.S. was not supplying arms to either side. However, that war

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4 Reference is to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.
remained a matter of concern to the United States, and we would like to hear Soviet views.

Gromyko replied that the Soviet Union maintained contacts with Iraq, but less so with Iran because of the complex situation there. The Soviet Union considered the current Iran-Iraq conflict to be an absurd war for both countries and that it was time to end it. Gromyko could not understand why it started in the first place. It would be helpful if the U.S. would act similarly and advise Iraq and “your old bosom friend Iran” to put an end to it. However, as he saw it, it would be a gross miscalculation on the part of the United States if, with reference to the danger from Iran, the U.S. decided to install military facilities in an Arab country adjacent to it. There was no need to do it, such a move would only make matters worse.

The Secretary replied that the Persian Gulf was of vital importance to the United States and that any spillover of the fundamentalist movement, as recently seen in the coup attempt in Bahrain, would have grave consequences. The U.S. was concerned not only about Iran or Iraq, but also about the possibility of a spillover into Bahrain, Kuwait, or Saudi Arabia. The U.S. would have to look to its interests. The Secretary took note of Gromyko’s statement, but wanted him to know how important the Gulf was to the United States.

The Secretary then turned to the matter of human rights, which was at the very top of his list and a matter of great concern in the United States. On his way to the meeting, the Secretary was handed a paper by some New York Congressmen;\(^5\) he hadn’t looked at it yet but it probably dealt with emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. He remembered that when he was in the Nixon administration, he had a quiet exchange with the Soviet side concerning an increase in emigrants from the Soviet Union. An increase came about and this was welcomed. We would welcome some information about the 15 names on the list which Ambassador Hartman handed to Korniyenko after the first meeting. These were persons claiming U.S. citizenship who wanted to return to the United States; most of them were elderly, and one had been trying to emigrate since 1947. This was a long time. Resolution of questions such as these would do much to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. Little things in this area, he added, could make a big difference.

The Secretary said that he and Gromyko should discuss such matters quietly in order to improve U.S./Soviet relations. Shcharansky was another case to be discussed. His wife was planning to demonstrate in front of the Soviet Embassy; he was a sick man and cases of this

\(^5\) Not further identified.
nature were bound to catch attention in the United States. When discussing arms reductions earlier on, the Secretary had touched on the Helsinki Final Act and activities on the part of the Soviet Union which appeared not to be in accord with the provision of that agreement. The Secretary wanted to point out very emphatically, without engaging in polemics, that little things could make a big difference in mutual relations. The U.S. would welcome discussions to ease existing strains. There were ways of doing it without interfering in the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union and some thought should be given to how to bring it about.

Gromyko replied that the deterioration of relations had created an atmosphere that was less conducive to resolving emigration problems from the Soviet Union for certain people. Gromyko felt that U.S. policy was entirely responsible. Gromyko quickly added that he was not going to engage in polemics either, but that somehow they got into the discussion. As for the list received from the U.S., concerning people who were claiming to be U.S. citizens, the Soviets believed them to be Soviet citizens. But he was ready to look at them to determine whether or not they could be classified as U.S. citizens. This could be done objectively and he was prepared to look into this matter. The other list definitely dealt with Soviet citizens wishing to go to Israel and not to the United States. The Soviet Union could not look at such a request. These were not people wishing to go to the United States, but to Israel, and Gromyko wanted to be clear that the treatment of such a category of people cannot be revised. He remembered that the Secretary kept referring to the Helsinki Final Act. A government should, if possible, benevolently review such cases, and act benevolently, if possible. It also was the absolute sovereign right of a state to make the final decision. Gromyko remembered the Secretary’s statement that an individual should have the last word. There was no super-national authority which could make these decisions. It was the sovereign state that would make the final decision. No other position was possible. The last word belonged to the state. There was no scope for a collision of views if an objective view were taken.

The Secretary returned to Gromyko’s statement that the last word belonged to the state. This wasn’t right; the last word belonged to the individual wishing to emigrate. In the U.S. view it was very important for an individual to have the capacity to express himself. On the scale of values, this principle stood very high. The individual should have the last word regardless of where he or she lived. If Gromyko had nothing to add to this subject, perhaps U.S. and Soviet representatives at the Madrid meeting could meet to discuss this issue.

Gromyko stated that the last word was not with the individual. There were cases where an individual was engaged in secret or top
secret work. Every state had the right not to allow such people to leave the country. This was an inalienable right of the state. (Gromyko repeated inalienable right in English.) The Soviet Union had the right to do it. Gromyko remembered cases where an individual was held back, but then after awhile was allowed to depart. The last word was not with the individual, he repeated.

The Secretary replied that much depended on each individual case. The above conditions did not affect many people. An individual had rights over his life and for the most part could come and go as he wished. The U.S. did not have the problem that the Soviets faced. The Secretary remembered a slogan he saw abroad “Yankee go home and take me with you.” He added that the annual in-flow of people into the United States from all over the world was considerable. As for the 15 individuals involved, he did not think they were involved in top secret work and if U.S.-Soviet relations were to improve, such cases would have to be handled differently. Any positive action taken by the Soviet Union would improve the atmosphere that had gotten worse, as Gromyko had noted earlier.

Gromyko admitted that there was only a small percentage of people involved in secret work who wanted to leave. He pointed out that many people were allowed to leave the Soviet Union during the last few years. Dobrynin added that the number was well over 100,000. Gromyko continued to say that Shultz seemed to believe that many Soviet people wanted to leave, but very often these were people who are making much noise about it, had the time to write and in general were making a nuisance of themselves. There were even cases where a person was said by the U.S. to be anxious to leave, but when asked, the answer was “no, I don’t want to leave, only my relatives abroad want me to come”. (Gromyko instructed his interpreter to render the above passage “with feeling”.)

The Secretary then mentioned the case of Professor McClellan’s wife, who had been waiting for eight years to come to the U.S. Gromyko said he was unfamiliar with the case, but promised to look into it and Korniyenko added that he was familiar with the case. The Secretary asked whether the two CSCE negotiators would want to meet and discuss these issues. Ambassador Kampelman would be ready to discuss these matters.

Gromyko said that these questions did not require a special meeting, but that he would support the idea of having a meeting to discuss the Madrid CSCE sessions and he was sure that, if Kampelman raised human rights questions, the Soviet representative would be prepared to listen. At the same time, Gromyko wanted to avail himself of the opportunity to object vehemently to an unusual move by the U.S. side which must have been sanctioned at the very top. The Soviet
Representative, Kovalev while in Madrid, had agreed to meet with Kampelman in Vienna. Upon arrival in Vienna, he discovered that Kampelman had not come. In all his experience in diplomatic affairs, Gromyko had never encountered such unacceptable behavior by a diplomat. He felt that in the future, he might have to send diplomatic notes to arrange similar meetings. He asked the Secretary to straighten this matter out, but in principle he was ready to conduct such talks at any time and at any place.

The Secretary replied that confusion about the meeting was due to a third party trying to arrange it. Austria undertook to arrange this meeting, but something went wrong. He assured Gromyko that this matter would be worked out through the two Ambassadors. Gromyko suggested that the U.S. representative should travel to Moscow on such an occasion, since his Soviet counterpart had already done his foreign travel. The Secretary replied that the venue and the time could be discussed by the Ambassadors. Gromyko agreed.

Gromyko then suggested that the discussion move on to regional topics such as Afghanistan, the Caribbean and Africa.

Gromyko started by saying that Afghanistan had already been discussed with the Secretary’s predecessor and that he would like to only mention two aspects of the Afghanistan problem. First, there was the domestic issue concerning the regime, the leadership, the competence of the regime, its legal system and so on. Nobody had any right to interfere in these internal affairs of Afghanistan. Then there was the external aspect. The Secretary interjected that, before moving on to external affairs, he wanted to point out that Soviet troops were currently stationed in Afghanistan. Gromyko promised to take up that issue and continued to explain his view of the situation. On the external situation, armed incursions from Pakistan were taking place, and these gangs were trained mainly in Pakistan and partly in Iran. They engaged in acts of terrorism such as shooting teachers and children, and young men were forced to join these gangs. These incursions from outside amounted to a foreign aggression which was the main reason why the Afghan leadership asked the Soviet Union for assistance. This was a security issue in Afghanistan and, at the Afghan request, the Soviet Union had sent a limited number of Soviet troops. This was because the incursions from Pakistan were fighting the existing regime and government.

As for the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Gromyko wanted the Secretary to hear from a representative of the Soviet Union that, as soon as these armed outside elements stopped fighting the present government, Soviet troops would be pulled out. There must be an effective and guaranteed end to such incursions. How could this be subject to negotiations. A pullout would be a part of an understand-
ing between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. “We went in, and we will pull out when the Afghan leadership agrees”. Afghanistan would have to be an independent and non-aligned country. This was being said in the corridors of the UN. Why not support it? Why would such a position be unacceptable to the West and to Pakistan? The armed bands did not come from the moon, but from Pakistan where they were trained and armed. On the question of refugees, real refugees could return to Afghanistan without any difficulty, and there were special laws dealing with such refugees. There was, of course, a small group of formerly privileged people from Afghanistan who would have to seek refuge elsewhere. Lastly, meetings to be held in Geneva through the good offices of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, between Afghan and Pakistani representatives, would have Soviet support. The U.S. had good relations with Pakistan and the Soviet Union was not against Pakistan; it was only concerned that Pakistan was a base for incursions into Afghanistan. Afghanistan also wanted to improve relations with Pakistan, and they had some border questions to discuss. They should talk—that was the Soviet position. An improvement of the situation in that region also would help U.S.-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union found it impossible to maintain any other position. “This is a door to the Soviet Union, this is a neighboring border state. That’s what it is.”

The Secretary replied that his view of the diplomatic and military history differed sharply from Gromyko’s. Men were fighting in Afghanistan because armed forces of another country were dominating the government in Afghanistan. There were incursions because foreign forces were stationed in Afghanistan and tried to control that country. The Secretary also wanted to add a phrase to Gromyko’s proposal for an independent and non-aligned Afghanistan. The phrase would be, “a government freely chosen by the Afghan people.” The presence of foreign troops in that country would make free choice impossible. The removal of Soviet occupation was the key to the question. The Secretary was glad to hear that there would be talks in Geneva and he hoped that a resolution would also positively affect U.S.-Soviet relations. He added that in the past, the Afghan government had not looked ideal to the U.S. and it was friendly to the Soviet Union; but the U.S. did not object. Now the U.S. and many countries at the UN objected to the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan and believed that fighting in that country was also bad for the Soviet Union. He also mentioned that the recent talks between Ambassador Hartman and the Soviet representative in Moscow had not been productive. Another round could take place and the U.S. side was ready to continue such discussions. The Secretary concluded that his views on the history of that country differed from Gromyko’s, but that the U.S. would welcome any positive outcome of the talks in Geneva.
Gromyko agreed that their assessment of the history and of the actual situation in Afghanistan was different. He too would like to see progress in Geneva and if the U.S. could take a positive view, this could occur.

The Secretary then proposed to discuss the Caribbean area, including Central America. The buildup of arms in Nicaragua was far beyond its needs and the flow of arms to other Central American states was disruptive to the stability of that region. Elections had been held in El Salvador showing a very high turn-out by the population in spite of efforts by armed guerrillas to stop people from participating. That country needed stability which would then lead to economic development. It needed a chance. The problem in Central America was to foster economic development, which the U.S. supported, but now such development was hindered by armed intervention, through channels leading through Nicaragua, and by arms deliveries from Cuba and other countries. However, the origin of these arms was the Soviet Union. In particular, as the Secretary had mentioned last week, the emergence of jet fighters, or for that matter, armed Cuban forces in Nicaragua was unacceptable to the United States. Nations of Central America wanted stability and were willing to work with the United States. The massive buildup of arms was disruptive and causing a great deal of concern to the United States. Cuba appeared to be involved in that area and so was the Soviet Union by delivering arms. Because of Soviet involvement we were interested in Gromyko’s view.

Gromyko replied that his country was watching the Caribbean area and Central America and agreed that at times this was an unquiet, even tense part of the world. But the tensions were not generated by Cuba and very little Nicaragua; these were little Latin American countries facing the United States, which was a big country. Gromyko could not agree that these forces could be disruptive, but he knew of U.S. accusations leveled at Cuba. Also, Nicaragua seemed to be appearing more and more frequently in the Washington lexicon. The notion that Cuba or Nicaragua was a danger to the United States could not be taken seriously. No world leader could seriously believe such accusations. In fact, all this was unbelievable. Cuba did have some Soviet arms, but not much because Cuba cannot afford much. There were minimal amounts of weapons sent to Nicaragua for its own security purposes. Gromyko felt that U.S. information was not very good and that some of the accusations could not be treated seriously. Business was bad for U.S. foreign policy in El Salvador, he continued, but not because of Cuba and Nicaragua; rather, it was because of the way the people of that country lived. There were some groups of people there—Gromyko was sure that the Secretary would understand his thoughts without going into detail. As for Nicaragua, this was a new country
to the Soviet Union, but it was of no danger to the United States and had no evil intentions towards the United States. He assured the Secretary that the U.S. could sleep peacefully because no problems would come her way from these quarters. The idea that Soviet influence and Soviet arms in that area presented a danger to the U.S. could not be taken seriously. The Soviet Union would need a very long arm to reach that area, and it had no plans and no desire to do so. The Soviet Union wanted Cuba and Nicaragua to have good relations with the United States, and they in turn wanted to establish good relations with the United States. However, the U.S. responded to these overtures by a blockade, ostracism and isolation. Was this good for U.S. policy? Everyone had the right to feel sympathy or antipathy towards somebody. Even during the American Revolution, people had different sympathies. It would be best for the U.S. to remain calm, but instead the U.S. was about to start a radio propaganda war against Cuba. The Soviet Union felt that this was unnecessary, that it would be better for the U.S. to remain cool in evaluating the situation. As a big country, the U.S. could inject a calming and moderating influence into that region and cool hot tempers. The U.S. as a big power could afford to do it without any harm to its foreign policy and prestige.

The Secretary replied that he was very disappointed in Gromyko’s response. It was ridiculous to think that the U.S. was trying to stir-up problems in that area. The problem was that arms were flowing from Nicaragua down to Costa Rica, Honduras and other countries. This flow of arms and of military advisers should be stopped to give these countries a chance for stability and for development. Without going into detail, the Secretary found the situation in the area very troublesome, but the U.S. was ready to defend its interests there.

Gromyko replied that he had heard a similar approach from the Secretary’s predecessor, namely that Nicaragua was receiving a flow of arms, of Cuban advisors, etc. He tried to verify this information by checking with the Cubans and found that Haig’s information was incorrect, to put it mildly. There were Cuban teachers and medical personnel, but there were no military advisers. The idea that Cuba had plans to interfere in Nicaragua was simply hard to believe. He said that the Soviet Union had enjoyed good relations with Cuba for a number of years. Nicaragua was a new country to the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union felt sympathy for the Nicaraguan people. Gromyko was sure that the Secretary knew the clique, or whatever he wished to call them, who were earlier in power in that country. He wanted to stress again that the stories about military advisers and other schemes and plans in that area were pure inventions. Gromyko was not saying this to give the Secretary a false feeling of security. The Soviet Union was not that naive.
The Secretary said he was glad to hear Gromyko’s assurances, but the information available to him pointed to large volumes of arms, with indications of where they were going. There was no doubt about it and there were also groups disruptive of existing governments. This was a very unpleasant and unacceptable situation. He did not know what the Cubans told Gromyko. Gromyko said there were some people from Cuba in Nicaragua, but they were medical personnel and teachers, and not military people as the Secretary had implied. The Secretary said that even if it were as Gromyko had said, the presence of combat troops or jet planes would be unacceptable. Gromyko asked for confirmation that the Secretary had said “jet planes,” and both interpreters confirmed that he had. Gromyko then asked if this statement referred to a present or a hypothetical situation. (The Secretary did not respond directly to this question.)

The Secretary then turned to Africa, saying that he hoped that perhaps something constructive could be done. Gromyko replied that what was needed, first of all, was an independent Namibian state. South Africa had no right to be there, it contradicted certain UN Resolutions. Second, South Africa also would have to stop aggression against Angola, especially using Namibian territory. The whole world could see the raids and aggression by South Africa. Third, aid to some groups such as UNITA, in Angola, which fight against the present government, would have to stop. Gromyko knew that there were Cuban troops in Angola. This was a situation analogous to Afghanistan because the presence of Cuban troops in Angola was not the cause but the effect of South African aggression. If these causes were removed, then Cuban troops would also be removed. Gromyko said that he and the Secretary had talked to the Angolans, and both knew their position. Gromyko knew what the Angolans thought about the region and what they thought about Cuban troops. There was a joint statement by Angola and Cuba early this year on that subject. Gromyko thought that earlier the U.S. had been interested in talking to the Soviet Union about this issue. However, lately he had noticed a certain waning of interest on the part of the U.S. The Soviet Union was ready to keep up contacts with other countries trying to resolve the Angolan question without interfering in its internal affairs. Gromyko said that Crocker’s meeting with Soviet representatives was only informative. As for the Group of Five any U.S.-Soviet talks had nothing to do with the creation of the Group of Five; they sort of formed themselves. He believed that the relevant UN Resolutions would be a good basis for a general solution. He was sure that more contacts were needed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and also some other countries, to resolve the issue.

The Secretary welcomed the statement about contacts. As for the Contact Group, he said that their work was in line with UN interests.
and that they were attempting to bring about independence and free elections in Namibia. These were complicated talks involving South Africa, but they seemed to be going fairly well. At this point, there was no certainty of having an election with UN presence. The impediment now was the lack of operational plans for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola connected to the South African pullout from Namibia. More was needed than just general statements. A program for assurances was needed that provided for Cuban troop withdrawal if Namibia gained independence. Without such assurances, little could be done. Even if it were not connected with talks about Namibian independence, some parallel action was still needed. The hurdle remained: how would Cubans leave Angola? The U.S. side was working to resolve this issue, and the Secretary hoped that Gromyko would also use his influence to bring about a solution. The Secretary said that this might be an area where the two powers could do something constructive together. He repeated that the USSR had influence and that the U.S. was willing to cooperate. The neighboring states also wanted to see an independent Namibia. The Secretary thought it possible to have parallel efforts in this direction. He agreed that the meeting between Crocker and the Soviet representative was mainly informative. As for additional points of contact suggested by Gromyko, the Secretary thought that Crocker and Ambassador Hartman should arrange for another meeting to share ideas and see whether some parallel actions could be taken as initiated. He wanted to include Ambassador Hartman because he was familiar with the subject and could play an important role if events should take a more constructive turn.

As for Angola, the Secretary believed that this nation needed a national reconciliation but that the Angolans would have to work this out themselves. The presence of foreign forces was a burden to the local economy; at a time when the Angolans needed development, the less they spent on arms, the more would be left for development.

Gromyko suggested that representatives from each side should agree on the date and place for consultations and do this roughly within a month or a month-and-a-half. In essence, the Soviet Union wanted to see this matter resolved, and he knew that Angola and Cuba also wanted a resolution, but on a just basis. This would involve an independent Namibia, no aid to those against the present Angolan regime, and no South African aggression against Angola. As for Cuban troops, if the above could be resolved, then it would not be difficult for Angola and Cuba to resolve the rest. As for the Contact Group, Gromyko said that the USSR was not bound by it. The Soviet Union and the U.S. should consult bilaterally and then inform others later of the results. The Secretary said that he did not object to this proposal. He would be prepared to have a meeting within a month and would leave it up to Hartman and Crocker to decide on the time and the place.
Gromyko then moved on to nuclear non-proliferation. He wanted the Secretary to know that the Soviet Union was an unconditional supporter of the non-proliferation treaty. More work by the Soviet Union and the U.S. was necessary to widen the circle of participants because not as many countries had joined as had been envisaged, and it was necessary to watch this agreement very closely because there were loopholes in it. Gromyko was glad that the Secretary was showing interest in this matter. It had come to his attention that there were certain circles in the United States advocating other ways of resolving the problem without supporting the original agreement. He did not want to believe it, and he was glad to hear that that was but a rumor. If the U.S. was firmly supporting the non-proliferation agreement and its provisions, the Soviet Union would act accordingly.

The Secretary said that the U.S. was ready to subscribe to these principles and also felt genuine concern about necessary vigilance and the need to close any loopholes in the NPT. He also assured Gromyko of continuing U.S. support for the IAEA, but had to register his distress over the vote on Israel. He was against the politicizing of this group. He was distressed at what had happened in Vienna recently. This agency was very valuable and should not be politicized. As for contacts on non-proliferation issues, the Secretary informed Gromyko that the U.S. had recently appointed Mr. Richard Kennedy to deal with these matters full-time. The Secretary said that it might be constructive to have meetings in Washington or Moscow or in some other place to establish a quiet pattern of work in this area. He believed that the interests of the two powers were close on this issue, so constructive work should be possible.

Gromyko thought it possible for the representatives to meet and to look at the strict implementation of the NPT. The date and place could be arranged later. The Secretary added that their Ambassadors could be helpful in such an endeavor.

In summing up, Gromyko said that the two parties had discussed issues from the top downwards. He wanted to close on a note stressed by Brezhnev and himself at the UNGA—that the USSR would like normal relations with the United States, but on the basis of respect for its legitimate interests. Nobody should be allowed to disturb the balance in the world and therefore the sides started with START and INF in Europe, questions of exceptional importance. Gromyko was sure that the U.S. was familiar with Soviet proposals presented early on and during the present UNGA session. He wanted to stress statements made by the Soviet Union in a unilateral way about no-first-use of nuclear weapons and hoped that the U.S. would act in a similar manner. He would not expect an answer at this point, but since the U.S. was familiar with the Soviet position, he would ask the Secretary to study it without bias or prejudice.
The Secretary wanted to make a few comments in a similar spirit. As for the last question, the Secretary pointed out that no-first-use of any kind of weapon was a posture maintained by NATO and by the U.S. This meant no aggression with any weapon. This matter should be looked at in a comprehensive manner. As for arms reductions, the Secretary knew of the professional attitude and the businesslike manner in which the negotiators were working in Geneva and this applied to both U.S. and Soviet negotiators. The Secretary mentioned this in his UNGA speech\(^6\) and, although many issues still divided the two sides and it was impossible to predict the outcome, he was glad to observe that the negotiations were conducted in a businesslike way and would hope that Gromyko would share his view. As for the overall picture, some U.S. and Soviet views were not dissimilar, but the main question remained, namely, what kind of relationship would the super-powers have? This was important to the U.S. and the USSR and to the whole world. Relations could be more constructive than they were in the past or continue to remain as they were. The U.S. was prepared to defend its interests, but would prefer to move to more constructive relations between the two powers.

To sum up the second session, the areas of possible cooperation appeared to be South Africa and non-proliferation. Finally, the Secretary stressed again the importance that the U.S. placed on the question of human rights and asked Gromyko again to look at the list of 15 names presented by Ambassador Hartman in the first meeting.

In closing, Gromyko replied that he too appreciated the businesslike atmosphere of these discussions and, as for any announcements or statements, each side was free to say whatever it saw fit, but that the Soviet side would want to reserve the right to announce necessary corrections if some distorted views of the talks were to appear. He felt that these talks were of a closed and private nature. The Secretary suggested that the spokesmen for each side should work out a suitable text.

Over refreshments, the Secretary and Gromyko discussed the possibility of a further meeting prior to next year’s UNGA, and the two agreed to see how events went in coming months.

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\(^6\) Shultz’s September 30 speech is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, November 1982, pp. 1–9.
222. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

My Second Session with Gromyko—October 4

Today’s return meeting with Gromyko at the Soviet U.N. Mission went four-and-a-half hours. The atmosphere, as at our first session, was serious and devoid of polemics. Basic differences were not narrowed, but I believe we laid the foundation for future discussions.

Gromyko dealt at length on the Middle East. His main point was that as a major power close to the region the Soviet Union must be included in diplomatic efforts to achieve Middle East peace. While he reiterated familiar Soviet support for a Palestinian state, he went out of his way to repeat several times that the USSR also supports Israel’s right to exist.

Discussion proceeded from the Arab-Israeli dispute to the Iran/Iraq war. This gave me the opportunity to tell Gromyko we consider the Gulf an area of vital importance to us, and if the conflict spreads to endanger our friends in the area this would be a matter of grave concern to us.

On human rights, I stressed Jewish emigration, and mentioned Anatoly Shcharanskiy as well as people with a claim to American citizenship who wish to emigrate. Gromyko claimed that emigration had declined because our relations have turned down, but did not budge on substance.

On Afghanistan, Gromyko sounded the same two notes as in the first meeting: the problem is mainly the result of outside interference, and the USSR favors the talks taking place under the UN Secretary General’s auspices with Pakistan and Afghanistan.

I stressed the disruptive influence of Soviet support for the arms buildup and political subversion in the Caribbean/Central America by Cuba and Nicaragua. I told Gromyko that the introduction of jet fighter aircraft or armed Cuban forces in Nicaragua would be unacceptable to the U.S.

On southern Africa, I described the efforts we and the Contact Group are making to achieve a Namibia settlement, and how Cuban

troop withdrawal from Angola is related to it. Gromyko replied that the Soviets would like to see the problem solved, but emphasized that Cuban troops would only leave after the South Africans were out of Namibia.

Turning to nuclear proliferation, I said this seemed to us to be an area where the two countries might be able to work together. He replied that the Soviets stand firmly in support of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and “are prepared to act accordingly”.

At the close of our meeting, I reiterated a point made last week: We are prepared to go in a more constructive direction in our relationship, or continue as we are. For our part, we would prefer to embark on a more constructive path, but the choice is up to the Soviet Union.

223. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, October 15, 1982

SUBJECT
East-West Economic Policy

It is worthwhile to step back from the tactical details of our current discussions with the Allies on the Poland-related sanctions to review our overall progress on East-West relations. (C)

From 1976 to 1980, you succeeded in transforming American public opinion concerning East-West relations. You exposed the fatal weaknesses in detente policies, and built support for a more realistic approach. From 1980 to 1982, you changed U.S. government policy towards the Soviet Union. You increased military expenditures, placed arms control policies on a sound basis, and changed the tone of our public statements about the Soviet Union. Your challenge for the next

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00044 15 Oct 1982. Confidential. Sent for information. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Reagan initialed below the date. On October 15, Reagan held a meeting of the National Security Council from 2:10 to 3:20 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes of this meeting were found. In a diary entry for that day, Reagan wrote: “An N.S.C. meeting. George S. has made some progress on negotiations with our European cousins. If we can get enough agreement on credit restrictions etc. to the Soviet U. we could lift the sanctions on the pipeline.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Vol. I, p. 163)
two years is to change the public opinions and government policies of our allies in the area of East-West economic relations. This process will not be easy—the allies, for many reasons, consider the detente era an unqualified success. Many in this Administration will say that the difficulties of changing our Allies’ minds are insurmountable. Because the effort will be ultimately unsuccessful, they argue, and because it will generate friction in the Alliance, we should not try. I believe that as a matter of principle we must continue to make every attempt to change the course of East-West economic policy and its fueling of Soviet military might, and I am confident that we can succeed. (C)

In the two earlier phases of your efforts, objectives were fairly clear. Your victory in the 1980 election capped the campaign to change U.S. opinion on East-West relations; in the past two years your two defense budgets and your arms reduction proposals have been identifiable milestones in changing U.S. government policy towards the Soviet Union. For the next phase—changing the opinions and policies of our allies—equally clear milestones are needed. In priority order, I suggest that they are: (C)

1) Firm commitments from the Allies to buy no more natural gas from the USSR than presently contracted amounts;
2) A strengthened agreement on procedures to halt the flow of high Western technology to the Soviet Union.
3) A firm pledge by our allies to end subsidized credits to the USSR and tighten remaining credit terms. (C)

We should measure our success against these objectives—not some lowest-common-denominator agreement with the allies. (C)

We should use the current round of repression in Poland to publicly make the transition from a sanctions policy tied to events in Poland to a two-part policy. The first part is to put in place an enduring East-West economic policy based on the three objectives listed above. The second part is a modified package of sanctions tied directly to events in Poland. Our rationale is that Poland is not only a tragic event in itself, but also a manifestation of underlying repressive character of the Soviet Union which must be met by enduring unified Western policies in the area of East-West economic relations. (C)
224. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 16, 1982

SUBJECT

Shcharanskiy Case

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams
Assistant Secretary Designate Richard Burt
Deputy Assistant Secretary Designate Mark Palmer
EUR/SOV Acting Director Richard Combs (Notetaker)
Mrs. Avital Shcharanskiy
Eliezer Sadan, Mrs. Shcharanskiy’s Personal Advisor
Dr. Baruch Gur, Minister-Counselor, Israeli Embassy

Mrs. Shcharanskiy met with the Secretary for 30 minutes at her request to discuss the situation of her husband Anatoliy.

Mrs. Shcharanskiy said that she was in the United States to assist her husband, whose situation was very dangerous. He had been on hunger strike since September 27, was in poor health and was completely isolated in Soviet prison. Last year she had met with the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State, and President Reagan had said he would help. Today Anatoliy’s life was at stake. She had heard many kind words about Secretary Shultz and hoped he could find a way to help her husband.

The Secretary assured Mrs. Shcharanskiy the United States Government was fully aware of her husband’s situation and would do all it appropriately could to assist. One of our recent efforts on Mr. Shcharanskiy’s behalf was made during the Secretary’s meetings with Gromyko in New York. At the President’s direction, and in accord with the Secretary’s own inclination, human rights issues were placed at the top of our agenda. This marked a departure from the pattern of past meetings with Gromyko, as did the fact that Gromyko’s response was more substantive than heretofore. Just prior to the second meeting with Gromyko at the Soviet UN Mission, a group of U.S. Congressmen gathered outside of that mission and handed the Secretary material about the Shcharanskiy case as he entered. He was thus able to tell Gromyko that he had just received information about the case, that

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Shcharanskiy. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Combs on October 20; cleared by Palmer, Burt, Abrams, Shultz, and McManaway. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.

2 See Documents 217 and 221.
Mrs. Shcharanskiy was in the U.S. to assist her husband and that many in Congress shared her concern.

The Secretary said he had conveyed to Gromyko—and through him to the entire Soviet leadership—that the United States was strong, and had strong allies. If the Soviet Union continued with a pattern of behavior that threatened our interests, we would defend those interests. But a more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship was possible if Moscow altered its behavior. Change in Soviet human rights practices, including emigration, would be particularly significant—and it was in this context that the Secretary called Gromyko’s attention to the Shcharanskiy case.

It was very difficult to judge what impact this had on Gromyko, the Secretary continued. And we did not know what effect the meetings would have in Moscow. He had been joined in the Gromyko meetings by Ambassador Hartman as well as by Under Secretary Eagleburger and Assistant Secretary Burt. Ambassador Hartman was now back in Moscow. We have asked our CSCE Ambassador, Max Kampelman, to meet with his Soviet counterpart to discuss human rights issues, and Ambassador Hartman would be following up these issues in the Embassy’s contacts with Soviet officials in Moscow. But decision-making processes in Moscow were at best murky: we had a general impression that Brezhnev was not in good health, and the smell of political succession was in the Moscow air. Nonetheless, we had placed our concerns in front of the Soviet leadership and had made clear that we would judge the prospects for an improved relationship on the basis of Soviet deeds, not words. We had to be honest: we could not say we had found the key to tragic situations such as the plight of Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. The inhumanity of the Soviet system was sometimes difficult for us to comprehend. We must all pray that the Soviets will heed the message we have given them, and that Anatoliy Shcharanskiy will be spared.

Mrs. Shcharanskiy indicated appreciation for what had been done but felt that her husband had screamed for help by means of his hunger strike. He had become a symbol for all Soviet Jews, as well as for all human rights activists in the USSR. She thought U.S. actions on her husband’s behalf should be more intensive. Perhaps a prisoner exchange could be worked out. Perhaps something could be done with respect to the President’s October 15 grain offer or regarding other aspects of trade.

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3 Reference is to Reagan’s announcement on October 15 that he was directing the Secretary of Agriculture to negotiate additional grain sales to the Soviet Union. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, vol. II, pp. 1329–1331)
The Secretary responded that a number of specific efforts were underway, and we would continue our search for other approaches to the problem. We did not, however, want to give Moscow the idea that it could gain major concessions from the United States by tormenting prominent Soviet Jews; that is why the Secretary had said we would do all that was appropriate. He hoped it would soon be possible to give Mrs. Shcharanskiy more positive news, but at this moment he did not want to create false hopes. We were well aware that good news regarding her husband would be welcomed not only by her but also throughout the United States and the world.

225. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Washington, October 20, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to express my deep personal concern about the condition of Anatoly Shcharansky. His plight has aroused a great deal of sympathy and support in the United States.

Since September 27, Mr. Shcharansky has been on a hunger strike which he has undertaken to protest the denial to him by Chistopol' prison authorities of permission to write letters to his friends and relatives or to receive visits from his mother or brother. After five years of incarceration, his health is said to have deteriorated significantly. The continuation of a hunger strike places his life in jeopardy.

I urge you to give your personal attention to this matter, and I trust that some way can be found to accommodate Mr. Shcharansky's needs for greater communication with his family within the requirements of your penal system.

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290742, 8290870). No classification marking. Bremer sent a draft of the letter to Clark under cover of an October 14 memorandum. (Ibid.) In an undated note to Clark, received on October 16, McFarlane wrote: "Judge—You might want to take this up at a 9:30 meeting. You might also want to consider urging the President to call Dobrynin in for a private session to give him the letter and to explain what the President has said dozen of times; that he does not seek to embarrass the Soviets; he will not publicize this letter but only wants to see some results without a test of manhood." (Ibid.)
While I am writing you because of the particular urgency of this situation, I also urge your personal intervention to secure Mr. Shcharansky’s release from prison and permission to join his family in Israel.²

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

² In telegram 298898 to Moscow, October 23, the Department instructed the Embassy to deliver the letter as soon as possible to the highest ranking authority. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820008–0530) In telegram 12851 from Moscow, October 25, the Embassy reported that a member of the U.S. delegation delivered the President’s letter to the Soviet Foreign Ministry that day. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820008–0539)

226. Memorandum From William Martin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, October 22, 1982

SUBJECT

Soviet Gas in European Markets

We have received a troubling CIA assessment on the potential market for Soviet gas in European markets through use of only one strand of the Siberian pipeline and full use of existing infrastructure. This illustrates very clearly that unless we can get a commitment from the Europeans to limit their gas contracts to present levels, the Soviets will capture most of the market of the 1990s and drive out the competitive alternatives.

Attached (Tab I) are three visuals which tell the story.²

Case I is the no Siberian gas case. The key here is that Dutch gas would have to be increased over the short term, but over the longer


² Attached but not printed.
term, Norwegian and North African producers can meet demand. This is the President’s original alternative energy case.

Case II assumes that the first strand of the pipeline is completed but that there are no more gas contracts with the Soviet Union. As you can see, there is still room for alternatives, particularly Norwegian gas. Sufficient market is preserved to allow development of the giant Troll field.

Case III shows how big a chunk the Soviets can take out of the market with only one strand, if some limitation is not imposed on contracts. The results are dismaying. They can effectively block out all large scale alternatives. Only the Sleipner field in Norway is assumed to be developed. Troll is knocked out.

Bottom line: The Foreign Ministers communique is presently inadequate because it does not contain a statement to limit gas purchases over the longer term. If we do not get this commitment, then economic momentum will be on the side of the Soviets. They have all the advantages. We must even the scales. I think that the President must be made aware of this analytical evidence and the consequences of not pressing the Europeans now to limit their gas purchases over the longer term.

227. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Moscow**

Washington, October 28, 1982, 0227Z

302968. For Hartman from Eagleburger and Burt. Subject: Dobrynin Call on Eagleburger October 26.

1. (S—Entire text). Begin summary: Dobrynin called on Eagleburger at his request October 26 to deliver Soviet announcement of same day launch within USSR of “a new type” of light ICBM “RS–22.” Notification states it is made as “gesture of good will” and “guided by the objective to preserve (sic) all positive achievements of the SALT–2 negotiations.” We are analyzing significance of notification and its content. Discussion also touched on Shultz-Gromyko meeting in New York and states of INF and START negotiations. End summary.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Nodis; Stadis; Immediate. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Palmer, Burt, and in S/S–O; approved by Eagleburger.
2. On October 26 at 1700, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called at his request on Under Secretary Eagleburger to deliver unofficial Soviet Embassy translation of notification of same-day launch [of] a “new type” of light ICBM “RS–22” at Plesetsk. Text of translation is given in para 3 below. Eagleburger was accompanied by EUR Assistant Secretary-Designate Burt, EUR/SOV Director Simons and P Special Assistant Montgomery.

3. Begin text: As a gesture of good will, the Soviet side informs the U.S. side that the first launch of the “RS–22” light intercontinental ballistic missile of a new type was carried out on October 26, 1982 in the Soviet Union, within its national territory.

   . . . in submitting this notification the Soviet side is guided by the objective to preserve all positive achievements of the SALT–2 negotiations. The present notification is offered, of course, on a strictly confidential basis. End text.

4. With reference to the specification that the launch was of a “new type” of system, Burt asked if it were possible for us to conclude that this was the USSR’s designated new type under the provisions of SALT II. Moscow saying that other systems which would be tested will be variants of older types of systems? Dobrynin said he “presumed” this was so, but was not 100 percent sure.

5. Burt noted we had observed two new systems under development, one larger than the other, and at least one which appeared to be mobile, and he asked if one of these systems was involved. Dobrynin said he had no information on this point.

6. Burt expressed his view that the notification represented something of a departure for the Soviet side, and Dobrynin reaffirmed that it is indeed a gesture.

7. With reference to the recently concluded conference on democratization in Communist countries, Dobrynin congratulated Eagleburger on being a good crusader. Eagleburger rejoined that the conference had been interesting, and should give the Soviets no cause for concern. Dobrynin replied that they are not concerned, but continue to be surprised at what kind of administration there is in Washington.

8. Eagleburger asked Dobrynin’s off-the-record assessment of the Shultz-Gromyko meetings. Dobrynin said there had been no progress on the issues, but the Soviet judgment was that agreement to move forward with discussions of human rights/CSCE, Southern Africa and non-proliferation was welcome “small movement, even though discussions on some of these and similar topics like Afghanistan had been in train before.” Eagleburger agreed. Dobrynin asked when the Soviet side could expect answers to its proposals for beginning discussion on Southern Africa and non-proliferation the week of November 9. In the
case of non-proliferation, it was a question of using experts from the Soviet UNGA delegation or sending them back to Moscow. Eagleburger and Burt said answers could be expected soon, and would probably suggest that discussions begin somewhat later than the Soviets had proposed, perhaps in the late November-early December timeframe.

9. Eagleburger said he would be in New Delhi in mid-November, and asked to be remembered to Dobrynin’s former No. 2 in Washington (now Ambassador in New Delhi) Vorontsov, on the off chance they would have occasion to meet.

10. Dobrynin asked for our assessment of the status of START and INF.

11. With regard to INF, Burt said our assessment is that the Soviet stance is a little tougher this round than last. Dobrynin asked for an example. Burt said it is a general impression, based on the fact that the Soviet negotiator returned to announce that he would be reiterating the basic Soviet position without change. With regard to START, it is too early for us to form the same kind of impression, Burt continued. We think it good that both sides are discussing the concept of reductions and the same type of units of account, but we are still at the stage of exploring views.

12. With regard to the Soviet suggestion of a statement of principles, Burt continued, we are not opposed to the approach per se; the difficulty is that the Soviets are suggesting the wrong principles. It could be helpful to agree on basic principles, and there were precedents, but they must be the same principles. Dobrynin rejoined that if the U.S. sticks to a zero option for a whole year, the Soviets can be expected to put forward a version of their own. Eagleburger noted that the Soviets had put forward a peculiar kind of zero option.

14[sic]. Eagleburger drew Dobrynin’s attention to the fact that in briefing the press following his meetings with Gromyko the Secretary had stressed that the two sides were approaching the negotiations seriously. Dobrynin asked jovially whether this was a message to the “next (Soviet) generation,” as Bernard Gwertzman had claimed in the New York Times. Eagleburger replied that in all seriousness our approach is that we deal with Soviet Governments one at a time, and thus with the government in place; Gwertzman may not have invented his story, but he did not get it from George Shultz, or Eagleburger himself, or from Burt.

15. Dobrynin asked whether in Burt’s opinion Rostow’s trip to Europe was helpful to the negotiations in Geneva. Burt replied that he

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thought it was, since it demonstrated our commitment to progress in the negotiation. Eagleburger said Rostow seemed to have had a useful talk with Soviet negotiator Kvitsinskiy. He had also been talking to our allies. Dobrynin said the trouble was that he appeared to be saying different things in these conversations. Eagleburger surmised that some allies might not have been listening as carefully as Kvitsinskiy, but asked for specific examples. Dobrynin said his was a general impression. Eagleburger concluded that the reports he had did not show such contradictions.

Shultz

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228. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Reagan

Moscow, October 30, 1982

Dear Mr. President:

I want to draw your attention to the fact that the question you touched upon in your letter of last October 25, 2 concerns a Soviet citizen, sentenced for espionage and other grave anti-Soviet crimes, and lies within the exclusive competence of the Soviet State. There are neither legal nor any other grounds for resolving it in the manner you would wish.

At the same time, as I understand it, there is no basis for concern in this matter.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev 3

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1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290742, 8290870). No classification marking. A typewritten note at the top of the memorandum reads: “Unofficial Translation.” Dobrynin delivered the letter to Shultz under cover of a November 1 letter. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 225.

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
229. Minutes of an Interagency Coordinating Committee for U.S.-Soviet Affairs Meeting\(^1\)

Washington, November 2, 1982

Assistant Secretary of State-Designate Richard Burt opened the meeting by stating his belief that ICCUSA should be revitalized. Burt explained that the Committee serves a very useful function not only as a mechanism for information dissemination, but for policy coordination, and in this regard, called for ICCUSA to move from a concentration on exchange-related matters to a broader policy focus. He noted that the US has never been as successful as the USSR in speaking with a single policy voice, and looked to ICCUSA as a way of overcoming this difficulty. He proposed that ICCUSA meet approximately every two months.

Turning to the first agenda item, US-Soviet relations, Burt noted that Secretary Shultz had placed Soviet affairs at the top of his foreign policy priorities. In the past, Soviet policy has often changed with changes in administrations and personalities, but that has not been the case with the Haig-Shultz transition.

Discussing the Shultz-Gromyko meetings, he described Gromyko’s argument that the downturn in relations was due to US actions. Gromyko claimed that the US had barred the Soviets from playing a political role in important regions of the world, and had unilaterally abandoned detente. Secretary Shultz, countered by stating that the downturn was directly attributable to Soviet actions—in Angola, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan, for example. The US position is that deeds, not words, are important—and if there is no change in Soviet actions, then the relationship will remain strained.

Burt remarked that the USSR is now at a crossroads with its leadership transition. Mindful of this, Shultz took great pains to detail US objections to Soviet actions so that the upcoming leadership generation will have a clear idea of US foreign policy. Burt characterized our policy as an undramatic, sober, firm one. The US will remain strong, revitalize its economic power, and do whatever is necessary to strike a military balance.

In sum, the message we have sent to the Soviets is that relations can go either way—but the decision is now up to the USSR, and the

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\(^1\) Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR—Death of President Brezhnev (November 1982) (1)–(2). Confidential. Bremer sent a copy of the minutes to Clark under cover of a December 21 memorandum. (Ibid.)
US is prepared for longterm competition. We will be watching Soviet behavior closely.

The CIA representative commented that Brezhnev’s speech to the Defense Council raised interesting questions about Soviet policies. In his view, the speech did not offer much reassurance to the Soviet military on defense issues.

The question was raised whether US exchange participants should be briefed on US policy before traveling to the Soviet Union. Burt answered that the exchangees should be briefed on policy, so that they will understand the US stance, but not so that they will be used as a channel of communication with the Soviets. The Commerce Department representative noted that the state of US-Soviet relations makes it more difficult to maintain useful relations with Eastern European countries. In reply, Burt described our policy of differentiation and noted as well that we do not treat Yugoslavia as a Warsaw Pact state.

Discussing reciprocity in US-Soviet relations, Burt stated that it is a point of principle that relations proceed on an equitable basis, on the mundane level (e.g. protection of nationals), as well as in more substantial areas (e.g. arms control). He noted that this is a very difficult policy to administer: the closed Soviet society gives the USSR the advantage in controlling matters of reciprocity. Nonetheless, reciprocity is essential in our dealings with the Soviets. Burt cited the new Foreign Missions Act as an important tool of reciprocity and introduced a staff member of the State Department’s Office of Foreign Missions, who described the powers accruing to the Department from the Act and offered to provide more detailed briefings on the Act to any ICCUSA representative.

The Assistant Secretary-Designate then left to meet with Secretary Shultz. Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, took the chair. Turning to other agenda items, Simons noted that all personal non-group travel to the USSR by US government employees must be cleared in advance with the State Department. In this connection, he remarked that hostile intelligence recruitment efforts remain a concern and asked representatives to remind their agencies of this.

On exchanges, Simons commented that it may be time to take another look at our exchange policy, to identify areas where exchanges operate to the detriment of the US, and conversely, to spot fields in which the absence of exchange agreements puts the US Government

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2 Reference is to Brezhnev’s speech of October 27 to a conference of Soviet military leaders at the Kremlin. *(Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 34, no. 43, November 24, 1982, pp. 1–3)*
at a disadvantage in managing relations. The OSTP representative described a case involving an NOAA-managed exchange which remained in effect for years at considerable cost and no benefit to the US. He suggested that some agencies may not be aware of the importance of reciprocity.

The meeting was opened to comments from the representatives. Interior Department representatives raised the need to designate an area coordinator, at the Assistant Secretary level, for the wildlife conservation exchange. They stated that participation at that level was necessary in order to mobilize resources effectively within the Interior Department. It was noted, however, that the ban on contacts at the Assistant Secretary level remains in force, and Simons agreed that it will be very difficult to find reasons to rescind that sanction.

Discussion then arose of the overall value to the US of exchanges, whether exchange agreements with the USSR still served US policy purposes and whether the agreements benefit the US taxpayer. Simons commented that exchanges serve a useful role as a part of the overall structure of bilateral relations, but also said that the US must benefit from the exchanges in order to keep the programs going. They should not serve merely a symbolic function. Simons also warned that we must be alert to attempts by the Soviets to “end-run” the official exchange structure and develop new exchanges with private American organizations.

The NSF representative informed the group that he had heard that the Soviets were discussing de facto reconstitution of the science and technology agreement with the American Council of Learned Societies, and that the Council wants to use unexpended S&T funds for discussions with the Soviets. In the NSF’s view, those funds should only be used for wind-up activities. Greenberg asked if Simons’ earlier comments meant that we should now consider revitalizing the S&T agreement. Simons replied that that was not necessarily the case, but that we need to identify any ways in which the absence of exchange agreements works against our interests. The FBI representative then asked if these S&T discussions could be halted through visa denials; Simons felt that we could run into problems with visa procedures.

The OSTP representative said that he would be interested to know the overall level of exchange activity. He suspects that the level is lower than during more cordial periods, regardless of Soviet end-run activities. He also stated that representatives should pay close attention to the need for decisions on exchange renewals, and cited the Agricultural Agreement as an example. He noted the seeming Soviet propensity for “December surprises” and remarked on the need for US agencies to have their options on the Agricultural and other agreements cleared well in advance of the renewal deadlines.
MEMORANDUM FROM RICHARD PIPES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT’S ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (CLARK)\(^1\)

WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 3, 1982

SUBJECT

BREZHNEV’S SPEECH OF OCTOBER 27\(^2\)

Brezhnev’s speech has unleashed a flood of paper. The controversial question is: did he say something really new which presents a fresh threat to us, or did he merely reiterate old themes? In the two attached memoranda (Tab I, November 2; and Tab II, October 29\(^3\)), State reaffirms its view that the October 27 speech did not represent a new departure and does not presage a major military effort. I concur with State’s evaluation on the following grounds:

—Brezhnev did not promise his military audience to increase defense spending but urged them to improve their performance.
—He stressed the improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations which most likely was meant to reassure his audience that the Soviet international situation is better than it has been for some time.
—The day after Brezhnev had delivered his speech, Chernenko, his closest collaborator and apparent choice for successor, spoke in Tiflis and downplayed the U.S. military threat.

State seems correct to me in arguing that the main thrust of Brezhnev’s talk was that the Soviet armed forces must do better with what they have rather than count on more money and resources.


\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 229.

\(^3\) Tab II is attached but not printed.
Tab I

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, November 2, 1982

SUBJECT

Brezhnev’s Address to Military Leaders: Why All the Confusion?

U.S. media analyses of Brezhnev’s October 27 speech to Soviet military leaders have distorted the substance of Brezhnev’s remarks. Some interpretations virtually ignore the actual content of the speech. Few show awareness of the context in which the speech was delivered.

Subsequent developments in the USSR seem to support our view that Brezhnev’s speech disclosed no fundamental policy shifts and was in fact addressed primarily to Brezhnev’s immediate audience, the Soviet military establishment. For example:

—Brezhnev’s speech preceded a major address to the same audience by Defense Minister Ustinov on “the state of combat and political training in the army and navy and tasks of its further perfection.” The full text of Ustinov’s remarks has not been published, perhaps because it was sharply critical of the military (Ustinov is reputed to be a hard-driving perfectionist). However, the initial portion, as carried on Soviet television, indicates that Brezhnev’s remarks were intended to set the stage for Ustinov’s critique of Soviet military preparedness.

—The day after Brezhnev’s speech, Brezhnev’s protege Chernenko addressed an award ceremony in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and was a little less harsh than his mentor in discussing the United States. In particular, Chernenko did not dwell on U.S. military preparations.

—And, in a related development, senior members of Arbatov’s USA Institute who are currently visiting Washington commented privately that Brezhnev’s remarks about the U.S. were blunt because of the audience he was addressing, not because of a basic change in Moscow’s thinking.

In light of these developments, we believe Brezhnev’s unusually stark characterization of the U.S. military threat was in the first instance crafted to underscore the urgency of improving deficiencies in combat and political training in the Soviet armed forces. It did not mark a

4 Confidential.
fundamental change in Moscow’s current assessment of U.S. policy, though Chernenko’s follow-up speech did hint at Soviet toughness in arms control negotiations and implied that Moscow would not be intimidated by any U.S. military programs. Similarly, we continue to be skeptical that Brezhnev’s speech broke new ground with regard to Soviet military spending. His basic message here was that the Soviet military-industrial complex and the armed forces must do better with sizable resources they are currently provided, not that they are going to receive an even larger slice of the resource pie.

L. Paul Bremer, III

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5 McManaway signed for Bremer above Bremer’s typed signature.

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231. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, November 9, 1982

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on November 9, 5:00 p.m., on East-West Economic Relations

Issue

Now that we have reached agreement with the Allies on the non-paper, the issue before you is to select the appropriate U.S. response in terms of modifying our unilateral oil and gas controls.

Facts

The following options will be presented to you at the NSC meeting:

Option 1: Lift all oil and gas equipment and technology sanctions against the Soviet Union.

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Option 2: As recommended in attached memo\(^2\) from Secretaries Shultz and Baldrige, cancel the June 22 measures, and resulting denial orders; retain December 29 controls with broad “exceptions” criteria including grandfathering pre-December contracts.

Option 3: “Toughen” the recommendations in the Shultz/Baldrige memo through an NSDD, requiring speedy agreement on multilateral controls on critical oil and gas equipment in the context of the study called for in the non-paper.

Option 4: Lift only the June 22 measures pending the separate successful negotiation of multilateral controls on critical oil and gas equipment.

Discussion

Your selection from these options depends on the approach you think will be most effective in translating the broad principles of the non-paper into specific firm commitments. Option 1 relies completely on the good faith of the Allies in living up to the spirit of the non-paper. The history of this issue is not encouraging in this respect. Option 4 requires new concessions from the Europeans before we will grandfather pre-December contracts, and would probably be contested by them, if not rejected. Option 2 occupies the middle ground on a U.S. response. You should understand that it will be difficult for the Commerce Department to administer, because of its complexity. Vigilant high-level attention will be required to ensure it does not degenerate into Option 1. The liberal “exceptions” policy of Option 2 can forfeit any future U.S. leverage and prejudice unfavorably the outcome of the study on oil and gas technology controls. Option 3 addresses these limitations directly by accelerating the study on multilateral oil and gas controls to replace the exceptions policy as quickly as possible.

The confused public handling of this issue in recent months argues strongly for a clear statement from you at this critical juncture. The cabinet must be informed that your statement and the White House-issued press guidance on these decisions will govern all public and private explanation of our policy. Poland remains at the center of this policy—the prolonged repression of the Poles has been the catalyst in the forging of an enduring, security-minded East-West economic policy.

RECOMMENDATION

That you select one of the four options modifying U.S. sanctions as the U.S. response to agreement on the non-paper.\(^3\)

\(^2\) Not found attached.

\(^3\) Reagan did not indicate his preference with respect to these options on this copy of the memorandum.
1. Lift all oil and gas equipment and technology controls against the Soviet Union.

2. Cancel June 22 measures, and resulting denial orders, while retaining December 29 controls, with broad “exceptions” criteria, including the grandfathering of pre-December contracts.

3. Same as Option 2, with an NSDD which requires speedy agreement on multilateral controls on critical oil and gas equipment to replace the “exceptions” policy.

4. Lift only June 22 measures; December sanctions would be maintained pending successful negotiation of multilateral controls on critical oil and gas equipment.
232. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, November 9, 1982, 5:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
NSC Meeting regarding the Allied Agreement on East-West Trade and Poland-related Sanctions

PARTICIPANTS
The President
CIA
The Vice President Mr. John McMahon
OPD
State Secretary George P. Shultz Mr. Roger Porter
JCS
Secretary Donald T. Regan General John W. Vessey
White House Mr. Marc E. Leland
Defense Judge William P. Clark
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger Mr. Edwin Meese, III
Mr. James A. Baker, III Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Mr. Fred C. Ikle
NSC Mr. Lionel Olmer Admiral John Poindexter
Col. Michael O. Wheeler
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige Mr. Roger Robinson
Mr. Joseph Wright
USTR Ambassador William E. Brock Cdr. Dennis Blair
OMB

Minutes
National Security Adviser Clark opened the meeting, noting that the next decision point on the sanctions issue had arrived after the decisions of December, 1981 and June, 1982. He said that Secretary Shultz would review the status of consultations with the Allies. Although the President might not be ready to make a decision at the meeting, he continued, the Secretary of State needed a selection by the President from among the four options in order to inform the Allies. (C)

Secretary Shultz said that although during the consultations, the Allies there had been careful not to discuss the pipeline sanctions, they

1 Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File: Records, 1981–88, NSC 00065 09 Nov 82 [1/2]. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Blair sent the minutes to Clark under cover of a November 17 memorandum. Poindexter initialed approval of the minutes on Blair’s memorandum on behalf of Clark. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 189.

3 See Document 231.
were now “curious” to know what action the President would take to modify the sanctions. The consultations with the Allies, he continued, had identified the common ground in the area of East-West economic relations. This common ground enabled the Allies to feel that they had not been negotiating with the United States under duress, and the United States for its part was able to put forward an agreement in a positive, upbeat manner. The Secretary stated that he would address four topics: the status of the discussions with the Allies; a review of the non-paper; the side letters to the paper; and the Poland-related sanctions. (C)

Concerning the status of the discussions, the Secretary pointed out that although the paper was in a final form, final Allied approval depended on U.S. sanctions modifications. He pointed out that certain words in the text of the paper such as “subsidize” and “strategic interests” were ambiguous. There was an inherent ambiguity in these words that could only be worked out as the paper became “concrete and operational.” There were several side letters to be written in conjunction with the paper: the Italians wanted reassurance that the contracts covered in the “pause for reflection” which they had instituted would not be considered “new contracts,” therefore subject to the agreement of the non-paper. The Federal Republic wanted similar reassurances on an imminent gas agreement covering Berlin. The Japanese wanted assurances concerning the Sakhalin project, for which contracts were signed on a yearly basis. The Belgians wanted an assurance for contracts similar to those of Italy. Secretary Shultz pointed out all these situations were straightforward, legitimate, in good faith and that the countries concerned were seeking reasonable assurances. Concerning the interpretation of the word “subsidize,” the side letter would point out that the definition of the word is not identical among all the governments. Secretary Shultz thought that this side letter might be better handled by other means during the consultations. There was also a potential side letter concerning the phrase “common approach.” The United States was concerned that this phrase not be interpreted to mean that countries could only take actions which were agreed by all of them. The United States had asserted in the consultations that it might still be necessary to take unilateral actions. Secretary Shultz then stated that Under Secretary Wallis had rejected a European proposal on a joint examination of the legal aspects of extraterritoriality. Under Secretary Wallis had said that such a study could be undertaken as a separate effort, but not as part of the non-paper. (C)

Secretary Shultz next reviewed the contents of the non-paper for the members of the National Security Council. He covered the introduction, the section listing criteria for East-West trade, a list of areas for study, and the near-term undertakings in the study. He concluded this
description by pointing out that the United States would attempt to remove or make side letters unnecessary, but that if this were not successful, he would have no hard objection to the side letters. (C)

Secretary Shultz then turned to the schedule for further consultations. He said that a meeting had been scheduled for tomorrow, November 10, with the four European countries affected by the American temporary denial orders. He said at that meeting he hoped to inform those countries what the President’s intentions were for modifying the sanctions. Later in the afternoon of November 10 there was a meeting of the “Seven plus two” in which the entire package would be reviewed. In an effort to avoid the disagreements which had followed the Versailles Summit, all the Allies would agree on what they would say publicly. The American preference was to distribute the non-paper. The French had objected. As an alternative, the State Department had distributed to the Allies a precis of the paper in the form of talking points which the President would use, and had asked for a similar paper from each of the Allies by tomorrow. At the 10 November afternoon meeting, the task was to put the papers together and to coordinate the public pronouncements. The Secretary noted that the non-paper would in due course become public through leaks in any case and that this was nothing to be worried about since it was a good paper, one to be proud of. Secretary Shultz concluded that by tomorrow afternoon the Allies could be very close to a final agreement on all elements in the package requiring only a few cables among foreign ministers and capitals to wrap it up. (C)

Judge Clark asked if the Secretary considered it worthwhile for the President to send a message through his channels to the other heads of state. (C)

Secretary Shultz said that the basic public line of all the heads of state should be that the paper represented a victory for the Alliance, not for any individual country. It was necessary to have an upbeat, positive presentation. It would be good for the President to emphasize this interpretation to his counterparts. The Secretary had met earlier in the afternoon with German Defense Secretary Manfred Woerner and had given him this message concerning public handling of the issues. Woerner had promised to take this message back to Chancellor Kohl. In conclusion, Secretary Shultz said messages from the President to his counterparts would be desirable. (C)

Judge Clark reviewed the manner in which the U.S. would announce the arrangement. The President would announce the overall agreement on East-West trade, then the “action would shift” to the question of modifying the U.S. sanctions, and the announcement on this subject would be handled by Secretary Shultz and Secretary Baldrige, who actually was responsible for administering the sanctions.
The idea would be that the President would announce the broad outlines of the agreement, and then give directions to his departments to implement them. This was similar to the way in which these sanctions had been imposed. (C)

Secretary Shultz said that he would be giving a background briefing with Secretary Baldrige. He would elaborate on the overall agreement, and Secretary Baldrige would field the questions on the sanctions themselves. (C)

Before the views of the other members of the NSC were given, the President stated that what he wanted to know was whether the agreement which Secretary Shultz had worked out was superior to what the United States now had in place. He recalled that Under Secretary Buckley had gone to Europe to work out common measures. If he had succeeded there would have been no need for U.S. sanctions. Neither had there been any success at the Versailles or Bonn Summits in working out common sanctions. (C)

Secretary Shultz said that the agreement was basically a good one. It was, of course, impossible to say whether the work program laid out in the agreement would meet all U.S. objectives. However, a certain momentum was being generated and it looked promising. As for the concrete content of the agreement, the improvements to COCOM were actually in progress. The agreement that there be no new gas contracts signed for the course of the study was a clear commitment. Basically, the paper was a commitment by the Alliance to work out an economic strategy to complement the military strategy and the strategy on values which the Alliance already had. It was appalling to him that the Alliance did not have one already. As for the studies, the Secretary recommended strongly that they go forward and that the U.S. government assign their best people to them. Properly done, the studies could be of great significance. There was always the possibility that they could peter out and produce no concrete results, but the Secretary doubted it. The agreement on credit policy was a plus, in the Secretary’s view. He hoped that an arrangement could be worked out. Other credit agreements having nothing to do with the Soviet Union had been negotiated from time to time and had not been terribly successful, but it was worthwhile trying again. Concerning the agreement to study controls on high-technology items outside the military sector, specifically oil and gas controls, the Secretary thought that the possibilities were good of obtaining some positive commitments. He did not expect sweeping controls, but some individual items could be identified. The Secretary continued to say that the United States had “gotten a lot of mileage” out of the pipeline controls. They had focused the attention of the Allies and they had focused world attention on Poland. There had been damage done to the pipeline in terms of delaying it and

creating difficulties for it, although the intelligence community had different views on the exact nature of these effects. In the end, however, the Soviets would complete this pipeline, as they had many other pipelines. When the Soviets completed the pipeline, the United States did not want to have its pipeline sanctions in place, since this would give the appearance of failure. There was a point, therefore, when it was important to modify the pipeline sanctions. In the Secretary’s judgement, we had just about reached that point. (C)

Secretary Weinberger agreed that the non-paper had good potential. The criteria were especially good. However, he pointed out that the paper was basically an agreement to consider an agreement, with the exception of the commitment not to sign new gas contracts. The undertakings on COCOM were nothing new. The agreements on credit, an *ex post* review and a harmonization of policies, would be good if they were fulfilled. The studies had potential to have greater results, Secretary Weinberger felt, if the U.S. sanctions were lifted in a way that retained leverage in U.S. hands. More leverage was needed than simply assigning good people to do the studies. After the Versailles Summit, the agreements had been disavowed by some of the participants. Secretary Weinberger pointed out that some French officials were already saying privately that the paper contained nothing new. Very little could come from the paper and the studies unless the United States retained some leverage. He agreed with Secretary Shultz that the sanctions that the United States had imposed had given positive results. Without the pain they had inflicted there would have been no movement on the common agreement. The manner of lifting the sanctions would give the opportunity to ensure the studies were completed and gave concrete commitments. In summary, the United States should get something solid in return for lifting its sanctions. Secretary Weinberger, therefore, recommended a variation on option four: that the temporary denial orders be rescinded and that enforcement of the June 18 measures be suspended pending completion of the studies. When these studies resulted in concrete commitments, the rest of the sanctions would be eliminated. This leverage would be retained to prevent a repetition of Versailles. (C)

Secretary Baldrige pointed out that the effectiveness of the sanctions was now at its height. Within a couple of years it would diminish as companies and countries figured out ways to work around the sanctions. In his opinion if the studies showed promise, then it was sensible to drop these sanctions before they became weaker. Although he had signed a memo with Secretary Shultz which recommended option 2, he was now changing his recommendation to option 1. Option 4 simply penalized American companies while European companies took their business. If the agreement was in fact better than the sanctions, then
the clean, unambiguous action of option 1 should be taken. Even under option 1 the Afghanistan sanctions relating to oil and gas equipment would still be in place, as would the export control mechanisms. The important thing was to relieve the uncertainty for American businessmen and customers. Uncertainty prevented from going ahead with their plans. If the December sanctions were retained, the effect would be that Alsthom Atlantique would take over contracts for rotors which General Electric was unable to compete for. (C)

Secretary Shultz stated that he supported option 2. (C)

Mr. Baker asked whether the President himself would announce both the overall agreement and lifting the sanctions. Judge Clark replied that the President would announce the overall agreement and the Commerce Department would announce the sanctions modifications. Mr. Baker replied that from the press point of view the government would not be successful in separating the two pronouncements. (C)

The President stated that it was necessary to say publicly that the United States would have preferred to have had an agreement like this in the first place, before it imposed unilateral sanctions. (C)

Secretary Shultz pointed out that instead of saying that the United States had obtained this agreement from its Allies, he could therefore lift the sanctions, he could say something like “in the light of this agreement . . . ” (C)

Mr. Baker concluded that it was [his] opinion that the President should announce both the agreement and the modification of the sanctions in his statement. (C)

In reply to a question from Counsellor Meese, Secretary Baldrige said that option 2 would solve some but not all of the problems of U.S. companies which had been affected by these sanctions. It would not solve General Electric’s problem with its rotors. He frankly said he did not understand what leverage over the Allies would remain with option 2. (C)

Counsellor Meese said that option 2, the “broad exception” option, would give the U.S. flexibility. The concept as he understood it was a gradual loosening of U.S. controls except for selected areas of high technology. Secretary Shultz agreed that this was the case, and that option 2 would allow Caterpillar and Allis-Chalmers to compete for contracts. Secretary Baldrige interjected that the effect was still to leave U.S. companies under controls but not European companies. (C)

Secretary Shultz said that controls would remain in place, but that companies would proceed with their contracts under the exceptions. The United States would restrain certain high technology items. It was true that some of our companies would be penalized, but this would be a form of leverage. A structure would also be in place so that further actions could be taken if necessary. (C)
Secretary Baldrige said that the structure for controls would exist in any case. He still failed to see why controlling U.S. companies but not European companies gave us leverage over European governments. (C)

Counsellor Meese stated that his recommendation was option 2. (C)

Secretary Regan said that he agreed with Secretary Shultz’s analysis of the importance of the agreement. His recommendation was option 2. He pointed out that under option 2 companies would still be competing for many non-Soviet contracts and for Soviet contracts under the exceptions policy. (C)

The Vice President inquired whether option 2 would allow the Cameron Company to sell blowout preventers to the Soviet Union. Secretary Shultz replied that these were high technology, U.S.-origin items and would be candidates for remaining under controls. The Vice President said that a lot of money was involved in these contracts and that it was not entirely clear that they were sensitive technology and should be controlled. (C)

Under Secretary Olmer said that the blowout preventers could be sold. The only items which would be held would be rock bits and submersible pumps under option 2. Secretary Shultz said that option 2 would retain controls over more than just bits and pumps; there was a list of additional equipment which would be covered. (C)

Under Secretary Olmer continued that the U.S. would be attempting to obtain multilateral controls on this type of equipment, but that if they were unsuccessful, then the equipment would be allowed to be shipped as an exception. (C)

Mr. McMahon said that he was relaying Director Casey’s views. Director Casey considered it a major achievement that the Allies were sitting down to work out a common economic policy towards the East. He suggested that as many reviews as possible be conducted in the NATO context in order to emphasize the security context. He said that tightening COCOM restrictions alone is a tremendous achievement. He thought the paper itself was a very positive step. (C)

General Vessey said that the options were basically not a military matter. It would be an advantage for overall NATO cooperation to have an agreement with the Allies, but if the studies failed to control high technology items, then the military tasks of the United States would be more difficult. From his point of view options 2, 3, or 4 would be acceptable. (C)

Ambassador Brock said that, in answer to the President’s question, the agreement was better than what the United States now had. He favored option 1. The problem of businessmen was uncertainty, and the exceptions policy of option 2 retained this uncertainty. Controls
would still remain under option 1 to prohibit the export to the Soviet Union of sensitive high technology products which were unique and controlled by the U.S. He said the effect of options 2, 3, or 4 would be simply to put additional U.S. products under controls which other countries could manufacture and win U.S. contracts.

The President asked for a clarification of the difference between option 1 and option 2. Under Secretary Olmer explained that under the 1978 Afghanistan sanctions and prior controls, the United States prohibited the export to the Soviet Union of oil and gas exploration and production equipment and technology. It did not under these controls, prohibit export of equipment for refining or transmission and had not controlled foreign subsidiaries and licensees. The measures taken in June controlled subsidiaries and licensees. The measures of December 1981 controlled refining and transmission equipment. Therefore, under option 1, two of the four oil and gas equipment areas would remain under controls, whereas under option 2, all four areas would remain under control. In addition, under option 2 there would be a small amount of additional leverage concerning extraterritoriality. Concerning G.E.’s rotors, the hope would be that the agreement reached after the studies on high technology items would prevent Alstom Atlantique from displacing General Electric in the world market. (C)

Secretary Weinberger said that Secretary Baldrige had asked what leverage the United States would retain under option 2. He pointed out that despite all the talk that Alstom Atlantique could replace General Electric, there had been no sign in the four months since the June measures that it was able to do so. Most observers believed it would take at least two years to accomplish this. In addition, Secretary Weinberger pointed out that the situation in Poland was getting even worse. He reiterated that under option 4 the December sanctions would be removed once solid commitments had emerged from the studies. (C)

Secretary Shultz said that the wording of option 1 was not completely correct. It was not true that “all sanctions” would be lifted. It was more accurate to say that the measures taken in December 1981 and June 1982 would be lifted. (C)

Secretary Baldrige, in reply to Secretary Weinberger’s remarks, said that it was not a four-month proposition to build high-speed rotors. If Alstom Atlantique saw that G.E. was being excluded from the world market, it would move right in. (C)

The President closed the meeting by hoping that everyone else would have a pleasant evening. (C)

On November 16 the President signed NSDD 66 which approved the “Summary of Conclusions” on East-West economic relations result-

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4 See Document 246.
ing from consultations with the Allies by Secretary Shultz; approved cancellation of the December 30 sanctions and the June 22 amendment; and laid out the President's objectives for the studies with the Allies in the area of East-West economic relations. In his radio address on November 13 the President announced the agreement and the lifting of the sanctions. (C)


233. Editorial Note

In a diary entry for November 11, 1982, President Ronald Reagan wrote that his day started at 3:30 a.m., when President's Assistant for National Security Affairs William "Clark called with word that Brezhnev died." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Volume I, page 171) At 10:01 a.m. in the State Dining Room at the White House, Reagan delivered remarks presenting the Presidential Citizens Medal to Raymond Weeks at a Veterans Day Ceremony. At the close of these remarks, the President read the letter he had just sent to Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium in Moscow. "Please accept my condolences on the death of President Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev. President Brezhnev was one of the world's most important figures for nearly two decades. May I ask you to convey our sympathies to the President's family. I would also like to convey through you to the Soviet Government and people the strong desire of the United States to work toward an improved relationship with the Soviet Union. I look forward to conducting relations with the new leadership in the Soviet Union with the aim of expanding the areas where our two nations can cooperate to mutual advantage." After reading this letter, Reagan added: "Now, I've said for many years there are fundamental differences between the Soviet system and our own system here in the United States. But I believe our peoples, for all our differences, share a desire and a dedication to peace." (Public Papers: Reagan, 1982, volume II, pages 1445–1447)

Reagan wrote in a diary entry on November 12: "The Soviets have told us our funeral delegation should only be 3 people. So it will be the V.P., Secretary of State & our Ambassador. Incidentally our allies have followed my lead—no heads of state will attend." (Brinkley, ed.,
That day, following a brief hospital visit after he choked on a fish bone at lunch, Secretary of State George Shultz departed from Andrews Air Force Base for Moscow, to meet Vice President George Bush, who had been traveling in Africa. (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pages 124–125)


234. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, November 15, 1982, 4:40–5:10 p.m.

SUBJECT
Report of Bush-Andropov Meeting

PARTICIPANTS
U.S. Participants
Vice President George Bush
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR Participants
General Secretary of the CPSU Yuriy V. Andropov
Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko
Mr. Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov Assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU
Mr. Viktor Sukhodrev Interpreter

1 Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files: Series II: USSR Subject, Andropov [8]; Secret. The meeting took place in the Kremlin. Shultz forwarded the memorandum to Reagan under cover of a November 17 memorandum, which Clark then forwarded to Reagan under cover of a November 22 memorandum that Reagan initialed. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File, USSR (11/16/82–11/18/82)
Addressing Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz, General Secretary Andropov first wanted to express his personal appreciation for the respect manifested by the United States toward the Soviet Union on this sad occasion of the death of President Leonid I. Brezhnev as indicated by the high rank of the delegation dispatched to Moscow by the United States.

Andropov said that the recent remarks by President Reagan to the effect that he wanted to conduct a policy of improving Soviet/American relations had not gone unnoticed on the Soviet side, and he wanted to add that the intentions of the Soviet leadership were certainly analogous. At the recent Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and at today’s solemn ceremony, he had already had occasion to state that the principled policy of the Soviet leadership would remain unchanged and as consistent as it had been during the life of Leonid I. Brezhnev. In this connection he wanted to say that this consistent policy of the Soviet Union toward the U.S. had been and would continue to be based on equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Above all it would be a policy aimed at peaceful development of relations. He would not conceal the fact that the relations between our two countries today were quite complex. However, it was not the Soviet side which had dealt with the other as an adversary. Moreover, the Soviet Union invariably and consistently displayed restraint in the face of unfriendly and at times openly hostile remarks and steps on the U.S. side. Displaying such restraint, the Soviet Union was not doing it because it was unsure of its strength. The U.S. side or anyone else for that matter should have no illusions on this score. The Soviet leadership acted in this fashion because it believed that such a policy was sensible and that to act otherwise would hold no promise.

Andropov wanted to draw the attention of the U.S. side to the fact that due to U.S. actions, at present almost the entire stock of stability between the two countries, which had been built up over the years, had been carelessly squandered. This was true of almost the entire reserve of stability which served to insure both sides against unpleasant surprises. He thought that both sides clearly understood that if such an erosion of the productive layer of Soviet/American relations were allowed to continue, there would be no guarantee that this would not bring the sides to catastrophe. He therefore believed that the urgent task today was to put an end to this process. He understood, of course, that matters could not be helped simply by verbal promises, but it was surely a fact, and he would like the Vice President to understand him correctly, that it would be desirable for our two countries to halt further

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2 Presumably a reference to Reagan’s November 11 remarks; see Document 233.
spirals in the arms race and to reach agreement at the current negotia-
tions on European and nuclear arms on a mutually agreeable basis
that would not prejudice the interests of either side and would be
based on strict adherence to the principle of equality and equal security.
Of course, there really was no other way out of the present predicament,
because if the arms build up continues, the U.S. side would build up,
the Soviet side would build up too, and one might well ask where this
would lead in the end and what would be the end result. After all, all
present here today were certainly experienced and sophisticated peo-
ple, and he was sure that his friend A.A. Gromyko shared his views
in saying that it would be completely impossible for either side to
believe that it could come to any negotiation with proposals that were
unacceptable to the other side. This applied to both sides. Of course,
the two sides could engage in debate and even sometimes scold each
other in the press or in some other forum, but when it came to specific
matters it was absolutely necessary to act as sober-minded and normal
people. There was no way of evading this requirement. Andropov
noted that at present there was insufficient trust between the two sides,
i.e. trust on the part of the Soviet Union as well as on the part of the
United States, but the Vice President should understand that this was
so because universally accepted standards of conduct had been violated
and attempts had been undertaken to interfere in the internal affairs
of the other side. The Soviet leadership resolutely rejected such a policy
of dictating one’s own standards to the other side. No one had the
right to do so or to dictate what the other side could or could not do.

He wanted to point out that the entire Soviet leadership had been
and continued to be in favor of an active and businesslike dialogue
between our two countries with respect to matters of mutual interest
and questions that required businesslike discussion. There were cer-
tainly many such questions and the Soviet Union was in favor of
broadening the range of problems discussed in negotiations and
exchanging views in a direct dialogue in order to give such negotiations
specific content and to insure that they would result in developing
good and stable relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States. Such relations would certainly be conducive to a far more
healthy international atmosphere than existed today.

Andropov apologized to Mr. Bush for raising these questions on
this, not the most auspicious occasion, realizing that, after all, he and
Secretary Shultz had come to Moscow to express his condolences and
sympathy to the Soviet Union at this moment of grief. However, the
Soviet leadership wanted to have good relations in fact, and he would
appreciate this being conveyed to President Reagan. Naturally, these
relations had to be based on equality without prejudice to the interests
of either country. He was well aware of the fact that Secretary Shultz
and his friend Gromyko were used to this kind of dialogue because they were battle-hardened men, but he had felt that this first meeting between Mr. Bush and himself, even on this sad occasion, should be used as an opportunity to express these views.

Andropov thought that if this brief speech of his could contribute to improvement of relations between us, this meeting would have been well worthwhile. In conclusion he would ask the Vice President to convey the views expressed to President Reagan and to express to him best wishes on behalf of the entire Soviet leadership, wishes for continued success and good health. He also asked Bush to convey to the President the gratitude of the Soviet leadership for the condolences he had expressed on this sad occasion of the passing of L.I. Brezhnev, in particular when he had visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

Vice President Bush first wanted to express officially the condolences we had come here to express and to tender to Andropov and his colleagues our thanks for the extraordinary courtesies extended to us not only here but also in Washington by Ambassador Dobrynin.

Andropov interrupted to repeat his thanks for these condolences, and also for the condolences in writing which President Reagan had conveyed in Washington.³

Vice President Bush said he felt that he knew Andropov and that he was delighted to meet him at this table. He thought the two of them had a somewhat similar background. When Bill Clark had become the head of the National Security Council Bush had invited Ambassador Dobrynin to his home for the purpose of meeting Clark. He had asked Dobrynin to be as frank with us as Andropov had been today. In the same spirit of frankness we could, even on this sad occasion, as he had done with Dobrynin, detail some of the problems of deep concern to us, such as Afghanistan, Poland, and human rights from the standpoint of international norms, and one or two others. He could assure the General Secretary that we did not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of others but had to say that the American people felt strongly about these issues. We were committed, under this President, to maintaining the strength of our military forces, at a level adequate for our security, but we are not interested in an arms race. We shared the commitment which seemed to be expressed here regarding the need to have fruitful talks, but we believe that, in the arms control field, these must be based on verifiable agreements which provide for real reduction in arms. The Vice President said that the President is deadly serious on this issue.

³ See Document 233.
Bush said that he had noted some contentious areas of deep concern to us, areas where we hoped change would be possible on the Soviet side. He could assure Andropov that we would respond positively to any positive changes. He could not agree more that the objective of our negotiations had to be preservation of peace and stability. Andropov had said that the Soviet Union had acted with restraint in the face of what it considered to be hostile actions. Time did not allow Bush to develop this theme, to rebut Andropov’s contentions, or to detail our list of Soviet actions which we considered hostile. Still, if both sides felt it was possible to make progress, it was an important fact. The Vice President said he had noted the young men who had marched in the parade at today’s ceremony. He himself had four sons and of course could not help but hope that the negotiations in Geneva would bear fruit. The Vice President appreciated Andropov’s taking time to meet with us and wanted to wish him well on his accession to great new responsibilities. We were ready to do our part.

Andropov thanked the Vice President and the Secretary for this meeting and once again for the goodwill manifested in coming here to share the grief of the Soviet people. He did not believe it necessary to go into the details of the questions each of them had raised today, but of course these problems did exist and they should be understood from a correct perspective. At present the US side had its own understanding of these matters, as did the Soviet side. It was therefore necessary to sit down and talk and resolve the differences between us, but this was not the occasion to do so. He would therefore once again thank the Vice President for the views he had expressed, and would ask him once again to convey his best regards to President Reagan and assure the President that the most sincere wish of the Soviet leadership was to improve and strengthen the relations between the Soviet Union and the U.S., since this would be in the interests of not only our two countries, but in fact of all mankind.
235. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 15, 1982, 1848Z

13793. Pass Secretary’s party only from Hartman. Subject: Meeting With Andropov.

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. Following is a fairly full account (to be compared with Krimer’s notes) of the half-hour meeting with Andropov held between 4:30 and 5:00 p.m. on November 15, 1982. Those present on the Soviet side were: General Secretary Andropov, Foreign Minister Gromyko, Foreign Policy Politburo Aide Alexandrov and Interpreter Viktor Sukhodrov. On the U.S. side were: Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Ambassador Hartman, Interpreter Bill Krimer. The meeting took place in one of the state reception rooms of the old Kremlin Palace. After an exchange of handshakes, greetings and some photography, each group sat on the opposite side of a long table.

3. Andropov read from a prepared text with some extemporaneous interpolations to amplify his own thinking. He began by expressing the appreciation of himself and his colleagues and the Soviet people for the expressions of condolences from the American people and particularly for the mark of respect by the American people in sending such a distinguished delegation. He said that it had not gone unnoticed that President Reagan had said that it was our policy to work toward improved relations. He said, “We have taken note of this statement and can say to you that our intentions are analogous.” Andropov continued that he had already had the occasion to state in the Central Committee meeting and at today’s ceremonies that the new leadership’s line will be the same as under President Brezhnev. The Soviet Union has had a consistent and principled policy and they are following the line of equality, non-interference and the seeking of peaceful relations. But, he went on, “sin will out.” It is fair to say that our U.S.-Soviet relations are in a complex condition. It was not the Soviets, he said, who took the initiative to worsen relations. In fact, the Soviets displayed great restraint in the face of what has appeared at times to be provocation. We have exercised this restraint not because we are unsure of ourselves or weak, but because we believe confrontation is senseless and won’t get anywhere.

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1 Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N820009–0209. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Stadis.
4. Andropov went on to say that he would like to draw the attention of his American guests to the fact that it was due to U.S. actions that “We have almost fully squandered agreements that insured us against surprises.” He said that if this erosion of the productive layer of our relations should continue, he was sure it would lead to catastrophe and it was, therefore, necessary to rebuild our relations.

5. Andropov went on to say that he understood we could not just pledge in words, but instead we must find ways to show by deeds how we can stop the arms race and reach agreements on strategic weapons and intermediate missiles in Europe that will be mutually acceptable and based on the principles of equality and equal security. He then interpolated and said that there is no other way; “If we continue, you will continue the arms build up, and we will, and where will it all end? We all have sufficient experience and sophistication. Gromyko and Shultz understand these things well. It would be a mistake on both sides if either one comes in with a position which is so different that negotiation becomes impossible.” He then added to the text that we can always debate and quarrel with each other in the press, but in the end we must talk to each other in a sober-minded and normal way. He said, “There is a true lack, and we must admit this, of mutual trust. Confidence has been undermined primarily because acceptable standards have not been followed. You have been interfering in the internal affairs, and teaching others to do so, of other states. No one has the right to impose his standards or to dictate his policy view of the world.” He then went on to point out that Soviet leaders were dedicated to a broad, active dialogue between us and, indeed, between all countries. He made an appeal for business-like discussions that would broaden the range of contacts between us. He called for exchanges, negotiation and consultation. He said it was important to give practical content to our relationship and that he hoped this would lead to good and stable relations. He said the result would heal this bad climate.

6. He then added at the end of his statement that he trusted we would excuse his raising these frank points on perhaps not the most auspicious occasion, “when you have shown such good will by coming to express sympathy with us. But,” he said, “I felt it was important that I should take this occasion to express to you directly so that you could pass on this expression to your President, which is the feeling for the mood of our leaders and people. We want good relations. We want the best relations, but these always must be based on real rights and interests.” With his only spark of humor in the conversation, he said that Shultz and Gromyko were probably steeled to exchanging harsh words, but looking at Vice President Bush, he said, “we are men of peace and, therefore, it is important that we express our thoughts
frankly to one another.” He said he felt it was important that he should express his thoughts and hoped that his “little speech” would have a good effect.

7. He again extended the wishes of the leadership for the success and health of President Reagan and, once again, expressed his thanks for the condolences and, most particularly, for the President’s personal visit to the Soviet Embassy.

8. The Vice President once again expressed his condolences and those of the President and said that he and the Secretary very much appreciated the courtesies that had been extended both here and in Washington. He said, with a smile, that he felt he really knew Mr. Andropov quite well since in the past they had shared some of the same tasks. He said, “Hopefully, this gives a basis on which to have a discussion.” The Vice President said that when Bill Clark took over his new functions, he had invited Ambassador Dobrynin to his house for dinner. In the conversation that evening, the Vice President asked Dobrynin to be frank in saying what disturbed him about American policy and that he would be equally frank in telling Dobrynin what was wrong from the U.S. point of view with Soviet policy. He said he recognized that there was not time to go into great detail on these matters today, but that he had listed for Ambassador Dobrynin Afghanistan, Poland, the treatment of human rights issues according to international norms and several other important issues. He said we had no intent to interfere in the internal affairs of others, but we feel very strongly about these issues. “We are committed to maintaining our military strength at a level adequate for our security, but we are not interested in an arms race. We believe we share a commitment for the need for fruitful talks, but we believe these must be, in the arms control field, based on verifiable agreements which provide for real reductions in arms. The Vice President said that the President is deadly serious on this issue. “We have cited some areas where we think change is possible and we will respond positively to any positive change. We believe in the objective of discussions and peace through negotiations. You have said that you have acted with restraint in the face of what you think have been hostile actions. Time doesn’t allow me to develop these points or to rebut your contentions, and I suppose we could add our own list, but we feel it’s possible to make progress.”

9. The Vice President ended by saying that no one could help but be moved by the sight of those young men on Red Square today. He said he had four sons and these thoughts stress for him the need for the Geneva negotiations to bear fruit. The Vice President ended by thanking the General Secretary and expressing once again our readiness to do our part.

10. Andropov ended by thanking the Vice President once again, saying that he hoped ways would be found to continue discussions
and get into details. He said, "You have your perspective and we have ours. It’s necessary to sit down and talk. We can’t do it now, but we should find ways to do this." He asked to have his greetings sent once again to President Reagan and his assurance that the whole Soviet leadership wished to strengthen our relations.

11. Comment: Andropov appeared to me to be more fit, although quite stooped, than he had at the November 7 reception, and this despite all his strenuous activities of the past few days. Andropov is clearly in charge. With no title except General Secretary and perhaps chairman of the funeral committee, he received the most senior delegation heads. There were a number of signs of special gesture toward the United States and although his words had a tough ring, they were said with an openness and directness that had a certain appeal. For the first time in years, the Soviet Union appears to have firm, dynamic, but tough leadership. Andropov did not appear to me to sound or act as though the mantle of power had just descended on his shoulders. He talked as though he has been exercising power for some time and that he has reached some understanding with his colleagues so that they accept his position as leader. One interesting footnote was the presence of Alexandrov, who was Brezhnev’s foreign policy advisor. I had seen him the other day at the reception and found him weighed down with the cares of office and perhaps worries about his boss’s health. Today he was almost glowing as he carefully noted any additions which his new leader made to the statement which he had obviously prepared. Gromyko too appeared at ease with Andropov, although he wore his serious face with his mouth very carefully tilted downward, which always indicates that the news being given is not all pleasant tidings.

12. It will be interesting to compare notes with the Germans, for example, who saw him just after us, to see if there are any special messages for Europe as distinct from the U.S.

13. When you have Secretary-approved text, Vice President asked to have copy sent to his party.

Hartman
November 15, 1982, 1903Z

SECTO 15021. Subject: Moscow Trip: Visit to Pentecostalist Families in Embassy for the President.

1. Confidential—Entire text.
2. Just before leaving for the airport following our meeting with Andropov, George and Barbara Bush and I had the sad and sobering experience of meeting with the six Pentecostalist family members living in our Moscow Embassy. As you know, we have been giving the Pentecostalists refuge since June 1978 because the Soviets insist they must return to Siberia before their emigration applications will be considered. They wish to leave the Soviet Union directly because their previous applications have brought them only persecution.

3. The six family members seemed touched by our unexpected visit. It gave them the chance to give us the letters they had prepared to send us on the occasion of our stay in Moscow, and they were generous in their praise of U.S. help and our efforts to help them emigrate. During our chat, George and I expressed the hope that the time will soon come when they can leave and be free to practice their religion as they wish, without encouraging unrealistic expectations on their part.

4. We did not publicize the visit beforehand, but it did come on the heels of our talk with Andropov, and I doubt the Soviets will miss the clear signal of your deep commitment to the cause of human rights in the USSR.

Shultz

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237. Message From Vice President Bush to President Reagan

November 15, 1982, 2000Z

SUBJECT
My Visit to Moscow

1. Mr. President, George Shultz will brief you verbally on our Moscow visit, but I wanted to pass along a couple of thoughts.

2. I am glad you sent us. The Soviets clearly appreciated the gesture and shared their appreciation in several ways.

3. By way of example: George Shultz and I walked to the receiving hall. Took off our coats, and went to the rear of the line. When we were halfway up the stairs walking along with the likes of President Zia, Prime Minister Suzuki and many more, a Soviet protocol officer pushed through the crowd on the stairs and told us to come forward. Reluctantly we obliged, being led obtusely past all the waiting dignitaries. We were installed at the head of the line just in front of Prime Minister Trudeau. This was all done in front of a large TV camera pool. We then greeted Andropov, Tikinov, and Gromyko, all of whom thanked us profusely for coming and asking that we convey their sincere thanks to you.

4. There were other little gestures, but the major event was our meeting at 4:30 p.m. with Andropov and Gromyko. Soviet watchers were amazed that Andropov received us.

5. I will not report here on the conversation. A verbatim report is being prepared, but since this was the first known visit with Andropov by Americans, let me convey some impressions.

6. He seemed sure of himself. He read his three-page brief but with ease and self-assurance.

7. He conveyed strength, but not in a bellicose way.

8. He dished it out, but did not flinch as I mentioned Poland, Afghanistan, and human rights.

9. He smiled and seemed genuinely warm when I made joking reference to his having been KGB chief while I was head of CIA.

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2 See Document 234.
10. It is of course too early to predict how things will evolve in Moscow, but for some reason I feel up-beat. Opportunity may well lie ahead, though much of the rhetoric was predictable and accusatory.

11. I am writing this cable as we fly Moscow to Frankfurt—a Soviet navigator up front in the cockpit; the impressions of Red Square and the pageantry of Brezhnev’s funeral fresh in my mind.

12. We were very close to the front. When the goose-stepping, arm-swinging, elite guard marched in I at first saw only hostile troops and hostile power. We had a little wait and I watched the changing of the guard and looked at the faces and then I saw my sons and yours: George, Jeb, Neil, Marvin, Mike and Ron.

13. I saw a funeral without tears, save for the immediate family. I saw a funeral without God and thought “how sad—how lonely.”

14. I can’t speak for George Shultz with whom it was a total joy sharing these responsibilities, but let me say two things now: First, thanks for sending us on an unforgettable mission. Second: we must succeed in our quest for peace.

15. Now back to Africa. Warm regards,

George

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238. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, November 17, 1982

SUBJECT

Background Paper for Your Thursday Meeting with Shultz and Weinberger²

It is much too early to tell which way Andropov will direct Soviet policies. He is by instinct and experience a policeman; there is nothing in his background to indicate any liberal tendencies. Indeed, compared to him, his defeated rival, Chernenko, is almost a moderate. However, Andropov faces immense problems and his decisions may be inspired

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² November 18. No minutes of the conversation were found.
less by what he wants to do than by what he must do. I believe that
the following are his immediate goals:

—To restore in the USSR a sense of strong leadership which has
been missing for a year: in this respect, Western conciliatory moves
over the past week have been very helpful and are appreciated by him.

—To stem the psychological onslaught on the USSR and Communism
launched by President Reagan, and, in particular, to put an end
to the idea that the West has any leverage inside the USSR over the
economic or political actions of the Soviet Government. (Note that in his
talk with Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz the “most forceful”
presentation concerned “interference in internal Soviet affairs”. They
are hurting from our economic and “democratization” offensives.)

—To stop or at least reduce internal corruption and consumerism
which makes it difficult to control the population.

—To derail the U.S. defense programs which face the Soviet leadership
with formidable technical and budgetary problems.

—To repress and isolate the dissident movement in the USSR.

These priorities are fairly clear. What Andropov may do beyond
that remains to be seen. In particular, his views on economic reform
are unknown—it is quite uncertain whether he will turn toward greater
self-reliance and harsh punitive measures to improve productivity, or,
on the contrary, take the path of moderate reform and rely on incentives.

A good case can be made that we have gone as far as we should
for the time being in our good-will gestures toward the man, and ought
now to await further significant conciliatory gestures from Moscow.

239. Note From Stanley Moskowitz of the National Intelligence
Directorate to Director of Central Intelligence Casey¹

Washington, November 17, 1982

Tom Simons gave me an oral brief on the Vice President and
Secretary’s meeting with Andropov:

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence,
Job 84B00049R: Subject Files (1981–1982), Box 14, Folder 341: DCI/DDCI Meeting With
Secretary of State Shultz 19NOV82. Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Gates. Printed from an
uninitialed copy.
Andropov read from a script but he did not slavishly follow it. He was at ease with the material.

Simons (or the VP) characterized Andropov as unyielding on substance, but “positive” and procedurally inviting”.

Andropov started by expressing appreciation for the respect we showed Brezhnev and the rank of our delegation.

He said that the President’s statements about desiring better relations had not gone unnoticed.

The USSR desired the peaceful development of relations. The international situation was complex. The USSR was showing restraint, but the US should be under no illusion regarding its strength.

US actions have squandered the reserve of good will from the detente period. It’s important to maintain stability in US–USSR relations.

Erosion in relations should not be allowed to continue.

More than verbal promises are needed to improve relations.

It is desirable to halt the arms race spiral in a way that won’t prejudice either side’s interests, and on the basis of equality, non-interference and mutual advantage.

Both sides should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other. We have different standards, (for internal behavior, presumably) and they should be respected. (Simons said that Andropov showed the most passion on the question of non-interference in internal affairs.)

To me, from the brief run-down, the most interesting aspect is Andropov’s raising the question of interference. The Soviets are enormously sensitive on this subject, and they have gotten the message from the President’s democratization effort. That’s not surprising. What is surprising is that Andropov would be so clearly willing to express their sensitivity and—we might guess, their vulnerability—on this issue. We have not heard the last of this, particularly as we move ahead on Soviet minorities programs, etc.

Simons told me that it may be a while before a Memcon is finally approved. Apparently there is some back and forth with Ambassador Hartman on what to say in the memorandum about the Vice President’s remarks. I got the impression that the Vice President may have misspoken, but that is only conjecture. I would guess that there is probably some sensitivity, particularly at the NSC over the Vice President’s fairly positive remarks in Moscow. Note that he had described Brezhnev as a prominent world “leader”. The word leader had been explicitly changed to “figure” in the official letter of condolence.
240. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon) to the Deputy Director for Intelligence (Gates)¹

Washington, November 19, 1982

SUBJECT
Secretary Shultz’s Comments Regarding His Meeting with Yuri Andropov

1. Shultz said Andropov introduced and “dismissed” the other key Soviet officials and evidenced himself as being very much in charge as he spoke at Brezhnev’s funeral. He appeared adroit—with the facility to react at a moment’s notice. The Secretary had the feeling that Andropov could escalate a situation very quickly and “take us on.”

2. Shultz said that Andropov was very good at disinformation and misrepresented the context of Andropov’s meeting with the Americans when he spoke to the Germans a few hours later. Shultz said the Americans met Andropov at 10:00 a.m. and the Germans at 5:30 p.m. During the conversation with the Americans he appeared in a friendly manner. However, with the Germans, according to the information reaching Shultz, the tone was threatening; he read from a script; and laid it on the line to the Germans on how he saw things.

3. Shultz said Andropov showed that he understood some English. When Vice President Bush was speaking he evidenced an understanding of what he was saying. Parenthetically Shultz said that Dobrynin claims that Andropov understands English but he never heard him speak it and he certainly never spoke it to Dobrynin.

4. Andropov seemed vigorous, complexion somewhat pale but eyes steely—basically a quiet, unrevealing expression as compared to Gromyko who was very expressive facially. Shultz noted that the Americans had a meeting with Andropov shortly after he shook some 2,000 hands but he still had a great deal of energy about him. He apparently has a very easy and relaxed relationship with Gromyko and the two occasionally whispered and laughed between them. It was obvious to Shultz that Gromyko was on excellent terms with Andropov. At one point when the Vice President spoke of himself and Andropov having had the same jobs in intelligence, Andropov replied, “yes, we are men of peace but they (referring to Gromyko and Shultz) are the men of problems.”

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: Executive Director and Executive Registry Files (1982), Box 20, Folder 3, L–205A McMahon Grams. Secret.
5. The Secretary said there was no question in his mind but that Andropov was completely in charge—nothing collective about the situation at all. It also appeared obvious that he has been running things for some time and not just grabbing the baton upon the death of Brezhnev.

John N. McMahon

241. Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)\(^1\)

Washington, November 22, 1982

I had a very interesting lunch today with Cyrus Vance and his family, who were here for the unveiling of his portrait. George Shultz was unable to be present at the lunch, although he was present just before lunch and was there again for the unveiling. It gave me an opportunity to have some impression of Vance’s personality. He came through as stronger than I had been led to believe by the media, but at the same time, he did not seem as multi-faceted as I suspected that he might be. He is very much a public person—a slow, deliberate, balanced figure on all occasions. I see in him, deeply etched, the senior Wall Street corporate partner, as well as the experienced man of foreign affairs. I liked him very much, as I gather all people who have dealt with him have liked him.

We had a long meeting this afternoon at 6 o’clock concerning a question involving negotiations with the union over senior Foreign Service performance pay. What was interesting about it was not the details about bonus systems but rather the Secretary’s great interest in improving the management of the Department. An entire hour was spent on the subject, and the Secretary probed very deeply into the way in which bonus systems work and should work.

Somewhat earlier, at 5:15, we had a meeting called a Pre-Brief for a lunch that the Secretary is having tomorrow with Soviet Ambassador

Dobrynin.² It quickly turned into a discussion of what our policy toward the Soviet Union should be in this period of change just after General Secretary Andropov has come to power. Obviously everyone fears that the public euphoria over a possible looser situation in the Soviet Union will lead us toward short-sighted measures. One element in this appears to be Andropov’s willingness, perhaps a result of his experience with disinformation as the head of the KGB, to try to manipulate U.S. opinion and the opinion of other countries through planted messages and signals.

For example, William Verity, the head of the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission, came back with what he thought was a message, which was a series of Soviet suggestions that they were ready for a summit. They were interested in whether he would be speaking to the President. This led Verity into great enthusiasm, apparently, about the prospects of a move toward detente and greatly expanded U.S. commercial relations with the Soviet Union.

Similarly, it is quite apparent that Andropov distorted the conversation that he had with Vice President Bush in a subsequent conversation with President Carstens of West Germany. Essentially Andropov told Carstens that Bush had linked Soviet policy in Afghanistan and Poland to our position on the missile deployments in Europe. Quite to the contrary, Bush had simply made the point that our relationship with the Soviet Union would depend upon the actual actions that the Soviet Union took. Our position is that we believe the missile deployments are needed to offset the effects of the Soviet SS–20. Obviously Andropov is trying either to browbeat the Germans or to find some formula by which he could eliminate the threat of new U.S. missile deployments without in any way affecting the existing Russian SS–20 deployments.

I am dictating this on the way home en route to pick up Marcia for a black tie dinner being given for us by Ambassador and Mrs. Jacovides of the Cyprus Embassy.

² In a note he dictated on November 23, Dam added: “The Secretary met with Ambassador Dobrynin today. The meeting was the result of a conversation at a reception that the Secretary and Dobrynin had several weeks ago, but the actual date was not set until after the Secretary returned from the Brezhnev funeral. I would suspect that the fact of the lunch will get a considerable amount of press play. I heard some of the debriefing of the Secretary by the staff. Apparently it was a business-like lunch which might lead to closer contacts and more comprehensive discussion, but nothing at all definitive came out of it. It seems likely that the Secretary and Dobrynin will not meet again until close to Christmas because of the Secretary’s travel schedule, and the meeting may not even occur then because of Dobrynin’s return at Christmas to the Soviet Union.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)
242. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan

Washington, November 22, 1982

SUBJECT

Report on Visit with Ambassadors Nitze, Rowny and Ellis, [1 line not declassified]

1. Our arms control negotiators in START and INF see the Soviet delegations as stonewalling with Moscow likely, at some time soon in INF, to put out an unacceptable but publicly appealing offer and then launch a propaganda barrage to blame American inflexibility for failure of the negotiations.

2. They are insisting that aircraft must be included, UK and French systems must be taken into account, and there should be no restraints on Soviet Far Eastern deployment. Soviet attempts to introduce aircraft in the negotiations are aimed at emasculating US support for its allies; there can be no compensation for UK and French systems; and if SS–20s were moved to the Far East, they could be easily moved back.

3. Nitze speculates that the new Soviet proposal would likely call for 200 intermediate range missiles on each side, including UK and French systems, and 100 bombers. The Soviets now have 200 SS–20s west of the crest of the Urals, thus they could dismantle their obsolete SS–4s and 5s and not have to destroy a single SS–20. Obsolete badgers and blinders could be moved or destroyed, and excess Backfire could be moved east of the Urals. We should be prepared for a leak or other announcement of this proposal.

4. To deal with this we need full consultation with the Allies at each step in the negotiations in order to present a united front against the anticipated Soviet campaign. If the US is going to ask for on-site inspection the Allies must be consulted in advance because they have their own laws to contend with. The Allies are well aware of what the Soviets are up to.

5. It is most likely that the Soviets are readying a full propaganda campaign to discredit the US proposal. To counter this, we need a public information campaign reiterating our position, laying out the issues and the negotiating record frankly, the disparity in forces, etc. The President’s speech Monday provides the basis for this. Nitze urges that his confidentiality arrangement with the head of the Soviet delega-

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980–1986), Box 12, Folder 398, DCI Memo Chrono (1 Nov–31 Dec ’82). Secret. Sent through Clark, who did not initial this copy of the memorandum.
tion not be allowed to hinder higher US Government and any available Allied officials exploiting the extremity, lack of logic, and general nastiness of the Soviet Union in its INF position.

6. Fortunately, SHAPE is mounting an information program to be conducted with contingents of officers going to public meetings in Europe to explain INF issues. This should be supplemented by mobilizing US Ambassadors and other ranking officials in Europe as spokesmen. To make this effective, General Lawson, Chief of Staff, SHAPE, urged that photography be released for public inspection. I have had this issue reviewed once again and the conclusion is the same as it was in response to an asserted need for photography to support SALT II in 1979 and to support INF deployment in 1981. The threat to the protection of sources and methods outweighs the somewhat doubtful persuasive value of revealing to the public even degraded satellite imagery of selected Soviet INF hardware. The Inman-Hughes display of airplane photography of Nicaragua this spring had little if any impact on public opinion. The Kennedy photos on Cuban missiles were meaningful because they were taken from U–2 planes at an altitude of 500 feet. Our satellite photos are meaningful only to a trained interpreter. Releases will inevitably make less effective the collection of these imaging systems and trade possible, and I think unlikely, short-term political/military gains for long-term degradation of our critical information gathering capacities. Actually, there is no widespread doubt in Europe that SS–20s are there and photography doesn’t convey the spread of deployment or broad purpose. We believe that preparation of a public document with careful renderings of SS–20 facilities and equipment similar to the Secretary of Defense’s *Soviet Military Power* is the best way to develop public understanding of the Soviet developments.

7. Nitze urges that we make every effort to make a further offer, which should be complete and not piecemeal, or, if that is deemed not to be desirable, to explore all reasonable alternatives in order to provide Kohl with ammunition to win the potential political battle over deployment.

8. Substantial research and policy determinations in both INF and START are necessary as a prerequisite to this. The Soviet delegation is paranoid on cruise missiles, viewing the combination of bombers and cruise missiles—with either or both using Stealth technology—as the upcoming first strike threat. Aborting the cruise missile may be their primary objective in the current round of negotiations, as aborting ABM was in SALT I. The cruise missile may have great strategic value for us in countering a conventional move where the Soviets have logistical advantages as in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, the Soviets probably perceive less military value in the modern cruise missile for
them than for the US. They need cruise missiles less than we do; they
depend less on bombers for intercontinental missions, and they already
have a powerful ballistic missile force on land and at sea. They are
threatening us, we believe, with deployment of sea-launched cruise
missiles on submarines off the US coast—and perhaps other actions
as well—to reciprocate for our planned deployment of Pershing II in
Europe, and they may deploy cruise missiles as early as next year for
primarily political purposes. A requirement to protect against US cruise
missiles would greatly stretch their resources. So, we need a net assess-
ment of our interest in cruise missiles.

9. There are additional requirements to complete the START picture
from a monitoring/verification point of view:

—Advice is needed on how to deal with denial of flight test data.
There is a view that we need to encrypt terminal guidance telemetry
to keep the Soviets from jamming our guidance mechanisms. That will
be hard to negotiate and they can get our guidance structure from
sources other than telemetry while we can’t. So, it may be more impor-
tant to maintain access to Soviet telemetry than to deny them our
guidance data, a denial that may be temporary.

—If mobile ICBMs are permitted in START, how will they be
monitored?

—If and when cruise missiles are on the table, how will they be
dealt with to include SLCMs and conventional vs. nuclear armed
cruise missiles?

—Some of our reconstitution proposals are unverifiable, how are
they to be handled?

—The warhead counting rules also contain monitoring and verifi-
cation problems.

10. Ambassador Ellis at the Special Consultative Committee has
two issues of concern to him, the ABM Treaty review and the SS–16
issue. He expressed dismay with the attitude of holding the ABM
Treaty review hostage to resolution of other issues. He pointed out
that the Soviets are building a good case for a presentation on poor
US performance towards the Treaty review. The Soviets have already
told him twice that they thought the US was stalling on beginning the
review. This would strengthen a Soviet claim that the US is stalling in
START and INF. Ellis has detailed instructions on how to conduct the
Treaty review and wants a firm determination that he can carry out
that review in a business-like way. He emphasized that we can amend
the ABM Treaty at any time to take account of future US plans regarding
MX and BMD. On the SS–16 issue, Ellis urged that we should carefully
consider how we return to the issue before any precipitous action. He
believes that it is not wise to tell the Soviets directly that satisfactory
resolution of the SS–16 issue is an official precondition to the beginning of the ABM Treaty review. He thinks it was correct to bring the issue up, but that we should realize that we may not get any further response from them.

William J. Casey

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2 Casey signed W.J. Casey above his typed signature.

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243. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)

Washington, November 24, 1982

SUBJECT

Analysis of Andropov’s Speech of November 22, 1982

The Department of State has sent the attached analysis (Tab I) of Andropov’s address of November 22. The turgid document concludes that “the speech does not reveal any shift in specific Soviet policies or in Moscow’s overall approach to East-West relations”. This is true as far as it goes except that there are in the speech some interesting nuances which deserve notice:

—The emphasis is on the need for economic reform, with strong hints it should follow the Hungarian model.

—The emphasis on Soviet relations with Asian countries (China and India, above all) which suggests a possible drive to attain detente in Asia in order to be better able to face the American “threat”.

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Attachment

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Bremer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)\(^2\)

Washington, November 23, 1982

SUBJECT

Andropov’s Plenum Speech—Foreign Policy Aspects

Andropov’s speech at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee November 22 is a shrewd effort to capitalize on the positive atmosphere and rising international expectations surrounding the succession. The speech also provided him an opportunity to put his own personal stamp on the tone, if not yet the substance, of post-Brezhnev Soviet foreign policy.

The essence of this new tone is to convey a greater sense of Soviet flexibility and reasonableness through verbal moderation, without making any concessions on substantive issues. By so doing, Andropov intends to reassure his domestic constituencies of the continuity of Soviet foreign policy; provide further momentum to an improvement in Moscow’s relations with the Third World, China and Western Europe; and place the U.S. on the defensive, thus maneuvering Washington closer to an arms control-centered relationship similar to detente.

Andropov begins his speech by reassuring the CPSU, the Soviet military, and the USSR’s allies and friends that Soviet foreign policy will continue to pursue the line set out by his predecessor; that the Soviet armed forces will continue to receive “everything necessary;” and that Moscow will vigorously pursue development of relations with like-minded Socialist nations. Following up on the fence-mending begun during the Brezhnev funeral, Andropov then makes a direct appeal for improvement of Soviet relations with “our great neighbor” China, the Third World (with special mention of India), and Western Europe.

The most striking element of the speech, however, is an explicit call for return to the detente relationship of the 1970s, centering on arms control negotiations with the United States and Western Europe. Declaring that “the future belongs to this policy,” Andropov calls for a relationship based on “reciprocity and equality,” explicitly rejecting

\(^2\) Confidential.
linkage between normal U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations and “some sort of preliminary concessions in different fields.” By avoiding direct criticism of the U.S. by name or direct mention of regional issues such as Afghanistan, Poland and Kampuchea, Andropov conveys moderation to West European ears and relegates Soviet international behavior to a category beyond serious mention.

In this way, he sets the stage to emphasize the issue which he wishes to be the litmus test of East-West relations: arms control. On this issue, he takes care to strike a measured and moderate tone, asserting that the Soviets want neither “the dispute of ideas to grow into a confrontation of states” nor “arms . . . to become a gauge of the potentials of social systems.” He stresses a desire for both nuclear and conventional arms negotiations and implicitly criticizes the U.S. position by condemning “talks for the sake of talks” and mere restatements of existing differences. He refrains, however, from the sort of explicit criticism of U.S. motives and proposals that other Soviet spokesmen have advanced in recent weeks. Several times he says that any agreement must reflect “the interests of both sides,” but quickly qualifies this with the warning that no one should expect unilateral disarmament from the USSR. He concludes by repeating Brezhnev’s call for a freeze on strategic arsenals as a first step to a START agreement.

The speech does not reveal any shift in specific Soviet policies or in Moscow’s overall approach to East-West relations. It does, however, represent a tactical refinement in the way the new leadership intends to pursue familiar objectives. Many of these tactical adjustments were evident during the last year of the Brezhnev period—and may indeed have been inspired by the Andropov ascendancy then taking place—but we can expect them to be accelerated now that Andropov has taken over in his own right. Thus, the playing up of potential U.S.-European differences on East-West relations and the encouragement of the Western nuclear freeze movement may now be reinforced by a more direct appeal to the nostalgia for detente. This may be supported by an attempt to subordinate regional issues, and thus linkage, by muting the rhetorical battle over these issues. The Soviets also may hope to dissipate international resistance to their goals in Afghanistan, Poland and Kampuchea by talking compromise and openly courting the nations (China, Pakistan, the West Europeans) whose support we need to maintain pressure for Soviet concessions. The new leadership probably hopes, in turn, that all these developments will increase pressures on Washington to reduce its demands for an overall bilateral improvement and to acquiesce in Moscow’s desire to place arms control at the center of U.S.-Soviet relations.

L. Paul Bremer, III
244. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Soviet Central Committee and Supreme Soviet Meetings—Domestic Aspects

Leadership Developments

The Central Committee met in plenary session on November 22, and three changes in the leadership were announced. As expected, Andrey Kirilenko was dropped from the Politburo, ostensibly for reasons of health. Geydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s party chief, was named to full membership in the Politburo. Aliyev has long been considered a supporter of Konstantin Chernenko, Andropov’s primary rival in the succession struggle. However, the intelligence community now believes that Aliyev’s associations with Andropov may be even closer, since Aliyev was a KGB man before he gained the top Party spot in Azerbaijan in 1969. Aliyev may thus represent a compromise choice suitable to both Chernenko and Andropov supporters.

Central Committee member Nikolay Ryzhkov was named to replace Kirilenko as one of the Central Committee Secretaries. It is not known what responsibilities Ryzhkov will assume, although his background is in heavy industry. It should be noted also that 83-year-old Politburo member Arvid Pel’she did show up at the plenum, thus scotching reports he had died during Brezhnev’s funeral. The total voting membership of the Politburo now stands at twelve, which is a little low, historically. If Andropov already has a working majority, keeping the Politburo small may suit his interests, at least until he can move his own men up through the ranks and into the Politburo. It may also indicate, however, that there is still disagreement within the Politburo over who to promote to bring the voting membership up to its more normal level of 13–14 persons.

At the November 23 meeting of the Supreme Soviet, Andropov was elected to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Gromyko and Chernenko had been mentioned by many sources as possible alternatives to Andropov as the new Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. However, since neither of them is on the Presidium of that body, the odds are very strong now that Andropov will be elected to the Chairmanship

on November 24. If this occurs, it will mean that Andropov will have
done in the space of only a few days what it took his predecessor,
Leonid Brezhnev, nearly thirteen years to accomplish: he will simulta-
neously hold both the head of Party and head of State positions.

*Economic Policy*

Contrary to press accounts, we read Andropov’s November 22
Plenum speech on the economy as offering only slight, though possibly
revealing, shifts in nuances from recent Brezhnev pronouncements.
The new Soviet leader set out an agenda of the USSR’s mounting
economic problems, but offered only tentative glimpses of his own
preferences for dealing with them. Andropov did suggest that he will
favor the stick, rather than the carrot, as an economic stimulus. He
carefully refrained from promising miracles, confessing “I do not have
any ready recipes for solution” of the “many tasks” facing the ailing
economy. Andropov’s remarks offered a rhetorical valedictory to the
Brezhnev years, but shed only the dimmest of light on the nation’s
future path. Specifically, Andropov:

—Admitted that the economic news was bad, “emphatically” noting
that production plans had not been fulfilled over the past two
years and acknowledging the looming constraints on Soviet labor, raw
material and energy supplies;

—Acknowledged the importance of material incentives, but placed
more emphasis than his predecessor on the need for discipline in the
economy, declaring that “shoddy work, inactivity and irresponsibility
should have an immediate and unavoidable effect on the earnings,
official status and moral prestige of workers;”

—Pledged to continue Brezhnev’s commitment to improving the
living conditions of Soviet consumers, while distancing himself person-
ally by referring to it as this “question which Leonid Ilich thought
particularly important;” and

—Called for more independence for Soviet industrial managers,
particularly those who “boldly introduce new technology,” and for
importing successful managerial techniques from abroad. However,
Andropov did not embrace the cause of economic reform too tightly,
noting “it is necessary to act with caution here.”

Following Brezhnev’s practice, Andropov also included a ritual
pledge to “provide the army and the navy with everything necessary.”
Unlike his predecessor, Andropov associated his leadership colleagues
with this policy which, he averred, “the Politburo considers
compulsory.”
245. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, November 27, 1982

SUBJECT

George Shultz’s Luncheon Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on November 23, 1982

In his first meeting with George Shultz since Andropov had been named General Secretary, Dobrynin cautiously explored the ground without making any fresh promises or commitments. His instructions seem to have been to learn at first hand how far the United States was prepared to translate its friendly gestures toward the post-Brezhnev leadership into specific concessions. His main points were:

—That it might be desirable for you to meet with Andropov. George’s response to this suggestion was cool.

—That no progress was being made in the Geneva arms talks and that the negotiations might better be moved to “higher levels” (summit?). George replied that we had excellent negotiators in Geneva.

—That we were violating SALT II with your MX decision and “planning something ‘deceptive’ regarding the ABM Treaty”, which George firmly refuted.

As had been their practice in the past, the Soviet side insists on excluding from discussion all regional areas of conflict between us (Poland, Afghanistan, Central America, Angola, etc.), in order to confine negotiations with us exclusively to bilateral issues, essentially arms control and summit conferences. In this respect, Andropov’s accession to power has made no perceptive difference as yet.

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Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, November 24, 1982

SUBJECT
My Luncheon with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin November 23

As we agreed Tuesday morning, \(^3\) I told Ambassador Dobrynin that you are totally committed to maintaining US strength, but are no less serious in your willingness to work for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that the Soviets also wanted a more constructive relationship and the question was how to bring this about.

This led to a discussion of the issues, places and people involved. The issues, I said, were on the agenda which Foreign Minister Gromyko and I identified in New York—arms control, regional issues (Afghanistan, Kampuchea, etc.) and what I called “Madrid” issues (CSCE and human rights). We reviewed the various settings for US-Soviet discussions: INF and START in Geneva, MBFR in Vienna, CSCE in Madrid and the experts’ talks on non-proliferation and Southern Africa currently being arranged. I noted that if we are serious about the effort to improve relations, he and I should meet more often. Equally, as it is important for the Soviet Government that Dobrynin get a “feel” for us in high level meetings, it is also important for the United States that Ambassador Hartman have the opportunity to get a “feel” for the Soviet leadership through regular access and exchanges. Dobrynin acknowledged this point. We discussed the possibility of my meeting with Gromyko this spring, but agreed that such a meeting would depend on the progress in our relations over the next several months.

Dobrynin raised the question of whether or not “our bosses” should meet. He explained that in his last years Brezhnev could give speeches and sign documents, but not negotiate. This, however, was not the case with Andropov. He asked if there were any point to a get-acquainted meeting with you. I replied that there is no point to a meeting for the sake of a meeting. What is needed is the prospect of forward movement on problems between us. I agreed to explore the issue but basically, adhered to our previous position on the summit question.

\(^2\) Secret; Sensitive.
\(^3\) November 23.
I raised with Dobrynin the misrepresentation of what the Vice President told Andropov in Andropov’s account to the West Germans. Dobrynin said he was puzzled and could not understand what had happened, but I am sure he got the point.

There was a good deal of discussion about how to negotiate. In that context, Ambassador Dobrynin noted that the Soviets felt there had been no progress in Geneva. He said frankly that the Soviet negotiators there were totally bound by their instructions and without flexibility. He suggested that any progress on arms control would require a political impulse from higher levels. He seemed to imply that we might need another forum for the “real” negotiations. I replied that we have competent personnel in Geneva who are prepared to negotiate. It was agreed, however, that as the current round of negotiations was coming to an end, each side should review the bidding with its negotiators when they returned to their respective capitals.

Dobrynin complained that your M–X basing decision was a violation of the SALT II Treaty and also suggested that we were planning something “deceptive” regarding the ABM Treaty. I refuted Dobrynin’s allegations about SALT II and have instructed that we clarify and correct any misperceptions on the ABM issue. Dobrynin also asked where we planned to discuss the CBMs which you proposed. I noted that we considered Geneva the appropriate forum. He agreed that Geneva was appropriate for some of the measures but not for all, for example the hot line. We agreed to discuss the issue further at a later date.

We concluded that each of us would discuss the broader subject of improved relations within our governments in preparation for our next meeting. Ambassador Dobrynin conveyed the feeling that if there is some prospective movement, he was willing to do his best in support of it. On balance, I think the discussion reinforced the central message I gave on your behalf at the outset: we will remain strong, but are willing to work for more constructive relations.
EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND POLAND-RELATED SANCTIONS (U)

I have reviewed the “Summary of Conclusions” of the consultations with our Allies conducted by Secretary Shultz of which a copy is attached. This framework agreement establishes the security-minded principles that will govern East-West economic relations for the remainder of this decade and beyond. In putting these principles into practice, the Allies have committed themselves to immediate actions on the key elements of East-West trade including: agreement not to sign or approve any new contracts for the purchase of Soviet gas during the urgent study of Western energy alternatives; agreement to strengthen the effectiveness of controls on high technology transfer to the USSR, including examination of the necessity of multilateral controls on critical oil and gas equipment and technology; and agreement to harmonize export credit policies. It is my goal that firm allied commitments emerge from the studies in each of these major categories in the next few months and that the resulting common policies will be substantially agreed by the time of or before the Williamsburg Economic Summit presently scheduled for May 1983. The principal objectives of the United States during these studies are as follows: (S)

1. An agreement that countries participating in the agreement will not commit to any incremental deliveries of Soviet gas beyond the amounts contracted for from the first strand of the Siberian pipeline; not commit themselves to significant incremental deliveries through already existing pipeline capacity; and participate in the accelerated development of alternative Western energy resources, principally Norwegian gas reserves. To accomplish this objective, the U.S. should undertake intensive work with our Allies and within the IEA/OECD to encourage development of these Western alternatives and to encourage that adequate safety net measures are adopted to protect against a shutdown of Soviet gas. (S)

2. An agreement to add critical technologies and equipment to the COCOM list, harmonize national licensing procedures for COCOM, and substantially improve the coordination and effectiveness of international enforcement efforts. (S)

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3. A quick agreement that allied security interests require controls on advanced technology and equipment beyond the expanded COCOM list, including equipment in the oil and gas sector; development of a list of equipment in this category and an effective procedure to control its transfer to the Soviet Union. (S)

4. An agreement that builds on the recent OECD agreement substantially raising interest rates to the USSR to achieve further restraints on officially-backed credits such as higher downpayments, shortened maturities and an established framework to monitor this process. (S)

Preparations within the U.S. Government

The Senior Interagency Group for International Economic Policy (SIG–IEP) will be responsible for the attainment of U.S. objectives in the context of the work program and studies called for in the “Summary of Conclusions.” Interagency working groups will be established under the supervision of the SIG–IEP to develop U.S. positions and strategies for the achievement of these objectives in the four principal areas of U.S. concern. In addition, a working group will be established for an overall study of East-West economic relations in the context of political and strategic considerations. These working groups will submit for approval by the President, through the SIG–IEP, the strategies for attaining U.S. objectives and all U.S. positions for meetings with Allies. The SIG–IEP will report to the President periodically through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs the state of progress in attaining the objectives. (S)

The members of the working groups will be as follows:

Energy: International Energy Security Group, Chaired by State
COCOM High Technology: Senior Interagency Group on Transfer of Strategic Technology, Chaired by State
Credits: Treasury (Chair), NSC Staff, State, Commerce
East-West Economic Relations: State (Chair), NSC Staff, Treasury, Commerce, DOD.

Delegations to negotiate with Allies on these subjects will be chaired by a representative of the Department of State and will include representatives from the National Security Council Staff and concerned departments. (S)

Poland-related Sanctions

On the expectation of firm allied commitments in these four areas reflecting U.S. objectives emerging from the work program agreed in the “Summary of Conclusions,” I approved the cancellation of the December 30 sanctions on oil and gas equipment and technology to the Soviet Union and the June 22 amendment extending these controls to U.S. subsidiaries and licensees abroad. In addition, I have approved
the resumption of case-by-case licensing for commodities under national security controls. Sanctions imposed against the USSR following the invasion of Afghanistan remain in effect, including a presumption of denial for exports of oil and gas technology for manufacturing equipment used for exploration and production. This decision was taken because we believe that the framework agreement represented by the “Summary of Conclusions” on an enduring and unified approach to East-West economic relations in a security context represents stronger and more effective measures to advance reconciliation in Poland and addresses our vital long-term strategic and security objectives toward the USSR. (S)

Ronald Reagan

Attachment

Summary of Conclusions (U)²

Washington, undated

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

During conversations in Washington between the Secretary of State of the United States of America and representatives of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom on the subject of East-West relations, in which representatives of the EEC participated, a certain number of conclusions have been reached on behalf of the governments represented. The summary of these follows. (C)

1. They recognize the necessity of conducting their relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe on the basis of a global and comprehensive policy designed to serve their common fundamental security interests. They are particularly conscious of the need that action in the economic field be consistent with that global and comprehensive policy and thus be based on a common approach. They are resolved together to take the necessary steps to remove differences and to ensure that future decisions by their governments on these issues are taken on the basis of an analysis of the East-West relationship as a whole, with due regard for their respective interests and in a spirit of mutual trust and confidence. (S)

² Secret; Sensitive.
2. The following criteria should govern the economic dealings of their countries with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries:
   — That they will not undertake trade arrangements, or take steps, which contribute to the military or strategic advantage and capabilities of the USSR.
   — That it is not in their interest to subsidize the Soviet economy; trade should be conducted in a prudent manner without preferential treatment.
   — That it is not their purpose to engage in economic warfare against the Soviet Union. To be consistent with our broad security interests, trade with the USSR must proceed, *inter alia*, on the basis of a strict balance of advantages. (S)

   It is agreed to examine thoroughly in the appropriate bodies how to apply these criteria, taking into account the various economic and political problems involved, with the view to agreeing on a common line of action in the spirit of paragraph one and the above criteria. They will pay due attention in the course of this work to the question of how best to tailor their economic relations with Eastern European countries to the specific situation of each of them, recognizing the different political and economic conditions that prevail in each of these Eastern European countries. (S)

   The overall analysis of economic relations with the USSR and the Eastern European countries will touch in particular on the following areas:
   — Strategic goods and technology of military significance (COCOM);
   — Other high technology items;
   — Credit policy;
   — Energy;
   — Agricultural products. (S)

   In their analysis of other high technology items, it is agreed to examine immediately whether their security interests require controls, to be implemented in an agreed and appropriate manner, on the export to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of advanced technology and equipment to be jointly determined. This immediate examination of whether their security interests require controls, to be implemented in an agreed and appropriate manner, on the export to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe of advanced technology and equipment will include technology and equipment with direct applications to the oil and gas sector. (S)

   In the field of energy, they will initiate a study of their projected energy requirements and dependence upon imports over the next decade and beyond and possible means of meeting these requirements,
with particular attention being given to the European energy situation. The study will be conducted under the auspices of the OECD. (S)

3. As an immediate decision and following decisions already made, they have further agreed on the following:

(a) Building on the conclusions of the High-Level Meeting, they will work together within the framework of the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) to protect their contemporary security interests: the list of strategic items will be evaluated and, if necessary, adjusted. This objective will be pursued at the COCOM Review now under way. They will take the necessary measures to strengthen the effectiveness and responsiveness of COCOM and to enhance their national mechanisms as necessary to enforce COCOM decisions. (S)

(b) It was agreed at Versailles that the development of economic and financial relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would be subject to periodic *ex post* review. The necessary procedures for this purpose will be established without delay. Having in mind the criteria in paragraph two above, they will work urgently further to harmonize export credit policies. (S)

(c) They have informed each other that during the course of the study on energy requirements, they will not sign, or approve the signing by their companies of, new contracts with the Soviet Union for the purchase of natural gas. (S)
247. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, December 4, 1982

SUBJECT

Engaging the Soviets In a Serious Effort to Make Progress—Is Now the Time?

A number of factors justify our asking ourselves whether or not the time has come to try to engage the Soviet leadership in a serious effort to put our relationship on a more stable footing, moving—if you will—from confrontation to serious negotiations toward reaching solutions to the major areas of disagreement between us. After two years, you have established clearly that the United States has reversed course from being a nation in decline to one which has both the will and capability to defend its interests and once more, play a leading role in international affairs. Your defense modernization program has provided the solid foundation for this broader commitment. In regional issues—from Latin America to the Middle East—you have engendered the respect among the local leaders essential to checking the Soviet advance. In Europe the forthcoming multilateral effort to chart a new course in East-West economic relations promises for the first time in a decade to turn the tide of detente toward a more sober basis for limiting Soviet expansion at Allied expense.

Furthermore, problems within the Soviet Union have worsened. If our economic problems are bad, their’s are worse. As tenuous as our relations are with some allies, their problems are even more severe as Poland makes clear. Added to these are their looming problems with their ethnically diverse nationalities. To relieve their domestic economic problems it would be attractive to them to find a way to limit their expenditures on the military and although history gives us little basis for confidence or optimism in this area, it is not out of the question.

From another point of view, whether or not it makes sense for us to take an initiative, it is extremely likely that the Soviets will try some kind of initiative—probably in arms control—to put us off guard, appeal to our allies’ peace movements and further drive a wedge between us. Thus, at a minimum we must be ready to counter an anticipated propaganda ploy in the days or weeks ahead.

For my own part, I believe an initiative, conveyed through an extremely private channel, would be worthwhile. The risk is, of course,

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that they might perceive it as a sign of weakness engendered with the increasing trouble we may have in carrying your programs with the Congress and broader national uncertainty over the continued military buildup. All things considered however, they have very strong incentives for trying to reach agreement with us in some area—enough to make a try worthwhile in my judgment.

If this is true, the next question is, in what area—regional issues, arms control or human rights—should we focus our attention? The attached staff paper done for me goes into that question and concludes that the best opportunity is in arms control and specifically the INF talks in Geneva.2

If you were to conclude that an initiative of some kind is worth trying, an important question will be whether it is feasible in terms of avoiding subversion from within. This is perhaps too strong, however, it is very clear that some of your appointees—well meaning and well-grounded in history—have a very deep conviction that because past dialogues have been flawed and have damaged US interests, that we ought not try and cannot do better. I disagree. The flaws of detente in the early 70’s centered in part on the weakened ability of the US (deriving from Vietnam and Watergate) to wield the sticks as well as the carrots and in part from less than realistic understanding of Soviet/Marxist doctrine—a tendency to impute good will and western values where they don’t exist. We don’t suffer those liabilities.

But the question remains—if an initiative is worthwhile, can we put it together. It seems to me that that question, along with the possible agenda ought to be aired by your principal advisors (The Vice President, the Secretary of State, Defense, Bill Casey and perhaps others) and a recommendation given to you. If they believe that a serious effort is worth a try then we can go on to think of how to put it together. If you agree, I recommend that I convene a meeting in the Situation Room tomorrow to discuss the matter with the principals.3

Go ahead ________ Other ________

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2 Not attached.

3 An unknown hand checked the “Go ahead” line and wrote beneath it: “Mtg held 12–5–82.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan, who had been on a 5-day trip to Latin America, returned to the White House at 11:19 p.m. on December 4.
248. Editorial Note

On December 5, 1982, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs William Clark chaired an informal meeting at the White House—as he had proposed to President Ronald Reagan the previous day (see Document 247)—to consider the prospects for improvement in Soviet-American relations. No formal record of the substance of this meeting was found. Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam dictated a personal note that evening in which he reported: “I accompanied the Secretary to a meeting in the Situation Room chaired by Bill Clark. This was a Cabinet-level group with Ed Meese and Jim Baker included. The purpose was to discuss where we go from here with the Soviet Union. The outcome of the meeting was to designate me to chair a working-level group on the subject.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 8SD308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)

On December 6, Dam dictated a personal note: “At 4:30 in the afternoon I met with the working group that had been set up at the meeting yesterday. This meeting in the Situation Room involved Eagleburger, Ikle, McFarlane, General Gorman, Admiral Murphy, and Casey, who was there because McMahon was unable to come. We discussed a series of studies to be done to help determine where we should be going in our relationship with the Soviet Union over the next two years, with special reference to the next six months. The midpoint in the Reagan first term happens to coincide with the succession of Andropov to the leadership in the Soviet Union. Beyond that, we discussed how we could get in a position to decide how to respond to any sudden Soviet initiatives, either substantive or propaganda, in the near term. It was recognized that such an initiative was likely in the INF area; therefore particular attention needs to be paid to the substance of the issues in that area.” (Ibid.)

Dam chaired another meeting of his working group on December 8. In a memorandum to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane later that day, Major General Richard Boverie reported: “I attended DepSecState Dam’s meeting today on arms control. (This was the second such meeting.) Other attendees included Larry Eagleburger, Fred Ikle, Richard Perle, and Lt. Gen. Paul Gorman. The bulk of the meeting was devoted to a general discussion of the pros and cons of arms control. In brief, the highlights were: — Richard Perle noted that a case could be made that the past dozen years of arms control has been harmful to our national security (the military balance has shifted adversely, etc.). He also said that we must engage in negotiations, but that we have to determine what our objec-
tives and interests really are in such negotiations. —General Gorman said that in the past few years the Chiefs have turned 180 degrees on the issue. They now believe that arms control can be useful in capping the Soviet buildup. —Fred Ikle said that we will be facing some very difficult—perhaps insurmountable—verification problems in the future. Secretary Dam concluded the meeting by indicating that the subject for the next meeting will be cruise missiles (including verification of cruise missiles) and that the subject for the meeting following that will be verification control.” (Reagan Library, McFarlane Files, McFarlane Chron—December 1982)

249. Study Prepared by an Ad Hoc Interagency Group on U.S.-Soviet Relations

Washington, December 6, 1982

Response to NSSD 11–82: U.S. Relations With The USSR

INTRODUCTION

The record of US-Soviet relations since October, 1917, has been one of tension and hostility, interrupted by short-lived periods of cooperation. The Soviet challenge to U.S. interests has many roots, including: (1) an imperial tradition; (2) threat perceptions rooted in Russian history; and (3) the nature of the Communist regime, its internal insecurity, its superpower ambitions, and its ideologically-mandated animosity toward the United States as the “main bastion of capitalism.”

U.S. tensions with the Soviet Union have resulted in substantial measure from the unrelenting growth of Soviet military power and Moscow’s readiness to use force in ways which threaten U.S. Allies and pose a threat to the security of the United States. The U.S. has built up its military power vis-a-vis the Soviets, and has pursued a

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1 Source: National Security Council, Box SR 080 [NSSD 60–76], NSSD 75, US Relations w/USSR. Secret. Prepared in response to NSSD 11–82 (see Document 204). Sent from Bremer to Clark under cover of a December 6 memorandum: “Attached are the draft NSDD and supporting study on U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union mandated by NSSD 11–82. These papers have been approved for submission to the NSC by all participating agencies. Dissenting views on the part of the Department of Agriculture are reflected in footnotes.”
policy of containment on the periphery of the Soviet Union. Such responses are essential, and the United States must sustain the resources and the will to compete effectively with the Soviet Union. This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.

Because Soviet aggressiveness has sources in the Soviet internal system, an effective national strategy requires that U.S. policies toward that country also take into account their impact on its internal development. For example, it is inconsistent to raise the defense budget to meet the Soviet threat and at the same time allow Western economic relations with Moscow to contribute directly to the growth of Soviet military power. There is also concern among Americans about the human rights situation in the Soviet Union and the lack of individual freedom in Soviet society. This too requires that the U.S. take into account the nature of the Soviet system in formulation of policy toward the USSR.

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union proceeds on the assumption that the maintenance of power by the Soviet regime rests ultimately on force and that Soviet external aggressiveness stems in part from the nature of the Soviet political system. Therefore, the U.S. must, within the limits of its capabilities, design political, economic, and other measures which advance the long-term objective of promoting: (1) the decentralization and demilitarization of the Soviet economy; (2) the weakening of the power and privileged position of the ruling Communist elite (nomenklatura); (3) gradual democratization of the USSR.

The U.S. almost certainly lacks the capability to bring about major beneficial changes in the Soviet internal order over the near to middle term. Indeed, there is a real possibility that increased external pressure on the Soviet Union could, at least in the short run, give the ruling Communist elite greater incentive for internal repression and external aggressiveness. However, it is also possible that carefully designed and implemented U.S. policies could have an important, if marginal, beneficial impact on Soviet internal developments. This impact could grow over time if there is a sustained effort to see that U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union systematically take into account the potential impact on Soviet internal developments.

Thus, the first two tracks of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union are:

—To compete effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in the international arena, particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States.
—To undertake a coordinated, long-term effort to reduce the threat that the Soviet system poses to our interests.

There is an important third track. The U.S. must engage the Soviet Union in dialogue and negotiations to attempt to reach agreements based on strict reciprocity and mutual interest. This is particularly
important when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a process of political succession.

All three tracks of U.S. policy must be implemented simultaneously and sustained over the long term. It will be important that the West, with firm U.S. leadership, create and sustain negative and positive incentives powerful enough to influence Soviet behavior. Moscow must know that irresponsible and aggressive behavior will incur costs that would outweigh any gains. At the same time, the U.S. must make clear to the Soviets that real restraint in their behavior would pave the way for a relationship that might bring important benefits for the Soviet Union. It is particularly important that this message be conveyed clearly during the succession period, since this may be a particularly opportune time for external forces to affect the policies of Brezhnev's successors.

The study which follows is not specifically an analysis of the Soviet political transition, although its implications for U.S. policy are addressed. This study is instead designed to outline a U.S-Soviet policy for the near to medium term. The first part of the study examines in detail the determinants of Soviet behavior, the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet system, prospects for future developments in Soviet foreign policy and within the Soviet Union itself, and the degree of vulnerability of the system to external leverage. The second part sets forth in detail a U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, with emphasis on the role of the military balance, U.S. relationships with Allies and developing countries, interaction with Soviet allies in Eastern Europe and the Third World, and bilateral relations with the Soviet Union itself. Within the latter, the study places particular emphasis on how economic relations and expanded political action programs can be structured and utilized to advance U.S. interests.

[Omitted here is the body of the study.]
250. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

SUBJECT
George Shultz’s Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin on December 6

On December 6, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called on George Shultz to present a Soviet demarche on the means of “improving” U.S.-Soviet relations (Tab A). The demarche contained six points which can be conveniently summarized under two headings:

1. The Soviet Union would like to broaden the range of political relations between our countries by greatly expanding diplomatic contacts and maintaining continuous communications between Shultz and Gromyko either directly or through the respective embassies; however, they are in no hurry to arrange a summit.

2. In order for such a broadening of relations to occur the United States must take several concrete steps:

—eliminate polemical attacks on the Soviet Union such as charging it with the use of chemical weapons;

—stop meddling in internal Soviet affairs; and

—adopt a different position on arms negotiations.

What does this add up to? Moscow is willing to talk to us on a whole range of topics provided we stop accusing it of violating international agreements and criticizing its internal policies. We must also modify our negotiating positions in Geneva to show that we really have a “desire to reach an understanding”. With this demarche they are attempting to put us in a position of supplicant who must pay for the right to negotiate. The question is: What are they willing to pay for our consent?

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Tab A

Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan\(^2\)

December 7, 1982, 0115Z


Memorandum for: The President

From: George P. Shultz

I met briefly with Soviet Amb Dobrynin this morning at his request to hear a demarche on the state of our “dialogue” and how it might be improved. Reading from a paper, Dobrynin made six points:

First, he said that as Andropov had told the Vice President in Moscow, the Soviets want to “rectify” the U.S.-Soviet relationship through talks on concrete topics and are ready to proceed if you are. But to move forward Dobrynin said we needed to “eliminate artificial irritants” like our comments on Soviet chemical weapons use. The Soviets, he added, do not want polemics per se, but as the “Pravda” response to your Nov 22 message made clear, they will not let attacks pass without answer.

Second, he said the Soviets think it is unproductive to measure the importance of the issues on the U.S.-Soviet agenda by “subjective notions,” especially when they pertain to internal jurisdiction. (Dobrynin later specified to one of my staff that this point “really” referred to emigration from the Soviet Union.)

Third, the Soviets favor exchanges of views and the search for concrete solutions, but he said they do not believe the results to date have been satisfactory, especially in arms control. Dobrynin said Moscow hoped your statement of readiness for better relations will be reflected in U.S. positions on the substance of negotiations, and that Moscow did not sense a desire to reach understanding in the unofficial exchanges we have had in Geneva and on the eve of the Madrid CSCE meeting. He added that the current recess in the Geneva talks offered an opportunity to think about the future of the negotiations.

Fourth, he said the Soviets were prepared for broader and more active contacts through the Embassies and between the Ministries of

\(^2\) Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to the Department of State and the Embassy in Moscow. Sent from Shultz’s aircraft. Reagan initialed the first page of the telegram. Shultz was en route to Europe to attend a NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels, with stops beforehand in Bonn and afterwards in The Hague, Rome, Paris, Madrid, and London.
Foreign Affairs. He added that he was always ready for discussion with me, and there would be “no difficulties” for Ambassador Hartman to see Gromyko and First Deputy Korniyenko. He also proposed mutual visits and exchanges between the Ministries at other levels: Assistant Secretary, Deputy Assistant Secretary, chiefs of department or desk.

Fifth, he said that Gromyko was prepared to discuss any subject with me through the Ambassadors in the two capitals and personally, including the Geneva negotiations. Such exchanges have proved “good way to go” in the past, he observed. Dobrynin also said that Gromyko was ready to take a “positive” approach to the possibility of another meeting with me before the next UNGA session.

Sixth, on the possibility of a summit: Dobrynin said Soviet views are known and are similar to ours, i.e., that any such meeting must be carefully prepared. I replied that I regarded the message as significant; that I would bring it to your attention; and that I would respond in due course. The notion of enriching our dialogue is a good one, I said, and with respect to arms control, I concurred that the recess in the Geneva talks is perhaps a good time to evaluate what we have learned and where we should go from here. I said I was also glad to hear Gromyko’s statement of readiness to keep up contact with me either through our Ambassadors or personally, and I noted that our positions on a summit appear to be similar.

End of text.

251. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, December 13, 1982

The State of the Soviet Economy in the 1980s

The Basic Situation

Soviet economic growth will continue to decline in the 1980s as average annual rates of increase in labor and capital decline and produc-

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tivity gains fall short of plans. We expect average annual GNP growth to fall below 2 percent per year in the 1980s.

- The labor force will grow more slowly in the eighties than it did in the seventies—at an average annual rate of 0.7 percent compared with 1.5 percent.
- Growth in the productivity of Soviet plant and equipment, which has fallen substantially since 1975, will continue to drop as the cost of exploiting natural resources rises and Moscow is forced to spend more on infrastructure.
- Continued stagnation in key industrial materials—particularly metals—will inhibit growth in new machinery, the key source for introducing new technology.
- Energy production will grow more slowly and become more expensive, whether or not oil production falls.
- With continued growth in domestic energy requirements, Moscow will face a conflict between maintaining oil exports and meeting domestic needs.
- Agriculture will remain the most unstable sector of the Soviet economy, with performance in any year highly dependent on weather conditions.

Slower growth of production will mean slower expansion in the availability of goods and services to be divided among competing claimants—resources for future growth (investment), the consumer, and defense.

- Continued rapid growth in defense spending can be maintained only at the expense of investment growth.
- Slower expansion of investment will be compounded by the increasing demand for investment goods in the energy, transportation, metallurgy, and machinery sectors.
- An increased share of investment in heavy industries, together with continued large allocations to agriculture, will depress the expansion of housing, and other consumer goods and services.

Making up production shortfalls through imports will become more expensive as the need for imports increases and Moscow’s ability to pay (hard currency earnings) declines.

- The Soviet need for imports of Western grain and other agricultural commodities will remain high in the 1980s, as will requirements for Western machinery and technology.
- We expect real export earnings to decline between now and 1990 as sales of natural gas fail to offset the drop in oil earnings, and opportunities to expand exports of other commodities remain limited by their low marketability and tightness in domestic supplies.
• The availability of Western credits will be crucial for Moscow to maintain or increase its imports from the West; a tighter credit market would complicate Soviet economic problems and make resource allocation decisions more painful.

Options for the New Leaders

Changes in Decision-Making Process

The poor performance of the economy during the latter years of the Brezhnev regime has driven home to the new leadership the notion that there are relatively few opportunities for quick fixes and that the economic problems of the current decade may spill over into the 1990s. Because the new leaders can expect to reap the benefits of policies with longer pay-off periods, their policy decisions may be more forward looking. The new leaders will be especially sensitive to the fact that severe disruption of the economic system by the implementation of hasty, ill-conceived policies might be a quick route to both economic and political disaster.

The new leadership probably will continue to favor bureaucratic centralism rather than moving voluntarily toward fundamental systemic change. These leaders—because of the stringent economic situation and their own personalities—will rely more on tightened discipline and control to effect economic policies of long standing than on coaxing desired behavior through increased incentives. Andropov’s long tenure in the KGB has given him experience in using administrative measures to modify behavior. Moreover, the Soviet people, faced with unsettling economic and social problems, seem ready to accept a leader who would demand greater discipline.

This trend, however, would not rule out a mix of liberal and authoritarian measures. Greater dependence on the private sector, for example, is a distinct possibility that could be classified as liberal, while harsher penalties for labor absenteeism and mismanagement, though authoritarian in nature, need not mark a return to neo-Stalinism.

Changes in Policy

The new leaders will surely bring changes in economic policy. Because they have laid particular stress on continuity, and because it may take some time to develop a strong consensus, new policy lines may not appear until the 1986–90 five year plan has been drafted—i.e., 1984/85. Some indications of change are likely to be discernable next year, however, as discussion and debate about policies for the late eighties ensues and annual plans for 1984 and 1985 are formulated.

Major Claimants. The hardest policy decision for the Andropov leadership will be resource allocation among the major claimants. Maintaining historical growth in defense spending would squeeze invest-
ment and consumption further. Keeping investment growth at current rates as well, might result in an absolute decline in consumption.

The Military. Strong incentives exist for at least some slowdown in military hardware procurement. In addition to needing more resources to break economic bottlenecks, a slowdown (or even zero growth) in military procurement for a few years would have no appreciable negative impact on forces already in the field, and modernization of these forces could still proceed. We believe the groundwork for such a course may have already been laid in Brezhnev’s speech to top military officers on 27 October 1982. In any event, this course will be required if the Andropov Politburo wants to improve economic performance substantially.

Investment. A strong candidate to receive more investment funds is the machine-building sector—because of the need to modernize Soviet industry and because of constraints on importing foreign machinery and technology. Modernizing machine-building would also help justify a temporary slowdown in defense hardware as such action could ultimately enhance military hardware production. The new leadership, with its longer time horizon, might launch such an effort.

Consumption. A new leadership prone to authoritarian solutions is likely to be more pragmatic in its consumer policy, and may place more stress on tying wages and “perks” more closely to production results. Retail prices may also be raised on all but essential goods and services, and an expansion of the private sector in consumer services may be in the offing.

Reform. The new leadership’s predilection for administrative measures and bureaucratic centralism would severely limit the extent of future economic reform. The difficult economic situation argues against reform measures—like those launched in Eastern Europe—that had never been tested in the USSR. Some movement toward a regionally organized economy might be thought more suitable to today’s problems—for example, exploitation of energy and raw materials in Siberia.

Agriculture. The new leaders will continue to support the farm sector, but might decide to favor the industries that support agriculture and those that process its output. The Food Program already does this to some extent, but an actual cut of investment inside the farm gate would be a stronger signal of the new leaders’ dissatisfaction with the returns from agricultural investment.

Labor. In addition to instilling tighter discipline, the new leaders are apt to focus on automating manual labor (consistent with more investment in machinery), and developing social and cultural infrastructure in labor-deficit regions. The latter would provide some inducement for emigrants from labor surplus areas and reinforce a regionally differentiated pro-natal policy favoring the labor deficit areas.
East-West Trade. With economic problems pressing from every quarter, the new leadership might welcome—though perhaps not publicly—the opportunity to expand economic ties with the West in general and with the US in particular; the more so if decisions are taken to slow growth in military hardware, step-up investment in machinery, and reduce investment on the farms. Under these circumstances, Moscow might find it advantageous to press for (1) economic ties that provide them with technology and goods for both civilian and military purposes and (2) arms control arrangements that limit Western advances in military technology which they would find difficult and costly to counter.

Impact of Changes. These changes in approach and policies will not be a panacea for the Soviet economy’s ills. Nevertheless, the changed policies could bring marginal improvements in key areas and allow the new leadership to continue to muddle through even in the face of economic conditions probably worse than they had expected. Of primary importance to the new leaders, these policies would not require the surrender of power and would continue to allow them the freedom to impose their will on the smallest economic or administrative unit. In this way, they could feel assured of their ability to handle such problems as public unrest, external economic or military threats, or internal disasters that would require an emergency redistribution of resources.

Opportunities for the US

Opportunities for the US to influence the policy changes discussed above lie mainly in whether and to what extent we are willing to expand commercial ties with Moscow and in the signals we send the new Soviet leaders with respect to arms control negotiations. Of most immediate use to Moscow would be an arms control agreement that would provide a more predictable future strategic environment and thereby permit the Soviets to avoid certain costly new systems—and perhaps thereby enable them to increase somewhat future investment for bottleneck sectors of the economy—particularly transportation, ferrous metals, and machine building. Soviet officials have clearly indicated that staying with the United States in an arms race would have dire consequences for their economy. They probably are also uncertain of their ability to keep up technologically.

Moscow’s recent attitude toward purchases of US grain notwithstanding, the United States could again become an important source of Soviet purchases of agricultural products and machinery and equipment for both agriculture and industry. The need is there, if the “price” (including sanctity of contract) is right. Soviet agriculture could benefit substantially from US technology in livestock feed production, fertilizer
application, and animal breeding, and the US is still Moscow’s best long-term bet for grain imports on a large scale.

The USSR faces increasing dependence on the West in developing and processing its oil and gas resources in the 1980s. From a technical viewpoint, the US is the preferred supplier of most types of oil and gas equipment because it is by far the largest producer, with the most experience, the best support network, and often the best technology. In some products—for example, large capacity down-hole pumps—the US has a world monopoly (albeit one that could be broken in a few years by entry of other Western producers), and the most critical needs of Soviet oil industry are for just such equipment.

Because the prospects for Soviet hard currency earnings in the 1980s are far from bright, Western credits will have to cover an increasing proportion of Soviet imports from the West. An increase in the availability of US government backed credit could look very attractive to the new leaders in Moscow.

However, since the mid-1970s, the Soviet experience in commercial relations with the US has been disappointing to Moscow, and it would probably take a strong initiative on our part just to get their attention. Although a US offer to renew close economic ties with the USSR might be welcome, it would probably be greeted skeptically by the Soviet leadership as primarily a tactical maneuver—a further retreat by Washington (following the grain and pipeline decisions) brought about by US-West European economic competition and pressures from US business circles. Needing to consolidate his power, Andropov could not—even if he wished—respond unilaterally to such an initiative, but would have to move within a leadership consensus strongly influenced by the views of Gromyko and Ustinov, who would urge caution. Thus the Soviets might:

- Accept part of the offer as a means of coping with particularly acute bottlenecks, especially in technology and food supplies.
- Seek to avoid the establishment of long-term economic dependencies on the US.
- Exploit any new atmosphere of mutual accommodation as a means of reinforcing support in the United States and Western Europe for cutbacks in defense spending and arms control measures favorable to Soviet interests.

We would expect the Soviets to give any US initiative low-key treatment, publicly casting doubt on US motives, but at the same time seeking to engage the Administration in a dialogue about it. A US offer to return to a “business-as-usual” basis would probably not result in any surge in orders for US companies beyond the sectors in which the US is already an important supplier. Moscow is at least as likely to
use the opportunity created by a US offer to put commercial pressure on the West Europeans and Japanese, and exacerbate existing tensions in the Alliance. At a minimum, Moscow would press for US government guarantees regarding fulfillment of contracts while at a maximum it might seek repeal of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments. In either case, it would refuse to make any significant political concessions in return—which Andropov probably could not deliver even if he desired. If this process permitted the Soviets to acquire more technology on acceptable terms from the United States, they would do so—but not at the expense of established ties with Western Europe and Japan, or of their own long-term economic independence. The Soviets have traditionally taken advantage of opportunities to exploit relations with the West to acquire technology and goods for both military and civilian purposes and we expect they will continue to do so.

252. Memorandum From Richard Pipes of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, December 15, 1982

SUBJECT
State’s Paper on “U.S.-Soviet Relations”

At your request, State has prepared a study on likely Soviet policies in the next 6–24 months and our possible responses (Tab I).² I find the paper utterly disappointing in almost every respect and quite useless for purposes of policy guidance.

The State Department assumes—contrary to all evidence—that the primary concern of the current Soviet administration lies in the area of foreign policy whereas all the evidence indicates that its uppermost concerns are internal. The Andropov regime must first of all solidify its power by placing its own people in positions of authority and removing rivals. Next it must reinvigorate the flagging economy by raising productivity, reducing thefts of state property, and meeting mounting consumer demands. Then it has to deal with pressures within

² See Document 249.
the Communist Empire. These are Andropov’s prime concerns and to acknowledge them means painting a very different picture of the “View from Moscow” from that presented in State’s study. The latter document is wildly optimistic about the ability of the present regime to handle internal difficulties and concentrate on foreign policies.

In dealing with U.S. responses, State’s study repeats tired old arguments about a combination of containment and cooperation with the Soviet Union. That whole part of the study (pages 4–10) could easily have been produced under President Carter. The underlying premise is that we are dealing with an ordinary pragmatic regime that will respond to a combination of carrots and sticks. The fact that the leadership of the Soviet government is now in the hands of a one-time head of the Security Police and that this presents us with a very special kind of threat is not even considered. There is no sense here of a Soviet global strategy and therefore no recommendation of a global U.S. response. While it is true that the study was to deal only with the next two years, surely its analyses and prescription must harmonize with the long-term views taken by the Soviet NSDD: they do not do that at all. In particular, there is no mention here of the need to apply internal pressure on the Soviet Union and its Empire through economic, political, and ideological instrumentalities which constitutes one of the three principal U.S. policy objectives of the Soviet NSDD.

I have included a memorandum from Wheeler to Bremer for your convenience. (Tab II)³

RECOMMENDATION

1. That State’s study “U.S.-Soviet Relations” be returned to State for a thorough revision which would take into account Andropov’s political mentality, pay adequate attention to Soviet internal problems, and accord with the NSDD on U.S.-Soviet relations.⁴

2. If you approve, Mike Wheeler will forward the memorandum at Tab II to Bremer.

³ Not found attached.
⁴ Reagan did not indicate his preferences with respect to the recommendations.
253. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, December 16, 1982, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT
U.S. Relations with the USSR

PARTICIPANTS
The President
CIA
Mr. William Casey

The Vice President
LISUN
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

Admiral Daniel Murphy

JCS
General John Vessey

STATE
ACDA
Mr. Robert Gray

Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam

TREASURY
NSC
Judge William P. Clark

Mr. Robert Blackwell

WHITE HOUSE
Rear Admiral John Poindexter

Mr. Marc Leland

Mr. Charles Wick

OSD
Mr. Richard Darman

Secretary John Block

JCS
Judge Clark

TREASURY

Secretaries Casper Weinberger

AGRICULTURE
Mr. Edwin Meese III

Mr. Frank Carlucci

Mr. James Baker III

Deputy Secretary Frank Carlucci

Judge William P. Clark

Mr. Richard Darman

JCS
Rear Admiral John Poindexter

Mr. Lionel Olmer

COMMERCE
Mr. Richard Pipes

Secretary John Block

WEB
Colonel Michael O. Wheeler

COMMERCE

Mr. Lionel Olmer

OMB

Minutes

Judge Clark began the meeting by reviewing the course of the study on U.S.-Soviet relations and by noting that no decision was required at this point. He noted that there was disagreement on several issues, which would be discussed during the course of the meeting.

Deputy Secretary Dam was asked to discuss the study in detail. He pointed out that the differences could be viewed as relatively minor, given the scope of the study and the importance of the subject. All agree, he said, that U.S. policy should contribute to containing (and over time reversing) Soviet expansionism, should promote internal

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1 Source: Ronald Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File, NSC00070 16 DEC 82 [2/2]. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Prepared by Colonel Michael Wheeler of the National Security Council Staff, based on his handwritten notes. (Ibid.) According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 2:05 until 3:05 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) All brackets are in the original.

2 See Document 249.
change in the Soviet system, and should involve negotiation where U.S. interest would be served by such an approach. He reviewed the major elements of the study, and then described the general areas of difference: (1) whether U.S. policy should have as a goal inducing the Soviets to shift resources from capital investment in heavy industry and related activities toward the consumer sector; (2) whether we should adopt as a goal refraining from assisting the Soviet in developing their natural resources; (3) and whether there should be boycotts on agriculture as part of total trade.

The President commented that he could save some discussion by pointing out that he had crossed out contentious lines on pages two and two/A\(^3\) of the draft National Security Decision Document [the President points to the lines]—they are provocative and should not be allowed to leak. The President stated that nothing should be in the paper that we don’t want to tell the Russians; we know what our policy is if the situation calls for its implementation.

Secretary Weinberger agreed that if we are clear about our policy, it does not matter what is in the paper.

The President pointed out that this approach would be what he always has thought of as a part of quiet diplomacy.

Secretary Weinberger cautioned that if something is taken out of the draft, however, some may interpret that to be a shift in policy.

Secretary Baldridge was asked by Judge Clark if he had anything he wished to say. Secretary Baldridge proceeded to point out that he disagreed with Secretary Weinberger on the issue of refraining from assisting the Soviets with development of their natural resources. To do that would be to wage economic warfare. He pointed out that he thought interagency agreement had been reached to take this out of the drafts, and did not understand why it was in the paper.

Judge Clark stated that the general rule is that all significant disagreements should be placed on the table.

[At this point, the President received a note which informed him of the crash of an FBI aircraft in Ohio. He expressed his deep sympathy for the families, since there were four FBI agents involved with eleven children among them.]

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3 The Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce had objected and advocated removing the following two sentences from the draft of NSDD 75: “To induce the USSR to shift capital and resources from the defense sector to capital investments and consumer goods,” and “To refrain from assisting the Soviet Union with developing natural resources with which to earn, at minimal cost to itself, hard currency.” (Draft NSDD, Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: NSC Meeting File, NSC00070 16 DEC 82 [2/2])
Discussion continued among Dam, Weinberger, and Baldridge on the question of Soviet natural resource development. Judge Clark asked Secretary Regan if he wished to comment.

Secretary Regan shifted the discussion to the question of technology transfer, and pointed out that the paper was ambiguous in terms of not specifying whether high or low technology was intended.

The Vice President agreed that there were ambiguities in that area which could best be dealt with by leaving the section out.

Mr. Casey [inaudible]

Ambassador Kirkpatrick said she too was bothered by the ambiguous way in which technology was discussed in the paper. What, for instance, was meant by “critical” technology? She presumed that the central goal was to avoid helping the Soviets develop their military establishment.

Secretary Regan suggested that perhaps what was intended was “unique” technology, i.e., technology that the U.S. has but not its allies.

Secretary Baldridge interjected that the discussion showed how complicated the subject was, and that it needed clarification at the SIG. We cannot give business such ambiguous guidance.

At Judge Clark’s request, Dr. Pipes pointed out that the word “critical” was not in the draft initially, but was added at State’s insistence.

Secretary Weinberger, citing Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s description of the central goal of controlling the transfer of technology, suggested that we should be examining all technology, and if that means that business goes abroad, so be it.

Deputy Secretary Dam asked Secretary Weinberger what would be accomplished if the Soviets could get the technology elsewhere. This discussion was continued, with Secretaries Weinberger and Baldridge participating, and with comments from Judge Clark and Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

In a December 17 personal note reporting on the previous day, Dam dictated: “In the afternoon we had a major NSC meeting having to do with a review of an NSC paper and draft national security decision directive on the Soviet Union. The discussion reopened a lot of the wounds within the Administration having to do with trade with the Soviet Union, particularly trade in low technology goods that can be said to aid Soviet natural resource industries to earn hard currency. At one point I crossed swords with Cap Weinberger. Actually the President was on our side of this debate, but Cap tried to say that although we would delete the offensive provisions (which had been put in by Richard Pipes, a hard-line Harvard professor just completing his service on the NSC staff), we would agree that they actually had been agreed on and that we were only deleting them to avoid leaks. As a result, while losing, Cap tried to win.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)
The President summarized the discussion by saying that we should not facilitate a Soviet military buildup.

After brief, related comments by Mr. Wick and Secretary Block, Secretary Weinberger turned to the issue of securing allied cohesion. That is an attractive goal, he said, but sometimes we pay an awful price to achieve it, and making it a course of action we are committed to may amount on occasion to preemptive capitulation.

General Vessey pointed out that sensitive technologies have been transferred in the past, and that our goal should be to insure that they are not transferred in the future.

The President summarized the discussion by noting what had been said and repeating that he did not want to compromise our chance of exercising quiet diplomacy.

Judge Clark asked if there were other comments, at which point Secretary Block shifted the discussion to the study document instead of the draft decision document. He began with the phrase “total boycott” on page thirty of the study, and suggested removing the phrase. He also referred to sections of page twenty-one, commenting that if what was being discussed on that page was the grain embargo, he did not think it had been successful.

Secretary Weinberger countered that he thought there had been some effect from the grain embargo, across the board. Secretaries Weinberger and Block discussed this issue briefly, until Deputy Secretary Dam pointed out that the important qualifier “unified” had been in the study.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick turned the discussion to a different point, suggesting that on page four of the study, the phrase “...and friends who support us” should be added. She discussed specific examples of some Third World countries that we should give higher priority to helping because of their support for us in Third World forums. Secretary Dam agreed, but Deputy Secretary Carlucci questioned whether this meant if Brazil, for instance, opposes the U.S. position on an issue, that we would not help them in other areas.

Secretary Baldridge turned the discussion to a point of clarification, i.e., what is the policy on development of Soviet resources. Do we trade with them? Do we engage in economic warfare?

Secretary Weinberger said he presumed that decisions would be made on a case-by-case basis. He cited the example of the pipeline, which gets them $10 billion per year in hard currency for practically no cost.

The President inserted that he wished to keep our options open.

Mr. Wick raised the question of what is meant by “strict reciprocity” on page six, giving the example of cultural exchange. Dr. Pipes explained the choices in this area, with Mr. Wick offering additional
comments about whether we want to give them access that we are denied.

*The President* commented that many Soviets stay here when they come on tours.

*Secretary Block* added that it is to our benefit to have Soviets come to the United States and see the vast contrast in societies between theirs and ours. The discussion continued briefly, with Deputy Secretary Dam stating that the areas of the study dealing with exchanges could be reworked.

*Judge Clark* pointed out that time was up—that no decisions had been reached, and that more drafting was in order.

*The President* concluded the meeting by thanking the participants for expressing their points of view, with the final observation that he thought the discussion had cleared the air a little.

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**254. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency**

Washington, December 21, 1982

SPOT COMMENTARY: Andropov Addresses Soviet 60th Anniversary Meeting

In his speech this morning, Andropov made public Moscow’s offer in the INF talks to reduce Soviet “medium range” missiles in Europe to a number equivalent to the UK and French missile forces. He appeared to tie this offer, however, to an additional agreement on INF aircraft. He reiterated Moscow’s threat to deploy an ICBM analogous to the MX and stated that the USSR was already testing a long-range cruise missile which would be deployed if the US proceeded to deploy long-range cruise missiles of its own.

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2 Reference is to Andropov’s speech commemorating the 60th anniversary of the creation of the Soviet Union. Under cover of a December 23 memorandum, Kraemer forwarded a one-page summary of the speech to McFarlane, who wrote on the covering memorandum: “Sven—Thanks. Please assure wide dissem.” (Reagan Library, McFarlane Files, 1982–1985, Chron—December 1982)
At the same time, he reaffirmed Moscow’s commitment to strategic arms limitations and reiterated the Soviet Union’s willingness to reduce the level of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles by 25 percent below the SALT II aggregates.

—Andropov’s INF missile proposal has previously been made by Soviet negotiators in Geneva. It implies a Soviet willingness to reduce approximately one-third of its SS–20 force opposite Europe in addition to the dismantlement of approximately 250 older SS–4 and SS–5 missiles. The Soviet offer remains contingent, however, on nondeployment of new NATO missiles.

—His announcement of the Soviet cruise missile program is new. It is intended to heighten pressure on West Europeans to break with NATO’s INF plans and may be related to previous Soviet threats to place the US in an analogous strategic position if NATO proceeds with INF modernization.

—Andropov’s claim that Moscow is willing to reduce strategic delivery vehicles by 25 percent is consistent with Moscow’s START offer to reduce 1,800 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers from the agreed SALT II level of 2,400.

**Domestic Aspects**

The domestic portion of Andropov’s speech provided few clues about the direction of policy in coming months, and suggested he has yet to formulate a comprehensive plan for attacking economic problems. He refrained from praising Brezhnev, however, perhaps out of a desire to dissociate himself from the policy failures of recent years.

Andropov’s remarks on domestic policy focused on the nationality question, as had Brezhnev’s speech 10 years ago and as was appropriate for the anniversary of the Soviet Union’s formation. Overall, his remarks emphasized the themes of Russian nationalism and political and economic centralization. He emphasized, for example, the need for greater regional specialization. And his statement that the final aim of nationality policy was the “merger” of national cultures and peoples, for example, was a centralizing formulation that has not been used in recent years. However, he seemed to call for increased representation of indigenous nationalities in the party and state institutions of non-Russian republics. He attributed the persistence of parochial tendencies among Soviet nationalities partly to “mistakes we make in our work.”

Andropov also made a brief reference to the food program, suggesting that this part of Brezhnev’s domestic policy will continue. He stressed the need to improve transportation, reinforcing other indications that improving the performance of this distressed sector will be a top priority.

Chernenko made a brief introductory speech. The prominent role accorded him indicates that he remains a key figure in the leadership,
and further indicates that he is exercising responsibility within the Secretariat for ideology.

(The above preliminary assessments are based on the partial text available from TASS and Moscow Radio at time of writing and are not exhaustive.)

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255. Memorandum From Paula Dobriansky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, December 22, 1982

SUBJECT

Attempted Assassination of the Pope: Unofficial Soviet Paper

At Tab I is the text of an intemperately-worded “unofficial” paper delivered by Soviet Embassy Charge Bessmertnykh to Under Secretary of State Eagleburger. The demarche disclaims any Soviet or Bulgarian responsibility in the attempted assassination of the Pope, alleges that the U.S. is waging a “slanderous campaign” against the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, and further accuses the U.S. of libeling Soviet leaders.² The paper reflects a strong reaction to Western speculations that Andropov, as former head of the KGB, must have been intimately involved in the attempted assassination. It concludes with usual Soviet rhetoric by saying that unless this campaign of vilification against Soviet and Bulgarian leadership ceases, the Soviets will feel “free to act accordingly”—whatever this means.

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² Reports about potential Soviet involvement in the May 13, 1981, assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II arose following a question Pipes received in a December 17 interview recorded for CNN, the substance of which leaked that day. “I responded that given the virtually certain participation of the Bulgarian secret services, which the KGB controlled, it was not implausible to assume that the KGB had had a hand in it, although there was no hard evidence to this effect,” recalled Pipes, who had given the interview with the understanding that it would be aired after his departure from the administration at the end of that week, upon the conclusion of his 2-year sabbatical from Harvard. (Pipes, Vixi, p. 205)
Under Secretary Eagleburger has already rejected the protest and its allegations as entirely false. In fact, he noted that U.S. official comment on this issue has been restrained. Lastly, the Under Secretary mentioned that the offensive tone and content of the paper could affect U.S. views of the new Soviet leadership's attitudes on our bilateral relations.

I do not believe that any further action on our part is warranted. Dennis Blair and Al Myer concur.

Attachment

Paper

Moscow, undated

An unbridled slanderous campaign is being conducted in the USA against Bulgaria and the Soviet Union alleging their involvement in the assassination attempt on Pope John-Paul II in May 1981.

All this malicious campaign, as is also openly admitted in the American press, is being carried out with the knowledge and encouragement of the US official bodies. It is being directed and coordinated by the American special services.

We reject in a most categorical way this provocative ploy and the attempts to use a blatant lie in order to cast aspersion on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The very suggestion alleging a possible existence in the socialist countries of certain quarters which can have anything to do with terrorist acts, is fundamentally absurd. It runs counter to the policy and ideology of our society.

The government of the United States of America, undoubtedly, knows that neither Bulgaria, nor the Soviet Union are involved in the actions which some people seek to ascribe to them. No one is in possession of any facts at all with regard to this matter, if one is to speak of nothing but facts and not of the concoctions being fabricated. As to facts, they are simply not in existence. And if, nevertheless, heinous allegations regarding the Soviet Union are continuing, it can be viewed in no other way, but as a deliberate line aimed at exacerbating an atmosphere of animosity in the relationship between our countries. The Soviet side, of course, will draw appropriate conclusions therefrom.

3 Secret. A typewritten note at the top of the memorandum reads: "Unofficial translation."
Absolutely inadmissible are offensive personal invectives allowed in the USA lately regarding the Soviet leadership. It is perfectly clear that this constitutes a gross contradiction of both the requirements of elementary ethics and the commonly accepted norms of intercourse among states maintaining diplomatic relations with one another.

The Soviet side lodges a resolute protest with the US government in this regard and indignantly declines the insinuations of that sort.

It is well known that, on our part, we, so far, have been exercising restraint in this respect. However, it should be clear that there must be a limit to everything. If, on the US part, no effective measures are taken to cease invectives regarding the Soviet leadership, we will consider ourselves free to act accordingly.

256. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, December 28, 1982

SUBJECT

“Andropov: His Power and Program”

Bill Casey forwarded you an insightful CIA report (Tab A) entitled, “Andropov: His Power and Program.” The primary findings include:

1. The precedent of an extended period for a new Soviet leader to consolidate power does not apply. Andropov is a “leader who has come to power with firm support in the Politburo at the outset, and who has a mandate to act in both domestic and foreign affairs.” He is supported by the military, the security apparatus and powerful conservative elements of the Party.

2. Given Andropov’s promotion and apparently unchallenged accession to power, he will move promptly to address and tackle domestic and foreign issues/problems, displaying initiative and resolve where necessary. His domestic agenda might include: continuing a “vigilence” campaign to restore discipline, waging a major anti-corruption campaign, seeking additional resources for both the military and the KGB, generating limited experimentation and economic reform,

and promoting greater realism in planning and recognition of problems. Andropov’s foreign policy agenda might entail:

—Curbing U.S. strategic modernization, preventing the INF deployment and deepening the rift between the U.S. and Western Europe.

—Permitting some flexibility toward East European efforts to cope with economic problems, but only within the context of close ties to the USSR and firm party control.

—Securing a pseudo-neutral government in Kabul which would allow Moscow to achieve some sort of regional settlement and withdraw some forces.

—Vigorously pursuing policies intended to improve Sino-Soviet relations.

The report concludes that the Soviet Union is likely to pose an even greater threat to U.S. security as we are faced with a more active, intelligent, adroit adversary—Andropov.

Tab A

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan

Washington, November 29, 1982

SUBJECT
Andropov: His Power and Program

1. Here is a memorandum on how we now see the thrust and scope of Andropov’s program. It was prepared by Bob Gates, our Deputy Director for Intelligence, who has maintained a realistic view of Soviet purposes. He did two stints at the NSC, one with Kissinger and one with Brzezinski, and two stints at CIA as National Intelligence Officer for Soviet Affairs. You may recall that this experience was put to good use last year in analyzing Brezhnev’s correspondence with you and recommending responses.

2. One added feature which has struck me is the emerging picture of Ustinov as giving Andropov crucial support. When you put together Ustinov’s 30-odd years in command of defense industries and then defense and Andropov’s 15 years at the KGB, you get an awesome

2 Secret. Also addressed to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, and Clark
concentration of institutional power. To brag a little, I attach a note in which we called this six months before the event.

William J. Casey

Attachment

Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence (Gates) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey and the Deputy Director of Intelligence (McMahon)

No. DDI # 9593–82 Washington, November 20, 1982

SUBJECT
Andropov: His Power and Program

1. The emerging conventional wisdom seems to be that the USSR will now enter a period of collegial rule in which continuity will be stressed and the new leaders will hold back from significant policy changes for the near to medium term. In this view, Andropov will be preoccupied with internal matters such as improving the economy and any new initiatives that do appear will likely focus on domestic affairs rather than foreign policy. The immediate post-Khrushchev period is cited as precedent for what will happen.

2. I believe that analysis is based on a misreading of the events of recent days, Andropov’s character, and history. In 1953, a number of new initiatives followed the death of Stalin (and preceded Khrushchev’s consolidation of power)—a purge of the KGB, an end to the intra-party terror, the Virgin Lands program, a decision to end the Korean War, and a mending of relations with the Yugoslavs. In 1964, the new leaders swept aside a number of major changes Khrushchev had made in the party organization, sharply raised investment in agriculture, began the heavy military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border, and actively began to support North Vietnam’s effort to take over the South.

3. Andropov comes to power at a time when there is a widely perceived need for renewal in the USSR—to get the economy moving again, to get rid of corruption, to restore discipline, to reassert the idealism of the Revolution and relatedly to reaffirm Russia’s mission-

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3 Casey signed “W.J. Casey” above his typed signature.

4 Secret.
ary/evangelical role at home and abroad. Perversely, this often takes the shape of nostalgia for Stalin. It is his forcefulness, toughness, decisiveness and ability to move the country that the Party seeks in Andropov—believing they can have all that without the old dictator’s less welcome attributes (such as a tendency to shoot his colleagues).

4. The Soviet leadership appears to have decided last spring that Andropov was the man to lead the USSR out of its political and economic doldrums after Brezhnev’s death. He was moved from the KGB back to the Central Committee Secretariat, a more appropriate and acceptable launching point. I believe that since then he has steadily consolidated his power and begun, with his colleagues, to develop new initiatives and implement certain of them—even before assuming power. As the Soviets say, “it is not by accident” that in the last several months we have seen both a new internal crackdown in the Soviet Union and also a major new initiative in foreign policy—the effort to improve relations between the Soviet Union and China. There also are indications that the military has been asking for additional resources. In my judgment, Andropov has been behind the first two of these initiatives and supported the third.

5. In brief, I believe the precedent of an extended period for the new leader to consolidate power—as with Brezhnev after the overthrow of Khrushchev—does not apply this time around. This view is supported by Andropov’s prompt appointment; his clear authoritativeness during events surrounding Brezhnev’s funeral; his role and “presence” in meetings with the principal foreign visitors; the quick promotion of an old KGB colleague to the Politburo; and his speeches at the Central Committee Plenum and Supreme Soviet. This time we have a leader who has come to power with firm support in the Politburo at the outset, has a mandate to act in both domestic and foreign affairs, and will do so.

6. The nature of this succession and the character of Andropov himself argue strongly that he will move promptly and broadly to tackle many of Russia’s problems. For the first time in Soviet history, there has been a smooth succession where the new leader has assumed power in an orderly way and probably with greater leeway to make decisions than enjoyed by his predecessor. Indeed, Andropov has been chosen because he is a man who can make decisions and hopefully can end the long period of drift, especially in internal affairs. He is on close terms with the powerful conservative elements in the Soviet hierarchy and is a man who can act with both intelligence and imagination on a long list of pressing foreign and domestic issues. What we are likely to see with Andropov is preservation of the forms of “collegiality” but the absence of its paralyzing effect on decisionmaking. All of the senior policymakers who might block Andropov are dead or out of power; those who remain, such as Ustinov and Gromyko, are
closely allied with him; his presumed rival, Chernenko, appears (for now, at least) to have been co-opted.

7. Given Andropov’s prompt and apparently unchallenged accession to power, his personality and past history, and the problems that face him, what might Andropov’s agenda resemble for the coming period? On the basis of both 1953 and 1964, historical experience would suggest that a number of changes or initiatives can be expected:

**Internal Affairs**

—A continuation of the “vigilance” campaign and internal crackdown to restore discipline, to give the impression of a strong hand at the top again, to forestall any impression of internal relaxation as a result of the succession, to keep the country well under control so that other initiatives or reforms do not lead to unrealistic expectations or spontaneous popular action, and to secure the home front for perhaps severe measures to revive the economy.

—A major anti-corruption campaign by a man who is said to have a reputation for being relatively “clean” among Soviet leaders. The promotion of Aliyev to the Politburo further suggests action in this area. It is plain that many of the present political problems in Poland and Romania grow out of popular awareness and resentment of the corruption of senior party officials. While Andropov would have to proceed carefully with this, the KGB’s role in exposing the corruption of Brezhnev’s family early in the year is indicative of his willingness to use this issue both politically and for larger ends. With his KGB background, he would know against whom to strike. There might even be a return of an occasional show trial specifically for corruption, although Andropov would choose the targets with care to insulate his strongest supporters.

—It seems logical and likely that Andropov would press for additional resources for both the military and the KGB. These are important constituencies for him and for his principal supporters in the leadership. While there might be some reallocation of priorities within the military, overall greater resources to respond to the perceived increased threat from the US are in the cards, in my view.

—On the economy, while specific policies are difficult to forecast at this point, we should expect “reform” and perhaps some limited experimentation. The focus on internal discipline, anti-corruption and vigilance—in essence, the maintenance of strict internal controls—must go hand in hand with any effort to undertake economic reform or experiments, witness the Polish experience. While a more detailed analysis of economic options available to the new leadership will take more time, the essential message is that we should anticipate change in this area and it seems likely to involve (1) greater trade with the
West, (2) more problems for us in the area of technology transfer, and (3) more difficulty with our Western and Japanese allies over the issue of trade with the East. The idea of Andropov’s willingness to consider reform in the Soviet economy is suggested by stories that he has been the protector of Hungarian economic reform and is willing to consider such new approaches—although Hungary is obviously a much smaller country and the costs of failure are not as high (always a disincentive to agricultural reform in Russia).

—in the Party itself, I expect to see Andropov move to improve the competence of senior officials generally while ensuring that the new men are sympathetic to his objectives and politically supportive. He already is placing his own people in openings on the Politburo, Secretariat, and elsewhere in the hierarchy.

—more generally, Andropov’s advocacy at the Supreme Soviet of greater realism in planning and recognition of problems, and the call of an important Soviet newspaper editorial last week for a major revamping of the Soviet bureaucracy, both suggest that significant changes are in store internally.

Foreign Policy

—US: Andropov seems likely to pursue a policy directed at achieving simultaneously some visible reduction in tensions with the United States, curbing new US arms programs, preventing the deployment of INF, and dividing the US from its European allies. A conciliatory approach to the United States and effective use of peace-oriented propaganda and “active measures” are to be expected. The Soviets will try to reinforce notions already current in the West of the need for forthcoming gestures to the new Soviet leader and the need to take advantage of this “new beginning.” While the European decision on INF remains uncertain it would seem most unlikely for the Soviets to abandon the Geneva talks. Rather, we should be prepared for imaginative Soviet initiatives both in negotiations and in public in the next few months to throw the US on the defensive and increase divisions between the Europeans and ourselves. Should INF deployment actually begin, the Soviets could then walk out in Geneva and blame failure on the US. They would subsequently strive to prevent full deployment by playing on European fears and purported US intransigence.

The Soviets have seen a steady deterioration in US-Soviet relations for seven years under three US administrations. I believe they have concluded that the moment for establishing a more benign relationship on their terms has passed. Arms control negotiations and other forms of cooperation with the US government are likely considered to hold out little prospect of success for years to come. Thus, Andropov probably will focus Soviet policy on isolating the US and trying, through
all instruments available to him, to build opposition to US military modernization and to US policies toward the USSR generally, both in the US and abroad.

—East-West Trade: Andropov likely will continue efforts to tie East and West Europe to the USSR through economic “cooperation” and trade. The Soviets already are aware of the leverage they hold because of the value of East-West trade to the West and the jobs said to depend upon it. Trade thus has both economic and political benefits for them. Andropov presumably will strive to maximize these benefits and seek a corollary benefit in the strains such increased dealings will bring between the US and its allies. After removal by the US of sanctions imposed after Afghanistan and after Poland, this instrument of US policy will have little credibility in the future in Soviet eyes. Indeed, Andropov will see the US as little more than an annoyance in the area of trade and technology transfer, unable to impose discipline inside the US, much less in Europe and Japan.

—Eastern Europe: Andropov reportedly has evinced considerable hostility to the Yugoslavs, Romanians and Czechs in the past—implying little tolerance for deviation from loyalty to Moscow and political orthodoxy. Almost as proof, his meeting with the Yugoslavs after the Brezhnev funeral was “harsh” and he pointedly snubbed Ceausescu. On the other hand, he is said to be close to Kadar of Hungary and a protector of Hungarian economic reforms. This and other information suggests some flexibility toward East European efforts to cope with economic problems but only within the context of close ties to the USSR and firm party control. As in the USSR, Andropov could well urge his East European colleagues to impose stricter discipline at home—accompanied by a campaign to root out obvious and damaging corruption in high places, perhaps by making examples of some officials.

—Afghanistan: Afghanistan seems to be a candidate for a new Soviet initiative to try to diminish in some measure both the insurgency there and their military role. It continues to be an embarrassment for them in Islamic countries as well as in the West, it does impose a certain military cost in both materiel and casualties, and it is an obstacle to any significant reconciliation with the Chinese. Some new initiative combining a new government with some greater legitimacy in Afghanistan (although still under Soviet control) coupled with strong pressure on Pakistan to abandon its supporting role for the insurgents could conceivably meet with some success if orchestrated well by the Soviets. It could involve a government in Kabul with a figleaf image of neutrality and a diminution of support for the insurgents that would allow the Soviets to withdraw at least some of their forces.

—Middle East: The short term options are not bright, but the Soviets are prepared to be patient. Egypt and Iran are the big prizes and
Andropov will pursue overt and covert policies designed to take advantage of any instability in either country.

—Kampuchea: Kampuchea is another area where the Soviets could make some concessions to the Chinese for larger ends. Never before have the Soviets shown any particular sensitivity to Hanoi’s concerns. While Vietnam might not abandon its campaign in Kampuchea under Soviet pressure, the Soviets still could claim to the Chinese that they were no longer supporting Vietnam’s effort and were amenable to new political arrangements that could be worked out. This might involve some sort of face saving settlements that would not represent a defeat for Vietnam but would get most of their troops out of the country.

—Third World: In the Third World, I believe we can expect not only a continuation of the direct and indirect destabilization activities the Soviets have had underway in recent years but perhaps an increase in that activity. In many ways Soviet policy in the Third World is likely to be indicative of a more assertive Soviet role abroad generally, although as our papers on Andropov have made clear, he prefers to win by strategem and maneuver rather than resort to force—although he will use force if maneuvering fails and the risks are deemed acceptable.

—China: As I have suggested in several places above, I believe Andropov is playing a key role in the new initiative to try and patch things up with China. At some point, this will involve tough decisions for the Soviets because any real reconciliation with China will require acceding to Chinese preconditions relating to Afghanistan, Kampuchea or Soviet deployments along the Chinese border. The latter is probably the easiest area for the Soviets to be responsive. Andropov’s pointed conversation with Foreign Minister Huang Hua after Brezhnev’s funeral, the meeting between Huang Hua and Gromyko the next day and Chinese willingness to send Huang Hua is indicative of both powers intent to pursue an improved relationship at minimum and to improve their mutual positions with respect to the US.

8. In sum, the US faces a new and, in many ways, far more intelligent and skillful adversary than we confronted in Khrushchev or Brezhnev—and a man who is a “doer”. He is familiar with the world and a realist. My money says we will face a much greater challenge from the USSR under his leadership. While the specifics of his program are difficult to construct, we should be prepared for significant new Soviet initiatives in both internal and foreign policy. A leadership has come to power during the last two weeks in the Soviet Union with greater power and more unity at the highest level than after either the succession in 1953 or 1964. It has come to power with considerable work to do and Andropov is not a man who will delay in setting in motion initiatives to address a number of issues and problems. The effort to
repair relations with China—long thought out of the question by most analysts in the West—is indicative of the kind of flexibility, pragmatism and boldness we can expect from this new leader. His talks with the Yugoslavs and Finns are indicative of his willingness to play hard ball.

Robert M. Gates

Attachment

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan

Washington, April 22, 1982

SUBJECT
Soviet Political Succession: Institutions, People and Policies

1. With Suslov’s death, Kirilenko fading away, and the inception of the Chernenko boom, I tasked our Soviet analysts to evaluate the prospects for the Soviet succession.

2. In recent weeks Chernenko appears to have peaked too soon, with Andropov emerging as the present favorite. Ustinov has the military clout and seems to be lining up with Andropov, but may be positioning himself for partnership or even competition. Under pressure, forced to stick our necks out on a dark horse, we pick Grishin, the 67 year old Moscow party boss and fourth youngest member of the Politburo, and Gorbachev, at 51 the youngest Politburo member, who is Party Secretary for Agriculture, a post which Khrushchev held on his way to the top. Brezhnev also was deeply involved in agricultural matters on his way up.

3. If I had to bet money, I’d take Andropov on the nose and Gorbachev across the board.

4. This paper analyzes the influence of various Soviet institutions, the policy issues which might be influential in the outcome, and the policy implications of possible resolutions.

William J. Casey

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6 Not found attached.

7 Casey signed “W.J. Casey” above his typed signature.
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, January 5, 1983

SUBJECT
The Truth and The Strength of America’s Deterrent

The Soviets make all their strategic decisions—whether to advance or retreat—on the basis of their assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of their opponents. The key element in this assessment is the adversary’s strength of moral-political conviction—i.e., his will to use force if necessary to defend his vital interests. In practice, as the Soviets see it, this means the willingness of their opponent to speak plainly about the nature and goals of communism.

The Soviet system depends for its survival on the systematic suppression of the truth. This is done by imposing the ideological Party line to justify totalitarian rule and serve the internal security system by setting the standard against which deviationism is measured. Loyalty to the regime is thus determined by the capacity to affirm the falsehoods of the ideology. All must say that the USSR is a “workers’ state” when it is not. Everyone must be a good courtier and tell the naked emperor that he is wearing nice clothes. The Soviets extend this principle to the world. Thus, the key feature of “Finlandization” is for the target country to censor itself—if not to lie outright, then at least to remain silent. In fact, the Soviets measure their dominance or influence over another country by that country’s willingness to accommodate the USSR by censoring itself.

As the Soviets see it, to tell the truth about the USSR is to risk igniting their internal security threat—the threat of mass popular resistance to the ideology, as in Poland. Thus, their highest priority is to jam our broadcasts and to intimidate and induce NATO governments to “tone down their rhetoric” and censor themselves. Gromyko’s main mission in his talks with Haig was to get us to do just that.

When stating that the Soviets will “lie,” “cheat,” and “commit any crime” to further their goals, you lifted a partial veil of self-censorship we had imposed on ourselves for some 15 years. In doing so, however, you showed the Soviets that we have the moral strength and political

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support to say that the emperor has no clothes and to withstand the protests of the Soviets and the “courtiers” in the media and elsewhere. Thus, by simply telling the truth, you incalculably strengthened the credibility of our military deterrent. All our weapons mean little unless the President shows he has the will to use them with the conviction that America has something worth defending. Normally, it has taken an act of considerable force to demonstrate this will. President Ford used the Mayaguez incident; President Nixon used bombing attacks in Vietnam to impress this on the Soviets. Yet, you did it in a non-military way—by having the courage to tell the truth about the Soviets. So long as our leaders deliver this message, the Soviets will know that we are not spiritually weak, that we are not Finlandized and that we have not permitted wishful thinking to obscure a clear understanding of Soviet intentions. They will be less inclined to make major strategic advances based on calculations of American weakness.

258. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan

Washington, undated

NSPG Meeting
Date: January 10, 1983
Location: Situation Room
Time: 2:00 p.m.

I. PURPOSE

To obtain views of your advisors on US-Soviet relations and next steps in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations. No decisions are required.

II. BACKGROUND

You asked us to examine the significance of the change in leadership in the Soviet Union and to determine what opportunities or problems might exist as a result of that change. In particular, you asked that we assess what opportunities or problems may exist in arms control.

1 Source: National Security Council, Box SR 107, NSPG 49 [US Rel w/ Sov U] Jan 1983. Top Secret. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Tab A, a set of talking points, was not attached.
US-Soviet Relations. Attached at Tab B is the Executive Summary of the study on US-Soviet relations. It was prepared by State on a closehold basis with assistance from DOD and CIA (although the paper does not necessarily reflect an agreed interagency view). You have already seen this paper. In brief, some highlights are as follows. We expect, on the one hand, limited risk-taking and threats by the Soviets, and on the other hand, limited cost-cutting and peace offensives, occurring along a basically unchanged center-line of Soviet policy that falls between broad expansionism and broad retreat. For now, we should stick to the line that US-Soviet relations will improve if, but only if, the Soviets behave more responsibly. If the Soviets become both more conciliatory and more menacing—i.e., roughly what we expect—we should, rhetorically at least, “reward” the positive and “punish” the negative. We should avoid being outflanked on international problems and outmaneuvered in arms control. More specifically, we should preempt Soviet moves, illuminate Soviet tokenism, signal our interest in progress, cement our support at home and abroad, update our terms for solutions, and prevent the Soviets from thinking they can address problems without us. Next steps could include internal USG planning, consultations and actions with others, and actions with the Soviets.

INF Negotiations. Also attached are two papers which represent two different views on the INF negotiations.

The paper at Tab C\(^2\) was prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It says that it would be the wrong time to abandon our position for zero missiles on both sides. At least until after the German elections in March, abandonment of zero would worsen rather than strengthen our position. Allied governments would have to shift their position and argue that they will deploy even if negotiations succeed. European opponents of deployments now have a stake in the negotiations because they might lead to a zero outcome; abandon “zero” and their interest will diminish sharply. Also, there would be serious verification problems with a non-zero approach.

The paper at Tab D\(^3\) was prepared by State. It says that we need to deploy INF missiles in Europe to re-establish the US strategic link to NATO. Because the threat cannot be eliminated by arms control, we must deploy. Failure to deploy would be a massive political defeat for the US and the Alliance, with lasting scars here and in Europe. Allied governments cannot continue to maintain support for deployments unless we show we are making every effort for an agreement. The paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of two options:

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\(^2\) Not attached.

\(^3\) Not attached.

(1) insist on zero-zero as the only outcome; and (2) propose achieving zero-zero in two steps, the first being equal global ceilings of 300 INF missiles (roughly half of 572).

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger
Ed Meese
DCI Casey
UN Ambassador Kirkpatrick
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver
Bill Clark
Acting JCS Chairman General Barrow
Bud McFarlane

IV. PRESS PLAN

None.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

After introductory remarks by me, George Shultz will provide a brief overview of the study on US-Soviet relations. Other participants will then comment.

Subsequently, George and Cap Weinberger will provide their respective views on the INF negotiations. This will be followed by a round-robin discussion among the meeting participants.

Based upon the flow of the meeting, you may wish to provide guidance on the matters raised. However, no specific decisions are required at this particular time.
Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to consider what we can expect from the Soviets over the next 6–24 months and how we should attempt to steer East-West relations in that same period. It concludes with a summary of possible Soviet initiatives, suggested US responses, and possible US initiatives. These conclusions are based on analysis of:

- the Andropov regime’s view of the world situation and of how Soviet interests can be advanced;
- the strength of Andropov’s political position and the resources and constraints that define what he can attempt and achieve; and
- our view of American interests and what we would like to see the Soviets do, stop doing, or abstain from doing insofar as their conduct affects our interests.

This study is based on the long-term framework for US policy toward the USSR established by NSDD 11–82.5

THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW

Assets and Liabilities

In assessing its inheritance, the Soviet leadership finds major gains and assets:

- superpower status and global reach;
- a quarreling, economically shaky West;
- domestic political stability; and
- an economy strong enough to support massive military outlays while keeping popular discontent within tolerable limits;

... as well as problems:

- discontent in Eastern Europe;

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4 Top Secret; Sensitive.
5 See Documents 203 and 249.
• declining productivity, morale and economic growth (to below 2% percent per annum);
• the Afghanistan predicament; and
• Western—especially American—rearmament.

With regard to military competition, the regime finds itself with:
• rough overall balance, with Soviet leads in ground forces, long-range INF missiles, and ICBMs, as well as reduced American advantages in naval and other power projection forces and in military technology;

... but also:
• prospective loss of the Soviet advantage in INF, as well as American strategic modernization and restored American naval and technological supremacy.

Basic Choices

On balance, Brezhnev’s successors will be sufficiently content with these conditions, unsure of how to effect basic change, and sober about the consequences of unregulated competition or direct confrontation with us that they will not be inclined to depart from the country’s general historical course.

The leaders probably think the economy can sustain roughly the current pace of military effort (4% per annum growth) and international aggrandizement, but not much more. It would take a much graver economic crisis than expected to force the regime to consider military and international contraction, given that this would mean abandonment of Brezhnev’s main achievement: Soviet might and reach comparable to ours. At the same time, the deteriorating economic situation will make the regime cautious about taking on a larger military burden and new international liabilities. In sum, the regime will opt for neither an expansionist surge nor broad retrenchment.

Nothing in Andropov’s background or character suggests that he would be predisposed to swing widely from Brezhnev’s course. Moreover, while his position in the leadership is strong—in part because his colleagues want a strong leader—he is bound by consensus, and particularly beholden to Ustinov and Gromyko. These factors also militate against major domestic or international shifts.

Foreign Policy Directions

This by no means implies passive continuity in foreign policy. The difficulty of effecting domestic change could encourage foreign policy dynamism, albeit within the framework set under Brezhnev. The Soviet leaders may see more sophisticated, innovative, agile, and diversified diplomacy as the best and cheapest way to undercut and pressure us,
expand their influence, relieve internal pressures, and perhaps cut the political costs of some of their more exposed positions abroad. They may be contemplating a mix of selective international “opportunity-seizing” and “loss-cutting,” but in both cases with costs, risks and deviations kept to a minimum.

The new leadership, like the old, sees in Washington an Administration that refuses to respect Soviet status and prerogatives as an equal superpower, even while—in their view—exaggerating Soviet military advantages. They see us as having raised the costs and risks of military and international competition. However, they may doubt the Administration’s ability to maintain a national consensus in support of restoring American strength, or to forge a Western consensus around Washington’s East-West outlook and policies. They doubt our willingness to respond positively to anything less than a broad Soviet retreat, which they will not contemplate.

For some in Moscow, this assessment of Washington calls for a more confrontationist approach, an expanded Soviet military effort, greater sacrifice, and less regard for Western public opinion. There may be those at the other extreme who believe the USSR must deal directly with American concerns in order to avert a level of competition and confrontation the country cannot afford. However, while resource constraints will work against the advocates of a major military and international surge, they will not dictate retreat either. Thus, the view most likely to prevail is that US-Soviet relations should be placed in a holding pattern until it becomes clear whether or not this Administration’s strategic approach is a passing phenomenon.

Thus, on the whole, with the possible exception of START, it is unlikely that the Soviets see much percentage in making major concessions in the hope of satisfying this Administration. They may probe our willingness to do business with them, but their expectations will be low. They are more likely to try even harder to put us on the defensive politically and to stimulate a public and Allied backlash against our policies. In the process, however, they might be induced to take some real if limited steps that would partially meet our concerns.

With regard to arms control (notably START and INF), the Soviets have a definite interest in somehow heading off unrestrained competition. Indeed, the leadership may be less than sanguine about having to back up threats of stepped-up Soviet military programs in the event that our effort continues. At the same time, they doubt that we are genuinely interested in agreements that take account of their concerns (e.g., cruise missiles), and their military establishment is in a position to block “disadvantageous” deals. The Soviets will therefore follow an integrated arms control strategy combining propaganda with real but limited concessions, their purpose being to cut off domestic and Allied...
support for our build-up while leaving open the possibility of our addressing their concerns and thus reaching agreements. To the degree they succeed in cutting off our support, they will care less about actually reaching agreements with us, since they could then avoid reducing their forces without fear of being forced into an expanded military effort.

In general, the Soviet leaders may feel that Soviet interests are best served by isolating and “outflanking” us as much as possible—that is, by orienting their foreign policy away from US-Soviet relations, and by trying to come to grips with some of their problems without reference to us. This would enhance their freedom to ignore our concerns, their ability to weaken our relations with others, and their ability to pursue new initiatives. In INF, the direct negotiations with us are secondary, indeed subordinated, to the task of turning Europe against deployments. Even in START, where they must deal with us, they will try to reach American public opinion over our heads.

Trying to operate around the US over the next 6–24 months would represent a necessary “tactical”—and, they probably hope, temporary—departure from the Soviets’ basic emphasis on the centrality of the US-Soviet relationship in managing world affairs.

THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

Assessment

Our program to re-establish American ascendancy involves rear-mament, world economic recovery, respect for international law and order, and the promotion of democratic values. Progress in achieving these goals affects and is affected by our competition with the Soviet Union.

- The more successful we are in our overall program, the more able we will be to induce more restrained Soviet conduct or, failing that, to counter Soviet misconduct.
- The Soviets want to impede our program, mainly by dividing us from those at home or abroad whose support we need for success.

The results we have achieved so far are mixed:

- We have succeeded in making the Soviets more cautious but we have not caused them to retreat from existing positions.
- We have increased public awareness of the Soviet challenge here and abroad, but we have not laid to rest questions about our own commitment to better East-West relations—questions which the Soviets are quick to feed.

Our Goals

Over the next 6–24 months, our chief aims toward the competition should be:
• to consolidate domestic consensus in support of sustained growth in defense spending, and thus to convince the Soviets that they are not witnessing a passing phenomenon;
  • to prevent further Soviet encroachments;
  • to reduce existing international problems caused by the Soviets, and to increase the costs to the Soviets of those problems on which there is no progress;
  • to maintain control of the East-West agenda, the terms by which problems are dealt with, and the standards by which Soviet behavior is measured;
  • to strengthen our general Western coalition and keep our coalitions on specific issues intact;
  • to reduce Western contributions to Soviet power and dependence on East-West trade;
  • to engage the Soviets constructively on issues where our interests overlap; and
  • to show that our approach to East-West relations is bearing fruit, in the sense that both Soviet behavior and our competitive position are beginning to improve.

Because the Andropov regime will probably follow a more active and sophisticated foreign policy, oriented away from addressing problems with us and on our terms, and because it may find it easier to mollify others than to satisfy us, we need to preserve our influence over the manner in which outstanding issues are played out. This does not mean that we should alter our general stance: we should remain in a broadly reactive posture, in the sense that only genuine improvement in Soviet conduct will bring about more positive American policies toward the USSR. At the same time, in view of the Soviet policies we foresee, we may need to take initiatives to maintain our coalitions and to maintain demanding but attainable standards for Soviet conduct on outstanding problems.

Because we cannot force broad Soviet retreat, we should be selective and opportunistic ourselves if we want to cause concrete improvement in Soviet conduct in the next two years. To remain relevant regarding international problems the Soviets would like to deal with without reference to us (e.g., Poland, Afghanistan, Kampuchea), we have to be, and appear to be, realistic in setting near-term goals. Our long-term goals concerning such problems could become obsolete if we don’t define the near-term progress we want. We should be true to our promise to respond positively to real improvement in Soviet international conduct and reasonable in recognizing what is real and what is not or else we will lose our capacity to influence Moscow and to keep our partners with us. We will assist the Soviets in their effort to isolate
us if we are seen as staking out rigid and maximal positions that we know cannot be a basis for progress, however noble those positions might be.

Just as the Soviets may now try to outflank us, we have to be ready to execute our own political flanking movements to ensure that they cannot escape from our agenda of concerns and our standards for responsible conduct and real progress. This means we should consider how to use not only US-Soviet relations to induce improved Soviet behavior but also our relations with other key actors, such as our European Allies, Japan, China, ASEAN, Pakistan, and African Front-Line States. Only if we frustrate Soviet efforts to divide us from our support, at home and abroad, can we induce them to move from shadow to substance as they attempt to reduce the costs to them of the problems they have caused.

With regard to arms control, we should above all avoid being left in a position in which Soviet programs are not limited while ours cannot be sustained due to lack of public and Allied support. To the degree the Soviets can convince our own and European publics that we do not want progress, they may succeed in blocking our rearmament while avoiding reductions and retaining their advantages. Our aim must be to avoid being outmaneuvered in this way without compromising our principles of reductions, equality and verifiability.

The Relationship of Short-term and Long-term Goals

Even if we succeed over the next two years in preserving support for our policies, in preventing new Soviet encroachments, and in reducing one or more outstanding problems, the basic facts of US-Soviet relations will persist: the Soviets will still have the means and incentive to challenge our interests in the Third World; they will be able to maintain the internal discipline needed to bear a massive military burden; and they will continue to try to undermine support for Western rearmament.

If we want to alter these facts fundamentally within the next two years, the approach outlined above is inadequate. Some would therefore argue that instead of trying to reduce existing problems, we should allow them to get worse for the sake of weakening the Soviets. By this reasoning, we should, for example, not help the Soviets find a way to put their Afghanistan encumbrance behind them. We should not facilitate Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea, nor address Soviet objectives as part of the give-and-take of arms control. And we should do nothing to avert turmoil in Eastern Europe—much less in the USSR itself—that could relieve the Soviets’ burden.

Others believe that there are several basic flaws in this line of reasoning:
• It seriously underestimates the Soviets’ ability to cope with their problems and to resort to extraordinary harshness to maintain control and avoid defeat.

• It overestimates our ability to preserve essential support among those at home and abroad who want to see outstanding problems solved, even if the Soviets might stand to gain.

• It ignores our genuine interests in easing human suffering (whether in Kampuchea or Afghanistan) and advancing reconciliation, justice, and human rights (as in Poland).

• Most fundamentally, it overlooks the fact that we are in a dynamic situation, dealing with volatile problems which could lead to dangerous instabilities we may not be able to control. Southwest Asia and nuclear arms competition are but two graphic examples. Simply put, while we may be able to damage Soviet interests through uncontrolled competition, we cannot be confident of safeguarding our own. Thus, we want to contain and reduce conflict, even as we force the Soviets to pay a high price for their misdeeds.

In sum, having advanced a set of goals for improved Soviet behavior, this Administration should not and cannot now fail to seize whatever opportunities present themselves to achieve them, even if the Soviets can benefit from a lessening of the problems they have created. Moreover, if we can show in the course of the next two years that we are causing the Soviets to behave more responsibly, we will help to establish a durable political basis for this Administration’s approach for the rest of this decade and beyond.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the Executive Summary.]

259. Editorial Note

On January 10, 1983, President Ronald Reagan held a meeting of the National Security Planning Group from 2:27 to 3:12 p.m. in the Situation Room of the White House. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No formal minutes of the meeting were found. According to the personal note Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam dictated at the end of that day: “We had an NSPG meeting this afternoon at 2 o’clock in the Situation Room with the President. Actually it didn’t get started until about 2:30, because the President was behind schedule. Therefore, while we reviewed the question of whether there is anything new introduced into the U.S.–U.S.S.R. policy question by the arrival of Andropov on the scene, we did not discuss the INF issue, which
was really the important, or at least the urgent, question on the agenda. The question has been remanded to the working group that I chair, and it will meet tomorrow, but it’s a little difficult to know what the working group can agree on at this time.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records: Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files, Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983) In a diary entry that day, Reagan wrote: “Another meeting was with N.S.C. planning group re our strategy with the Soviet U. Geo. S. thinks our re-direction since we’ve been here is a success.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Volume I, page 187)

On January 13, Reagan held a meeting of the National Security Planning Group from 1:05 to 2:13 p.m. in the Situation Room of the White House. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No minutes were found. In a diary entry that day, Reagan wrote: “An N.S.C. meeting re our arms negotiations—we’ll stick with our zero option plan. Found I was wishing I could do the negotiating with the Soviets—They cant be any tougher than [Paramount Studios head] Y. Frank Freeman & [Columbia Pictures head] Harry Cohen.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, Volume I, page 188)


Washington, January 17, 1983

**U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR (S)**

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity, outstanding disagreements. Specifically, U.S. tasks are:

1. To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas—particularly in the overall military balance and in geo-
graphical regions of priority concern to the United States. This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.

2. To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. The U.S. recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system, and that relations with the USSR should therefore take into account whether or not they help to strengthen this system and its capacity to engage in aggression.

3. To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. This is important when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a process of political succession. (S)

In order to implement this threefold strategy, the U.S. must convey clearly to Moscow that unacceptable behavior will incur costs that would outweigh any gains. At the same time, the U.S. must make clear to the Soviets that genuine restraint in their behavior would create the possibility of an East-West relationship that might bring important benefits for the Soviet Union. It is particularly important that this message be conveyed clearly during the succession period, since this may be a particularly opportune time for external forces to affect the policies of Brezhnev’s successors. (S)

Shaping the Soviet Environment: Arenas of Engagement

Implementation of U.S. policy must focus on shaping the environment in which Soviet decisions are made both in a wide variety of functional and geopolitical arenas and in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship. (S)

A. Functional

1. Military Strategy: The U.S. must modernize its military forces—both nuclear and conventional—so that Soviet leaders perceive that the U.S. is determined never to accept a second place or a deteriorating military posture. Soviet calculations of possible war outcomes under any contingency must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for Soviet leaders to initiate an attack. The future strength of U.S. military capabilities must be assured. U.S. military technology advances must be exploited, while controls over transfer of military related/dual-use technology, products, and services must be tightened. (S)

In Europe, the Soviets must be faced with a reinvigorated NATO. In the Far East we must ensure that the Soviets cannot count on a secure flank in a global war. Worldwide, U.S. general purpose forces
must be strong and flexible enough to affect Soviet calculations in a wide variety of contingencies. In the Third World, Moscow must know that areas of interest to the U.S. cannot be attacked or threatened without risk of serious U.S. military countermeasures. (S)

2. Economic Policy: U.S. policy on economic relations with the USSR must serve strategic and foreign policy goals as well as economic interests. In this context, U.S. objectives are:

—Above all, to ensure that East-West economic relations do not facilitate the Soviet military buildup. This requires prevention of the transfer of technology and equipment that would make a substantial contribution directly or indirectly to Soviet military power.
—To avoid subsidizing the Soviet economy or unduly easing the burden of Soviet resource allocation decisions, so as not to dilute pressures for structural change in the Soviet system.
—To seek to minimize the potential for Soviet exercise of reverse leverage on Western countries based on trade, energy supply, and financial relationships.
—To permit mutual beneficial trade—without Western subsidization or the creation of Western dependence—with the USSR in non-strategic areas, such as grains. (S)

The U.S. must exercise strong leadership with its Allies and others to develop a common understanding of the strategic implications of East-West trade, building upon the agreement announced November 13, 1982 (see NSDD 66).2 This approach should involve efforts to reach agreements with the Allies on specific measures, such as: (a) no incremental deliveries of Soviet gas beyond the amounts contracted for from the first strand of the Siberian pipeline; (b) the addition of critical technologies and equipment to the COCOM list, the harmonization of national licensing procedures for COCOM, and the substantial improvement of the coordination and effectiveness of international enforcement efforts; (c) controls on advanced technology and equipment beyond the expanded COCOM list, including equipment in the oil and gas sector; (d) further restraints on officially-backed credits such as higher down payments, shortened maturities and an established framework to monitor this process; and (e) the strengthening of the role of the OECD and NATO in East-West trade analysis and policy. (S)

In the longer term, if Soviet behavior should worsen, e.g., an invasion of Poland, we would need to consider extreme measures. Should Soviet behavior improve, carefully calibrated positive economic signals, including a broadening of government-to-government economic contacts, could be considered as a means of demonstrating to the Soviets

2 See Document 246.
the benefits that real restraint in their conduct might bring. Such steps could not, however, alter the basic direction of U.S. policy. (S)

3. Political Action: U.S. policy must have an ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade unions, free enterprise, and political democracy over the repressive features of Soviet Communism. We need to review and significantly strengthen U.S. instruments of political action including: (a) The President’s London initiative to support democratic forces; (b) USG efforts to highlight Soviet human rights violations; and (c) U.S. radio broadcasting policy. The U.S. should:

—Expose at all available fora the double standards employed by the Soviet Union in dealing with difficulties within its own domain and the outside (“capitalist”) world (e.g., treatment of labor, policies toward ethnic minorities, use of chemical weapons, etc.).

—Prevent the Soviet propaganda machine from seizing the semantic high-ground in the battle of ideas through the appropriation of such terms as “peace.” (S)

B. Geopolitical

1. The Industrial Democracies: An effective response to the Soviet challenge requires close partnership among the industrial democracies, including stronger and more effective collective defense arrangements. The U.S. must provide strong leadership and conduct effective consultations to build consensus and cushion the impact of intra-alliance disagreements. While Allied support of U.S. overall strategy is essential, the U.S. may on occasion be forced to act to protect vital interests without Allied support and even in the face of Allied opposition; even in this event, however, U.S. should consult to the maximum extent possible with its Allies. (S)

2. The Third World: The U.S. must rebuild the credibility of its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and those of its Allies and friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet policy. The U.S. effort in the Third World must involve an important role for security assistance and foreign military sales, as well as readiness to use U.S. military forces where necessary to protect vital interests and support endangered Allies and friends. U.S. policy must also involve diplomatic initiatives to promote resolution of regional crises vulnerable to Soviet exploitation, and an appropriate mixture of economic

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3 See Document 177.
assistance programs and private sector initiatives for Third World countries. (S)

3. The Soviet Empire: There are a number of important weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the Soviet empire which the U.S. should exploit. U.S. policies should seek wherever possible to encourage Soviet allies to distance themselves from Moscow in foreign policy and to move toward democratization domestically. (S)

   (a) Eastern Europe: The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen Moscow’s hold on the region while promoting the cause of human rights in individual East European countries. The U.S. can advance this objective by carefully discriminating in favor of countries that show relative independence from the USSR in their foreign policy, or show a greater degree of internal liberalization. U.S. policies must also make clear that East European countries which reverse movements of liberalization, or drift away from an independent stance in foreign policy, will incur significant costs in their relations with the U.S. (S)

   (b) Afghanistan: The U.S. objective is to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets’ political, military, and other costs remain high while the occupation continues. (S)

   (c) Cuba: The U.S. must take strong countermeasures to affect the political/military impact of Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba. The U.S. must also provide economic and military assistance to states in Central America and the Caribbean Basin threatened by Cuban destabilizing activities. Finally, the U.S. will seek to reduce the Cuban presence and influence in southern Africa by energetic leadership of the diplomatic effort to achieve a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, or failing that, by increasing the costs of Cuba’s role in southern Africa. (S)

   (d) Soviet Third World Alliances: U.S. policy will seek to limit the destabilizing activities of Soviet Third World allies and clients. It is a further objective to weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links between them and the Soviet Union. U.S. policy will include active efforts to encourage democratic movements and forces to bring about political change inside these countries. (S)

4. China: China continues to support U.S. efforts to strengthen the world’s defenses against Soviet expansionism. The U.S. should over time seek to achieve enhanced strategic cooperation and policy coordination with China, and to reduce the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. The U.S. will continue to pursue a policy of substantially liberalized technology transfer and sale of military equipment to China on a case-by-case basis within the parameters of the policy approved by the President in 1981, and defined further in 1982. (S)

5. Yugoslavia: It is U.S. policy to support the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia’s current
difficulties in paying its foreign debts have increased its vulnerability to Soviet pressures. The Yugoslav government, well aware of this vulnerability, would like to reduce its trade dependence on the Soviet Union. It is in our interest to prevent any deterioration in Yugoslavia’s economic situation that might weaken its resolve to withstand Soviet pressure. (S)

C. Bilateral Relationships

1. Arms Control: The U.S. will enter into arms control negotiations when they serve U.S. national security objectives. At the same time, U.S. policy recognizes that arms control agreements are not an end in themselves but are, in combination with U.S. and Allied efforts to maintain the military balance, an important means for enhancing national security and global stability. The U.S. should make clear to the Allies as well as to the USSR that U.S. ability to reach satisfactory results in arms control negotiations will inevitably be influenced by the international situation, the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations, and the difficulties in defining areas of mutual agreement with an adversary which often seeks unilateral gains. U.S. arms control proposals will be consistent with necessary force modernization plans and will seek to achieve balanced, significant, and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. (S)

2. Official Dialogue: The U.S. should insist that Moscow address the full range of U.S. concerns about Soviet internal behavior and human rights violations, and should continue to resist Soviet efforts to return to a U.S.-Soviet agenda focused primarily on arms control. U.S.-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues can serve U.S. interests if they are used to keep pressure on Moscow for responsible behavior. Such contacts can also be useful in driving home to Moscow that the costs of irresponsibility are high, and that the U.S. is prepared to work for pragmatic solutions of regional problems if Moscow is willing seriously to address U.S. concerns. At the same time, such contacts must be handled with care to avoid offering the Soviet Union a role in regional questions it would not otherwise secure. (S)

A continuing dialogue with the Soviets at Foreign Minister level facilitates necessary diplomatic communication with the Soviet leadership and helps to maintain Allied understanding and support for U.S. approach to East-West relations. A summit between President Reagan and his Soviet counterpart might promise similarly beneficial results. At the same time, unless it were carefully handled a summit could be seen as registering an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations without the changes in Soviet behavior which we have insisted upon. It could therefore generate unrealizable expectations and further stimulate unilateral Allied initiatives toward Moscow. (S)
A summit would not necessarily involve signature of major new U.S.-Soviet agreements. Any summit meeting should achieve the maximum possible positive impact with U.S. Allies and the American public, while making clear to both audiences that improvement in Soviet-American relations depends on changes in Soviet conduct. A summit without such changes must not be understood to signal such improvement. (S)

3. U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Exchanges: The role of U.S.-Soviet cultural, educational, scientific and other cooperative exchanges should be seen in light of the U.S. intention to maintain a strong ideological component in relations with Moscow. The U.S. should not further dismantle the framework of exchanges; indeed those exchanges which could advance the U.S. objective of promoting positive evolutionary change within the Soviet system should be expanded. At the same time, the U.S. will insist on full reciprocity and encourage its Allies to do so as well. This recognizes that unless the U.S. has an effective official framework for handling exchanges, the Soviets will make separate arrangements with private U.S. sponsors, while denying reciprocal access to the Soviet Union. U.S. policy on exchanges must also take into account the necessity to prevent transfer of sensitive U.S. technology to the Soviet Union. (S)

Priorities in the U.S. Approach: Maximizing Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behavior

The interrelated tasks of containing and reversing Soviet expansion and promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet Union itself cannot be accomplished quickly. The coming 5–10 years will be a period of considerable uncertainty in which the Soviets may test U.S. resolve by continuing the kind of aggressive international behavior which the U.S. finds unacceptable. (S)

The uncertainties will be exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process of political succession to Brezhnev. The U.S. will not seek to adjust its policies to the Soviet internal conflict, but rather try to create incentives (positive and negative) for the new leadership to adopt policies less detrimental to U.S. interests. The U.S. will remain ready for improved U.S.-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes significant changes in policies of concern to it; the burden for any further deterioration in relations must fall squarely on Moscow. The U.S. must not yield to pressures to “take the first step.” (S)

The existing and projected gap between finite U.S. resources and the level of capabilities needed to implement U.S. strategy makes it essential that the U.S.: (1) establish firm priorities for the use of limited U.S. resources where they will have the greatest restraining impact on
the Soviet Union; and (2) mobilize the resources of Allies and friends which are willing to join the U.S. in containing the expansion of Soviet power. (S)

Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be a strong military capable of action across the entire spectrum of potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to deter attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its Allies, or other important countries, and to defeat such an attack should deterrence fail. Although unilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in rebuilding Western military strength to counter the Soviet threat, the protection of Western interests will require increased U.S. cooperation with Allied and other states and greater utilization of their resources. This military strategy will be combined with a political strategy attaching high priority to the following objectives:

—Sustaining steady, long-term growth in U.S. defense spending and capabilities—both nuclear and conventional. This is the most important way of conveying to the Soviets U.S. resolve and political staying-power.

—Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with the Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise strong leadership in developing policies to deal with the multifaceted Soviet threat to Western interests. It will require that the U.S. take Allied concerns into account, and also that U.S. Allies take into equal account U.S. concerns. In this connection, and in addition to pushing Allies to spend more on defense, the U.S. must make a serious effort to negotiate arms control agreements consistent with U.S. military strategy and necessary force modernization plans, and should seek to achieve balanced, significant and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. The U.S. must also develop, together with the Allies, a unified Western approach to East-West economic relations, implementing the agreement announced on November 13, 1982.

—Maintenance of a strategic relationship with China, and efforts to minimize opportunities for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

—Building and sustaining a major ideological/political offensive which, together with other efforts, will be designed to bring about evolutionary change of the Soviet system. This must be a long-term and sophisticated program, given the nature of the Soviet system.

—Effective opposition to Moscow’s efforts to consolidate its position in Afghanistan. This will require that the U.S. continue efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context of a negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, the U.S. must keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and ensure that Soviet costs on the ground are high.
—Blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the critical Middle East and Southwest Asia regions. This will require both continued efforts to seek a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to bolster U.S. relations with moderate states in the region, and a sustained U.S. defense commitment to deter Soviet military encroachments.

—Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to permit a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a longer-term increase in diversity and independence throughout Eastern Europe. This will require that the U.S. continue to impose costs on the Soviet Union for its behavior in Poland. It will also require that the U.S. maintain a U.S. policy of differentiation among East European countries.

—Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship. This will require that the U.S. use a variety of instruments, including diplomatic efforts and U.S. security and economic assistance. The U.S. must also retain the option of using of its military forces to protect vital U.S. security interests against threats which may arise from the Soviet-Cuban connection. (S)

Articulating the U.S. Approach: Sustaining Public and Congressional Support

The policy outlined above is one for the long haul. It is unlikely to yield a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic near-term victories in the U.S. effort to moderate Soviet behavior, pressure is likely to mount for change in U.S. policy. There will be appeals from important segments of domestic opinion for a more “normal” U.S.-Soviet relationship, particularly in a period of political transition in Moscow. (S)

It is therefore essential that the American people understand and support U.S. policy. This will require that official U.S. statements and actions avoid generating unrealizable expectations for near-term progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same time, the U.S. must demonstrate credibly that its policy is not a blueprint for an open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious search for a stable and constructive long-term basis for U.S.-Soviet relations. (S)

Ronald Reagan
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